Iran's Government and Its People: Elections, Opinion and Repression, 1980–2026

Iran's Government and Its People: Elections, Opinion and Repression, 1980–2026

1. The Crimson Winter: A 50 Day Record of Iran’s 2025–2026 Nationwide Protests

   HRANA (Human Rights Activists News Agency), 2026-02-23 · supports

   “This report adopts a disciplined human rights methodology centered on documenting minimum verifiable cases rather than publishing maximal estimates. ... • Protesters killed: 6,488 • Children killed, counted separately and not included among protesters: 236 • Civilians killed, non-protester: 76 • Military and government forces killed: 207 • Total fatalities: 7,007 An additional 11,744 cases remain under review and are not included in confirmed totals. ... • Total arrests: 53,777 • Children, teenagers, and school students arrested: 555 • University students arrested: 147”Hide quote

   This report adopts a disciplined human rights methodology centered on documenting minimum verifiable cases rather than publishing maximal estimates. ... • Protesters killed: 6,488 • Children killed, counted separately and not included among protesters: 236 • Civilians killed, non-protester: 76 • Military and government forces killed: 207 • Total fatalities: 7,007 An additional 11,744 cases remain under review and are not included in confirmed totals. ... • Total arrests: 53,777 • Children, teenagers, and school students arrested: 555 • University students arrested: 147

2. At least 3,117 people killed during Iran protests, state media report

   Al Jazeera, 2026-01-21 · supports

   “Iranian state television has released the first official death toll from the recent antigovernment protests that engulfed the country, reporting that 3,117 people were killed during the crackdown. ... The US-based Human Rights Activists News Agency (HRANA) has said 4,519 were killed during the wave of demonstrations, including 4,251 protesters, 197 security personnel, 35 people aged under 18 and 38 bystanders who it says were neither protesters nor security personnel. ... HRANA also said 9,049 additional deaths were under review.”Hide quote

   Iranian state television has released the first official death toll from the recent antigovernment protests that engulfed the country, reporting that 3,117 people were killed during the crackdown. ... The US-based Human Rights Activists News Agency (HRANA) has said 4,519 were killed during the wave of demonstrations, including 4,251 protesters, 197 security personnel, 35 people aged under 18 and 38 bystanders who it says were neither protesters nor security personnel. ... HRANA also said 9,049 additional deaths were under review.

3. Rights group says confirmed Iran protest toll over 6,000

   Al-Monitor (AFP), 2026-01-27 · supports

   “The US-based Human Rights Activists News Agency (HRANA) said it had confirmed that 6,126 people had been killed, including 5,777 protesters, 86 minors, 214 members of the security forces and 49 bystanders. But the group, which has an extensive network of sources inside Iran and has tracked the protests on a daily basis since they began, added it was still investigating another 17,091 possible fatalities. ... At least 41,880 people have been arrested, it said.”Hide quote

   The US-based Human Rights Activists News Agency (HRANA) said it had confirmed that 6,126 people had been killed, including 5,777 protesters, 86 minors, 214 members of the security forces and 49 bystanders. But the group, which has an extensive network of sources inside Iran and has tracked the protests on a daily basis since they began, added it was still investigating another 17,091 possible fatalities. ... At least 41,880 people have been arrested, it said.

4. Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Islamic Republic of Iran (A/HRC/61/60)

   UN Human Rights Council, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Iran, 2026-03-19 · supports

   “On 21 January, the Foundation of Martyrs and Veterans Affairs announced that 3,117 individuals had been killed, including members of the security forces, and 690 'rioters'. At the time of writing the present report, one credible human rights organization had estimated that over 7,000 people, including up to 6,500 protesters, over 230 children and at least 200 members of the security forces had been killed. ... [conditions] have made it difficult for the Mission to arrive at precise estimates at the time of writing of the number of people killed and injured. ... A credible human rights organization estimated that by mid-February, over 50,000 people had been arrested ... credible human rights organizations recording at least 464 executions between July and September. A further 222 people were executed in October alone – the highest monthly total recorded in at least 25 years. ... amount to the crimes against humanity of murder, imprisonment, torture”Hide quote

   On 21 January, the Foundation of Martyrs and Veterans Affairs announced that 3,117 individuals had been killed, including members of the security forces, and 690 'rioters'. At the time of writing the present report, one credible human rights organization had estimated that over 7,000 people, including up to 6,500 protesters, over 230 children and at least 200 members of the security forces had been killed. ... [conditions] have made it difficult for the Mission to arrive at precise estimates at the time of writing of the number of people killed and injured. ... A credible human rights organization estimated that by mid-February, over 50,000 people had been arrested ... credible human rights organizations recording at least 464 executions between July and September. A further 222 people were executed in October alone – the highest monthly total recorded in at least 25 years. ... amount to the crimes against humanity of murder, imprisonment, torture

5. A Name-Based Reckoning: Documented Fatalities and State Responsibility in Iran's 1404 Uprising

   NIAC Insights (National Iranian American Council), 2026-02-26 · supports

   “While HRANA notes that its broader documentation framework records 7,007 fatalities during this period, the report's most concrete and publicly verifiable contribution lies in the publication of 4,555 named individuals who were killed during the uprising. ... Initially, 2,986 names were released, with the remaining cases listed as unspecified. In a subsequent update, the number of published names rose to 3,038.”Hide quote

   While HRANA notes that its broader documentation framework records 7,007 fatalities during this period, the report's most concrete and publicly verifiable contribution lies in the publication of 4,555 named individuals who were killed during the uprising. ... Initially, 2,986 names were released, with the remaining cases listed as unspecified. In a subsequent update, the number of published names rose to 3,038.

6. Iran: Details released of 304 deaths during protests six months after security forces’ killing spree

   Amnesty International, 2020-05-20 · supports

   “Amnesty International has released details of the deaths of 304 men, women and children killed by Iran's security forces during last November's ruthless crackdown ... more than 220 of the recorded deaths took place over just two days on 16 and 17 November.”Hide quote

   Amnesty International has released details of the deaths of 304 men, women and children killed by Iran's security forces during last November's ruthless crackdown ... more than 220 of the recorded deaths took place over just two days on 16 and 17 November.

7. Freedom in the World 2026: Iran

   Freedom House, 2026 · supports

   “Freedom in the World 2026 Iran Not Free 10 100 PR Political Rights 4 40 CL Civil Liberties 6 60 Last Year's Score & Status 11 100 Not Free ... Authorities responded harshly to the Woman, Life, Freedom movement, which began in 2022 ... In early 2024, a United Nations fact-finding mission reported that at least 551 protesters had been killed. ... In 2023, the parliament approved a bill that would impose heavier penalties, including steeper fines and longer prison terms, on women who do not wear the hijab. Implementation was scheduled to begin in December 2024, but it was paused by the Pezeshkian administration and remained pending during 2025. Widespread defiance of the hijab mandate continued, and in December 2025 authorities arrested the organizers of a marathon on Kish Island in which many women competed without a headscarf.”Hide quote

   Freedom in the World 2026 Iran Not Free 10 100 PR Political Rights 4 40 CL Civil Liberties 6 60 Last Year's Score & Status 11 100 Not Free ... Authorities responded harshly to the Woman, Life, Freedom movement, which began in 2022 ... In early 2024, a United Nations fact-finding mission reported that at least 551 protesters had been killed. ... In 2023, the parliament approved a bill that would impose heavier penalties, including steeper fines and longer prison terms, on women who do not wear the hijab. Implementation was scheduled to begin in December 2024, but it was paused by the Pezeshkian administration and remained pending during 2025. Widespread defiance of the hijab mandate continued, and in December 2025 authorities arrested the organizers of a marathon on Kish Island in which many women competed without a headscarf.

8. Freedom in the World 2026: Saudi Arabia

   Freedom House, 2026 · complicates

   “Freedom in the World 2026 Saudi Arabia Not Free 9 100 PR Political Rights 1 40 CL Civil Liberties 8 60 Last Year's Score & Status 9 100 Not Free”Hide quote

   Freedom in the World 2026 Saudi Arabia Not Free 9 100 PR Political Rights 1 40 CL Civil Liberties 8 60 Last Year's Score & Status 9 100 Not Free

9. Countries and Territories (Freedom in the World scores)

   Freedom House, 2026 · complicates

   “Freedom House rates people’s access to political rights and civil liberties in 208 countries and territories through its annual Freedom in the World report. ... Country or Territory | Freedom in the World Score | Political Rights | Civil Liberties ... Iran | 10/100 Not Free | 4 | 6 ... Saudi Arabia | 9/100 Not Free”Hide quote

   Freedom House rates people’s access to political rights and civil liberties in 208 countries and territories through its annual Freedom in the World report. ... Country or Territory | Freedom in the World Score | Political Rights | Civil Liberties ... Iran | 10/100 Not Free | 4 | 6 ... Saudi Arabia | 9/100 Not Free

10. Iran: Authorities unleash wave of oppression after hostilities with Israel

    Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, 2025-09-03 · complicates

    “Since 13 June, Iranian authorities have arrested over 20,000 people, including dissidents, human rights defenders, journalists, social media users, families of victims unlawfully killed in nationwide protests and foreign nationals. ... In an 12 August statement, Saeed Montazer Al-Mahdi, spokesperson for the police, announced that about 21,000 people had been arrested. ... At least nine men have been executed on politically motivated charges and/or accusations of espionage for Israel”Hide quote

    Since 13 June, Iranian authorities have arrested over 20,000 people, including dissidents, human rights defenders, journalists, social media users, families of victims unlawfully killed in nationwide protests and foreign nationals. ... In an 12 August statement, Saeed Montazer Al-Mahdi, spokesperson for the police, announced that about 21,000 people had been arrested. ... At least nine men have been executed on politically motivated charges and/or accusations of espionage for Israel

11. Iranians’ Attitudes Toward the 2026 Protests and War

    GAMAAN (Group for Analyzing and Measuring Attitudes in Iran), 2026-07-27 · supports

    “The findings in this report are based on a weighted sample of 31,450 respondents inside Iran. ... 42% considered the U.S. and Israeli military action to be 'military aggression against Iran,' while nearly the same share disagreed ... About 40% viewed the U.S. and Israeli military operation as a form of 'humanitarian intervention' (R2P), while about 48% disagreed ... about 38% of society reported that they had supported military intervention both before and after the 39-day war. By contrast, about 27% said they had opposed military intervention both before and after the war. ... about 60% felt satisfaction at the weakening of the Islamic Republic during the war ... about 59% opposed Iran building nuclear weapons ... about 47% did not consider closing the Strait of Hormuz to be the right action ... about 68% of society believes that the agreement did not serve the interests of the Iranian people ... Only about 14% had a positive assessment of the regime's response”Hide quote

    The findings in this report are based on a weighted sample of 31,450 respondents inside Iran. ... 42% considered the U.S. and Israeli military action to be 'military aggression against Iran,' while nearly the same share disagreed ... About 40% viewed the U.S. and Israeli military operation as a form of 'humanitarian intervention' (R2P), while about 48% disagreed ... about 38% of society reported that they had supported military intervention both before and after the 39-day war. By contrast, about 27% said they had opposed military intervention both before and after the war. ... about 60% felt satisfaction at the weakening of the Islamic Republic during the war ... about 59% opposed Iran building nuclear weapons ... about 47% did not consider closing the Strait of Hormuz to be the right action ... about 68% of society believes that the agreement did not serve the interests of the Iranian people ... Only about 14% had a positive assessment of the regime's response

12. Iranians’ Attitudes Toward the 2026 Protests and 39-Day War: Survey Report (Figure 17 and methodology)

    GAMAAN (Group for Analyzing and Measuring Attitudes in Iran), 2026-07 · supports

    “Which form of political system do you prefer? ... Republic non-federal 16.6% federal 10.9% ... Monarchy non-federal 25.4% federal 8.5% ... Islamic Republic (I.R.) %13.4 ... The form of the alternative to the I.R. doesn't matter to me %6.1 ... I lack the knowledge to choose an alternative to the I.R. %19.1 ... about 13% chose the “Islamic Republic,” indicating a decline of about 7 percentage points compared with last year. ... After weighting, the effective sample size is approximately 6,211. ... the survey reports an approximate 95% credibility level with a conservative credibility interval of ±3 percentage points. ... about 97% received the survey link through Psiphon”Hide quote

    Which form of political system do you prefer? ... Republic non-federal 16.6% federal 10.9% ... Monarchy non-federal 25.4% federal 8.5% ... Islamic Republic (I.R.) %13.4 ... The form of the alternative to the I.R. doesn't matter to me %6.1 ... I lack the knowledge to choose an alternative to the I.R. %19.1 ... about 13% chose the “Islamic Republic,” indicating a decline of about 7 percentage points compared with last year. ... After weighting, the effective sample size is approximately 6,211. ... the survey reports an approximate 95% credibility level with a conservative credibility interval of ±3 percentage points. ... about 97% received the survey link through Psiphon

13. Has Khamenei backtracked from strict hijab enforcement?

    Iran International, 2024-12-19 · supports

    “Iran's Supreme National Security (SNSC) may have shelved the controversial new hijab law, some lawmakers and the media outlets in Tehran say, most likely with the consent of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. ... several lawmakers, including Deputy Speaker Ali Nikzad, have confirmed that the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) has decided to put the hijab law on hold for now ... The President heads the Security Council, but all its decisions require the Supreme Leader’s signature to come into effect.”Hide quote

    Iran's Supreme National Security (SNSC) may have shelved the controversial new hijab law, some lawmakers and the media outlets in Tehran say, most likely with the consent of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. ... several lawmakers, including Deputy Speaker Ali Nikzad, have confirmed that the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) has decided to put the hijab law on hold for now ... The President heads the Security Council, but all its decisions require the Supreme Leader’s signature to come into effect.

14. Iran’s security council halts implementation of new hijab bill: Parliament speaker

    Rudaw, 2025-05-25 · supports

    “Ghalibaf told lawmakers during a tense parliamentary session that the SNSC 'has notified the parliament in writing that this [Chastity and Hijab] law should not be enacted for the time being,' adding, 'In this case, I cannot enact the law.' The law ... was finalized and published on November 30, 2024. ... An unjust law will not be enforced, and if it is, it will create discontent.”Hide quote

    Ghalibaf told lawmakers during a tense parliamentary session that the SNSC 'has notified the parliament in writing that this [Chastity and Hijab] law should not be enacted for the time being,' adding, 'In this case, I cannot enact the law.' The law ... was finalized and published on November 30, 2024. ... An unjust law will not be enforced, and if it is, it will create discontent.

15. Iran announces Khamenei’s son Mojtaba as country's new supreme leader

    Iran International, 2026-03-08 · supports

    “Iran's Assembly of Experts announced in a statement on Sunday that Mojtaba Khamenei has been chosen as the country's new supreme leader, days after Iran International first reported on Tuesday that the Assembly of Experts had selected him under pressure from the Revolutionary Guards. ... “In today’s extraordinary session, the Assembly of Experts, by the decisive vote of its members, selected and introduced Ayatollah Seyed Mojtaba Hosseini Khamenei as the third leader of the sacred system of the Islamic Republic of Iran,” the body said in a statement.”Hide quote

    Iran's Assembly of Experts announced in a statement on Sunday that Mojtaba Khamenei has been chosen as the country's new supreme leader, days after Iran International first reported on Tuesday that the Assembly of Experts had selected him under pressure from the Revolutionary Guards. ... “In today’s extraordinary session, the Assembly of Experts, by the decisive vote of its members, selected and introduced Ayatollah Seyed Mojtaba Hosseini Khamenei as the third leader of the sacred system of the Islamic Republic of Iran,” the body said in a statement.

16. Country Profile: Iran, Islamic Republic of

    IFES ElectionGuide, 2026 · supports

    “Chief of State: Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Mojtaba KHAMENEI (since 8 March 2026) ... 2013-06-14 ... Turnout 72.71”Hide quote

    Chief of State: Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Mojtaba KHAMENEI (since 8 March 2026) ... 2013-06-14 ... Turnout 72.71

17. Three more pro-reform papers shut down

    Committee to Protect Journalists, 2000-04-27 · complicates

    “New York, April 27, 2000 — Hard-line political forces continued their crackdown on Iran's reformist press by closing three more newspapers, bringing to 16 the total number of publications shut down in the last week. ... which is directed by President Muhammad Khatami's brother”Hide quote

    New York, April 27, 2000 — Hard-line political forces continued their crackdown on Iran's reformist press by closing three more newspapers, bringing to 16 the total number of publications shut down in the last week. ... which is directed by President Muhammad Khatami's brother

18. Iran's Parliamentary Elections: Inside the Candidate Approval Process

    The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2016-01-22 · supports

    “In January 2004, it rejected 3,600 out of 8,157 candidates for Majlis, including 83 sitting members. Ultimately, around a thousand of these were reinstated after one-third of the Majlis resigned in protest.”Hide quote

    In January 2004, it rejected 3,600 out of 8,157 candidates for Majlis, including 83 sitting members. Ultimately, around a thousand of these were reinstated after one-third of the Majlis resigned in protest.

19. Many Incumbent And Ex-Lawmakers Barred From Running In Iran Election

    Iran International, 2024-01-07 · supports

    “A report on the Etemad Online website said that out of the 290 lawmakers, 275 had registered their candidacy for the upcoming elections but the qualifications of only 26 have been rejected.”Hide quote

    A report on the Etemad Online website said that out of the 290 lawmakers, 275 had registered their candidacy for the upcoming elections but the qualifications of only 26 have been rejected.

20. Iran’s election: By the numbers

    Al Jazeera, 2021-06-18 · supports

    “• Seven presidential candidates approved by Iran’s Guardian Council to run out of 592 who registered, with three later dropping out • Zero women out of the 40 who registered approved to run for the presidency ... • 73 percent turnout in Iran’s last presidential election in 2017”Hide quote

    • Seven presidential candidates approved by Iran’s Guardian Council to run out of 592 who registered, with three later dropping out • Zero women out of the 40 who registered approved to run for the presidency ... • 73 percent turnout in Iran’s last presidential election in 2017

21. Iran heads to presidential run-off on July 5 amid record low turnout

    Al Jazeera, 2024-06-29 · supports

    “Only 40 percent of more than 61 million eligible Iranians voted, the Ministry of Interior said on Saturday, a new low in presidential elections since the country’s 1979 revolution. ... The lowest presidential turnout in the more than four-decade history of the Islamic republic was the one that got Raisi into office, with 48.8 percent.”Hide quote

    Only 40 percent of more than 61 million eligible Iranians voted, the Ministry of Interior said on Saturday, a new low in presidential elections since the country’s 1979 revolution. ... The lowest presidential turnout in the more than four-decade history of the Islamic republic was the one that got Raisi into office, with 48.8 percent.

22. Centrist Masoud Pezeshkian will be Iran’s next president

    Al Jazeera, 2024-07-06 · supports

    “Pezeshkian acknowledges ‘difficult path ahead’ after winning run-off election with 53.7 percent of the vote ... Participation in the run-off was 49.8 percent in the tight race between Pezeshkian, the sole moderate in an original field of four candidates who has pledged to open Iran to the world, and the former nuclear negotiator Jalili”Hide quote

    Pezeshkian acknowledges ‘difficult path ahead’ after winning run-off election with 53.7 percent of the vote ... Participation in the run-off was 49.8 percent in the tight race between Pezeshkian, the sole moderate in an original field of four candidates who has pledged to open Iran to the world, and the former nuclear negotiator Jalili

23. Disqualified Presidential Candidates in Iran Lodge Protests

    Iran International, 2024-06-10 · supports

    “The Guardian Council, which vets candidates, approved only six out of more than 80 who registered to run. Key figures, including former parliament speaker Ali Larijani and former president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, were disqualified.”Hide quote

    The Guardian Council, which vets candidates, approved only six out of more than 80 who registered to run. Key figures, including former parliament speaker Ali Larijani and former president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, were disqualified.

24. Low turnout as conservatives dominate Iran parliamentary election

    Al Jazeera, 2024-03-04 · supports

    “The country saw a voter turnout of 41 percent in Friday’s elections for the national legislature and Assembly of Experts, the lowest participation since Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution ... “Around 25 million people participated with a turnout of 41 percent,” Interior Minister Ahmad Vahidi said ... The lowest previous turnout was in the parliamentary elections in 2020, which saw a 42 percent turnout during the COVID-19 pandemic. About 62 percent of voters participated in 2016.”Hide quote

    The country saw a voter turnout of 41 percent in Friday’s elections for the national legislature and Assembly of Experts, the lowest participation since Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution ... “Around 25 million people participated with a turnout of 41 percent,” Interior Minister Ahmad Vahidi said ... The lowest previous turnout was in the parliamentary elections in 2020, which saw a 42 percent turnout during the COVID-19 pandemic. About 62 percent of voters participated in 2016.

25. Death Sentences and Executions 2025 (ACT 50/0778/2026)

    Amnesty International, 2026-05 · supports

    “Amnesty International recorded 2,707 executions in 2025, an increase by 78% from the 1,518 known executions in 2024. It is the highest figure recorded by Amnesty International since 1981 ... a spike in executions in Iran, where the country total reached at least 2,159, more than doubling the 2024 figure of at least 972; and accounting for 80% of all recorded executions. ... The known totals do not include the thousands of people believed to have been executed in China ... EXECUTIONS RECORDED GLOBALLY IN 2025 Afghanistan (6), China (+), Egypt (23), Iran ( 2,159+), Iraq (+), Japan (1), Kuwait (17), North Korea (+), Saudi Arabia (356+), Singapore (17), Somalia (17+), South Sudan (1), Taiwan (1), United Arab Emirates (UAE, 3), USA (47), Viet Nam (+), Yemen (51+). ... The executions known to have been carried out in Iran and Saudi Arabia accounted for 93% of the total.”Hide quote

    Amnesty International recorded 2,707 executions in 2025, an increase by 78% from the 1,518 known executions in 2024. It is the highest figure recorded by Amnesty International since 1981 ... a spike in executions in Iran, where the country total reached at least 2,159, more than doubling the 2024 figure of at least 972; and accounting for 80% of all recorded executions. ... The known totals do not include the thousands of people believed to have been executed in China ... EXECUTIONS RECORDED GLOBALLY IN 2025 Afghanistan (6), China (+), Egypt (23), Iran ( 2,159+), Iraq (+), Japan (1), Kuwait (17), North Korea (+), Saudi Arabia (356+), Singapore (17), Somalia (17+), South Sudan (1), Taiwan (1), United Arab Emirates (UAE, 3), USA (47), Viet Nam (+), Yemen (51+). ... The executions known to have been carried out in Iran and Saudi Arabia accounted for 93% of the total.

26. Global: Recorded executions hit their highest figure since 2015

    Amnesty International, 2025-04-08 · supports

    “Iran executed 119 more individuals than last year (from at least 853 to at least 972) – accounting for 64% of all known executions.”Hide quote

    Iran executed 119 more individuals than last year (from at least 853 to at least 972) – accounting for 64% of all known executions.

27. World Development Indicators: Population, total (SP.POP.TOTL), API

    World Bank, 2026-10-08 · supports

    “"indicator":{"id":"SP.POP.TOTL","value":"Population, total"} ... "lastupdated":"2026-10-08" ... Iran, Islamic Rep. 2025 92417681 ... Saudi Arabia 2025 36973555 ... Kuwait 2025 4865298 ... Singapore 2025 6111175 ... Yemen, Rep. 2025 41773878 ... Somalia, Fed. Rep. 2025 19654739 ... United Arab Emirates 2025 11513149 ... Egypt, Arab Rep. 2025 118365995 ... United States 2025 341784857 ... Afghanistan 2025 43844111 ... South Sudan 2025 12188788 ... Japan 2025 123366734”Hide quote

    "indicator":{"id":"SP.POP.TOTL","value":"Population, total"} ... "lastupdated":"2026-10-08" ... Iran, Islamic Rep. 2025 92417681 ... Saudi Arabia 2025 36973555 ... Kuwait 2025 4865298 ... Singapore 2025 6111175 ... Yemen, Rep. 2025 41773878 ... Somalia, Fed. Rep. 2025 19654739 ... United Arab Emirates 2025 11513149 ... Egypt, Arab Rep. 2025 118365995 ... United States 2025 341784857 ... Afghanistan 2025 43844111 ... South Sudan 2025 12188788 ... Japan 2025 123366734

28. IAEA Director General report on Iran, GOV/2026/50

    International Atomic Energy Agency, 2026-09-01 · supports

    “On 28 February 2026, the United States of America and Israel launched further military attacks on Iran, including on the sites of some nuclear facilities. Consequently, the Agency stopped conducting verification activities in Iran.”Hide quote

    On 28 February 2026, the United States of America and Israel launched further military attacks on Iran, including on the sites of some nuclear facilities. Consequently, the Agency stopped conducting verification activities in Iran.

29. Iran Update Special Report, July 13, 2026

    Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project, 2026-07-13 · supports

    “Iran has continuously made efforts to reconstitute its ballistic missile and drone programs since the ceasefire on April 8. ... The United States will resume its blockade of Iranian ports beginning on July 14 at 4:00 PM ET.”Hide quote

    Iran has continuously made efforts to reconstitute its ballistic missile and drone programs since the ceasefire on April 8. ... The United States will resume its blockade of Iranian ports beginning on July 14 at 4:00 PM ET.

30. Report consistent with the War Powers Resolution (House Document 119-167)

    US House of Representatives (letter from the President), 2026-06-29 · supports

    “These efforts led to my signing a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran on June 17, 2026.”Hide quote

    These efforts led to my signing a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran on June 17, 2026.

31. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) at a Glance

    Arms Control Association, 2025-02 · supports

    “January 16, 2016, Implementation Day”Hide quote

    January 16, 2016, Implementation Day

32. Timeline of Nuclear Diplomacy With Iran

    Arms Control Association, 2023-01 · supports

    “May 8, 2018: President Trump announces that he is withdrawing the United States from the JCPOA”Hide quote

    May 8, 2018: President Trump announces that he is withdrawing the United States from the JCPOA

33. Iran Presidential Elections, All Provinces (workbook)

    Iran Data Portal, Syracuse University, 2017-05 · supports

    “Province | no. eligible voters | no. votes | Turnout (percent) ... Iran (total) ... [Turnout (percent), by election:] 1st (1980) 67.42; 2nd (1981) 64.24; 3rd (1981) 74.26; 4th (1985) 54.78; 5th (1989) 54.59; 6th (1993) 50.66; 7th (1997) 79.92; 8th (2001) 66.77; 9th, first round (2005) 62.84; 9th, second round (2005) 59.76; 10th (2009) 85.22; 11th (2013) 76.25”Hide quote

    Province | no. eligible voters | no. votes | Turnout (percent) ... Iran (total) ... [Turnout (percent), by election:] 1st (1980) 67.42; 2nd (1981) 64.24; 3rd (1981) 74.26; 4th (1985) 54.78; 5th (1989) 54.59; 6th (1993) 50.66; 7th (1997) 79.92; 8th (2001) 66.77; 9th, first round (2005) 62.84; 9th, second round (2005) 59.76; 10th (2009) 85.22; 11th (2013) 76.25

34. Presidential Elections in Iran: Number of Candidates Registered and Allowed to Run (infographic)

    Iran Data Portal, Syracuse University, 2017-04 · supports

    “Presidential Elections in Iran Number of Candidates Registered and Allowed to Run ... 1st 1980 124 ... 2nd 1981 71 ... 3rd 1981 46 ... 4th 1985 50 ... 5th 1989 79 ... 6th 1993 128 ... 7th 1997 238 ... 8th 2001 814 ... 9th 2005 1014 ... 10th 2009 475 ... 11th 2013 686 ... 12th 2017 1636 ... Candidates submitting their candidacy are first vetted by the Ministry of Interior and then by the Guardian Council. ... Number of candidates allowed to run may be different from the number of candidates finally ran.”Hide quote

    Presidential Elections in Iran Number of Candidates Registered and Allowed to Run ... 1st 1980 124 ... 2nd 1981 71 ... 3rd 1981 46 ... 4th 1985 50 ... 5th 1989 79 ... 6th 1993 128 ... 7th 1997 238 ... 8th 2001 814 ... 9th 2005 1014 ... 10th 2009 475 ... 11th 2013 686 ... 12th 2017 1636 ... Candidates submitting their candidacy are first vetted by the Ministry of Interior and then by the Guardian Council. ... Number of candidates allowed to run may be different from the number of candidates finally ran.

35. Annual Report on the Death Penalty in Iran 2025

    Iran Human Rights (IHRNGO) and ECPM, 2026-04 · supports

    “EXECUTION TRENDS IN THE LAST 18 YEARS (2008-2025) [bar labels, 2008 to 2025 in order:] 350 402 546 676 580 687 753 972 530 517 273 280 267 333 582 834 975 1639 ... From IHRNGO’s first annual report in 2008 to 2025, Iranian authorities have executed at least 11,196 people ... At least 1,639 people were executed, marking the highest number of recorded executions since 1989 and a dramatic 68% increase compared to 2024, when 975 executions were recorded. ... With 222 executions, October was the bloodiest month in 2025 ... Only 113 executions (under 7%) were announced by official sources ... 60% of executions took place in the second half of the year. ... Execution numbers tend to increase when authorities fear social unrest and when the attention of the international community is focused on other geopolitical issues. ... A new surge in executions began in the months after the 12-day war between Iran and Israel in June ... Following the death of President Ebrahim Raisi on 19 May 2024, Iran held a presidential election marked by the lowest voter turnout in the history of the Islamic Republic. ... At least 2,292 people have been executed since Masoud Pezeshkian took office in July 2024. By comparison, during the less than three years of Ebrahim Raisi’s presidency (2021–2024), and the 8-year presidential terms of Hassan Rouhani (2013–2021) and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005–2013), at least 1,714, 4,249, and 3,337 people were executed, respectively. ... The average number of monthly executions under Pezeshkian reached 135 (more than four executions per day), compared to 51 per month during Raisi’s tenure, 44 under Rouhani, and 35 under Ahmadinejad. ... The 2017 Amendment created hope that it would eventually lead to a complete halt in drug-related executions, and while it did lead to a decline in executions of men and a complete drop in executions of women until 2021, the outcome was not guaranteed. Since 2021, the 2017 Amendment has been reversed in practice, with drug-related executions rising from an average of 26 per year between 2018-2020 to at least 795 in 2025.”Hide quote

    EXECUTION TRENDS IN THE LAST 18 YEARS (2008-2025) [bar labels, 2008 to 2025 in order:] 350 402 546 676 580 687 753 972 530 517 273 280 267 333 582 834 975 1639 ... From IHRNGO’s first annual report in 2008 to 2025, Iranian authorities have executed at least 11,196 people ... At least 1,639 people were executed, marking the highest number of recorded executions since 1989 and a dramatic 68% increase compared to 2024, when 975 executions were recorded. ... With 222 executions, October was the bloodiest month in 2025 ... Only 113 executions (under 7%) were announced by official sources ... 60% of executions took place in the second half of the year. ... Execution numbers tend to increase when authorities fear social unrest and when the attention of the international community is focused on other geopolitical issues. ... A new surge in executions began in the months after the 12-day war between Iran and Israel in June ... Following the death of President Ebrahim Raisi on 19 May 2024, Iran held a presidential election marked by the lowest voter turnout in the history of the Islamic Republic. ... At least 2,292 people have been executed since Masoud Pezeshkian took office in July 2024. By comparison, during the less than three years of Ebrahim Raisi’s presidency (2021–2024), and the 8-year presidential terms of Hassan Rouhani (2013–2021) and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005–2013), at least 1,714, 4,249, and 3,337 people were executed, respectively. ... The average number of monthly executions under Pezeshkian reached 135 (more than four executions per day), compared to 51 per month during Raisi’s tenure, 44 under Rouhani, and 35 under Ahmadinejad. ... The 2017 Amendment created hope that it would eventually lead to a complete halt in drug-related executions, and while it did lead to a decline in executions of men and a complete drop in executions of women until 2021, the outcome was not guaranteed. Since 2021, the 2017 Amendment has been reversed in practice, with drug-related executions rising from an average of 26 per year between 2018-2020 to at least 795 in 2025.

36. Annual Report on Execution in Iran 2025–2026

    HRANA (Human Rights Activists in Iran Statistics Center), 2026-10-09 · supports

    “Ten-Year Trend of Executions in Iran (2016–2026) ... executions declined from 505 in 2016–2017 to 238 in 2018–2019. The number then increased each year from 2019–2020 onward, reaching 2,003 in 2025–2026, the highest total recorded across these ten reporting periods. ... 2025-2026 2,003 2024-2025 1,553 2023-2024 823 2022-2023 664 2021-2022 528 2020-2021 272 2019-2020 249 2018-2019 238 2017-2018 265 2016-2017 505”Hide quote

    Ten-Year Trend of Executions in Iran (2016–2026) ... executions declined from 505 in 2016–2017 to 238 in 2018–2019. The number then increased each year from 2019–2020 onward, reaching 2,003 in 2025–2026, the highest total recorded across these ten reporting periods. ... 2025-2026 2,003 2024-2025 1,553 2023-2024 823 2022-2023 664 2021-2022 528 2020-2021 272 2019-2020 249 2018-2019 238 2017-2018 265 2016-2017 505

37. Annual Report on Execution in Iran 2025–2026 (monthly chart and political executions by month)

    HRANA (Human Rights Activists in Iran Statistics Center), 2026-10-09 · supports

    “the highest number of executions was recorded in December 2025, while the lowest full-month total was recorded in March 2026. The figures for October 2025 and October 2026, which cover only the last 22 days and the first seven days of those months respectively, are not representative of a full month. [Monthly chart labels, October 2025 to October 2026:] 200 324 404 334 282 10 30 73 114 73 85 69 5 ... Political and security-related executions 69 ... ◄ 35 people (51% of all political and security-related executions) were executed in connection with the January 2026 (Dey 1404) protests. ◄ 29 people were executed in April (14) and May 2026 (15) alone, the peak of executions during this period. ... By Month of Execution Month Number October 2025 1 November 2025 0 December 2025 1 January 2026 4 February 2026 0 March 2026 8 April 2026 14 May 2026 15 June 2026 5 July 2026 9 August 2026 6 September 2026 3 October 2026 3 Total 69”Hide quote

    the highest number of executions was recorded in December 2025, while the lowest full-month total was recorded in March 2026. The figures for October 2025 and October 2026, which cover only the last 22 days and the first seven days of those months respectively, are not representative of a full month. [Monthly chart labels, October 2025 to October 2026:] 200 324 404 334 282 10 30 73 114 73 85 69 5 ... Political and security-related executions 69 ... ◄ 35 people (51% of all political and security-related executions) were executed in connection with the January 2026 (Dey 1404) protests. ◄ 29 people were executed in April (14) and May 2026 (15) alone, the peak of executions during this period. ... By Month of Execution Month Number October 2025 1 November 2025 0 December 2025 1 January 2026 4 February 2026 0 March 2026 8 April 2026 14 May 2026 15 June 2026 5 July 2026 9 August 2026 6 September 2026 3 October 2026 3 Total 69

38. World Development Indicators: GDP growth (annual %), Iran (API)

    World Bank, 2026-10-08 · supports

    “"indicator":{"id":"NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG","value":"GDP growth (annual %)"}, "country":{"id":"IR","value":"Iran, Islamic Rep."} ... "lastupdated":"2026-10-08" ... "date":"2025","value":-2.82597163290347 ... "date":"2016","value":8.8150866425182”Hide quote

    "indicator":{"id":"NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG","value":"GDP growth (annual %)"}, "country":{"id":"IR","value":"Iran, Islamic Rep."} ... "lastupdated":"2026-10-08" ... "date":"2025","value":-2.82597163290347 ... "date":"2016","value":8.8150866425182

39. World Development Indicators: Inflation, consumer prices (annual %), Iran (API)

    World Bank, 2026-10-08 · supports

    “"indicator":{"id":"FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG","value":"Inflation, consumer prices (annual %)"},"country":{"id":"IR","value":"Iran, Islamic Rep."} ... "lastupdated":"2026-10-08" ... "date":"2025","value":42.1712244965444”Hide quote

    "indicator":{"id":"FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG","value":"Inflation, consumer prices (annual %)"},"country":{"id":"IR","value":"Iran, Islamic Rep."} ... "lastupdated":"2026-10-08" ... "date":"2025","value":42.1712244965444

The War's Human and Financial Costs, with Earlier Wars for Scale, 2026

1. Day 39 of U.S. and Israeli Attacks on Iran: Extensive Damage to the Rail Network and Roads

   HRANA (Human Rights Activists News Agency), 2026-04-07 · supports

   “Aggregated data since the beginning of the conflict on February 28, 2026, based on incidents recorded in the incident tab and using minimum values for figures marked "more than": • Civilian fatalities: 1,701 people (including at least 254 children) • Military fatalities: 1,221 people • Unclassified fatalities (civilian/military): 714 people … Delays in medical reporting, difficulties in confirming identities, and restricted access to certain provinces may result in temporary undercounting. … they have not been included in the event-based calculations”Hide quote

   Aggregated data since the beginning of the conflict on February 28, 2026, based on incidents recorded in the incident tab and using minimum values for figures marked "more than": • Civilian fatalities: 1,701 people (including at least 254 children) • Military fatalities: 1,221 people • Unclassified fatalities (civilian/military): 714 people … Delays in medical reporting, difficulties in confirming identities, and restricted access to certain provinces may result in temporary undercounting. … they have not been included in the event-based calculations

2. At least 7,650 killed in 40 days of war, including 1,030 civilians — Hengaw’s tenth report

   Hengaw Organization for Human Rights, 2026-04-08 · complicates

   “According to data collected by Hengaw, at least 7,650 people were killed during the recent war, of whom 1,030 (equivalent to 13.5%) were civilians. … At least 6,620 military personnel were killed, the majority of whom were members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the army. … Hengaw has repeatedly emphasized during the conflict that Iranian military forces abandoned official bases and were stationed in civilian locations, including schools, student dormitories, and mosques within residential areas. … To date, no comprehensive official report on military casualties has been issued by state authorities.”Hide quote

   According to data collected by Hengaw, at least 7,650 people were killed during the recent war, of whom 1,030 (equivalent to 13.5%) were civilians. … At least 6,620 military personnel were killed, the majority of whom were members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the army. … Hengaw has repeatedly emphasized during the conflict that Iranian military forces abandoned official bases and were stationed in civilian locations, including schools, student dormitories, and mosques within residential areas. … To date, no comprehensive official report on military casualties has been issued by state authorities.

3. Middle East escalation of conflict — Global external situation report #10 (data as of 21 July)

   World Health Organization, 2026-07-22 · supports

   “Iran 3 200 000 [Displaced] 33 806 [Injured] 3 375 [Deaths] … All numbers are estimates and may differ from other sources due to data cutoff times. … Since the beginning of the hostilities on 28 February, national authorities reported 3375 deaths and 33 806 injuries in the Islamic Republic of Iran, including 15 injuries following strikes on 7 June. An additional 50 deaths and more than 517 injuries have been reported as occurring between 27 June – 19 July … Cumulative figures since 28 February have yet to be reported.”Hide quote

   Iran 3 200 000 [Displaced] 33 806 [Injured] 3 375 [Deaths] … All numbers are estimates and may differ from other sources due to data cutoff times. … Since the beginning of the hostilities on 28 February, national authorities reported 3375 deaths and 33 806 injuries in the Islamic Republic of Iran, including 15 injuries following strikes on 7 June. An additional 50 deaths and more than 517 injuries have been reported as occurring between 27 June – 19 July … Cumulative figures since 28 February have yet to be reported.

4. World Development Indicators: Population, total (SP.POP.TOTL), Iran

   World Bank, 2026-10-08 · supports

   “"indicator":{"id":"SP.POP.TOTL","value":"Population, total"},"country":{"id":"IR","value":"Iran, Islamic Rep."},"countryiso3code":"IRN","date":"2025","value":92417681”Hide quote

   "indicator":{"id":"SP.POP.TOTL","value":"Population, total"},"country":{"id":"IR","value":"Iran, Islamic Rep."},"countryiso3code":"IRN","date":"2025","value":92417681

5. Israeli, Iranian and US forces in Iran 2026 (conflict page)

   Airwars, 2026-10 · supports

   “Over 40 days Airwars tracked 267 civilian harm incidents and has published 71. … In June, U.S. strikes began again after negotiations faltered. Airwars' rapid response team has tracked 34 further incidents of civilian harm, of which 23 have been published.”Hide quote

   Over 40 days Airwars tracked 267 civilian harm incidents and has published 71. … In June, U.S. strikes began again after negotiations faltered. Airwars' rapid response team has tracked 34 further incidents of civilian harm, of which 23 have been published.

6. Civilian harm in Iran after one month of war

   Airwars, 2026-03-27 · complicates

   “At least 1,443 civilians have been killed by U.S. and Israeli forces, including 217 children, according to HRA.”Hide quote

   At least 1,443 civilians have been killed by U.S. and Israeli forces, including 217 children, according to HRA.

7. Report of the independent international fact-finding mission on the Islamic Republic of Iran (A/HRC/61/60)

   UN Human Rights Council, 2026-03-19 · complicates

   “On 3 March, the Iranian Red Crescent Society reported that 787 people had been killed in the Islamic Republic of Iran since the air strikes had begun.”Hide quote

   On 3 March, the Iranian Red Crescent Society reported that 787 people had been killed in the Islamic Republic of Iran since the air strikes had begun.

8. Pentagon raises Iran war death toll to 21

   Task & Purpose, 2026-10-10 · supports

   “Since Feb. 28, 865 service members have been wounded in the war, the majority since July 7. … This summer the Pentagon split deaths and injuries in the war into two separate categories: one for Operation Epic Fury and one listed as 'overseas operations,' covering casualties since July.”Hide quote

   Since Feb. 28, 865 service members have been wounded in the war, the majority since July 7. … This summer the Pentagon split deaths and injuries in the war into two separate categories: one for Operation Epic Fury and one listed as 'overseas operations,' covering casualties since July.

9. Pentagon's latest Iran war cost estimate: $43.6 billion

   Roll Call, 2026-09-18 · supports

   “The Pentagon's latest figure comprises $11.2 billion already obligated for operating expenses ... plus $32.4 billion in unfunded replacement costs for munitions, damaged aircraft and other assets … The new Pentagon estimate of $43.6 billion is current as of Sept. 3, the document said … the CBO said the war cost $38.1 billion through July … The IG, meanwhile, put the figure at $33.4 billion. Its estimate ran through June. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth testified in July that the war would cost $37.5 billion through the end of September. The Pentagon has asked Congress for $67.1 billion in supplemental spending”Hide quote

   The Pentagon's latest figure comprises $11.2 billion already obligated for operating expenses ... plus $32.4 billion in unfunded replacement costs for munitions, damaged aircraft and other assets … The new Pentagon estimate of $43.6 billion is current as of Sept. 3, the document said … the CBO said the war cost $38.1 billion through July … The IG, meanwhile, put the figure at $33.4 billion. Its estimate ran through June. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth testified in July that the war would cost $37.5 billion through the end of September. The Pentagon has asked Congress for $67.1 billion in supplemental spending

10. DOD officials say Iran war has cost $25 billion so far during congressional grilling

    NPR (via KASU), 2026-04-29 · supports

    “Twenty-five billion dollars - that's how much the Pentagon estimates the war with Iran is costing.”Hide quote

    Twenty-five billion dollars - that's how much the Pentagon estimates the war with Iran is costing.

11. Costs of the Armed Conflict With Iran (letter, 15 September 2026; archived 1 October 2026)

    Congressional Budget Office, 2026-09-15 · supports

    “CBO estimates that as of August 1, 2026, the armed conflict with Iran has cost DoD approximately $38 billion. … if the level of violence remained as low as it was in May and June, an additional month of conflict would cost $2 billion; if the intensity of the conflict increased to roughly the level experienced in July, the cost per month would increase to $3 billion. … CBO relied on government databases and public reports because DoD did not respond to CBO's requests for information. … This past June, the Administration requested $87.6 billion in supplemental appropriations, of which $67.1 billion was for DoD to pay for the conflict. … relatively few U.S. forces have been involved compared with the much larger and longer U.S. operations in Iraq and Afghanistan … in the first quarter of 2027, inflation (measured year over year) in the price index for personal consumption expenditures (PCE) is now estimated to be 0.5 percentage points higher than the agency projected in February 2026, and core PCE inflation is estimated to be 0.3 percentage points higher”Hide quote

    CBO estimates that as of August 1, 2026, the armed conflict with Iran has cost DoD approximately $38 billion. … if the level of violence remained as low as it was in May and June, an additional month of conflict would cost $2 billion; if the intensity of the conflict increased to roughly the level experienced in July, the cost per month would increase to $3 billion. … CBO relied on government databases and public reports because DoD did not respond to CBO's requests for information. … This past June, the Administration requested $87.6 billion in supplemental appropriations, of which $67.1 billion was for DoD to pay for the conflict. … relatively few U.S. forces have been involved compared with the much larger and longer U.S. operations in Iraq and Afghanistan … in the first quarter of 2027, inflation (measured year over year) in the price index for personal consumption expenditures (PCE) is now estimated to be 0.5 percentage points higher than the agency projected in February 2026, and core PCE inflation is estimated to be 0.3 percentage points higher

12. The War May Be Ending: What Did Epic Fury Cost?

    Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2026-06-23 · supports

    “CSIS estimates war costs to be around $40 billion ($34 billion to $42 billion).”Hide quote

    CSIS estimates war costs to be around $40 billion ($34 billion to $42 billion).

13. Epic Fury costs as of the April 8 cease-fire

    American Enterprise Institute, 2026-04-10 · supports

    “we estimate an incremental cost to date of between $25 and $35 billion.”Hide quote

    we estimate an incremental cost to date of between $25 and $35 billion.

14. A Renewed Iran War Would Test Diminished Interceptor Inventories

    Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2026-07-27 · supports

    “This has required extensive use of interceptors, with Patriot inventories now under 1,000 and THAAD inventories at about 250. Diminished stockpiles may force the United States and its coalition partners to take more risks with interceptions.”Hide quote

    This has required extensive use of interceptors, with Patriot inventories now under 1,000 and THAAD inventories at about 250. Diminished stockpiles may force the United States and its coalition partners to take more risks with interceptions.

15. Last Rounds? The Status of Key Munitions at the Iran War Ceasefire

    Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2026-04-21 · complicates

    “Of the total deliveries, 5 percent was deducted for training, lot testing, and other nonoperational uses. … Up to 400 of the older PAC-2 missiles may also still be in the stockpile but are not included in Figure 9.”Hide quote

    Of the total deliveries, 5 percent was deducted for training, lot testing, and other nonoperational uses. … Up to 400 of the older PAC-2 missiles may also still be in the stockpile but are not included in Figure 9.

16. American War and Military Operations Casualties: Lists and Statistics (RL32492)

    Congressional Research Service, 2020-07-29 · supports

    “Table 12. Operation Iraqi Freedom: Casualty Summary by Casualty Category (as of July 16, 2020) … Total Hostile Deaths 3,481 ... Total Nonhostile Deaths 937 ... Total Deaths 4,418 ... Total Wounded in Action 31,994 … [Operation Enduring Freedom] Total Deaths 2,349 ... Total Wounded In Action 20,149 … [Operation New Dawn] Total Deaths 74”Hide quote

    Table 12. Operation Iraqi Freedom: Casualty Summary by Casualty Category (as of July 16, 2020) … Total Hostile Deaths 3,481 ... Total Nonhostile Deaths 937 ... Total Deaths 4,418 ... Total Wounded in Action 31,994 … [Operation Enduring Freedom] Total Deaths 2,349 ... Total Wounded In Action 20,149 … [Operation New Dawn] Total Deaths 74

17. The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11 (RL33110)

    Congressional Research Service, 2014-12-08 · supports

    “Congress has approved appropriations for the past 13 years of war that total $1.6 trillion ... $686 billion (43%) for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) for Afghanistan and other counterterror operations received; $815 billion (51%) for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)/Operation New Dawn (OND)”Hide quote

    Congress has approved appropriations for the past 13 years of war that total $1.6 trillion ... $686 billion (43%) for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) for Afghanistan and other counterterror operations received; $815 billion (51%) for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)/Operation New Dawn (OND)

18. Iraq War's Price Tag

    Council on Foreign Relations, 2005-02-02 · supports

    “In September 2002, White House economic adviser Lawrence Lindsey told The Wall Street Journal that a U.S. intervention in Iraq could cost between $100 billion and $200 billion... White House Budget Director Mitchell E. Daniels Jr. labeled that figure as 'very, very high' and estimated total war costs at between $50 billion to $60 billion. … Brookings Institution senior fellows Michael O'Hanlon and Lael Brainard estimated in August 2003 that military and reconstruction costs could range from $150 billion to $300 billion. … On the eve of the war in March 2003, an independent task force report from the Council on Foreign Relations estimated that stabilizing Iraq could cost some $20 billion a year for several years”Hide quote

    In September 2002, White House economic adviser Lawrence Lindsey told The Wall Street Journal that a U.S. intervention in Iraq could cost between $100 billion and $200 billion... White House Budget Director Mitchell E. Daniels Jr. labeled that figure as 'very, very high' and estimated total war costs at between $50 billion to $60 billion. … Brookings Institution senior fellows Michael O'Hanlon and Lael Brainard estimated in August 2003 that military and reconstruction costs could range from $150 billion to $300 billion. … On the eve of the war in March 2003, an independent task force report from the Council on Foreign Relations estimated that stabilizing Iraq could cost some $20 billion a year for several years

19. Iran Update Special Report, July 13, 2026

    Institute for the Study of War and AEI Critical Threats Project, 2026-07-13 · supports

    “Iran has continuously made efforts to reconstitute its ballistic missile and drone programs since the ceasefire on April 8. … The United States will resume its blockade of Iranian ports beginning on July 14 at 4:00 PM ET.”Hide quote

    Iran has continuously made efforts to reconstitute its ballistic missile and drone programs since the ceasefire on April 8. … The United States will resume its blockade of Iranian ports beginning on July 14 at 4:00 PM ET.

20. War Powers report to Congress (House Document 119-169)

    The White House (via GovInfo), 2026-07-10 · supports

    “military action commenced on July 7, 2026, against the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran”Hide quote

    military action commenced on July 7, 2026, against the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran

21. Trump says US will not resume military strikes on Iran before midterm elections

    Associated Press (via WCAX), 2026-10-08 · supports

    “But Trump in a social media post on Thursday said the U.S. "will not be attacking Iran at any time prior to the Midterm Elections to be held in the United States on November 3rd."”Hide quote

    But Trump in a social media post on Thursday said the U.S. "will not be attacking Iran at any time prior to the Midterm Elections to be held in the United States on November 3rd."

22. US warns allies to prepare for possible Iran strikes, retaliation after elections, AP sources say

    Associated Press (via WCAX), 2026-10-29 · supports

    “The cost of fighting the Iran war to American taxpayers has grown to $47.1 billion, according to the latest estimate the Pentagon has provided to Congress.”Hide quote

    The cost of fighting the Iran war to American taxpayers has grown to $47.1 billion, according to the latest estimate the Pentagon has provided to Congress.

23. Defense Casualty Analysis System: conflict casualty summaries, Operation Epic Fury and Overseas Operations (monthly and by category)

    US Department of Defense, Defense Casualty Analysis System, 2026-10-28 · supports

    “[Operation Epic Fury, monthly] "month_Year":"FEBRUARY 2026" … "tot_kia":"0" … "tot_acc":"0" … "tot_wia":"36" … "month_Year":"MARCH 2026" … "tot_kia":"7" … "tot_acc":"7" … "tot_total":"14" … "tot_wia":"342" … "month_Year":"APRIL 2026" … "tot_wia":"34" … "month_Year":"JUNE 2026" … "tot_wia":"5" … "month_Year":"JULY 2026" … "tot_kia":"0" … "tot_acc":"1" … "tot_wia":"0" … [Overseas Operations, monthly] "month_Year":"JULY 2026" … "tot_kia":"4" … "tot_acc":"0" … "tot_wia":"350" … "month_Year":"SEPTEMBER 2026" … "tot_acc":"2" … "tot_wia":"94" … "month_Year":"OCTOBER 2026" … "tot_acc":"1" … "tot_wia":"4" … [category totals] Epic Fury "total":"15", "casualty_CATEGORIES":"TOTAL DEATHS" … "airforce":"6","spaceforce":"0","total":"6", "casualty_CATEGORIES":"ACCIDENT" … "total":"8", "casualty_CATEGORIES":"TOTAL NON-HOSTILE DEATHS" … "total":"417", "casualty_CATEGORIES":"WOUNDED IN ACTION (WIA)" … Overseas Operations "total":"7", "casualty_CATEGORIES":"TOTAL DEATHS" … "total":"3", "casualty_CATEGORIES":"TOTAL NON-HOSTILE DEATHS" … "total":"448", "casualty_CATEGORIES":"WOUNDED IN ACTION (WIA)" … "extractionDate":"October 28, 2026"”Hide quote

    [Operation Epic Fury, monthly] "month_Year":"FEBRUARY 2026" … "tot_kia":"0" … "tot_acc":"0" … "tot_wia":"36" … "month_Year":"MARCH 2026" … "tot_kia":"7" … "tot_acc":"7" … "tot_total":"14" … "tot_wia":"342" … "month_Year":"APRIL 2026" … "tot_wia":"34" … "month_Year":"JUNE 2026" … "tot_wia":"5" … "month_Year":"JULY 2026" … "tot_kia":"0" … "tot_acc":"1" … "tot_wia":"0" … [Overseas Operations, monthly] "month_Year":"JULY 2026" … "tot_kia":"4" … "tot_acc":"0" … "tot_wia":"350" … "month_Year":"SEPTEMBER 2026" … "tot_acc":"2" … "tot_wia":"94" … "month_Year":"OCTOBER 2026" … "tot_acc":"1" … "tot_wia":"4" … [category totals] Epic Fury "total":"15", "casualty_CATEGORIES":"TOTAL DEATHS" … "airforce":"6","spaceforce":"0","total":"6", "casualty_CATEGORIES":"ACCIDENT" … "total":"8", "casualty_CATEGORIES":"TOTAL NON-HOSTILE DEATHS" … "total":"417", "casualty_CATEGORIES":"WOUNDED IN ACTION (WIA)" … Overseas Operations "total":"7", "casualty_CATEGORIES":"TOTAL DEATHS" … "total":"3", "casualty_CATEGORIES":"TOTAL NON-HOSTILE DEATHS" … "total":"448", "casualty_CATEGORIES":"WOUNDED IN ACTION (WIA)" … "extractionDate":"October 28, 2026"

Iran's Actions Abroad: Proxies, Plots, Hostage-Taking and Attacks, 1979–2026

1. AMIA bombing: Argentina court holds Iran, Hezbollah responsible

   Buenos Aires Times, 2024-04-11 · supports

   “Argentina’s Federal Criminal Cassation Court affirmed on Thursday that the deadly attacks on the Israeli Embassy and the AMIA Jewish community centre were the responsibility of the Islamic fundamentalist organisation Hezbollah, sponsored by the government of Iran. The ruling also declared that both episodes should be considered crimes against humanity, thus placing them beyond the statute of limitations despite the passage of time and the lack of judicial results. ... In 1992, a bomb attack on the Israeli Embassy left 29 dead. Two years later, a truck loaded with explosives drove into the AMIA Jewish centre and detonated, leaving 85 dead and 300 injured. ... put blame on then-Iran president Ali Akbar Hashemi Bahramaie Rafsanjani as well as other Iranian officials and Hezbollah members”Hide quote

   Argentina’s Federal Criminal Cassation Court affirmed on Thursday that the deadly attacks on the Israeli Embassy and the AMIA Jewish community centre were the responsibility of the Islamic fundamentalist organisation Hezbollah, sponsored by the government of Iran. The ruling also declared that both episodes should be considered crimes against humanity, thus placing them beyond the statute of limitations despite the passage of time and the lack of judicial results. ... In 1992, a bomb attack on the Israeli Embassy left 29 dead. Two years later, a truck loaded with explosives drove into the AMIA Jewish centre and detonated, leaving 85 dead and 300 injured. ... put blame on then-Iran president Ali Akbar Hashemi Bahramaie Rafsanjani as well as other Iranian officials and Hezbollah members

2. AMIA: procesaron a siete iraníes y un libanés por el atentado

   TodoJujuy, 2026-09-21 · supports

   “AMIA: procesaron a siete iraníes y un libanés por el atentado ... Rafecas procesó como autores mediatos a cuatro exfuncionarios iraníes: Alí Fallahijan, exministro de Inteligencia. Alí Velayati, exministro de Relaciones Exteriores. Mohsen Rezai, excomandante de la Guardia Revolucionaria. Ahmad Vahidi, exjefe de la Fuerza Al Quds. ... la Cámara Federal de Casación Penal todavía debe resolver planteos sobre la constitucionalidad del juicio en ausencia”Hide quote

   AMIA: procesaron a siete iraníes y un libanés por el atentado ... Rafecas procesó como autores mediatos a cuatro exfuncionarios iraníes: Alí Fallahijan, exministro de Inteligencia. Alí Velayati, exministro de Relaciones Exteriores. Mohsen Rezai, excomandante de la Guardia Revolucionaria. Ahmad Vahidi, exjefe de la Fuerza Al Quds. ... la Cámara Federal de Casación Penal todavía debe resolver planteos sobre la constitucionalidad del juicio en ausencia

3. France bomb plot: Iran diplomat Assadollah Assadi sentenced to 20 years

   BBC News, 2021-02-04 · supports

   “France bomb plot: Iran diplomat Assadollah Assadi sentenced to 20 years ... An Iranian diplomat has been convicted of a plot to bomb a big French rally held by an exiled opposition group.”Hide quote

   France bomb plot: Iran diplomat Assadollah Assadi sentenced to 20 years ... An Iranian diplomat has been convicted of a plot to bomb a big French rally held by an exiled opposition group.

4. Two Russian Mob Leaders Sentenced to 25 Years in Prison for Murder-For-Hire Targeting a Journalist on Behalf of the Iranian Government

   US Department of Justice, 2025-10-30 · supports

   “The Iranian Government Hired Polad Omarov and Rafat Amirov to Kill Masih Alinejad in Exchange for $500,000 ... were each sentenced yesterday to 25 years' in prison ... The IRGC offered AMIROV $500,000 for Ms. Alinejad's murder”Hide quote

   The Iranian Government Hired Polad Omarov and Rafat Amirov to Kill Masih Alinejad in Exchange for $500,000 ... were each sentenced yesterday to 25 years' in prison ... The IRGC offered AMIROV $500,000 for Ms. Alinejad's murder

5. Brooklyn Man Sentenced to 15 Years in Prison for Murder-for-Hire Plot and Stalking a Journalist and Prominent Critic of the Iranian Government

   US Department of Justice, 2026-01-28 · supports

   “Today, convicted murderer Carlisle Rivera, also known as “Pop,” was sentenced to 15 years in prison for his participation in a murder-for-hire plot directed by the Government of Iran targeting Masih Alinejad, a journalist, author, and human rights activist ... in 2024, Rivera was hired by his criminal confederate, Farhad Shakeri, to murder Masih Alinejad on instructions from high-ranking members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).”Hide quote

   Today, convicted murderer Carlisle Rivera, also known as “Pop,” was sentenced to 15 years in prison for his participation in a murder-for-hire plot directed by the Government of Iran targeting Masih Alinejad, a journalist, author, and human rights activist ... in 2024, Rivera was hired by his criminal confederate, Farhad Shakeri, to murder Masih Alinejad on instructions from high-ranking members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

6. Justice Department Announces Murder-For-Hire and Related Charges Against IRGC Asset and Two Local Operatives

   US Department of Justice, 2024-11-08 · complicates

   “Shakeri Was Tasked by Iranian Regime with Surveilling and Plotting to Assassinate President-Elect Donald J. Trump ... Farhad Shakeri, 51, of Iran; Carlisle Rivera, also known as Pop, 49, of Brooklyn, New York; and Jonathon Loadholt, 36, of Staten Island, New York, were charged today in a criminal complaint in connection with their alleged involvement in a plot to murder ... Shakeri remains at large and is believed to reside in Iran.”Hide quote

   Shakeri Was Tasked by Iranian Regime with Surveilling and Plotting to Assassinate President-Elect Donald J. Trump ... Farhad Shakeri, 51, of Iran; Carlisle Rivera, also known as Pop, 49, of Brooklyn, New York; and Jonathon Loadholt, 36, of Staten Island, New York, were charged today in a criminal complaint in connection with their alleged involvement in a plot to murder ... Shakeri remains at large and is believed to reside in Iran.

7. Two Men Charged in Alleged Plot to Assassinate Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the United States

   US Department of Justice, 2011-10-11 · complicates

   “Two individuals have been charged in New York for their alleged participation in a plot directed by elements of the Iranian government to murder the Saudi Ambassador to the United States with explosives”Hide quote

   Two individuals have been charged in New York for their alleged participation in a plot directed by elements of the Iranian government to murder the Saudi Ambassador to the United States with explosives

8. State Sponsors of Terrorism

   US Department of State, 2025-12 · supports

   “Currently there are four countries designated under these authorities: Cuba, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea), Iran, and Syria. Country Designation Date Cuba January 12, 2021 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) November 20, 2017 Iran January 19, 1984 Syria December 29, 1979”Hide quote

   Currently there are four countries designated under these authorities: Cuba, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea), Iran, and Syria. Country Designation Date Cuba January 12, 2021 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) November 20, 2017 Iran January 19, 1984 Syria December 29, 1979

9. Country Reports on Terrorism 2023

   US Department of State, 2025-03 · supports

   “In 2023, Iran remained the leading state sponsor of terrorism ... Iran has provided hundreds of millions of dollars in support of Hizballah and trained thousands of its fighters at camps in Iran. ... Since the end of the 2006 Israeli-Hizballah conflict, Iran has supplied Hizballah in Lebanon with thousands of rockets, missiles, and small arms in violation of UNSCR 1701. ... Although there is no evidence that Iran knew about Hamas’s October 7 attacks on Israel in advance, its long-standing material, financial, and training support to Hamas enabled Hamas to execute the attack. ... On October 18, IAMGs restarted attacks against US military and diplomatic facilities, which came after an 18-month general pause in attacks in Iraq and a six-month pause in attacks in Syria. By the end of 2023, IAMGs had attacked US facilities in Iraq and Syria more than 100 times.”Hide quote

   In 2023, Iran remained the leading state sponsor of terrorism ... Iran has provided hundreds of millions of dollars in support of Hizballah and trained thousands of its fighters at camps in Iran. ... Since the end of the 2006 Israeli-Hizballah conflict, Iran has supplied Hizballah in Lebanon with thousands of rockets, missiles, and small arms in violation of UNSCR 1701. ... Although there is no evidence that Iran knew about Hamas’s October 7 attacks on Israel in advance, its long-standing material, financial, and training support to Hamas enabled Hamas to execute the attack. ... On October 18, IAMGs restarted attacks against US military and diplomatic facilities, which came after an 18-month general pause in attacks in Iraq and a six-month pause in attacks in Syria. By the end of 2023, IAMGs had attacked US facilities in Iraq and Syria more than 100 times.

10. Final report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen (S/2024/731)

    UN Security Council, Panel of Experts on Yemen, 2024-10-11 · supports

    “Information gathered by the Panel indicates that they have been receiving technical assistance, training, weapons and financial support from the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraqi armed groups and Hizbullah. ... 70. The Panel observes strong similarities between the documented materiel and those developed or operated by the Islamic Republic of Iran (53 items). Similar items are also operated by armed groups in Iraq (20), Lebanon (11), the occupied Palestinian territory (5), Bahrain (1) and Somalia (1)”Hide quote

    Information gathered by the Panel indicates that they have been receiving technical assistance, training, weapons and financial support from the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraqi armed groups and Hizbullah. ... 70. The Panel observes strong similarities between the documented materiel and those developed or operated by the Islamic Republic of Iran (53 items). Similar items are also operated by armed groups in Iraq (20), Lebanon (11), the occupied Palestinian territory (5), Bahrain (1) and Somalia (1)

11. Trends in Iranian External Assassination, Surveillance, and Abduction Plots (CTC Sentinel, vol. 15, no. 2)

    Combating Terrorism Center at West Point (Matthew Levitt), 2022-02-24 · complicates

    “This study draws on an unclassified and open-source dataset of 98 cases of Iranian external operations from December 1979 through December 2021. ... this is in no way a comprehensive listing of all such Iranian external operations. ... Of the 98 cases in the dataset, 42 involved the targeting of dissidents, 21 of whom were dual nationals or legal foreign residents. An additional 31 of the 98 cases targeted Jews or Israelis, 24 targeted diplomats, 24 targeted Western interests, seven targeted Gulf state interests, five involved the fatwa against Salman Rushdie ... Out of 55 cases over the past decade, 22 operations targeted Iranian dissidents, 25 cases targeted Jews or Israelis, 19 targeted diplomats, 12 targeted specifically Western interests, and six targeted Gulf state interests. ... The dataset suggests there was a gap in Iranian external operational activity for about 23 months after 9/11 ... there were only two plots in Europe in the decade after 9/11. This dramatic drop in attacks in Europe reversed itself over the past decade, however, with 17 plots in Europe since 2011.”Hide quote

    This study draws on an unclassified and open-source dataset of 98 cases of Iranian external operations from December 1979 through December 2021. ... this is in no way a comprehensive listing of all such Iranian external operations. ... Of the 98 cases in the dataset, 42 involved the targeting of dissidents, 21 of whom were dual nationals or legal foreign residents. An additional 31 of the 98 cases targeted Jews or Israelis, 24 targeted diplomats, 24 targeted Western interests, seven targeted Gulf state interests, five involved the fatwa against Salman Rushdie ... Out of 55 cases over the past decade, 22 operations targeted Iranian dissidents, 25 cases targeted Jews or Israelis, 19 targeted diplomats, 12 targeted specifically Western interests, and six targeted Gulf state interests. ... The dataset suggests there was a gap in Iranian external operational activity for about 23 months after 9/11 ... there were only two plots in Europe in the decade after 9/11. This dramatic drop in attacks in Europe reversed itself over the past decade, however, with 17 plots in Europe since 2011.

12. Iranian External Operations in Europe: The Criminal Connection

    International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (Matthew Levitt and Sarah Boches), 2024-10-16 · complicates

    “of the 218 plots in the overall dataset covering 1979 to today, 102 plots occurred in Europe. The pace of Iranian operational activity in Europe has spiked, with over half of these plots (54 cases) occurring between 2021 and 2024. These operations have focused on targeting Iranian dissidents (34 cases), including journalists broadcasting news in Farsi that Tehran would rather not see the light of day, Israeli citizens and diplomats (10 cases), and Jews (7 cases). Furthermore, of these 54 plots, sixteen involved the use of criminal perpetrators to carry out the attacks. ... The Washington Institute has produced an interactive map drawing on this dataset which depicts Iranian external operations – assassinations, abductions, intimidation and surveillance plots – around the world”Hide quote

    of the 218 plots in the overall dataset covering 1979 to today, 102 plots occurred in Europe. The pace of Iranian operational activity in Europe has spiked, with over half of these plots (54 cases) occurring between 2021 and 2024. These operations have focused on targeting Iranian dissidents (34 cases), including journalists broadcasting news in Farsi that Tehran would rather not see the light of day, Israeli citizens and diplomats (10 cases), and Jews (7 cases). Furthermore, of these 54 plots, sixteen involved the use of criminal perpetrators to carry out the attacks. ... The Washington Institute has produced an interactive map drawing on this dataset which depicts Iranian external operations – assassinations, abductions, intimidation and surveillance plots – around the world

13. MI5 Director General delivers annual threat update

    MI5 (the Security Service), 2026-10-13 · supports

    “The other state keen on subcontracting its UK violence is Iran. I’ve been calling this out since 2022. Today, we continue to see familiar Iranian intent – using criminal proxies to try to intimidate oppositionists, Iranian media organisations, and Israeli sites. But 2026 has also seen the Iranians, like the Russians, attempting to expand their hybrid campaign. Over the last twelve months, our Iran-linked operations have led to more than fifty arrests in the UK. ... The spring saw a wave of arson and sabotage incidents targeting Jewish communities in the UK and other European nations. ... claimed by a group calling itself the Islamic Movement of the Companions of the Right. Behind this front sat members of the IRGC. ... The other major shift this year has been Iranian ambitions to come at harder targets, like military sites.”Hide quote

    The other state keen on subcontracting its UK violence is Iran. I’ve been calling this out since 2022. Today, we continue to see familiar Iranian intent – using criminal proxies to try to intimidate oppositionists, Iranian media organisations, and Israeli sites. But 2026 has also seen the Iranians, like the Russians, attempting to expand their hybrid campaign. Over the last twelve months, our Iran-linked operations have led to more than fifty arrests in the UK. ... The spring saw a wave of arson and sabotage incidents targeting Jewish communities in the UK and other European nations. ... claimed by a group calling itself the Islamic Movement of the Companions of the Right. Behind this front sat members of the IRGC. ... The other major shift this year has been Iranian ambitions to come at harder targets, like military sites.

14. Director General Sir Ken McCallum gives threat update

    MI5 (the Security Service), 2025-10-16 · supports

    “Iran’s autocratic regime is likewise frantically trying to silence its opponents around the world, including in the UK. ... MI5 has tracked more than twenty potentially lethal Iran-backed plots in just the one year since I last stood at this podium. ... In a collective public response to this shared threat, fourteen nations, including the UK, together condemned Iran’s efforts to kill, kidnap and harass in Europe and North America.”Hide quote

    Iran’s autocratic regime is likewise frantically trying to silence its opponents around the world, including in the UK. ... MI5 has tracked more than twenty potentially lethal Iran-backed plots in just the one year since I last stood at this podium. ... In a collective public response to this shared threat, fourteen nations, including the UK, together condemned Iran’s efforts to kill, kidnap and harass in Europe and North America.

15. US designates Iran as state sponsor of wrongful detention

    Iran International, 2026-02-27 · supports

    “US Secretary of State Marco Rubio on Friday designated Iran a state sponsor of wrongful detention, citing its pattern of hostage-taking and arbitrary detention of Americans. “The Iranian regime must stop taking hostages and release all Americans unjustly detained in Iran, steps that could end this designation and associated actions,” Rubio said in a statement. ... "No American should travel to Iran for any reason.”Hide quote

    US Secretary of State Marco Rubio on Friday designated Iran a state sponsor of wrongful detention, citing its pattern of hostage-taking and arbitrary detention of Americans. “The Iranian regime must stop taking hostages and release all Americans unjustly detained in Iran, steps that could end this designation and associated actions,” Rubio said in a statement. ... "No American should travel to Iran for any reason.

16. Low turnout as conservatives dominate Iran parliamentary election

    Al Jazeera, 2024-03-04 · supports

    ““Around 25 million people participated with a turnout of 41 percent,” Interior Minister Ahmad Vahidi said at a news conference in Tehran”Hide quote

    “Around 25 million people participated with a turnout of 41 percent,” Interior Minister Ahmad Vahidi said at a news conference in Tehran

17. Tracking Anti-U.S. and Anti-Israel Strikes From Iraq and Syria During the Gaza Crisis

    The Washington Institute for Near East Policy (Michael Knights, Amir al-Kaabi and Hamdi Malik, Militia Spotlight), 2024-12-03 · supports

    “Claimed attacks on U.S. and coalition bases in Iraq and Syria, which were the predominant category until the temporary cessation of anti-U.S. attacks in February-July 2024. When we can confirm attacks, we have given them a serial number in the lefthand column. We can have very high confidence these claimed anti-coalition attacks actually occurred. Since September 2024, the number of anti-U.S. strikes in Syria seems to be increasing again, but it is very hard to get high-confidence evidence of these attacks. ... Claimed attacks on Israel ... do not receive a serial number. ... Serial Number | Date | Target ... 223 | Dec 3 | Conoco, Syria ... 182 | Feb 4 | Omar, Syria ... 180 | Jan 28 | Erbil, Iraq ... 128 | Dec 31 | Erbil, Iraq ... 90 | Nov 23 | al-Asad and Erbil, Iraq ... 32 | Oct 31 | al-Asad, Iraq ... 1 | Oct 18”Hide quote

    Claimed attacks on U.S. and coalition bases in Iraq and Syria, which were the predominant category until the temporary cessation of anti-U.S. attacks in February-July 2024. When we can confirm attacks, we have given them a serial number in the lefthand column. We can have very high confidence these claimed anti-coalition attacks actually occurred. Since September 2024, the number of anti-U.S. strikes in Syria seems to be increasing again, but it is very hard to get high-confidence evidence of these attacks. ... Claimed attacks on Israel ... do not receive a serial number. ... Serial Number | Date | Target ... 223 | Dec 3 | Conoco, Syria ... 182 | Feb 4 | Omar, Syria ... 180 | Jan 28 | Erbil, Iraq ... 128 | Dec 31 | Erbil, Iraq ... 90 | Nov 23 | al-Asad and Erbil, Iraq ... 32 | Oct 31 | al-Asad, Iraq ... 1 | Oct 18

Outside Attempts to Topple, Coerce or Disarm Hostile Regimes, 1816–2023

1. Jervis Forum Roundtable 17-6 on Downes, Catastrophic Success: Why Foreign-Imposed Regime Change Goes Wrong (Cornell University Press, 2021)

   H-Diplo/RJISSF (reviewers' summaries, with page numbers in Downes's book), 2025-10 · supports

   “Marshaling a new dataset of 120 cases of FIRC (1816–2008) … One-third of all FIRCs descend into civil war in the first post-intervention decade (94), especially in low-income countries, where FIRCs increase the risk of civil war by eight percentage points (100). … Foreign-imposed regime change more than doubles the likelihood of civil war in the decade that follows (94-96). … Civil war is four and a half times more likely to follow a leadership regime change than in other cases (98). And, whereas 47 percent of installed leaders have been forcibly removed from power, two-third of leaders installed through leadership regime change have lost power through irregular means (168). … Regime change also appears to have no significant effect on the probability of a future militarized dispute between the target and intervener (251-2). And indeed, leadership regime changes more than double the risk of a dispute occurring (252). … These states are no more likely to vote together in the United Nations General Assembly or to share alliance portfolios than other types of states (254-5). … Regime changes that seek to restore previously ousted rulers to power tend to have best outcomes … the base rate is quite low, and so even if FIRC doubles the risk of civil war onset, would-be interveners might view this as acceptable compared to maintaining the status quo.”Hide quote

   Marshaling a new dataset of 120 cases of FIRC (1816–2008) … One-third of all FIRCs descend into civil war in the first post-intervention decade (94), especially in low-income countries, where FIRCs increase the risk of civil war by eight percentage points (100). … Foreign-imposed regime change more than doubles the likelihood of civil war in the decade that follows (94-96). … Civil war is four and a half times more likely to follow a leadership regime change than in other cases (98). And, whereas 47 percent of installed leaders have been forcibly removed from power, two-third of leaders installed through leadership regime change have lost power through irregular means (168). … Regime change also appears to have no significant effect on the probability of a future militarized dispute between the target and intervener (251-2). And indeed, leadership regime changes more than double the risk of a dispute occurring (252). … These states are no more likely to vote together in the United Nations General Assembly or to share alliance portfolios than other types of states (254-5). … Regime changes that seek to restore previously ousted rulers to power tend to have best outcomes … the base rate is quite low, and so even if FIRC doubles the risk of civil war onset, would-be interveners might view this as acceptable compared to maintaining the status quo.

2. You Can't Always Get What You Want: Why Foreign-Imposed Regime Change Seldom Improves Interstate Relations (Downes and O'Rourke, International Security 41:2), abstract

   Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, 2016 · supports

   “A new dataset and an analysis of foreign interventions in the Congo Wars show that FIRC damages relations between intervener and target state more often than it improves them.”Hide quote

   A new dataset and an analysis of foreign interventions in the Congo Wars show that FIRC damages relations between intervener and target state more often than it improves them.

3. Forced to Be Free? Why Foreign-Imposed Regime Change Rarely Leads to Democratization (Downes and Monten, International Security 37:4), abstract

   Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, 2013 · supports

   “A statistical examination of seventy instances of foreign-imposed regime change (FIRC) in the twentieth century shows that implementing prodemocratic institutional reforms, such as sponsoring elections, is not enough to induce democratization; interveners will meet with little success unless conditions in the target state—in the form of high levels of economic development and societal homogeneity, and previous experience with representative governance—are favorable to democracy. Given that prospective regime change operations are likely to target regimes in poor, diverse countries, policymakers should scale back their expectations that democracy will flourish after FIRC.”Hide quote

   A statistical examination of seventy instances of foreign-imposed regime change (FIRC) in the twentieth century shows that implementing prodemocratic institutional reforms, such as sponsoring elections, is not enough to induce democratization; interveners will meet with little success unless conditions in the target state—in the form of high levels of economic development and societal homogeneity, and previous experience with representative governance—are favorable to democracy. Given that prospective regime change operations are likely to target regimes in poor, diverse countries, policymakers should scale back their expectations that democracy will flourish after FIRC.

4. H-Diplo/ISSF Article Review 26 on Downes and Monten, "Forced to Be Free?"

   H-Diplo/ISSF (review by Mark Peceny), 2014-02-14 · complicates

   “They have collected data on 107 examples of this phenomenon from 1816 to the contemporary era, from Austria’s removal of revolutionaries from the government of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies in 1821 through the 2003 overthrow of Saddam Hussein. … Iran in 1953, Guatemala in 1954, and Chile in 1973 are included, but the Reagan Doctrine cases of covert action in the 1980s are excluded.”Hide quote

   They have collected data on 107 examples of this phenomenon from 1816 to the contemporary era, from Austria’s removal of revolutionaries from the government of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies in 1821 through the 2003 overthrow of Saddam Hussein. … Iran in 1953, Guatemala in 1954, and Chile in 1973 are included, but the Reagan Doctrine cases of covert action in the 1980s are excluded.

5. Boston College Political Scientist Wins Award for Her Foreign Policy Book

   Boston College News, 2019-11 · supports

   “U.S. covert operations during the Cold War were unsuccessful more than 60 percent of the time and most failed to remain covert, often resulting in unforeseen, and disastrous, consequences, according to O’Rourke, who found that states targeted for regime change were more likely to experience civil war in the 10 years following intervention.”Hide quote

   U.S. covert operations during the Cold War were unsuccessful more than 60 percent of the time and most failed to remain covert, often resulting in unforeseen, and disastrous, consequences, according to O’Rourke, who found that states targeted for regime change were more likely to experience civil war in the 10 years following intervention.

6. Covert Wars to What End?

   War on the Rocks, 2019-08-07 · supports

   “O'Rourke compiled an original dataset of U.S. regime-change operations carried out between 1947 and 1989, including 64 covert cases. … more than two thirds (44 of 64) were undertaken in support of authoritarian forces, 'including at least six operations that sought to replace liberal democratic governments with illiberal authoritarian regimes.'”Hide quote

   O'Rourke compiled an original dataset of U.S. regime-change operations carried out between 1947 and 1989, including 64 covert cases. … more than two thirds (44 of 64) were undertaken in support of authoritarian forces, 'including at least six operations that sought to replace liberal democratic governments with illiberal authoritarian regimes.'

7. Review of Lindsey A. O'Rourke, Covert Regime Change: America's Secret Cold War

   H-War (review by Paxton Stover), 2024-08 · supports

   “covert operations are most likely to succeed against democratic governments, weak states, and American allies”Hide quote

   covert operations are most likely to succeed against democratic governments, weak states, and American allies

8. Attacking the Atom: Does Bombing Nuclear Facilities Affect Proliferation? (Kreps and Fuhrmann, Journal of Strategic Studies), abstract

   Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, 2011-04 · supports

   “This article addresses these questions by conducting an analysis of 16 attacks against nuclear facilities from 1942 to 2007. … There is evidence that the peacetime attacks delayed the target's nuclear program, although the size of this effect is rather modest. The wartime cases were less successful, as attacks often missed their targets either due to operational failure or limited intelligence on the location of critical targets. In our concluding section we show that many of the conditions that were conducive to past success are not present in the contemporary Iran case. Overall, our findings reveal an interesting paradox. The historical cases that have successfully delayed proliferation are those when the attacking state struck well before a nuclear threat was imminent.”Hide quote

   This article addresses these questions by conducting an analysis of 16 attacks against nuclear facilities from 1942 to 2007. … There is evidence that the peacetime attacks delayed the target's nuclear program, although the size of this effect is rather modest. The wartime cases were less successful, as attacks often missed their targets either due to operational failure or limited intelligence on the location of critical targets. In our concluding section we show that many of the conditions that were conducive to past success are not present in the contemporary Iran case. Overall, our findings reveal an interesting paradox. The historical cases that have successfully delayed proliferation are those when the attacking state struck well before a nuclear threat was imminent.

9. Revisiting Osirak: Preventive Attacks and Nuclear Proliferation Risks (Braut-Hegghammer, International Security 36:1), abstract

   Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, 2011 · complicates

   “The attack had mixed effects: it triggered a covert nuclear weapons program that did not previously exist, while necessitating a more difficult and timeconsuming technical route to developing nuclear weapons. Notwithstanding gross inefficiencies in the ensuing program, a decade later Iraq stood on the threshold of a nuclear weapons capability.”Hide quote

   The attack had mixed effects: it triggered a covert nuclear weapons program that did not previously exist, while necessitating a more difficult and timeconsuming technical route to developing nuclear weapons. Notwithstanding gross inefficiencies in the ensuing program, a decade later Iraq stood on the threshold of a nuclear weapons capability.

10. When Did (and Didn’t) States Proliferate? Chronicling the Spread of Nuclear Weapons (Philipp C. Bleek), text and Table 1

    Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, 2017-06 · supports

    “Thirty-one countries at least opened the door to potential nuclear weapons programs, seventeen of those launched weapons programs, and ten acquired deliverable nuclear weapons. But proliferation has also been complemented by de-proliferation: one state that developed nuclear weapons subsequently gave them up, seven of those who launched programs never or have not yet acquired, and fourteen countries halted their exploration of nuclear weapons without launching programs. … Libya returned to no activity in 2003, when Libya announced that it was abandoning its weapons of mass destruction programs and allowing international inspections. … Iraqi exploration is coded as 1975, though the evidence is somewhat circumstantial, and pursuit is coded as 1981, returning to no activity in 1991. … Jo and Gartzke code pursuit as 1973. … Iraq’s activities prior to 1981, including as described by Braut-Hegghammer, are sufficiently robust that one might reasonably code them as pursuit rather than merely exploration … Iraq’s pursuit ended in 1991, when in the aftermath of the first Gulf War it was forced to give up its mass destruction capabilities and submit to an intensive verification regime. … one could reasonably code Iran as dropping from pursuit down to exploration either after 2003, based on the 2007 National Intelligence Assessment, or in 2015, when Iran agreed to significantly constrain its nuclear program under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. … Syria returned to exploring in 2007 following the destruction of the Al-Kibar facility by Israel on September 6, 2007. There is no publicly available evidence of political decisions to either continue or cease activity on which to base a coding of continued exploration.”Hide quote

    Thirty-one countries at least opened the door to potential nuclear weapons programs, seventeen of those launched weapons programs, and ten acquired deliverable nuclear weapons. But proliferation has also been complemented by de-proliferation: one state that developed nuclear weapons subsequently gave them up, seven of those who launched programs never or have not yet acquired, and fourteen countries halted their exploration of nuclear weapons without launching programs. … Libya returned to no activity in 2003, when Libya announced that it was abandoning its weapons of mass destruction programs and allowing international inspections. … Iraqi exploration is coded as 1975, though the evidence is somewhat circumstantial, and pursuit is coded as 1981, returning to no activity in 1991. … Jo and Gartzke code pursuit as 1973. … Iraq’s activities prior to 1981, including as described by Braut-Hegghammer, are sufficiently robust that one might reasonably code them as pursuit rather than merely exploration … Iraq’s pursuit ended in 1991, when in the aftermath of the first Gulf War it was forced to give up its mass destruction capabilities and submit to an intensive verification regime. … one could reasonably code Iran as dropping from pursuit down to exploration either after 2003, based on the 2007 National Intelligence Assessment, or in 2015, when Iran agreed to significantly constrain its nuclear program under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. … Syria returned to exploring in 2007 following the destruction of the Al-Kibar facility by Israel on September 6, 2007. There is no publicly available evidence of political decisions to either continue or cease activity on which to base a coding of continued exploration.

11. Economic Sanctions: New Directions for the 21st Century (presentation of Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 3rd edition)

    Peterson Institute for International Economics (Hufbauer, Schott, Elliott and Oegg), 2008-07 · supports

    “204 observations from World War I to 2000 … Sanctions “succeed” in about one-third of the cases overall, but the success rate depends importantly on the type of objectives sought … Success means sanctions contributed significantly to the partial or full achievement of the foreign policy goal … Targets are friendly or democratic countries, rather than enemies, autocrats … Libya – Success at Last? … But only after 20+ years … Destabilization of either existing regime unlikely … Carrots plus sticks strategy more effective than sticks alone … Do not expect quick success against autocratic regimes”Hide quote

    204 observations from World War I to 2000 … Sanctions “succeed” in about one-third of the cases overall, but the success rate depends importantly on the type of objectives sought … Success means sanctions contributed significantly to the partial or full achievement of the foreign policy goal … Targets are friendly or democratic countries, rather than enemies, autocrats … Libya – Success at Last? … But only after 20+ years … Destabilization of either existing regime unlikely … Carrots plus sticks strategy more effective than sticks alone … Do not expect quick success against autocratic regimes

12. Why Economic Sanctions Still Do Not Work (Pape, International Security, with Elliott's reply), abstract

    Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, 1998 · contests

    “Robert Pape of Dartmouth College challenged the findings in Economic Sanctions Reconsidered … One of the study’s coauthors, Kimberly Ann Elliott of the Institute of International Economics, argues here that Pape mischaracterizes the principal objective of the work, which, according to Elliott, was to determine if and how economic sanctions contributed to desired foreign policy outcomes—not, as Pape contends, whether they caused them.”Hide quote

    Robert Pape of Dartmouth College challenged the findings in Economic Sanctions Reconsidered … One of the study’s coauthors, Kimberly Ann Elliott of the Institute of International Economics, argues here that Pape mischaracterizes the principal objective of the work, which, according to Elliott, was to determine if and how economic sanctions contributed to desired foreign policy outcomes—not, as Pape contends, whether they caused them.

13. Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions 1945–2005: Updating the TIES Dataset (Morgan, Bapat and Kobayashi, Conflict Management and Peace Science 31:5), accepted manuscript

    White Rose Research Online (University of Leeds), 2014 · supports

    “The new version of the Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions (TIES) data set includes 1,412 cases in which one or more states threatened and/or imposed economic sanctions on a single target during the 1945-2005 period. … Sanctions were imposed in 845 of these cases (60%) leaving 567 cases that involved only threats (40%). … The U.S. is the primary sender in a bit over 48% of the cases … we see 384 cases identified as successful if we employ the strict definition of sanctions that requires total or partial acquiescence on the part of the target. Under this definition of ‘success’ sanctions may be considered successful in 27.2% of the cases, if we consider all cases, or in 37.5% of the cases for which we have data for the final outcome. … We see a 40.8% success rate in the pool of all cases and a remarkable 56% success rate when cases with missing final outcomes are removed. … The third definition based on the settlement nature scores identifies 454 successes, which translates to a 32.2% success rate in the full sample and a 44% success rate in the restricted sample.”Hide quote

    The new version of the Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions (TIES) data set includes 1,412 cases in which one or more states threatened and/or imposed economic sanctions on a single target during the 1945-2005 period. … Sanctions were imposed in 845 of these cases (60%) leaving 567 cases that involved only threats (40%). … The U.S. is the primary sender in a bit over 48% of the cases … we see 384 cases identified as successful if we employ the strict definition of sanctions that requires total or partial acquiescence on the part of the target. Under this definition of ‘success’ sanctions may be considered successful in 27.2% of the cases, if we consider all cases, or in 37.5% of the cases for which we have data for the final outcome. … We see a 40.8% success rate in the pool of all cases and a remarkable 56% success rate when cases with missing final outcomes are removed. … The third definition based on the settlement nature scores identifies 454 successes, which translates to a 32.2% success rate in the full sample and a 44% success rate in the restricted sample.

14. The Global Sanctions Data Base – Release 4 (WIFO Working Paper 681/2024)

    Austrian Institute of Economic Research (WIFO), 2024-07 · complicates

    “Covering the period 1950-2023, it contains 1,547 sanction cases … The GSDB excludes sanction threats. Additionally, the GSDB defines nine political objectives (policy change, regime destabilization, ending territorial conflict, war prevention, ending war, terrorism, human rights violation, restoration of democracy, and other objectives that do not fit into any of the aforementioned categories) and five objective-specific success score categories (total success, partial success, negotiation settlement, failure, and ongoing for cases that have not been repealed) for each sanction objective.”Hide quote

    Covering the period 1950-2023, it contains 1,547 sanction cases … The GSDB excludes sanction threats. Additionally, the GSDB defines nine political objectives (policy change, regime destabilization, ending territorial conflict, war prevention, ending war, terrorism, human rights violation, restoration of democracy, and other objectives that do not fit into any of the aforementioned categories) and five objective-specific success score categories (total success, partial success, negotiation settlement, failure, and ongoing for cases that have not been repealed) for each sanction objective.

15. Economics Faculty Create First-Ever Global Sanctions Data Base

    Drexel University LeBow College of Business, 2021-08-06 · complicates

    “Among other things, they found that more than 190 countries have imposed sanctions, and that the rate of success has been 30 to 50 percent.”Hide quote

    Among other things, they found that more than 190 countries have imposed sanctions, and that the rate of success has been 30 to 50 percent.

16. When Does Aerial Bombing Work? (Horowitz and Reiter, Journal of Conflict Resolution 45:2), abstract

    IDEAS/RePEc, 2001-04 · supports

    “Multivariate probit analysis is used to test three hypotheses on all instances of air power coercion from 1917 to 1999 … Results show that coercion is more likely to work if the target's military vulnerability is higher, but higher levels of civilian vulnerability have no effect on the chances of coercion success; that target regime type has no effect; and that success is less likely when the attacker demands the target change its leadership.”Hide quote

    Multivariate probit analysis is used to test three hypotheses on all instances of air power coercion from 1917 to 1999 … Results show that coercion is more likely to work if the target's military vulnerability is higher, but higher levels of civilian vulnerability have no effect on the chances of coercion success; that target regime type has no effect; and that success is less likely when the attacker demands the target change its leadership.

17. Why Bombing Syria Isn't Likely to Work

    Reason (Ronald Bailey), 2013-09-06 · supports

    “"Of our 53 cases of air power coercion, 19 (36 percent) were successes and 34 (64 percent) were failures," they report. Horowitz and Reiter define air power coercion a "success" when a target changes its behavior as demanded without being attacked.”Hide quote

    "Of our 53 cases of air power coercion, 19 (36 percent) were successes and 34 (64 percent) were failures," they report. Horowitz and Reiter define air power coercion a "success" when a target changes its behavior as demanded without being attacked.

18. H-Diplo/ISSF Roundtable XI-9 on Nicholas L. Miller, Stopping the Bomb (Cornell University Press, 2018), review by Matthew Fuhrmann

    H-Diplo/ISSF, 2019-01-27 · complicates

    “As Miller’s analysis shows, once a program had started, sanctions succeeded in only three of 22 cases (135). Thus, based on this analysis, sanctions appear to work about 14 percent of the time—a pretty dismal success rate. … Miller correctly points out, however, that we cannot infer much about the value of sanctions as an instrument of nonproliferation by limiting our analysis to these episodes. We must also look at the cases where the prospect of sanctions deterred a country from starting a bomb program in the first place. Once we do that, a much more sanguine picture emerges. … Sanctions threats can work if they are credible and if the potential proliferator is highly dependent on the United States.”Hide quote

    As Miller’s analysis shows, once a program had started, sanctions succeeded in only three of 22 cases (135). Thus, based on this analysis, sanctions appear to work about 14 percent of the time—a pretty dismal success rate. … Miller correctly points out, however, that we cannot infer much about the value of sanctions as an instrument of nonproliferation by limiting our analysis to these episodes. We must also look at the cases where the prospect of sanctions deterred a country from starting a bomb program in the first place. Once we do that, a much more sanguine picture emerges. … Sanctions threats can work if they are credible and if the potential proliferator is highly dependent on the United States.

19. Rupal Mehta, Delaying Doomsday: The Politics of Nuclear Reversal (event summary)

    Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Center for Global Security Research, 2020-02-25 · supports

    “the important role that external incentives—sanctions and rewards can play in nuclear negotiations, especially when the threat to use force remains 'on the table'. Specifically, this book argues that nuclear reversal is most likely when states are threatened with sanctions and offered face-saving rewards that help them withstand domestic political opposition. … the study employs a unified, multi-method observational research design to identify patterns of behavior over time among all proliferators. In addition to quantitative analyses that systematically explores nuclear reversal historically, the book incorporates three in-depth case studies comparing the Indian, Iranian, and North Korean nuclear programs”Hide quote

    the important role that external incentives—sanctions and rewards can play in nuclear negotiations, especially when the threat to use force remains 'on the table'. Specifically, this book argues that nuclear reversal is most likely when states are threatened with sanctions and offered face-saving rewards that help them withstand domestic political opposition. … the study employs a unified, multi-method observational research design to identify patterns of behavior over time among all proliferators. In addition to quantitative analyses that systematically explores nuclear reversal historically, the book incorporates three in-depth case studies comparing the Indian, Iranian, and North Korean nuclear programs

20. 'Cross the Line and I'm Gonna Do Nothing' (Boston Globe)

    Dartmouth News, 2013-06-24 · contests

    “In his 2006 book, Calculating Credibility, Press examined three 20th-century cases … 'When I went into this, I was certain that backing down was going to hurt credibility,' Press said. But what he found was that even if the leaders backed down from their original threats, they were still taken seriously in the future.”Hide quote

    In his 2006 book, Calculating Credibility, Press examined three 20th-century cases … 'When I went into this, I was certain that backing down was going to hurt credibility,' Press said. But what he found was that even if the leaders backed down from their original threats, they were still taken seriously in the future.

21. Revisiting Reputation: How Past Actions Matter in International Politics (Weisiger and Yarhi-Milo, International Organization 69:2)

    Princeton University, 2015-11-11 · supports

    “We find that past action is closely connected to subsequent dispute initiation and that the effects of reputation generalize beyond the immediate circumstances of the past dispute. Although reputation is not all-important, leaders are well advised to consider the reputational implications of policy decisions in international conflict. … juxtaposing reputation for resolve to power and interests is misleading when past actions influence observers' beliefs about interests”Hide quote

    We find that past action is closely connected to subsequent dispute initiation and that the effects of reputation generalize beyond the immediate circumstances of the past dispute. Although reputation is not all-important, leaders are well advised to consider the reputational implications of policy decisions in international conflict. … juxtaposing reputation for resolve to power and interests is misleading when past actions influence observers' beliefs about interests

22. Saudi crown prince says will develop nuclear bomb if Iran does

    Al Jazeera, 2018-03-15 · supports

    “'Saudi Arabia does not want to acquire any nuclear bomb, but without a doubt, if Iran developed a nuclear bomb, we will follow suit as soon as possible,' Mohammad bin Salman, popularly known as MBS, told US broadcaster CBS in an interview set to air on Sunday.”Hide quote

    'Saudi Arabia does not want to acquire any nuclear bomb, but without a doubt, if Iran developed a nuclear bomb, we will follow suit as soon as possible,' Mohammad bin Salman, popularly known as MBS, told US broadcaster CBS in an interview set to air on Sunday.

23. Divining Nuclear Intentions: A Review Essay (Potter and Mukhatzhanova, International Security), abstract

    Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, 2008 · contests

    “Both works challenge conventional conceptions of the sources of nuclear weapons decisions and offer new insights into why past predictions of rapid proliferation failed to materialize and why current prognoses about rampant proliferation are similarly flawed.”Hide quote

    Both works challenge conventional conceptions of the sources of nuclear weapons decisions and offer new insights into why past predictions of rapid proliferation failed to materialize and why current prognoses about rampant proliferation are similarly flawed.

24. Peace Time: Cease-Fire Agreements and the Durability of Peace (Fortna), book page

    Princeton University Press, 2004 · supports

    “Strong agreements markedly lessen the risk of further war. Mechanisms such as demilitarized zones, dispute resolution commissions, peacekeeping, and external guarantees can help maintain peace between even the deadliest of foes.”Hide quote

    Strong agreements markedly lessen the risk of further war. Mechanisms such as demilitarized zones, dispute resolution commissions, peacekeeping, and external guarantees can help maintain peace between even the deadliest of foes.