Iran's Actions Abroad: Proxies, Plots, Hostage-Taking and Attacks, 1979–2026
Courts in Argentina, Belgium and the US have tied Iranian officials to bombings and murder plots, and Iran-aligned militias attacked US forces in a burst in 2023–24, while counts of plots rest on limited sources. [1][3][4][11][13][17]
Confirmed attacks on US and coalition forces
Attacks the Washington Institute's Militia Spotlight tracker confirmed and gave a serial number, by month. Claimed attacks on Israel are excluded.
Attacks per month, by month
Attacks the Washington Institute's Militia Spotlight tracker confirmed and gave a serial number, by month. Claimed attacks on Israel are excluded. Read as confirmed attacks on US and coalition forces: Attacks per month. 2 dated events are numbered on a strip under the graph and listed below it. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- Confirmed attacks (WINEP)
Events marked above
Attacks restart after an 18-month pause in Iraq
The State Department says attacks restarted on 18 October 2023 after "an 18-month general pause in attacks in Iraq and a six-month pause in attacks in Syria".
Source: US Department of State [9]
Temporary cessation of anti-US attacks
The tracker describes "the temporary cessation of anti-U.S. attacks in February-July 2024".
Observations 4
Iran-aligned militias attacked US forces more than 200 times before this war
The attacks came in a burst and then nearly stopped
About four in five of the confirmed attacks fell in the first four months, to January 2024 (chart). 17 From February to mid-July 2024 the tracker confirmed only a handful, during what it calls a "temporary cessation". Attacks resumed at a lower rate from August.
Before October 2023 there had been a long pause
The State Department says the October 2023 attacks "came after an 18-month general pause in attacks in Iraq and a six-month pause in attacks in Syria" (marked on the chart). 9
The pauses show the militias' attacks start and stop. The sources do not say whether Iran ordered the pauses or the restarts.
The State Department found no sign Iran knew of 7 October in advance
It says "there is no evidence that Iran knew about Hamas's October 7 attacks on Israel in advance", while its support "enabled Hamas to execute the attack". 9
About this data
Full published range: 2023-10–2024-12. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – The tracker's whole run: from 18 October 2023 to its last update on 3 December 2024, so the first and last months are partial. Monthly counts are derived here from the serial numbers, which run in date order from 1 to 223: each month's count is its highest serial minus the previous month's highest. Twenty-one serials have no row on the page; each falls between dated rows in the same month, so the derived months are unaffected.
Houthi materiel inspected by the UN Panel of Experts, by where similar items are developed or operated, 2023–24
Number of inspected items the Panel found strongly similar to materiel developed or operated by each state or group, in its final report of October 2024.
Inspected items
- Iran53
- Armed groups in Iraq20
- Armed groups in Lebanon11
- Armed groups in the occupied Palestinian territory5
- Armed groups in Bahrain1
- Armed groups in Somalia1
Source: UN Security Council, Panel of Experts on Yemen [10]
Observations 2
Most Houthi weapons the UN inspected resemble Iranian materiel
The UN Panel found strong similarities to Iranian materiel in more inspected items than to any other source (chart). It says the Houthis receive "technical assistance, training, weapons and financial support" from Iran, Iraqi armed groups and Hezbollah. 10
The Panel reports resemblance, not proven supply
The finding is that items are "similar" to those Iran develops or operates, not that each was shipped from Iran. 10 Similar items are also operated by armed groups in Iraq and Lebanon.
About this data
Paragraph 70 of S/2024/731. The Panel reports similarity, not proof of supply, and an item can resemble materiel in more than one place, so the bars are not exclusive and do not add to a total. Iran denies supplying the Houthis.
Court findings, convictions and charges, 2011–2026
Court rulings and convictions are shown separately from charges, which are allegations that have not been tested in court.
Filled marker: major event Hollow: minor
Showing 7 of 7 events
2011
· Charge only
Alleged plot to kill the Saudi ambassador in Washington
US criminal complaint: two men charged; the outcome was not checked for this report.
Source: US Department of Justice [7]
2021
· Conviction
2018 plot to bomb an Iranian opposition rally near Paris
Belgian court, Antwerp: Iranian diplomat Assadollah Assadi convicted, 20 years.
Source: BBC News [3]
2024
· Court finding · major event
1992 Israeli Embassy bombing (29 dead) and 1994 AMIA bombing (85 dead), Buenos Aires
Argentina, Federal Criminal Cassation Court: attacks were by Hezbollah, "sponsored by the government of Iran"; crimes against humanity.
Source: Buenos Aires Times [1]
· Charge only
Alleged tasking of Farhad Shakeri to surveil and plot against President-elect Trump
US criminal complaint: Shakeri charged; "remains at large and is believed to reside in Iran".
Source: US Department of Justice [6]
2025
· Conviction · major event
Plot to kill journalist Masih Alinejad in New York
US federal court: Rafat Amirov and Polad Omarov sentenced to 25 years each; DOJ says the IRGC offered $500,000.
Source: US Department of Justice [4]
2026
· Conviction
Second plot against Alinejad, organised by Farhad Shakeri
US federal court: Carlisle Rivera sentenced to 15 years.
Source: US Department of Justice [5]
· Charge only
AMIA bombing: seven Iranians and a Lebanese charged, including four former officials
Argentine federal judge (Rafecas): charged as indirect perpetrators; trial in absentia under constitutional challenge.
Source: TodoJujuy [2]
Sources: Buenos Aires Times [1]; TodoJujuy [2]; BBC News [3]; US Department of Justice [4]; US Department of Justice [5]; US Department of Justice [6]; US Department of Justice [7]
Observations 4
Argentina's highest criminal court held Iran-backed Hezbollah responsible for two bombings
In April 2024 the Cassation Court ruled that both Buenos Aires bombings were carried out by Hezbollah "sponsored by the government of Iran", and blamed then-president Rafsanjani and other officials. 1 Iran denies involvement; no one has been tried in person.
US courts have sentenced men hired to kill a critic of the regime on US soil
The US cases here are plots, and the Trump case is only a charge
About this data
Each entry is as of the date shown, except the first Alinejad case, whose status is as of 30 October 2025.
US state sponsors of terrorism, by date designated
The US list as last readable on state.gov, a copy captured on 31 December 2025.
Filled marker: major event Hollow: minor
Showing 4 of 4 events
1979
· Designated
Syria
Still listed in the 31 Dec 2025 copy; later status unverified.
Source: US Department of State [8]
1984
· Designated · major event
Iran
Source: US Department of State [8]
2017
· Designated
North Korea
Source: US Department of State [8]
2021
· Designated
Cuba
Source: US Department of State [8]
Source: US Department of State [8]
Observations 2
Iran has been on the US terrorism-sponsor list since 1984
Iran is the longest-listed state on the list after Syria (timeline). 8 Whether Syria has since been removed could not be checked, because state.gov refused automated requests.
The State Department calls Iran the leading state sponsor
Its 2023 report calls Iran "the leading state sponsor of terrorism". It says Iran gave Hezbollah "hundreds of millions of dollars" and "thousands of rockets, missiles, and small arms" since 2006. 9 This is the US government's own assessment, with no published accounting behind the dollar figure.
Plots abroad attributed to Iran, in one author's dataset
Counts by Matthew Levitt of the Washington Institute, from open sources. He calls the dataset "in no way a comprehensive listing", and target categories overlap, so they do not add to the total.
| Measure | Count | Period |
|---|---|---|
| Plots in the dataset | 98 [11] | Dec 1979 – Dec 2021 |
| Of which targeted dissidents | 42 [11] | Dec 1979 – Dec 2021 |
| Of which targeted Jews or Israelis | 31 [11] | Dec 1979 – Dec 2021 |
| Plots in the decade 2011–2021 | 55 [11] | 2011–2021 |
| Plots in Europe in the decade after 9/11 | 2 [11] | 2001–2011 |
| Plots in Europe since 2011 | 17 [11] | 2011–2021 |
| Plots in the expanded dataset | 218 [12] | 1979 – Oct 2024 |
| Of which in Europe | 102 [12] | 1979 – Oct 2024 |
| Plots in Europe, 2021–2024 | 54 [12] | 2021–2024 |
| Of which targeted Iranian dissidents | 34 [12] | 2021–2024 |
| Of which used criminal perpetrators | 16 [12] | 2021–2024 |
Sources: Combating Terrorism Center at West Point (Matthew Levitt) [11]; International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (Matthew Levitt and Sarah Boches) [12]
Observations 3
Most recent plots in Europe targeted Iranian dissidents
MI5's statements on Iran-backed plots in the UK
MI5's own totals, published without a case list or definitions, measuring different things over different years.
- potentially lethal Iran-backed plots tracked
- more than 20
- arrests in the UK from Iran-linked operations
- more than 50
Sources: MI5 (the Security Service) [13]; MI5 (the Security Service) [14]
Observations 3
MI5 reports a rising Iranian threat in the UK, by its own unaudited count
MI5 says the IRGC was behind the spring 2026 arson attacks
The targets MI5 names are mostly opponents, media and Jewish sites
The US Secretary of State designated Iran "a state sponsor of wrongful detention" on 27 February 2026, the day before the war.
The Iranian regime must stop taking hostages and release all Americans unjustly detained in Iran, steps that could end this designation and associated actions
Observations 1
The US named Iran a state sponsor of wrongful detention the day before the war
On 27 February 2026 the Secretary of State designated Iran "a state sponsor of wrongful detention", citing "its pattern of hostage-taking and arbitrary detention of Americans". 15
He said releasing detained Americans were "steps that could end this designation". 15 No series of cases by year was found.
About this data
What this measures. Court outcomes, US designations, one tracker of attacks on US forces, one UN weapons inspection and counts of plots from one researcher and from MI5. Each has its own counter, named beside every figure.
What it does not measure. No source counts plots that were foiled against those carried out. Houthi attacks on shipping are not shown because ACLED's counts sit behind a login. The Global Terrorism Database, which could give a longer record, needs registration and was not used.
How confident to be. Court findings and convictions are the firmest evidence here. The State Department reports and MI5 statements are official assessments without published evidence; the Washington Institute and Levitt are independent but hawk-leaning. The militia tracker counts only attacks it could confirm, so it is a floor.
Commonly mistaken for. The militia attacks are often cited as one continuous campaign; the chart shows a four-month burst and a long lull. A charge such as the Shakeri complaint is often reported as if proven.
Dates. As of late October 2026. The attack tracker stops on 3 December 2024; Levitt's counts run to October 2024; MI5's latest statement is 13 October 2026; court outcomes are dated on the timeline.
Related Data
Iran's Nuclear Programme: Stockpile, Inspections and Assessments, 2011–2026
Iran kept within the 2015 deal's uranium limit until after the US left it, then built a large stock enriched to 60%, and since the strikes the IAEA cannot say where it is. [1][9][15][50]
Total enriched stock, kg of uranium
Kilograms of uranium in Iran's enriched stock, as reported in each IAEA quarterly report, against the 2015 deal's limit of 202.8 kg. Figures were verified by inspectors to February 2021 and estimated by the IAEA after that. The last figure is the IAEA's estimate for 13 June 2025, the day Israel's strikes began; there is no later figure (as of 1 September 2026).
kg of uranium (not of UF6 gas), by date the IAEA figure describes
Kilograms of uranium in Iran's enriched stock, as reported in each IAEA quarterly report, against the 2015 deal's limit of 202.8 kg. Figures were verified by inspectors to February 2021 and estimated by the IAEA after that. The last figure is the IAEA's estimate for 13 June 2025, the day Israel's strikes began; there is no later figure (as of 1 September 2026). Read as total enriched stock, kg of uranium: kg of uranium (not of UF6 gas). Dashed segments cross 1 definitional break in the source, explained in Method Changes below this graph. 6 dated events are numbered on a strip under the graph and listed below it. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- Enriched UraniumUranium processed to raise its share of U-235, the form that sustains a nuclear chain reaction. The percentage is that share: weapons typically use about 90%.
- Limit under the 2015 deal
Events marked above
US leaves the 2015 deal
President Trump announces US withdrawal from the JCPOA.
Source: Arms Control Association [9]
Stock limit exceeded
The IAEA verifies 205.0 kg, above the 202.8 kg limit.
Enrichment above 3.67% begins
The IAEA's monitors show Iran enriching above the deal's 3.67% cap.
IAEA loses monitoring data
Iran stops applying the Additional Protocol; the IAEA loses access to its monitoring data and to complementary access visits.
60% enrichment begins
Israeli strikes begin; US strikes 22 June
Attacks on Iran's nuclear facilities ran from 13 to 24 June 2025. The IAEA stopped verification and had withdrawn its inspectors by the end of June.
Vertical dashed lines mark measurement changes. See method changes.
Source: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) [50]
Observations 4
While the deal held, the stock stayed under its limit
Every IAEA report from February 2017 to May 2019 found the stock under the 2015 deal's limit and enrichment no higher than 3.67%. 17 26 In August 2018 the IAEA said it had made complementary access visits "to all the sites and locations in Iran which it needed to visit". 23
In 2016 Iran slightly exceeded the deal's cap on heavy water, a material that is not enriched uranium, and was back within the limit by December. 9
The limits were broken only after the US left the deal
The total dips when low-enriched uranium is fed into further enrichment
The total fell in four reports between 2021 and 2024. For August 2021 the IAEA gives the reason: uranium enriched to 2% was used "to produce uranium enriched up to 5%". 35 The other reports record the falls without explaining them, so a dip in this line is not, on its own, a sign that Iran slowed down.
Totals after February 2021 are IAEA estimates
From February 2021 the IAEA lost access to its monitoring data, and from May 2021 it could no longer verify the total; each later figure is its estimate from Iran's declarations and partial checks. 34 The final figure, for 13 June 2025, also rests on "the past operating records" of Iran's facilities. 50
Method Changes
2021-05-22: IAEA estimates replace verified totals
GOV/2021/28: "For this reporting period, the Agency has not been able to verify Iran's total enriched uranium stockpile", because it had lost access to its monitoring data on 23 February 2021. From this report on, each total is an IAEA estimate built from Iran's declarations and partial verification. [50]
About this data
Full published range: 2017-02-18–2025-06-13. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – The IAEA's quarterly reports under the 2015 deal began in February 2016, but the four 2016 reports state only that the stock "has not exceeded" the limit; the first published quantity is for 18 February 2017 (GOV/2017/10). The last is the estimate for 13 June 2025 in GOV/2026/50; the IAEA has published no figure for any later date, so the line stops there. To May 2019 the reports give "uranium enriched up to 3.67%", the only level Iran then held; from August 2019 they give the total at all levels. One extra point, 1 July 2019, comes from the IAEA's special report on the breach (GOV/INF/2019/8).
Total enriched stock, kg of uranium
Each point is the figure in that quarter's IAEA report (sources 17–49, 51 and the series source), in kilograms of uranium. The deal's limit of 300 kg of UF6 gas "corresponds to 202.8 kg of uranium" in the IAEA's own conversion; it is drawn flat across the whole range for reference, although Iran stopped observing it in July 2019.
Uranium enriched to 60%, kg of uranium
Kilograms of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235, in the form of UF6 gas, as estimated in each IAEA quarterly report from the first one after production began. Weapons uranium typically contains about 90%, according to the Congressional Research Service. The last figure, for 13 June 2025, is the IAEA's latest; it has published none since (as of 1 September 2026).
kg of uranium (in UF6 form), by date the IAEA figure describes
Kilograms of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235, in the form of UF6 gas, as estimated in each IAEA quarterly report from the first one after production began. Weapons uranium typically contains about 90%, according to the Congressional Research Service. The last figure, for 13 June 2025, is the IAEA's latest; it has published none since (as of 1 September 2026). Read as uranium enriched to 60%, kg of uranium: kg of uranium (in UF6 form). 1 dated event is numbered on a strip under the graph and listed below it. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- Enriched UraniumUranium processed to raise its share of U-235, the form that sustains a nuclear chain reaction. The percentage is that share: weapons typically use about 90%.
Events marked above
IAEA Board finds non-compliance
The Board adopts resolution GOV/2025/38 on Iran's non-compliance with its safeguards agreement.
Source: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) [51]
Observations 3
The 60% stock more than doubled in the seven months before the strikes
Most of the last 60% figure was verified, but no one has seen it since
The IAEA's last estimate, for the day the strikes began, is 440.9 kg of 60% uranium. 50
It had verified 432.9 kg of that. 50 As of September 2026 it "cannot provide any information on the current size, composition or whereabouts" of the stock. 1
Grossi said after the June 2025 strikes that most of it, "but less than 70 percent", was in the tunnels at Isfahan, as ISIS reports him. 2 Iran's foreign minister said in March 2026 that it is "under the rubble" and Iran has "no plan" to recover it. 3
Iran is the only state without nuclear weapons making 60% uranium
Subtleties
60% is not weapons grade, but most of the work is done
Uranium for weapons typically contains about 90% U-235. 3 CRS notes that "relatively little additional effort" is needed to get there from Iran's higher-enriched stocks, which is why US estimates of the time to weapons-grade uranium were counted in days before the 2025 strikes (see the estimates table below).
About this data
Full published range: 2021-05-22–2025-06-13. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – Iran began enriching to 60% on 17 April 2021 (GOV/2021/28); the first quarterly figure is for 22 May 2021. All points are IAEA estimates. For 13 June 2025 the IAEA says it verified 432.9 kg of the 440.9 kg.
Uranium enriched to 60%, kg of uranium
Each point is the "uranium enriched up to 60% U-235" figure in that quarter's IAEA report (sources 34–49 and 51); the last is the series source above (GOV/2026/50). The small fall in February 2024 is in the IAEA's own figures.
IAEA Board of Governors votes on Iran resolutions, 2026
How the 34 voting Board members cast their votes on the two 2026 resolutions on Iran's safeguards non-compliance. The September resolution sent the matter to the UN Security Council and General Assembly.
In favour · Board members
- GOV/2026/61, 9 September 2026 (referral to the UN)23
- GOV/2026/40, 10 June 202621
Show all breakdowns
| Category | In favour | Against | Abstained | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| GOV/2026/40, 10 June 2026 | 21 | 3 | 10 | 34 |
| GOV/2026/61, 9 September 2026 (referral to the UN) | 23 | 3 | 8 | 34 |
Source: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors, via Iran Watch [13]; International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors, via Iran Watch [14]
Observations 1
The Board sent Iran's case to the UN, with three against and many abstaining
In June 2026 the Board recalled that Iran's failures "constitute non-compliance" and said the IAEA could not verify "that there has been no diversion" of material to weapons. 1 In September it asked for its resolutions to go to the UN Security Council and General Assembly. 14 Each 2026 resolution passed with three votes against and at least eight abstentions. 13 14
About this data
Each total is the sum of the vote counts the resolution itself records (21 + 3 + 10 and 23 + 3 + 8). The June 2025 non-compliance resolution (GOV/2025/38) and the November 2025 resolution (GOV/2025/71) are not charted: neither text could be fetched (both URLs returned errors), so their votes are not confirmed at source.
What inspectors could see, 2016–2026
What the IAEA could verify in Iran at each step, from the 2015 deal taking effect to its latest report.
Filled marker: major event Hollow: minor
Showing 12 of 12 events
2016
· Inspections or agreed access
Implementation Day: the 2015 deal's limits take effect
Source: Arms Control Association [10]
2018
· Inspections or agreed access
Complementary access to every site it "needed to visit"
2021
· Access lost
Iran stops applying the Additional Protocol, ending complementary access
· Access lost
No access to its monitoring data
· Access lost
Can no longer verify the total stock; figures become estimates
2025
– · Strikes · major event
Strikes on Iran's nuclear sites; verification stops and inspectors leave
· Access lost
Iranian law suspends cooperation with the IAEA
– · Inspections or agreed access
Cairo agreement on inspection procedures, then ended by Iran
2026
· Inspections or agreed access
Inspections at 7 of 13 facilities not struck in 2025, none of the 8 struck
· Strikes · major event
US and Israeli strikes; verification stops again
– · Inspections or agreed access
One inspection, at the Bushehr power plant
· Access lost
No information on the size, composition or location of the enriched stock
Sources: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) [1]; Institute for Science and International Security (David Albright, Sarah Burkhard, Spencer Faragasso, Andrea Stricker) [2]; Arms Control Association [10]; International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) [23]; International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) [34]
Observations 2
Inspectors' access narrowed in steps, long before the war
What the IAEA and US intelligence said about weapons work, 2011–2026
Official statements on whether Iran had a weapons programme, by date. They are records of what was said, not measurements.
Showing 8 of 8 events
2011
· IAEA
Weapons-relevant work "took place under a structured programme"
Before the end of 2003, and "some activities may still be ongoing".
2015
· IAEA
A "coordinated effort" before the end of 2003
It "did not advance beyond feasibility and scientific studies", with "no credible indications" of such work after 2009.
2024
· US intelligence
"Iran is not currently undertaking the key nuclear weapons-development activities necessary to produce a testable nuclear device"
As quoted by CRS.
Source: Congressional Research Service (Paul K. Kerr), via EveryCRSReport [3]
2025
· US intelligence
"Iran is not building a nuclear weapon"
Khamenei "has not reauthorized" the programme, "though pressure has probably built on him".
· IAEA
"no credible indications of an ongoing, undeclared structured nuclear programme"
Three sites were "part of an undeclared structured nuclear programme … until the early 2000s"; Iran "sanitised locations".
2026
· IAEA
No information in June 2025 on "a structured systematic … program to build or to construct a nuclear weapon"
IAEA chief Grossi, as quoted by CRS.
Source: Congressional Research Service (Paul K. Kerr), via EveryCRSReport [3]
· US intelligence
Iran was "intending to try to recover" its nuclear infrastructure
No judgment on a weapons decision.
· Agreement
"Iran reaffirms that it shall not procure or develop nuclear weapons"
US–Iran memorandum, as quoted by CRS.
Source: Congressional Research Service (Paul K. Kerr), via EveryCRSReport [3]
Sources: Congressional Research Service (Paul K. Kerr), via EveryCRSReport [3]; Office of the Director of National Intelligence [4]; Office of the Director of National Intelligence [5]; International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) [6]; International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) [7]; International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) [8]
Observations 7
The IAEA found an undeclared weapons-relevant programme that ran to the early 2000s
The IAEA's findings of 2011, 2015 and 2025 all place organised weapons-relevant work before the end of 2003. 8 7 6
The 2025 report adds that Iran used about 10 kg of undeclared uranium metal in 2002–03 and kept material from the old programme at Turquzabad until 2018. Iran also "sanitised locations". 6
Because of this, the IAEA said in May 2025 it "will not be in a position to provide assurance" that the programme is "exclusively peaceful". 6
In May 2025 the IAEA found no ongoing structured programme
Grossi: no sign of a "structured systematic" weapons programme in June 2025
In March 2026 Grossi said that in June 2025, when the first strikes came, the IAEA had no "information indicating that there was a structured systematic [Iranian] program to build or to construct a nuclear weapon". 3
US intelligence said in 2025 that Iran was not building a weapon
The March 2025 threat assessment judged that Iran "is not building a nuclear weapon" and that Khamenei had not restarted the programme halted in 2003. It added that pressure on him to do so had "probably built". 4
The 2026 assessment does not say whether Iran had decided to build one
Talks were under way in the days before the war
In June 2026 Iran signed a pledge not to make nuclear weapons
The June 2026 US–Iran memorandum states that "Iran reaffirms that it shall not procure or develop nuclear weapons". 3
How close Iran was to weapons-grade uranium or a weapon, by source and date
Published estimates, which measure different things: time to weapons-grade uranium, time to a weapon, or the size of the stock.
| As of | Estimate | What it measures | Who, and how it is known |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mar 2022 | As little as one week | Weapons-grade uranium for one weapon | State Department official (CRS) [3] |
| Before June 2025 | Three to six months | "Breakout time" (not defined) | US intelligence, "reportedly" (FDD) [12] |
| Nov 2024 | Enough for "more than a dozen" weapons if further enriched | Size of the stock, not time | ODNI report (CRS) [3] |
| May 2025 | "Probably less than one week" | Weapons-grade uranium for one weapon | Defense Intelligence Agency (CRS) [3] |
| Before June 2025 | "Within months" | A first weapon not carried by a missile | ISIS's own judgment [2] |
| Jul 2025 | About two years | Set back by the June strikes | Pentagon (FDD) [12] |
| May 2026 | 9 to 12 months | Able to build a weapon | US intelligence, per Reuters (FDD; Reuters not read) [12] |
| May 2026 | At least two and a half years | A weapon, without foreign help | FDD's own judgment [12] |
| Jun 2026 | "More than a year"; "no identifiable route" to weapons-grade uranium | A first weapon not carried by a missile | ISIS's own judgment [2] |
| Oct 2026 | "Unclear" | — | CRS [3] |
Sources: Institute for Science and International Security (David Albright, Sarah Burkhard, Spencer Faragasso, Andrea Stricker) [2]; Congressional Research Service (Paul K. Kerr), via EveryCRSReport [3]; Foundation for Defense of Democracies (Andrea Stricker) [12]
Observations 3
Before the strikes, US estimates put weapons-grade uranium days away
ISIS: for the first time in 20 years, no identifiable route
The estimates measure different things
Time to weapons-grade uranium, time to a working weapon and the size of the stock are different measures, and the table keeps them apart. Most post-strike figures are reported second-hand, through CRS or FDD; CRS concludes that "the current assessed timeline is unclear". 3
What did the strikes do to Iran's enriched uranium?
Answers from Iran, the US government, an independent institute and the IAEA, none of them independently checked.
under the rubble
Abbas Araghchi, Iran's foreign ministerHe added that Iran has "no plan" to recover it (CRS).Source: Congressional Research Service (Paul K. Kerr), via EveryCRSReport [3] it's buried and we're watching it. We know exactly what they have
Pete Hegseth, US Defense SecretarySource: Rev (transcript of a US Department of Defense briefing) [11] no identifiable route to produce weapon-grade uranium
Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS)Source: Institute for Science and International Security (David Albright, Sarah Burkhard, Spencer Faragasso, Andrea Stricker) [2] cannot provide any information on the current size, composition or whereabouts
IAEAOf the stock of enriched uranium.Source: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) [1]
Sources: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) [1]; Institute for Science and International Security (David Albright, Sarah Burkhard, Spencer Faragasso, Andrea Stricker) [2]; Congressional Research Service (Paul K. Kerr), via EveryCRSReport [3]; Rev (transcript of a US Department of Defense briefing) [11]
Observations 1
Damage claims cannot be checked against each other
The Pentagon said "nearly 80%" of Iran's nuclear industrial base was "hit", not destroyed. 11 US and Iranian officials say enrichment has not resumed, but the IAEA cannot verify whether it has. 3 1 No source read here publishes evidence that settles which claim is right; CRS notes that neither the US government nor the IAEA has described evidence of covert production. 3
About this data
On 8 April 2026 Gen. Dan Caine, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, said "nearly 80% of Iran's nuclear industrial base was hit". In 2026 US and Iranian officials also said Iran "has not resumed enriching uranium" (CRS).
About this data
What is measured. The two charts are the IAEA's own quarterly figures for Iran's enriched uranium, in kilograms of uranium. Each point names its report in the Sources. The timelines, table and quotes collect dated statements; they are records of what was said, not measurements.
Verified versus estimated. Up to February 2021 the totals were verified by inspectors. After that they are IAEA estimates built from Iran's declarations, partial checks and past operating records (see the Method Changes under the first chart).
Why the line stops in June 2025. The IAEA has published no stock figure for any date after 13 June 2025. That is a gap in the measurement, not evidence that the stock is smaller or larger.
No country comparison. The IAEA reports that no other state without nuclear weapons produces 60% uranium, so there is no comparable series to chart beside Iran's.
Single-party claims. The damage figures come from the Pentagon briefing, Iranian officials and ISIS, and none has been independently checked. ISIS and FDD are Washington think tanks; their own estimates are labelled as theirs. The Reuters report on a 9–12-month timeline is read only through FDD.
What this is commonly mistaken for. 60% uranium is not weapons-grade uranium, and an estimate of time to weapons-grade uranium is not an estimate of time to a usable weapon.
Decisions, Law and Diplomacy: Congress, the President, Ceasefires and Negotiations, 2024–2026
Both chambers of Congress adopted a resolution to end the war, of doubtful legal force, while the administration declared hostilities over and then reported new strikes, and most Americans disapprove. [4][7][10][18][28]
Yes and no votes
Every House roll call on a concurrent resolution directing the President to remove US forces from hostilities with Iran, 5 March to 15 September 2026. The first reading shows yes and no votes; the second shows members who voted against their party's majority.
Members voting, by date of roll call
Every House roll call on a concurrent resolution directing the President to remove US forces from hostilities with Iran, 5 March to 15 September 2026. The first reading shows yes and no votes; the second shows members who voted against their party's majority. Read as yes and no votes: Members voting. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- Yes (end the war)
- No
Source: Office of the Clerk, US House of Representatives [52]
Observations 2
A House majority voted to end the war three times
The House rejected the first three resolutions by margins of seven votes or fewer, including a tie, then adopted the next three, from June to September (chart). 1 3 6
Every vote was on a concurrent resolution under section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution. The House has held no roll call of any kind since mid-September, as of 29 October (see the chart note).
The resolutions do not bind the President in practice
A concurrent resolution is not sent to the President to sign or veto. CRS calls its effect "uncertain" since the Supreme Court's 1983 Chadha ruling, and Lawfare says it was brought into "serious constitutional doubt". 11 10
A joint resolution would be binding but faces a veto, which two-thirds of each chamber would have to override. 10
Members voting against their party
Members, by date of roll call
Every House roll call on a concurrent resolution directing the President to remove US forces from hostilities with Iran, 5 March to 15 September 2026. The first reading shows yes and no votes; the second shows members who voted against their party's majority. Read as members voting against their party: Members. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- Republicans voting yes
- Democrats voting no
Source: Office of the Clerk, US House of Representatives [52]
Observations 1
Republican defections grew but stayed small
Republicans voting to end the war rose from two in March to seven in September, out of more than 200 Republicans voting. Democrats voting against fell to none from June on (chart). 1 6
In the Senate, Republican yes votes rose from one to four (chart below). With the House this evenly divided, these few members and absences decided each result.
About this data
Full published range: 2026-03-05–2026-09-15. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – The Clerk's 2026 roll calls run to number 314 (16 September 2026); numbers 315 and above returned no file when checked on 29 October 2026, so there has been no House vote of any kind since then. Six of the 314 are Iran war-powers resolutions.
Yes and no votes
Totals from the totals-by-vote field of each roll call. Members voting "present" or not voting are excluded.
Members voting against their party
From the totals-by-party field of each roll call: Republican yea-total and Democratic nay-total.
Yes and no votes
All 14 Senate roll calls on Iran war-powers measures, 4 March to 24 September 2026: motions to discharge or proceed to joint resolutions, and votes on two House concurrent resolutions. The second reading shows senators who voted against their party's majority.
Senators voting, by date of roll call
All 14 Senate roll calls on Iran war-powers measures, 4 March to 24 September 2026: motions to discharge or proceed to joint resolutions, and votes on two House concurrent resolutions. The second reading shows senators who voted against their party's majority. Read as yes and no votes: Senators voting. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- Yes (end the war)
- No
Source: United States Senate [53]
Observations 1
The Senate voted 14 times and succeeded twice
Twelve of the Senate's votes failed. A motion to discharge succeeded in May, but the resolution then failed a motion to proceed. In June the Senate adopted H.Con.Res.86, which the House had passed, so both chambers adopted one resolution (chart). 7 8
The Senate rejected the next House resolution, H.Con.Res.89, by one vote in September. GovTrack's list shows no Iran war-powers vote after that, as of late October. 9
Senators voting against their party
Senators, by date of roll call
All 14 Senate roll calls on Iran war-powers measures, 4 March to 24 September 2026: motions to discharge or proceed to joint resolutions, and votes on two House concurrent resolutions. The second reading shows senators who voted against their party's majority. Read as senators voting against their party: Senators. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- Republicans voting yes
- Democrats voting no
Source: United States Senate [53]
Observations 1
Senate defections were steady at a handful
About this data
Full published range: 2026-03-04–2026-09-24. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – The Senate's own vote list (archived 10 October 2026) and GovTrack's list (captured 26–29 October 2026, latest vote 30 September) show no Iran war-powers vote after 24 September. Party counts are tallied from the member records in each roll-call file; the file for 23 July (vote 207) has no archived copy, so that date has totals only.
Yes and no votes
Yeas and nays as printed in the Senate vote list. A yes vote favours ending the war in every case.
Senators voting against their party
Derived: Republicans recorded "Yea" and Democrats recorded "Nay", counted from the member records of each archived roll-call XML file (votes 46, 58, 69, 79, 88, 113, 118, 129, 174, 184, 192, 216 and 244). The two independents voted yes every time. On 24 June one further Republican voted "Present".
Approve of Trump's handling
Share of US adults who approve of President Trump's handling of the military action against Iran, and who say using force was the right decision, in Pew's two surveys (March and early October 2026). The markers below the chart date the ceasefire, blockade, War Powers letters, memorandum of understanding, strikes and the latest reported plans.
% who approve, by survey fieldwork month
Share of US adults who approve of President Trump's handling of the military action against Iran, and who say using force was the right decision, in Pew's two surveys (March and early October 2026). The markers below the chart date the ceasefire, blockade, War Powers letters, memorandum of understanding, strikes and the latest reported plans. Read as approve of Trump's handling: % who approve. 16 dated events are numbered on a strip under the graph and listed below it. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- All adults
- Rep/lean Rep
- Dem/lean Dem
Events marked above
War Powers report cites Article II
48-hour report on strikes begun 28 February, filed "consistent with" the War Powers Resolution.
Source: The White House (copy published by Just Security) [12]
Ceasefire
The President ordered a two-week ceasefire on 7 April; it was then extended.
Source: The White House (US Government Publishing Office) [14]
US blockade of Iranian ports begins
Source: Lawfare [10]
Letter: hostilities "have terminated"
Known only through quotation by Lawfare and Jack Goldsmith; the letter itself was not found on govinfo.
Source: Lawfare [10]
Iran downs a US Apache; US strikes from 9 June
As reported in the President's War Powers letter of 12 June.
Source: The White House (US Government Publishing Office) [14]
US–Iran memorandum of understanding signed
The President's letter gives 17 June; ISW/CTP calls it "the June 18 MoU".
Source: The White House (US Government Publishing Office) [15]
US strikes on 26 and 28 June
After Iranian attacks on vessels on 25 and 27 June, per the President's letter.
Source: The White House (US Government Publishing Office) [15]
US strikes resume; memorandum breaks down
Blockade reimposed
Source: US Central Command [50]
US strikes in Iraq on Iran-backed militias
US strikes on Iran, including state oil tankers
AP reports no US strike on Iran since early September (as of 28 October).
Source: The White House (US Government Publishing Office) [18]
Trump: no attack before the 3 November midterms
Source: Associated Press (via WCAX) [42]
NYT: plans for a short operation after the midterms
As relayed by ISW/CTP.
Source: Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project [44]
DNI memo: Iran in "advanced stages" of attack planning
As reported by ISW/CTP; the memo itself could not be fetched.
Source: Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project [45]
Saudi, Pakistani and Turkish officials in Tehran; Qatari plan
Reported plan: Iran reopens Hormuz, US lifts the blockade, over five days. ISW/CTP reports no progress.
Source: Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project [47]
US tells allies to prepare for possible renewed strikes
AP, citing two diplomats; no final decision by the President.
Source: Associated Press (via WCAX) [49]
Source: Pew Research Center [54]
Observations 2
Most Americans disapprove, and approval has slipped
In Pew's surveys about a third of adults approve of the President's handling of the war, down slightly since March; Pew's separate question on whether force was the right decision moved the same way (chart). 28 29
Gallup in June and Quinnipiac in March, asking about the military action itself, also found majorities against (charts below). 30 31
Most Republicans still approve, in falling numbers
Say using force was the right decision
% right decision, by survey fieldwork month
Share of US adults who approve of President Trump's handling of the military action against Iran, and who say using force was the right decision, in Pew's two surveys (March and early October 2026). The markers below the chart date the ceasefire, blockade, War Powers letters, memorandum of understanding, strikes and the latest reported plans. Read as say using force was the right decision: % right decision. 16 dated events are numbered on a strip under the graph and listed below it. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- All adults
- Rep/lean Rep
Events marked above
War Powers report cites Article II
48-hour report on strikes begun 28 February, filed "consistent with" the War Powers Resolution.
Source: The White House (copy published by Just Security) [12]
Ceasefire
The President ordered a two-week ceasefire on 7 April; it was then extended.
Source: The White House (US Government Publishing Office) [14]
US blockade of Iranian ports begins
Source: Lawfare [10]
Letter: hostilities "have terminated"
Known only through quotation by Lawfare and Jack Goldsmith; the letter itself was not found on govinfo.
Source: Lawfare [10]
Iran downs a US Apache; US strikes from 9 June
As reported in the President's War Powers letter of 12 June.
Source: The White House (US Government Publishing Office) [14]
US–Iran memorandum of understanding signed
The President's letter gives 17 June; ISW/CTP calls it "the June 18 MoU".
Source: The White House (US Government Publishing Office) [15]
US strikes on 26 and 28 June
After Iranian attacks on vessels on 25 and 27 June, per the President's letter.
Source: The White House (US Government Publishing Office) [15]
US strikes resume; memorandum breaks down
Blockade reimposed
Source: US Central Command [50]
US strikes in Iraq on Iran-backed militias
US strikes on Iran, including state oil tankers
AP reports no US strike on Iran since early September (as of 28 October).
Source: The White House (US Government Publishing Office) [18]
Trump: no attack before the 3 November midterms
Source: Associated Press (via WCAX) [42]
NYT: plans for a short operation after the midterms
As relayed by ISW/CTP.
Source: Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project [44]
DNI memo: Iran in "advanced stages" of attack planning
As reported by ISW/CTP; the memo itself could not be fetched.
Source: Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project [45]
Saudi, Pakistani and Turkish officials in Tehran; Qatari plan
Reported plan: Iran reopens Hormuz, US lifts the blockade, over five days. ISW/CTP reports no progress.
Source: Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project [47]
US tells allies to prepare for possible renewed strikes
AP, citing two diplomats; no final decision by the President.
Source: Associated Press (via WCAX) [49]
Source: Pew Research Center [54]
About this data
Full published range: 2026-03–2026-10. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – Pew asked both questions in March (16–22 March, 3,524 adults) and from 28 September to 4 October (labelled October by Pew). Republicans and Democrats include leaners. Pew prints no Democratic figure for the right-decision question ("one-in-ten" in October), so that line is omitted. Event markers run to 28 October 2026.
Say using force was the right decision
October total is Pew's 34%, "down 4 percentage points from March" (38%).
Approval of the US military action against Iran, by party (Gallup), June 2026
Share of US adults who approve or disapprove of "this U.S. military action against Iran" (Gallup, telephone, 1–15 June 2026, 1,001 adults).
Approve · % of adults
- Republicans79%
- All adults34%
- Independents26%
- Democrats8%
Show all breakdowns
| Category | Approve | Disapprove | No opinion | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| All adults | 34% | 63% | 4% | 101% |
| Republicans | 79% | 19% | 2% | 100% |
| Independents | 26% | 68% | 6% | 100% |
| Democrats | 8% | 90% | 2% | 100% |
Source: Gallup [30]
About this data
From the party table for question 24 of Gallup's final topline. Gallup's party groups exclude leaners. Each bar is the sum of the three published shares, which is 101 for all adults because of rounding. Gallup published this question once, so there is no Gallup trend.
Support for the US military action against Iran, by party (Quinnipiac), March 2026
Share of registered voters who support or oppose "the U.S. military action against Iran" (Quinnipiac, 6–8 March 2026, 1,002 registered voters).
Support · % of registered voters
- Republicans85%
- All voters40%
- Independents31%
- Democrats7%
Show all breakdowns
| Category | Support | Oppose | Don't know | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| All voters | 40% | 53% | 7% | 100% |
| Republicans | 85% | 11% | 5% | 101% |
| Independents | 31% | 60% | 9% | 100% |
| Democrats | 7% | 89% | 4% | 100% |
Source: Quinnipiac University Poll [31]
Observations 1
Support split almost entirely along party lines
In Quinnipiac's poll a week after the war began, Republicans supported the action and Democrats opposed it by similar margins; independents sat closer to Democrats (chart). 31
About this data
From question 10 of the release. Party groups exclude leaners. Each bar is the sum of the three published shares (101 for Republicans, from rounding).
Should the President have received Congress's approval before acting? By party (Quinnipiac), March 2026
Answers of registered voters to "Do you think President Trump should have received approval from Congress before taking military action against Iran, or not?" (Quinnipiac, 6–8 March 2026).
Should have · % of registered voters
- Democrats92%
- Independents64%
- All voters59%
- Republicans22%
Show all breakdowns
| Category | Should have | Should not have | Don't know | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| All voters | 59% | 38% | 3% | 100% |
| Republicans | 22% | 76% | 2% | 100% |
| Independents | 64% | 33% | 3% | 100% |
| Democrats | 92% | 5% | 3% | 100% |
Source: Quinnipiac University Poll [31]
Observations 1
Most voters said Congress should have been asked first
In March, 59% of registered voters said the President should have received approval from Congress before acting, including most independents and about a fifth of Republicans (chart). 31 This is one poll; no later reading was found.
About this data
From question 15 of the release. Each bar is the sum of the three published shares. No other pollster found asked this question, so there is no trend or comparison.
War Powers reports by presidents, and those that started the 60-day clock, 1975–March 2017
Reports submitted to Congress under the War Powers Resolution from 1975 to March 2017, and the number that cited section 4(a)(1), which starts the 60-day withdrawal requirement (CRS).
Reports
- All War Powers reports168
- Reports citing section 4(a)(1)1
Source: Congressional Research Service [11]
Observations 1
Presidents have almost never started the 60-day clock themselves
About this data
CRS R42699, updated 8 March 2019. The one report citing section 4(a)(1) was the 1975 Mayaguez seizure, by which time the operation was over. CRS publishes no count after March 2017.
What has the President said about war and about Iran?
Four statements, from the 2024 campaign to October 2026.
I was the first president in modern times to start no new wars. … Iran is very close to having a nuclear weapon, which would have never happened.
Donald Trump, CandidateConvention acceptance speechSource: The American Presidency Project (UC Santa Barbara) [32] They said: 'He will start a war.' I'm not going to start a war. I'm going to stop wars.
Donald Trump, President-electElection-night remarksSource: The American Presidency Project (UC Santa Barbara) [33] I acted pursuant to my constitutional authority as Commander in Chief … in collective self-defense of our regional allies, including Israel.
Donald Trump, President48-hour War Powers reportSource: The White House (copy published by Just Security) [12] will not be attacking Iran at any time prior to the Midterm Elections … having productive discussions with the Islamic Republic of Iran
Donald Trump, PresidentSocial media postSource: Associated Press (via WCAX) [42]
Sources: The White House (copy published by Just Security) [12]; The American Presidency Project (UC Santa Barbara) [32]; The American Presidency Project (UC Santa Barbara) [33]; Associated Press (via WCAX) [42]
Observations 2
The 2024 campaign promised to stop wars
On election night 2024 the President said "I'm not going to start a war. I'm going to stop wars." The remarks did not mention Iran. 33
The same campaign called Iran "very close" to a weapon
In his 2024 convention speech he said Iran was "very close to having a nuclear weapon" and blamed his predecessor. 32 Both lines were said by the same candidate in the same year.
War Powers letters, 2026
Each letter the President sent Congress under the War Powers Resolution in 2026, by date. Letters from June on report new military action.
Filled marker: major event Hollow: minor
Showing 7 of 7 events
2026
· Reports military action
Strikes on Iran from 28 Feb
Article II; "consistent with" the Act.
Source: The White House (copy published by Just Security) [12]
· Says hostilities have ended · major event
Hostilities that began 28 Feb "have terminated"
No exchange of fire since 7 Apr. Quoted by Lawfare and Goldsmith; letter not found.
Source: Lawfare [10]
· Reports military action
Iran downed a US Apache (8 Jun); US strikes from 9 Jun
House Doc 119-162
Source: The White House (US Government Publishing Office) [14]
· Reports military action
US strikes on 26 and 28 Jun; MoU signed 17 Jun
House Doc 119-167
Source: The White House (US Government Publishing Office) [15]
· Reports military action
US strikes from 7 Jul
House Doc 119-169
Source: The White House (US Government Publishing Office) [16]
· Reports military action
US strikes in Iraq from 27 Jul on Iran-directed militias
House Doc 119-183
Source: The White House (US Government Publishing Office) [17]
· Reports military action
US strikes on Iran from 1 Sep, including state oil tankers
House Doc 119-193
Source: The White House (US Government Publishing Office) [18]
Sources: Lawfare [10]; The White House (copy published by Just Security) [12]; Executive Functions (Jack Goldsmith) [13]; The White House (US Government Publishing Office) [14]; The White House (US Government Publishing Office) [15]; The White House (US Government Publishing Office) [16]; The White House (US Government Publishing Office) [17]; The White House (US Government Publishing Office) [18]
Observations 2
Hostilities were declared over, then new strikes were reported
The 1 May letter said hostilities "have terminated" because there had been no exchange of fire since the ceasefire. 10 The blockade that began in April was still running, and from June the administration filed at least five letters reporting new military action (timeline). 14 18
Goldsmith calls the "no exchange of fire" claim "highly misleading". 13 The 1 May letter is known only through these quotations.
Each new letter treats the strikes as a separate action
The same text makes the President "Commander in Chief".
The Congress shall have Power … To declare War
Earlier uses of force without authorisation, and Congress's votes, 2011–2025
The main roll calls found on earlier operations, and the count of all uses of force since 1798.
| Operation | Vote | Result |
|---|---|---|
| Libya, 2011 | House: authorise the operation (24 Jun 2011) | Failed, 123–295 [20] |
| Libya, 2011 | House: limit funding (24 Jun 2011) | Failed, 180–238 [21] |
| Yemen (Saudi-led war), 2019 | S.J.Res.7: Senate 54–46, House 247–175 | Vetoed; override failed 53–45 (2 May 2019) [22] [23] |
| Iran, 2020 | S.J.Res.68: Senate 55–45, House 227–186 | Vetoed; override failed 49–44 (7 May 2020) [24] [25] |
| Iran, 2025 | S.J.Res.59: Senate (27 Jun 2025) | Failed, 47–53 [26] |
| All uses of force, 1798–2023 | — | "Hundreds of instances"; 11 declarations of war covering five wars [19] |
Sources: Congressional Research Service [19]; Office of the Clerk, US House of Representatives [20]; Office of the Clerk, US House of Representatives [21]; Office of the Clerk, US House of Representatives [22]; United States Senate [23]; Office of the Clerk, US House of Representatives [24]; United States Senate [25]; Senate Democrats (Senate Periodical Press Gallery floor log) [26]
Observations 3
Congress has declared war eleven times, in five wars
The Constitution gives Congress the power "To declare War" and makes the President "Commander in Chief". 51
CRS counts eleven declarations of war covering five wars, and "hundreds of instances" of US forces used abroad in conflict or potential conflict. 19 The administration did not seek authorisation for this war before the 60-day mark. 10
CRS does not code the instances by authorisation, length or scale (see Data still needed).
Every binding attempt since 2011 to end an operation failed
Research finds Congress shapes wars without binding votes
Kriner's study, as described on its publisher's page, finds that Congress "materially shapes the initiation, scope, and duration of major military actions", and that the party balance in Congress helps explain how long conflicts last. 27 The publisher's page gives no effect sizes.
The ceasefire record, April–July 2026
Attacks, strikes and agreements during the ceasefire, from the President's letters and ISW/CTP. No Iranian or neutral record was found.
Filled marker: major event Hollow: minor
Showing 11 of 11 events
2026
– · Both · major event
Two-week ceasefire ordered, then extended
Source: The White House (US Government Publishing Office) [14]
· Iran acted
Engaged a US Army Apache, "forcing its crash landing"
Source: The White House (US Government Publishing Office) [14]
· US acted
Strikes on missile sites, mining, air defences, command
Source: The White House (US Government Publishing Office) [14]
· Both · major event
Memorandum of understanding signed
Source: The White House (US Government Publishing Office) [15]
– · Iran acted
Attacks on neutral-flagged vessels in Hormuz, on 25 and 27 Jun
Source: The White House (US Government Publishing Office) [15]
– · US acted
Strikes on drone, missile and command sites, on 26 and 28 Jun
Source: The White House (US Government Publishing Office) [15]
– · Iran acted
Attacks on several neutral-flagged vessels
Source: The White House (US Government Publishing Office) [16]
· US acted
Strikes resume
Source: The White House (US Government Publishing Office) [16]
– · Iran acted
IRGC Navy announced the strait closed and struck two vessels
Source: Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project [34]
· US acted
Struck "dozens of Iranian military targets"
Source: Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project [34]
· US acted
Blockade reimposed
Source: Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project [34]
Sources: The White House (US Government Publishing Office) [14]; The White House (US Government Publishing Office) [15]; The White House (US Government Publishing Office) [16]; Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project [34]; US Central Command [50]
Observations 2
Both sides used force during the ceasefire
The President's own letters record Iranian attacks and US strikes during the ceasefire, before and after the memorandum (timeline). 14 15 In each letter the US strikes answer a named Iranian attack.
Every entry comes from the US government or ISW/CTP. No Iranian or neutral record was found to check the sequence.
Negotiations and agreements, 2016–2026
The talks and agreements between the US and Iran, from the 2015 deal to the latest proposals.
Filled marker: major event Hollow: minor
Showing 8 of 8 events
2016
· Agreement
Implementation Day of the 2015 nuclear deal (JCPOA)
Enrichment capped at 3.67 percent for 15 years, stockpile under 300 kg.
Source: Arms Control Association [40]
2025
– · Talks and proposals
Five rounds of US–Iran talks
The sixth (15 Jun) suspended after Israel's attack. Wikipedia (tertiary).
Source: Wikipedia [41]
2026
· Talks and proposals
Indirect US–Iran talks in Geneva on 17 and 26 Feb
Attended by the IAEA Director General.
· Strikes · major event
US and Israeli strikes; IAEA stops verification in Iran
· Agreement · major event
Memorandum: "Iran reaffirms that it shall not procure or develop nuclear weapons"
Also safe passage for shipping.
· Talks and proposals
President rejects Iran's proposal to reopen Hormuz within seven days on conditions
Source: Associated Press (via WCAX) [42]
· Talks and proposals
Qatari plan reported: Hormuz reopened for blockade lifted, over five days
Dispute over sequencing. ISW/CTP citing the NYT.
Source: Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project [47]
· Talks and proposals
Iran's foreign minister: Tehran "continues to give diplomacy a chance to succeed"
Source: Associated Press (via WCAX) [49]
Sources: The White House (US Government Publishing Office) [15]; International Atomic Energy Agency [38]; Congressional Research Service [39]; Arms Control Association [40]; Wikipedia [41]; Associated Press (via WCAX) [42]; Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project [47]; Associated Press (via WCAX) [49]
Observations 3
Talks were under way when the strikes began
Iran signed a no-weapons pledge in June
The June memorandum states that "Iran reaffirms that it shall not procure or develop nuclear weapons". 39 Its other terms, including any on inspections, have not been published in any source found, so it cannot be compared clause by clause with the 2015 deal.
Where have allies and regional governments stood on the war?
The statements found, not a complete record of allied positions.
We did not participate in these strikes … We condemn Iranian attacks on countries in the region
UK, France and GermanyJoint statement by the E3 leadersSource: UK Government (Prime Minister's Office) [36] launched without United Nations authorisation
Badr al Busaidi, Oman's foreign ministerSource: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sultanate of Oman [37] exercise wisdom and pursue political solutions
UAE foreign ministrySource: Associated Press (via WCAX) [49]
Sources: UK Government (Prime Minister's Office) [36]; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sultanate of Oman [37]; Associated Press (via WCAX) [49]
Observations 2
Key European allies did not join the strikes
The British, French and German leaders said they "did not participate", while condemning Iran's attacks on its neighbours "in the strongest terms". 36 This list is the statements found, not a complete record of allied positions.
About this data
UN Security Council resolution 2817 (11 March 2026) could not be checked at source, because UN sites refused the fetch. On 26 October 2026 Oman's foreign minister also called for a Gulf non-aggression pact with Iran (ISW/CTP).
The latest events, July–October 2026
Assessments and reports since the ceasefire ended. Most come from one source, named on each entry, and are not official findings.
Showing 8 of 8 events
2026
· Iran's forces, as assessed
ISW/CTP: Iran "continuously made efforts to reconstitute its ballistic missile and drone programs"
From the April ceasefire on.
Source: Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project [34]
– · Attacks
23 attacks on vessels near Hormuz
Officials told Bloomberg, via ISW/CTP.
Source: Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project [43]
· US plans and pledges
The President pledges no attack on Iran before the midterms
Source: Associated Press (via WCAX) [42]
· Iran's forces, as assessed
New defence minister plans to rebuild "in mountains and security structures"
ISW/CTP reads his appointment as prioritising missiles.
Source: Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project [35]
· US plans and pledges
NYT reports plans for "a short and intensive operation" after 3 November
Source: Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project [44]
· Iran's forces, as assessed
Intelligence chief warns of Iran's "advanced stages" of planning attacks on US targets
As reported by ISW/CTP; the memo itself could not be fetched.
Source: Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project [45]
· Attacks
Houthis fire missiles and drones at Saudi Arabia
ISW/CTP.
Source: Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project [46]
· US plans and pledges
AP: allies told to prepare for renewed action and Iranian retaliation
AP's diplomats say the President has made no final decision.
Source: Associated Press (via WCAX) [49]
Sources: Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project [34]; Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project [35]; Associated Press (via WCAX) [42]; Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project [43]; Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project [44]; Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project [45]; Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project [46]; Associated Press (via WCAX) [49]
Observations 4
Iran worked to rebuild missiles and drones, in ISW/CTP's assessment
ISW/CTP assesses that Iran "continuously made efforts to reconstitute its ballistic missile and drone programs" from the April ceasefire. 34 In October it read the new defence minister's appointment, and his plan to rebuild "in mountains and security structures", as prioritising missiles. 35
These are assessments by ISW and AEI's Critical Threats Project, not imagery or official findings.
A new round of strikes is reported to be planned after the midterms
The NYT reported plans for "a short and intensive operation" after 3 November, and AP reports allies were told to prepare for renewed action and Iranian retaliation. 44 49 AP's diplomats say the President has made no final decision.
AP reports no US strike on Iran since early September (as of 28 October). 49
The intelligence chief warned of Iranian attack planning, as reported
ISW/CTP reports that the Director of National Intelligence warned on 23 October that Iran is in the "advanced stages" of planning attacks on US targets in the region. 45 The memo itself could not be fetched, so this rests on ISW/CTP's account.
Fighting spread to shipping and Saudi Arabia in October
Subtleties
Several Senate votes were on procedure, not the resolution
Eleven of the 14 Senate votes were motions to discharge a committee, and one was a motion to proceed. A yes vote on each favoured ending the war, but only the two votes on House resolutions were votes on a resolution itself. 7
Polls asked different questions
Pew asks about the President's handling and about whether force was the right decision; Gallup asks about approval of "this U.S. military action"; Quinnipiac about support for it. Gallup and Quinnipiac exclude leaners from their party groups; Pew includes them. The pollsters are shown separately for this reason. 28 30 31
Most claims about the latest events come from one side
The incident record comes from the President's letters; the reconstitution and October assessments from ISW/CTP, which is affiliated with the American Enterprise Institute; blockade figures from US Central Command. Each is labelled as such above.
About this data
What this measures. Recorded votes in Congress, the President's War Powers letters, public statements, three pollsters' surveys, and the dated record of the ceasefire and talks. It does not measure whether the war is lawful; that is a legal and constitutional question the records inform but do not settle.
As of. House and Senate votes as of 29 October 2026 (no votes after 16 and 30 September respectively). Polls run from March to early October 2026. Events run to 28 October; ISW/CTP's 29 October update was not yet published when checked.
How it compares. Earlier operations come from CRS's list (1798–2023) and its count of War Powers reports (1975–March 2017); neither has a newer edition on EveryCRSReport. The earlier votes table covers the main roll calls found on Libya (2011), Yemen (2019) and Iran (2020, 2025).
How confident to be. The vote counts and letters are primary records. The 1 May letter, the DNI memo, the NYT report and resolution 2817 are known only second-hand. Gallup gives a margin of error of ±4 points; small moves within one pollster's series may be noise.
Commonly mistaken for. "Congress voted to end the war" is true of a concurrent resolution that the President need not sign; it is not a law. Pew's 33% is approval of the President's handling, not of the war as such.
Iran's Government and Its People: Elections, Opinion and Repression, 1980–2026
Turnout has fallen to record lows, few candidates are allowed to stand, and executions and protest killings have reached levels not recorded in decades, with real but narrow signs of moderation. [1][13][20][21][35]
Turnout, first or only round
Votes cast as a share of eligible voters in each presidential election's first (or only) round. The source changes in 2017, marked as a break.
% of eligible voters, by election month
Votes cast as a share of eligible voters in each presidential election's first (or only) round. The source changes in 2017, marked as a break. Read as turnout, first or only round: % of eligible voters. Dashed segments cross 1 definitional break in the source, explained in Method Changes below this graph. 5 dated events are numbered on a strip under the graph and listed below it. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- Turnout
Events marked above
Reformist papers closed
Sixteen publications closed in one week under President Khatami.
Majlis vetting purge
The Guardian Council rejected 3,600 of 8,157 parliamentary candidates, including 83 sitting members.
November 2019 crackdown
Source: Amnesty International [6]
Woman, Life, Freedom protests begin
Source: Freedom House [7]
President Raisi dies; early election
Vertical dashed lines mark measurement changes. See method changes.
Source: Iran Data Portal, Syracuse University [33]
Observations 2
The two lowest presidential turnouts are the last two elections
In 2024 voters elected the one moderate in the field
After Raisi's death, Masoud Pezeshkian, "the sole moderate in an original field of four", won the runoff with 53.7 percent of the vote. 22
Turnout rose to 49.8 percent in the runoff, about ten points above the first round. 22 21 He was one of only six candidates the Guardian Council approved (next chart). 23
Method Changes
2017-05: Source changes to news reports
The Iran Data Portal workbook ends in 2013. Later points are Interior Ministry turnout figures as quoted by Al Jazeera. The sources disagree for 2013: the workbook gives 76.25, IFES ElectionGuide 72.71. [33]
About this data
Full published range: 1980-01–2024-06. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – 1980 to 2013 are the "Iran (total)" row of the Iran Data Portal workbook, which gives years only; points are placed at each election's month. 2017 to 2024 are Interior Ministry figures as reported by Al Jazeera, because the workbook stops in 2013. Two elections were held in 1981. Runoffs (2005, 2024) are not plotted: 59.76 in the 2005 runoff (Data Portal) and 49.8 percent in the 2024 runoff (Al Jazeera).
Candidates registered and allowed
How many people registered for each presidential election and how many the Ministry of Interior and Guardian Council allowed to run, with the share allowed.
Candidates, by election month
How many people registered for each presidential election and how many the Ministry of Interior and Guardian Council allowed to run, with the share allowed. Read as candidates registered and allowed: Candidates. Dashed segments cross 1 definitional break in the source, explained in Method Changes below this graph. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- Registered
- Allowed to run
Vertical dashed lines mark measurement changes. See method changes.
Source: Iran Data Portal, Syracuse University [34]
Method Changes
2021-06: Source changes to news reports
The Iran Data Portal infographic ends in 2017; later counts are from news reports of the Guardian Council's lists. [34]
About this data
Full published range: 1980-01–2024-06. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – 1980 to 2017 are from the Iran Data Portal infographic, an image: the registered counts are printed numbers and the allowed counts are icons, one per candidate, counted by hand. 2021 is from Al Jazeera and 2024 from Iran International. For 2024 the source says only "more than 80" registered, so 80 is plotted and the share (6 ÷ 80 = 7.5%) is an upper bound. Shares are calculated here as allowed ÷ registered, to one decimal place.
Share of registrants allowed to run
Calculated as allowed ÷ registered. The 2024 value is an upper bound because more than 80 registered.
Executions recorded by IHRNGO
Executions IHRNGO confirmed from at least two sources, each year since its first annual report. These are minimums. Presidents' terms and the June 2025 war are marked under the chart.
Executions (minimum), by calendar year
Executions IHRNGO confirmed from at least two sources, each year since its first annual report. These are minimums. Presidents' terms and the June 2025 war are marked under the chart. Read as executions recorded by IHRNGO: Executions (minimum). 6 dated events are numbered on a strip under the graph and listed below it. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- IHRNGO
Events marked above
Rouhani takes office
Drug-law amendment
The 2017 amendment to the Anti-Narcotics Law narrowed the death penalty for drug offences; IHRNGO says it has been "reversed in practice" since 2021.
Raisi takes office
Woman, Life, Freedom protests
Source: Freedom House [7]
Pezeshkian takes office
Twelve-day war with Israel
Source: Iran Human Rights (IHRNGO) and ECPM [35]
Observations 4
Executions in 2025 were the most since 1989
Executions rose fastest under Pezeshkian
A fall after 2015 followed a drug-law change that has since been undone
Executions fell sharply from 2016 to 2020 (chart). IHRNGO links the decline to the 2017 drug-law amendment, which narrowed the death penalty for drug offences. 35
It says the amendment "has been reversed in practice" since 2021: drug executions averaged 26 a year in 2018–2020 and reached at least 795 in 2025. 35
Executions surged after the June 2025 war
IHRNGO says "a new surge in executions began in the months after the 12-day war" and that 60% of 2025's executions came in the second half of the year. 35
It finds executions "tend to increase when authorities fear social unrest and when the attention of the international community is focused on other geopolitical issues". 35 The UN mission called October 2025's total "the highest monthly total recorded in at least 25 years". 4
About this data
Full published range: 2008–2025. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – IHRNGO's whole published series, from the bar labels of its chart "Execution trends in the last 18 years (2008-2025)", which sum to its stated total of 11,196. The 2026 report is not yet published.
Executions documented by HRANA
Executions documented by HRANA's Statistics Center in each reporting year, which runs from about 10 October to 8 October. Each point is placed at the October in which the year ends.
Executions (minimum), by reporting year ending in October
Executions documented by HRANA's Statistics Center in each reporting year, which runs from about 10 October to 8 October. Each point is placed at the October in which the year ends. Read as executions documented by HRANA: Executions (minimum). 2 dated events are numbered on a strip under the graph and listed below it. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- HRANA
Events marked above
Twelve-day war with Israel
US and Israeli strikes begin (28 Feb)
Source: HRANA (Human Rights Activists in Iran Statistics Center) [36]
Observations 1
A third counter shows the same rise
HRANA counts from October to October. Its latest year, to October 2026, was its highest in ten reporting years (chart). 36
Like IHRNGO, it shows a low around 2018–19 and a rise every year since.
About this data
Full published range: 2017-10–2026-10. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – HRANA's ten published reporting periods. HRANA says its 2024–25 figure was "updated based on supplementary data and may differ from those published in last year's report".
All executions
Executions HRANA documented in each month of its latest reporting year, and the subset on political and security-related charges. October 2025 covers only the last 22 days and October 2026 the first seven.
Executions per month, by month
Executions HRANA documented in each month of its latest reporting year, and the subset on political and security-related charges. October 2025 covers only the last 22 days and October 2026 the first seven. Read as all executions: Executions per month. 5 dated events are numbered on a strip under the graph and listed below it. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- All executions
Events marked above
Nationwide protests and crackdown
HRANA's 50-day record runs from 28 December 2025.
US and Israeli strikes begin (28 Feb)
Ceasefire (8 Apr)
Memorandum signed (17 Jun)
US blockade resumes (14 Jul)
Source: HRANA (Human Rights Activists in Iran Statistics Center) [37]
Observations 1
Total executions fell sharply in the first months of the war
HRANA recorded hundreds of executions a month from November 2025 to February 2026, then its lowest full month in March 2026, when the strikes began (chart). 37
The monthly total recovered after the ceasefire but stayed well below its pre-war level through September. HRANA does not say why it fell.
Political and security-related executions
Executions per month, by month
Executions HRANA documented in each month of its latest reporting year, and the subset on political and security-related charges. October 2025 covers only the last 22 days and October 2026 the first seven. Read as political and security-related executions: Executions per month. 5 dated events are numbered on a strip under the graph and listed below it. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- Political and security-related
Events marked above
Nationwide protests and crackdown
HRANA's 50-day record runs from 28 December 2025.
US and Israeli strikes begin (28 Feb)
Ceasefire (8 Apr)
Memorandum signed (17 Jun)
US blockade resumes (14 Jul)
Source: HRANA (Human Rights Activists in Iran Statistics Center) [37]
Observations 2
Political executions peaked during and just after the war
Executions on political and security charges ran the other way: HRANA's peak months were April and May 2026, with 29 between them (chart). 37
Half the political executions were tied to the January protests
Of the political and security executions HRANA recorded in its latest year, 35 were "in connection with the January 2026 (Dey 1404) protests". 37
About this data
Full published range: 2025-10–2026-10. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – All executions are the bar labels of HRANA's monthly chart, which sum to its total of 2,003. Political and security-related executions are its table "By Month of Execution", which sums to 69.
Real GDP growth
Annual change in real GDP. The 2015 nuclear deal's implementation and the US withdrawal are marked under the chart.
% change on previous year, by calendar year
Annual change in real GDP. The 2015 nuclear deal's implementation and the US withdrawal are marked under the chart. Read as real GDP growth: % change on previous year. 2 dated events are numbered on a strip under the graph and listed below it. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- GDP growth
Events marked above
Nuclear deal implemented
Source: Arms Control Association [31]
US withdraws from the deal
Source: Arms Control Association [32]
Source: World Bank [38]
Observations 1
The economy grew in the deal's first year and shrank after the US left
Growth was strongest in 2016, the year the nuclear deal took effect, and turned negative in 2018 and 2019 after the US withdrew (chart). 38 Inflation was at its lowest in decades in 2016 and 2017 and then climbed (next chart). 39
The timing fits sanctions relief and their return, but these series do not separate sanctions from oil prices or other causes.
About this data
Full published range: 1961–2025. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – The World Bank's whole series for Iran (World Development Indicators, updated 8 October 2026). Values are rounded here to one decimal place from the API's unrounded figures.
Consumer price inflation
Annual change in consumer prices. The 2015 nuclear deal's implementation and the US withdrawal are marked under the chart.
% change on previous year, by calendar year
Annual change in consumer prices. The 2015 nuclear deal's implementation and the US withdrawal are marked under the chart. Read as consumer price inflation: % change on previous year. 2 dated events are numbered on a strip under the graph and listed below it. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- Inflation
Events marked above
Nuclear deal implemented
Source: Arms Control Association [31]
US withdraws from the deal
Source: Arms Control Association [32]
Source: World Bank [39]
About this data
Full published range: 1960–2025. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – The World Bank's whole series for Iran (World Development Indicators, updated 8 October 2026). Values are rounded here to one decimal place from the API's unrounded figures.
Turnout in parliamentary (Majlis) elections, Iran, 2016, 2020 and 2024
Votes cast as a share of eligible voters, by the Interior Ministry's figures as reported by Al Jazeera.
% of eligible voters
- 201662%
- 202042%
- 202441%
Source: Al Jazeera [24]
Observations 1
Parliamentary turnout also hit a record low in 2024
The March 2024 parliamentary election drew 41 percent, "the lowest participation since Iran's 1979 Islamic Revolution", just below 2020's pandemic-year 42 percent. 24
About this data
Only three elections are shown because the full parliamentary series (IPU Parline) could not be fetched; see Data still needed. The 2016 figure is "about 62 percent".
Deaths in the protests of 28 December 2025 – 15 February 2026, by HRANA's category, as of 23 February 2026
All deaths HRANA had confirmed in the 50-day record, split into its categories. A further 11,744 cases were under review and are not included.
Deaths confirmed by HRANA
- Protesters6,488 · 92.6%
- Children (counted separately)236 · 3.4%
- Other civilians76 · 1.1%
- Military and government forces207 · 3%
Source: HRANA (Human Rights Activists News Agency) [1]; UN Human Rights Council, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Iran [4]
Observations 1
HRANA confirmed 7,007 deaths in the January 2026 crackdown, most of them protesters
HRANA's 7,007 counts every confirmed death in its 50-day record, protesters and others (chart). 1
It is a floor: 11,744 more cases were still under review when it was published. 1
The government counted 3,117 dead by late January, including people it called "rioters". 4
The UN mission found the crackdown amounted to "crimes against humanity of murder, imprisonment, torture". 4
About this data
HRANA counts children separately from protesters. The government's own count, 3,117 by 21 January, has no published split beyond 690 "rioters" (UN mission). The UN mission gives no count of its own.
Crackdown deaths, by counter and method
Each count comes from a different counter using a different method, so they cannot be read as one series.
| Crackdown | Counter | Count | Method | As of |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| June 2009 | No primary count found | — | — | — |
| November 2019 | Amnesty International | 304 deaths | Named cases, "details released" | 20 May 2020 [6] |
| 2022–23 (Woman, Life, Freedom) | UN fact-finding mission | At least 551 protesters | Confirmed minimum | Early 2024 [7] |
| Dec 2025 – Feb 2026 | Government (Martyrs Foundation) | 3,117 | Official total | 21 Jan 2026 [2] |
| Dec 2025 – Feb 2026 | HRANA | 4,519 (9,049 under review) | Confirmed minimum | 21 Jan 2026 [2] |
| Dec 2025 – Feb 2026 | HRANA | 6,126 (17,091 under review) | Confirmed minimum | 27 Jan 2026 [3] |
| Dec 2025 – Feb 2026 | HRANA | 7,007 (11,744 under review) | Confirmed minimum | 23 Feb 2026 [1] |
| Dec 2025 – Feb 2026 | Published names | HRANA 4,555; government 3,038 | Named individuals | 26 Feb 2026 [5] |
Sources: HRANA (Human Rights Activists News Agency) [1]; Al Jazeera [2]; Al-Monitor (AFP) [3]; NIAC Insights (National Iranian American Council) [5]; Amnesty International [6]; Freedom House [7]
Observations 3
Each of the last three protest waves was put down with lethal force
There is no verified count for 2009
No primary source for deaths in the 2009 post-election crackdown was found, so it is left blank rather than filled from secondary reports. See Data still needed.
Arrests after crackdowns and outside attacks
Arrests counted after the June 2025 war and during the January 2026 crackdown, by counter.
| Period | Counter | Arrests | As of |
|---|---|---|---|
| 13 June – early Sept 2025, after the twelve-day war | Amnesty and Human Rights Watch | Over 20,000 | 3 Sep 2025 [10] |
| Same period | Iranian police (spokesperson) | About 21,000 | 12 Aug 2025 [10] |
| January 2026 protests | HRANA | At least 41,880 | 27 Jan 2026 [3] |
| January 2026 protests | Unnamed NGO, cited by the UN mission | Over 50,000 | Mid-Feb 2026 [4] |
| 28 Dec 2025 – 15 Feb 2026 | HRANA | 53,777 | 23 Feb 2026 [1] |
Sources: HRANA (Human Rights Activists News Agency) [1]; Al-Monitor (AFP) [3]; UN Human Rights Council, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Iran [4]; Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch [10]
Observations 2
Repression widened after the June 2025 war
In the three months after the June 2025 war, Amnesty and Human Rights Watch counted over 20,000 arrests, including "dissidents, human rights defenders, journalists" and foreign nationals; the police's own figure was about 21,000. 10 At least nine men were executed on political or espionage charges. 10
The January 2026 crackdown brought more than 50,000 arrests
HRANA counted 53,777 arrests during the crackdown, including hundreds of children and school students. 1
Recorded executions by country, 2025 (Amnesty International)
Executions Amnesty recorded in each of the 17 countries known to have executed people in 2025. These are minimums.
Executions recorded
- Iran2,159
- Saudi Arabia356
- Yemen51
- USA47
- Egypt23
- Kuwait17
- Singapore17
- Somalia17
- Afghanistan6
- United Arab Emirates3
- Japan1
- South Sudan1
- Taiwan1
Source: Amnesty International [25]
Observations 2
Iran carried out most of the world's recorded executions in 2025
Amnesty recorded at least 2,159 executions in Iran, 80% of all it recorded worldwide (chart). 25 China is not included: Amnesty believes it executed thousands but cannot count them.
About this data
From the report's list "Executions recorded globally in 2025". Amnesty gives no figure ("+") for China, Iraq, North Korea and Viet Nam, so they are not charted. It believes China executed thousands. Iran, Saudi Arabia, Somalia and Yemen are marked "+" after their figure, meaning at least that many.
Recorded executions per million residents, 2025
Amnesty's recorded executions in 2025 divided by each country's 2025 population (World Bank).
Executions per million residents
- Iran23.36
- Saudi Arabia9.63
- Kuwait3.49
- Singapore2.78
- Yemen1.22
- Somalia0.86
- United Arab Emirates0.26
- Egypt0.19
- USA0.14
- Afghanistan0.14
- South Sudan0.08
- Japan0.01
Source: Amnesty International [25]; World Bank [27]
About this data
Calculated here: executions (Amnesty) ÷ population (World Bank SP.POP.TOTL, 2025) × one million, to two decimal places. For example, Iran 2,159 ÷ 92,417,681 × one million = 23.36. Taiwan is omitted because the World Bank publishes no population for it; countries without an Amnesty figure are omitted as in the chart above.
Executions in Iran by counter, 2023–2025
IHRNGO and Amnesty International each publish a minimum count for Iran by calendar year. They are separate counts and differ, most of all for 2025.
Executions (minimum)
- 2023 — IHRNGO834
- 2023 — Amnesty853
- 2024 — IHRNGO975
- 2024 — Amnesty972
- 2025 — IHRNGO1,639
- 2025 — Amnesty2,159
Source: Iran Human Rights (IHRNGO) and ECPM [35]; Amnesty International [25]; Amnesty International [26]
About this data
Only the years for which both counts were read are shown. Amnesty's series runs from 1981 but its earlier Iran figures were not fetched for this report. HRANA's count uses October years and is charted separately above.
Average executions per month under each president, 2005–2025 (IHRNGO)
IHRNGO's average monthly executions for each presidency, from Ahmadinejad (2005–2013) to Pezeshkian's first 17 months (July 2024 – December 2025).
Executions per month
- Ahmadinejad (8 years)35
- Rouhani (8 years)44
- Raisi (33 months)51
- Pezeshkian (17 months)135
Source: Iran Human Rights (IHRNGO) and ECPM [35]
Observations 1
The execution rate rose under every recent president
By IHRNGO's count, the average monthly rate rose from Ahmadinejad to Rouhani to Raisi, then more than doubled under Pezeshkian (chart). 35
About this data
From IHRNGO's chart "Average monthly executions per president". IHRNGO's totals per term are 3,337 (Ahmadinejad), 4,249 (Rouhani), 1,714 (Raisi, 33 months) and 2,292 (Pezeshkian, 17 months).
Freedom in the World scores, 195 countries, 2026 edition (covering 2025)
Freedom House's aggregate score out of 100 for every country it rates, lowest first. Iran and Saudi Arabia are highlighted.
Score out of 100
- South Sudan0
- Sudan1
- Turkmenistan1
- Eritrea3
- North Korea3
- Myanmar4
- Central African Republic5
- Equatorial Guinea5
- Tajikistan5
- Azerbaijan6
- Belarus7
- Afghanistan8
- Somalia8
- China9
- Cuba9
- Saudi Arabia9
- Iran10
- Libya10
- Syria10
- Yemen10
- Bahrain12
- Russia12
- Uzbekistan12
- Burundi13
- Laos13
- Venezuela13
- Nicaragua14
- Cameroon15
- Chad15
- Eswatini17
- Republic of the Congo17
- Democratic Republic of the Congo18
- Egypt18
- Ethiopia18
- United Arab Emirates18
- Burkina Faso20
- Vietnam20
- Mali21
- Rwanda21
- Cambodia22
- Haiti22
- Kazakhstan23
- Djibouti24
- Oman24
- Gabon25
- Kyrgyzstan25
- Qatar25
- Zimbabwe25
- Brunei27
- Niger27
- Angola28
- Guinea28
- Tanzania28
- Kuwait30
- Algeria31
- Iraq31
- Pakistan32
- Turkey32
- Guinea-Bissau33
- Thailand33
- Uganda33
- Jordan34
- Morocco37
- Togo37
- Mauritania38
- Comoros41
- Lebanon41
- Maldives41
- El Salvador42
- Mozambique42
- Tunisia42
- Bangladesh44
- Nigeria44
- Côte d'Ivoire46
- Honduras47
- Guatemala48
- Singapore48
- Kenya49
- Madagascar50
- Georgia51
- The Gambia51
- Ukraine51
- Malaysia53
- Serbia53
- Zambia53
- Armenia54
- Bosnia and Herzegovina54
- Indonesia56
- Mexico58
- Philippines58
- Nepal59
- Moldova60
- Benin61
- Kosovo61
- Papua New Guinea61
- Sierra Leone61
- India62
- Paraguay63
- Sri Lanka63
- Ecuador64
- Hungary65
- Liberia65
- Peru66
- Dominican Republic67
- Lesotho67
- North Macedonia67
- Malawi68
- Montenegro68
- Albania69
- Bhutan69
- Bolivia69
- Colombia69
- Senegal70
- Fiji72
- Brazil73
- Israel73
- Namibia73
- Timor-Leste73
- Bulgaria74
- Guyana74
- Solomon Islands74
- Botswana75
- Nauru75
- Tonga79
- Ghana80
- Jamaica81
- Seychelles81
- South Africa81
- Suriname81
- United States81
- Croatia82
- Monaco82
- Panama82
- Poland82
- Vanuatu82
- Antigua and Barbuda83
- Romania83
- South Korea83
- Trinidad and Tobago83
- Mongolia84
- Samoa84
- São Tomé and Príncipe84
- Argentina85
- Greece85
- Belize87
- Italy87
- Mauritius87
- Malta88
- Slovakia88
- France89
- Grenada89
- Kiribati89
- Latvia89
- St. Kitts and Nevis89
- Cyprus90
- Liechtenstein90
- Lithuania90
- St. Vincent and the Grenadines90
- The Bahamas90
- Costa Rica91
- Spain91
- St. Lucia91
- Cabo Verde92
- Dominica92
- Micronesia92
- Palau92
- United Kingdom92
- Andorra93
- Marshall Islands93
- Taiwan93
- Tuvalu93
- Australia94
- Austria94
- Barbados94
- Belgium95
- Chile95
- Czechia95
- Germany95
- Iceland95
- Estonia96
- Japan96
- Portugal96
- Switzerland96
- Canada97
- Denmark97
- Luxembourg97
- Netherlands97
- San Marino97
- Slovenia97
- Uruguay97
- Ireland98
- New Zealand99
- Norway99
- Sweden99
- Finland100
Source: Freedom House [9]; Freedom House [7]; Freedom House [8]
Observations 1
Iran is among the least free countries, alongside Saudi Arabia
About this data
Every country in the "Freedom in the World Score" column of Freedom House's Countries and Territories table. The 12 rated territories (marked with an asterisk there, such as Tibet and Gaza) are left out. Iran scored 11 in the previous edition. Ties are listed alphabetically.
Preferred form of political system, GAMAAN online survey, June 2026
Answers to "Which form of political system do you prefer?" among respondents inside Iran, weighted to literate residents aged 15 and over (fieldwork 20–27 June 2026).
% of respondents
- Monarchy, non-federal25.4% · 25.4%
- Monarchy, federal8.5% · 8.5%
- Republic, non-federal16.6% · 16.6%
- Republic, federal10.9% · 10.9%
- Islamic Republic13.4% · 13.4%
- The form of the alternative doesn't matter6.1% · 6.1%
- Lack the knowledge to choose19.1% · 19.1%
Source: GAMAAN (Group for Analyzing and Measuring Attitudes in Iran) [12]
Observations 1
Few respondents prefer the Islamic Republic
In GAMAAN's June 2026 online sample, about 13% chose the Islamic Republic, down about 7 points on the previous year (chart). 12 Monarchy and republic each drew more, and about a quarter had no clear alternative.
About this data
From Figure 17 of the report. The sample was reached online through circumvention tools, mostly Psiphon; GAMAAN gives a credibility interval of ±3 points. The previous wave put the Islamic Republic about 7 points higher.
Views of the war and the regime, GAMAAN online survey, June 2026
Share of respondents inside Iran agreeing with each statement (fieldwork 20–27 June 2026). Each bar is a separate question.
% of respondents
- Called the US–Israeli action "military aggression against Iran"42%
- Called it "humanitarian intervention"40%
- Supported foreign military intervention before and after the war38%
- Opposed foreign military intervention before and after the war27%
- Felt satisfaction at the weakening of the Islamic Republic during the war60%
- Opposed Iran building nuclear weapons59%
- Said the US–Iran agreement did not serve Iranians68%
- Rated the regime's response to the January protests positively14%
Source: GAMAAN (Group for Analyzing and Measuring Attitudes in Iran) [11]
Observations 2
Respondents split on whether the strikes were aggression
42% in GAMAAN's sample called the US–Israeli action "military aggression against Iran", while about 40% called it "humanitarian intervention" (chart). 11 Most opposed Iran building nuclear weapons.
Most were glad to see the regime weakened
About 60% "felt satisfaction at the weakening of the Islamic Republic during the war", and only about 14% approved of its response to the January protests. 11
About this data
GAMAAN reports most of these as "about" a percentage. The sample was reached online through circumvention tools; see About this data.
Openings and reversals, 2000–2026
Dated moves toward and away from openness in Iran, as the sources report them.
Filled marker: major event Hollow: minor
Showing 9 of 9 events
2000
· Reversal
Sixteen reformist publications closed in one week under President Khatami
2004
· Reversal
3,600 parliamentary candidates rejected, including 83 sitting members; about a thousand reinstated
2019
· Reversal
304 protesters killed under President Rouhani
Source: Amnesty International [6]
2024
· Opening
Pezeshkian, the field's one moderate, elected
Source: Al Jazeera [22]
· Opening
Harsher hijab law shelved by the Supreme National Security Council
Source: Iran International [13]
2025
· Opening
Speaker told in writing the hijab law "should not be enacted for the time being"
Source: Rudaw [14]
· Reversal
Organisers of a marathon where women ran unveiled arrested
Source: Freedom House [7]
– · Reversal · major event
Protest crackdown: 7,007 deaths by HRANA's count
2026
· Succession
Mojtaba Khamenei, the late Leader's son, named Leader
Source: Iran International [15]
Sources: HRANA (Human Rights Activists News Agency) [1]; Amnesty International [6]; Freedom House [7]; Iran International [13]; Rudaw [14]; Iran International [15]; IFES ElectionGuide [16]; Committee to Protect Journalists [17]; The Washington Institute for Near East Policy [18]; Al Jazeera [22]
Observations 3
The harsher hijab law was shelved, with the Leader's assent
In December 2024 the Supreme National Security Council put the new hijab law "on hold"; its decisions "require the Supreme Leader's signature". 13 In May 2025 the Speaker said he had been told in writing not to enact it. 14
What was halted is the new law's enactment. The existing hijab rules stayed, and Freedom House records arrests in December 2025 over unveiled women at a marathon. 7
Earlier openings were reversed while reformists held the presidency
The new Leader is the old Leader's son
Subtleties
Moderation and repression ran side by side
The 2024 election and the shelved hijab law are the clearest signs of moderation in these sources. In the same period executions rose fastest and the January 2026 crackdown was the deadliest here. A reader who takes only one set of facts gets a one-sided picture.
The war's first months cut both ways
Total executions dropped when the bombing began, while political executions and arrests rose. "The war weakened repression" and "the war hardened it" each use one half of the same HRANA data.
About this data
What this measures. Turnout, candidate vetting, executions, protest deaths, arrests, expert freedom scores and one online survey. Every count of killing or execution is a confirmed minimum by a named counter: IHRNGO, HRANA and Amnesty each use their own method and period, so each has its own chart.
What it does not measure. No source measures how hijab rules are enforced on the street, or how united the regime's security forces are. Executions and deaths in the war itself are in the war's human and financial costs.
How confident to be. Iran does not let independent monitors work, and most executions are unannounced: IHRNGO says under 7% were officially announced in 2025. True numbers are likely higher than every count here.
The survey. GAMAAN reached its sample online, almost all through the Psiphon circumvention tool, and weighted it to literate residents aged 15 and over. Its effective sample size after weighting is about 6,211. 12 People who use such tools may differ from those who do not; no offline survey was found to check this.
How it compares. Amnesty's execution counts and Freedom House's scores cover every country they rate, and both charts show the full set. Turnout and vetting have no comparable cross-country measure here.
Dates. As of late October 2026. Execution counts run to 8 October 2026 (HRANA) and December 2025 (IHRNGO, Amnesty); crackdown counts stop on 23 February 2026; the survey was fielded 20–27 June 2026.
Data still needed
- Iran-attributed plots abroad by year, split into foiled and carried out, from a source other than a single authorWhether Iran is mostly stopped or mostly succeeds bears on whether its record abroad can be contained by policing or needs stronger measures. No source found makes the split.
- Houthi attacks on commercial shipping by week since October 2023 (ACLED Red Sea dataset)ACLED keeps the counts behind a login, so the scale of Houthi attacks before the war cannot be shown or set against the panel's weapons findings.
- Attacks on US forces in Iraq and Syria by month before October 2023 and after December 2024, counted the same wayThe only monthly series covers fourteen months. A longer one would show whether the 2023–24 burst was unusual and whether attacks resumed during the 2026 war.
- Wrongful detentions and hostage cases involving Iran, by yearNo series was found, so whether hostage-taking has grown cannot be shown; only the February 2026 designation is on record.
- The State Department's current State Sponsors of Terrorism liststate.gov refused automated requests; the last readable copy (31 December 2025) still lists Syria, so whether it has since been removed is unverified.
- Case lists behind MI5's totals of plots and arrestsMI5 publishes totals without cases or definitions, so its figures cannot be checked or compared with other countries' counts.
- Iran's funding of Hezbollah and other groups in dollars per year, from an audited or official estimateThe State Department says only "hundreds of millions of dollars", which cannot show whether support grew or shrank.
Sources
Iran's Actions Abroad: Proxies, Plots, Hostage-Taking and Attacks, 1979–2026
- AMIA bombing: Argentina court holds Iran, Hezbollah responsible
Buenos Aires Times, 2024-04-11 · supports
“Argentina’s Federal Criminal Cassation Court affirmed on Thursday that the deadly attacks on the Israeli Embassy and the AMIA Jewish community centre were the responsibility of the Islamic fundamentalist organisation Hezbollah, sponsored by the government of Iran. The ruling also declared that both episodes should be considered crimes against humanity, thus placing them beyond the statute of limitations despite the passage of time and the lack of judicial results. ... In 1992, a bomb attack on the Israeli Embassy left 29 dead. Two years later, a truck loaded with explosives drove into the AMIA Jewish centre and detonated, leaving 85 dead and 300 injured. ... put blame on then-Iran president Ali Akbar Hashemi Bahramaie Rafsanjani as well as other Iranian officials and Hezbollah members”
Argentina’s Federal Criminal Cassation Court affirmed on Thursday that the deadly attacks on the Israeli Embassy and the AMIA Jewish community centre were the responsibility of the Islamic fundamentalist organisation Hezbollah, sponsored by the government of Iran. The ruling also declared that both episodes should be considered crimes against humanity, thus placing them beyond the statute of limitations despite the passage of time and the lack of judicial results. ... In 1992, a bomb attack on the Israeli Embassy left 29 dead. Two years later, a truck loaded with explosives drove into the AMIA Jewish centre and detonated, leaving 85 dead and 300 injured. ... put blame on then-Iran president Ali Akbar Hashemi Bahramaie Rafsanjani as well as other Iranian officials and Hezbollah members
- AMIA: procesaron a siete iraníes y un libanés por el atentado
TodoJujuy, 2026-09-21 · supports
“AMIA: procesaron a siete iraníes y un libanés por el atentado ... Rafecas procesó como autores mediatos a cuatro exfuncionarios iraníes: Alí Fallahijan, exministro de Inteligencia. Alí Velayati, exministro de Relaciones Exteriores. Mohsen Rezai, excomandante de la Guardia Revolucionaria. Ahmad Vahidi, exjefe de la Fuerza Al Quds. ... la Cámara Federal de Casación Penal todavía debe resolver planteos sobre la constitucionalidad del juicio en ausencia”
AMIA: procesaron a siete iraníes y un libanés por el atentado ... Rafecas procesó como autores mediatos a cuatro exfuncionarios iraníes: Alí Fallahijan, exministro de Inteligencia. Alí Velayati, exministro de Relaciones Exteriores. Mohsen Rezai, excomandante de la Guardia Revolucionaria. Ahmad Vahidi, exjefe de la Fuerza Al Quds. ... la Cámara Federal de Casación Penal todavía debe resolver planteos sobre la constitucionalidad del juicio en ausencia
- France bomb plot: Iran diplomat Assadollah Assadi sentenced to 20 years
BBC News, 2021-02-04 · supports
“France bomb plot: Iran diplomat Assadollah Assadi sentenced to 20 years ... An Iranian diplomat has been convicted of a plot to bomb a big French rally held by an exiled opposition group.”
France bomb plot: Iran diplomat Assadollah Assadi sentenced to 20 years ... An Iranian diplomat has been convicted of a plot to bomb a big French rally held by an exiled opposition group.
- Two Russian Mob Leaders Sentenced to 25 Years in Prison for Murder-For-Hire Targeting a Journalist on Behalf of the Iranian Government
US Department of Justice, 2025-10-30 · supports
“The Iranian Government Hired Polad Omarov and Rafat Amirov to Kill Masih Alinejad in Exchange for $500,000 ... were each sentenced yesterday to 25 years' in prison ... The IRGC offered AMIROV $500,000 for Ms. Alinejad's murder”
The Iranian Government Hired Polad Omarov and Rafat Amirov to Kill Masih Alinejad in Exchange for $500,000 ... were each sentenced yesterday to 25 years' in prison ... The IRGC offered AMIROV $500,000 for Ms. Alinejad's murder
- Brooklyn Man Sentenced to 15 Years in Prison for Murder-for-Hire Plot and Stalking a Journalist and Prominent Critic of the Iranian Government
US Department of Justice, 2026-01-28 · supports
“Today, convicted murderer Carlisle Rivera, also known as “Pop,” was sentenced to 15 years in prison for his participation in a murder-for-hire plot directed by the Government of Iran targeting Masih Alinejad, a journalist, author, and human rights activist ... in 2024, Rivera was hired by his criminal confederate, Farhad Shakeri, to murder Masih Alinejad on instructions from high-ranking members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).”
Today, convicted murderer Carlisle Rivera, also known as “Pop,” was sentenced to 15 years in prison for his participation in a murder-for-hire plot directed by the Government of Iran targeting Masih Alinejad, a journalist, author, and human rights activist ... in 2024, Rivera was hired by his criminal confederate, Farhad Shakeri, to murder Masih Alinejad on instructions from high-ranking members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
- Justice Department Announces Murder-For-Hire and Related Charges Against IRGC Asset and Two Local Operatives
US Department of Justice, 2024-11-08 · complicates
“Shakeri Was Tasked by Iranian Regime with Surveilling and Plotting to Assassinate President-Elect Donald J. Trump ... Farhad Shakeri, 51, of Iran; Carlisle Rivera, also known as Pop, 49, of Brooklyn, New York; and Jonathon Loadholt, 36, of Staten Island, New York, were charged today in a criminal complaint in connection with their alleged involvement in a plot to murder ... Shakeri remains at large and is believed to reside in Iran.”
Shakeri Was Tasked by Iranian Regime with Surveilling and Plotting to Assassinate President-Elect Donald J. Trump ... Farhad Shakeri, 51, of Iran; Carlisle Rivera, also known as Pop, 49, of Brooklyn, New York; and Jonathon Loadholt, 36, of Staten Island, New York, were charged today in a criminal complaint in connection with their alleged involvement in a plot to murder ... Shakeri remains at large and is believed to reside in Iran.
- Two Men Charged in Alleged Plot to Assassinate Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the United States
US Department of Justice, 2011-10-11 · complicates
“Two individuals have been charged in New York for their alleged participation in a plot directed by elements of the Iranian government to murder the Saudi Ambassador to the United States with explosives”
Two individuals have been charged in New York for their alleged participation in a plot directed by elements of the Iranian government to murder the Saudi Ambassador to the United States with explosives
- State Sponsors of Terrorism
US Department of State, 2025-12 · supports
“Currently there are four countries designated under these authorities: Cuba, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea), Iran, and Syria. Country Designation Date Cuba January 12, 2021 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) November 20, 2017 Iran January 19, 1984 Syria December 29, 1979”
Currently there are four countries designated under these authorities: Cuba, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea), Iran, and Syria. Country Designation Date Cuba January 12, 2021 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) November 20, 2017 Iran January 19, 1984 Syria December 29, 1979
- Country Reports on Terrorism 2023
US Department of State, 2025-03 · supports
“In 2023, Iran remained the leading state sponsor of terrorism ... Iran has provided hundreds of millions of dollars in support of Hizballah and trained thousands of its fighters at camps in Iran. ... Since the end of the 2006 Israeli-Hizballah conflict, Iran has supplied Hizballah in Lebanon with thousands of rockets, missiles, and small arms in violation of UNSCR 1701. ... Although there is no evidence that Iran knew about Hamas’s October 7 attacks on Israel in advance, its long-standing material, financial, and training support to Hamas enabled Hamas to execute the attack. ... On October 18, IAMGs restarted attacks against US military and diplomatic facilities, which came after an 18-month general pause in attacks in Iraq and a six-month pause in attacks in Syria. By the end of 2023, IAMGs had attacked US facilities in Iraq and Syria more than 100 times.”
In 2023, Iran remained the leading state sponsor of terrorism ... Iran has provided hundreds of millions of dollars in support of Hizballah and trained thousands of its fighters at camps in Iran. ... Since the end of the 2006 Israeli-Hizballah conflict, Iran has supplied Hizballah in Lebanon with thousands of rockets, missiles, and small arms in violation of UNSCR 1701. ... Although there is no evidence that Iran knew about Hamas’s October 7 attacks on Israel in advance, its long-standing material, financial, and training support to Hamas enabled Hamas to execute the attack. ... On October 18, IAMGs restarted attacks against US military and diplomatic facilities, which came after an 18-month general pause in attacks in Iraq and a six-month pause in attacks in Syria. By the end of 2023, IAMGs had attacked US facilities in Iraq and Syria more than 100 times.
- Final report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen (S/2024/731)
UN Security Council, Panel of Experts on Yemen, 2024-10-11 · supports
“Information gathered by the Panel indicates that they have been receiving technical assistance, training, weapons and financial support from the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraqi armed groups and Hizbullah. ... 70. The Panel observes strong similarities between the documented materiel and those developed or operated by the Islamic Republic of Iran (53 items). Similar items are also operated by armed groups in Iraq (20), Lebanon (11), the occupied Palestinian territory (5), Bahrain (1) and Somalia (1)”
Information gathered by the Panel indicates that they have been receiving technical assistance, training, weapons and financial support from the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraqi armed groups and Hizbullah. ... 70. The Panel observes strong similarities between the documented materiel and those developed or operated by the Islamic Republic of Iran (53 items). Similar items are also operated by armed groups in Iraq (20), Lebanon (11), the occupied Palestinian territory (5), Bahrain (1) and Somalia (1)
- Trends in Iranian External Assassination, Surveillance, and Abduction Plots (CTC Sentinel, vol. 15, no. 2)
Combating Terrorism Center at West Point (Matthew Levitt), 2022-02-24 · complicates
“This study draws on an unclassified and open-source dataset of 98 cases of Iranian external operations from December 1979 through December 2021. ... this is in no way a comprehensive listing of all such Iranian external operations. ... Of the 98 cases in the dataset, 42 involved the targeting of dissidents, 21 of whom were dual nationals or legal foreign residents. An additional 31 of the 98 cases targeted Jews or Israelis, 24 targeted diplomats, 24 targeted Western interests, seven targeted Gulf state interests, five involved the fatwa against Salman Rushdie ... Out of 55 cases over the past decade, 22 operations targeted Iranian dissidents, 25 cases targeted Jews or Israelis, 19 targeted diplomats, 12 targeted specifically Western interests, and six targeted Gulf state interests. ... The dataset suggests there was a gap in Iranian external operational activity for about 23 months after 9/11 ... there were only two plots in Europe in the decade after 9/11. This dramatic drop in attacks in Europe reversed itself over the past decade, however, with 17 plots in Europe since 2011.”
This study draws on an unclassified and open-source dataset of 98 cases of Iranian external operations from December 1979 through December 2021. ... this is in no way a comprehensive listing of all such Iranian external operations. ... Of the 98 cases in the dataset, 42 involved the targeting of dissidents, 21 of whom were dual nationals or legal foreign residents. An additional 31 of the 98 cases targeted Jews or Israelis, 24 targeted diplomats, 24 targeted Western interests, seven targeted Gulf state interests, five involved the fatwa against Salman Rushdie ... Out of 55 cases over the past decade, 22 operations targeted Iranian dissidents, 25 cases targeted Jews or Israelis, 19 targeted diplomats, 12 targeted specifically Western interests, and six targeted Gulf state interests. ... The dataset suggests there was a gap in Iranian external operational activity for about 23 months after 9/11 ... there were only two plots in Europe in the decade after 9/11. This dramatic drop in attacks in Europe reversed itself over the past decade, however, with 17 plots in Europe since 2011.
- Iranian External Operations in Europe: The Criminal Connection
International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (Matthew Levitt and Sarah Boches), 2024-10-16 · complicates
“of the 218 plots in the overall dataset covering 1979 to today, 102 plots occurred in Europe. The pace of Iranian operational activity in Europe has spiked, with over half of these plots (54 cases) occurring between 2021 and 2024. These operations have focused on targeting Iranian dissidents (34 cases), including journalists broadcasting news in Farsi that Tehran would rather not see the light of day, Israeli citizens and diplomats (10 cases), and Jews (7 cases). Furthermore, of these 54 plots, sixteen involved the use of criminal perpetrators to carry out the attacks. ... The Washington Institute has produced an interactive map drawing on this dataset which depicts Iranian external operations – assassinations, abductions, intimidation and surveillance plots – around the world”
of the 218 plots in the overall dataset covering 1979 to today, 102 plots occurred in Europe. The pace of Iranian operational activity in Europe has spiked, with over half of these plots (54 cases) occurring between 2021 and 2024. These operations have focused on targeting Iranian dissidents (34 cases), including journalists broadcasting news in Farsi that Tehran would rather not see the light of day, Israeli citizens and diplomats (10 cases), and Jews (7 cases). Furthermore, of these 54 plots, sixteen involved the use of criminal perpetrators to carry out the attacks. ... The Washington Institute has produced an interactive map drawing on this dataset which depicts Iranian external operations – assassinations, abductions, intimidation and surveillance plots – around the world
- MI5 Director General delivers annual threat update
MI5 (the Security Service), 2026-10-13 · supports
“The other state keen on subcontracting its UK violence is Iran. I’ve been calling this out since 2022. Today, we continue to see familiar Iranian intent – using criminal proxies to try to intimidate oppositionists, Iranian media organisations, and Israeli sites. But 2026 has also seen the Iranians, like the Russians, attempting to expand their hybrid campaign. Over the last twelve months, our Iran-linked operations have led to more than fifty arrests in the UK. ... The spring saw a wave of arson and sabotage incidents targeting Jewish communities in the UK and other European nations. ... claimed by a group calling itself the Islamic Movement of the Companions of the Right. Behind this front sat members of the IRGC. ... The other major shift this year has been Iranian ambitions to come at harder targets, like military sites.”
The other state keen on subcontracting its UK violence is Iran. I’ve been calling this out since 2022. Today, we continue to see familiar Iranian intent – using criminal proxies to try to intimidate oppositionists, Iranian media organisations, and Israeli sites. But 2026 has also seen the Iranians, like the Russians, attempting to expand their hybrid campaign. Over the last twelve months, our Iran-linked operations have led to more than fifty arrests in the UK. ... The spring saw a wave of arson and sabotage incidents targeting Jewish communities in the UK and other European nations. ... claimed by a group calling itself the Islamic Movement of the Companions of the Right. Behind this front sat members of the IRGC. ... The other major shift this year has been Iranian ambitions to come at harder targets, like military sites.
- Director General Sir Ken McCallum gives threat update
MI5 (the Security Service), 2025-10-16 · supports
“Iran’s autocratic regime is likewise frantically trying to silence its opponents around the world, including in the UK. ... MI5 has tracked more than twenty potentially lethal Iran-backed plots in just the one year since I last stood at this podium. ... In a collective public response to this shared threat, fourteen nations, including the UK, together condemned Iran’s efforts to kill, kidnap and harass in Europe and North America.”
Iran’s autocratic regime is likewise frantically trying to silence its opponents around the world, including in the UK. ... MI5 has tracked more than twenty potentially lethal Iran-backed plots in just the one year since I last stood at this podium. ... In a collective public response to this shared threat, fourteen nations, including the UK, together condemned Iran’s efforts to kill, kidnap and harass in Europe and North America.
- US designates Iran as state sponsor of wrongful detention
Iran International, 2026-02-27 · supports
“US Secretary of State Marco Rubio on Friday designated Iran a state sponsor of wrongful detention, citing its pattern of hostage-taking and arbitrary detention of Americans. “The Iranian regime must stop taking hostages and release all Americans unjustly detained in Iran, steps that could end this designation and associated actions,” Rubio said in a statement. ... "No American should travel to Iran for any reason.”
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio on Friday designated Iran a state sponsor of wrongful detention, citing its pattern of hostage-taking and arbitrary detention of Americans. “The Iranian regime must stop taking hostages and release all Americans unjustly detained in Iran, steps that could end this designation and associated actions,” Rubio said in a statement. ... "No American should travel to Iran for any reason.
- Low turnout as conservatives dominate Iran parliamentary election
Al Jazeera, 2024-03-04 · supports
““Around 25 million people participated with a turnout of 41 percent,” Interior Minister Ahmad Vahidi said at a news conference in Tehran”
“Around 25 million people participated with a turnout of 41 percent,” Interior Minister Ahmad Vahidi said at a news conference in Tehran
- Tracking Anti-U.S. and Anti-Israel Strikes From Iraq and Syria During the Gaza Crisis
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy (Michael Knights, Amir al-Kaabi and Hamdi Malik, Militia Spotlight), 2024-12-03 · supports
“Claimed attacks on U.S. and coalition bases in Iraq and Syria, which were the predominant category until the temporary cessation of anti-U.S. attacks in February-July 2024. When we can confirm attacks, we have given them a serial number in the lefthand column. We can have very high confidence these claimed anti-coalition attacks actually occurred. Since September 2024, the number of anti-U.S. strikes in Syria seems to be increasing again, but it is very hard to get high-confidence evidence of these attacks. ... Claimed attacks on Israel ... do not receive a serial number. ... Serial Number | Date | Target ... 223 | Dec 3 | Conoco, Syria ... 182 | Feb 4 | Omar, Syria ... 180 | Jan 28 | Erbil, Iraq ... 128 | Dec 31 | Erbil, Iraq ... 90 | Nov 23 | al-Asad and Erbil, Iraq ... 32 | Oct 31 | al-Asad, Iraq ... 1 | Oct 18”
Claimed attacks on U.S. and coalition bases in Iraq and Syria, which were the predominant category until the temporary cessation of anti-U.S. attacks in February-July 2024. When we can confirm attacks, we have given them a serial number in the lefthand column. We can have very high confidence these claimed anti-coalition attacks actually occurred. Since September 2024, the number of anti-U.S. strikes in Syria seems to be increasing again, but it is very hard to get high-confidence evidence of these attacks. ... Claimed attacks on Israel ... do not receive a serial number. ... Serial Number | Date | Target ... 223 | Dec 3 | Conoco, Syria ... 182 | Feb 4 | Omar, Syria ... 180 | Jan 28 | Erbil, Iraq ... 128 | Dec 31 | Erbil, Iraq ... 90 | Nov 23 | al-Asad and Erbil, Iraq ... 32 | Oct 31 | al-Asad, Iraq ... 1 | Oct 18
Iran's Nuclear Programme: Stockpile, Inspections and Assessments, 2011–2026
- Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of United Nations Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, GOV/2026/50, paras 2–16, 28, 39, 45
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2026-09-01 · supports
“These attacks took place between 13–24 June 2025. On 22 June 2025, the United States conducted attacks on three of Iran’s nuclear facilities. The Agency stopped conducting verification activities in Iran at the commencement of the military attacks and, by the end of June 2025, had decided to withdraw all of its inspectors from Iran for safety reasons. … On 2 July 2025, the President of Iran signed into force a law suspending cooperation with the Agency. … On 9 September 2025, the Director General signed an agreement with the Foreign Minister of Iran, Dr Abbas Araghchi, in Cairo – referred to as the ‘Cairo agreement’ … Iran, in a letter of 20 November 2025, informed the Director General that the Cairo agreement was “no longer valid and shall henceforth be regarded as terminated”. … The Director General was in attendance at the indirect negotiations between the United States of America and Iran that took place on 17 and 26 February 2026 in Geneva, in which he provided advice on issues relevant to the verification of Iran’s nuclear programme. On 28 February 2026, the United States of America and Israel launched further military attacks on Iran, including on the sites of some nuclear facilities. Consequently, the Agency stopped conducting verification activities in Iran. … On 1–3 June 2026, the Agency conducted an inspection and DIV at the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP) … On 10 June 2026, the Board adopted resolution GOV/2026/40 in which, inter alia, it: recalled that “Iran’s many failures to provide the Agency with full and timely cooperation regarding undeclared nuclear material and activities at multiple undeclared locations in Iran, as detailed in GOV/2025/25, constitute non-compliance with its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement …” … further reiterated that “consistent with Article 19 of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement, the Agency is not able to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded under the Agreement to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices” … Due to the lack of information about, and access to, any of Iran’s four declared enrichment facilities to perform verification activities the Agency cannot provide any information on the current size, composition or whereabouts of the stockpile of enriched uranium in Iran or whether Iran has suspended all enrichment related activities, including R&D. … The Board considered the Director General’s report and, on 12 June 2025, adopted resolution GOV/2025/38 … Since Iran stopped provisionally applying its Additional Protocol in February 2021, the Agency has not been able, inter alia, to conduct complementary access to any sites or other locations in Iran.”
These attacks took place between 13–24 June 2025. On 22 June 2025, the United States conducted attacks on three of Iran’s nuclear facilities. The Agency stopped conducting verification activities in Iran at the commencement of the military attacks and, by the end of June 2025, had decided to withdraw all of its inspectors from Iran for safety reasons. … On 2 July 2025, the President of Iran signed into force a law suspending cooperation with the Agency. … On 9 September 2025, the Director General signed an agreement with the Foreign Minister of Iran, Dr Abbas Araghchi, in Cairo – referred to as the ‘Cairo agreement’ … Iran, in a letter of 20 November 2025, informed the Director General that the Cairo agreement was “no longer valid and shall henceforth be regarded as terminated”. … The Director General was in attendance at the indirect negotiations between the United States of America and Iran that took place on 17 and 26 February 2026 in Geneva, in which he provided advice on issues relevant to the verification of Iran’s nuclear programme. On 28 February 2026, the United States of America and Israel launched further military attacks on Iran, including on the sites of some nuclear facilities. Consequently, the Agency stopped conducting verification activities in Iran. … On 1–3 June 2026, the Agency conducted an inspection and DIV at the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP) … On 10 June 2026, the Board adopted resolution GOV/2026/40 in which, inter alia, it: recalled that “Iran’s many failures to provide the Agency with full and timely cooperation regarding undeclared nuclear material and activities at multiple undeclared locations in Iran, as detailed in GOV/2025/25, constitute non-compliance with its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement …” … further reiterated that “consistent with Article 19 of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement, the Agency is not able to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded under the Agreement to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices” … Due to the lack of information about, and access to, any of Iran’s four declared enrichment facilities to perform verification activities the Agency cannot provide any information on the current size, composition or whereabouts of the stockpile of enriched uranium in Iran or whether Iran has suspended all enrichment related activities, including R&D. … The Board considered the Director General’s report and, on 12 June 2025, adopted resolution GOV/2025/38 … Since Iran stopped provisionally applying its Additional Protocol in February 2021, the Agency has not been able, inter alia, to conduct complementary access to any sites or other locations in Iran.
- Analysis of IAEA Iran Verification and Monitoring and NPT Safeguards Reports — June 2026
Institute for Science and International Security (David Albright, Sarah Burkhard, Spencer Faragasso, Andrea Stricker), 2026-06-09 · complicates
“The IAEA conducted an inspection and a DIV between June 1-3, 2026, at Bushehr. The IAEA stated in its February 2026 NPT report that “the Agency had conducted inspections/DIVs at 7 of the 13 unaffected facilities, but had yet to conduct inspections/DIVs at any of the 8 affected facilities or at the Isfahan Fuel Enrichment Plant).” … With the massive destruction of its gas centrifuge program and installed centrifuge cascades, for the first time in 20 years, Iran has no identifiable route to produce weapon-grade uranium (WGU) in its centrifuge enrichment plants. … While before the strikes, Iran could have made its first non-missile deliverable nuclear weapon within months, it would need more than a year today and face significant new uncertainties in knowing whether the weapon would work. Director General Grossi stated after the June 2025 strikes that the IAEA believes that most of the HEU, but less than 70 percent of the stock, is located inside the Esfahan tunnel complex. … The IAEA emphasizes that “Iran is the only NPT non-nuclear-weapon State to have produced and accumulated uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 …” … no breakout estimate to WGU is included in the Institute’s analysis of the IAEA report, since to do so would require unsubstantiated speculation”
The IAEA conducted an inspection and a DIV between June 1-3, 2026, at Bushehr. The IAEA stated in its February 2026 NPT report that “the Agency had conducted inspections/DIVs at 7 of the 13 unaffected facilities, but had yet to conduct inspections/DIVs at any of the 8 affected facilities or at the Isfahan Fuel Enrichment Plant).” … With the massive destruction of its gas centrifuge program and installed centrifuge cascades, for the first time in 20 years, Iran has no identifiable route to produce weapon-grade uranium (WGU) in its centrifuge enrichment plants. … While before the strikes, Iran could have made its first non-missile deliverable nuclear weapon within months, it would need more than a year today and face significant new uncertainties in knowing whether the weapon would work. Director General Grossi stated after the June 2025 strikes that the IAEA believes that most of the HEU, but less than 70 percent of the stock, is located inside the Esfahan tunnel complex. … The IAEA emphasizes that “Iran is the only NPT non-nuclear-weapon State to have produced and accumulated uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 …” … no breakout estimate to WGU is included in the Institute’s analysis of the IAEA report, since to do so would require unsubstantiated speculation
- Iran and Nuclear Weapons Production (IF12106)
Congressional Research Service (Paul K. Kerr), via EveryCRSReport, 2026-10-13 · complicates
“The status of Iran’s nuclear program is unclear. … A November 2024 ODNI report explained that Iran’s fissile material stockpile would, if further enriched, have been sufficient for “more than a dozen nuclear weapons.” The U.S. government estimated that Iran would have needed as little as one week to produce enough weapons-grade HEU for one nuclear weapon, according to a State Department (DOS) official in March 2022. The Defense Intelligence Agency assessed in May 2025 that Iran would have needed “probably less than one week” to produce this amount of HEU. … HEU used in nuclear weapons typically contains about 90% u-235. … The latter two categories of UF6 are of particular concern because relatively little additional effort would be necessary to produce weapons-grade HEU using UF6 containing these amounts of u-235. … Iran’s Foreign Minister Seyed Abbas Araghchi stated on March 15, 2026, that the country’s enriched uranium is “under the rubble” created by the June 2025 attacks on Iran’s enrichment facilities. Iran has “no plan” to recover this material, he added. In 2026, U.S. and Iranian officials have said that Iran has not resumed enriching uranium. … Grossi stated on March 4, 2026, that the IAEA in June 2025 had no “information indicating that there was a structured systematic [Iranian] program to build or to construct a nuclear weapon.” … The 2024 ATA observed that “Iran is not currently undertaking the key nuclear weapons-development activities necessary to produce a testable nuclear device.” … The 2026 ATA states that the United States is “monitoring Iranian WMD-related capabilities and actions following” the 2026 attacks; the ATA does not address Iran’s nuclear weapons activities. … A June 2026 memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the United States and Iran states that “Iran reaffirms that it shall not procure or develop nuclear weapons.” … The current assessed timeline is unclear. … Neither the U.S. government nor the IAEA have publicly described evidence that Iran is conducting covert fissile material production nuclear activities.”
The status of Iran’s nuclear program is unclear. … A November 2024 ODNI report explained that Iran’s fissile material stockpile would, if further enriched, have been sufficient for “more than a dozen nuclear weapons.” The U.S. government estimated that Iran would have needed as little as one week to produce enough weapons-grade HEU for one nuclear weapon, according to a State Department (DOS) official in March 2022. The Defense Intelligence Agency assessed in May 2025 that Iran would have needed “probably less than one week” to produce this amount of HEU. … HEU used in nuclear weapons typically contains about 90% u-235. … The latter two categories of UF6 are of particular concern because relatively little additional effort would be necessary to produce weapons-grade HEU using UF6 containing these amounts of u-235. … Iran’s Foreign Minister Seyed Abbas Araghchi stated on March 15, 2026, that the country’s enriched uranium is “under the rubble” created by the June 2025 attacks on Iran’s enrichment facilities. Iran has “no plan” to recover this material, he added. In 2026, U.S. and Iranian officials have said that Iran has not resumed enriching uranium. … Grossi stated on March 4, 2026, that the IAEA in June 2025 had no “information indicating that there was a structured systematic [Iranian] program to build or to construct a nuclear weapon.” … The 2024 ATA observed that “Iran is not currently undertaking the key nuclear weapons-development activities necessary to produce a testable nuclear device.” … The 2026 ATA states that the United States is “monitoring Iranian WMD-related capabilities and actions following” the 2026 attacks; the ATA does not address Iran’s nuclear weapons activities. … A June 2026 memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the United States and Iran states that “Iran reaffirms that it shall not procure or develop nuclear weapons.” … The current assessed timeline is unclear. … Neither the U.S. government nor the IAEA have publicly described evidence that Iran is conducting covert fissile material production nuclear activities.
- Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, 2025
Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2025-03 · complicates
“We continue to assess Iran is not building a nuclear weapon and that Khamenei has not reauthorized the nuclear weapons program he suspended in 2003, though pressure has probably built on him to do so. In the past year, there has been an erosion of a decades-long taboo on discussing nuclear weapons in public that has emboldened nuclear weapons advocates within Iran's decisionmaking apparatus.”
We continue to assess Iran is not building a nuclear weapon and that Khamenei has not reauthorized the nuclear weapons program he suspended in 2003, though pressure has probably built on him to do so. In the past year, there has been an erosion of a decades-long taboo on discussing nuclear weapons in public that has emboldened nuclear weapons advocates within Iran's decisionmaking apparatus.
- Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, 2026
Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2026-03 · complicates
“Prior to Operation Epic Fury, Iran was … intending to try to recover from the devastation of its nuclear infrastructure sustained during the 12-Day War, and refused to live up to its nuclear obligations with the IAEA, including refusing to allow IAEA access to key nuclear facilities. … We are monitoring Iranian WMD-related capabilities and actions following the initiation of Operation Epic Fury.”
Prior to Operation Epic Fury, Iran was … intending to try to recover from the devastation of its nuclear infrastructure sustained during the 12-Day War, and refused to live up to its nuclear obligations with the IAEA, including refusing to allow IAEA access to key nuclear facilities. … We are monitoring Iranian WMD-related capabilities and actions following the initiation of Operation Epic Fury.
- NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran, GOV/2025/25, paras 17, 77–81, 86
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2025-05-31 · supports
“these three locations, and other possible related locations, were part of an undeclared structured nuclear programme carried out by Iran until the early 2000s and that some activities used undeclared nuclear material. … the Agency concludes that approximately 10 kg of natural uranium metal, which had not been declared by Iran, was available to the Applied Physics Institute (API) operating at Lavisan-Shian in the period 2002-2003. … Iran retained unknown nuclear material and/or heavily contaminated equipment, and other assets, arising from the former undeclared structured nuclear programme, at Turquzabad in the period 2009 until 2018, after which items were removed from the location. … The Agency has no credible indications of an ongoing, undeclared structured nuclear programme of the type described above in Iran and notes the statements of the highest officials in Iran that the use of nuclear weapons is incompatible with Islamic Law. … the fact that Iran is the only non-nuclear-weapon State in the world that is producing and accumulating uranium enriched to 60% remains a matter of serious concern … has sanitised locations as listed in this report, which has impeded Agency verification activities. … the Agency will not be in a position to provide assurance that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful.”
these three locations, and other possible related locations, were part of an undeclared structured nuclear programme carried out by Iran until the early 2000s and that some activities used undeclared nuclear material. … the Agency concludes that approximately 10 kg of natural uranium metal, which had not been declared by Iran, was available to the Applied Physics Institute (API) operating at Lavisan-Shian in the period 2002-2003. … Iran retained unknown nuclear material and/or heavily contaminated equipment, and other assets, arising from the former undeclared structured nuclear programme, at Turquzabad in the period 2009 until 2018, after which items were removed from the location. … The Agency has no credible indications of an ongoing, undeclared structured nuclear programme of the type described above in Iran and notes the statements of the highest officials in Iran that the use of nuclear weapons is incompatible with Islamic Law. … the fact that Iran is the only non-nuclear-weapon State in the world that is producing and accumulating uranium enriched to 60% remains a matter of serious concern … has sanitised locations as listed in this report, which has impeded Agency verification activities. … the Agency will not be in a position to provide assurance that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful.
- Final Assessment on Past and Present Outstanding Issues regarding Iran’s Nuclear Programme, GOV/2015/68, para 87
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2015-12-02 · complicates
“The Agency assesses that a range of activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device were conducted in Iran prior to the end of 2003 as a coordinated effort, and some activities took place after 2003. The Agency also assesses that these activities did not advance beyond feasibility and scientific studies, and the acquisition of certain relevant technical competences and capabilities. The Agency has no credible indications of activities in Iran relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device after 2009.”
The Agency assesses that a range of activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device were conducted in Iran prior to the end of 2003 as a coordinated effort, and some activities took place after 2003. The Agency also assesses that these activities did not advance beyond feasibility and scientific studies, and the acquisition of certain relevant technical competences and capabilities. The Agency has no credible indications of activities in Iran relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device after 2009.
- Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, GOV/2011/65, Annex para 53
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2011-11-08 · supports
“After assessing carefully and critically the extensive information available to it, the Agency finds the information to be, overall, credible. The information indicates that Iran has carried out activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device. The information also indicates that prior to the end of 2003, these activities took place under a structured programme, and that some activities may still be ongoing.”
After assessing carefully and critically the extensive information available to it, the Agency finds the information to be, overall, credible. The information indicates that Iran has carried out activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device. The information also indicates that prior to the end of 2003, these activities took place under a structured programme, and that some activities may still be ongoing.
- Timeline of Nuclear Diplomacy With Iran
Arms Control Association, 2023-01 · supports
“Iran is meeting its nuclear obligations, although it slightly exceeded a cap set on the stockpile of heavy water … bringing Iran back within the limit … May 8, 2018: President Trump announces that he is withdrawing the United States from the JCPOA … May 8, 2019: Iran announces that it will no longer be bound by stockpiles limitations … July 1, 2019: Iran announces that it breached the 300 kilogram limit … The IAEA confirms that Iran has exceeded the limit. … April 13, 2021: Iran notifies the International Atomic Energy Agency that it has begun to boost enrichment levels to 60 percent … in response to the April 11 attack.”
Iran is meeting its nuclear obligations, although it slightly exceeded a cap set on the stockpile of heavy water … bringing Iran back within the limit … May 8, 2018: President Trump announces that he is withdrawing the United States from the JCPOA … May 8, 2019: Iran announces that it will no longer be bound by stockpiles limitations … July 1, 2019: Iran announces that it breached the 300 kilogram limit … The IAEA confirms that Iran has exceeded the limit. … April 13, 2021: Iran notifies the International Atomic Energy Agency that it has begun to boost enrichment levels to 60 percent … in response to the April 11 attack.
- The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) at a Glance
Arms Control Association, 2025-02 · supports
“For 10 years operating centrifuges reduced to 5,060 IR-1 machines … For 15 years level of uranium enrichment capped at 3.67 percent uranium-235 … For 15 years the stockpile is kept under 300 kilograms of 3.67 percent enriched uranium in total (all forms) … January 16, 2016, Implementation Day”
For 10 years operating centrifuges reduced to 5,060 IR-1 machines … For 15 years level of uranium enrichment capped at 3.67 percent uranium-235 … For 15 years the stockpile is kept under 300 kilograms of 3.67 percent enriched uranium in total (all forms) … January 16, 2016, Implementation Day
- Hegseth and Caine Hold a Briefing on Iran (transcript)
Rev (transcript of a US Department of Defense briefing), 2026-04-08 · complicates
“nearly 80% of Iran's nuclear industrial base was hit, further degrading their attempts to attain a nuclear weapon. … So right now it's buried and we're watching it. We know exactly what they have”
nearly 80% of Iran's nuclear industrial base was hit, further degrading their attempts to attain a nuclear weapon. … So right now it's buried and we're watching it. We know exactly what they have
- Oversights Mar Low-End Estimate of Tehran's Nuclear Weapons Timeline
Foundation for Defense of Democracies (Andrea Stricker), 2026-05-06 · complicates
“U.S. intelligence assessments have concluded that Iran is now 9 to 12 months away from being able to build a nuclear weapon, according to a Reuters report. … In July 2025, the Pentagon estimated that the June strikes had pushed Iran back to roughly two years … prior to this conflict and the 12-Day War, U.S. intelligence reportedly placed Iran's breakout time at three to six months. … Any realistic assessment accounting for all these setbacks would place the timeline at two and a half years at least, absent foreign assistance.”
U.S. intelligence assessments have concluded that Iran is now 9 to 12 months away from being able to build a nuclear weapon, according to a Reuters report. … In July 2025, the Pentagon estimated that the June strikes had pushed Iran back to roughly two years … prior to this conflict and the 12-Day War, U.S. intelligence reportedly placed Iran's breakout time at three to six months. … Any realistic assessment accounting for all these setbacks would place the timeline at two and a half years at least, absent foreign assistance.
- NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran, Board resolution GOV/2026/40
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors, via Iran Watch, 2026-06-10 · supports
“The resolution was adopted with 21 in favour, 3 against and 10 abstentions.”
The resolution was adopted with 21 in favour, 3 against and 10 abstentions.
- NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran, Board resolution GOV/2026/61
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors, via Iran Watch, 2026-09-09 · supports
“The resolution was adopted with 23 in favour, 3 against and 8 abstentions. … Requests the Director General to report this resolution and the previously adopted resolutions contained in GOV/2025/38 and GOV/2026/40, as well as the Director General’s report contained in GOV/2026/50, to all Members of the Agency and to the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations”
The resolution was adopted with 23 in favour, 3 against and 8 abstentions. … Requests the Director General to report this resolution and the previously adopted resolutions contained in GOV/2025/38 and GOV/2026/40, as well as the Director General’s report contained in GOV/2026/50, to all Members of the Agency and to the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations
- Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/INF/2019/8
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2019-07-01 · supports
“On 1 July 2019, the Agency verified that the quantity of Iran’s uranium enriched up to 3.67% U-235 was 205.0 kg, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission. Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile, therefore, has exceeded 300 kg of UF6 enriched up to 3.67% U-235 (or the equivalent in different chemical forms), as the quantity of 300 kg of UF6 corresponds to 202.8 kg of uranium.”
On 1 July 2019, the Agency verified that the quantity of Iran’s uranium enriched up to 3.67% U-235 was 205.0 kg, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission. Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile, therefore, has exceeded 300 kg of UF6 enriched up to 3.67% U-235 (or the equivalent in different chemical forms), as the quantity of 300 kg of UF6 corresponds to 202.8 kg of uranium.
- Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/INF/2019/9
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2019-07-08 · supports
“On 8 July 2019, the Agency, using its on-line enrichment monitors, verified that Iran was enriching UF6 above 3.67% U-235 at FEP.”
On 8 July 2019, the Agency, using its on-line enrichment monitors, verified that Iran was enriching UF6 above 3.67% U-235 at FEP.
- Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2017/10
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2017-02-24 · supports
“Iran has not enriched uranium above 3.67% U-235 (para. 28). … Throughout the reporting period, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile has not exceeded 300 kg of UF6 enriched up to 3.67% U-235 (or the equivalent in different chemical forms) (para. 56). … As of 18 February 2017, the quantity of Iran’s uranium enriched up to 3.67% U-235 was 101.7 kg, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission.”
Iran has not enriched uranium above 3.67% U-235 (para. 28). … Throughout the reporting period, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile has not exceeded 300 kg of UF6 enriched up to 3.67% U-235 (or the equivalent in different chemical forms) (para. 56). … As of 18 February 2017, the quantity of Iran’s uranium enriched up to 3.67% U-235 was 101.7 kg, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission.
- Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2017/24
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2017-06-02 · supports
“Iran has not enriched uranium above 3.67% U-235 (para. 28). … Throughout the reporting period, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile has not exceeded 300 kg of UF6 enriched up to 3.67% U-235 (or the equivalent in different chemical forms) (para. 56). … As of 27 May 2017, the quantity of Iran’s uranium enriched up to 3.67% U-235 was 79.8 kg, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission.”
Iran has not enriched uranium above 3.67% U-235 (para. 28). … Throughout the reporting period, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile has not exceeded 300 kg of UF6 enriched up to 3.67% U-235 (or the equivalent in different chemical forms) (para. 56). … As of 27 May 2017, the quantity of Iran’s uranium enriched up to 3.67% U-235 was 79.8 kg, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission.
- Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2017/35
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2017-08-31 · supports
“Iran has not enriched uranium above 3.67% U-235 (para. 28). … Throughout the reporting period, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile has not exceeded 300 kg of UF6 enriched up to 3.67% U-235 (or the equivalent in different chemical forms) (para. 56). … As of 21 August 2017, the quantity of Iran’s uranium enriched up to 3.67% U-235 was 88.4 kg, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission.”
Iran has not enriched uranium above 3.67% U-235 (para. 28). … Throughout the reporting period, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile has not exceeded 300 kg of UF6 enriched up to 3.67% U-235 (or the equivalent in different chemical forms) (para. 56). … As of 21 August 2017, the quantity of Iran’s uranium enriched up to 3.67% U-235 was 88.4 kg, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission.
- Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2017/48
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2017-11-13 · supports
“Iran has not enriched uranium above 3.67% U-235 (para. 28). … Throughout the reporting period, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile has not exceeded 300 kg of UF6 enriched up to 3.67% U-235 (or the equivalent in different chemical forms) (para. 56). … As of 5 November 2017, the quantity of Iran’s uranium enriched up to 3.67% U-235 was 96.7 kg, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission.”
Iran has not enriched uranium above 3.67% U-235 (para. 28). … Throughout the reporting period, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile has not exceeded 300 kg of UF6 enriched up to 3.67% U-235 (or the equivalent in different chemical forms) (para. 56). … As of 5 November 2017, the quantity of Iran’s uranium enriched up to 3.67% U-235 was 96.7 kg, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission.
- Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2018/7
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2018-02-22 · supports
“Iran has not enriched uranium above 3.67% U-235 (para. 28). … Throughout the reporting period, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile has not exceeded 300 kg of UF6 enriched up to 3.67% U-235 (or the equivalent in different chemical forms) (para. 56). … As of 12 February 2018, the quantity of Iran’s uranium enriched up to 3.67% U-235 was 109.5 kg, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission.”
Iran has not enriched uranium above 3.67% U-235 (para. 28). … Throughout the reporting period, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile has not exceeded 300 kg of UF6 enriched up to 3.67% U-235 (or the equivalent in different chemical forms) (para. 56). … As of 12 February 2018, the quantity of Iran’s uranium enriched up to 3.67% U-235 was 109.5 kg, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission.
- Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2018/24
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2018-05-24 · supports
“Iran has not enriched uranium above 3.67% U-235 (para. 28). … Throughout the reporting period, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile has not exceeded 300 kg of UF6 enriched up to 3.67% U-235 (or the equivalent in different chemical forms) (para. 56). … As of 14 May 2018, the quantity of Iran’s uranium enriched up to 3.67% U-235 was 123.9 kg, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission.”
Iran has not enriched uranium above 3.67% U-235 (para. 28). … Throughout the reporting period, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile has not exceeded 300 kg of UF6 enriched up to 3.67% U-235 (or the equivalent in different chemical forms) (para. 56). … As of 14 May 2018, the quantity of Iran’s uranium enriched up to 3.67% U-235 was 123.9 kg, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission.
- Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2018/33
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2018-08-30 · supports
“Iran has not enriched uranium above 3.67% U-235 (para. 28). … Throughout the reporting period, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile has not exceeded 300 kg of UF6 enriched up to 3.67% U-235 (or the equivalent in different chemical forms) (para. 56). … As of 18 August 2018, the quantity of Iran’s uranium enriched up to 3.67% U-235 was 139.4 kg, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission. … The Agency has continued to evaluate Iran’s declarations under the Additional Protocol, and has conducted complementary accesses under the Additional Protocol to all the sites and locations in Iran which it needed to visit.”
Iran has not enriched uranium above 3.67% U-235 (para. 28). … Throughout the reporting period, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile has not exceeded 300 kg of UF6 enriched up to 3.67% U-235 (or the equivalent in different chemical forms) (para. 56). … As of 18 August 2018, the quantity of Iran’s uranium enriched up to 3.67% U-235 was 139.4 kg, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission. … The Agency has continued to evaluate Iran’s declarations under the Additional Protocol, and has conducted complementary accesses under the Additional Protocol to all the sites and locations in Iran which it needed to visit.
- Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2018/47
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2018-11-12 · supports
“Iran has not enriched uranium above 3.67% U-235 (para. 28). … Throughout the reporting period, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile has not exceeded 300 kg of UF6 enriched up to 3.67% U-235 (or the equivalent in different chemical forms) (para. 56). … As of 4 November 2018, the quantity of Iran’s uranium enriched up to 3.67% U-235 was 149.4 kg, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission.”
Iran has not enriched uranium above 3.67% U-235 (para. 28). … Throughout the reporting period, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile has not exceeded 300 kg of UF6 enriched up to 3.67% U-235 (or the equivalent in different chemical forms) (para. 56). … As of 4 November 2018, the quantity of Iran’s uranium enriched up to 3.67% U-235 was 149.4 kg, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission.
- Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2019/10
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2019-02-22 · supports
“Iran has not enriched uranium above 3.67% U-235 (para. 28). … Throughout the reporting period, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile has not exceeded 300 kg of UF6 enriched up to 3.67% U-235 (or the equivalent in different chemical forms) (para. 56). … As of 16 February 2019, the quantity of Iran’s uranium enriched up to 3.67% U-235 was 163.8 kg, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission.”
Iran has not enriched uranium above 3.67% U-235 (para. 28). … Throughout the reporting period, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile has not exceeded 300 kg of UF6 enriched up to 3.67% U-235 (or the equivalent in different chemical forms) (para. 56). … As of 16 February 2019, the quantity of Iran’s uranium enriched up to 3.67% U-235 was 163.8 kg, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission.
- Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2019/21
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2019-05-31 · supports
“Iran has not enriched uranium above 3.67% U-235 (para. 28). … Throughout the reporting period, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile has not exceeded 300 kg of UF6 enriched up to 3.67% U-235 (or the equivalent in different chemical forms) (para. 56). … As of 20 May 2019, the quantity of Iran’s uranium enriched up to 3.67% U-235 was 174.1 kg, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission.”
Iran has not enriched uranium above 3.67% U-235 (para. 28). … Throughout the reporting period, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile has not exceeded 300 kg of UF6 enriched up to 3.67% U-235 (or the equivalent in different chemical forms) (para. 56). … As of 20 May 2019, the quantity of Iran’s uranium enriched up to 3.67% U-235 was 174.1 kg, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission.
- Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2019/32
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2019-08-30 · supports
“As of 19 August 2019, the Agency verified that Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 241.6 kg, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission.”
As of 19 August 2019, the Agency verified that Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 241.6 kg, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission.
- Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2019/55
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2019-11-11 · supports
“As of 3 November 2019, the Agency verified that, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 372.3 kg (+130.7 kg since the Acting Director General’s previous quarterly report).”
As of 3 November 2019, the Agency verified that, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 372.3 kg (+130.7 kg since the Acting Director General’s previous quarterly report).
- Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2020/5
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2020-03-03 · supports
“As of 19 February 2020, the Agency verified that, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile, comprising enriched uranium produced at FEP, PFEP and FFEP was 1020.9 kg (+648.6 kg since the previous quarterly report).”
As of 19 February 2020, the Agency verified that, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile, comprising enriched uranium produced at FEP, PFEP and FFEP was 1020.9 kg (+648.6 kg since the previous quarterly report).
- Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2020/26
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2020-06-05 · supports
“As of 20 May 2020, the Agency verified that, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile, comprising enriched uranium produced at FEP, PFEP and FFEP was 1571.6 kg (+550.7 kg since the previous quarterly report).”
As of 20 May 2020, the Agency verified that, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile, comprising enriched uranium produced at FEP, PFEP and FFEP was 1571.6 kg (+550.7 kg since the previous quarterly report).
- Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2020/41
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2020-09-04 · supports
“As of 25 August 2020, the Agency verified that, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile, comprising enriched uranium produced at FEP, PFEP and FFEP was 2105.4 kg (+533.8 kg since the previous quarterly report).”
As of 25 August 2020, the Agency verified that, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile, comprising enriched uranium produced at FEP, PFEP and FFEP was 2105.4 kg (+533.8 kg since the previous quarterly report).
- Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2020/51
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2020-11-11 · supports
“As of 2 November 2020, the Agency verified that, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile, comprising enriched uranium produced at FEP, PFEP and FFEP was 2442.9 kg (+337.5 kg since the previous quarterly report).”
As of 2 November 2020, the Agency verified that, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile, comprising enriched uranium produced at FEP, PFEP and FFEP was 2442.9 kg (+337.5 kg since the previous quarterly report).
- Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2021/10
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2021-02-23 · supports
“As of 16 February 2021, the Agency verified that, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile, comprising enriched uranium produced at FEP, PFEP and FFEP was 2967.8 kg (+524.9 kg since the previous quarterly report).”
As of 16 February 2021, the Agency verified that, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile, comprising enriched uranium produced at FEP, PFEP and FFEP was 2967.8 kg (+524.9 kg since the previous quarterly report).
- Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2021/28
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2021-05-31 · supports
“For this reporting period, the Agency has not been able to verify Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile, comprising enriched uranium produced at FEP, PFEP and FFEP. … the Agency has estimated that, as of 22 May 2021, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 3241.0 kg (+273.2 kg since the previous quarterly report). … 2.4 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235. … has been enriching UF6 up to 60% U-235 since 17 April 2021. … Since 23 February 2021, while centrifuges and associated infrastructure in storage remained under continuous monitoring by Agency surveillance equipment, the Agency has not had access to the data and recordings collected by its equipment (paras 29, 47, 48 and 70).”
For this reporting period, the Agency has not been able to verify Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile, comprising enriched uranium produced at FEP, PFEP and FFEP. … the Agency has estimated that, as of 22 May 2021, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 3241.0 kg (+273.2 kg since the previous quarterly report). … 2.4 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235. … has been enriching UF6 up to 60% U-235 since 17 April 2021. … Since 23 February 2021, while centrifuges and associated infrastructure in storage remained under continuous monitoring by Agency surveillance equipment, the Agency has not had access to the data and recordings collected by its equipment (paras 29, 47, 48 and 70).
- Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2021/39
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2021-09-07 · supports
“… the Agency has estimated that, as of 30 August 2021, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 2441.3 kg. This figure represents a decrease of 799.7 kg since the previous quarterly report, which is due to the use of uranium enriched up to 2% U-235 to produce uranium enriched up to 5% U-235. … 10.0 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (+7.6 kg).”
… the Agency has estimated that, as of 30 August 2021, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 2441.3 kg. This figure represents a decrease of 799.7 kg since the previous quarterly report, which is due to the use of uranium enriched up to 2% U-235 to produce uranium enriched up to 5% U-235. … 10.0 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (+7.6 kg).
- Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2021/51
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2021-11-17 · supports
“… the Agency has estimated that, as of 6 November 2021, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 2489.7 kg. … 17.7 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (+7.7 kg).”
… the Agency has estimated that, as of 6 November 2021, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 2489.7 kg. … 17.7 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (+7.7 kg).
- Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2022/4
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2022-03-03 · supports
“… the Agency has estimated that, as of 19 February 2022, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 3197.1 kg. … 33.2 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (+15.5 kg).”
… the Agency has estimated that, as of 19 February 2022, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 3197.1 kg. … 33.2 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (+15.5 kg).
- Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2022/24
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2022-05-30 · supports
“… the Agency has estimated that, as of 15 May 2022, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 3809.3 kg. … 43.1 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (+9.9 kg).”
… the Agency has estimated that, as of 15 May 2022, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 3809.3 kg. … 43.1 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (+9.9 kg).
- Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2022/39
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2022-09-07 · supports
“… the Agency has estimated that, as of 21 August 2022, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 3940.9 kg. … 55.6 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (+12.5 kg).”
… the Agency has estimated that, as of 21 August 2022, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 3940.9 kg. … 55.6 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (+12.5 kg).
- Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2022/62
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2022-11-10 · supports
“… the Agency has estimated that, as of 22 October 2022, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 3673.7 kg. … 62.3 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (+6.7 kg).”
… the Agency has estimated that, as of 22 October 2022, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 3673.7 kg. … 62.3 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (+6.7 kg).
- Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2023/8
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2023-02-28 · supports
“… the Agency has estimated that, as of 12 February 2023, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 3760.8 kg. … 87.5 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (+25.2 kg).”
… the Agency has estimated that, as of 12 February 2023, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 3760.8 kg. … 87.5 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (+25.2 kg).
- Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2023/24
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2023-05-31 · supports
“… the Agency has estimated that, as of 13 May 2023, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 4744.5 kg. … 114.1 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (+26.6 kg).”
… the Agency has estimated that, as of 13 May 2023, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 4744.5 kg. … 114.1 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (+26.6 kg).
- Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2023/39
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2023-09-04 · supports
“… the Agency has estimated that, as of 19 August 2023, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 3795.5 kg. … 121.6 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (+7.5 kg).”
… the Agency has estimated that, as of 19 August 2023, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 3795.5 kg. … 121.6 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (+7.5 kg).
- Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2023/57
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2023-11-15 · supports
“… the Agency has estimated that, as of 28 October 2023, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 4486.8 kg. … 128.3 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (+6.7 kg).”
… the Agency has estimated that, as of 28 October 2023, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 4486.8 kg. … 128.3 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (+6.7 kg).
- Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2024/7
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2024-02-26 · supports
“… the Agency has estimated that, as of 10 February 2024, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 5525.5 kg. … 121.5 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (–6.8 kg).”
… the Agency has estimated that, as of 10 February 2024, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 5525.5 kg. … 121.5 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (–6.8 kg).
- Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2024/26
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2024-05-27 · supports
“… the Agency has estimated that, as of 11 May 2024, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 6201.3 kg. … 142.1 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (+20.6 kg).”
… the Agency has estimated that, as of 11 May 2024, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 6201.3 kg. … 142.1 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (+20.6 kg).
- Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2024/41
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2024-08-29 · supports
“… the Agency has estimated that, as of 17 August 2024, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 5751.8 kg. … 164.7 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (+22.6 kg).”
… the Agency has estimated that, as of 17 August 2024, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 5751.8 kg. … 164.7 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (+22.6 kg).
- Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2024/61
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2024-11-19 · supports
“… the Agency has estimated that, as of 26 October 2024, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 6604.4 kg. … 182.3 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (+17.6 kg).”
… the Agency has estimated that, as of 26 October 2024, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 6604.4 kg. … 182.3 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (+17.6 kg).
- Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2025/8
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2025-02-26 · supports
“… the Agency has estimated that, as of 8 February 2025, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 8294.4 kg. … 274.8 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (+92.5 kg).”
… the Agency has estimated that, as of 8 February 2025, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 8294.4 kg. … 274.8 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (+92.5 kg).
- Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of United Nations Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, GOV/2026/50, para 27 and footnote 17
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2026-09-01 · supports
“Based on the information provided by Iran up to 12 June 2025, previous Agency verification activities and estimates based on the past operating records of the relevant declared facilities, the Agency’s estimate of Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile, as of 13 June 2025, was 9874.9 kg, comprising 9040.5 kg of uranium in the form of UF6 and 834.4 kg of uranium in other forms. The total enriched uranium stockpile of 9040.5 kg in the form of UF6 comprised: 8599.6 kg of LEU – 2391.1 kg of uranium enriched up to 2% U-235, 6024.4 kg of uranium enriched up to 5% U-235, and 184.1 kg of uranium enriched up to 20% U-235; and 440.9 kg of HEU – uranium enriched up to 60% U-235. … The Agency has verified 432.9 kg of this 440.9 kg of uranium in the form of UF6 enriched up to 60% U-235.”
Based on the information provided by Iran up to 12 June 2025, previous Agency verification activities and estimates based on the past operating records of the relevant declared facilities, the Agency’s estimate of Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile, as of 13 June 2025, was 9874.9 kg, comprising 9040.5 kg of uranium in the form of UF6 and 834.4 kg of uranium in other forms. The total enriched uranium stockpile of 9040.5 kg in the form of UF6 comprised: 8599.6 kg of LEU – 2391.1 kg of uranium enriched up to 2% U-235, 6024.4 kg of uranium enriched up to 5% U-235, and 184.1 kg of uranium enriched up to 20% U-235; and 440.9 kg of HEU – uranium enriched up to 60% U-235. … The Agency has verified 432.9 kg of this 440.9 kg of uranium in the form of UF6 enriched up to 60% U-235.
- Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2025/24, paras 26–27
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2025-05-31 · supports
“the Agency has estimated that, as of 17 May 2025, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 9247.6 kg. This figure represents an increase of 953.2 kg since the previous quarterly report. … 408.6 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (+133.8 kg).”
the Agency has estimated that, as of 17 May 2025, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 9247.6 kg. This figure represents an increase of 953.2 kg since the previous quarterly report. … 408.6 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (+133.8 kg).
Decisions, Law and Diplomacy: Congress, the President, Ceasefires and Negotiations, 2024–2026
- Roll Call 85, H.Con.Res.38, 5 March 2026 (XML)
Office of the Clerk, US House of Representatives, 2026-03-05 · supports
“<legis-num>H CON RES 38</legis-num> ... <vote-question>On Agreeing to the Resolution</vote-question> ... <vote-result>Failed</vote-result> ... <action-date>5-Mar-2026</action-date> ... <vote-desc>Directing the President pursuant to section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution to remove United States Armed Forces from unauthorized hostilities in the Islamic Republic of Iran</vote-desc> ... <party>Republican</party><yea-total>2</yea-total><nay-total>215</nay-total><present-total>0</present-total><not-voting-total>1</not-voting-total> ... <party>Democratic</party><yea-total>210</yea-total><nay-total>4</nay-total><present-total>0</present-total><not-voting-total>0</not-voting-total> ... <total-stub>Totals</total-stub><yea-total>212</yea-total><nay-total>219</nay-total><present-total>0</present-total><not-voting-total>1</not-voting-total>”
<legis-num>H CON RES 38</legis-num> ... <vote-question>On Agreeing to the Resolution</vote-question> ... <vote-result>Failed</vote-result> ... <action-date>5-Mar-2026</action-date> ... <vote-desc>Directing the President pursuant to section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution to remove United States Armed Forces from unauthorized hostilities in the Islamic Republic of Iran</vote-desc> ... <party>Republican</party><yea-total>2</yea-total><nay-total>215</nay-total><present-total>0</present-total><not-voting-total>1</not-voting-total> ... <party>Democratic</party><yea-total>210</yea-total><nay-total>4</nay-total><present-total>0</present-total><not-voting-total>0</not-voting-total> ... <total-stub>Totals</total-stub><yea-total>212</yea-total><nay-total>219</nay-total><present-total>0</present-total><not-voting-total>1</not-voting-total>
- Roll Call 114, H.Con.Res.40, 16 April 2026 (XML)
Office of the Clerk, US House of Representatives, 2026-04-16 · supports
“<legis-num>H CON RES 40</legis-num> ... <vote-result>Failed</vote-result> ... <action-date>16-Apr-2026</action-date> ... <party>Republican</party><yea-total>1</yea-total><nay-total>212</nay-total><present-total>1</present-total><not-voting-total>3</not-voting-total> ... <party>Democratic</party><yea-total>212</yea-total><nay-total>1</nay-total><present-total>0</present-total><not-voting-total>0</not-voting-total> ... <party>Independent</party><yea-total>0</yea-total><nay-total>1</nay-total> ... <total-stub>Totals</total-stub><yea-total>213</yea-total><nay-total>214</nay-total><present-total>1</present-total><not-voting-total>3</not-voting-total>”
<legis-num>H CON RES 40</legis-num> ... <vote-result>Failed</vote-result> ... <action-date>16-Apr-2026</action-date> ... <party>Republican</party><yea-total>1</yea-total><nay-total>212</nay-total><present-total>1</present-total><not-voting-total>3</not-voting-total> ... <party>Democratic</party><yea-total>212</yea-total><nay-total>1</nay-total><present-total>0</present-total><not-voting-total>0</not-voting-total> ... <party>Independent</party><yea-total>0</yea-total><nay-total>1</nay-total> ... <total-stub>Totals</total-stub><yea-total>213</yea-total><nay-total>214</nay-total><present-total>1</present-total><not-voting-total>3</not-voting-total>
- Roll Call 170, H.Con.Res.75, 14 May 2026 (XML)
Office of the Clerk, US House of Representatives, 2026-05-14 · supports
“<legis-num>H CON RES 75</legis-num> ... <vote-result>Failed</vote-result> ... <action-date>14-May-2026</action-date> ... <party>Republican</party><yea-total>3</yea-total><nay-total>210</nay-total><present-total>0</present-total><not-voting-total>4</not-voting-total> ... <party>Democratic</party><yea-total>209</yea-total><nay-total>1</nay-total><present-total>0</present-total><not-voting-total>2</not-voting-total> ... <total-stub>Totals</total-stub><yea-total>212</yea-total><nay-total>212</nay-total><present-total>0</present-total><not-voting-total>6</not-voting-total>”
<legis-num>H CON RES 75</legis-num> ... <vote-result>Failed</vote-result> ... <action-date>14-May-2026</action-date> ... <party>Republican</party><yea-total>3</yea-total><nay-total>210</nay-total><present-total>0</present-total><not-voting-total>4</not-voting-total> ... <party>Democratic</party><yea-total>209</yea-total><nay-total>1</nay-total><present-total>0</present-total><not-voting-total>2</not-voting-total> ... <total-stub>Totals</total-stub><yea-total>212</yea-total><nay-total>212</nay-total><present-total>0</present-total><not-voting-total>6</not-voting-total>
- Roll Call 199, H.Con.Res.86, 3 June 2026 (XML)
Office of the Clerk, US House of Representatives, 2026-06-03 · supports
“<legis-num>H CON RES 86</legis-num> ... <vote-result>Passed</vote-result> ... <action-date>3-Jun-2026</action-date> ... <vote-desc>Directing the President, pursuant to section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution, to remove United States Armed Forces from hostilities with Iran</vote-desc> ... <party>Republican</party><yea-total>4</yea-total><nay-total>207</nay-total><present-total>0</present-total><not-voting-total>6</not-voting-total> ... <party>Democratic</party><yea-total>211</yea-total><nay-total>0</nay-total><present-total>0</present-total><not-voting-total>1</not-voting-total> ... <total-stub>Totals</total-stub><yea-total>215</yea-total><nay-total>208</nay-total><present-total>0</present-total><not-voting-total>7</not-voting-total>”
<legis-num>H CON RES 86</legis-num> ... <vote-result>Passed</vote-result> ... <action-date>3-Jun-2026</action-date> ... <vote-desc>Directing the President, pursuant to section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution, to remove United States Armed Forces from hostilities with Iran</vote-desc> ... <party>Republican</party><yea-total>4</yea-total><nay-total>207</nay-total><present-total>0</present-total><not-voting-total>6</not-voting-total> ... <party>Democratic</party><yea-total>211</yea-total><nay-total>0</nay-total><present-total>0</present-total><not-voting-total>1</not-voting-total> ... <total-stub>Totals</total-stub><yea-total>215</yea-total><nay-total>208</nay-total><present-total>0</present-total><not-voting-total>7</not-voting-total>
- Roll Call 282, H.Con.Res.89, 23 July 2026 (XML)
Office of the Clerk, US House of Representatives, 2026-07-23 · supports
“<legis-num>H CON RES 89</legis-num> ... <vote-result>Passed</vote-result> ... <action-date>23-Jul-2026</action-date> ... <party>Republican</party><yea-total>4</yea-total><nay-total>207</nay-total><present-total>0</present-total><not-voting-total>7</not-voting-total> ... <party>Democratic</party><yea-total>210</yea-total><nay-total>0</nay-total><present-total>0</present-total><not-voting-total>2</not-voting-total> ... <total-stub>Totals</total-stub><yea-total>214</yea-total><nay-total>208</nay-total><present-total>0</present-total><not-voting-total>9</not-voting-total>”
<legis-num>H CON RES 89</legis-num> ... <vote-result>Passed</vote-result> ... <action-date>23-Jul-2026</action-date> ... <party>Republican</party><yea-total>4</yea-total><nay-total>207</nay-total><present-total>0</present-total><not-voting-total>7</not-voting-total> ... <party>Democratic</party><yea-total>210</yea-total><nay-total>0</nay-total><present-total>0</present-total><not-voting-total>2</not-voting-total> ... <total-stub>Totals</total-stub><yea-total>214</yea-total><nay-total>208</nay-total><present-total>0</present-total><not-voting-total>9</not-voting-total>
- Roll Call 307, H.Con.Res.93, 15 September 2026 (XML)
Office of the Clerk, US House of Representatives, 2026-09-15 · supports
“<legis-num>H CON RES 93</legis-num> ... <vote-result>Passed</vote-result> ... <action-date>15-Sep-2026</action-date> ... <party>Republican</party><yea-total>7</yea-total><nay-total>203</nay-total><present-total>0</present-total><not-voting-total>8</not-voting-total> ... <party>Democratic</party><yea-total>213</yea-total><nay-total>0</nay-total><present-total>0</present-total><not-voting-total>1</not-voting-total> ... <total-stub>Totals</total-stub><yea-total>220</yea-total><nay-total>204</nay-total><present-total>0</present-total><not-voting-total>9</not-voting-total>”
<legis-num>H CON RES 93</legis-num> ... <vote-result>Passed</vote-result> ... <action-date>15-Sep-2026</action-date> ... <party>Republican</party><yea-total>7</yea-total><nay-total>203</nay-total><present-total>0</present-total><not-voting-total>8</not-voting-total> ... <party>Democratic</party><yea-total>213</yea-total><nay-total>0</nay-total><present-total>0</present-total><not-voting-total>1</not-voting-total> ... <total-stub>Totals</total-stub><yea-total>220</yea-total><nay-total>204</nay-total><present-total>0</present-total><not-voting-total>9</not-voting-total>
- Senate Roll Call Votes, 119th Congress, 2nd Session (vote menu XML; Internet Archive copy of 10 October 2026)
United States Senate, 2026-10-10 · supports
“00244 24-Sep H.Con.Res. 89 On the Concurrent Resolution Rejected 49 50 H. Con. Res. 89; A concurrent resolution directing the President, pursuant to section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution, to remove United States Armed Forces from hostilities with Iran. ... 00216 30-Jul S.J.Res. 181 On the Motion to Discharge Rejected 49 50 ... 00207 23-Jul S.J.Res. 180 On the Motion to Discharge Rejected 47 49 ... 00192 24-Jun S.J.Res. 185 On the Motion to Proceed Rejected 47 50 ... 00184 23-Jun H.Con.Res. 86 On the Concurrent Resolution Agreed to 50 48 ... 00174 16-Jun S.J.Res. 172 On the Motion to Discharge Rejected 47 48 ... 00129 19-May S.J.Res. 185 On the Motion to Discharge Agreed to 50 47 ... 00118 13-May S.J.Res. 163 On the Motion to Discharge Rejected 49 50 ... 00113 30-Apr S.J.Res. 184 On the Motion to Discharge Rejected 47 50 ... 00088 22-Apr S.J.Res. 114 On the Motion to Discharge Rejected 46 51 ... 00079 15-Apr S.J.Res. 123 On the Motion to Discharge Rejected 47 52 ... 00069 24-Mar S.J.Res. 116 On the Motion to Discharge Rejected 47 53 ... 00058 18-Mar S.J.Res. 118 On the Motion to Discharge Rejected 47 53 ... 00046 04-Mar S.J.Res. 104 On the Motion to Discharge Rejected 47 53 Motion to Discharge S.J. Res. 104; A joint resolution to direct the removal of United States Armed Forces from hostilities within or against the Islamic Republic of Iran that have not been authorized by Congress.”
00244 24-Sep H.Con.Res. 89 On the Concurrent Resolution Rejected 49 50 H. Con. Res. 89; A concurrent resolution directing the President, pursuant to section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution, to remove United States Armed Forces from hostilities with Iran. ... 00216 30-Jul S.J.Res. 181 On the Motion to Discharge Rejected 49 50 ... 00207 23-Jul S.J.Res. 180 On the Motion to Discharge Rejected 47 49 ... 00192 24-Jun S.J.Res. 185 On the Motion to Proceed Rejected 47 50 ... 00184 23-Jun H.Con.Res. 86 On the Concurrent Resolution Agreed to 50 48 ... 00174 16-Jun S.J.Res. 172 On the Motion to Discharge Rejected 47 48 ... 00129 19-May S.J.Res. 185 On the Motion to Discharge Agreed to 50 47 ... 00118 13-May S.J.Res. 163 On the Motion to Discharge Rejected 49 50 ... 00113 30-Apr S.J.Res. 184 On the Motion to Discharge Rejected 47 50 ... 00088 22-Apr S.J.Res. 114 On the Motion to Discharge Rejected 46 51 ... 00079 15-Apr S.J.Res. 123 On the Motion to Discharge Rejected 47 52 ... 00069 24-Mar S.J.Res. 116 On the Motion to Discharge Rejected 47 53 ... 00058 18-Mar S.J.Res. 118 On the Motion to Discharge Rejected 47 53 ... 00046 04-Mar S.J.Res. 104 On the Motion to Discharge Rejected 47 53 Motion to Discharge S.J. Res. 104; A joint resolution to direct the removal of United States Armed Forces from hostilities within or against the Islamic Republic of Iran that have not been authorized by Congress.
- Roll Call Vote 184, 119th Congress, 2nd Session: H.Con.Res.86 (XML; Internet Archive copy)
United States Senate, 2026-06-23 · supports
“Concurrent Resolution Agreed to (50-48) ... Collins (R-ME) Collins Susan R ME Yea”
Concurrent Resolution Agreed to (50-48) ... Collins (R-ME) Collins Susan R ME Yea
- Congressional Votes Database
GovTrack.us, 2026-10 · supports
“Analysis and Commentary Oct. 26, 2026: What Comes After the Election? ... On the Nomination PN1129: Keith Sonderling, of Florida, to be Secretary of Labor Senate Vote Nomination #256 Confirmed 47/41 Sept. 30, 2026 ... H.Con.Res. 89: Directing the President, pursuant to section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution, to remove United States Armed Forces from hostilities with Iran. Senate Vote Concurrent #244 Resolution Sept. 24, Rejected 49/50”
Analysis and Commentary Oct. 26, 2026: What Comes After the Election? ... On the Nomination PN1129: Keith Sonderling, of Florida, to be Secretary of Labor Senate Vote Nomination #256 Confirmed 47/41 Sept. 30, 2026 ... H.Con.Res. 89: Directing the President, pursuant to section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution, to remove United States Armed Forces from hostilities with Iran. Senate Vote Concurrent #244 Resolution Sept. 24, Rejected 49/50
- Law and the Iran War: After the First 60 Days
Lawfare, 2026-05-08 · supports
“this past Friday, May 1, President Trump argued that the administration had already complied with the War Powers Resolution’s 60-day cut-off. “There has been no exchange of fire between United States Forces and Iran since April 7, 2026,” the letter asserted ... Hence, in the Trump administration’s view, “[t]he hostilities that began on February 28, 2026”—the day when Operation Epic Fury against Iran began—”have terminated[,]” ... the May 1 letter also notes that “the threat posed by Iran to the United States and our Armed Forces remains significant[.]” ... If the administration viewed the blockade that began on April 13 ... While Section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution initially gave Congress the power to compel the president to remove U.S. armed forces from ongoing hostilities through a concurrent resolution, the Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in INS v. Chadha brought such arrangements into serious constitutional doubt. And while joint resolutions avoid Chadha concerns, they only do so because they are subject to a presidential veto. ... voiced frustration with the Trump administration’s refusal to seek congressional authorization before the 60-day mark”
this past Friday, May 1, President Trump argued that the administration had already complied with the War Powers Resolution’s 60-day cut-off. “There has been no exchange of fire between United States Forces and Iran since April 7, 2026,” the letter asserted ... Hence, in the Trump administration’s view, “[t]he hostilities that began on February 28, 2026”—the day when Operation Epic Fury against Iran began—”have terminated[,]” ... the May 1 letter also notes that “the threat posed by Iran to the United States and our Armed Forces remains significant[.]” ... If the administration viewed the blockade that began on April 13 ... While Section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution initially gave Congress the power to compel the president to remove U.S. armed forces from ongoing hostilities through a concurrent resolution, the Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in INS v. Chadha brought such arrangements into serious constitutional doubt. And while joint resolutions avoid Chadha concerns, they only do so because they are subject to a presidential veto. ... voiced frustration with the Trump administration’s refusal to seek congressional authorization before the 60-day mark
- The War Powers Resolution: Concepts and Practice (R42699)
Congressional Research Service, 2019-03-08 · supports
“From 1975 through March 2017, Presidents have submitted 168 reports as the result of the War Powers Resolution, but only one, the 1975 Mayaguez seizure, cited Section 4(a)(1), which triggers the 60-day withdrawal requirement ... Section 5(c) requires the President to remove the forces at any time if Congress so directs by concurrent resolution; the effectiveness of this subsection is uncertain because of the 1983 Supreme Court decision on the legislative veto. ... A concurrent resolution is adopted by both chambers, but it does not require presentment to the President for signature or veto.”
From 1975 through March 2017, Presidents have submitted 168 reports as the result of the War Powers Resolution, but only one, the 1975 Mayaguez seizure, cited Section 4(a)(1), which triggers the 60-day withdrawal requirement ... Section 5(c) requires the President to remove the forces at any time if Congress so directs by concurrent resolution; the effectiveness of this subsection is uncertain because of the 1983 Supreme Court decision on the legislative veto. ... A concurrent resolution is adopted by both chambers, but it does not require presentment to the President for signature or veto.
- Letter to the President pro tempore of the Senate on Operation Epic Fury (War Powers report), March 2, 2026
The White House (copy published by Just Security), 2026-03-02 · supports
“I acted pursuant to my constitutional authority as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive to conduct United States foreign relations. ... I am providing this report as part of my efforts to keep the Congress fully informed, consistent with the War Powers Resolution (Public Law 93-148). ... in collective self-defense of our regional allies, including Israel.”
I acted pursuant to my constitutional authority as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive to conduct United States foreign relations. ... I am providing this report as part of my efforts to keep the Congress fully informed, consistent with the War Powers Resolution (Public Law 93-148). ... in collective self-defense of our regional allies, including Israel.
- Trump’s Interpretation of the War Powers Resolution
Executive Functions (Jack Goldsmith), 2026-05-04 · supports
“the 'hostilities' ... that began on Feb. 28 had 'terminated' due to the April 7 ceasefire ... highly misleading”
the 'hostilities' ... that began on Feb. 28 had 'terminated' due to the April 7 ceasefire ... highly misleading
- Letter Informing Congress of Military Action Commenced on June 9, 2026 (House Document 119-162)
The White House (US Government Publishing Office), 2026-06-12 · supports
“I write today to apprise you of military action commenced on June 9, 2026, at my direction against the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran. ... As previously communicated to the Congress, I ordered a 2-week ceasefire on April 7, 2026. The ceasefire was then extended. ... On June 8, 2026, despite these good-faith diplomatic efforts and the ongoing ceasefire, Iran engaged a United States Army AH-64 Apache helicopter, forcing its crash landing. In response, at my direction, on June 9, 2026, United States Armed Forces commenced precision strikes against numerous targets within Iran ... I acted pursuant to my constitutional authority as Commander in Chief and as Chief Executive to conduct United States foreign relations.”
I write today to apprise you of military action commenced on June 9, 2026, at my direction against the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran. ... As previously communicated to the Congress, I ordered a 2-week ceasefire on April 7, 2026. The ceasefire was then extended. ... On June 8, 2026, despite these good-faith diplomatic efforts and the ongoing ceasefire, Iran engaged a United States Army AH-64 Apache helicopter, forcing its crash landing. In response, at my direction, on June 9, 2026, United States Armed Forces commenced precision strikes against numerous targets within Iran ... I acted pursuant to my constitutional authority as Commander in Chief and as Chief Executive to conduct United States foreign relations.
- Letter Informing Congress of Military Actions Taken on June 26 and June 28, 2026 (House Document 119-167)
The White House (US Government Publishing Office), 2026-06-29 · supports
“I write today to apprise you of military actions taken at my direction against the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran on June 26 and June 28, 2026. ... These efforts led to my signing a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran on June 17, 2026. The MOU requires the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to make arrangements using its best efforts for the safe passage of commercial vessels . . . from the Persian Gulf to the Sea of Oman. Despite this commitment, Iran attacked a neutral-flagged commercial vessel transiting the Strait of Hormuz on June 25, 2026. At my direction, United States Armed Forces responded on June 26, 2026, with defensive strikes ... Following another Iranian attack against a neutral-flagged commercial vessel on June 27, 2026, United States Armed Forces responded at my direction on June 28, 2026, with precision strikes”
I write today to apprise you of military actions taken at my direction against the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran on June 26 and June 28, 2026. ... These efforts led to my signing a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran on June 17, 2026. The MOU requires the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to make arrangements using its best efforts for the safe passage of commercial vessels . . . from the Persian Gulf to the Sea of Oman. Despite this commitment, Iran attacked a neutral-flagged commercial vessel transiting the Strait of Hormuz on June 25, 2026. At my direction, United States Armed Forces responded on June 26, 2026, with defensive strikes ... Following another Iranian attack against a neutral-flagged commercial vessel on June 27, 2026, United States Armed Forces responded at my direction on June 28, 2026, with precision strikes
- Letter Informing Congress of Military Action Commenced on July 7, 2026 (House Document 119-169)
The White House (US Government Publishing Office), 2026-07-10 · supports
“I write to apprise you of military action commenced on July 7, 2026, against the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran. ... Despite this commitment, Iran again attacked several neutral-flagged commercial vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz between July 6-7, 2026. At my direction, United States Armed Forces responded, commencing on July 7, 2026, with defensive strikes against targets within Iran”
I write to apprise you of military action commenced on July 7, 2026, against the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran. ... Despite this commitment, Iran again attacked several neutral-flagged commercial vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz between July 6-7, 2026. At my direction, United States Armed Forces responded, commencing on July 7, 2026, with defensive strikes against targets within Iran
- Letter Informing Congress of Military Action Commenced on July 27, 2026 (House Document 119-183)
The White House (US Government Publishing Office), 2026-08-03 · supports
“I write to apprise you of military action commenced on July 27, 2026, against targets in the Republic of Iraq following Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-directed attacks by Iranian aligned militia groups (IAMGs).”
I write to apprise you of military action commenced on July 27, 2026, against targets in the Republic of Iraq following Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-directed attacks by Iranian aligned militia groups (IAMGs).
- Letter Informing Congress of Military Action Commenced on September 1, 2026 (House Document 119-193)
The White House (US Government Publishing Office), 2026-09-03 · supports
“I write today to apprise you of military action commenced on September 1, 2026, against the Islamic Republic of Iran. At my direction, United States Armed Forces responded to Iran's late August 2026 attacks against United States Armed Forces with defensive strikes against targets within Iran and Iranian territorial waters including ... oil tankers belonging to the National Iranian Oil Company ... I acted pursuant to my constitutional authority as Commander in Chief and as Chief Executive to conduct United States foreign relations. I am providing this report as part of my efforts to keep the Congress fully informed, consistent with the War Powers Resolution (Public Law 93-148).”
I write today to apprise you of military action commenced on September 1, 2026, against the Islamic Republic of Iran. At my direction, United States Armed Forces responded to Iran's late August 2026 attacks against United States Armed Forces with defensive strikes against targets within Iran and Iranian territorial waters including ... oil tankers belonging to the National Iranian Oil Company ... I acted pursuant to my constitutional authority as Commander in Chief and as Chief Executive to conduct United States foreign relations. I am providing this report as part of my efforts to keep the Congress fully informed, consistent with the War Powers Resolution (Public Law 93-148).
- Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798–2023 (R42738)
Congressional Research Service, 2023-06-07 · complicates
“The following list reviews hundreds of instances in which the United States has used military forces abroad in situations of military conflict or potential conflict to protect U.S. citizens or promote U.S. interests. The list does not include covert actions or the many occurrences in which U.S. forces have been stationed abroad... Eleven times in its history, the United States has formally declared war against foreign nations. These 11 U.S. war declarations encompassed five separate wars”
The following list reviews hundreds of instances in which the United States has used military forces abroad in situations of military conflict or potential conflict to protect U.S. citizens or promote U.S. interests. The list does not include covert actions or the many occurrences in which U.S. forces have been stationed abroad... Eleven times in its history, the United States has formally declared war against foreign nations. These 11 U.S. war declarations encompassed five separate wars
- Roll Call 493, H.J.Res.68, 24 June 2011 (XML)
Office of the Clerk, US House of Representatives, 2011-06-24 · complicates
“<legis-num>H J RES 68</legis-num> <vote-question>On Passage</vote-question> <vote-result>Failed</vote-result> <action-date>24-Jun-2011</action-date> <vote-desc>Authorizing the limited use of the United States Armed Forces in support of the NATO mission in Libya</vote-desc> ... <total-stub>Totals</total-stub><yea-total>123</yea-total><nay-total>295</nay-total>”
<legis-num>H J RES 68</legis-num> <vote-question>On Passage</vote-question> <vote-result>Failed</vote-result> <action-date>24-Jun-2011</action-date> <vote-desc>Authorizing the limited use of the United States Armed Forces in support of the NATO mission in Libya</vote-desc> ... <total-stub>Totals</total-stub><yea-total>123</yea-total><nay-total>295</nay-total>
- Roll Call 494, H.R.2278, 24 June 2011 (XML)
Office of the Clerk, US House of Representatives, 2011-06-24 · complicates
“<legis-num>H R 2278</legis-num> <vote-question>On Passage</vote-question> <vote-result>Failed</vote-result> <action-date>24-Jun-2011</action-date> <vote-desc>To limit the use of funds appropriated to the Department of Defense for United States Armed Forces in support of North Atlantic Treaty Organization Operation Unified Protector with respect to Libya, unless otherwise specifically authorized by law</vote-desc> ... <total-stub>Totals</total-stub><yea-total>180</yea-total><nay-total>238</nay-total>”
<legis-num>H R 2278</legis-num> <vote-question>On Passage</vote-question> <vote-result>Failed</vote-result> <action-date>24-Jun-2011</action-date> <vote-desc>To limit the use of funds appropriated to the Department of Defense for United States Armed Forces in support of North Atlantic Treaty Organization Operation Unified Protector with respect to Libya, unless otherwise specifically authorized by law</vote-desc> ... <total-stub>Totals</total-stub><yea-total>180</yea-total><nay-total>238</nay-total>
- Roll Call 153, S.J.Res.7, 4 April 2019 (XML)
Office of the Clerk, US House of Representatives, 2019-04-04 · complicates
“<legis-num>S J RES 7</legis-num> <vote-question>On Passage</vote-question> <vote-result>Passed</vote-result> <action-date>4-Apr-2019</action-date> <vote-desc>To direct the removal of the United States Armed Forces from hostilities in the Republic of Yemen that have not been authorized by Congress</vote-desc> ... <total-stub>Totals</total-stub><yea-total>247</yea-total><nay-total>175</nay-total><present-total>1</present-total>”
<legis-num>S J RES 7</legis-num> <vote-question>On Passage</vote-question> <vote-result>Passed</vote-result> <action-date>4-Apr-2019</action-date> <vote-desc>To direct the removal of the United States Armed Forces from hostilities in the Republic of Yemen that have not been authorized by Congress</vote-desc> ... <total-stub>Totals</total-stub><yea-total>247</yea-total><nay-total>175</nay-total><present-total>1</present-total>
- Senate Roll Call Votes, 116th Congress, 1st Session (vote menu XML; Internet Archive copy)
United States Senate, 2019 · complicates
“00094 02-May S.J.Res. 7 On Overriding the Veto Veto Sustained 53 45 Shall the Joint Resolution S.J. Res. 7 Pass, the Objections of the President of the United States Notwithstanding; A joint resolution to direct the removal of United States Armed Forces from hostilities in the Republic of Yemen that have not been authorized by Congress. ... 00048 13-Mar S.J.Res. 7 On the Joint Resolution Passed 54 46”
00094 02-May S.J.Res. 7 On Overriding the Veto Veto Sustained 53 45 Shall the Joint Resolution S.J. Res. 7 Pass, the Objections of the President of the United States Notwithstanding; A joint resolution to direct the removal of United States Armed Forces from hostilities in the Republic of Yemen that have not been authorized by Congress. ... 00048 13-Mar S.J.Res. 7 On the Joint Resolution Passed 54 46
- Roll Call 101, S.J.Res.68, 11 March 2020 (XML)
Office of the Clerk, US House of Representatives, 2020-03-11 · complicates
“<legis-num>S J RES 68</legis-num> <vote-question>On Passage</vote-question> <vote-result>Passed</vote-result> <action-date>11-Mar-2020</action-date> <vote-desc>To direct the removal of United States Armed Forces from hostilities against the Islamic Republic of Iran that have not been authorized by Congress</vote-desc> ... <total-stub>Totals</total-stub><yea-total>227</yea-total><nay-total>186</nay-total>”
<legis-num>S J RES 68</legis-num> <vote-question>On Passage</vote-question> <vote-result>Passed</vote-result> <action-date>11-Mar-2020</action-date> <vote-desc>To direct the removal of United States Armed Forces from hostilities against the Islamic Republic of Iran that have not been authorized by Congress</vote-desc> ... <total-stub>Totals</total-stub><yea-total>227</yea-total><nay-total>186</nay-total>
- Senate Roll Call Votes, 116th Congress, 2nd Session (vote menu XML; Internet Archive copy)
United States Senate, 2020 · complicates
“00084 07-May S.J.Res. 68 On Overriding the Veto Veto Sustained 49 44 Shall the Joint Resolution S.J. Res. 68 Pass, the Objections of the President of the United States to the Contrary Notwithstanding?; A joint resolution to direct the removal of United States Armed Forces from hostilities against the Islamic Republic of Iran that have not been authorized by Congress. ... 00052 13-Feb S.J.Res. 68 On the Joint Resolution Passed 55 45”
00084 07-May S.J.Res. 68 On Overriding the Veto Veto Sustained 49 44 Shall the Joint Resolution S.J. Res. 68 Pass, the Objections of the President of the United States to the Contrary Notwithstanding?; A joint resolution to direct the removal of United States Armed Forces from hostilities against the Islamic Republic of Iran that have not been authorized by Congress. ... 00052 13-Feb S.J.Res. 68 On the Joint Resolution Passed 55 45
- Friday, June 27, 2025 (Senate floor wrap-up)
Senate Democrats (Senate Periodical Press Gallery floor log), 2025-06-27 · complicates
“By a vote of 47-53, the Senate did not agree to S.J. Res.59, the Kaine War Powers Resolution on Iran. Senator Paul (R) voted aye and Senator Fetterman (D) voted no.”
By a vote of 47-53, the Senate did not agree to S.J. Res.59, the Kaine War Powers Resolution on Iran. Senator Paul (R) voted aye and Senator Fetterman (D) voted no.
- After the Rubicon: Congress, Presidents, and the Politics of Waging War (publisher's description)
University of Chicago Press, 2010 · supports
“Kriner expertly demonstrates the full extent to which Congress materially shapes the initiation, scope, and duration of major military actions ... He shows how the balance of party power in the legislature trumps conventional strategic variables in explaining the duration of U.S. military conflicts.”
Kriner expertly demonstrates the full extent to which Congress materially shapes the initiation, scope, and duration of major military actions ... He shows how the balance of party power in the legislature trumps conventional strategic variables in explaining the duration of U.S. military conflicts.
- Iran conflict remains deeply unpopular, as many Americans expect it to go on for months
Pew Research Center, 2026-10-08 · supports
“Around two-thirds of Americans (65%) disapprove of the way President Donald Trump is handling the U.S. military action in Iran, while a third (33%) approve ... Evaluations of the initial decision to use force are similar: 34% now view this as the right decision – down 4 percentage points from March. ... Today, 33% of adults say they approve of how Trump is handling the U.S. military action against Iran – down from 37% in March. This decline has come entirely from Republicans: At the start of the conflict, 69% approved of his handling of the conflict. Today, 63% do. Democrats’ views are unchanged. ... Today, 65% of Republicans say the decision to use force in Iran was the right one – down from 71% in March.”
Around two-thirds of Americans (65%) disapprove of the way President Donald Trump is handling the U.S. military action in Iran, while a third (33%) approve ... Evaluations of the initial decision to use force are similar: 34% now view this as the right decision – down 4 percentage points from March. ... Today, 33% of adults say they approve of how Trump is handling the U.S. military action against Iran – down from 37% in March. This decline has come entirely from Republicans: At the start of the conflict, 69% approved of his handling of the conflict. Today, 63% do. Democrats’ views are unchanged. ... Today, 65% of Republicans say the decision to use force in Iran was the right one – down from 71% in March.
- Americans Broadly Disapprove of U.S. Military Action in Iran
Pew Research Center, 2026-03-25 · supports
“About six-in-ten Americans (61%) disapprove of Trump’s handling of the conflict, while 37% approve. ... The new Pew Research Center survey of 3,524 U.S. adults, conducted March 16-22, also finds a similar balance of opinion on whether the initial decision to use military force was right (38%) or wrong (59%). ... In contrast, about seven-in-ten Republicans and Republican leaners approve of how Trump is handling the conflict (69%) and think the U.S. made the right decision (71%).”
About six-in-ten Americans (61%) disapprove of Trump’s handling of the conflict, while 37% approve. ... The new Pew Research Center survey of 3,524 U.S. adults, conducted March 16-22, also finds a similar balance of opinion on whether the initial decision to use military force was right (38%) or wrong (59%). ... In contrast, about seven-in-ten Republicans and Republican leaners approve of how Trump is handling the conflict (69%) and think the U.S. made the right decision (71%).
- Gallup News Service, June Wave 1, Final Topline (June 1–15, 2026)
Gallup, 2026-06 · supports
“Results are based on telephone interviews conducted June 1-15, 2026, with a random sample of –1,001—adults ... QN24: Do you approve or disapprove of this U.S. military action against Iran? ... Total ... Republican Independent Democrat ... Approve 34% ... 79% 26% 8% ... Disapprove 63% ... 19% 68% 90% ... (DK)/(Refused) 4% ... 2% 6% 2%”
Results are based on telephone interviews conducted June 1-15, 2026, with a random sample of –1,001—adults ... QN24: Do you approve or disapprove of this U.S. military action against Iran? ... Total ... Republican Independent Democrat ... Approve 34% ... 79% 26% 8% ... Disapprove 63% ... 19% 68% 90% ... (DK)/(Refused) 4% ... 2% 6% 2%
- Quinnipiac University National Poll, released March 9, 2026
Quinnipiac University Poll, 2026-03-09 · supports
“Fifty-three percent of voters oppose the U.S. military action against Iran, while 40 percent support it. Democrats (89 – 7 percent) and independents (60 – 31 percent) oppose the U.S. military action against Iran, while Republicans (85 – 11 percent) support it. ... 10. Do you support or oppose the U.S. military action against Iran? ... Tot Rep Dem Ind ... Support 40% 85% 7% 31% ... Oppose 53 11 89 60 ... DK/NA 7 5 4 9 ... 15. Do you think President Trump should have received approval from Congress before taking military action against Iran, or not? ... Tot Rep Dem Ind ... Yes/Should have 59% 22% 92% 64% ... No 38 76 5 33 ... DK/NA 3 2 3 3 ... 1,002 self-identified registered voters nationwide were surveyed from March 6th – 8th”
Fifty-three percent of voters oppose the U.S. military action against Iran, while 40 percent support it. Democrats (89 – 7 percent) and independents (60 – 31 percent) oppose the U.S. military action against Iran, while Republicans (85 – 11 percent) support it. ... 10. Do you support or oppose the U.S. military action against Iran? ... Tot Rep Dem Ind ... Support 40% 85% 7% 31% ... Oppose 53 11 89 60 ... DK/NA 7 5 4 9 ... 15. Do you think President Trump should have received approval from Congress before taking military action against Iran, or not? ... Tot Rep Dem Ind ... Yes/Should have 59% 22% 92% 64% ... No 38 76 5 33 ... DK/NA 3 2 3 3 ... 1,002 self-identified registered voters nationwide were surveyed from March 6th – 8th
- Address Accepting the Presidential Nomination at the Republican National Convention in Milwaukee, Wisconsin
The American Presidency Project (UC Santa Barbara), 2024-07-18 · supports
“I was the first president in modern times to start no new wars. ... With our victory in November, the years of war, weakness and chaos will be over. I don't have wars. ... they did everything possible for Iran and now Iran is very close to having a nuclear weapon, which would have never happened.”
I was the first president in modern times to start no new wars. ... With our victory in November, the years of war, weakness and chaos will be over. I don't have wars. ... they did everything possible for Iran and now Iran is very close to having a nuclear weapon, which would have never happened.
- Remarks Accepting Election as the 47th President of the United States in Palm Beach, Florida
The American Presidency Project (UC Santa Barbara), 2024-11-06 · supports
“They said: 'He will start a war.' I'm not going to start a war. I'm going to stop wars.”
They said: 'He will start a war.' I'm not going to start a war. I'm going to stop wars.
- Iran Update Special Report, July 13, 2026
Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project, 2026-07-13 · supports
“The US-Iran ceasefire has effectively ended with relatively more intense and consistent exchanges of fire in the Persian Gulf. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy announced on July 11 that it closed the strait, struck a Cyprus-flagged vessel, and then struck a second unspecified vessel on July 12. The United States struck dozens of Iranian military targets on July 12 to degrade Iran’s ability to threaten shipping. ... Iran has continuously made efforts to reconstitute its ballistic missile and drone programs since the ceasefire on April 8. ... The United States will resume its blockade of Iranian ports beginning on July 14 at 4:00 PM ET.”
The US-Iran ceasefire has effectively ended with relatively more intense and consistent exchanges of fire in the Persian Gulf. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy announced on July 11 that it closed the strait, struck a Cyprus-flagged vessel, and then struck a second unspecified vessel on July 12. The United States struck dozens of Iranian military targets on July 12 to degrade Iran’s ability to threaten shipping. ... Iran has continuously made efforts to reconstitute its ballistic missile and drone programs since the ceasefire on April 8. ... The United States will resume its blockade of Iranian ports beginning on July 14 at 4:00 PM ET.
- Iran Update, October 19, 2026
Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project, 2026-10-19 · supports
“The Iranian regime's appointment of Mehrdad Akhlaghi, who has extensive experience in missile technology, as Iran's new defense minister indicates that the regime is prioritizing the reconstitution of its missile program. ... stated on October 19 that Iran will not rebuild defense industrial facilities at old locations but will instead construct them 'in mountains and security structures.'”
The Iranian regime's appointment of Mehrdad Akhlaghi, who has extensive experience in missile technology, as Iran's new defense minister indicates that the regime is prioritizing the reconstitution of its missile program. ... stated on October 19 that Iran will not rebuild defense industrial facilities at old locations but will instead construct them 'in mountains and security structures.'
- Joint E3 leaders’ statement on Iran: 28 February 2026
UK Government (Prime Minister's Office), 2026-02-28 · complicates
“We did not participate in these strikes, but are in close contact with our international partners, including the United States, Israel, and partners in the region. ... We condemn Iranian attacks on countries in the region in the strongest terms. … Ultimately, the Iranian people must be allowed to determine their future.”
We did not participate in these strikes, but are in close contact with our international partners, including the United States, Israel, and partners in the region. ... We condemn Iranian attacks on countries in the region in the strongest terms. … Ultimately, the Iranian people must be allowed to determine their future.
- Foreign Minister's article in Le Monde
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sultanate of Oman, 2026-07-14 · complicates
“Sayyid Badr describes the war as "a catastrophe". He notes that it has been launched without United Nations authorisation and has failed to achieve the objectives cited to justify it.”
Sayyid Badr describes the war as "a catastrophe". He notes that it has been launched without United Nations authorisation and has failed to achieve the objectives cited to justify it.
- NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran (GOV/2026/50)
International Atomic Energy Agency, 2026-09-01 · supports
“The Director General was in attendance at the indirect negotiations between the United States of America and Iran that took place on 17 and 26 February 2026 in Geneva ... On 28 February 2026, the United States of America and Israel launched further military attacks on Iran, including on the sites of some nuclear facilities. Consequently, the Agency stopped conducting verification activities in Iran.”
The Director General was in attendance at the indirect negotiations between the United States of America and Iran that took place on 17 and 26 February 2026 in Geneva ... On 28 February 2026, the United States of America and Israel launched further military attacks on Iran, including on the sites of some nuclear facilities. Consequently, the Agency stopped conducting verification activities in Iran.
- Iran and Nuclear Weapons Production (IF12106)
Congressional Research Service, 2026-10-13 · supports
“A June 2026 memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the United States and Iran states that 'Iran reaffirms that it shall not procure or develop nuclear weapons.'”
A June 2026 memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the United States and Iran states that 'Iran reaffirms that it shall not procure or develop nuclear weapons.'
- The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) at a Glance
Arms Control Association, 2025-02 · supports
“For 10 years operating centrifuges reduced to 5,060 IR-1 machines … For 15 years level of uranium enrichment capped at 3.67 percent uranium-235 … For 15 years the stockpile is kept under 300 kilograms of 3.67 percent enriched uranium in total (all forms) ... January 16, 2016, Implementation Day”
For 10 years operating centrifuges reduced to 5,060 IR-1 machines … For 15 years level of uranium enrichment capped at 3.67 percent uranium-235 … For 15 years the stockpile is kept under 300 kilograms of 3.67 percent enriched uranium in total (all forms) ... January 16, 2016, Implementation Day
- 2025 Iran–United States negotiations
Wikipedia, 2026-10 · supports
“The third round of high-level negotiations took place on April 26, 2025 ... The fourth round of talks were held on May 11 in Oman ... The fifth round of talks, held on May 23 in Rome ... the sixth round of US-Iran talks, scheduled in Oman on June 15, were indefinitely suspended”
The third round of high-level negotiations took place on April 26, 2025 ... The fourth round of talks were held on May 11 in Oman ... The fifth round of talks, held on May 23 in Rome ... the sixth round of US-Iran talks, scheduled in Oman on June 15, were indefinitely suspended
- Trump says US will not resume military strikes on Iran before midterm elections
Associated Press (via WCAX), 2026-10-08 · supports
“But Trump in a social media post on Thursday said the U.S. "will not be attacking Iran at any time prior to the Midterm Elections to be held in the United States on November 3rd." Trump added that his team has been "having productive discussions with the Islamic Republic of Iran." ... Negotiations had appeared at a standstill since Trump late last month publicly rejected Iran's proposal to reopen the Strait of Hormuz within seven days if the U.S. met certain conditions.”
But Trump in a social media post on Thursday said the U.S. "will not be attacking Iran at any time prior to the Midterm Elections to be held in the United States on November 3rd." Trump added that his team has been "having productive discussions with the Islamic Republic of Iran." ... Negotiations had appeared at a standstill since Trump late last month publicly rejected Iran's proposal to reopen the Strait of Hormuz within seven days if the U.S. met certain conditions.
- Iran Update, October 21, 2026
Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project, 2026-10-21 · supports
“Several shipping and maritime security officials told Bloomberg on October 20 that at least five of the 23 recorded attacks on vessels in or near the Strait of Hormuz in the first two weeks of October struck commercial vessels' engine rooms.”
Several shipping and maritime security officials told Bloomberg on October 20 that at least five of the 23 recorded attacks on vessels in or near the Strait of Hormuz in the first two weeks of October struck commercial vessels' engine rooms.
- Iran Update, October 22, 2026
Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project, 2026-10-22 · supports
“The New York Times reported on October 21 that the US and Israeli militaries have developed specific plans for a short and intensive operation against Iran after the US midterm elections on November 3, citing US officials and other people briefed on the deliberations.”
The New York Times reported on October 21 that the US and Israeli militaries have developed specific plans for a short and intensive operation against Iran after the US midterm elections on November 3, citing US officials and other people briefed on the deliberations.
- Iran Update, October 24, 2026
Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project, 2026-10-24 · supports
“Director of National Intelligence Jay Clayton warned on October 23 that US intelligence assessments indicate that Iran is in the "advanced stages" of planning attacks against US targets in the region.”
Director of National Intelligence Jay Clayton warned on October 23 that US intelligence assessments indicate that Iran is in the "advanced stages" of planning attacks against US targets in the region.
- Iran Update, October 25, 2026
Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project, 2026-10-25 · supports
“The Houthis have fired at least 12 missiles and two drones targeting Saudi Arabia since October 24”
The Houthis have fired at least 12 missiles and two drones targeting Saudi Arabia since October 24
- Iran Update, October 26, 2026
Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project, 2026-10-26 · supports
“Senior officials from the Mecca Pact’s three signatories met with senior Iranian officials in Tehran on October 26 to discuss a new US-Iran ceasefire amid reported US and Israeli preparations for another round of strikes in Iran. ... Two diplomats briefed on the ongoing talks told the New York Times on October 26 that Qatari mediators are trying to secure an agreement in which the United States and Iran would make "a series of concessions over a five-day period." The diplomats added that those concessions include Iran reopening the Strait of Hormuz in exchange for the United States lifting its naval blockade on Iranian ports. ... The United States and Iran reportedly continue to disagree on the sequencing of the agreement.”
Senior officials from the Mecca Pact’s three signatories met with senior Iranian officials in Tehran on October 26 to discuss a new US-Iran ceasefire amid reported US and Israeli preparations for another round of strikes in Iran. ... Two diplomats briefed on the ongoing talks told the New York Times on October 26 that Qatari mediators are trying to secure an agreement in which the United States and Iran would make "a series of concessions over a five-day period." The diplomats added that those concessions include Iran reopening the Strait of Hormuz in exchange for the United States lifting its naval blockade on Iranian ports. ... The United States and Iran reportedly continue to disagree on the sequencing of the agreement.
- Iran Update, October 27, 2026
Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project, 2026-10-27 · supports
“This threat comes as Director of National Intelligence Jay Clayton warned in a memo on October 23 that Iran has “substantially increased” its efforts to target US personnel. ... Omani Foreign Affairs Minister Badr al Busaidi called for a Gulf non-aggression pact with Iran on October 26, but Iran is unlikely to accept such an agreement unless it can also secure a US withdrawal from the region. Regional sources said that the summit made no progress on any issue.”
This threat comes as Director of National Intelligence Jay Clayton warned in a memo on October 23 that Iran has “substantially increased” its efforts to target US personnel. ... Omani Foreign Affairs Minister Badr al Busaidi called for a Gulf non-aggression pact with Iran on October 26, but Iran is unlikely to accept such an agreement unless it can also secure a US withdrawal from the region. Regional sources said that the summit made no progress on any issue.
- US warns allies to prepare for possible Iran strikes, retaliation after elections, AP sources say
Associated Press (via WCAX), 2026-10-29 · supports
“U.S. officials have told several Middle East countries and regional allies to be prepared for potential renewed military action against Iran after next week’s midterm elections in the United States — as well as the possibility that Iran will attempt to retaliate against them, according to two diplomats briefed on the matter. ... President Donald Trump has not made a final decision on whether to carry out new strikes against Iran, the diplomats stressed. ... Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said Wednesday in a post on X that Tehran “continues to give diplomacy a chance to succeed” ... the United Arab Emirates foreign ministry issued a statement urging the sides to “exercise wisdom and pursue political solutions to help contain tensions” ... While the U.S. has not carried out a strike against Iran since early September, the situation in the Middle East has become more complicated.”
U.S. officials have told several Middle East countries and regional allies to be prepared for potential renewed military action against Iran after next week’s midterm elections in the United States — as well as the possibility that Iran will attempt to retaliate against them, according to two diplomats briefed on the matter. ... President Donald Trump has not made a final decision on whether to carry out new strikes against Iran, the diplomats stressed. ... Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said Wednesday in a post on X that Tehran “continues to give diplomacy a chance to succeed” ... the United Arab Emirates foreign ministry issued a statement urging the sides to “exercise wisdom and pursue political solutions to help contain tensions” ... While the U.S. has not carried out a strike against Iran since early September, the situation in the Middle East has become more complicated.
- U.S. Forces Disable Cargo Vessel Attempting to Violate Blockade
US Central Command, 2026-10-10 · supports
“CENTCOM forces resumed America’s blockade against all ships entering or departing Iranian ports on July 14. Four commercial vessels have been disabled and 135 ships have been turned around during three months of strict enforcement.”
CENTCOM forces resumed America’s blockade against all ships entering or departing Iranian ports on July 14. Four commercial vessels have been disabled and 135 ships have been turned around during three months of strict enforcement.
- The Constitution of the United States: A Transcription (Article I, Section 8; Article II, Section 2)
U.S. National Archives, 1787-09-17 · supports
“Section. 8. The Congress shall have Power … To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water; To raise and support Armies … Section. 2. The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States”
Section. 8. The Congress shall have Power … To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water; To raise and support Armies … Section. 2. The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States
- House roll-call XML files 85, 114, 170, 199, 282 and 307 (2026); latest shown
Office of the Clerk, US House of Representatives, 2026-09-15 · supports
“<legis-num>H CON RES 93</legis-num> ... <vote-result>Passed</vote-result> ... <action-date>15-Sep-2026</action-date> ... <party>Republican</party><yea-total>7</yea-total><nay-total>203</nay-total> ... <party>Democratic</party><yea-total>213</yea-total><nay-total>0</nay-total> ... <total-stub>Totals</total-stub><yea-total>220</yea-total><nay-total>204</nay-total>”
<legis-num>H CON RES 93</legis-num> ... <vote-result>Passed</vote-result> ... <action-date>15-Sep-2026</action-date> ... <party>Republican</party><yea-total>7</yea-total><nay-total>203</nay-total> ... <party>Democratic</party><yea-total>213</yea-total><nay-total>0</nay-total> ... <total-stub>Totals</total-stub><yea-total>220</yea-total><nay-total>204</nay-total>
- Senate Roll Call Votes, 119th Congress, 2nd Session (vote menu XML; Internet Archive copy of 10 October 2026)
United States Senate, 2026-10-10 · supports
“00244 24-Sep H.Con.Res. 89 On the Concurrent Resolution Rejected 49 50 ... 00184 23-Jun H.Con.Res. 86 On the Concurrent Resolution Agreed to 50 48 ... 00129 19-May S.J.Res. 185 On the Motion to Discharge Agreed to 50 47 ... 00046 04-Mar S.J.Res. 104 On the Motion to Discharge Rejected 47 53”
00244 24-Sep H.Con.Res. 89 On the Concurrent Resolution Rejected 49 50 ... 00184 23-Jun H.Con.Res. 86 On the Concurrent Resolution Agreed to 50 48 ... 00129 19-May S.J.Res. 185 On the Motion to Discharge Agreed to 50 47 ... 00046 04-Mar S.J.Res. 104 On the Motion to Discharge Rejected 47 53
- Iran conflict remains deeply unpopular (chart data: approval of Trump's handling, by party)
Pew Research Center, 2026-10-08 · supports
“% who say they approve of how Donald Trump is handling the U.S. military action against Iran Date March October Total 37 33 Rep/Lean Rep 69 63 Dem/Lean Dem 9 9 ... Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted Sept. 28-Oct. 4, 2026.”
% who say they approve of how Donald Trump is handling the U.S. military action against Iran Date March October Total 37 33 Rep/Lean Rep 69 63 Dem/Lean Dem 9 9 ... Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted Sept. 28-Oct. 4, 2026.
Iran's Government and Its People: Elections, Opinion and Repression, 1980–2026
- The Crimson Winter: A 50 Day Record of Iran’s 2025–2026 Nationwide Protests
HRANA (Human Rights Activists News Agency), 2026-02-23 · supports
“This report adopts a disciplined human rights methodology centered on documenting minimum verifiable cases rather than publishing maximal estimates. ... • Protesters killed: 6,488 • Children killed, counted separately and not included among protesters: 236 • Civilians killed, non-protester: 76 • Military and government forces killed: 207 • Total fatalities: 7,007 An additional 11,744 cases remain under review and are not included in confirmed totals. ... • Total arrests: 53,777 • Children, teenagers, and school students arrested: 555 • University students arrested: 147”
This report adopts a disciplined human rights methodology centered on documenting minimum verifiable cases rather than publishing maximal estimates. ... • Protesters killed: 6,488 • Children killed, counted separately and not included among protesters: 236 • Civilians killed, non-protester: 76 • Military and government forces killed: 207 • Total fatalities: 7,007 An additional 11,744 cases remain under review and are not included in confirmed totals. ... • Total arrests: 53,777 • Children, teenagers, and school students arrested: 555 • University students arrested: 147
- At least 3,117 people killed during Iran protests, state media report
Al Jazeera, 2026-01-21 · supports
“Iranian state television has released the first official death toll from the recent antigovernment protests that engulfed the country, reporting that 3,117 people were killed during the crackdown. ... The US-based Human Rights Activists News Agency (HRANA) has said 4,519 were killed during the wave of demonstrations, including 4,251 protesters, 197 security personnel, 35 people aged under 18 and 38 bystanders who it says were neither protesters nor security personnel. ... HRANA also said 9,049 additional deaths were under review.”
Iranian state television has released the first official death toll from the recent antigovernment protests that engulfed the country, reporting that 3,117 people were killed during the crackdown. ... The US-based Human Rights Activists News Agency (HRANA) has said 4,519 were killed during the wave of demonstrations, including 4,251 protesters, 197 security personnel, 35 people aged under 18 and 38 bystanders who it says were neither protesters nor security personnel. ... HRANA also said 9,049 additional deaths were under review.
- Rights group says confirmed Iran protest toll over 6,000
Al-Monitor (AFP), 2026-01-27 · supports
“The US-based Human Rights Activists News Agency (HRANA) said it had confirmed that 6,126 people had been killed, including 5,777 protesters, 86 minors, 214 members of the security forces and 49 bystanders. But the group, which has an extensive network of sources inside Iran and has tracked the protests on a daily basis since they began, added it was still investigating another 17,091 possible fatalities. ... At least 41,880 people have been arrested, it said.”
The US-based Human Rights Activists News Agency (HRANA) said it had confirmed that 6,126 people had been killed, including 5,777 protesters, 86 minors, 214 members of the security forces and 49 bystanders. But the group, which has an extensive network of sources inside Iran and has tracked the protests on a daily basis since they began, added it was still investigating another 17,091 possible fatalities. ... At least 41,880 people have been arrested, it said.
- Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Islamic Republic of Iran (A/HRC/61/60)
UN Human Rights Council, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Iran, 2026-03-19 · supports
“On 21 January, the Foundation of Martyrs and Veterans Affairs announced that 3,117 individuals had been killed, including members of the security forces, and 690 'rioters'. At the time of writing the present report, one credible human rights organization had estimated that over 7,000 people, including up to 6,500 protesters, over 230 children and at least 200 members of the security forces had been killed. ... [conditions] have made it difficult for the Mission to arrive at precise estimates at the time of writing of the number of people killed and injured. ... A credible human rights organization estimated that by mid-February, over 50,000 people had been arrested ... credible human rights organizations recording at least 464 executions between July and September. A further 222 people were executed in October alone – the highest monthly total recorded in at least 25 years. ... amount to the crimes against humanity of murder, imprisonment, torture”
On 21 January, the Foundation of Martyrs and Veterans Affairs announced that 3,117 individuals had been killed, including members of the security forces, and 690 'rioters'. At the time of writing the present report, one credible human rights organization had estimated that over 7,000 people, including up to 6,500 protesters, over 230 children and at least 200 members of the security forces had been killed. ... [conditions] have made it difficult for the Mission to arrive at precise estimates at the time of writing of the number of people killed and injured. ... A credible human rights organization estimated that by mid-February, over 50,000 people had been arrested ... credible human rights organizations recording at least 464 executions between July and September. A further 222 people were executed in October alone – the highest monthly total recorded in at least 25 years. ... amount to the crimes against humanity of murder, imprisonment, torture
- A Name-Based Reckoning: Documented Fatalities and State Responsibility in Iran's 1404 Uprising
NIAC Insights (National Iranian American Council), 2026-02-26 · supports
“While HRANA notes that its broader documentation framework records 7,007 fatalities during this period, the report's most concrete and publicly verifiable contribution lies in the publication of 4,555 named individuals who were killed during the uprising. ... Initially, 2,986 names were released, with the remaining cases listed as unspecified. In a subsequent update, the number of published names rose to 3,038.”
While HRANA notes that its broader documentation framework records 7,007 fatalities during this period, the report's most concrete and publicly verifiable contribution lies in the publication of 4,555 named individuals who were killed during the uprising. ... Initially, 2,986 names were released, with the remaining cases listed as unspecified. In a subsequent update, the number of published names rose to 3,038.
- Iran: Details released of 304 deaths during protests six months after security forces’ killing spree
Amnesty International, 2020-05-20 · supports
“Amnesty International has released details of the deaths of 304 men, women and children killed by Iran's security forces during last November's ruthless crackdown ... more than 220 of the recorded deaths took place over just two days on 16 and 17 November.”
Amnesty International has released details of the deaths of 304 men, women and children killed by Iran's security forces during last November's ruthless crackdown ... more than 220 of the recorded deaths took place over just two days on 16 and 17 November.
- Freedom in the World 2026: Iran
Freedom House, 2026 · supports
“Freedom in the World 2026 Iran Not Free 10 100 PR Political Rights 4 40 CL Civil Liberties 6 60 Last Year's Score & Status 11 100 Not Free ... Authorities responded harshly to the Woman, Life, Freedom movement, which began in 2022 ... In early 2024, a United Nations fact-finding mission reported that at least 551 protesters had been killed. ... In 2023, the parliament approved a bill that would impose heavier penalties, including steeper fines and longer prison terms, on women who do not wear the hijab. Implementation was scheduled to begin in December 2024, but it was paused by the Pezeshkian administration and remained pending during 2025. Widespread defiance of the hijab mandate continued, and in December 2025 authorities arrested the organizers of a marathon on Kish Island in which many women competed without a headscarf.”
Freedom in the World 2026 Iran Not Free 10 100 PR Political Rights 4 40 CL Civil Liberties 6 60 Last Year's Score & Status 11 100 Not Free ... Authorities responded harshly to the Woman, Life, Freedom movement, which began in 2022 ... In early 2024, a United Nations fact-finding mission reported that at least 551 protesters had been killed. ... In 2023, the parliament approved a bill that would impose heavier penalties, including steeper fines and longer prison terms, on women who do not wear the hijab. Implementation was scheduled to begin in December 2024, but it was paused by the Pezeshkian administration and remained pending during 2025. Widespread defiance of the hijab mandate continued, and in December 2025 authorities arrested the organizers of a marathon on Kish Island in which many women competed without a headscarf.
- Freedom in the World 2026: Saudi Arabia
Freedom House, 2026 · complicates
“Freedom in the World 2026 Saudi Arabia Not Free 9 100 PR Political Rights 1 40 CL Civil Liberties 8 60 Last Year's Score & Status 9 100 Not Free”
Freedom in the World 2026 Saudi Arabia Not Free 9 100 PR Political Rights 1 40 CL Civil Liberties 8 60 Last Year's Score & Status 9 100 Not Free
- Countries and Territories (Freedom in the World scores)
Freedom House, 2026 · complicates
“Freedom House rates people’s access to political rights and civil liberties in 208 countries and territories through its annual Freedom in the World report. ... Country or Territory | Freedom in the World Score | Political Rights | Civil Liberties ... Iran | 10/100 Not Free | 4 | 6 ... Saudi Arabia | 9/100 Not Free”
Freedom House rates people’s access to political rights and civil liberties in 208 countries and territories through its annual Freedom in the World report. ... Country or Territory | Freedom in the World Score | Political Rights | Civil Liberties ... Iran | 10/100 Not Free | 4 | 6 ... Saudi Arabia | 9/100 Not Free
- Iran: Authorities unleash wave of oppression after hostilities with Israel
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, 2025-09-03 · complicates
“Since 13 June, Iranian authorities have arrested over 20,000 people, including dissidents, human rights defenders, journalists, social media users, families of victims unlawfully killed in nationwide protests and foreign nationals. ... In an 12 August statement, Saeed Montazer Al-Mahdi, spokesperson for the police, announced that about 21,000 people had been arrested. ... At least nine men have been executed on politically motivated charges and/or accusations of espionage for Israel”
Since 13 June, Iranian authorities have arrested over 20,000 people, including dissidents, human rights defenders, journalists, social media users, families of victims unlawfully killed in nationwide protests and foreign nationals. ... In an 12 August statement, Saeed Montazer Al-Mahdi, spokesperson for the police, announced that about 21,000 people had been arrested. ... At least nine men have been executed on politically motivated charges and/or accusations of espionage for Israel
- Iranians’ Attitudes Toward the 2026 Protests and War
GAMAAN (Group for Analyzing and Measuring Attitudes in Iran), 2026-07-27 · supports
“The findings in this report are based on a weighted sample of 31,450 respondents inside Iran. ... 42% considered the U.S. and Israeli military action to be 'military aggression against Iran,' while nearly the same share disagreed ... About 40% viewed the U.S. and Israeli military operation as a form of 'humanitarian intervention' (R2P), while about 48% disagreed ... about 38% of society reported that they had supported military intervention both before and after the 39-day war. By contrast, about 27% said they had opposed military intervention both before and after the war. ... about 60% felt satisfaction at the weakening of the Islamic Republic during the war ... about 59% opposed Iran building nuclear weapons ... about 47% did not consider closing the Strait of Hormuz to be the right action ... about 68% of society believes that the agreement did not serve the interests of the Iranian people ... Only about 14% had a positive assessment of the regime's response”
The findings in this report are based on a weighted sample of 31,450 respondents inside Iran. ... 42% considered the U.S. and Israeli military action to be 'military aggression against Iran,' while nearly the same share disagreed ... About 40% viewed the U.S. and Israeli military operation as a form of 'humanitarian intervention' (R2P), while about 48% disagreed ... about 38% of society reported that they had supported military intervention both before and after the 39-day war. By contrast, about 27% said they had opposed military intervention both before and after the war. ... about 60% felt satisfaction at the weakening of the Islamic Republic during the war ... about 59% opposed Iran building nuclear weapons ... about 47% did not consider closing the Strait of Hormuz to be the right action ... about 68% of society believes that the agreement did not serve the interests of the Iranian people ... Only about 14% had a positive assessment of the regime's response
- Iranians’ Attitudes Toward the 2026 Protests and 39-Day War: Survey Report (Figure 17 and methodology)
GAMAAN (Group for Analyzing and Measuring Attitudes in Iran), 2026-07 · supports
“Which form of political system do you prefer? ... Republic non-federal 16.6% federal 10.9% ... Monarchy non-federal 25.4% federal 8.5% ... Islamic Republic (I.R.) %13.4 ... The form of the alternative to the I.R. doesn't matter to me %6.1 ... I lack the knowledge to choose an alternative to the I.R. %19.1 ... about 13% chose the “Islamic Republic,” indicating a decline of about 7 percentage points compared with last year. ... After weighting, the effective sample size is approximately 6,211. ... the survey reports an approximate 95% credibility level with a conservative credibility interval of ±3 percentage points. ... about 97% received the survey link through Psiphon”
Which form of political system do you prefer? ... Republic non-federal 16.6% federal 10.9% ... Monarchy non-federal 25.4% federal 8.5% ... Islamic Republic (I.R.) %13.4 ... The form of the alternative to the I.R. doesn't matter to me %6.1 ... I lack the knowledge to choose an alternative to the I.R. %19.1 ... about 13% chose the “Islamic Republic,” indicating a decline of about 7 percentage points compared with last year. ... After weighting, the effective sample size is approximately 6,211. ... the survey reports an approximate 95% credibility level with a conservative credibility interval of ±3 percentage points. ... about 97% received the survey link through Psiphon
- Has Khamenei backtracked from strict hijab enforcement?
Iran International, 2024-12-19 · supports
“Iran's Supreme National Security (SNSC) may have shelved the controversial new hijab law, some lawmakers and the media outlets in Tehran say, most likely with the consent of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. ... several lawmakers, including Deputy Speaker Ali Nikzad, have confirmed that the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) has decided to put the hijab law on hold for now ... The President heads the Security Council, but all its decisions require the Supreme Leader’s signature to come into effect.”
Iran's Supreme National Security (SNSC) may have shelved the controversial new hijab law, some lawmakers and the media outlets in Tehran say, most likely with the consent of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. ... several lawmakers, including Deputy Speaker Ali Nikzad, have confirmed that the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) has decided to put the hijab law on hold for now ... The President heads the Security Council, but all its decisions require the Supreme Leader’s signature to come into effect.
- Iran’s security council halts implementation of new hijab bill: Parliament speaker
Rudaw, 2025-05-25 · supports
“Ghalibaf told lawmakers during a tense parliamentary session that the SNSC 'has notified the parliament in writing that this [Chastity and Hijab] law should not be enacted for the time being,' adding, 'In this case, I cannot enact the law.' The law ... was finalized and published on November 30, 2024. ... An unjust law will not be enforced, and if it is, it will create discontent.”
Ghalibaf told lawmakers during a tense parliamentary session that the SNSC 'has notified the parliament in writing that this [Chastity and Hijab] law should not be enacted for the time being,' adding, 'In this case, I cannot enact the law.' The law ... was finalized and published on November 30, 2024. ... An unjust law will not be enforced, and if it is, it will create discontent.
- Iran announces Khamenei’s son Mojtaba as country's new supreme leader
Iran International, 2026-03-08 · supports
“Iran's Assembly of Experts announced in a statement on Sunday that Mojtaba Khamenei has been chosen as the country's new supreme leader, days after Iran International first reported on Tuesday that the Assembly of Experts had selected him under pressure from the Revolutionary Guards. ... “In today’s extraordinary session, the Assembly of Experts, by the decisive vote of its members, selected and introduced Ayatollah Seyed Mojtaba Hosseini Khamenei as the third leader of the sacred system of the Islamic Republic of Iran,” the body said in a statement.”
Iran's Assembly of Experts announced in a statement on Sunday that Mojtaba Khamenei has been chosen as the country's new supreme leader, days after Iran International first reported on Tuesday that the Assembly of Experts had selected him under pressure from the Revolutionary Guards. ... “In today’s extraordinary session, the Assembly of Experts, by the decisive vote of its members, selected and introduced Ayatollah Seyed Mojtaba Hosseini Khamenei as the third leader of the sacred system of the Islamic Republic of Iran,” the body said in a statement.
- Country Profile: Iran, Islamic Republic of
IFES ElectionGuide, 2026 · supports
“Chief of State: Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Mojtaba KHAMENEI (since 8 March 2026) ... 2013-06-14 ... Turnout 72.71”
Chief of State: Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Mojtaba KHAMENEI (since 8 March 2026) ... 2013-06-14 ... Turnout 72.71
- Three more pro-reform papers shut down
Committee to Protect Journalists, 2000-04-27 · complicates
“New York, April 27, 2000 — Hard-line political forces continued their crackdown on Iran's reformist press by closing three more newspapers, bringing to 16 the total number of publications shut down in the last week. ... which is directed by President Muhammad Khatami's brother”
New York, April 27, 2000 — Hard-line political forces continued their crackdown on Iran's reformist press by closing three more newspapers, bringing to 16 the total number of publications shut down in the last week. ... which is directed by President Muhammad Khatami's brother
- Iran's Parliamentary Elections: Inside the Candidate Approval Process
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2016-01-22 · supports
“In January 2004, it rejected 3,600 out of 8,157 candidates for Majlis, including 83 sitting members. Ultimately, around a thousand of these were reinstated after one-third of the Majlis resigned in protest.”
In January 2004, it rejected 3,600 out of 8,157 candidates for Majlis, including 83 sitting members. Ultimately, around a thousand of these were reinstated after one-third of the Majlis resigned in protest.
- Many Incumbent And Ex-Lawmakers Barred From Running In Iran Election
Iran International, 2024-01-07 · supports
“A report on the Etemad Online website said that out of the 290 lawmakers, 275 had registered their candidacy for the upcoming elections but the qualifications of only 26 have been rejected.”
A report on the Etemad Online website said that out of the 290 lawmakers, 275 had registered their candidacy for the upcoming elections but the qualifications of only 26 have been rejected.
- Iran’s election: By the numbers
Al Jazeera, 2021-06-18 · supports
“• Seven presidential candidates approved by Iran’s Guardian Council to run out of 592 who registered, with three later dropping out • Zero women out of the 40 who registered approved to run for the presidency ... • 73 percent turnout in Iran’s last presidential election in 2017”
• Seven presidential candidates approved by Iran’s Guardian Council to run out of 592 who registered, with three later dropping out • Zero women out of the 40 who registered approved to run for the presidency ... • 73 percent turnout in Iran’s last presidential election in 2017
- Iran heads to presidential run-off on July 5 amid record low turnout
Al Jazeera, 2024-06-29 · supports
“Only 40 percent of more than 61 million eligible Iranians voted, the Ministry of Interior said on Saturday, a new low in presidential elections since the country’s 1979 revolution. ... The lowest presidential turnout in the more than four-decade history of the Islamic republic was the one that got Raisi into office, with 48.8 percent.”
Only 40 percent of more than 61 million eligible Iranians voted, the Ministry of Interior said on Saturday, a new low in presidential elections since the country’s 1979 revolution. ... The lowest presidential turnout in the more than four-decade history of the Islamic republic was the one that got Raisi into office, with 48.8 percent.
- Centrist Masoud Pezeshkian will be Iran’s next president
Al Jazeera, 2024-07-06 · supports
“Pezeshkian acknowledges ‘difficult path ahead’ after winning run-off election with 53.7 percent of the vote ... Participation in the run-off was 49.8 percent in the tight race between Pezeshkian, the sole moderate in an original field of four candidates who has pledged to open Iran to the world, and the former nuclear negotiator Jalili”
Pezeshkian acknowledges ‘difficult path ahead’ after winning run-off election with 53.7 percent of the vote ... Participation in the run-off was 49.8 percent in the tight race between Pezeshkian, the sole moderate in an original field of four candidates who has pledged to open Iran to the world, and the former nuclear negotiator Jalili
- Disqualified Presidential Candidates in Iran Lodge Protests
Iran International, 2024-06-10 · supports
“The Guardian Council, which vets candidates, approved only six out of more than 80 who registered to run. Key figures, including former parliament speaker Ali Larijani and former president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, were disqualified.”
The Guardian Council, which vets candidates, approved only six out of more than 80 who registered to run. Key figures, including former parliament speaker Ali Larijani and former president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, were disqualified.
- Low turnout as conservatives dominate Iran parliamentary election
Al Jazeera, 2024-03-04 · supports
“The country saw a voter turnout of 41 percent in Friday’s elections for the national legislature and Assembly of Experts, the lowest participation since Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution ... “Around 25 million people participated with a turnout of 41 percent,” Interior Minister Ahmad Vahidi said ... The lowest previous turnout was in the parliamentary elections in 2020, which saw a 42 percent turnout during the COVID-19 pandemic. About 62 percent of voters participated in 2016.”
The country saw a voter turnout of 41 percent in Friday’s elections for the national legislature and Assembly of Experts, the lowest participation since Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution ... “Around 25 million people participated with a turnout of 41 percent,” Interior Minister Ahmad Vahidi said ... The lowest previous turnout was in the parliamentary elections in 2020, which saw a 42 percent turnout during the COVID-19 pandemic. About 62 percent of voters participated in 2016.
- Death Sentences and Executions 2025 (ACT 50/0778/2026)
Amnesty International, 2026-05 · supports
“Amnesty International recorded 2,707 executions in 2025, an increase by 78% from the 1,518 known executions in 2024. It is the highest figure recorded by Amnesty International since 1981 ... a spike in executions in Iran, where the country total reached at least 2,159, more than doubling the 2024 figure of at least 972; and accounting for 80% of all recorded executions. ... The known totals do not include the thousands of people believed to have been executed in China ... EXECUTIONS RECORDED GLOBALLY IN 2025 Afghanistan (6), China (+), Egypt (23), Iran ( 2,159+), Iraq (+), Japan (1), Kuwait (17), North Korea (+), Saudi Arabia (356+), Singapore (17), Somalia (17+), South Sudan (1), Taiwan (1), United Arab Emirates (UAE, 3), USA (47), Viet Nam (+), Yemen (51+). ... The executions known to have been carried out in Iran and Saudi Arabia accounted for 93% of the total.”
Amnesty International recorded 2,707 executions in 2025, an increase by 78% from the 1,518 known executions in 2024. It is the highest figure recorded by Amnesty International since 1981 ... a spike in executions in Iran, where the country total reached at least 2,159, more than doubling the 2024 figure of at least 972; and accounting for 80% of all recorded executions. ... The known totals do not include the thousands of people believed to have been executed in China ... EXECUTIONS RECORDED GLOBALLY IN 2025 Afghanistan (6), China (+), Egypt (23), Iran ( 2,159+), Iraq (+), Japan (1), Kuwait (17), North Korea (+), Saudi Arabia (356+), Singapore (17), Somalia (17+), South Sudan (1), Taiwan (1), United Arab Emirates (UAE, 3), USA (47), Viet Nam (+), Yemen (51+). ... The executions known to have been carried out in Iran and Saudi Arabia accounted for 93% of the total.
- Global: Recorded executions hit their highest figure since 2015
Amnesty International, 2025-04-08 · supports
“Iran executed 119 more individuals than last year (from at least 853 to at least 972) – accounting for 64% of all known executions.”
Iran executed 119 more individuals than last year (from at least 853 to at least 972) – accounting for 64% of all known executions.
- World Development Indicators: Population, total (SP.POP.TOTL), API
World Bank, 2026-10-08 · supports
“"indicator":{"id":"SP.POP.TOTL","value":"Population, total"} ... "lastupdated":"2026-10-08" ... Iran, Islamic Rep. 2025 92417681 ... Saudi Arabia 2025 36973555 ... Kuwait 2025 4865298 ... Singapore 2025 6111175 ... Yemen, Rep. 2025 41773878 ... Somalia, Fed. Rep. 2025 19654739 ... United Arab Emirates 2025 11513149 ... Egypt, Arab Rep. 2025 118365995 ... United States 2025 341784857 ... Afghanistan 2025 43844111 ... South Sudan 2025 12188788 ... Japan 2025 123366734”
"indicator":{"id":"SP.POP.TOTL","value":"Population, total"} ... "lastupdated":"2026-10-08" ... Iran, Islamic Rep. 2025 92417681 ... Saudi Arabia 2025 36973555 ... Kuwait 2025 4865298 ... Singapore 2025 6111175 ... Yemen, Rep. 2025 41773878 ... Somalia, Fed. Rep. 2025 19654739 ... United Arab Emirates 2025 11513149 ... Egypt, Arab Rep. 2025 118365995 ... United States 2025 341784857 ... Afghanistan 2025 43844111 ... South Sudan 2025 12188788 ... Japan 2025 123366734
- IAEA Director General report on Iran, GOV/2026/50
International Atomic Energy Agency, 2026-09-01 · supports
“On 28 February 2026, the United States of America and Israel launched further military attacks on Iran, including on the sites of some nuclear facilities. Consequently, the Agency stopped conducting verification activities in Iran.”
On 28 February 2026, the United States of America and Israel launched further military attacks on Iran, including on the sites of some nuclear facilities. Consequently, the Agency stopped conducting verification activities in Iran.
- Iran Update Special Report, July 13, 2026
Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project, 2026-07-13 · supports
“Iran has continuously made efforts to reconstitute its ballistic missile and drone programs since the ceasefire on April 8. ... The United States will resume its blockade of Iranian ports beginning on July 14 at 4:00 PM ET.”
Iran has continuously made efforts to reconstitute its ballistic missile and drone programs since the ceasefire on April 8. ... The United States will resume its blockade of Iranian ports beginning on July 14 at 4:00 PM ET.
- Report consistent with the War Powers Resolution (House Document 119-167)
US House of Representatives (letter from the President), 2026-06-29 · supports
“These efforts led to my signing a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran on June 17, 2026.”
These efforts led to my signing a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran on June 17, 2026.
- The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) at a Glance
Arms Control Association, 2025-02 · supports
“January 16, 2016, Implementation Day”
January 16, 2016, Implementation Day
- Timeline of Nuclear Diplomacy With Iran
Arms Control Association, 2023-01 · supports
“May 8, 2018: President Trump announces that he is withdrawing the United States from the JCPOA”
May 8, 2018: President Trump announces that he is withdrawing the United States from the JCPOA
- Iran Presidential Elections, All Provinces (workbook)
Iran Data Portal, Syracuse University, 2017-05 · supports
“Province | no. eligible voters | no. votes | Turnout (percent) ... Iran (total) ... [Turnout (percent), by election:] 1st (1980) 67.42; 2nd (1981) 64.24; 3rd (1981) 74.26; 4th (1985) 54.78; 5th (1989) 54.59; 6th (1993) 50.66; 7th (1997) 79.92; 8th (2001) 66.77; 9th, first round (2005) 62.84; 9th, second round (2005) 59.76; 10th (2009) 85.22; 11th (2013) 76.25”
Province | no. eligible voters | no. votes | Turnout (percent) ... Iran (total) ... [Turnout (percent), by election:] 1st (1980) 67.42; 2nd (1981) 64.24; 3rd (1981) 74.26; 4th (1985) 54.78; 5th (1989) 54.59; 6th (1993) 50.66; 7th (1997) 79.92; 8th (2001) 66.77; 9th, first round (2005) 62.84; 9th, second round (2005) 59.76; 10th (2009) 85.22; 11th (2013) 76.25
- Presidential Elections in Iran: Number of Candidates Registered and Allowed to Run (infographic)
Iran Data Portal, Syracuse University, 2017-04 · supports
“Presidential Elections in Iran Number of Candidates Registered and Allowed to Run ... 1st 1980 124 ... 2nd 1981 71 ... 3rd 1981 46 ... 4th 1985 50 ... 5th 1989 79 ... 6th 1993 128 ... 7th 1997 238 ... 8th 2001 814 ... 9th 2005 1014 ... 10th 2009 475 ... 11th 2013 686 ... 12th 2017 1636 ... Candidates submitting their candidacy are first vetted by the Ministry of Interior and then by the Guardian Council. ... Number of candidates allowed to run may be different from the number of candidates finally ran.”
Presidential Elections in Iran Number of Candidates Registered and Allowed to Run ... 1st 1980 124 ... 2nd 1981 71 ... 3rd 1981 46 ... 4th 1985 50 ... 5th 1989 79 ... 6th 1993 128 ... 7th 1997 238 ... 8th 2001 814 ... 9th 2005 1014 ... 10th 2009 475 ... 11th 2013 686 ... 12th 2017 1636 ... Candidates submitting their candidacy are first vetted by the Ministry of Interior and then by the Guardian Council. ... Number of candidates allowed to run may be different from the number of candidates finally ran.
- Annual Report on the Death Penalty in Iran 2025
Iran Human Rights (IHRNGO) and ECPM, 2026-04 · supports
“EXECUTION TRENDS IN THE LAST 18 YEARS (2008-2025) [bar labels, 2008 to 2025 in order:] 350 402 546 676 580 687 753 972 530 517 273 280 267 333 582 834 975 1639 ... From IHRNGO’s first annual report in 2008 to 2025, Iranian authorities have executed at least 11,196 people ... At least 1,639 people were executed, marking the highest number of recorded executions since 1989 and a dramatic 68% increase compared to 2024, when 975 executions were recorded. ... With 222 executions, October was the bloodiest month in 2025 ... Only 113 executions (under 7%) were announced by official sources ... 60% of executions took place in the second half of the year. ... Execution numbers tend to increase when authorities fear social unrest and when the attention of the international community is focused on other geopolitical issues. ... A new surge in executions began in the months after the 12-day war between Iran and Israel in June ... Following the death of President Ebrahim Raisi on 19 May 2024, Iran held a presidential election marked by the lowest voter turnout in the history of the Islamic Republic. ... At least 2,292 people have been executed since Masoud Pezeshkian took office in July 2024. By comparison, during the less than three years of Ebrahim Raisi’s presidency (2021–2024), and the 8-year presidential terms of Hassan Rouhani (2013–2021) and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005–2013), at least 1,714, 4,249, and 3,337 people were executed, respectively. ... The average number of monthly executions under Pezeshkian reached 135 (more than four executions per day), compared to 51 per month during Raisi’s tenure, 44 under Rouhani, and 35 under Ahmadinejad. ... The 2017 Amendment created hope that it would eventually lead to a complete halt in drug-related executions, and while it did lead to a decline in executions of men and a complete drop in executions of women until 2021, the outcome was not guaranteed. Since 2021, the 2017 Amendment has been reversed in practice, with drug-related executions rising from an average of 26 per year between 2018-2020 to at least 795 in 2025.”
EXECUTION TRENDS IN THE LAST 18 YEARS (2008-2025) [bar labels, 2008 to 2025 in order:] 350 402 546 676 580 687 753 972 530 517 273 280 267 333 582 834 975 1639 ... From IHRNGO’s first annual report in 2008 to 2025, Iranian authorities have executed at least 11,196 people ... At least 1,639 people were executed, marking the highest number of recorded executions since 1989 and a dramatic 68% increase compared to 2024, when 975 executions were recorded. ... With 222 executions, October was the bloodiest month in 2025 ... Only 113 executions (under 7%) were announced by official sources ... 60% of executions took place in the second half of the year. ... Execution numbers tend to increase when authorities fear social unrest and when the attention of the international community is focused on other geopolitical issues. ... A new surge in executions began in the months after the 12-day war between Iran and Israel in June ... Following the death of President Ebrahim Raisi on 19 May 2024, Iran held a presidential election marked by the lowest voter turnout in the history of the Islamic Republic. ... At least 2,292 people have been executed since Masoud Pezeshkian took office in July 2024. By comparison, during the less than three years of Ebrahim Raisi’s presidency (2021–2024), and the 8-year presidential terms of Hassan Rouhani (2013–2021) and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005–2013), at least 1,714, 4,249, and 3,337 people were executed, respectively. ... The average number of monthly executions under Pezeshkian reached 135 (more than four executions per day), compared to 51 per month during Raisi’s tenure, 44 under Rouhani, and 35 under Ahmadinejad. ... The 2017 Amendment created hope that it would eventually lead to a complete halt in drug-related executions, and while it did lead to a decline in executions of men and a complete drop in executions of women until 2021, the outcome was not guaranteed. Since 2021, the 2017 Amendment has been reversed in practice, with drug-related executions rising from an average of 26 per year between 2018-2020 to at least 795 in 2025.
- Annual Report on Execution in Iran 2025–2026
HRANA (Human Rights Activists in Iran Statistics Center), 2026-10-09 · supports
“Ten-Year Trend of Executions in Iran (2016–2026) ... executions declined from 505 in 2016–2017 to 238 in 2018–2019. The number then increased each year from 2019–2020 onward, reaching 2,003 in 2025–2026, the highest total recorded across these ten reporting periods. ... 2025-2026 2,003 2024-2025 1,553 2023-2024 823 2022-2023 664 2021-2022 528 2020-2021 272 2019-2020 249 2018-2019 238 2017-2018 265 2016-2017 505”
Ten-Year Trend of Executions in Iran (2016–2026) ... executions declined from 505 in 2016–2017 to 238 in 2018–2019. The number then increased each year from 2019–2020 onward, reaching 2,003 in 2025–2026, the highest total recorded across these ten reporting periods. ... 2025-2026 2,003 2024-2025 1,553 2023-2024 823 2022-2023 664 2021-2022 528 2020-2021 272 2019-2020 249 2018-2019 238 2017-2018 265 2016-2017 505
- Annual Report on Execution in Iran 2025–2026 (monthly chart and political executions by month)
HRANA (Human Rights Activists in Iran Statistics Center), 2026-10-09 · supports
“the highest number of executions was recorded in December 2025, while the lowest full-month total was recorded in March 2026. The figures for October 2025 and October 2026, which cover only the last 22 days and the first seven days of those months respectively, are not representative of a full month. [Monthly chart labels, October 2025 to October 2026:] 200 324 404 334 282 10 30 73 114 73 85 69 5 ... Political and security-related executions 69 ... ◄ 35 people (51% of all political and security-related executions) were executed in connection with the January 2026 (Dey 1404) protests. ◄ 29 people were executed in April (14) and May 2026 (15) alone, the peak of executions during this period. ... By Month of Execution Month Number October 2025 1 November 2025 0 December 2025 1 January 2026 4 February 2026 0 March 2026 8 April 2026 14 May 2026 15 June 2026 5 July 2026 9 August 2026 6 September 2026 3 October 2026 3 Total 69”
the highest number of executions was recorded in December 2025, while the lowest full-month total was recorded in March 2026. The figures for October 2025 and October 2026, which cover only the last 22 days and the first seven days of those months respectively, are not representative of a full month. [Monthly chart labels, October 2025 to October 2026:] 200 324 404 334 282 10 30 73 114 73 85 69 5 ... Political and security-related executions 69 ... ◄ 35 people (51% of all political and security-related executions) were executed in connection with the January 2026 (Dey 1404) protests. ◄ 29 people were executed in April (14) and May 2026 (15) alone, the peak of executions during this period. ... By Month of Execution Month Number October 2025 1 November 2025 0 December 2025 1 January 2026 4 February 2026 0 March 2026 8 April 2026 14 May 2026 15 June 2026 5 July 2026 9 August 2026 6 September 2026 3 October 2026 3 Total 69
- World Development Indicators: GDP growth (annual %), Iran (API)
World Bank, 2026-10-08 · supports
“"indicator":{"id":"NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG","value":"GDP growth (annual %)"}, "country":{"id":"IR","value":"Iran, Islamic Rep."} ... "lastupdated":"2026-10-08" ... "date":"2025","value":-2.82597163290347 ... "date":"2016","value":8.8150866425182”
"indicator":{"id":"NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG","value":"GDP growth (annual %)"}, "country":{"id":"IR","value":"Iran, Islamic Rep."} ... "lastupdated":"2026-10-08" ... "date":"2025","value":-2.82597163290347 ... "date":"2016","value":8.8150866425182
- World Development Indicators: Inflation, consumer prices (annual %), Iran (API)
World Bank, 2026-10-08 · supports
“"indicator":{"id":"FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG","value":"Inflation, consumer prices (annual %)"},"country":{"id":"IR","value":"Iran, Islamic Rep."} ... "lastupdated":"2026-10-08" ... "date":"2025","value":42.1712244965444”
"indicator":{"id":"FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG","value":"Inflation, consumer prices (annual %)"},"country":{"id":"IR","value":"Iran, Islamic Rep."} ... "lastupdated":"2026-10-08" ... "date":"2025","value":42.1712244965444