Decisions, Law and Diplomacy: Congress, the President, Ceasefires and Negotiations, 2024–2026
Both chambers of Congress adopted a resolution to end the war, of doubtful legal force, while the administration declared hostilities over and then reported new strikes, and most Americans disapprove. [4][7][10][18][28]
Yes and no votes
Every House roll call on a concurrent resolution directing the President to remove US forces from hostilities with Iran, 5 March to 15 September 2026. The first reading shows yes and no votes; the second shows members who voted against their party's majority.
Members voting, by date of roll call
Every House roll call on a concurrent resolution directing the President to remove US forces from hostilities with Iran, 5 March to 15 September 2026. The first reading shows yes and no votes; the second shows members who voted against their party's majority. Read as yes and no votes: Members voting. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- Yes (end the war)
- No
Source: Office of the Clerk, US House of Representatives [52]
Observations 2
A House majority voted to end the war three times
The House rejected the first three resolutions by margins of seven votes or fewer, including a tie, then adopted the next three, from June to September (chart). 1 3 6
Every vote was on a concurrent resolution under section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution. The House has held no roll call of any kind since mid-September, as of 29 October (see the chart note).
The resolutions do not bind the President in practice
A concurrent resolution is not sent to the President to sign or veto. CRS calls its effect "uncertain" since the Supreme Court's 1983 Chadha ruling, and Lawfare says it was brought into "serious constitutional doubt". 11 10
A joint resolution would be binding but faces a veto, which two-thirds of each chamber would have to override. 10
Members voting against their party
Members, by date of roll call
Every House roll call on a concurrent resolution directing the President to remove US forces from hostilities with Iran, 5 March to 15 September 2026. The first reading shows yes and no votes; the second shows members who voted against their party's majority. Read as members voting against their party: Members. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- Republicans voting yes
- Democrats voting no
Source: Office of the Clerk, US House of Representatives [52]
Observations 1
Republican defections grew but stayed small
Republicans voting to end the war rose from two in March to seven in September, out of more than 200 Republicans voting. Democrats voting against fell to none from June on (chart). 1 6
In the Senate, Republican yes votes rose from one to four (chart below). With the House this evenly divided, these few members and absences decided each result.
About this data
Full published range: 2026-03-05–2026-09-15. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – The Clerk's 2026 roll calls run to number 314 (16 September 2026); numbers 315 and above returned no file when checked on 29 October 2026, so there has been no House vote of any kind since then. Six of the 314 are Iran war-powers resolutions.
Yes and no votes
Totals from the totals-by-vote field of each roll call. Members voting "present" or not voting are excluded.
Members voting against their party
From the totals-by-party field of each roll call: Republican yea-total and Democratic nay-total.
Yes and no votes
All 14 Senate roll calls on Iran war-powers measures, 4 March to 24 September 2026: motions to discharge or proceed to joint resolutions, and votes on two House concurrent resolutions. The second reading shows senators who voted against their party's majority.
Senators voting, by date of roll call
All 14 Senate roll calls on Iran war-powers measures, 4 March to 24 September 2026: motions to discharge or proceed to joint resolutions, and votes on two House concurrent resolutions. The second reading shows senators who voted against their party's majority. Read as yes and no votes: Senators voting. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- Yes (end the war)
- No
Source: United States Senate [53]
Observations 1
The Senate voted 14 times and succeeded twice
Twelve of the Senate's votes failed. A motion to discharge succeeded in May, but the resolution then failed a motion to proceed. In June the Senate adopted H.Con.Res.86, which the House had passed, so both chambers adopted one resolution (chart). 7 8
The Senate rejected the next House resolution, H.Con.Res.89, by one vote in September. GovTrack's list shows no Iran war-powers vote after that, as of late October. 9
Senators voting against their party
Senators, by date of roll call
All 14 Senate roll calls on Iran war-powers measures, 4 March to 24 September 2026: motions to discharge or proceed to joint resolutions, and votes on two House concurrent resolutions. The second reading shows senators who voted against their party's majority. Read as senators voting against their party: Senators. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- Republicans voting yes
- Democrats voting no
Source: United States Senate [53]
Observations 1
Senate defections were steady at a handful
About this data
Full published range: 2026-03-04–2026-09-24. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – The Senate's own vote list (archived 10 October 2026) and GovTrack's list (captured 26–29 October 2026, latest vote 30 September) show no Iran war-powers vote after 24 September. Party counts are tallied from the member records in each roll-call file; the file for 23 July (vote 207) has no archived copy, so that date has totals only.
Yes and no votes
Yeas and nays as printed in the Senate vote list. A yes vote favours ending the war in every case.
Senators voting against their party
Derived: Republicans recorded "Yea" and Democrats recorded "Nay", counted from the member records of each archived roll-call XML file (votes 46, 58, 69, 79, 88, 113, 118, 129, 174, 184, 192, 216 and 244). The two independents voted yes every time. On 24 June one further Republican voted "Present".
Approve of Trump's handling
Share of US adults who approve of President Trump's handling of the military action against Iran, and who say using force was the right decision, in Pew's two surveys (March and early October 2026). The markers below the chart date the ceasefire, blockade, War Powers letters, memorandum of understanding, strikes and the latest reported plans.
% who approve, by survey fieldwork month
Share of US adults who approve of President Trump's handling of the military action against Iran, and who say using force was the right decision, in Pew's two surveys (March and early October 2026). The markers below the chart date the ceasefire, blockade, War Powers letters, memorandum of understanding, strikes and the latest reported plans. Read as approve of Trump's handling: % who approve. 16 dated events are numbered on a strip under the graph and listed below it. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- All adults
- Rep/lean Rep
- Dem/lean Dem
Events marked above
War Powers report cites Article II
48-hour report on strikes begun 28 February, filed "consistent with" the War Powers Resolution.
Source: The White House (copy published by Just Security) [12]
Ceasefire
The President ordered a two-week ceasefire on 7 April; it was then extended.
Source: The White House (US Government Publishing Office) [14]
US blockade of Iranian ports begins
Source: Lawfare [10]
Letter: hostilities "have terminated"
Known only through quotation by Lawfare and Jack Goldsmith; the letter itself was not found on govinfo.
Source: Lawfare [10]
Iran downs a US Apache; US strikes from 9 June
As reported in the President's War Powers letter of 12 June.
Source: The White House (US Government Publishing Office) [14]
US–Iran memorandum of understanding signed
The President's letter gives 17 June; ISW/CTP calls it "the June 18 MoU".
Source: The White House (US Government Publishing Office) [15]
US strikes on 26 and 28 June
After Iranian attacks on vessels on 25 and 27 June, per the President's letter.
Source: The White House (US Government Publishing Office) [15]
US strikes resume; memorandum breaks down
Blockade reimposed
Source: US Central Command [50]
US strikes in Iraq on Iran-backed militias
US strikes on Iran, including state oil tankers
AP reports no US strike on Iran since early September (as of 28 October).
Source: The White House (US Government Publishing Office) [18]
Trump: no attack before the 3 November midterms
Source: Associated Press (via WCAX) [42]
NYT: plans for a short operation after the midterms
As relayed by ISW/CTP.
Source: Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project [44]
DNI memo: Iran in "advanced stages" of attack planning
As reported by ISW/CTP; the memo itself could not be fetched.
Source: Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project [45]
Saudi, Pakistani and Turkish officials in Tehran; Qatari plan
Reported plan: Iran reopens Hormuz, US lifts the blockade, over five days. ISW/CTP reports no progress.
Source: Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project [47]
US tells allies to prepare for possible renewed strikes
AP, citing two diplomats; no final decision by the President.
Source: Associated Press (via WCAX) [49]
Source: Pew Research Center [54]
Observations 2
Most Americans disapprove, and approval has slipped
In Pew's surveys about a third of adults approve of the President's handling of the war, down slightly since March; Pew's separate question on whether force was the right decision moved the same way (chart). 28 29
Gallup in June and Quinnipiac in March, asking about the military action itself, also found majorities against (charts below). 30 31
Most Republicans still approve, in falling numbers
Say using force was the right decision
% right decision, by survey fieldwork month
Share of US adults who approve of President Trump's handling of the military action against Iran, and who say using force was the right decision, in Pew's two surveys (March and early October 2026). The markers below the chart date the ceasefire, blockade, War Powers letters, memorandum of understanding, strikes and the latest reported plans. Read as say using force was the right decision: % right decision. 16 dated events are numbered on a strip under the graph and listed below it. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- All adults
- Rep/lean Rep
Events marked above
War Powers report cites Article II
48-hour report on strikes begun 28 February, filed "consistent with" the War Powers Resolution.
Source: The White House (copy published by Just Security) [12]
Ceasefire
The President ordered a two-week ceasefire on 7 April; it was then extended.
Source: The White House (US Government Publishing Office) [14]
US blockade of Iranian ports begins
Source: Lawfare [10]
Letter: hostilities "have terminated"
Known only through quotation by Lawfare and Jack Goldsmith; the letter itself was not found on govinfo.
Source: Lawfare [10]
Iran downs a US Apache; US strikes from 9 June
As reported in the President's War Powers letter of 12 June.
Source: The White House (US Government Publishing Office) [14]
US–Iran memorandum of understanding signed
The President's letter gives 17 June; ISW/CTP calls it "the June 18 MoU".
Source: The White House (US Government Publishing Office) [15]
US strikes on 26 and 28 June
After Iranian attacks on vessels on 25 and 27 June, per the President's letter.
Source: The White House (US Government Publishing Office) [15]
US strikes resume; memorandum breaks down
Blockade reimposed
Source: US Central Command [50]
US strikes in Iraq on Iran-backed militias
US strikes on Iran, including state oil tankers
AP reports no US strike on Iran since early September (as of 28 October).
Source: The White House (US Government Publishing Office) [18]
Trump: no attack before the 3 November midterms
Source: Associated Press (via WCAX) [42]
NYT: plans for a short operation after the midterms
As relayed by ISW/CTP.
Source: Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project [44]
DNI memo: Iran in "advanced stages" of attack planning
As reported by ISW/CTP; the memo itself could not be fetched.
Source: Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project [45]
Saudi, Pakistani and Turkish officials in Tehran; Qatari plan
Reported plan: Iran reopens Hormuz, US lifts the blockade, over five days. ISW/CTP reports no progress.
Source: Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project [47]
US tells allies to prepare for possible renewed strikes
AP, citing two diplomats; no final decision by the President.
Source: Associated Press (via WCAX) [49]
Source: Pew Research Center [54]
About this data
Full published range: 2026-03–2026-10. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – Pew asked both questions in March (16–22 March, 3,524 adults) and from 28 September to 4 October (labelled October by Pew). Republicans and Democrats include leaners. Pew prints no Democratic figure for the right-decision question ("one-in-ten" in October), so that line is omitted. Event markers run to 28 October 2026.
Say using force was the right decision
October total is Pew's 34%, "down 4 percentage points from March" (38%).
Approval of the US military action against Iran, by party (Gallup), June 2026
Share of US adults who approve or disapprove of "this U.S. military action against Iran" (Gallup, telephone, 1–15 June 2026, 1,001 adults).
Approve · % of adults
- Republicans79%
- All adults34%
- Independents26%
- Democrats8%
Show all breakdowns
| Category | Approve | Disapprove | No opinion | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| All adults | 34% | 63% | 4% | 101% |
| Republicans | 79% | 19% | 2% | 100% |
| Independents | 26% | 68% | 6% | 100% |
| Democrats | 8% | 90% | 2% | 100% |
Source: Gallup [30]
About this data
From the party table for question 24 of Gallup's final topline. Gallup's party groups exclude leaners. Each bar is the sum of the three published shares, which is 101 for all adults because of rounding. Gallup published this question once, so there is no Gallup trend.
Support for the US military action against Iran, by party (Quinnipiac), March 2026
Share of registered voters who support or oppose "the U.S. military action against Iran" (Quinnipiac, 6–8 March 2026, 1,002 registered voters).
Support · % of registered voters
- Republicans85%
- All voters40%
- Independents31%
- Democrats7%
Show all breakdowns
| Category | Support | Oppose | Don't know | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| All voters | 40% | 53% | 7% | 100% |
| Republicans | 85% | 11% | 5% | 101% |
| Independents | 31% | 60% | 9% | 100% |
| Democrats | 7% | 89% | 4% | 100% |
Source: Quinnipiac University Poll [31]
Observations 1
Support split almost entirely along party lines
In Quinnipiac's poll a week after the war began, Republicans supported the action and Democrats opposed it by similar margins; independents sat closer to Democrats (chart). 31
About this data
From question 10 of the release. Party groups exclude leaners. Each bar is the sum of the three published shares (101 for Republicans, from rounding).
Should the President have received Congress's approval before acting? By party (Quinnipiac), March 2026
Answers of registered voters to "Do you think President Trump should have received approval from Congress before taking military action against Iran, or not?" (Quinnipiac, 6–8 March 2026).
Should have · % of registered voters
- Democrats92%
- Independents64%
- All voters59%
- Republicans22%
Show all breakdowns
| Category | Should have | Should not have | Don't know | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| All voters | 59% | 38% | 3% | 100% |
| Republicans | 22% | 76% | 2% | 100% |
| Independents | 64% | 33% | 3% | 100% |
| Democrats | 92% | 5% | 3% | 100% |
Source: Quinnipiac University Poll [31]
Observations 1
Most voters said Congress should have been asked first
In March, 59% of registered voters said the President should have received approval from Congress before acting, including most independents and about a fifth of Republicans (chart). 31 This is one poll; no later reading was found.
About this data
From question 15 of the release. Each bar is the sum of the three published shares. No other pollster found asked this question, so there is no trend or comparison.
War Powers reports by presidents, and those that started the 60-day clock, 1975–March 2017
Reports submitted to Congress under the War Powers Resolution from 1975 to March 2017, and the number that cited section 4(a)(1), which starts the 60-day withdrawal requirement (CRS).
Reports
- All War Powers reports168
- Reports citing section 4(a)(1)1
Source: Congressional Research Service [11]
Observations 1
Presidents have almost never started the 60-day clock themselves
About this data
CRS R42699, updated 8 March 2019. The one report citing section 4(a)(1) was the 1975 Mayaguez seizure, by which time the operation was over. CRS publishes no count after March 2017.
What has the President said about war and about Iran?
Four statements, from the 2024 campaign to October 2026.
I was the first president in modern times to start no new wars. … Iran is very close to having a nuclear weapon, which would have never happened.
Donald Trump, CandidateConvention acceptance speechSource: The American Presidency Project (UC Santa Barbara) [32] They said: 'He will start a war.' I'm not going to start a war. I'm going to stop wars.
Donald Trump, President-electElection-night remarksSource: The American Presidency Project (UC Santa Barbara) [33] I acted pursuant to my constitutional authority as Commander in Chief … in collective self-defense of our regional allies, including Israel.
Donald Trump, President48-hour War Powers reportSource: The White House (copy published by Just Security) [12] will not be attacking Iran at any time prior to the Midterm Elections … having productive discussions with the Islamic Republic of Iran
Donald Trump, PresidentSocial media postSource: Associated Press (via WCAX) [42]
Sources: The White House (copy published by Just Security) [12]; The American Presidency Project (UC Santa Barbara) [32]; The American Presidency Project (UC Santa Barbara) [33]; Associated Press (via WCAX) [42]
Observations 2
The 2024 campaign promised to stop wars
On election night 2024 the President said "I'm not going to start a war. I'm going to stop wars." The remarks did not mention Iran. 33
The same campaign called Iran "very close" to a weapon
In his 2024 convention speech he said Iran was "very close to having a nuclear weapon" and blamed his predecessor. 32 Both lines were said by the same candidate in the same year.
War Powers letters, 2026
Each letter the President sent Congress under the War Powers Resolution in 2026, by date. Letters from June on report new military action.
Filled marker: major event Hollow: minor
Showing 7 of 7 events
2026
· Reports military action
Strikes on Iran from 28 Feb
Article II; "consistent with" the Act.
Source: The White House (copy published by Just Security) [12]
· Says hostilities have ended · major event
Hostilities that began 28 Feb "have terminated"
No exchange of fire since 7 Apr. Quoted by Lawfare and Goldsmith; letter not found.
Source: Lawfare [10]
· Reports military action
Iran downed a US Apache (8 Jun); US strikes from 9 Jun
House Doc 119-162
Source: The White House (US Government Publishing Office) [14]
· Reports military action
US strikes on 26 and 28 Jun; MoU signed 17 Jun
House Doc 119-167
Source: The White House (US Government Publishing Office) [15]
· Reports military action
US strikes from 7 Jul
House Doc 119-169
Source: The White House (US Government Publishing Office) [16]
· Reports military action
US strikes in Iraq from 27 Jul on Iran-directed militias
House Doc 119-183
Source: The White House (US Government Publishing Office) [17]
· Reports military action
US strikes on Iran from 1 Sep, including state oil tankers
House Doc 119-193
Source: The White House (US Government Publishing Office) [18]
Sources: Lawfare [10]; The White House (copy published by Just Security) [12]; Executive Functions (Jack Goldsmith) [13]; The White House (US Government Publishing Office) [14]; The White House (US Government Publishing Office) [15]; The White House (US Government Publishing Office) [16]; The White House (US Government Publishing Office) [17]; The White House (US Government Publishing Office) [18]
Observations 2
Hostilities were declared over, then new strikes were reported
The 1 May letter said hostilities "have terminated" because there had been no exchange of fire since the ceasefire. 10 The blockade that began in April was still running, and from June the administration filed at least five letters reporting new military action (timeline). 14 18
Goldsmith calls the "no exchange of fire" claim "highly misleading". 13 The 1 May letter is known only through these quotations.
Each new letter treats the strikes as a separate action
The same text makes the President "Commander in Chief".
The Congress shall have Power … To declare War
Earlier uses of force without authorisation, and Congress's votes, 2011–2025
The main roll calls found on earlier operations, and the count of all uses of force since 1798.
| Operation | Vote | Result |
|---|---|---|
| Libya, 2011 | House: authorise the operation (24 Jun 2011) | Failed, 123–295 [20] |
| Libya, 2011 | House: limit funding (24 Jun 2011) | Failed, 180–238 [21] |
| Yemen (Saudi-led war), 2019 | S.J.Res.7: Senate 54–46, House 247–175 | Vetoed; override failed 53–45 (2 May 2019) [22] [23] |
| Iran, 2020 | S.J.Res.68: Senate 55–45, House 227–186 | Vetoed; override failed 49–44 (7 May 2020) [24] [25] |
| Iran, 2025 | S.J.Res.59: Senate (27 Jun 2025) | Failed, 47–53 [26] |
| All uses of force, 1798–2023 | — | "Hundreds of instances"; 11 declarations of war covering five wars [19] |
Sources: Congressional Research Service [19]; Office of the Clerk, US House of Representatives [20]; Office of the Clerk, US House of Representatives [21]; Office of the Clerk, US House of Representatives [22]; United States Senate [23]; Office of the Clerk, US House of Representatives [24]; United States Senate [25]; Senate Democrats (Senate Periodical Press Gallery floor log) [26]
Observations 3
Congress has declared war eleven times, in five wars
The Constitution gives Congress the power "To declare War" and makes the President "Commander in Chief". 51
CRS counts eleven declarations of war covering five wars, and "hundreds of instances" of US forces used abroad in conflict or potential conflict. 19 The administration did not seek authorisation for this war before the 60-day mark. 10
CRS does not code the instances by authorisation, length or scale (see Data still needed).
Every binding attempt since 2011 to end an operation failed
Research finds Congress shapes wars without binding votes
Kriner's study, as described on its publisher's page, finds that Congress "materially shapes the initiation, scope, and duration of major military actions", and that the party balance in Congress helps explain how long conflicts last. 27 The publisher's page gives no effect sizes.
The ceasefire record, April–July 2026
Attacks, strikes and agreements during the ceasefire, from the President's letters and ISW/CTP. No Iranian or neutral record was found.
Filled marker: major event Hollow: minor
Showing 11 of 11 events
2026
– · Both · major event
Two-week ceasefire ordered, then extended
Source: The White House (US Government Publishing Office) [14]
· Iran acted
Engaged a US Army Apache, "forcing its crash landing"
Source: The White House (US Government Publishing Office) [14]
· US acted
Strikes on missile sites, mining, air defences, command
Source: The White House (US Government Publishing Office) [14]
· Both · major event
Memorandum of understanding signed
Source: The White House (US Government Publishing Office) [15]
– · Iran acted
Attacks on neutral-flagged vessels in Hormuz, on 25 and 27 Jun
Source: The White House (US Government Publishing Office) [15]
– · US acted
Strikes on drone, missile and command sites, on 26 and 28 Jun
Source: The White House (US Government Publishing Office) [15]
– · Iran acted
Attacks on several neutral-flagged vessels
Source: The White House (US Government Publishing Office) [16]
· US acted
Strikes resume
Source: The White House (US Government Publishing Office) [16]
– · Iran acted
IRGC Navy announced the strait closed and struck two vessels
Source: Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project [34]
· US acted
Struck "dozens of Iranian military targets"
Source: Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project [34]
· US acted
Blockade reimposed
Source: Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project [34]
Sources: The White House (US Government Publishing Office) [14]; The White House (US Government Publishing Office) [15]; The White House (US Government Publishing Office) [16]; Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project [34]; US Central Command [50]
Observations 2
Both sides used force during the ceasefire
The President's own letters record Iranian attacks and US strikes during the ceasefire, before and after the memorandum (timeline). 14 15 In each letter the US strikes answer a named Iranian attack.
Every entry comes from the US government or ISW/CTP. No Iranian or neutral record was found to check the sequence.
Negotiations and agreements, 2016–2026
The talks and agreements between the US and Iran, from the 2015 deal to the latest proposals.
Filled marker: major event Hollow: minor
Showing 8 of 8 events
2016
· Agreement
Implementation Day of the 2015 nuclear deal (JCPOA)
Enrichment capped at 3.67 percent for 15 years, stockpile under 300 kg.
Source: Arms Control Association [40]
2025
– · Talks and proposals
Five rounds of US–Iran talks
The sixth (15 Jun) suspended after Israel's attack. Wikipedia (tertiary).
Source: Wikipedia [41]
2026
· Talks and proposals
Indirect US–Iran talks in Geneva on 17 and 26 Feb
Attended by the IAEA Director General.
· Strikes · major event
US and Israeli strikes; IAEA stops verification in Iran
· Agreement · major event
Memorandum: "Iran reaffirms that it shall not procure or develop nuclear weapons"
Also safe passage for shipping.
· Talks and proposals
President rejects Iran's proposal to reopen Hormuz within seven days on conditions
Source: Associated Press (via WCAX) [42]
· Talks and proposals
Qatari plan reported: Hormuz reopened for blockade lifted, over five days
Dispute over sequencing. ISW/CTP citing the NYT.
Source: Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project [47]
· Talks and proposals
Iran's foreign minister: Tehran "continues to give diplomacy a chance to succeed"
Source: Associated Press (via WCAX) [49]
Sources: The White House (US Government Publishing Office) [15]; International Atomic Energy Agency [38]; Congressional Research Service [39]; Arms Control Association [40]; Wikipedia [41]; Associated Press (via WCAX) [42]; Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project [47]; Associated Press (via WCAX) [49]
Observations 3
Talks were under way when the strikes began
Iran signed a no-weapons pledge in June
The June memorandum states that "Iran reaffirms that it shall not procure or develop nuclear weapons". 39 Its other terms, including any on inspections, have not been published in any source found, so it cannot be compared clause by clause with the 2015 deal.
Where have allies and regional governments stood on the war?
The statements found, not a complete record of allied positions.
We did not participate in these strikes … We condemn Iranian attacks on countries in the region
UK, France and GermanyJoint statement by the E3 leadersSource: UK Government (Prime Minister's Office) [36] launched without United Nations authorisation
Badr al Busaidi, Oman's foreign ministerSource: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sultanate of Oman [37] exercise wisdom and pursue political solutions
UAE foreign ministrySource: Associated Press (via WCAX) [49]
Sources: UK Government (Prime Minister's Office) [36]; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sultanate of Oman [37]; Associated Press (via WCAX) [49]
Observations 2
Key European allies did not join the strikes
The British, French and German leaders said they "did not participate", while condemning Iran's attacks on its neighbours "in the strongest terms". 36 This list is the statements found, not a complete record of allied positions.
About this data
UN Security Council resolution 2817 (11 March 2026) could not be checked at source, because UN sites refused the fetch. On 26 October 2026 Oman's foreign minister also called for a Gulf non-aggression pact with Iran (ISW/CTP).
The latest events, July–October 2026
Assessments and reports since the ceasefire ended. Most come from one source, named on each entry, and are not official findings.
Showing 8 of 8 events
2026
· Iran's forces, as assessed
ISW/CTP: Iran "continuously made efforts to reconstitute its ballistic missile and drone programs"
From the April ceasefire on.
Source: Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project [34]
– · Attacks
23 attacks on vessels near Hormuz
Officials told Bloomberg, via ISW/CTP.
Source: Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project [43]
· US plans and pledges
The President pledges no attack on Iran before the midterms
Source: Associated Press (via WCAX) [42]
· Iran's forces, as assessed
New defence minister plans to rebuild "in mountains and security structures"
ISW/CTP reads his appointment as prioritising missiles.
Source: Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project [35]
· US plans and pledges
NYT reports plans for "a short and intensive operation" after 3 November
Source: Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project [44]
· Iran's forces, as assessed
Intelligence chief warns of Iran's "advanced stages" of planning attacks on US targets
As reported by ISW/CTP; the memo itself could not be fetched.
Source: Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project [45]
· Attacks
Houthis fire missiles and drones at Saudi Arabia
ISW/CTP.
Source: Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project [46]
· US plans and pledges
AP: allies told to prepare for renewed action and Iranian retaliation
AP's diplomats say the President has made no final decision.
Source: Associated Press (via WCAX) [49]
Sources: Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project [34]; Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project [35]; Associated Press (via WCAX) [42]; Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project [43]; Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project [44]; Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project [45]; Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project [46]; Associated Press (via WCAX) [49]
Observations 4
Iran worked to rebuild missiles and drones, in ISW/CTP's assessment
ISW/CTP assesses that Iran "continuously made efforts to reconstitute its ballistic missile and drone programs" from the April ceasefire. 34 In October it read the new defence minister's appointment, and his plan to rebuild "in mountains and security structures", as prioritising missiles. 35
These are assessments by ISW and AEI's Critical Threats Project, not imagery or official findings.
A new round of strikes is reported to be planned after the midterms
The NYT reported plans for "a short and intensive operation" after 3 November, and AP reports allies were told to prepare for renewed action and Iranian retaliation. 44 49 AP's diplomats say the President has made no final decision.
AP reports no US strike on Iran since early September (as of 28 October). 49
The intelligence chief warned of Iranian attack planning, as reported
ISW/CTP reports that the Director of National Intelligence warned on 23 October that Iran is in the "advanced stages" of planning attacks on US targets in the region. 45 The memo itself could not be fetched, so this rests on ISW/CTP's account.
Fighting spread to shipping and Saudi Arabia in October
Subtleties
Several Senate votes were on procedure, not the resolution
Eleven of the 14 Senate votes were motions to discharge a committee, and one was a motion to proceed. A yes vote on each favoured ending the war, but only the two votes on House resolutions were votes on a resolution itself. 7
Polls asked different questions
Pew asks about the President's handling and about whether force was the right decision; Gallup asks about approval of "this U.S. military action"; Quinnipiac about support for it. Gallup and Quinnipiac exclude leaners from their party groups; Pew includes them. The pollsters are shown separately for this reason. 28 30 31
Most claims about the latest events come from one side
The incident record comes from the President's letters; the reconstitution and October assessments from ISW/CTP, which is affiliated with the American Enterprise Institute; blockade figures from US Central Command. Each is labelled as such above.
About this data
What this measures. Recorded votes in Congress, the President's War Powers letters, public statements, three pollsters' surveys, and the dated record of the ceasefire and talks. It does not measure whether the war is lawful; that is a legal and constitutional question the records inform but do not settle.
As of. House and Senate votes as of 29 October 2026 (no votes after 16 and 30 September respectively). Polls run from March to early October 2026. Events run to 28 October; ISW/CTP's 29 October update was not yet published when checked.
How it compares. Earlier operations come from CRS's list (1798–2023) and its count of War Powers reports (1975–March 2017); neither has a newer edition on EveryCRSReport. The earlier votes table covers the main roll calls found on Libya (2011), Yemen (2019) and Iran (2020, 2025).
How confident to be. The vote counts and letters are primary records. The 1 May letter, the DNI memo, the NYT report and resolution 2817 are known only second-hand. Gallup gives a margin of error of ±4 points; small moves within one pollster's series may be noise.
Commonly mistaken for. "Congress voted to end the war" is true of a concurrent resolution that the President need not sign; it is not a law. Pew's 33% is approval of the President's handling, not of the war as such.
Related Data
Iran's Nuclear Programme: Stockpile, Inspections and Assessments, 2011–2026
Iran kept within the 2015 deal's uranium limit until after the US left it, then built a large stock enriched to 60%, and since the strikes the IAEA cannot say where it is. [1][9][15][50]
Total enriched stock, kg of uranium
Kilograms of uranium in Iran's enriched stock, as reported in each IAEA quarterly report, against the 2015 deal's limit of 202.8 kg. Figures were verified by inspectors to February 2021 and estimated by the IAEA after that. The last figure is the IAEA's estimate for 13 June 2025, the day Israel's strikes began; there is no later figure (as of 1 September 2026).
kg of uranium (not of UF6 gas), by date the IAEA figure describes
Kilograms of uranium in Iran's enriched stock, as reported in each IAEA quarterly report, against the 2015 deal's limit of 202.8 kg. Figures were verified by inspectors to February 2021 and estimated by the IAEA after that. The last figure is the IAEA's estimate for 13 June 2025, the day Israel's strikes began; there is no later figure (as of 1 September 2026). Read as total enriched stock, kg of uranium: kg of uranium (not of UF6 gas). Dashed segments cross 1 definitional break in the source, explained in Method Changes below this graph. 6 dated events are numbered on a strip under the graph and listed below it. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- Limit under the 2015 deal
Events marked above
US leaves the 2015 deal
President Trump announces US withdrawal from the JCPOA.
Source: Arms Control Association [9]
Stock limit exceeded
The IAEA verifies 205.0 kg, above the 202.8 kg limit.
Enrichment above 3.67% begins
The IAEA's monitors show Iran enriching above the deal's 3.67% cap.
IAEA loses monitoring data
Iran stops applying the Additional Protocol; the IAEA loses access to its monitoring data and to complementary access visits.
60% enrichment begins
Israeli strikes begin; US strikes 22 June
Attacks on Iran's nuclear facilities ran from 13 to 24 June 2025. The IAEA stopped verification and had withdrawn its inspectors by the end of June.
Vertical dashed lines mark measurement changes. See method changes.
Source: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) [50]
Observations 4
While the deal held, the stock stayed under its limit
Every IAEA report from February 2017 to May 2019 found the stock under the 2015 deal's limit and enrichment no higher than 3.67%. 17 26 In August 2018 the IAEA said it had made complementary access visits "to all the sites and locations in Iran which it needed to visit". 23
In 2016 Iran slightly exceeded the deal's cap on heavy water, a material that is not enriched uranium, and was back within the limit by December. 9
The limits were broken only after the US left the deal
The total dips when low-enriched uranium is fed into further enrichment
The total fell in four reports between 2021 and 2024. For August 2021 the IAEA gives the reason: uranium enriched to 2% was used "to produce uranium enriched up to 5%". 35 The other reports record the falls without explaining them, so a dip in this line is not, on its own, a sign that Iran slowed down.
Totals after February 2021 are IAEA estimates
From February 2021 the IAEA lost access to its monitoring data, and from May 2021 it could no longer verify the total; each later figure is its estimate from Iran's declarations and partial checks. 34 The final figure, for 13 June 2025, also rests on "the past operating records" of Iran's facilities. 50
Method Changes
2021-05-22: IAEA estimates replace verified totals
GOV/2021/28: "For this reporting period, the Agency has not been able to verify Iran's total enriched uranium stockpile", because it had lost access to its monitoring data on 23 February 2021. From this report on, each total is an IAEA estimate built from Iran's declarations and partial verification. [50]
About this data
Full published range: 2017-02-18–2025-06-13. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – The IAEA's quarterly reports under the 2015 deal began in February 2016, but the four 2016 reports state only that the stock "has not exceeded" the limit; the first published quantity is for 18 February 2017 (GOV/2017/10). The last is the estimate for 13 June 2025 in GOV/2026/50; the IAEA has published no figure for any later date, so the line stops there. To May 2019 the reports give "uranium enriched up to 3.67%", the only level Iran then held; from August 2019 they give the total at all levels. One extra point, 1 July 2019, comes from the IAEA's special report on the breach (GOV/INF/2019/8).
Total enriched stock, kg of uranium
Each point is the figure in that quarter's IAEA report (sources 17–49, 51 and the series source), in kilograms of uranium. The deal's limit of 300 kg of UF6 gas "corresponds to 202.8 kg of uranium" in the IAEA's own conversion; it is drawn flat across the whole range for reference, although Iran stopped observing it in July 2019.
Uranium enriched to 60%, kg of uranium
Kilograms of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235, in the form of UF6 gas, as estimated in each IAEA quarterly report from the first one after production began. Weapons uranium typically contains about 90%, according to the Congressional Research Service. The last figure, for 13 June 2025, is the IAEA's latest; it has published none since (as of 1 September 2026).
kg of uranium (in UF6 form), by date the IAEA figure describes
Kilograms of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235, in the form of UF6 gas, as estimated in each IAEA quarterly report from the first one after production began. Weapons uranium typically contains about 90%, according to the Congressional Research Service. The last figure, for 13 June 2025, is the IAEA's latest; it has published none since (as of 1 September 2026). Read as uranium enriched to 60%, kg of uranium: kg of uranium (in UF6 form). 1 dated event is numbered on a strip under the graph and listed below it. Use the Table switch to see every value.
Events marked above
IAEA Board finds non-compliance
The Board adopts resolution GOV/2025/38 on Iran's non-compliance with its safeguards agreement.
Source: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) [51]
Observations 3
The 60% stock more than doubled in the seven months before the strikes
Most of the last 60% figure was verified, but no one has seen it since
The IAEA's last estimate, for the day the strikes began, is 440.9 kg of 60% uranium. 50
It had verified 432.9 kg of that. 50 As of September 2026 it "cannot provide any information on the current size, composition or whereabouts" of the stock. 1
Grossi said after the June 2025 strikes that most of it, "but less than 70 percent", was in the tunnels at Isfahan, as ISIS reports him. 2 Iran's foreign minister said in March 2026 that it is "under the rubble" and Iran has "no plan" to recover it. 3
Iran is the only state without nuclear weapons making 60% uranium
Subtleties
60% is not weapons grade, but most of the work is done
Uranium for weapons typically contains about 90% U-235. 3 CRS notes that "relatively little additional effort" is needed to get there from Iran's higher-enriched stocks, which is why US estimates of the time to weapons-grade uranium were counted in days before the 2025 strikes (see the estimates table below).
About this data
Full published range: 2021-05-22–2025-06-13. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – Iran began enriching to 60% on 17 April 2021 (GOV/2021/28); the first quarterly figure is for 22 May 2021. All points are IAEA estimates. For 13 June 2025 the IAEA says it verified 432.9 kg of the 440.9 kg.
Uranium enriched to 60%, kg of uranium
Each point is the "uranium enriched up to 60% U-235" figure in that quarter's IAEA report (sources 34–49 and 51); the last is the series source above (GOV/2026/50). The small fall in February 2024 is in the IAEA's own figures.
IAEA Board of Governors votes on Iran resolutions, 2026
How the 34 voting Board members cast their votes on the two 2026 resolutions on Iran's safeguards non-compliance. The September resolution sent the matter to the UN Security Council and General Assembly.
In favour · Board members
- GOV/2026/61, 9 September 2026 (referral to the UN)23
- GOV/2026/40, 10 June 202621
Show all breakdowns
| Category | In favour | Against | Abstained | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| GOV/2026/40, 10 June 2026 | 21 | 3 | 10 | 34 |
| GOV/2026/61, 9 September 2026 (referral to the UN) | 23 | 3 | 8 | 34 |
Source: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors, via Iran Watch [13]; International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors, via Iran Watch [14]
Observations 1
The Board sent Iran's case to the UN, with three against and many abstaining
In June 2026 the Board recalled that Iran's failures "constitute non-compliance" and said the IAEA could not verify "that there has been no diversion" of material to weapons. 1 In September it asked for its resolutions to go to the UN Security Council and General Assembly. 14 Each 2026 resolution passed with three votes against and at least eight abstentions. 13 14
About this data
Each total is the sum of the vote counts the resolution itself records (21 + 3 + 10 and 23 + 3 + 8). The June 2025 non-compliance resolution (GOV/2025/38) and the November 2025 resolution (GOV/2025/71) are not charted: neither text could be fetched (both URLs returned errors), so their votes are not confirmed at source.
What inspectors could see, 2016–2026
What the IAEA could verify in Iran at each step, from the 2015 deal taking effect to its latest report.
Filled marker: major event Hollow: minor
Showing 12 of 12 events
2016
· Inspections or agreed access
Implementation Day: the 2015 deal's limits take effect
Source: Arms Control Association [10]
2018
· Inspections or agreed access
Complementary access to every site it "needed to visit"
2021
· Access lost
Iran stops applying the Additional Protocol, ending complementary access
· Access lost
No access to its monitoring data
· Access lost
Can no longer verify the total stock; figures become estimates
2025
– · Strikes · major event
Strikes on Iran's nuclear sites; verification stops and inspectors leave
· Access lost
Iranian law suspends cooperation with the IAEA
– · Inspections or agreed access
Cairo agreement on inspection procedures, then ended by Iran
2026
· Inspections or agreed access
Inspections at 7 of 13 facilities not struck in 2025, none of the 8 struck
· Strikes · major event
US and Israeli strikes; verification stops again
– · Inspections or agreed access
One inspection, at the Bushehr power plant
· Access lost
No information on the size, composition or location of the enriched stock
Sources: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) [1]; Institute for Science and International Security (David Albright, Sarah Burkhard, Spencer Faragasso, Andrea Stricker) [2]; Arms Control Association [10]; International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) [23]; International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) [34]
Observations 2
Inspectors' access narrowed in steps, long before the war
What the IAEA and US intelligence said about weapons work, 2011–2026
Official statements on whether Iran had a weapons programme, by date. They are records of what was said, not measurements.
Showing 8 of 8 events
2011
· IAEA
Weapons-relevant work "took place under a structured programme"
Before the end of 2003, and "some activities may still be ongoing".
2015
· IAEA
A "coordinated effort" before the end of 2003
It "did not advance beyond feasibility and scientific studies", with "no credible indications" of such work after 2009.
2024
· US intelligence
"Iran is not currently undertaking the key nuclear weapons-development activities necessary to produce a testable nuclear device"
As quoted by CRS.
Source: Congressional Research Service (Paul K. Kerr), via EveryCRSReport [3]
2025
· US intelligence
"Iran is not building a nuclear weapon"
Khamenei "has not reauthorized" the programme, "though pressure has probably built on him".
· IAEA
"no credible indications of an ongoing, undeclared structured nuclear programme"
Three sites were "part of an undeclared structured nuclear programme … until the early 2000s"; Iran "sanitised locations".
2026
· IAEA
No information in June 2025 on "a structured systematic … program to build or to construct a nuclear weapon"
IAEA chief Grossi, as quoted by CRS.
Source: Congressional Research Service (Paul K. Kerr), via EveryCRSReport [3]
· US intelligence
Iran was "intending to try to recover" its nuclear infrastructure
No judgment on a weapons decision.
· Agreement
"Iran reaffirms that it shall not procure or develop nuclear weapons"
US–Iran memorandum, as quoted by CRS.
Source: Congressional Research Service (Paul K. Kerr), via EveryCRSReport [3]
Sources: Congressional Research Service (Paul K. Kerr), via EveryCRSReport [3]; Office of the Director of National Intelligence [4]; Office of the Director of National Intelligence [5]; International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) [6]; International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) [7]; International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) [8]
Observations 7
The IAEA found an undeclared weapons-relevant programme that ran to the early 2000s
The IAEA's findings of 2011, 2015 and 2025 all place organised weapons-relevant work before the end of 2003. 8 7 6
The 2025 report adds that Iran used about 10 kg of undeclared uranium metal in 2002–03 and kept material from the old programme at Turquzabad until 2018. Iran also "sanitised locations". 6
Because of this, the IAEA said in May 2025 it "will not be in a position to provide assurance" that the programme is "exclusively peaceful". 6
In May 2025 the IAEA found no ongoing structured programme
Grossi: no sign of a "structured systematic" weapons programme in June 2025
In March 2026 Grossi said that in June 2025, when the first strikes came, the IAEA had no "information indicating that there was a structured systematic [Iranian] program to build or to construct a nuclear weapon". 3
US intelligence said in 2025 that Iran was not building a weapon
The March 2025 threat assessment judged that Iran "is not building a nuclear weapon" and that Khamenei had not restarted the programme halted in 2003. It added that pressure on him to do so had "probably built". 4
The 2026 assessment does not say whether Iran had decided to build one
Talks were under way in the days before the war
In June 2026 Iran signed a pledge not to make nuclear weapons
The June 2026 US–Iran memorandum states that "Iran reaffirms that it shall not procure or develop nuclear weapons". 3
How close Iran was to weapons-grade uranium or a weapon, by source and date
Published estimates, which measure different things: time to weapons-grade uranium, time to a weapon, or the size of the stock.
| As of | Estimate | What it measures | Who, and how it is known |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mar 2022 | As little as one week | Weapons-grade uranium for one weapon | State Department official (CRS) [3] |
| Before June 2025 | Three to six months | "Breakout time" (not defined) | US intelligence, "reportedly" (FDD) [12] |
| Nov 2024 | Enough for "more than a dozen" weapons if further enriched | Size of the stock, not time | ODNI report (CRS) [3] |
| May 2025 | "Probably less than one week" | Weapons-grade uranium for one weapon | Defense Intelligence Agency (CRS) [3] |
| Before June 2025 | "Within months" | A first weapon not carried by a missile | ISIS's own judgment [2] |
| Jul 2025 | About two years | Set back by the June strikes | Pentagon (FDD) [12] |
| May 2026 | 9 to 12 months | Able to build a weapon | US intelligence, per Reuters (FDD; Reuters not read) [12] |
| May 2026 | At least two and a half years | A weapon, without foreign help | FDD's own judgment [12] |
| Jun 2026 | "More than a year"; "no identifiable route" to weapons-grade uranium | A first weapon not carried by a missile | ISIS's own judgment [2] |
| Oct 2026 | "Unclear" | — | CRS [3] |
Sources: Institute for Science and International Security (David Albright, Sarah Burkhard, Spencer Faragasso, Andrea Stricker) [2]; Congressional Research Service (Paul K. Kerr), via EveryCRSReport [3]; Foundation for Defense of Democracies (Andrea Stricker) [12]
Observations 3
Before the strikes, US estimates put weapons-grade uranium days away
ISIS: for the first time in 20 years, no identifiable route
The estimates measure different things
Time to weapons-grade uranium, time to a working weapon and the size of the stock are different measures, and the table keeps them apart. Most post-strike figures are reported second-hand, through CRS or FDD; CRS concludes that "the current assessed timeline is unclear". 3
What did the strikes do to Iran's enriched uranium?
Answers from Iran, the US government, an independent institute and the IAEA, none of them independently checked.
under the rubble
Abbas Araghchi, Iran's foreign ministerHe added that Iran has "no plan" to recover it (CRS).Source: Congressional Research Service (Paul K. Kerr), via EveryCRSReport [3] it's buried and we're watching it. We know exactly what they have
Pete Hegseth, US Defense SecretarySource: Rev (transcript of a US Department of Defense briefing) [11] no identifiable route to produce weapon-grade uranium
Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS)Source: Institute for Science and International Security (David Albright, Sarah Burkhard, Spencer Faragasso, Andrea Stricker) [2] cannot provide any information on the current size, composition or whereabouts
IAEAOf the stock of enriched uranium.Source: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) [1]
Sources: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) [1]; Institute for Science and International Security (David Albright, Sarah Burkhard, Spencer Faragasso, Andrea Stricker) [2]; Congressional Research Service (Paul K. Kerr), via EveryCRSReport [3]; Rev (transcript of a US Department of Defense briefing) [11]
Observations 1
Damage claims cannot be checked against each other
The Pentagon said "nearly 80%" of Iran's nuclear industrial base was "hit", not destroyed. 11 US and Iranian officials say enrichment has not resumed, but the IAEA cannot verify whether it has. 3 1 No source read here publishes evidence that settles which claim is right; CRS notes that neither the US government nor the IAEA has described evidence of covert production. 3
About this data
On 8 April 2026 Gen. Dan Caine, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, said "nearly 80% of Iran's nuclear industrial base was hit". In 2026 US and Iranian officials also said Iran "has not resumed enriching uranium" (CRS).
About this data
What is measured. The two charts are the IAEA's own quarterly figures for Iran's enriched uranium, in kilograms of uranium. Each point names its report in the Sources. The timelines, table and quotes collect dated statements; they are records of what was said, not measurements.
Verified versus estimated. Up to February 2021 the totals were verified by inspectors. After that they are IAEA estimates built from Iran's declarations, partial checks and past operating records (see the Method Changes under the first chart).
Why the line stops in June 2025. The IAEA has published no stock figure for any date after 13 June 2025. That is a gap in the measurement, not evidence that the stock is smaller or larger.
No country comparison. The IAEA reports that no other state without nuclear weapons produces 60% uranium, so there is no comparable series to chart beside Iran's.
Single-party claims. The damage figures come from the Pentagon briefing, Iranian officials and ISIS, and none has been independently checked. ISIS and FDD are Washington think tanks; their own estimates are labelled as theirs. The Reuters report on a 9–12-month timeline is read only through FDD.
What this is commonly mistaken for. 60% uranium is not weapons-grade uranium, and an estimate of time to weapons-grade uranium is not an estimate of time to a usable weapon.
The War's Human and Financial Costs, with Earlier Wars for Scale, 2026
Every count puts Iranian deaths in the thousands by early April, though counters disagree on how many were civilians, while US deaths are far below Iraq's and official costs reach tens of billions. [1][2][3][9][11][16][23]
Wounded in action
Wounded in action, and deaths split into hostile and non-hostile, in each month since the war began, as recorded by the Defense Department's casualty database. Data extracted 28 October 2026; October is a part month.
Service members wounded in the month, by calendar month of the casualty
Wounded in action, and deaths split into hostile and non-hostile, in each month since the war began, as recorded by the Defense Department's casualty database. Data extracted 28 October 2026; October is a part month. Read as wounded in action: Service members wounded in the month. Dashed segments cross 1 definitional break in the source, explained in Method Changes below this graph. 4 dated events are numbered on a strip under the graph and listed below it. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- Wounded in action
Events marked above
Ceasefire
US strikes on Iran resume
US blockade of Iranian ports resumes
President pledges no strikes before the midterms
Source: Associated Press (via WCAX) [21]
Vertical dashed lines mark measurement changes. See method changes.
Source: US Department of Defense, Defense Casualty Analysis System [23]
Observations 1
Wounded rose with each round of fighting
Method Changes
2026-07: Casualties split into a second category
"This summer the Pentagon split deaths and injuries in the war into two separate categories: one for Operation Epic Fury and one listed as 'overseas operations,' covering casualties since July." Most casualties from July onward are recorded under Overseas Operations. [23]
Deaths, hostile and non-hostile
Service members who died in the month, by calendar month of the casualty
Wounded in action, and deaths split into hostile and non-hostile, in each month since the war began, as recorded by the Defense Department's casualty database. Data extracted 28 October 2026; October is a part month. Read as deaths, hostile and non-hostile: Service members who died in the month. Dashed segments cross 1 definitional break in the source, explained in Method Changes below this graph. 4 dated events are numbered on a strip under the graph and listed below it. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- Hostile deaths
- Non-hostile deaths
Events marked above
Ceasefire
US strikes on Iran resume
US blockade of Iranian ports resumes
President pledges no strikes before the midterms
Source: Associated Press (via WCAX) [21]
Vertical dashed lines mark measurement changes. See method changes.
Source: US Department of Defense, Defense Casualty Analysis System [23]
Observations 1
Method Changes
2026-07: Casualties split into a second category
"This summer the Pentagon split deaths and injuries in the war into two separate categories: one for Operation Epic Fury and one listed as 'overseas operations,' covering casualties since July." Most casualties from July onward are recorded under Overseas Operations. [23]
About this data
Full published range: 2026-02–2026-10. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – DCAS publishes monthly tables from February 2026 (Operation Epic Fury) and from June 2026 ("Overseas Operations"). Each value here is the sum of the two categories' published monthly values; months a category does not list count as zero. The deaths add up to the DCAS category totals (15 + 7 = 22) and the wounded to 417 + 448 = 865.
Wounded in action
Sum of the Epic Fury and Overseas Operations monthly "tot_wia" values.
Deaths, hostile and non-hostile
Hostile deaths are the monthly "tot_kia" column (killed in action and died of wounds; it sums to the 7 + 4 hostile deaths in the category tables). Non-hostile deaths are the "tot_acc" column (accidents, illness, undetermined and pending; it sums to the 8 + 3 non-hostile deaths).
Deaths in Iran from the war, by counter, early April 2026 (and the government count to 21 July)
Deaths each counter reports, split into civilians, military, and deaths it does not classify. HRANA to 7 April and Hengaw to 8 April cover the 40 days to the ceasefire; the Iranian authorities' count, relayed by WHO, runs to 21 July and is not split.
Civilian · People killed
- HRANA, to 7 April1,701
- Hengaw, to 8 April1,030
- Iranian authorities via WHO, to 21 July0
Show all breakdowns
| Category | Civilian | Military | Not classified by the counter | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| HRANA, to 7 April | 1,701 | 1,221 | 714 | 3,636 |
| Hengaw, to 8 April | 1,030 | 6,620 | 0 | 7,650 |
| Iranian authorities via WHO, to 21 July | 0 | 0 | 3,375 | 3,375 |
Source: HRANA (Human Rights Activists News Agency) [1]; Hengaw Organization for Human Rights [2]; World Health Organization [3]
Observations 3
At least 1,701 Iranian civilians were killed by early April, by HRANA's minimum count
HRANA counted 1,701 civilians killed by the April ceasefire, including at least 254 children. 1 It counts incident by incident, takes minimums, and warns of undercounting.
By Hengaw's count, most of those killed were military
About this data
HRANA publishes the three parts (1,701 civilians, 1,221 military, 714 unclassified) but no total; the 3,636 total and the 46.8% civilian share (1,701 ÷ 3,636) are our arithmetic. Hengaw publishes 7,650 killed, 1,030 civilians (13.5%) and 6,620 military, which add up. The authorities' 3,375 deaths have no civilian–military split, so all of it is shown as not classified. Each counter is a separate bar; none is merged with another. All are minimums or reported counts, not estimates of the true total.
How each count of Iranian deaths works
What each counter covers and how it counts. Only the first two separate civilians, and their counts stop at the April ceasefire.
| Counter | Covers | Deaths | Civilians | Method |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| HRANA | 28 Feb – 7 Apr | civilian, military and unclassified listed separately | 1,701 [1] | Incident by incident, minimum values; excludes state-media totals |
| Hengaw | 28 Feb – 8 Apr | 7,650 [2] | 1,030 [2] | Not published |
| Iranian authorities (via WHO) | 28 Feb – 21 Jul | 3,375 [3] | Not split | Reported by national authorities; WHO does not count |
| Iranian Red Crescent (via UN mission) | 28 Feb – 3 Mar | 787 [7] | Not split | Single statement |
| Airwars | 40-day war; June onward | Incidents, not deaths [5] | — | Tracks and publishes civilian-harm incidents |
Sources: HRANA (Human Rights Activists News Agency) [1]; Hengaw Organization for Human Rights [2]; World Health Organization [3]; Airwars [5]; UN Human Rights Council [7]
Observations 2
No count covers the fighting after April except the government's
HRANA's and Hengaw's counts end at the April ceasefire. 1 2 After that, only the authorities' totals and Airwars' incident tallies exist. 3 5
Airwars tracked 267 civilian-harm incidents before the ceasefire and 34 more after strikes resumed in June. 5 WHO notes the authorities have yet to publish cumulative figures. 3
Other reports reuse HRANA's figures
Airwars' one-month report of at least 1,443 civilians killed is HRANA's count, not a separate one. 6
People displaced inside Iran, against its population, as of 21 July 2026
WHO's estimate of people displaced in Iran, and the deaths reported by the Iranian authorities, each shown as a share of Iran's 2025 population (World Bank).
People
- Displaced (WHO estimate)3,200,000 · 3.5%
- Deaths reported by the authorities3,375 · 0%
- Population of Iran, 202592,417,681 · 100%
Source: World Health Organization [3]; World Bank [4]
About this data
WHO labels its displacement figure an estimate ("All numbers are estimates"). The share is our arithmetic: 3,200,000 ÷ 92,417,681 = 3.5%. The population is the World Bank's 2025 figure (WDI SP.POP.TOTL, last updated 8 October 2026). Population is shown as the 100% reference bar.
Estimates of what the war has cost the US military, by estimator and date, April–October 2026
Each published estimate of the war's cost to the Defense Department, in the order of the date it runs to. Values are in billions of US dollars, not adjusted for inflation.
US$ billions
- AEI, to 8 Apr (low end)25
- AEI, to 8 Apr (high end)35
- Pentagon, testimony 29 Apr25
- CSIS, 23 Jun (range 34–42)40
- DoD Inspector General, through June33.4
- CBO, to 1 Aug38
- Pentagon to Congress, to 3 Sep43.6
- Hegseth, July projection to end of Sep37.5
- Pentagon to Congress, reported by AP 29 Oct47.1
Source: Roll Call [9]; NPR (via KASU) [10]; Congressional Budget Office [11]; Center for Strategic and International Studies [12]; American Enterprise Institute [13]; Associated Press (via WCAX) [22]
Observations 2
Official estimates have risen from $25 billion to over $40 billion
About this data
Values are US$ billions (the chart's "count" unit is used because the chart has no dollar unit). AEI published a range ($25–35 bn), shown as its two ends; CSIS's central estimate is shown, with its $34–42 bn range in the label. Roll Call reports CBO's figure as $38.1 bn "through July"; CBO's letter says "approximately $38 billion" as of 1 August. Hegseth's $37.5 bn was a projection to the end of September made in July. AP's $47.1 bn is "the latest estimate the Pentagon has provided to Congress", reported 29 October; AP does not give the date it runs to. Estimators count different things (CBO and DoD include replacing munitions and equipment), so the bars are not one series.
US military deaths: the Iran war (to 28 October 2026) and the Iraq and Afghanistan operations
Total US service member deaths, hostile and non-hostile, in each operation as recorded by the Defense Department.
US service members killed
- Iran war, Feb–Oct 202622
- Operation New Dawn (Iraq, 2010–11)74
- Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan)2,349
- Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003–10)4,418
Source: Congressional Research Service [16]; US Department of Defense, Defense Casualty Analysis System [23]
Observations 1
About this data
Iran war: DCAS, Operation Epic Fury plus Overseas Operations (15 + 7), extracted 28 October 2026, of which 11 hostile and 11 non-hostile. Earlier operations: CRS RL32492 as of 16 July 2020 (OIF 3,481 hostile and 937 non-hostile). The Iran war has lasted eight months; OIF ran 2003–2010, OEF 2001–2014 and New Dawn 2010–2011, so this compares totals, not rates.
War costs for scale: the Iran war against Iraq and Afghanistan appropriations
The latest Defense Department estimate of the Iran war's cost, beside what Congress appropriated for the Iraq and Afghanistan operations over FY2001–2014. Billions of US dollars, not adjusted for inflation.
US$ billions
- Iran war, Pentagon to 3 Sep 202643.6
- Iran war, Pentagon as reported 29 Oct 202647.1
- Afghanistan and other counterterror (OEF), FY2001–14686
- Iraq (OIF and New Dawn), FY2001–14815
Source: Roll Call [9]; Congressional Research Service [17]; Associated Press (via WCAX) [22]
About this data
Values are US$ billions in the dollars of each year. Iraq is OIF plus New Dawn; Afghanistan is OEF "for Afghanistan and other counterterror operations" (CRS RL33110). The $1.6 trillion often quoted is all post-9/11 operations together, not Iraq alone. The Iran figures are cost estimates; the Iraq and Afghanistan figures are appropriations.
The Iraq war: early cost estimates against what Congress appropriated
The upper end of each total-cost estimate for the Iraq war, with the date it was made, beside the appropriations for Iraq through FY2014. Billions of US dollars.
US$ billions
- Daniels (White House budget office), 200260
- Lindsey (White House economic adviser), Sep 2002200
- Brookings, Aug 2003 (after the invasion)300
- Appropriated for Iraq, FY2001–14815
Source: Congressional Research Service [17]; Council on Foreign Relations [18]
Observations 1
Iraq cost far more than the White House forecast
About this data
Values are US$ billions. Each estimate is shown at its upper end (Daniels $50–60 bn; Lindsey $100–200 bn; Brookings $150–300 bn), which is the most generous reading of the estimates. Brookings' estimate was made in August 2003, five months after the invasion, so it is not a prewar estimate. The CFR task force's March 2003 figure ($20 bn a year "for several years") is a yearly rate, not a total, so it is not charted.
US interceptor stocks, CSIS estimates
CSIS's estimates of US inventories on 27 July 2026, built from budget documents, not Pentagon figures.
- Patriot interceptors
- fewer than 1,000
- THAAD interceptors
- about 250
Source: Center for Strategic and International Studies [14]
Observations 1
CSIS estimates interceptor stocks have been drawn down
About this data
What this measures. Deaths, injuries and displacement in Iran, US military casualties, and estimates of the war's cost to the Defense Department, as of late October 2026. Each figure carries the date it runs to: Iranian independent counts stop in April, costs run to September or later, US casualties to 28 October.
What it does not measure. Deaths in Israel, Iraq, Lebanon and the Gulf states, costs to the wider US economy (see oil, shipping and prices), and Iran's own costs.
US casualty data. DCAS publishes its tables through a JSON interface behind its web app; the series sums its two categories. The July split means a month's casualties appear in one category or the other, so neither category alone is a complete record.
How confident to be. The independent Iranian counts are minimums from organisations working without access to the country. The government count has no split and is relayed by WHO without checking. Cost estimates differ in what they include; none is an audited figure.
Commonly mistaken for. The $1.6 trillion figure for "the Iraq war" is all post-9/11 operations; Iraq's share was $815 billion. 17 The Brookings estimate of $150–300 billion is often called prewar, but was made in August 2003. 18
Oil, Shipping and Prices, 1974–2026
Oil and US petrol prices jumped after the war began, though real crude stayed below earlier peaks, and tracked traffic through Hormuz has stayed far below normal amid attacks on shipping and a US blockade. [1][3][10][13][23][25]
Brent, US$ a barrel
Monthly average of the daily Brent spot price, in US dollars a barrel, not adjusted for inflation, over the whole period EIA publishes. Daily values to 27 October 2026 are given in the observations.
US$ a barrel (nominal), by month
Monthly average of the daily Brent spot price, in US dollars a barrel, not adjusted for inflation, over the whole period EIA publishes. Daily values to 27 October 2026 are given in the observations. Read as brent, US$ a barrel: US$ a barrel (nominal). 6 dated events are numbered on a strip under the graph and listed below it. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- Brent spot, monthly average
Events marked above
US and Israeli strikes on Iran begin
Ceasefire
US blockade of Iranian ports begins
US–Iran memorandum signed
US blockade resumes
US strikes on Iran, including oil tankers
Source: US Energy Information Administration [21]
Observations 2
Brent nearly doubled by the April peak and rose again in the autumn
About this data
Full published range: 1987-05–2026-09. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – EIA's monthly Brent series starts in May 1987, when its daily series starts (20 May 1987), and the latest complete month is September 2026 (release of 28 October 2026). The monthly series is used because the daily one has more than 9,100 values. October 2026 daily values are in source 1.
Brent, US$ a barrel
Every value is copied from EIA's monthly table (source above), in US dollars a barrel; the chart's "count" unit is used because there is no dollar unit.
WTI, US$ a barrel
Monthly average of the daily West Texas Intermediate spot price at Cushing, Oklahoma, in US dollars a barrel, not adjusted for inflation, over the whole period EIA publishes.
US$ a barrel (nominal), by month
Monthly average of the daily West Texas Intermediate spot price at Cushing, Oklahoma, in US dollars a barrel, not adjusted for inflation, over the whole period EIA publishes. Read as WTI, US$ a barrel: US$ a barrel (nominal). 6 dated events are numbered on a strip under the graph and listed below it. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- WTI spot, monthly average
Events marked above
US and Israeli strikes on Iran begin
Ceasefire
US blockade of Iranian ports begins
US–Iran memorandum signed
US blockade resumes
US strikes on Iran, including oil tankers
Source: US Energy Information Administration [22]
Observations 1
US crude rose less than Brent
WTI, the US benchmark, went from $66.96 before the strikes to $114.58 at its April peak. 2 In proportion, its rise was smaller than Brent's.
About this data
Full published range: 1986-01–2026-09. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – EIA's WTI series starts in January 1986, a year before Brent's, so the two are separate charts. Latest complete month September 2026.
WTI, US$ a barrel
Every value is copied from EIA's monthly table (source above), in US dollars a barrel.
Imported crude, October 2026 US$ a barrel
The average price US refiners paid for imported crude oil each month, adjusted to October 2026 dollars with the consumer price index, over the whole historical period EIA publishes.
US$ a barrel (Oct 2026 dollars), by month
The average price US refiners paid for imported crude oil each month, adjusted to October 2026 dollars with the consumer price index, over the whole historical period EIA publishes. Read as imported crude, October 2026 US$ a barrel: US$ a barrel (Oct 2026 dollars). 1 dated event is numbered on a strip under the graph and listed below it. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- Real imported crude price
Events marked above
US and Israeli strikes on Iran begin
Source: US Energy Information Administration [23]
Observations 1
Adjusted for inflation, crude stayed below the 1981, 2008 and 2022 peaks
In October 2026 dollars, the refiner price of imported crude peaked at $98.85 in May 2026 (chart). 23
That is well below January 1981, July 2008 and June 2022 in the same series, and above the 1974 and 1990 levels. 23 EIA's estimates for September and October 2026 are close to May's, so the autumn may set a slightly higher 2026 peak.
About this data
Full published range: 1974-01–2026-08. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – EIA's real-price file starts in January 1974. Its values from September 2026 onward are estimates and forecasts ("Forecast / estimated values shown in blue"), so they are left out: the series stops at the last historical month, August 2026. This is the refiner imported crude cost, not Brent.
Imported crude, October 2026 US$ a barrel
Every value is column "Real" of the sheet, rounded to the cent; rows whose "Forecast Values" flag is 1 (September 2026 onward) are excluded. Peaks: January 1981 $148.55, July 2008 $194.52, June 2022 $126.68, May 2026 $98.85. Left out: the September 2026 estimate ($97.89) and October forecast ($100.00).
Regular gasoline, US$ a gallon
Average US retail price of regular gasoline, all formulations, in dollars a gallon including taxes, not adjusted for inflation. Weekly values are given in the observations.
US$ a gallon (nominal), by month
Average US retail price of regular gasoline, all formulations, in dollars a gallon including taxes, not adjusted for inflation. Weekly values are given in the observations. Read as regular gasoline, US$ a gallon: US$ a gallon (nominal). 7 dated events are numbered on a strip under the graph and listed below it. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- US regular gasoline, monthly average
Events marked above
US and Israeli strikes on Iran begin
Ceasefire
US blockade of Iranian ports begins
US–Iran memorandum signed
US blockade resumes
US strikes on Iran, including oil tankers
President pledges no strikes before the midterms
Source: Associated Press (via WCAX) [20]
About this data
Full published range: 1990-09–2026-10. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – EIA's monthly series starts in September 1990 (its weekly series on 20 August 1990); EIA marks December 1990 and January 1991 "NA", so those months are blank. October 2026 is EIA's published average of the October weeks to 26 October.
Regular gasoline, US$ a gallon
Every value is copied from EIA's monthly table (source above), in dollars a gallon.
US consumer prices, change over the 12 months to September 2026
Percentage change in the consumer price index over the year to September 2026, for all items, for all items less food and energy, for energy and for gasoline (BLS).
% change on a year earlier
- All items3.7%
- All items less food and energy2.6%
- Energy20.4%
- Gasoline34.2%
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics [4]
Observations 2
Gasoline prices drove most of the rise in inflation
BLS reports gasoline up 34.2 percent over the year to September, accounting for most of the energy index's rise. 4 Prices excluding food and energy rose far less (chart).
CBO attributes about half a point of extra inflation to the war
About this data
September 2026 is the latest month published; October CPI is due in mid-November. BLS does not say what caused the rise.
Ships a day, monthly average
Average number of ships a day recorded passing through the strait by satellite ship tracking (AIS), all vessel types and tankers, as published by IMF PortWatch. October 2026 runs to 25 October.
Ships a day, by month
Average number of ships a day recorded passing through the strait by satellite ship tracking (AIS), all vessel types and tankers, as published by IMF PortWatch. October 2026 runs to 25 October. Read as ships a day, monthly average: Ships a day. Dashed segments cross 1 definitional break in the source, explained in Method Changes below this graph. 7 dated events are numbered on a strip under the graph and listed below it. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- Tankers
Events marked above
US and Israeli strikes on Iran begin
Ceasefire
US blockade of Iranian ports begins
US–Iran memorandum signed
US blockade resumes
US strikes on Iran, including oil tankers
President pledges no strikes before the midterms
Source: Associated Press (via WCAX) [20]
Vertical dashed lines mark measurement changes. See method changes.
Source: IMF PortWatch [25]
Observations 3
Tracked traffic through Hormuz fell to almost nothing within days
The June reopening was brief
Other sources report much more traffic than the tracking counts
CENTCOM says more than 3,000 vessels passed through with US support in six months, and that Gulf partners exported more than 1.5 billion barrels since summer. 12 Kpler, via the Washington Post, reports Gulf exports approaching prewar daily averages. 13
EIA warns that ship-tracking signals in the strait have been "especially unreliable" since February. 26 Recorded transits are therefore a floor, and the true level is unsettled.
Method Changes
2026-03: Tracking signals unreliable
EIA: "Since the end of February 2026, AIS signal data for ships transiting the Strait of Hormuz have become especially unreliable." PortWatch counts are built from the same AIS signals. [25]
About this data
Full published range: 2019-01–2026-10. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – PortWatch publishes daily counts from 1 January 2019; the latest value queried on 29 October 2026 is for 25 October. Each point is our average of PortWatch's daily "n_total" (all ships) or "n_tanker" values for the month, not a figure PortWatch publishes. Since late February 2026, ship tracking in the strait has been unreliable (see the EIA flows chart), so these counts are likely to miss ships sailing with transponders off.
Ships a day, monthly average
Our monthly means of PortWatch daily counts (all days of each month that PortWatch publishes).
Oil, million barrels a day
EIA's estimates of crude oil, condensate and petroleum products, and of liquefied natural gas, moved through the strait each quarter, based on Vortexa tanker tracking.
Million barrels a day, by quarter
EIA's estimates of crude oil, condensate and petroleum products, and of liquefied natural gas, moved through the strait each quarter, based on Vortexa tanker tracking. Read as oil, million barrels a day: Million barrels a day. 1 dated event is numbered on a strip under the graph and listed below it. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- Total oil flows
Events marked above
US and Israeli strikes on Iran begin
Source: US Energy Information Administration [26]
Observations 1
Oil through the strait fell by more than three-quarters by the second quarter
LNG, billion cubic feet a day
Billion cubic feet a day, by quarter
EIA's estimates of crude oil, condensate and petroleum products, and of liquefied natural gas, moved through the strait each quarter, based on Vortexa tanker tracking. Read as LNG, billion cubic feet a day: Billion cubic feet a day. 1 dated event is numbered on a strip under the graph and listed below it. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- LNG flows
Events marked above
US and Israeli strikes on Iran begin
About this data
Full published range: 2025-02–2026-05. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – EIA's table covers 1Q25 to 2Q26 only (release of 12 August 2026; the October STEO did not update it). Each quarter is plotted at its middle month (February for 1Q, and so on). EIA says 2026 tracking data "are being revised frequently".
Traffic through every PortWatch chokepoint in September 2026, as a share of its 2025 average
Average ships a day in September 2026 divided by the average for 2025, for each of the 28 chokepoints IMF PortWatch tracks. 100% means traffic as usual.
% of 2025 daily average
- Bering Strait399%
- Mindoro Strait159%
- Magellan Strait153%
- Luzon Strait140%
- Makassar Strait118%
- Tsugaru Strait118%
- Mona Passage109%
- Lombok Strait106%
- Yucatan Channel106%
- Suez Canal105%
- Balabac Strait103%
- Sunda Strait103%
- Korea Strait100%
- Gibraltar Strait98%
- Taiwan Strait97%
- Cape of Good Hope96%
- Dover Strait96%
- Malacca Strait94%
- Windward Passage92%
- Bohai Strait91%
- Ombai Strait90%
- Panama Canal90%
- Torres Strait89%
- Oresund Strait81%
- Bab el-Mandeb Strait79%
- Bosporus Strait55%
- Strait of Hormuz4%
- Kerch Strait0%
Source: IMF PortWatch [25]
Observations 1
Hormuz is the outlier among the world's chokepoints
In September, most of the 28 chokepoints PortWatch tracks were close to their 2025 traffic (chart). 25 Only the Kerch Strait, near zero, ran lower than Hormuz.
About this data
Our arithmetic from PortWatch's daily "n_total" counts: the mean of September 2026's 30 days divided by the mean of 2025's 365 days. The full set of chokepoints is shown, in descending order. Small chokepoints swing widely: the Bering Strait averaged about one ship a day in 2025.
Iran's oil exports, March–May 2026 (Vortexa, via Reuters)
Average barrels a day of Iranian oil exports in each month, from the tanker tracker Vortexa as reported by Reuters on 4 June 2026. The US blockade of Iranian ports began on 13 April.
Million barrels a day
- March 20261.9
- April 2026 (blockade from 13 April)1.34
- May 20260.21
Source: Reuters (via Baird Maritime) [14]
Observations 1
Iran's exports collapsed after the first blockade began
About this data
Million barrels a day. March is Reuters' "nearly 1.9 million"; May is 209,000 barrels a day (0.209 million). Vortexa's data are proprietary, so no longer series could be checked; no figure after May was confirmed at source.
The US blockade in CENTCOM's own figures
Single-party claims from US Central Command, as worded in each release.
| Release | Period | Redirected or turned around | Disabled | Destroyed |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 20 May 2026 (caption) [9] | First blockade, from 13 April | 91 ships | — | — |
| 5 Oct 2026 [10] | Since 14 July | 130 vessels | 3 ships | 13 commercial vessels, "over the past 12 weeks" |
| 10 Oct 2026 [11] | Since 14 July | 135 ships | 4 vessels | 10 tankers linked to the IRGC |
Sources: US Central Command [9]; US Central Command [10]; US Central Command [11]; US Central Command [12]
Observations 3
CENTCOM reports enforcing the blockade by force
US forces are also destroying ships
CENTCOM's early-October releases say US forces destroyed 13 commercial vessels in one, and 10 IRGC-linked tankers in the other. 10 11
The two releases use different categories, and CENTCOM does not explain the difference. The 1 September War Powers letter reported strikes on Iranian state oil tankers. 19
Attacks on shipping continued in October
Officials told Bloomberg of 23 recorded attacks on vessels in or near Hormuz in the first two weeks of October, at least five hitting engine rooms. 13 The report, relayed by ISW/CTP, does not say who carried out each attack.
About this data
A release of 25 October 2026 adds that more than 3,000 vessels transited with US support over the "last six months", and that "over 95%" of ships passed safely.
The 1980s Tanker War
The last Gulf shipping war disrupted far less traffic
The Strauss Center says the 1980s Tanker War "failed to disrupt more than two percent of ships" in the Gulf even at its height, and real oil prices fell through the decade. 15
Tracked Hormuz traffic in 2026 has fallen much further than that (Hormuz chart). 25
About this data
What this measures. Crude oil spot prices (Brent, the world benchmark, and WTI, the US one), the real price US refiners paid for imported crude, US retail petrol, consumer prices, and ships and oil passing through the Strait of Hormuz, as of late October 2026.
Frequency. The price charts use EIA's monthly averages over each full published range, because the daily and weekly series have thousands of points. Daily and weekly values are quoted in the observations.
How confident to be. Prices are measured, not estimated. Hormuz counts and flows rest on ship tracking that EIA calls unreliable since February, and CENTCOM's tallies are claims by one side in the war.
Causes. A price rising after an event does not show the event caused all of it. CBO is the only source here that attributes inflation to the war. 5
Commonly mistaken for. A record in money terms is not a record in real terms: adjusted for inflation, 2026's crude prices were below several earlier peaks. 23 For the war's cost to the US government, see the war's human and financial costs.
Outside Attempts to Topple, Coerce or Disarm Hostile Regimes, 1816–2023
Results depend on how success is defined, but imposed regime change was more often followed by civil war than democracy, strikes modestly delayed nuclear programmes, and sanctions or bombing succeeded about a third of the time. [1][3][8][11][13][16]
The 31 states that explored nuclear weapons, by how far they went, 1939–2017
Every state Bleek codes as having at least explored a nuclear weapons programme, by the furthest stage reached and where it stood in 2017. Iran is the one state coded as still pursuing a weapon.
States
- Explored, then stopped without launching a programme14 · 45.2%
- Acquired weapons and kept them9 · 29%
- Launched a programme, stopped without a weapon6 · 19.4%
- Launched a programme, still pursuing (Iran)1 · 3.2%
- Acquired weapons, then gave them up (South Africa)1 · 3.2%
Source: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School [10]
Observations 6
Ten states built nuclear weapons in about 70 years; most that tried stopped
Iraq's programme ended after a war and years of intensive inspection
Syria stopped pursuing a weapon after Israel's 2007 strike, but is still coded as exploring
After Israel destroyed the Al-Kibar reactor in 2007, Syria "returned to exploring". Bleek finds no public evidence of a decision either to continue or to stop. 10
Libya gave up its programme in 2003 and accepted inspections
Osirak: did the strike delay Iraq or start its bomb programme?
Braut-Hegghammer finds the 1981 strike "triggered a covert nuclear weapons program that did not previously exist", and Bleek follows her in dating Iraq's pursuit from 1981. 9 10
Other datasets disagree: Jo and Gartzke date Iraq's pursuit from 1973, and Bleek grants that the earlier work could "reasonably" be coded as pursuit. 10 Which coding is right decides whether Osirak counts as a strike that started a programme or one that hit a programme already under way.
Bleek codes Iran as pursuing a weapon since 1989, with two alternative codings
Bleek codes Iran's pursuit as open-ended from 1989, but adds that one could "reasonably" code Iran as dropping back to exploration after 2003 or in 2015, when it accepted the nuclear deal's limits. 10
About this data
Bleek's own breakdown: of 31 states that explored, fourteen halted exploration, seven launched programmes but have not acquired weapons, and ten acquired weapons, one of which (South Africa) gave them up. The "kept them" bar is ten minus South Africa; the "stopped" bar is seven minus Iran, whose pursuit Bleek codes as open-ended from 1989. Stopped programmes: Yugoslavia, South Korea, Libya, Brazil, Iraq and Syria (Syria's pursuit ended in 2007 but Bleek still codes it as exploring). Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Belarus, which inherited Soviet weapons, are not in Bleek's table. Coding as of June 2017.
How often sanctions succeed under three definitions (TIES dataset, 1945–2005)
Share of the 1,412 threatened or imposed sanctions cases counted as successes in the TIES dataset, under each of its three definitions of success, for all cases and for the 1,024 cases with a known outcome.
% of cases counted as a success
- Strict: target gives in fully or partly (all cases)27.2%
- Strict (cases with a known outcome)37.5%
- Coders' settlement scores (all cases)32.2%
- Coders' settlement scores (known outcome)44%
- Relaxed: adds negotiated settlements (all cases)40.8%
- Relaxed (known outcome)56%
Source: White Rose Research Online (University of Leeds) [13]
Observations 3
How often sanctions work depends on what counts as success
In the TIES data, the success rate roughly doubles between the strictest count over all cases and the relaxed count over cases with a known outcome. 13 Counting negotiated settlements as success, as the relaxed definition does, means the sender also gave something up. 13
Hufbauer and colleagues count a success when sanctions "contributed significantly" to the goal, and find one in "about one-third" of 204 cases. 11 Pape argued that sanctions must have caused the result, not merely contributed; his stricter count was not read here. 12
Sanctions do worse against enemies and autocrats
Hufbauer and colleagues find sanctions more likely to work when targets are "friendly or democratic countries, rather than enemies, autocrats". 11 For Iran and North Korea they judged "destabilization of either existing regime unlikely", and found "carrots plus sticks" more effective than sticks alone. 11
A newer dataset gives a wider range, without a stated definition
About this data
From the authors' Table 1 and text. TIES includes trade disputes (672 of the 1,412 cases are trade-only) and threats that were never carried out (567 cases); the US is the primary sender in a bit over 48% of cases. The table prints the relaxed known-outcome rate as 56.3%; the text says 56%. A slice for security goals against US adversaries alone would need the case file, which was not downloaded.
Air-power coercion attempts, 1917–1999, by outcome
All 53 attempts Horowitz and Reiter identify to coerce a state with air power, counted as a success when the target changed its behaviour as demanded.
Attempts
- Succeeded19 · 35.8%
- Failed34 · 64.2%
Source: IDEAS/RePEc [16]; Reason (Ronald Bailey) [17]
Observations 2
About a third of air-power coercion attempts succeeded
Demanding a change of leader made bombing less likely to work
"Success is less likely when the attacker demands the target change its leadership." The target's regime type made no difference. 16
About this data
Counts as quoted from the article by Reason; the article itself is paywalled. Reason's summary of the success definition is "when a target changes its behavior as demanded without being attacked".
Studies of outside attempts to change governments, with how each defines success
Three studies of regime change imposed from outside, openly or covertly.
| Study | Cases and years | What counts as success, or the outcome measured | Main finding |
|---|---|---|---|
| Downes, Catastrophic Success (2021) | 120 imposed regime changes, 1816–2008 | No success score; outcomes are civil war within ten years, violent removal of the installed leader, later disputes, UN voting | Civil war risk "more than doubles"; four and a half times for leadership change [1] |
| Downes & Monten (2013) | 70 twentieth-century cases (107 in the dataset, 1816–2003) | The target becomes a democracy | Only where development, homogeneity and representative experience were favourable [3] [4] |
| O'Rourke, Covert Regime Change | 64 covert US attempts, 1947–89 | The US-backed side takes power | "Unsuccessful more than 60 percent of the time" [5] [6] |
Sources: H-Diplo/RJISSF (reviewers' summaries, with page numbers in Downes's book) [1]; Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School [3]; H-Diplo/ISSF (review by Mark Peceny) [4]; Boston College News [5]; War on the Rocks [6]
Observations 5
Imposed regime change more than doubles the risk of civil war
In Downes's data a third of imposed regime changes were followed by civil war within a decade. Imposing a new government "more than doubles" the likelihood, and replacing only the leader makes civil war "four and a half times more likely". 1
Nearly half of installed leaders were later forcibly removed, and about two-thirds of those installed by leadership change. 1 One reviewer notes the base rate of civil war is low, so even a doubled risk might look acceptable to an intervener. 1
Restoring an ousted ruler has done best
Downes finds that regime changes restoring a previously ousted ruler "tend to have best outcomes". 1
Regime change has not made targets friendlier
Democracy has followed only where conditions already favoured it
Most covert US attempts to change governments failed
Kreps and Fuhrmann studied 16 attacks on nuclear facilities, 1942–2007, measuring delay to the target's programme.
There is evidence that the peacetime attacks delayed the target's nuclear program, although the size of this effect is rather modest.
Observations 2
Strikes on nuclear sites have delayed programmes modestly
The same authors say past-success conditions are absent for Iran
Writing in 2011, Kreps and Fuhrmann concluded that "many of the conditions that were conducive to past success are not present in the contemporary Iran case". 8
Studies of pressure on nuclear programmes and of ceasefires
What sanctions, rewards and ceasefire terms have achieved, with how each study defines success.
| Study | Cases and years | What counts as success, or the outcome measured | Main finding |
|---|---|---|---|
| Miller, Stopping the Bomb (2018) | 22 US sanctions episodes after a programme had started | The programme stopped | Three of 22; the threat of sanctions deterred others from starting [18] |
| Mehta, Delaying Doomsday | All proliferators, plus case studies of India, Iran and North Korea | Nuclear reversal | Threats plus face-saving rewards, with force "on the table" [19] |
| Fortna, Peace Time (2004) | Ceasefires between states (number not on the page read) | Peace lasts | "Strong agreements markedly lessen the risk of further war" [24] |
Sources: H-Diplo/ISSF [18]; Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Center for Global Security Research [19]; Princeton University Press [24]
Observations 3
Sanctions stopped three of 22 programmes already under way, and deterred others from starting
In Miller's data, once a programme had started, US sanctions succeeded "in only three of 22 cases". 18 His reviewer Fuhrmann adds that "we cannot infer much" from those cases alone: counting states deterred from starting a programme gives "a much more sanguine picture". 18
Threats worked when "credible" and when the state was "highly dependent on the United States". 18
Threats plus face-saving rewards make reversal most likely
Mehta finds reversal "most likely" when states face sanctions and are offered "face-saving rewards", especially with force "on the table". The summary read gives no figures. 19
Strong ceasefire agreements last longer
Fortna finds that "strong agreements markedly lessen the risk of further war", naming demilitarised zones, dispute commissions, peacekeeping and outside guarantees. 24
Does backing down cost credibility?
Two answers from the research, reached by different methods.
were still taken seriously in the future
PressCalculating Credibility (2006 per Dartmouth), three 20th-century cases, on leaders who backed downSource: Dartmouth News [20] past action is closely connected to subsequent dispute initiation
Weisiger & Yarhi-MiloRevisiting Reputation, dispute dataSource: Princeton University [21]
Sources: Dartmouth News [20]; Princeton University [21]
Observations 1
The research on credibility is split
Press expected backing down to hurt credibility and found that leaders who did were "still taken seriously in the future". 20 Weisiger and Yarhi-Milo find that past action is "closely connected" to later challenges, and that judging credibility by current power and interests alone "is misleading". 21
Would an Iranian bomb set off others?
A leader's pledge beside what researchers found about past fears.
if Iran developed a nuclear bomb, we will follow suit as soon as possible
Mohammed bin Salman, Saudi Crown PrinceCBS, via Al JazeeraSource: Al Jazeera [22] past predictions of rapid proliferation failed to materialize
Potter & MukhatzhanovaReviewing two booksSource: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School [23] Thirty-one countries at least opened the door to potential nuclear weapons programs, seventeen of those launched weapons programs, and ten acquired deliverable nuclear weapons.
BleekSource: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School [10]
Sources: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School [10]; Al Jazeera [22]; Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School [23]
Observations 2
Saudi Arabia's crown prince said it would follow an Iranian bomb
In 2018 Mohammed bin Salman said Saudi Arabia did not want a bomb, "but without a doubt, if Iran developed a nuclear bomb, we will follow suit as soon as possible". 22
The other studies, with how each defines success
A success rate under one definition is not comparable with another.
| Study | Cases and years | What counts as success, or the outcome measured | Main finding |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bleek (2017) | 31 states, 1939–2017 | Stage reached: explore, pursue, acquire | Ten acquired; reversals are dated but their causes are not coded [10] |
| Hufbauer, Schott, Elliott & Oegg, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 3rd edition | 204 sanctions episodes, WWI–2000 | Sanctions "contributed significantly" to partial or full success | "About one-third" [11] |
| TIES (Morgan, Bapat & Kobayashi, 2014) | 1,412 threatened or imposed sanctions, 1945–2005 | Three definitions (see chart) | 27.2% to 56% [13] |
| Global Sanctions Data Base (2024) | 1,547 imposed sanctions, 1950–2023 | Per objective: total, partial, negotiated, failure, ongoing | "30 to 50 percent" (2021 announcement, definition not stated) [14] [15] |
| Horowitz & Reiter (2001) | 53 air-power coercion attempts, 1917–1999 | Target complies as demanded | 19 of 53 [16] [17] |
Sources: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School [10]; Peterson Institute for International Economics (Hufbauer, Schott, Elliott and Oegg) [11]; White Rose Research Online (University of Leeds) [13]; Austrian Institute of Economic Research (WIFO) [14]; Drexel University LeBow College of Business [15]; IDEAS/RePEc [16]; Reason (Ronald Bailey) [17]
Subtleties
None of these studies measures containment
Every study here measures an attempt to topple, coerce or disarm. No systematic study of holding a hostile state in check over years, with a success rate of its own, was found (see Data still needed).
The datasets were not built on a case like Iran
About this data
What is measured. Each study counts a different kind of attempt (imposed regime change, covert operations, strikes on nuclear sites, sanctions, air coercion) over a different period, with its own definition of success. The tables above keep each figure next to its definition.
Why there is no time series. The studies publish pooled results over long periods, not rates by year.
How the figures were read. Several books and articles are paywalled. Their figures are taken from abstracts, publishers' summaries and named reviewers, each labelled in the Sources. Downes's figures are reviewers' summaries with page numbers in his book.
What this is commonly mistaken for. A success rate under one definition is not comparable with another's. A third of sanctions cases "succeeding" under a contributed-to test is not a third succeeding because of sanctions.
Data still needed
- The text of the 1 May 2026 War Powers letter declaring that hostilities "have terminated"It is known only through quotation by Lawfare and Jack Goldsmith; govinfo has no copy. The full text would show how the letter treated the blockade then running.
- The full text of the June 2026 US–Iran memorandum of understandingOnly two clauses are quoted (the no-weapons pledge, via CRS, and safe passage, via the President's letter). Without the rest, its verification and enrichment terms cannot be set beside the 2015 deal's.
- Security Council resolution 2817 (11 March 2026): text and recorded voteReported as condemning Iran's attacks on Gulf states and silent on the US and Israeli strikes, but UN sites refused automated fetches. It decides what the UN record says about the war's legality.
- The 23 October 2026 memo from the Director of National IntelligenceKnown only through ISW/CTP's quotation; DocumentCloud blocked the fetch. The "advanced stages" warning is a single-party claim until the memo can be read.
- An Iranian or independent dated record of incidents during the April–July ceasefireThe incident record here comes from the President's War Powers letters and ISW/CTP. A record from the other side or a neutral monitor is needed to judge who fired first in each exchange.
- A dataset of US uses of force coded by congressional authorisation, with duration and scaleCRS counts hundreds of instances but does not code them by authorisation, length or size, so whether unauthorised wars run longer or larger cannot be tested.
- Polls after the 8 October pledge, with independents reported separately, from a repeated questionPew reports no independents; Gallup and Quinnipiac each asked once. A repeated question would show whether opposition among independents and Republican support have moved since June.
- Senate roll call 207 (23 July 2026) member record, and any votes after Congress returns from the midterm recessVote 207 has no archived member file, so its party split is missing; the vote series stops at 24 September.
Sources
Decisions, Law and Diplomacy: Congress, the President, Ceasefires and Negotiations, 2024–2026
- Roll Call 85, H.Con.Res.38, 5 March 2026 (XML)
Office of the Clerk, US House of Representatives, 2026-03-05 · supports
“<legis-num>H CON RES 38</legis-num> ... <vote-question>On Agreeing to the Resolution</vote-question> ... <vote-result>Failed</vote-result> ... <action-date>5-Mar-2026</action-date> ... <vote-desc>Directing the President pursuant to section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution to remove United States Armed Forces from unauthorized hostilities in the Islamic Republic of Iran</vote-desc> ... <party>Republican</party><yea-total>2</yea-total><nay-total>215</nay-total><present-total>0</present-total><not-voting-total>1</not-voting-total> ... <party>Democratic</party><yea-total>210</yea-total><nay-total>4</nay-total><present-total>0</present-total><not-voting-total>0</not-voting-total> ... <total-stub>Totals</total-stub><yea-total>212</yea-total><nay-total>219</nay-total><present-total>0</present-total><not-voting-total>1</not-voting-total>”
<legis-num>H CON RES 38</legis-num> ... <vote-question>On Agreeing to the Resolution</vote-question> ... <vote-result>Failed</vote-result> ... <action-date>5-Mar-2026</action-date> ... <vote-desc>Directing the President pursuant to section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution to remove United States Armed Forces from unauthorized hostilities in the Islamic Republic of Iran</vote-desc> ... <party>Republican</party><yea-total>2</yea-total><nay-total>215</nay-total><present-total>0</present-total><not-voting-total>1</not-voting-total> ... <party>Democratic</party><yea-total>210</yea-total><nay-total>4</nay-total><present-total>0</present-total><not-voting-total>0</not-voting-total> ... <total-stub>Totals</total-stub><yea-total>212</yea-total><nay-total>219</nay-total><present-total>0</present-total><not-voting-total>1</not-voting-total>
- Roll Call 114, H.Con.Res.40, 16 April 2026 (XML)
Office of the Clerk, US House of Representatives, 2026-04-16 · supports
“<legis-num>H CON RES 40</legis-num> ... <vote-result>Failed</vote-result> ... <action-date>16-Apr-2026</action-date> ... <party>Republican</party><yea-total>1</yea-total><nay-total>212</nay-total><present-total>1</present-total><not-voting-total>3</not-voting-total> ... <party>Democratic</party><yea-total>212</yea-total><nay-total>1</nay-total><present-total>0</present-total><not-voting-total>0</not-voting-total> ... <party>Independent</party><yea-total>0</yea-total><nay-total>1</nay-total> ... <total-stub>Totals</total-stub><yea-total>213</yea-total><nay-total>214</nay-total><present-total>1</present-total><not-voting-total>3</not-voting-total>”
<legis-num>H CON RES 40</legis-num> ... <vote-result>Failed</vote-result> ... <action-date>16-Apr-2026</action-date> ... <party>Republican</party><yea-total>1</yea-total><nay-total>212</nay-total><present-total>1</present-total><not-voting-total>3</not-voting-total> ... <party>Democratic</party><yea-total>212</yea-total><nay-total>1</nay-total><present-total>0</present-total><not-voting-total>0</not-voting-total> ... <party>Independent</party><yea-total>0</yea-total><nay-total>1</nay-total> ... <total-stub>Totals</total-stub><yea-total>213</yea-total><nay-total>214</nay-total><present-total>1</present-total><not-voting-total>3</not-voting-total>
- Roll Call 170, H.Con.Res.75, 14 May 2026 (XML)
Office of the Clerk, US House of Representatives, 2026-05-14 · supports
“<legis-num>H CON RES 75</legis-num> ... <vote-result>Failed</vote-result> ... <action-date>14-May-2026</action-date> ... <party>Republican</party><yea-total>3</yea-total><nay-total>210</nay-total><present-total>0</present-total><not-voting-total>4</not-voting-total> ... <party>Democratic</party><yea-total>209</yea-total><nay-total>1</nay-total><present-total>0</present-total><not-voting-total>2</not-voting-total> ... <total-stub>Totals</total-stub><yea-total>212</yea-total><nay-total>212</nay-total><present-total>0</present-total><not-voting-total>6</not-voting-total>”
<legis-num>H CON RES 75</legis-num> ... <vote-result>Failed</vote-result> ... <action-date>14-May-2026</action-date> ... <party>Republican</party><yea-total>3</yea-total><nay-total>210</nay-total><present-total>0</present-total><not-voting-total>4</not-voting-total> ... <party>Democratic</party><yea-total>209</yea-total><nay-total>1</nay-total><present-total>0</present-total><not-voting-total>2</not-voting-total> ... <total-stub>Totals</total-stub><yea-total>212</yea-total><nay-total>212</nay-total><present-total>0</present-total><not-voting-total>6</not-voting-total>
- Roll Call 199, H.Con.Res.86, 3 June 2026 (XML)
Office of the Clerk, US House of Representatives, 2026-06-03 · supports
“<legis-num>H CON RES 86</legis-num> ... <vote-result>Passed</vote-result> ... <action-date>3-Jun-2026</action-date> ... <vote-desc>Directing the President, pursuant to section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution, to remove United States Armed Forces from hostilities with Iran</vote-desc> ... <party>Republican</party><yea-total>4</yea-total><nay-total>207</nay-total><present-total>0</present-total><not-voting-total>6</not-voting-total> ... <party>Democratic</party><yea-total>211</yea-total><nay-total>0</nay-total><present-total>0</present-total><not-voting-total>1</not-voting-total> ... <total-stub>Totals</total-stub><yea-total>215</yea-total><nay-total>208</nay-total><present-total>0</present-total><not-voting-total>7</not-voting-total>”
<legis-num>H CON RES 86</legis-num> ... <vote-result>Passed</vote-result> ... <action-date>3-Jun-2026</action-date> ... <vote-desc>Directing the President, pursuant to section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution, to remove United States Armed Forces from hostilities with Iran</vote-desc> ... <party>Republican</party><yea-total>4</yea-total><nay-total>207</nay-total><present-total>0</present-total><not-voting-total>6</not-voting-total> ... <party>Democratic</party><yea-total>211</yea-total><nay-total>0</nay-total><present-total>0</present-total><not-voting-total>1</not-voting-total> ... <total-stub>Totals</total-stub><yea-total>215</yea-total><nay-total>208</nay-total><present-total>0</present-total><not-voting-total>7</not-voting-total>
- Roll Call 282, H.Con.Res.89, 23 July 2026 (XML)
Office of the Clerk, US House of Representatives, 2026-07-23 · supports
“<legis-num>H CON RES 89</legis-num> ... <vote-result>Passed</vote-result> ... <action-date>23-Jul-2026</action-date> ... <party>Republican</party><yea-total>4</yea-total><nay-total>207</nay-total><present-total>0</present-total><not-voting-total>7</not-voting-total> ... <party>Democratic</party><yea-total>210</yea-total><nay-total>0</nay-total><present-total>0</present-total><not-voting-total>2</not-voting-total> ... <total-stub>Totals</total-stub><yea-total>214</yea-total><nay-total>208</nay-total><present-total>0</present-total><not-voting-total>9</not-voting-total>”
<legis-num>H CON RES 89</legis-num> ... <vote-result>Passed</vote-result> ... <action-date>23-Jul-2026</action-date> ... <party>Republican</party><yea-total>4</yea-total><nay-total>207</nay-total><present-total>0</present-total><not-voting-total>7</not-voting-total> ... <party>Democratic</party><yea-total>210</yea-total><nay-total>0</nay-total><present-total>0</present-total><not-voting-total>2</not-voting-total> ... <total-stub>Totals</total-stub><yea-total>214</yea-total><nay-total>208</nay-total><present-total>0</present-total><not-voting-total>9</not-voting-total>
- Roll Call 307, H.Con.Res.93, 15 September 2026 (XML)
Office of the Clerk, US House of Representatives, 2026-09-15 · supports
“<legis-num>H CON RES 93</legis-num> ... <vote-result>Passed</vote-result> ... <action-date>15-Sep-2026</action-date> ... <party>Republican</party><yea-total>7</yea-total><nay-total>203</nay-total><present-total>0</present-total><not-voting-total>8</not-voting-total> ... <party>Democratic</party><yea-total>213</yea-total><nay-total>0</nay-total><present-total>0</present-total><not-voting-total>1</not-voting-total> ... <total-stub>Totals</total-stub><yea-total>220</yea-total><nay-total>204</nay-total><present-total>0</present-total><not-voting-total>9</not-voting-total>”
<legis-num>H CON RES 93</legis-num> ... <vote-result>Passed</vote-result> ... <action-date>15-Sep-2026</action-date> ... <party>Republican</party><yea-total>7</yea-total><nay-total>203</nay-total><present-total>0</present-total><not-voting-total>8</not-voting-total> ... <party>Democratic</party><yea-total>213</yea-total><nay-total>0</nay-total><present-total>0</present-total><not-voting-total>1</not-voting-total> ... <total-stub>Totals</total-stub><yea-total>220</yea-total><nay-total>204</nay-total><present-total>0</present-total><not-voting-total>9</not-voting-total>
- Senate Roll Call Votes, 119th Congress, 2nd Session (vote menu XML; Internet Archive copy of 10 October 2026)
United States Senate, 2026-10-10 · supports
“00244 24-Sep H.Con.Res. 89 On the Concurrent Resolution Rejected 49 50 H. Con. Res. 89; A concurrent resolution directing the President, pursuant to section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution, to remove United States Armed Forces from hostilities with Iran. ... 00216 30-Jul S.J.Res. 181 On the Motion to Discharge Rejected 49 50 ... 00207 23-Jul S.J.Res. 180 On the Motion to Discharge Rejected 47 49 ... 00192 24-Jun S.J.Res. 185 On the Motion to Proceed Rejected 47 50 ... 00184 23-Jun H.Con.Res. 86 On the Concurrent Resolution Agreed to 50 48 ... 00174 16-Jun S.J.Res. 172 On the Motion to Discharge Rejected 47 48 ... 00129 19-May S.J.Res. 185 On the Motion to Discharge Agreed to 50 47 ... 00118 13-May S.J.Res. 163 On the Motion to Discharge Rejected 49 50 ... 00113 30-Apr S.J.Res. 184 On the Motion to Discharge Rejected 47 50 ... 00088 22-Apr S.J.Res. 114 On the Motion to Discharge Rejected 46 51 ... 00079 15-Apr S.J.Res. 123 On the Motion to Discharge Rejected 47 52 ... 00069 24-Mar S.J.Res. 116 On the Motion to Discharge Rejected 47 53 ... 00058 18-Mar S.J.Res. 118 On the Motion to Discharge Rejected 47 53 ... 00046 04-Mar S.J.Res. 104 On the Motion to Discharge Rejected 47 53 Motion to Discharge S.J. Res. 104; A joint resolution to direct the removal of United States Armed Forces from hostilities within or against the Islamic Republic of Iran that have not been authorized by Congress.”
00244 24-Sep H.Con.Res. 89 On the Concurrent Resolution Rejected 49 50 H. Con. Res. 89; A concurrent resolution directing the President, pursuant to section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution, to remove United States Armed Forces from hostilities with Iran. ... 00216 30-Jul S.J.Res. 181 On the Motion to Discharge Rejected 49 50 ... 00207 23-Jul S.J.Res. 180 On the Motion to Discharge Rejected 47 49 ... 00192 24-Jun S.J.Res. 185 On the Motion to Proceed Rejected 47 50 ... 00184 23-Jun H.Con.Res. 86 On the Concurrent Resolution Agreed to 50 48 ... 00174 16-Jun S.J.Res. 172 On the Motion to Discharge Rejected 47 48 ... 00129 19-May S.J.Res. 185 On the Motion to Discharge Agreed to 50 47 ... 00118 13-May S.J.Res. 163 On the Motion to Discharge Rejected 49 50 ... 00113 30-Apr S.J.Res. 184 On the Motion to Discharge Rejected 47 50 ... 00088 22-Apr S.J.Res. 114 On the Motion to Discharge Rejected 46 51 ... 00079 15-Apr S.J.Res. 123 On the Motion to Discharge Rejected 47 52 ... 00069 24-Mar S.J.Res. 116 On the Motion to Discharge Rejected 47 53 ... 00058 18-Mar S.J.Res. 118 On the Motion to Discharge Rejected 47 53 ... 00046 04-Mar S.J.Res. 104 On the Motion to Discharge Rejected 47 53 Motion to Discharge S.J. Res. 104; A joint resolution to direct the removal of United States Armed Forces from hostilities within or against the Islamic Republic of Iran that have not been authorized by Congress.
- Roll Call Vote 184, 119th Congress, 2nd Session: H.Con.Res.86 (XML; Internet Archive copy)
United States Senate, 2026-06-23 · supports
“Concurrent Resolution Agreed to (50-48) ... Collins (R-ME) Collins Susan R ME Yea”
Concurrent Resolution Agreed to (50-48) ... Collins (R-ME) Collins Susan R ME Yea
- Congressional Votes Database
GovTrack.us, 2026-10 · supports
“Analysis and Commentary Oct. 26, 2026: What Comes After the Election? ... On the Nomination PN1129: Keith Sonderling, of Florida, to be Secretary of Labor Senate Vote Nomination #256 Confirmed 47/41 Sept. 30, 2026 ... H.Con.Res. 89: Directing the President, pursuant to section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution, to remove United States Armed Forces from hostilities with Iran. Senate Vote Concurrent #244 Resolution Sept. 24, Rejected 49/50”
Analysis and Commentary Oct. 26, 2026: What Comes After the Election? ... On the Nomination PN1129: Keith Sonderling, of Florida, to be Secretary of Labor Senate Vote Nomination #256 Confirmed 47/41 Sept. 30, 2026 ... H.Con.Res. 89: Directing the President, pursuant to section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution, to remove United States Armed Forces from hostilities with Iran. Senate Vote Concurrent #244 Resolution Sept. 24, Rejected 49/50
- Law and the Iran War: After the First 60 Days
Lawfare, 2026-05-08 · supports
“this past Friday, May 1, President Trump argued that the administration had already complied with the War Powers Resolution’s 60-day cut-off. “There has been no exchange of fire between United States Forces and Iran since April 7, 2026,” the letter asserted ... Hence, in the Trump administration’s view, “[t]he hostilities that began on February 28, 2026”—the day when Operation Epic Fury against Iran began—”have terminated[,]” ... the May 1 letter also notes that “the threat posed by Iran to the United States and our Armed Forces remains significant[.]” ... If the administration viewed the blockade that began on April 13 ... While Section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution initially gave Congress the power to compel the president to remove U.S. armed forces from ongoing hostilities through a concurrent resolution, the Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in INS v. Chadha brought such arrangements into serious constitutional doubt. And while joint resolutions avoid Chadha concerns, they only do so because they are subject to a presidential veto. ... voiced frustration with the Trump administration’s refusal to seek congressional authorization before the 60-day mark”
this past Friday, May 1, President Trump argued that the administration had already complied with the War Powers Resolution’s 60-day cut-off. “There has been no exchange of fire between United States Forces and Iran since April 7, 2026,” the letter asserted ... Hence, in the Trump administration’s view, “[t]he hostilities that began on February 28, 2026”—the day when Operation Epic Fury against Iran began—”have terminated[,]” ... the May 1 letter also notes that “the threat posed by Iran to the United States and our Armed Forces remains significant[.]” ... If the administration viewed the blockade that began on April 13 ... While Section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution initially gave Congress the power to compel the president to remove U.S. armed forces from ongoing hostilities through a concurrent resolution, the Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in INS v. Chadha brought such arrangements into serious constitutional doubt. And while joint resolutions avoid Chadha concerns, they only do so because they are subject to a presidential veto. ... voiced frustration with the Trump administration’s refusal to seek congressional authorization before the 60-day mark
- The War Powers Resolution: Concepts and Practice (R42699)
Congressional Research Service, 2019-03-08 · supports
“From 1975 through March 2017, Presidents have submitted 168 reports as the result of the War Powers Resolution, but only one, the 1975 Mayaguez seizure, cited Section 4(a)(1), which triggers the 60-day withdrawal requirement ... Section 5(c) requires the President to remove the forces at any time if Congress so directs by concurrent resolution; the effectiveness of this subsection is uncertain because of the 1983 Supreme Court decision on the legislative veto. ... A concurrent resolution is adopted by both chambers, but it does not require presentment to the President for signature or veto.”
From 1975 through March 2017, Presidents have submitted 168 reports as the result of the War Powers Resolution, but only one, the 1975 Mayaguez seizure, cited Section 4(a)(1), which triggers the 60-day withdrawal requirement ... Section 5(c) requires the President to remove the forces at any time if Congress so directs by concurrent resolution; the effectiveness of this subsection is uncertain because of the 1983 Supreme Court decision on the legislative veto. ... A concurrent resolution is adopted by both chambers, but it does not require presentment to the President for signature or veto.
- Letter to the President pro tempore of the Senate on Operation Epic Fury (War Powers report), March 2, 2026
The White House (copy published by Just Security), 2026-03-02 · supports
“I acted pursuant to my constitutional authority as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive to conduct United States foreign relations. ... I am providing this report as part of my efforts to keep the Congress fully informed, consistent with the War Powers Resolution (Public Law 93-148). ... in collective self-defense of our regional allies, including Israel.”
I acted pursuant to my constitutional authority as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive to conduct United States foreign relations. ... I am providing this report as part of my efforts to keep the Congress fully informed, consistent with the War Powers Resolution (Public Law 93-148). ... in collective self-defense of our regional allies, including Israel.
- Trump’s Interpretation of the War Powers Resolution
Executive Functions (Jack Goldsmith), 2026-05-04 · supports
“the 'hostilities' ... that began on Feb. 28 had 'terminated' due to the April 7 ceasefire ... highly misleading”
the 'hostilities' ... that began on Feb. 28 had 'terminated' due to the April 7 ceasefire ... highly misleading
- Letter Informing Congress of Military Action Commenced on June 9, 2026 (House Document 119-162)
The White House (US Government Publishing Office), 2026-06-12 · supports
“I write today to apprise you of military action commenced on June 9, 2026, at my direction against the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran. ... As previously communicated to the Congress, I ordered a 2-week ceasefire on April 7, 2026. The ceasefire was then extended. ... On June 8, 2026, despite these good-faith diplomatic efforts and the ongoing ceasefire, Iran engaged a United States Army AH-64 Apache helicopter, forcing its crash landing. In response, at my direction, on June 9, 2026, United States Armed Forces commenced precision strikes against numerous targets within Iran ... I acted pursuant to my constitutional authority as Commander in Chief and as Chief Executive to conduct United States foreign relations.”
I write today to apprise you of military action commenced on June 9, 2026, at my direction against the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran. ... As previously communicated to the Congress, I ordered a 2-week ceasefire on April 7, 2026. The ceasefire was then extended. ... On June 8, 2026, despite these good-faith diplomatic efforts and the ongoing ceasefire, Iran engaged a United States Army AH-64 Apache helicopter, forcing its crash landing. In response, at my direction, on June 9, 2026, United States Armed Forces commenced precision strikes against numerous targets within Iran ... I acted pursuant to my constitutional authority as Commander in Chief and as Chief Executive to conduct United States foreign relations.
- Letter Informing Congress of Military Actions Taken on June 26 and June 28, 2026 (House Document 119-167)
The White House (US Government Publishing Office), 2026-06-29 · supports
“I write today to apprise you of military actions taken at my direction against the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran on June 26 and June 28, 2026. ... These efforts led to my signing a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran on June 17, 2026. The MOU requires the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to make arrangements using its best efforts for the safe passage of commercial vessels . . . from the Persian Gulf to the Sea of Oman. Despite this commitment, Iran attacked a neutral-flagged commercial vessel transiting the Strait of Hormuz on June 25, 2026. At my direction, United States Armed Forces responded on June 26, 2026, with defensive strikes ... Following another Iranian attack against a neutral-flagged commercial vessel on June 27, 2026, United States Armed Forces responded at my direction on June 28, 2026, with precision strikes”
I write today to apprise you of military actions taken at my direction against the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran on June 26 and June 28, 2026. ... These efforts led to my signing a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran on June 17, 2026. The MOU requires the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to make arrangements using its best efforts for the safe passage of commercial vessels . . . from the Persian Gulf to the Sea of Oman. Despite this commitment, Iran attacked a neutral-flagged commercial vessel transiting the Strait of Hormuz on June 25, 2026. At my direction, United States Armed Forces responded on June 26, 2026, with defensive strikes ... Following another Iranian attack against a neutral-flagged commercial vessel on June 27, 2026, United States Armed Forces responded at my direction on June 28, 2026, with precision strikes
- Letter Informing Congress of Military Action Commenced on July 7, 2026 (House Document 119-169)
The White House (US Government Publishing Office), 2026-07-10 · supports
“I write to apprise you of military action commenced on July 7, 2026, against the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran. ... Despite this commitment, Iran again attacked several neutral-flagged commercial vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz between July 6-7, 2026. At my direction, United States Armed Forces responded, commencing on July 7, 2026, with defensive strikes against targets within Iran”
I write to apprise you of military action commenced on July 7, 2026, against the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran. ... Despite this commitment, Iran again attacked several neutral-flagged commercial vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz between July 6-7, 2026. At my direction, United States Armed Forces responded, commencing on July 7, 2026, with defensive strikes against targets within Iran
- Letter Informing Congress of Military Action Commenced on July 27, 2026 (House Document 119-183)
The White House (US Government Publishing Office), 2026-08-03 · supports
“I write to apprise you of military action commenced on July 27, 2026, against targets in the Republic of Iraq following Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-directed attacks by Iranian aligned militia groups (IAMGs).”
I write to apprise you of military action commenced on July 27, 2026, against targets in the Republic of Iraq following Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-directed attacks by Iranian aligned militia groups (IAMGs).
- Letter Informing Congress of Military Action Commenced on September 1, 2026 (House Document 119-193)
The White House (US Government Publishing Office), 2026-09-03 · supports
“I write today to apprise you of military action commenced on September 1, 2026, against the Islamic Republic of Iran. At my direction, United States Armed Forces responded to Iran's late August 2026 attacks against United States Armed Forces with defensive strikes against targets within Iran and Iranian territorial waters including ... oil tankers belonging to the National Iranian Oil Company ... I acted pursuant to my constitutional authority as Commander in Chief and as Chief Executive to conduct United States foreign relations. I am providing this report as part of my efforts to keep the Congress fully informed, consistent with the War Powers Resolution (Public Law 93-148).”
I write today to apprise you of military action commenced on September 1, 2026, against the Islamic Republic of Iran. At my direction, United States Armed Forces responded to Iran's late August 2026 attacks against United States Armed Forces with defensive strikes against targets within Iran and Iranian territorial waters including ... oil tankers belonging to the National Iranian Oil Company ... I acted pursuant to my constitutional authority as Commander in Chief and as Chief Executive to conduct United States foreign relations. I am providing this report as part of my efforts to keep the Congress fully informed, consistent with the War Powers Resolution (Public Law 93-148).
- Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798–2023 (R42738)
Congressional Research Service, 2023-06-07 · complicates
“The following list reviews hundreds of instances in which the United States has used military forces abroad in situations of military conflict or potential conflict to protect U.S. citizens or promote U.S. interests. The list does not include covert actions or the many occurrences in which U.S. forces have been stationed abroad... Eleven times in its history, the United States has formally declared war against foreign nations. These 11 U.S. war declarations encompassed five separate wars”
The following list reviews hundreds of instances in which the United States has used military forces abroad in situations of military conflict or potential conflict to protect U.S. citizens or promote U.S. interests. The list does not include covert actions or the many occurrences in which U.S. forces have been stationed abroad... Eleven times in its history, the United States has formally declared war against foreign nations. These 11 U.S. war declarations encompassed five separate wars
- Roll Call 493, H.J.Res.68, 24 June 2011 (XML)
Office of the Clerk, US House of Representatives, 2011-06-24 · complicates
“<legis-num>H J RES 68</legis-num> <vote-question>On Passage</vote-question> <vote-result>Failed</vote-result> <action-date>24-Jun-2011</action-date> <vote-desc>Authorizing the limited use of the United States Armed Forces in support of the NATO mission in Libya</vote-desc> ... <total-stub>Totals</total-stub><yea-total>123</yea-total><nay-total>295</nay-total>”
<legis-num>H J RES 68</legis-num> <vote-question>On Passage</vote-question> <vote-result>Failed</vote-result> <action-date>24-Jun-2011</action-date> <vote-desc>Authorizing the limited use of the United States Armed Forces in support of the NATO mission in Libya</vote-desc> ... <total-stub>Totals</total-stub><yea-total>123</yea-total><nay-total>295</nay-total>
- Roll Call 494, H.R.2278, 24 June 2011 (XML)
Office of the Clerk, US House of Representatives, 2011-06-24 · complicates
“<legis-num>H R 2278</legis-num> <vote-question>On Passage</vote-question> <vote-result>Failed</vote-result> <action-date>24-Jun-2011</action-date> <vote-desc>To limit the use of funds appropriated to the Department of Defense for United States Armed Forces in support of North Atlantic Treaty Organization Operation Unified Protector with respect to Libya, unless otherwise specifically authorized by law</vote-desc> ... <total-stub>Totals</total-stub><yea-total>180</yea-total><nay-total>238</nay-total>”
<legis-num>H R 2278</legis-num> <vote-question>On Passage</vote-question> <vote-result>Failed</vote-result> <action-date>24-Jun-2011</action-date> <vote-desc>To limit the use of funds appropriated to the Department of Defense for United States Armed Forces in support of North Atlantic Treaty Organization Operation Unified Protector with respect to Libya, unless otherwise specifically authorized by law</vote-desc> ... <total-stub>Totals</total-stub><yea-total>180</yea-total><nay-total>238</nay-total>
- Roll Call 153, S.J.Res.7, 4 April 2019 (XML)
Office of the Clerk, US House of Representatives, 2019-04-04 · complicates
“<legis-num>S J RES 7</legis-num> <vote-question>On Passage</vote-question> <vote-result>Passed</vote-result> <action-date>4-Apr-2019</action-date> <vote-desc>To direct the removal of the United States Armed Forces from hostilities in the Republic of Yemen that have not been authorized by Congress</vote-desc> ... <total-stub>Totals</total-stub><yea-total>247</yea-total><nay-total>175</nay-total><present-total>1</present-total>”
<legis-num>S J RES 7</legis-num> <vote-question>On Passage</vote-question> <vote-result>Passed</vote-result> <action-date>4-Apr-2019</action-date> <vote-desc>To direct the removal of the United States Armed Forces from hostilities in the Republic of Yemen that have not been authorized by Congress</vote-desc> ... <total-stub>Totals</total-stub><yea-total>247</yea-total><nay-total>175</nay-total><present-total>1</present-total>
- Senate Roll Call Votes, 116th Congress, 1st Session (vote menu XML; Internet Archive copy)
United States Senate, 2019 · complicates
“00094 02-May S.J.Res. 7 On Overriding the Veto Veto Sustained 53 45 Shall the Joint Resolution S.J. Res. 7 Pass, the Objections of the President of the United States Notwithstanding; A joint resolution to direct the removal of United States Armed Forces from hostilities in the Republic of Yemen that have not been authorized by Congress. ... 00048 13-Mar S.J.Res. 7 On the Joint Resolution Passed 54 46”
00094 02-May S.J.Res. 7 On Overriding the Veto Veto Sustained 53 45 Shall the Joint Resolution S.J. Res. 7 Pass, the Objections of the President of the United States Notwithstanding; A joint resolution to direct the removal of United States Armed Forces from hostilities in the Republic of Yemen that have not been authorized by Congress. ... 00048 13-Mar S.J.Res. 7 On the Joint Resolution Passed 54 46
- Roll Call 101, S.J.Res.68, 11 March 2020 (XML)
Office of the Clerk, US House of Representatives, 2020-03-11 · complicates
“<legis-num>S J RES 68</legis-num> <vote-question>On Passage</vote-question> <vote-result>Passed</vote-result> <action-date>11-Mar-2020</action-date> <vote-desc>To direct the removal of United States Armed Forces from hostilities against the Islamic Republic of Iran that have not been authorized by Congress</vote-desc> ... <total-stub>Totals</total-stub><yea-total>227</yea-total><nay-total>186</nay-total>”
<legis-num>S J RES 68</legis-num> <vote-question>On Passage</vote-question> <vote-result>Passed</vote-result> <action-date>11-Mar-2020</action-date> <vote-desc>To direct the removal of United States Armed Forces from hostilities against the Islamic Republic of Iran that have not been authorized by Congress</vote-desc> ... <total-stub>Totals</total-stub><yea-total>227</yea-total><nay-total>186</nay-total>
- Senate Roll Call Votes, 116th Congress, 2nd Session (vote menu XML; Internet Archive copy)
United States Senate, 2020 · complicates
“00084 07-May S.J.Res. 68 On Overriding the Veto Veto Sustained 49 44 Shall the Joint Resolution S.J. Res. 68 Pass, the Objections of the President of the United States to the Contrary Notwithstanding?; A joint resolution to direct the removal of United States Armed Forces from hostilities against the Islamic Republic of Iran that have not been authorized by Congress. ... 00052 13-Feb S.J.Res. 68 On the Joint Resolution Passed 55 45”
00084 07-May S.J.Res. 68 On Overriding the Veto Veto Sustained 49 44 Shall the Joint Resolution S.J. Res. 68 Pass, the Objections of the President of the United States to the Contrary Notwithstanding?; A joint resolution to direct the removal of United States Armed Forces from hostilities against the Islamic Republic of Iran that have not been authorized by Congress. ... 00052 13-Feb S.J.Res. 68 On the Joint Resolution Passed 55 45
- Friday, June 27, 2025 (Senate floor wrap-up)
Senate Democrats (Senate Periodical Press Gallery floor log), 2025-06-27 · complicates
“By a vote of 47-53, the Senate did not agree to S.J. Res.59, the Kaine War Powers Resolution on Iran. Senator Paul (R) voted aye and Senator Fetterman (D) voted no.”
By a vote of 47-53, the Senate did not agree to S.J. Res.59, the Kaine War Powers Resolution on Iran. Senator Paul (R) voted aye and Senator Fetterman (D) voted no.
- After the Rubicon: Congress, Presidents, and the Politics of Waging War (publisher's description)
University of Chicago Press, 2010 · supports
“Kriner expertly demonstrates the full extent to which Congress materially shapes the initiation, scope, and duration of major military actions ... He shows how the balance of party power in the legislature trumps conventional strategic variables in explaining the duration of U.S. military conflicts.”
Kriner expertly demonstrates the full extent to which Congress materially shapes the initiation, scope, and duration of major military actions ... He shows how the balance of party power in the legislature trumps conventional strategic variables in explaining the duration of U.S. military conflicts.
- Iran conflict remains deeply unpopular, as many Americans expect it to go on for months
Pew Research Center, 2026-10-08 · supports
“Around two-thirds of Americans (65%) disapprove of the way President Donald Trump is handling the U.S. military action in Iran, while a third (33%) approve ... Evaluations of the initial decision to use force are similar: 34% now view this as the right decision – down 4 percentage points from March. ... Today, 33% of adults say they approve of how Trump is handling the U.S. military action against Iran – down from 37% in March. This decline has come entirely from Republicans: At the start of the conflict, 69% approved of his handling of the conflict. Today, 63% do. Democrats’ views are unchanged. ... Today, 65% of Republicans say the decision to use force in Iran was the right one – down from 71% in March.”
Around two-thirds of Americans (65%) disapprove of the way President Donald Trump is handling the U.S. military action in Iran, while a third (33%) approve ... Evaluations of the initial decision to use force are similar: 34% now view this as the right decision – down 4 percentage points from March. ... Today, 33% of adults say they approve of how Trump is handling the U.S. military action against Iran – down from 37% in March. This decline has come entirely from Republicans: At the start of the conflict, 69% approved of his handling of the conflict. Today, 63% do. Democrats’ views are unchanged. ... Today, 65% of Republicans say the decision to use force in Iran was the right one – down from 71% in March.
- Americans Broadly Disapprove of U.S. Military Action in Iran
Pew Research Center, 2026-03-25 · supports
“About six-in-ten Americans (61%) disapprove of Trump’s handling of the conflict, while 37% approve. ... The new Pew Research Center survey of 3,524 U.S. adults, conducted March 16-22, also finds a similar balance of opinion on whether the initial decision to use military force was right (38%) or wrong (59%). ... In contrast, about seven-in-ten Republicans and Republican leaners approve of how Trump is handling the conflict (69%) and think the U.S. made the right decision (71%).”
About six-in-ten Americans (61%) disapprove of Trump’s handling of the conflict, while 37% approve. ... The new Pew Research Center survey of 3,524 U.S. adults, conducted March 16-22, also finds a similar balance of opinion on whether the initial decision to use military force was right (38%) or wrong (59%). ... In contrast, about seven-in-ten Republicans and Republican leaners approve of how Trump is handling the conflict (69%) and think the U.S. made the right decision (71%).
- Gallup News Service, June Wave 1, Final Topline (June 1–15, 2026)
Gallup, 2026-06 · supports
“Results are based on telephone interviews conducted June 1-15, 2026, with a random sample of –1,001—adults ... QN24: Do you approve or disapprove of this U.S. military action against Iran? ... Total ... Republican Independent Democrat ... Approve 34% ... 79% 26% 8% ... Disapprove 63% ... 19% 68% 90% ... (DK)/(Refused) 4% ... 2% 6% 2%”
Results are based on telephone interviews conducted June 1-15, 2026, with a random sample of –1,001—adults ... QN24: Do you approve or disapprove of this U.S. military action against Iran? ... Total ... Republican Independent Democrat ... Approve 34% ... 79% 26% 8% ... Disapprove 63% ... 19% 68% 90% ... (DK)/(Refused) 4% ... 2% 6% 2%
- Quinnipiac University National Poll, released March 9, 2026
Quinnipiac University Poll, 2026-03-09 · supports
“Fifty-three percent of voters oppose the U.S. military action against Iran, while 40 percent support it. Democrats (89 – 7 percent) and independents (60 – 31 percent) oppose the U.S. military action against Iran, while Republicans (85 – 11 percent) support it. ... 10. Do you support or oppose the U.S. military action against Iran? ... Tot Rep Dem Ind ... Support 40% 85% 7% 31% ... Oppose 53 11 89 60 ... DK/NA 7 5 4 9 ... 15. Do you think President Trump should have received approval from Congress before taking military action against Iran, or not? ... Tot Rep Dem Ind ... Yes/Should have 59% 22% 92% 64% ... No 38 76 5 33 ... DK/NA 3 2 3 3 ... 1,002 self-identified registered voters nationwide were surveyed from March 6th – 8th”
Fifty-three percent of voters oppose the U.S. military action against Iran, while 40 percent support it. Democrats (89 – 7 percent) and independents (60 – 31 percent) oppose the U.S. military action against Iran, while Republicans (85 – 11 percent) support it. ... 10. Do you support or oppose the U.S. military action against Iran? ... Tot Rep Dem Ind ... Support 40% 85% 7% 31% ... Oppose 53 11 89 60 ... DK/NA 7 5 4 9 ... 15. Do you think President Trump should have received approval from Congress before taking military action against Iran, or not? ... Tot Rep Dem Ind ... Yes/Should have 59% 22% 92% 64% ... No 38 76 5 33 ... DK/NA 3 2 3 3 ... 1,002 self-identified registered voters nationwide were surveyed from March 6th – 8th
- Address Accepting the Presidential Nomination at the Republican National Convention in Milwaukee, Wisconsin
The American Presidency Project (UC Santa Barbara), 2024-07-18 · supports
“I was the first president in modern times to start no new wars. ... With our victory in November, the years of war, weakness and chaos will be over. I don't have wars. ... they did everything possible for Iran and now Iran is very close to having a nuclear weapon, which would have never happened.”
I was the first president in modern times to start no new wars. ... With our victory in November, the years of war, weakness and chaos will be over. I don't have wars. ... they did everything possible for Iran and now Iran is very close to having a nuclear weapon, which would have never happened.
- Remarks Accepting Election as the 47th President of the United States in Palm Beach, Florida
The American Presidency Project (UC Santa Barbara), 2024-11-06 · supports
“They said: 'He will start a war.' I'm not going to start a war. I'm going to stop wars.”
They said: 'He will start a war.' I'm not going to start a war. I'm going to stop wars.
- Iran Update Special Report, July 13, 2026
Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project, 2026-07-13 · supports
“The US-Iran ceasefire has effectively ended with relatively more intense and consistent exchanges of fire in the Persian Gulf. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy announced on July 11 that it closed the strait, struck a Cyprus-flagged vessel, and then struck a second unspecified vessel on July 12. The United States struck dozens of Iranian military targets on July 12 to degrade Iran’s ability to threaten shipping. ... Iran has continuously made efforts to reconstitute its ballistic missile and drone programs since the ceasefire on April 8. ... The United States will resume its blockade of Iranian ports beginning on July 14 at 4:00 PM ET.”
The US-Iran ceasefire has effectively ended with relatively more intense and consistent exchanges of fire in the Persian Gulf. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy announced on July 11 that it closed the strait, struck a Cyprus-flagged vessel, and then struck a second unspecified vessel on July 12. The United States struck dozens of Iranian military targets on July 12 to degrade Iran’s ability to threaten shipping. ... Iran has continuously made efforts to reconstitute its ballistic missile and drone programs since the ceasefire on April 8. ... The United States will resume its blockade of Iranian ports beginning on July 14 at 4:00 PM ET.
- Iran Update, October 19, 2026
Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project, 2026-10-19 · supports
“The Iranian regime's appointment of Mehrdad Akhlaghi, who has extensive experience in missile technology, as Iran's new defense minister indicates that the regime is prioritizing the reconstitution of its missile program. ... stated on October 19 that Iran will not rebuild defense industrial facilities at old locations but will instead construct them 'in mountains and security structures.'”
The Iranian regime's appointment of Mehrdad Akhlaghi, who has extensive experience in missile technology, as Iran's new defense minister indicates that the regime is prioritizing the reconstitution of its missile program. ... stated on October 19 that Iran will not rebuild defense industrial facilities at old locations but will instead construct them 'in mountains and security structures.'
- Joint E3 leaders’ statement on Iran: 28 February 2026
UK Government (Prime Minister's Office), 2026-02-28 · complicates
“We did not participate in these strikes, but are in close contact with our international partners, including the United States, Israel, and partners in the region. ... We condemn Iranian attacks on countries in the region in the strongest terms. … Ultimately, the Iranian people must be allowed to determine their future.”
We did not participate in these strikes, but are in close contact with our international partners, including the United States, Israel, and partners in the region. ... We condemn Iranian attacks on countries in the region in the strongest terms. … Ultimately, the Iranian people must be allowed to determine their future.
- Foreign Minister's article in Le Monde
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sultanate of Oman, 2026-07-14 · complicates
“Sayyid Badr describes the war as "a catastrophe". He notes that it has been launched without United Nations authorisation and has failed to achieve the objectives cited to justify it.”
Sayyid Badr describes the war as "a catastrophe". He notes that it has been launched without United Nations authorisation and has failed to achieve the objectives cited to justify it.
- NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran (GOV/2026/50)
International Atomic Energy Agency, 2026-09-01 · supports
“The Director General was in attendance at the indirect negotiations between the United States of America and Iran that took place on 17 and 26 February 2026 in Geneva ... On 28 February 2026, the United States of America and Israel launched further military attacks on Iran, including on the sites of some nuclear facilities. Consequently, the Agency stopped conducting verification activities in Iran.”
The Director General was in attendance at the indirect negotiations between the United States of America and Iran that took place on 17 and 26 February 2026 in Geneva ... On 28 February 2026, the United States of America and Israel launched further military attacks on Iran, including on the sites of some nuclear facilities. Consequently, the Agency stopped conducting verification activities in Iran.
- Iran and Nuclear Weapons Production (IF12106)
Congressional Research Service, 2026-10-13 · supports
“A June 2026 memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the United States and Iran states that 'Iran reaffirms that it shall not procure or develop nuclear weapons.'”
A June 2026 memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the United States and Iran states that 'Iran reaffirms that it shall not procure or develop nuclear weapons.'
- The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) at a Glance
Arms Control Association, 2025-02 · supports
“For 10 years operating centrifuges reduced to 5,060 IR-1 machines … For 15 years level of uranium enrichment capped at 3.67 percent uranium-235 … For 15 years the stockpile is kept under 300 kilograms of 3.67 percent enriched uranium in total (all forms) ... January 16, 2016, Implementation Day”
For 10 years operating centrifuges reduced to 5,060 IR-1 machines … For 15 years level of uranium enrichment capped at 3.67 percent uranium-235 … For 15 years the stockpile is kept under 300 kilograms of 3.67 percent enriched uranium in total (all forms) ... January 16, 2016, Implementation Day
- 2025 Iran–United States negotiations
Wikipedia, 2026-10 · supports
“The third round of high-level negotiations took place on April 26, 2025 ... The fourth round of talks were held on May 11 in Oman ... The fifth round of talks, held on May 23 in Rome ... the sixth round of US-Iran talks, scheduled in Oman on June 15, were indefinitely suspended”
The third round of high-level negotiations took place on April 26, 2025 ... The fourth round of talks were held on May 11 in Oman ... The fifth round of talks, held on May 23 in Rome ... the sixth round of US-Iran talks, scheduled in Oman on June 15, were indefinitely suspended
- Trump says US will not resume military strikes on Iran before midterm elections
Associated Press (via WCAX), 2026-10-08 · supports
“But Trump in a social media post on Thursday said the U.S. "will not be attacking Iran at any time prior to the Midterm Elections to be held in the United States on November 3rd." Trump added that his team has been "having productive discussions with the Islamic Republic of Iran." ... Negotiations had appeared at a standstill since Trump late last month publicly rejected Iran's proposal to reopen the Strait of Hormuz within seven days if the U.S. met certain conditions.”
But Trump in a social media post on Thursday said the U.S. "will not be attacking Iran at any time prior to the Midterm Elections to be held in the United States on November 3rd." Trump added that his team has been "having productive discussions with the Islamic Republic of Iran." ... Negotiations had appeared at a standstill since Trump late last month publicly rejected Iran's proposal to reopen the Strait of Hormuz within seven days if the U.S. met certain conditions.
- Iran Update, October 21, 2026
Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project, 2026-10-21 · supports
“Several shipping and maritime security officials told Bloomberg on October 20 that at least five of the 23 recorded attacks on vessels in or near the Strait of Hormuz in the first two weeks of October struck commercial vessels' engine rooms.”
Several shipping and maritime security officials told Bloomberg on October 20 that at least five of the 23 recorded attacks on vessels in or near the Strait of Hormuz in the first two weeks of October struck commercial vessels' engine rooms.
- Iran Update, October 22, 2026
Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project, 2026-10-22 · supports
“The New York Times reported on October 21 that the US and Israeli militaries have developed specific plans for a short and intensive operation against Iran after the US midterm elections on November 3, citing US officials and other people briefed on the deliberations.”
The New York Times reported on October 21 that the US and Israeli militaries have developed specific plans for a short and intensive operation against Iran after the US midterm elections on November 3, citing US officials and other people briefed on the deliberations.
- Iran Update, October 24, 2026
Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project, 2026-10-24 · supports
“Director of National Intelligence Jay Clayton warned on October 23 that US intelligence assessments indicate that Iran is in the "advanced stages" of planning attacks against US targets in the region.”
Director of National Intelligence Jay Clayton warned on October 23 that US intelligence assessments indicate that Iran is in the "advanced stages" of planning attacks against US targets in the region.
- Iran Update, October 25, 2026
Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project, 2026-10-25 · supports
“The Houthis have fired at least 12 missiles and two drones targeting Saudi Arabia since October 24”
The Houthis have fired at least 12 missiles and two drones targeting Saudi Arabia since October 24
- Iran Update, October 26, 2026
Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project, 2026-10-26 · supports
“Senior officials from the Mecca Pact’s three signatories met with senior Iranian officials in Tehran on October 26 to discuss a new US-Iran ceasefire amid reported US and Israeli preparations for another round of strikes in Iran. ... Two diplomats briefed on the ongoing talks told the New York Times on October 26 that Qatari mediators are trying to secure an agreement in which the United States and Iran would make "a series of concessions over a five-day period." The diplomats added that those concessions include Iran reopening the Strait of Hormuz in exchange for the United States lifting its naval blockade on Iranian ports. ... The United States and Iran reportedly continue to disagree on the sequencing of the agreement.”
Senior officials from the Mecca Pact’s three signatories met with senior Iranian officials in Tehran on October 26 to discuss a new US-Iran ceasefire amid reported US and Israeli preparations for another round of strikes in Iran. ... Two diplomats briefed on the ongoing talks told the New York Times on October 26 that Qatari mediators are trying to secure an agreement in which the United States and Iran would make "a series of concessions over a five-day period." The diplomats added that those concessions include Iran reopening the Strait of Hormuz in exchange for the United States lifting its naval blockade on Iranian ports. ... The United States and Iran reportedly continue to disagree on the sequencing of the agreement.
- Iran Update, October 27, 2026
Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project, 2026-10-27 · supports
“This threat comes as Director of National Intelligence Jay Clayton warned in a memo on October 23 that Iran has “substantially increased” its efforts to target US personnel. ... Omani Foreign Affairs Minister Badr al Busaidi called for a Gulf non-aggression pact with Iran on October 26, but Iran is unlikely to accept such an agreement unless it can also secure a US withdrawal from the region. Regional sources said that the summit made no progress on any issue.”
This threat comes as Director of National Intelligence Jay Clayton warned in a memo on October 23 that Iran has “substantially increased” its efforts to target US personnel. ... Omani Foreign Affairs Minister Badr al Busaidi called for a Gulf non-aggression pact with Iran on October 26, but Iran is unlikely to accept such an agreement unless it can also secure a US withdrawal from the region. Regional sources said that the summit made no progress on any issue.
- US warns allies to prepare for possible Iran strikes, retaliation after elections, AP sources say
Associated Press (via WCAX), 2026-10-29 · supports
“U.S. officials have told several Middle East countries and regional allies to be prepared for potential renewed military action against Iran after next week’s midterm elections in the United States — as well as the possibility that Iran will attempt to retaliate against them, according to two diplomats briefed on the matter. ... President Donald Trump has not made a final decision on whether to carry out new strikes against Iran, the diplomats stressed. ... Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said Wednesday in a post on X that Tehran “continues to give diplomacy a chance to succeed” ... the United Arab Emirates foreign ministry issued a statement urging the sides to “exercise wisdom and pursue political solutions to help contain tensions” ... While the U.S. has not carried out a strike against Iran since early September, the situation in the Middle East has become more complicated.”
U.S. officials have told several Middle East countries and regional allies to be prepared for potential renewed military action against Iran after next week’s midterm elections in the United States — as well as the possibility that Iran will attempt to retaliate against them, according to two diplomats briefed on the matter. ... President Donald Trump has not made a final decision on whether to carry out new strikes against Iran, the diplomats stressed. ... Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said Wednesday in a post on X that Tehran “continues to give diplomacy a chance to succeed” ... the United Arab Emirates foreign ministry issued a statement urging the sides to “exercise wisdom and pursue political solutions to help contain tensions” ... While the U.S. has not carried out a strike against Iran since early September, the situation in the Middle East has become more complicated.
- U.S. Forces Disable Cargo Vessel Attempting to Violate Blockade
US Central Command, 2026-10-10 · supports
“CENTCOM forces resumed America’s blockade against all ships entering or departing Iranian ports on July 14. Four commercial vessels have been disabled and 135 ships have been turned around during three months of strict enforcement.”
CENTCOM forces resumed America’s blockade against all ships entering or departing Iranian ports on July 14. Four commercial vessels have been disabled and 135 ships have been turned around during three months of strict enforcement.
- The Constitution of the United States: A Transcription (Article I, Section 8; Article II, Section 2)
U.S. National Archives, 1787-09-17 · supports
“Section. 8. The Congress shall have Power … To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water; To raise and support Armies … Section. 2. The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States”
Section. 8. The Congress shall have Power … To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water; To raise and support Armies … Section. 2. The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States
- House roll-call XML files 85, 114, 170, 199, 282 and 307 (2026); latest shown
Office of the Clerk, US House of Representatives, 2026-09-15 · supports
“<legis-num>H CON RES 93</legis-num> ... <vote-result>Passed</vote-result> ... <action-date>15-Sep-2026</action-date> ... <party>Republican</party><yea-total>7</yea-total><nay-total>203</nay-total> ... <party>Democratic</party><yea-total>213</yea-total><nay-total>0</nay-total> ... <total-stub>Totals</total-stub><yea-total>220</yea-total><nay-total>204</nay-total>”
<legis-num>H CON RES 93</legis-num> ... <vote-result>Passed</vote-result> ... <action-date>15-Sep-2026</action-date> ... <party>Republican</party><yea-total>7</yea-total><nay-total>203</nay-total> ... <party>Democratic</party><yea-total>213</yea-total><nay-total>0</nay-total> ... <total-stub>Totals</total-stub><yea-total>220</yea-total><nay-total>204</nay-total>
- Senate Roll Call Votes, 119th Congress, 2nd Session (vote menu XML; Internet Archive copy of 10 October 2026)
United States Senate, 2026-10-10 · supports
“00244 24-Sep H.Con.Res. 89 On the Concurrent Resolution Rejected 49 50 ... 00184 23-Jun H.Con.Res. 86 On the Concurrent Resolution Agreed to 50 48 ... 00129 19-May S.J.Res. 185 On the Motion to Discharge Agreed to 50 47 ... 00046 04-Mar S.J.Res. 104 On the Motion to Discharge Rejected 47 53”
00244 24-Sep H.Con.Res. 89 On the Concurrent Resolution Rejected 49 50 ... 00184 23-Jun H.Con.Res. 86 On the Concurrent Resolution Agreed to 50 48 ... 00129 19-May S.J.Res. 185 On the Motion to Discharge Agreed to 50 47 ... 00046 04-Mar S.J.Res. 104 On the Motion to Discharge Rejected 47 53
- Iran conflict remains deeply unpopular (chart data: approval of Trump's handling, by party)
Pew Research Center, 2026-10-08 · supports
“% who say they approve of how Donald Trump is handling the U.S. military action against Iran Date March October Total 37 33 Rep/Lean Rep 69 63 Dem/Lean Dem 9 9 ... Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted Sept. 28-Oct. 4, 2026.”
% who say they approve of how Donald Trump is handling the U.S. military action against Iran Date March October Total 37 33 Rep/Lean Rep 69 63 Dem/Lean Dem 9 9 ... Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted Sept. 28-Oct. 4, 2026.
Iran's Nuclear Programme: Stockpile, Inspections and Assessments, 2011–2026
- Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of United Nations Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, GOV/2026/50, paras 2–16, 28, 39, 45
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2026-09-01 · supports
“These attacks took place between 13–24 June 2025. On 22 June 2025, the United States conducted attacks on three of Iran’s nuclear facilities. The Agency stopped conducting verification activities in Iran at the commencement of the military attacks and, by the end of June 2025, had decided to withdraw all of its inspectors from Iran for safety reasons. … On 2 July 2025, the President of Iran signed into force a law suspending cooperation with the Agency. … On 9 September 2025, the Director General signed an agreement with the Foreign Minister of Iran, Dr Abbas Araghchi, in Cairo – referred to as the ‘Cairo agreement’ … Iran, in a letter of 20 November 2025, informed the Director General that the Cairo agreement was “no longer valid and shall henceforth be regarded as terminated”. … The Director General was in attendance at the indirect negotiations between the United States of America and Iran that took place on 17 and 26 February 2026 in Geneva, in which he provided advice on issues relevant to the verification of Iran’s nuclear programme. On 28 February 2026, the United States of America and Israel launched further military attacks on Iran, including on the sites of some nuclear facilities. Consequently, the Agency stopped conducting verification activities in Iran. … On 1–3 June 2026, the Agency conducted an inspection and DIV at the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP) … On 10 June 2026, the Board adopted resolution GOV/2026/40 in which, inter alia, it: recalled that “Iran’s many failures to provide the Agency with full and timely cooperation regarding undeclared nuclear material and activities at multiple undeclared locations in Iran, as detailed in GOV/2025/25, constitute non-compliance with its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement …” … further reiterated that “consistent with Article 19 of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement, the Agency is not able to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded under the Agreement to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices” … Due to the lack of information about, and access to, any of Iran’s four declared enrichment facilities to perform verification activities the Agency cannot provide any information on the current size, composition or whereabouts of the stockpile of enriched uranium in Iran or whether Iran has suspended all enrichment related activities, including R&D. … The Board considered the Director General’s report and, on 12 June 2025, adopted resolution GOV/2025/38 … Since Iran stopped provisionally applying its Additional Protocol in February 2021, the Agency has not been able, inter alia, to conduct complementary access to any sites or other locations in Iran.”
These attacks took place between 13–24 June 2025. On 22 June 2025, the United States conducted attacks on three of Iran’s nuclear facilities. The Agency stopped conducting verification activities in Iran at the commencement of the military attacks and, by the end of June 2025, had decided to withdraw all of its inspectors from Iran for safety reasons. … On 2 July 2025, the President of Iran signed into force a law suspending cooperation with the Agency. … On 9 September 2025, the Director General signed an agreement with the Foreign Minister of Iran, Dr Abbas Araghchi, in Cairo – referred to as the ‘Cairo agreement’ … Iran, in a letter of 20 November 2025, informed the Director General that the Cairo agreement was “no longer valid and shall henceforth be regarded as terminated”. … The Director General was in attendance at the indirect negotiations between the United States of America and Iran that took place on 17 and 26 February 2026 in Geneva, in which he provided advice on issues relevant to the verification of Iran’s nuclear programme. On 28 February 2026, the United States of America and Israel launched further military attacks on Iran, including on the sites of some nuclear facilities. Consequently, the Agency stopped conducting verification activities in Iran. … On 1–3 June 2026, the Agency conducted an inspection and DIV at the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP) … On 10 June 2026, the Board adopted resolution GOV/2026/40 in which, inter alia, it: recalled that “Iran’s many failures to provide the Agency with full and timely cooperation regarding undeclared nuclear material and activities at multiple undeclared locations in Iran, as detailed in GOV/2025/25, constitute non-compliance with its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement …” … further reiterated that “consistent with Article 19 of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement, the Agency is not able to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded under the Agreement to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices” … Due to the lack of information about, and access to, any of Iran’s four declared enrichment facilities to perform verification activities the Agency cannot provide any information on the current size, composition or whereabouts of the stockpile of enriched uranium in Iran or whether Iran has suspended all enrichment related activities, including R&D. … The Board considered the Director General’s report and, on 12 June 2025, adopted resolution GOV/2025/38 … Since Iran stopped provisionally applying its Additional Protocol in February 2021, the Agency has not been able, inter alia, to conduct complementary access to any sites or other locations in Iran.
- Analysis of IAEA Iran Verification and Monitoring and NPT Safeguards Reports — June 2026
Institute for Science and International Security (David Albright, Sarah Burkhard, Spencer Faragasso, Andrea Stricker), 2026-06-09 · complicates
“The IAEA conducted an inspection and a DIV between June 1-3, 2026, at Bushehr. The IAEA stated in its February 2026 NPT report that “the Agency had conducted inspections/DIVs at 7 of the 13 unaffected facilities, but had yet to conduct inspections/DIVs at any of the 8 affected facilities or at the Isfahan Fuel Enrichment Plant).” … With the massive destruction of its gas centrifuge program and installed centrifuge cascades, for the first time in 20 years, Iran has no identifiable route to produce weapon-grade uranium (WGU) in its centrifuge enrichment plants. … While before the strikes, Iran could have made its first non-missile deliverable nuclear weapon within months, it would need more than a year today and face significant new uncertainties in knowing whether the weapon would work. Director General Grossi stated after the June 2025 strikes that the IAEA believes that most of the HEU, but less than 70 percent of the stock, is located inside the Esfahan tunnel complex. … The IAEA emphasizes that “Iran is the only NPT non-nuclear-weapon State to have produced and accumulated uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 …” … no breakout estimate to WGU is included in the Institute’s analysis of the IAEA report, since to do so would require unsubstantiated speculation”
The IAEA conducted an inspection and a DIV between June 1-3, 2026, at Bushehr. The IAEA stated in its February 2026 NPT report that “the Agency had conducted inspections/DIVs at 7 of the 13 unaffected facilities, but had yet to conduct inspections/DIVs at any of the 8 affected facilities or at the Isfahan Fuel Enrichment Plant).” … With the massive destruction of its gas centrifuge program and installed centrifuge cascades, for the first time in 20 years, Iran has no identifiable route to produce weapon-grade uranium (WGU) in its centrifuge enrichment plants. … While before the strikes, Iran could have made its first non-missile deliverable nuclear weapon within months, it would need more than a year today and face significant new uncertainties in knowing whether the weapon would work. Director General Grossi stated after the June 2025 strikes that the IAEA believes that most of the HEU, but less than 70 percent of the stock, is located inside the Esfahan tunnel complex. … The IAEA emphasizes that “Iran is the only NPT non-nuclear-weapon State to have produced and accumulated uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 …” … no breakout estimate to WGU is included in the Institute’s analysis of the IAEA report, since to do so would require unsubstantiated speculation
- Iran and Nuclear Weapons Production (IF12106)
Congressional Research Service (Paul K. Kerr), via EveryCRSReport, 2026-10-13 · complicates
“The status of Iran’s nuclear program is unclear. … A November 2024 ODNI report explained that Iran’s fissile material stockpile would, if further enriched, have been sufficient for “more than a dozen nuclear weapons.” The U.S. government estimated that Iran would have needed as little as one week to produce enough weapons-grade HEU for one nuclear weapon, according to a State Department (DOS) official in March 2022. The Defense Intelligence Agency assessed in May 2025 that Iran would have needed “probably less than one week” to produce this amount of HEU. … HEU used in nuclear weapons typically contains about 90% u-235. … The latter two categories of UF6 are of particular concern because relatively little additional effort would be necessary to produce weapons-grade HEU using UF6 containing these amounts of u-235. … Iran’s Foreign Minister Seyed Abbas Araghchi stated on March 15, 2026, that the country’s enriched uranium is “under the rubble” created by the June 2025 attacks on Iran’s enrichment facilities. Iran has “no plan” to recover this material, he added. In 2026, U.S. and Iranian officials have said that Iran has not resumed enriching uranium. … Grossi stated on March 4, 2026, that the IAEA in June 2025 had no “information indicating that there was a structured systematic [Iranian] program to build or to construct a nuclear weapon.” … The 2024 ATA observed that “Iran is not currently undertaking the key nuclear weapons-development activities necessary to produce a testable nuclear device.” … The 2026 ATA states that the United States is “monitoring Iranian WMD-related capabilities and actions following” the 2026 attacks; the ATA does not address Iran’s nuclear weapons activities. … A June 2026 memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the United States and Iran states that “Iran reaffirms that it shall not procure or develop nuclear weapons.” … The current assessed timeline is unclear. … Neither the U.S. government nor the IAEA have publicly described evidence that Iran is conducting covert fissile material production nuclear activities.”
The status of Iran’s nuclear program is unclear. … A November 2024 ODNI report explained that Iran’s fissile material stockpile would, if further enriched, have been sufficient for “more than a dozen nuclear weapons.” The U.S. government estimated that Iran would have needed as little as one week to produce enough weapons-grade HEU for one nuclear weapon, according to a State Department (DOS) official in March 2022. The Defense Intelligence Agency assessed in May 2025 that Iran would have needed “probably less than one week” to produce this amount of HEU. … HEU used in nuclear weapons typically contains about 90% u-235. … The latter two categories of UF6 are of particular concern because relatively little additional effort would be necessary to produce weapons-grade HEU using UF6 containing these amounts of u-235. … Iran’s Foreign Minister Seyed Abbas Araghchi stated on March 15, 2026, that the country’s enriched uranium is “under the rubble” created by the June 2025 attacks on Iran’s enrichment facilities. Iran has “no plan” to recover this material, he added. In 2026, U.S. and Iranian officials have said that Iran has not resumed enriching uranium. … Grossi stated on March 4, 2026, that the IAEA in June 2025 had no “information indicating that there was a structured systematic [Iranian] program to build or to construct a nuclear weapon.” … The 2024 ATA observed that “Iran is not currently undertaking the key nuclear weapons-development activities necessary to produce a testable nuclear device.” … The 2026 ATA states that the United States is “monitoring Iranian WMD-related capabilities and actions following” the 2026 attacks; the ATA does not address Iran’s nuclear weapons activities. … A June 2026 memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the United States and Iran states that “Iran reaffirms that it shall not procure or develop nuclear weapons.” … The current assessed timeline is unclear. … Neither the U.S. government nor the IAEA have publicly described evidence that Iran is conducting covert fissile material production nuclear activities.
- Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, 2025
Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2025-03 · complicates
“We continue to assess Iran is not building a nuclear weapon and that Khamenei has not reauthorized the nuclear weapons program he suspended in 2003, though pressure has probably built on him to do so. In the past year, there has been an erosion of a decades-long taboo on discussing nuclear weapons in public that has emboldened nuclear weapons advocates within Iran's decisionmaking apparatus.”
We continue to assess Iran is not building a nuclear weapon and that Khamenei has not reauthorized the nuclear weapons program he suspended in 2003, though pressure has probably built on him to do so. In the past year, there has been an erosion of a decades-long taboo on discussing nuclear weapons in public that has emboldened nuclear weapons advocates within Iran's decisionmaking apparatus.
- Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, 2026
Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2026-03 · complicates
“Prior to Operation Epic Fury, Iran was … intending to try to recover from the devastation of its nuclear infrastructure sustained during the 12-Day War, and refused to live up to its nuclear obligations with the IAEA, including refusing to allow IAEA access to key nuclear facilities. … We are monitoring Iranian WMD-related capabilities and actions following the initiation of Operation Epic Fury.”
Prior to Operation Epic Fury, Iran was … intending to try to recover from the devastation of its nuclear infrastructure sustained during the 12-Day War, and refused to live up to its nuclear obligations with the IAEA, including refusing to allow IAEA access to key nuclear facilities. … We are monitoring Iranian WMD-related capabilities and actions following the initiation of Operation Epic Fury.
- NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran, GOV/2025/25, paras 17, 77–81, 86
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2025-05-31 · supports
“these three locations, and other possible related locations, were part of an undeclared structured nuclear programme carried out by Iran until the early 2000s and that some activities used undeclared nuclear material. … the Agency concludes that approximately 10 kg of natural uranium metal, which had not been declared by Iran, was available to the Applied Physics Institute (API) operating at Lavisan-Shian in the period 2002-2003. … Iran retained unknown nuclear material and/or heavily contaminated equipment, and other assets, arising from the former undeclared structured nuclear programme, at Turquzabad in the period 2009 until 2018, after which items were removed from the location. … The Agency has no credible indications of an ongoing, undeclared structured nuclear programme of the type described above in Iran and notes the statements of the highest officials in Iran that the use of nuclear weapons is incompatible with Islamic Law. … the fact that Iran is the only non-nuclear-weapon State in the world that is producing and accumulating uranium enriched to 60% remains a matter of serious concern … has sanitised locations as listed in this report, which has impeded Agency verification activities. … the Agency will not be in a position to provide assurance that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful.”
these three locations, and other possible related locations, were part of an undeclared structured nuclear programme carried out by Iran until the early 2000s and that some activities used undeclared nuclear material. … the Agency concludes that approximately 10 kg of natural uranium metal, which had not been declared by Iran, was available to the Applied Physics Institute (API) operating at Lavisan-Shian in the period 2002-2003. … Iran retained unknown nuclear material and/or heavily contaminated equipment, and other assets, arising from the former undeclared structured nuclear programme, at Turquzabad in the period 2009 until 2018, after which items were removed from the location. … The Agency has no credible indications of an ongoing, undeclared structured nuclear programme of the type described above in Iran and notes the statements of the highest officials in Iran that the use of nuclear weapons is incompatible with Islamic Law. … the fact that Iran is the only non-nuclear-weapon State in the world that is producing and accumulating uranium enriched to 60% remains a matter of serious concern … has sanitised locations as listed in this report, which has impeded Agency verification activities. … the Agency will not be in a position to provide assurance that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful.
- Final Assessment on Past and Present Outstanding Issues regarding Iran’s Nuclear Programme, GOV/2015/68, para 87
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2015-12-02 · complicates
“The Agency assesses that a range of activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device were conducted in Iran prior to the end of 2003 as a coordinated effort, and some activities took place after 2003. The Agency also assesses that these activities did not advance beyond feasibility and scientific studies, and the acquisition of certain relevant technical competences and capabilities. The Agency has no credible indications of activities in Iran relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device after 2009.”
The Agency assesses that a range of activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device were conducted in Iran prior to the end of 2003 as a coordinated effort, and some activities took place after 2003. The Agency also assesses that these activities did not advance beyond feasibility and scientific studies, and the acquisition of certain relevant technical competences and capabilities. The Agency has no credible indications of activities in Iran relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device after 2009.
- Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, GOV/2011/65, Annex para 53
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2011-11-08 · supports
“After assessing carefully and critically the extensive information available to it, the Agency finds the information to be, overall, credible. The information indicates that Iran has carried out activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device. The information also indicates that prior to the end of 2003, these activities took place under a structured programme, and that some activities may still be ongoing.”
After assessing carefully and critically the extensive information available to it, the Agency finds the information to be, overall, credible. The information indicates that Iran has carried out activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device. The information also indicates that prior to the end of 2003, these activities took place under a structured programme, and that some activities may still be ongoing.
- Timeline of Nuclear Diplomacy With Iran
Arms Control Association, 2023-01 · supports
“Iran is meeting its nuclear obligations, although it slightly exceeded a cap set on the stockpile of heavy water … bringing Iran back within the limit … May 8, 2018: President Trump announces that he is withdrawing the United States from the JCPOA … May 8, 2019: Iran announces that it will no longer be bound by stockpiles limitations … July 1, 2019: Iran announces that it breached the 300 kilogram limit … The IAEA confirms that Iran has exceeded the limit. … April 13, 2021: Iran notifies the International Atomic Energy Agency that it has begun to boost enrichment levels to 60 percent … in response to the April 11 attack.”
Iran is meeting its nuclear obligations, although it slightly exceeded a cap set on the stockpile of heavy water … bringing Iran back within the limit … May 8, 2018: President Trump announces that he is withdrawing the United States from the JCPOA … May 8, 2019: Iran announces that it will no longer be bound by stockpiles limitations … July 1, 2019: Iran announces that it breached the 300 kilogram limit … The IAEA confirms that Iran has exceeded the limit. … April 13, 2021: Iran notifies the International Atomic Energy Agency that it has begun to boost enrichment levels to 60 percent … in response to the April 11 attack.
- The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) at a Glance
Arms Control Association, 2025-02 · supports
“For 10 years operating centrifuges reduced to 5,060 IR-1 machines … For 15 years level of uranium enrichment capped at 3.67 percent uranium-235 … For 15 years the stockpile is kept under 300 kilograms of 3.67 percent enriched uranium in total (all forms) … January 16, 2016, Implementation Day”
For 10 years operating centrifuges reduced to 5,060 IR-1 machines … For 15 years level of uranium enrichment capped at 3.67 percent uranium-235 … For 15 years the stockpile is kept under 300 kilograms of 3.67 percent enriched uranium in total (all forms) … January 16, 2016, Implementation Day
- Hegseth and Caine Hold a Briefing on Iran (transcript)
Rev (transcript of a US Department of Defense briefing), 2026-04-08 · complicates
“nearly 80% of Iran's nuclear industrial base was hit, further degrading their attempts to attain a nuclear weapon. … So right now it's buried and we're watching it. We know exactly what they have”
nearly 80% of Iran's nuclear industrial base was hit, further degrading their attempts to attain a nuclear weapon. … So right now it's buried and we're watching it. We know exactly what they have
- Oversights Mar Low-End Estimate of Tehran's Nuclear Weapons Timeline
Foundation for Defense of Democracies (Andrea Stricker), 2026-05-06 · complicates
“U.S. intelligence assessments have concluded that Iran is now 9 to 12 months away from being able to build a nuclear weapon, according to a Reuters report. … In July 2025, the Pentagon estimated that the June strikes had pushed Iran back to roughly two years … prior to this conflict and the 12-Day War, U.S. intelligence reportedly placed Iran's breakout time at three to six months. … Any realistic assessment accounting for all these setbacks would place the timeline at two and a half years at least, absent foreign assistance.”
U.S. intelligence assessments have concluded that Iran is now 9 to 12 months away from being able to build a nuclear weapon, according to a Reuters report. … In July 2025, the Pentagon estimated that the June strikes had pushed Iran back to roughly two years … prior to this conflict and the 12-Day War, U.S. intelligence reportedly placed Iran's breakout time at three to six months. … Any realistic assessment accounting for all these setbacks would place the timeline at two and a half years at least, absent foreign assistance.
- NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran, Board resolution GOV/2026/40
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors, via Iran Watch, 2026-06-10 · supports
“The resolution was adopted with 21 in favour, 3 against and 10 abstentions.”
The resolution was adopted with 21 in favour, 3 against and 10 abstentions.
- NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran, Board resolution GOV/2026/61
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors, via Iran Watch, 2026-09-09 · supports
“The resolution was adopted with 23 in favour, 3 against and 8 abstentions. … Requests the Director General to report this resolution and the previously adopted resolutions contained in GOV/2025/38 and GOV/2026/40, as well as the Director General’s report contained in GOV/2026/50, to all Members of the Agency and to the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations”
The resolution was adopted with 23 in favour, 3 against and 8 abstentions. … Requests the Director General to report this resolution and the previously adopted resolutions contained in GOV/2025/38 and GOV/2026/40, as well as the Director General’s report contained in GOV/2026/50, to all Members of the Agency and to the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations
- Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/INF/2019/8
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2019-07-01 · supports
“On 1 July 2019, the Agency verified that the quantity of Iran’s uranium enriched up to 3.67% U-235 was 205.0 kg, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission. Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile, therefore, has exceeded 300 kg of UF6 enriched up to 3.67% U-235 (or the equivalent in different chemical forms), as the quantity of 300 kg of UF6 corresponds to 202.8 kg of uranium.”
On 1 July 2019, the Agency verified that the quantity of Iran’s uranium enriched up to 3.67% U-235 was 205.0 kg, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission. Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile, therefore, has exceeded 300 kg of UF6 enriched up to 3.67% U-235 (or the equivalent in different chemical forms), as the quantity of 300 kg of UF6 corresponds to 202.8 kg of uranium.
- Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/INF/2019/9
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2019-07-08 · supports
“On 8 July 2019, the Agency, using its on-line enrichment monitors, verified that Iran was enriching UF6 above 3.67% U-235 at FEP.”
On 8 July 2019, the Agency, using its on-line enrichment monitors, verified that Iran was enriching UF6 above 3.67% U-235 at FEP.
- Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2017/10
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2017-02-24 · supports
“Iran has not enriched uranium above 3.67% U-235 (para. 28). … Throughout the reporting period, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile has not exceeded 300 kg of UF6 enriched up to 3.67% U-235 (or the equivalent in different chemical forms) (para. 56). … As of 18 February 2017, the quantity of Iran’s uranium enriched up to 3.67% U-235 was 101.7 kg, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission.”
Iran has not enriched uranium above 3.67% U-235 (para. 28). … Throughout the reporting period, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile has not exceeded 300 kg of UF6 enriched up to 3.67% U-235 (or the equivalent in different chemical forms) (para. 56). … As of 18 February 2017, the quantity of Iran’s uranium enriched up to 3.67% U-235 was 101.7 kg, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission.
- Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2017/24
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2017-06-02 · supports
“Iran has not enriched uranium above 3.67% U-235 (para. 28). … Throughout the reporting period, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile has not exceeded 300 kg of UF6 enriched up to 3.67% U-235 (or the equivalent in different chemical forms) (para. 56). … As of 27 May 2017, the quantity of Iran’s uranium enriched up to 3.67% U-235 was 79.8 kg, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission.”
Iran has not enriched uranium above 3.67% U-235 (para. 28). … Throughout the reporting period, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile has not exceeded 300 kg of UF6 enriched up to 3.67% U-235 (or the equivalent in different chemical forms) (para. 56). … As of 27 May 2017, the quantity of Iran’s uranium enriched up to 3.67% U-235 was 79.8 kg, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission.
- Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2017/35
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2017-08-31 · supports
“Iran has not enriched uranium above 3.67% U-235 (para. 28). … Throughout the reporting period, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile has not exceeded 300 kg of UF6 enriched up to 3.67% U-235 (or the equivalent in different chemical forms) (para. 56). … As of 21 August 2017, the quantity of Iran’s uranium enriched up to 3.67% U-235 was 88.4 kg, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission.”
Iran has not enriched uranium above 3.67% U-235 (para. 28). … Throughout the reporting period, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile has not exceeded 300 kg of UF6 enriched up to 3.67% U-235 (or the equivalent in different chemical forms) (para. 56). … As of 21 August 2017, the quantity of Iran’s uranium enriched up to 3.67% U-235 was 88.4 kg, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission.
- Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2017/48
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2017-11-13 · supports
“Iran has not enriched uranium above 3.67% U-235 (para. 28). … Throughout the reporting period, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile has not exceeded 300 kg of UF6 enriched up to 3.67% U-235 (or the equivalent in different chemical forms) (para. 56). … As of 5 November 2017, the quantity of Iran’s uranium enriched up to 3.67% U-235 was 96.7 kg, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission.”
Iran has not enriched uranium above 3.67% U-235 (para. 28). … Throughout the reporting period, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile has not exceeded 300 kg of UF6 enriched up to 3.67% U-235 (or the equivalent in different chemical forms) (para. 56). … As of 5 November 2017, the quantity of Iran’s uranium enriched up to 3.67% U-235 was 96.7 kg, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission.
- Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2018/7
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2018-02-22 · supports
“Iran has not enriched uranium above 3.67% U-235 (para. 28). … Throughout the reporting period, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile has not exceeded 300 kg of UF6 enriched up to 3.67% U-235 (or the equivalent in different chemical forms) (para. 56). … As of 12 February 2018, the quantity of Iran’s uranium enriched up to 3.67% U-235 was 109.5 kg, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission.”
Iran has not enriched uranium above 3.67% U-235 (para. 28). … Throughout the reporting period, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile has not exceeded 300 kg of UF6 enriched up to 3.67% U-235 (or the equivalent in different chemical forms) (para. 56). … As of 12 February 2018, the quantity of Iran’s uranium enriched up to 3.67% U-235 was 109.5 kg, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission.
- Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2018/24
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2018-05-24 · supports
“Iran has not enriched uranium above 3.67% U-235 (para. 28). … Throughout the reporting period, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile has not exceeded 300 kg of UF6 enriched up to 3.67% U-235 (or the equivalent in different chemical forms) (para. 56). … As of 14 May 2018, the quantity of Iran’s uranium enriched up to 3.67% U-235 was 123.9 kg, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission.”
Iran has not enriched uranium above 3.67% U-235 (para. 28). … Throughout the reporting period, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile has not exceeded 300 kg of UF6 enriched up to 3.67% U-235 (or the equivalent in different chemical forms) (para. 56). … As of 14 May 2018, the quantity of Iran’s uranium enriched up to 3.67% U-235 was 123.9 kg, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission.
- Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2018/33
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2018-08-30 · supports
“Iran has not enriched uranium above 3.67% U-235 (para. 28). … Throughout the reporting period, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile has not exceeded 300 kg of UF6 enriched up to 3.67% U-235 (or the equivalent in different chemical forms) (para. 56). … As of 18 August 2018, the quantity of Iran’s uranium enriched up to 3.67% U-235 was 139.4 kg, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission. … The Agency has continued to evaluate Iran’s declarations under the Additional Protocol, and has conducted complementary accesses under the Additional Protocol to all the sites and locations in Iran which it needed to visit.”
Iran has not enriched uranium above 3.67% U-235 (para. 28). … Throughout the reporting period, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile has not exceeded 300 kg of UF6 enriched up to 3.67% U-235 (or the equivalent in different chemical forms) (para. 56). … As of 18 August 2018, the quantity of Iran’s uranium enriched up to 3.67% U-235 was 139.4 kg, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission. … The Agency has continued to evaluate Iran’s declarations under the Additional Protocol, and has conducted complementary accesses under the Additional Protocol to all the sites and locations in Iran which it needed to visit.
- Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2018/47
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2018-11-12 · supports
“Iran has not enriched uranium above 3.67% U-235 (para. 28). … Throughout the reporting period, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile has not exceeded 300 kg of UF6 enriched up to 3.67% U-235 (or the equivalent in different chemical forms) (para. 56). … As of 4 November 2018, the quantity of Iran’s uranium enriched up to 3.67% U-235 was 149.4 kg, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission.”
Iran has not enriched uranium above 3.67% U-235 (para. 28). … Throughout the reporting period, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile has not exceeded 300 kg of UF6 enriched up to 3.67% U-235 (or the equivalent in different chemical forms) (para. 56). … As of 4 November 2018, the quantity of Iran’s uranium enriched up to 3.67% U-235 was 149.4 kg, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission.
- Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2019/10
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2019-02-22 · supports
“Iran has not enriched uranium above 3.67% U-235 (para. 28). … Throughout the reporting period, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile has not exceeded 300 kg of UF6 enriched up to 3.67% U-235 (or the equivalent in different chemical forms) (para. 56). … As of 16 February 2019, the quantity of Iran’s uranium enriched up to 3.67% U-235 was 163.8 kg, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission.”
Iran has not enriched uranium above 3.67% U-235 (para. 28). … Throughout the reporting period, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile has not exceeded 300 kg of UF6 enriched up to 3.67% U-235 (or the equivalent in different chemical forms) (para. 56). … As of 16 February 2019, the quantity of Iran’s uranium enriched up to 3.67% U-235 was 163.8 kg, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission.
- Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2019/21
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2019-05-31 · supports
“Iran has not enriched uranium above 3.67% U-235 (para. 28). … Throughout the reporting period, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile has not exceeded 300 kg of UF6 enriched up to 3.67% U-235 (or the equivalent in different chemical forms) (para. 56). … As of 20 May 2019, the quantity of Iran’s uranium enriched up to 3.67% U-235 was 174.1 kg, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission.”
Iran has not enriched uranium above 3.67% U-235 (para. 28). … Throughout the reporting period, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile has not exceeded 300 kg of UF6 enriched up to 3.67% U-235 (or the equivalent in different chemical forms) (para. 56). … As of 20 May 2019, the quantity of Iran’s uranium enriched up to 3.67% U-235 was 174.1 kg, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission.
- Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2019/32
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2019-08-30 · supports
“As of 19 August 2019, the Agency verified that Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 241.6 kg, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission.”
As of 19 August 2019, the Agency verified that Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 241.6 kg, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission.
- Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2019/55
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2019-11-11 · supports
“As of 3 November 2019, the Agency verified that, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 372.3 kg (+130.7 kg since the Acting Director General’s previous quarterly report).”
As of 3 November 2019, the Agency verified that, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 372.3 kg (+130.7 kg since the Acting Director General’s previous quarterly report).
- Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2020/5
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2020-03-03 · supports
“As of 19 February 2020, the Agency verified that, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile, comprising enriched uranium produced at FEP, PFEP and FFEP was 1020.9 kg (+648.6 kg since the previous quarterly report).”
As of 19 February 2020, the Agency verified that, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile, comprising enriched uranium produced at FEP, PFEP and FFEP was 1020.9 kg (+648.6 kg since the previous quarterly report).
- Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2020/26
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2020-06-05 · supports
“As of 20 May 2020, the Agency verified that, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile, comprising enriched uranium produced at FEP, PFEP and FFEP was 1571.6 kg (+550.7 kg since the previous quarterly report).”
As of 20 May 2020, the Agency verified that, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile, comprising enriched uranium produced at FEP, PFEP and FFEP was 1571.6 kg (+550.7 kg since the previous quarterly report).
- Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2020/41
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2020-09-04 · supports
“As of 25 August 2020, the Agency verified that, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile, comprising enriched uranium produced at FEP, PFEP and FFEP was 2105.4 kg (+533.8 kg since the previous quarterly report).”
As of 25 August 2020, the Agency verified that, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile, comprising enriched uranium produced at FEP, PFEP and FFEP was 2105.4 kg (+533.8 kg since the previous quarterly report).
- Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2020/51
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2020-11-11 · supports
“As of 2 November 2020, the Agency verified that, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile, comprising enriched uranium produced at FEP, PFEP and FFEP was 2442.9 kg (+337.5 kg since the previous quarterly report).”
As of 2 November 2020, the Agency verified that, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile, comprising enriched uranium produced at FEP, PFEP and FFEP was 2442.9 kg (+337.5 kg since the previous quarterly report).
- Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2021/10
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2021-02-23 · supports
“As of 16 February 2021, the Agency verified that, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile, comprising enriched uranium produced at FEP, PFEP and FFEP was 2967.8 kg (+524.9 kg since the previous quarterly report).”
As of 16 February 2021, the Agency verified that, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile, comprising enriched uranium produced at FEP, PFEP and FFEP was 2967.8 kg (+524.9 kg since the previous quarterly report).
- Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2021/28
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2021-05-31 · supports
“For this reporting period, the Agency has not been able to verify Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile, comprising enriched uranium produced at FEP, PFEP and FFEP. … the Agency has estimated that, as of 22 May 2021, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 3241.0 kg (+273.2 kg since the previous quarterly report). … 2.4 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235. … has been enriching UF6 up to 60% U-235 since 17 April 2021. … Since 23 February 2021, while centrifuges and associated infrastructure in storage remained under continuous monitoring by Agency surveillance equipment, the Agency has not had access to the data and recordings collected by its equipment (paras 29, 47, 48 and 70).”
For this reporting period, the Agency has not been able to verify Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile, comprising enriched uranium produced at FEP, PFEP and FFEP. … the Agency has estimated that, as of 22 May 2021, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 3241.0 kg (+273.2 kg since the previous quarterly report). … 2.4 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235. … has been enriching UF6 up to 60% U-235 since 17 April 2021. … Since 23 February 2021, while centrifuges and associated infrastructure in storage remained under continuous monitoring by Agency surveillance equipment, the Agency has not had access to the data and recordings collected by its equipment (paras 29, 47, 48 and 70).
- Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2021/39
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2021-09-07 · supports
“… the Agency has estimated that, as of 30 August 2021, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 2441.3 kg. This figure represents a decrease of 799.7 kg since the previous quarterly report, which is due to the use of uranium enriched up to 2% U-235 to produce uranium enriched up to 5% U-235. … 10.0 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (+7.6 kg).”
… the Agency has estimated that, as of 30 August 2021, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 2441.3 kg. This figure represents a decrease of 799.7 kg since the previous quarterly report, which is due to the use of uranium enriched up to 2% U-235 to produce uranium enriched up to 5% U-235. … 10.0 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (+7.6 kg).
- Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2021/51
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2021-11-17 · supports
“… the Agency has estimated that, as of 6 November 2021, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 2489.7 kg. … 17.7 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (+7.7 kg).”
… the Agency has estimated that, as of 6 November 2021, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 2489.7 kg. … 17.7 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (+7.7 kg).
- Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2022/4
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2022-03-03 · supports
“… the Agency has estimated that, as of 19 February 2022, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 3197.1 kg. … 33.2 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (+15.5 kg).”
… the Agency has estimated that, as of 19 February 2022, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 3197.1 kg. … 33.2 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (+15.5 kg).
- Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2022/24
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2022-05-30 · supports
“… the Agency has estimated that, as of 15 May 2022, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 3809.3 kg. … 43.1 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (+9.9 kg).”
… the Agency has estimated that, as of 15 May 2022, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 3809.3 kg. … 43.1 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (+9.9 kg).
- Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2022/39
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2022-09-07 · supports
“… the Agency has estimated that, as of 21 August 2022, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 3940.9 kg. … 55.6 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (+12.5 kg).”
… the Agency has estimated that, as of 21 August 2022, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 3940.9 kg. … 55.6 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (+12.5 kg).
- Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2022/62
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2022-11-10 · supports
“… the Agency has estimated that, as of 22 October 2022, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 3673.7 kg. … 62.3 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (+6.7 kg).”
… the Agency has estimated that, as of 22 October 2022, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 3673.7 kg. … 62.3 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (+6.7 kg).
- Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2023/8
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2023-02-28 · supports
“… the Agency has estimated that, as of 12 February 2023, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 3760.8 kg. … 87.5 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (+25.2 kg).”
… the Agency has estimated that, as of 12 February 2023, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 3760.8 kg. … 87.5 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (+25.2 kg).
- Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2023/24
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2023-05-31 · supports
“… the Agency has estimated that, as of 13 May 2023, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 4744.5 kg. … 114.1 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (+26.6 kg).”
… the Agency has estimated that, as of 13 May 2023, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 4744.5 kg. … 114.1 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (+26.6 kg).
- Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2023/39
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2023-09-04 · supports
“… the Agency has estimated that, as of 19 August 2023, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 3795.5 kg. … 121.6 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (+7.5 kg).”
… the Agency has estimated that, as of 19 August 2023, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 3795.5 kg. … 121.6 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (+7.5 kg).
- Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2023/57
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2023-11-15 · supports
“… the Agency has estimated that, as of 28 October 2023, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 4486.8 kg. … 128.3 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (+6.7 kg).”
… the Agency has estimated that, as of 28 October 2023, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 4486.8 kg. … 128.3 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (+6.7 kg).
- Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2024/7
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2024-02-26 · supports
“… the Agency has estimated that, as of 10 February 2024, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 5525.5 kg. … 121.5 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (–6.8 kg).”
… the Agency has estimated that, as of 10 February 2024, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 5525.5 kg. … 121.5 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (–6.8 kg).
- Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2024/26
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2024-05-27 · supports
“… the Agency has estimated that, as of 11 May 2024, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 6201.3 kg. … 142.1 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (+20.6 kg).”
… the Agency has estimated that, as of 11 May 2024, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 6201.3 kg. … 142.1 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (+20.6 kg).
- Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2024/41
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2024-08-29 · supports
“… the Agency has estimated that, as of 17 August 2024, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 5751.8 kg. … 164.7 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (+22.6 kg).”
… the Agency has estimated that, as of 17 August 2024, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 5751.8 kg. … 164.7 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (+22.6 kg).
- Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2024/61
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2024-11-19 · supports
“… the Agency has estimated that, as of 26 October 2024, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 6604.4 kg. … 182.3 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (+17.6 kg).”
… the Agency has estimated that, as of 26 October 2024, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 6604.4 kg. … 182.3 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (+17.6 kg).
- Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2025/8
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2025-02-26 · supports
“… the Agency has estimated that, as of 8 February 2025, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 8294.4 kg. … 274.8 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (+92.5 kg).”
… the Agency has estimated that, as of 8 February 2025, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 8294.4 kg. … 274.8 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (+92.5 kg).
- Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of United Nations Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, GOV/2026/50, para 27 and footnote 17
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2026-09-01 · supports
“Based on the information provided by Iran up to 12 June 2025, previous Agency verification activities and estimates based on the past operating records of the relevant declared facilities, the Agency’s estimate of Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile, as of 13 June 2025, was 9874.9 kg, comprising 9040.5 kg of uranium in the form of UF6 and 834.4 kg of uranium in other forms. The total enriched uranium stockpile of 9040.5 kg in the form of UF6 comprised: 8599.6 kg of LEU – 2391.1 kg of uranium enriched up to 2% U-235, 6024.4 kg of uranium enriched up to 5% U-235, and 184.1 kg of uranium enriched up to 20% U-235; and 440.9 kg of HEU – uranium enriched up to 60% U-235. … The Agency has verified 432.9 kg of this 440.9 kg of uranium in the form of UF6 enriched up to 60% U-235.”
Based on the information provided by Iran up to 12 June 2025, previous Agency verification activities and estimates based on the past operating records of the relevant declared facilities, the Agency’s estimate of Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile, as of 13 June 2025, was 9874.9 kg, comprising 9040.5 kg of uranium in the form of UF6 and 834.4 kg of uranium in other forms. The total enriched uranium stockpile of 9040.5 kg in the form of UF6 comprised: 8599.6 kg of LEU – 2391.1 kg of uranium enriched up to 2% U-235, 6024.4 kg of uranium enriched up to 5% U-235, and 184.1 kg of uranium enriched up to 20% U-235; and 440.9 kg of HEU – uranium enriched up to 60% U-235. … The Agency has verified 432.9 kg of this 440.9 kg of uranium in the form of UF6 enriched up to 60% U-235.
- Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2025/24, paras 26–27
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2025-05-31 · supports
“the Agency has estimated that, as of 17 May 2025, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 9247.6 kg. This figure represents an increase of 953.2 kg since the previous quarterly report. … 408.6 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (+133.8 kg).”
the Agency has estimated that, as of 17 May 2025, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 9247.6 kg. This figure represents an increase of 953.2 kg since the previous quarterly report. … 408.6 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (+133.8 kg).
The War's Human and Financial Costs, with Earlier Wars for Scale, 2026
- Day 39 of U.S. and Israeli Attacks on Iran: Extensive Damage to the Rail Network and Roads
HRANA (Human Rights Activists News Agency), 2026-04-07 · supports
“Aggregated data since the beginning of the conflict on February 28, 2026, based on incidents recorded in the incident tab and using minimum values for figures marked "more than": • Civilian fatalities: 1,701 people (including at least 254 children) • Military fatalities: 1,221 people • Unclassified fatalities (civilian/military): 714 people … Delays in medical reporting, difficulties in confirming identities, and restricted access to certain provinces may result in temporary undercounting. … they have not been included in the event-based calculations”
Aggregated data since the beginning of the conflict on February 28, 2026, based on incidents recorded in the incident tab and using minimum values for figures marked "more than": • Civilian fatalities: 1,701 people (including at least 254 children) • Military fatalities: 1,221 people • Unclassified fatalities (civilian/military): 714 people … Delays in medical reporting, difficulties in confirming identities, and restricted access to certain provinces may result in temporary undercounting. … they have not been included in the event-based calculations
- At least 7,650 killed in 40 days of war, including 1,030 civilians — Hengaw’s tenth report
Hengaw Organization for Human Rights, 2026-04-08 · complicates
“According to data collected by Hengaw, at least 7,650 people were killed during the recent war, of whom 1,030 (equivalent to 13.5%) were civilians. … At least 6,620 military personnel were killed, the majority of whom were members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the army. … Hengaw has repeatedly emphasized during the conflict that Iranian military forces abandoned official bases and were stationed in civilian locations, including schools, student dormitories, and mosques within residential areas. … To date, no comprehensive official report on military casualties has been issued by state authorities.”
According to data collected by Hengaw, at least 7,650 people were killed during the recent war, of whom 1,030 (equivalent to 13.5%) were civilians. … At least 6,620 military personnel were killed, the majority of whom were members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the army. … Hengaw has repeatedly emphasized during the conflict that Iranian military forces abandoned official bases and were stationed in civilian locations, including schools, student dormitories, and mosques within residential areas. … To date, no comprehensive official report on military casualties has been issued by state authorities.
- Middle East escalation of conflict — Global external situation report #10 (data as of 21 July)
World Health Organization, 2026-07-22 · supports
“Iran 3 200 000 [Displaced] 33 806 [Injured] 3 375 [Deaths] … All numbers are estimates and may differ from other sources due to data cutoff times. … Since the beginning of the hostilities on 28 February, national authorities reported 3375 deaths and 33 806 injuries in the Islamic Republic of Iran, including 15 injuries following strikes on 7 June. An additional 50 deaths and more than 517 injuries have been reported as occurring between 27 June – 19 July … Cumulative figures since 28 February have yet to be reported.”
Iran 3 200 000 [Displaced] 33 806 [Injured] 3 375 [Deaths] … All numbers are estimates and may differ from other sources due to data cutoff times. … Since the beginning of the hostilities on 28 February, national authorities reported 3375 deaths and 33 806 injuries in the Islamic Republic of Iran, including 15 injuries following strikes on 7 June. An additional 50 deaths and more than 517 injuries have been reported as occurring between 27 June – 19 July … Cumulative figures since 28 February have yet to be reported.
- World Development Indicators: Population, total (SP.POP.TOTL), Iran
World Bank, 2026-10-08 · supports
“"indicator":{"id":"SP.POP.TOTL","value":"Population, total"},"country":{"id":"IR","value":"Iran, Islamic Rep."},"countryiso3code":"IRN","date":"2025","value":92417681”
"indicator":{"id":"SP.POP.TOTL","value":"Population, total"},"country":{"id":"IR","value":"Iran, Islamic Rep."},"countryiso3code":"IRN","date":"2025","value":92417681
- Israeli, Iranian and US forces in Iran 2026 (conflict page)
Airwars, 2026-10 · supports
“Over 40 days Airwars tracked 267 civilian harm incidents and has published 71. … In June, U.S. strikes began again after negotiations faltered. Airwars' rapid response team has tracked 34 further incidents of civilian harm, of which 23 have been published.”
Over 40 days Airwars tracked 267 civilian harm incidents and has published 71. … In June, U.S. strikes began again after negotiations faltered. Airwars' rapid response team has tracked 34 further incidents of civilian harm, of which 23 have been published.
- Civilian harm in Iran after one month of war
Airwars, 2026-03-27 · complicates
“At least 1,443 civilians have been killed by U.S. and Israeli forces, including 217 children, according to HRA.”
At least 1,443 civilians have been killed by U.S. and Israeli forces, including 217 children, according to HRA.
- Report of the independent international fact-finding mission on the Islamic Republic of Iran (A/HRC/61/60)
UN Human Rights Council, 2026-03-19 · complicates
“On 3 March, the Iranian Red Crescent Society reported that 787 people had been killed in the Islamic Republic of Iran since the air strikes had begun.”
On 3 March, the Iranian Red Crescent Society reported that 787 people had been killed in the Islamic Republic of Iran since the air strikes had begun.
- Pentagon raises Iran war death toll to 21
Task & Purpose, 2026-10-10 · supports
“Since Feb. 28, 865 service members have been wounded in the war, the majority since July 7. … This summer the Pentagon split deaths and injuries in the war into two separate categories: one for Operation Epic Fury and one listed as 'overseas operations,' covering casualties since July.”
Since Feb. 28, 865 service members have been wounded in the war, the majority since July 7. … This summer the Pentagon split deaths and injuries in the war into two separate categories: one for Operation Epic Fury and one listed as 'overseas operations,' covering casualties since July.
- Pentagon's latest Iran war cost estimate: $43.6 billion
Roll Call, 2026-09-18 · supports
“The Pentagon's latest figure comprises $11.2 billion already obligated for operating expenses ... plus $32.4 billion in unfunded replacement costs for munitions, damaged aircraft and other assets … The new Pentagon estimate of $43.6 billion is current as of Sept. 3, the document said … the CBO said the war cost $38.1 billion through July … The IG, meanwhile, put the figure at $33.4 billion. Its estimate ran through June. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth testified in July that the war would cost $37.5 billion through the end of September. The Pentagon has asked Congress for $67.1 billion in supplemental spending”
The Pentagon's latest figure comprises $11.2 billion already obligated for operating expenses ... plus $32.4 billion in unfunded replacement costs for munitions, damaged aircraft and other assets … The new Pentagon estimate of $43.6 billion is current as of Sept. 3, the document said … the CBO said the war cost $38.1 billion through July … The IG, meanwhile, put the figure at $33.4 billion. Its estimate ran through June. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth testified in July that the war would cost $37.5 billion through the end of September. The Pentagon has asked Congress for $67.1 billion in supplemental spending
- DOD officials say Iran war has cost $25 billion so far during congressional grilling
NPR (via KASU), 2026-04-29 · supports
“Twenty-five billion dollars - that's how much the Pentagon estimates the war with Iran is costing.”
Twenty-five billion dollars - that's how much the Pentagon estimates the war with Iran is costing.
- Costs of the Armed Conflict With Iran (letter, 15 September 2026; archived 1 October 2026)
Congressional Budget Office, 2026-09-15 · supports
“CBO estimates that as of August 1, 2026, the armed conflict with Iran has cost DoD approximately $38 billion. … if the level of violence remained as low as it was in May and June, an additional month of conflict would cost $2 billion; if the intensity of the conflict increased to roughly the level experienced in July, the cost per month would increase to $3 billion. … CBO relied on government databases and public reports because DoD did not respond to CBO's requests for information. … This past June, the Administration requested $87.6 billion in supplemental appropriations, of which $67.1 billion was for DoD to pay for the conflict. … relatively few U.S. forces have been involved compared with the much larger and longer U.S. operations in Iraq and Afghanistan … in the first quarter of 2027, inflation (measured year over year) in the price index for personal consumption expenditures (PCE) is now estimated to be 0.5 percentage points higher than the agency projected in February 2026, and core PCE inflation is estimated to be 0.3 percentage points higher”
CBO estimates that as of August 1, 2026, the armed conflict with Iran has cost DoD approximately $38 billion. … if the level of violence remained as low as it was in May and June, an additional month of conflict would cost $2 billion; if the intensity of the conflict increased to roughly the level experienced in July, the cost per month would increase to $3 billion. … CBO relied on government databases and public reports because DoD did not respond to CBO's requests for information. … This past June, the Administration requested $87.6 billion in supplemental appropriations, of which $67.1 billion was for DoD to pay for the conflict. … relatively few U.S. forces have been involved compared with the much larger and longer U.S. operations in Iraq and Afghanistan … in the first quarter of 2027, inflation (measured year over year) in the price index for personal consumption expenditures (PCE) is now estimated to be 0.5 percentage points higher than the agency projected in February 2026, and core PCE inflation is estimated to be 0.3 percentage points higher
- The War May Be Ending: What Did Epic Fury Cost?
Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2026-06-23 · supports
“CSIS estimates war costs to be around $40 billion ($34 billion to $42 billion).”
CSIS estimates war costs to be around $40 billion ($34 billion to $42 billion).
- Epic Fury costs as of the April 8 cease-fire
American Enterprise Institute, 2026-04-10 · supports
“we estimate an incremental cost to date of between $25 and $35 billion.”
we estimate an incremental cost to date of between $25 and $35 billion.
- A Renewed Iran War Would Test Diminished Interceptor Inventories
Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2026-07-27 · supports
“This has required extensive use of interceptors, with Patriot inventories now under 1,000 and THAAD inventories at about 250. Diminished stockpiles may force the United States and its coalition partners to take more risks with interceptions.”
This has required extensive use of interceptors, with Patriot inventories now under 1,000 and THAAD inventories at about 250. Diminished stockpiles may force the United States and its coalition partners to take more risks with interceptions.
- Last Rounds? The Status of Key Munitions at the Iran War Ceasefire
Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2026-04-21 · complicates
“Of the total deliveries, 5 percent was deducted for training, lot testing, and other nonoperational uses. … Up to 400 of the older PAC-2 missiles may also still be in the stockpile but are not included in Figure 9.”
Of the total deliveries, 5 percent was deducted for training, lot testing, and other nonoperational uses. … Up to 400 of the older PAC-2 missiles may also still be in the stockpile but are not included in Figure 9.
- American War and Military Operations Casualties: Lists and Statistics (RL32492)
Congressional Research Service, 2020-07-29 · supports
“Table 12. Operation Iraqi Freedom: Casualty Summary by Casualty Category (as of July 16, 2020) … Total Hostile Deaths 3,481 ... Total Nonhostile Deaths 937 ... Total Deaths 4,418 ... Total Wounded in Action 31,994 … [Operation Enduring Freedom] Total Deaths 2,349 ... Total Wounded In Action 20,149 … [Operation New Dawn] Total Deaths 74”
Table 12. Operation Iraqi Freedom: Casualty Summary by Casualty Category (as of July 16, 2020) … Total Hostile Deaths 3,481 ... Total Nonhostile Deaths 937 ... Total Deaths 4,418 ... Total Wounded in Action 31,994 … [Operation Enduring Freedom] Total Deaths 2,349 ... Total Wounded In Action 20,149 … [Operation New Dawn] Total Deaths 74
- The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11 (RL33110)
Congressional Research Service, 2014-12-08 · supports
“Congress has approved appropriations for the past 13 years of war that total $1.6 trillion ... $686 billion (43%) for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) for Afghanistan and other counterterror operations received; $815 billion (51%) for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)/Operation New Dawn (OND)”
Congress has approved appropriations for the past 13 years of war that total $1.6 trillion ... $686 billion (43%) for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) for Afghanistan and other counterterror operations received; $815 billion (51%) for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)/Operation New Dawn (OND)
- Iraq War's Price Tag
Council on Foreign Relations, 2005-02-02 · supports
“In September 2002, White House economic adviser Lawrence Lindsey told The Wall Street Journal that a U.S. intervention in Iraq could cost between $100 billion and $200 billion... White House Budget Director Mitchell E. Daniels Jr. labeled that figure as 'very, very high' and estimated total war costs at between $50 billion to $60 billion. … Brookings Institution senior fellows Michael O'Hanlon and Lael Brainard estimated in August 2003 that military and reconstruction costs could range from $150 billion to $300 billion. … On the eve of the war in March 2003, an independent task force report from the Council on Foreign Relations estimated that stabilizing Iraq could cost some $20 billion a year for several years”
In September 2002, White House economic adviser Lawrence Lindsey told The Wall Street Journal that a U.S. intervention in Iraq could cost between $100 billion and $200 billion... White House Budget Director Mitchell E. Daniels Jr. labeled that figure as 'very, very high' and estimated total war costs at between $50 billion to $60 billion. … Brookings Institution senior fellows Michael O'Hanlon and Lael Brainard estimated in August 2003 that military and reconstruction costs could range from $150 billion to $300 billion. … On the eve of the war in March 2003, an independent task force report from the Council on Foreign Relations estimated that stabilizing Iraq could cost some $20 billion a year for several years
- Iran Update Special Report, July 13, 2026
Institute for the Study of War and AEI Critical Threats Project, 2026-07-13 · supports
“Iran has continuously made efforts to reconstitute its ballistic missile and drone programs since the ceasefire on April 8. … The United States will resume its blockade of Iranian ports beginning on July 14 at 4:00 PM ET.”
Iran has continuously made efforts to reconstitute its ballistic missile and drone programs since the ceasefire on April 8. … The United States will resume its blockade of Iranian ports beginning on July 14 at 4:00 PM ET.
- War Powers report to Congress (House Document 119-169)
The White House (via GovInfo), 2026-07-10 · supports
“military action commenced on July 7, 2026, against the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran”
military action commenced on July 7, 2026, against the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran
- Trump says US will not resume military strikes on Iran before midterm elections
Associated Press (via WCAX), 2026-10-08 · supports
“But Trump in a social media post on Thursday said the U.S. "will not be attacking Iran at any time prior to the Midterm Elections to be held in the United States on November 3rd."”
But Trump in a social media post on Thursday said the U.S. "will not be attacking Iran at any time prior to the Midterm Elections to be held in the United States on November 3rd."
- US warns allies to prepare for possible Iran strikes, retaliation after elections, AP sources say
Associated Press (via WCAX), 2026-10-29 · supports
“The cost of fighting the Iran war to American taxpayers has grown to $47.1 billion, according to the latest estimate the Pentagon has provided to Congress.”
The cost of fighting the Iran war to American taxpayers has grown to $47.1 billion, according to the latest estimate the Pentagon has provided to Congress.
- Defense Casualty Analysis System: conflict casualty summaries, Operation Epic Fury and Overseas Operations (monthly and by category)
US Department of Defense, Defense Casualty Analysis System, 2026-10-28 · supports
“[Operation Epic Fury, monthly] "month_Year":"FEBRUARY 2026" … "tot_kia":"0" … "tot_acc":"0" … "tot_wia":"36" … "month_Year":"MARCH 2026" … "tot_kia":"7" … "tot_acc":"7" … "tot_total":"14" … "tot_wia":"342" … "month_Year":"APRIL 2026" … "tot_wia":"34" … "month_Year":"JUNE 2026" … "tot_wia":"5" … "month_Year":"JULY 2026" … "tot_kia":"0" … "tot_acc":"1" … "tot_wia":"0" … [Overseas Operations, monthly] "month_Year":"JULY 2026" … "tot_kia":"4" … "tot_acc":"0" … "tot_wia":"350" … "month_Year":"SEPTEMBER 2026" … "tot_acc":"2" … "tot_wia":"94" … "month_Year":"OCTOBER 2026" … "tot_acc":"1" … "tot_wia":"4" … [category totals] Epic Fury "total":"15", "casualty_CATEGORIES":"TOTAL DEATHS" … "airforce":"6","spaceforce":"0","total":"6", "casualty_CATEGORIES":"ACCIDENT" … "total":"8", "casualty_CATEGORIES":"TOTAL NON-HOSTILE DEATHS" … "total":"417", "casualty_CATEGORIES":"WOUNDED IN ACTION (WIA)" … Overseas Operations "total":"7", "casualty_CATEGORIES":"TOTAL DEATHS" … "total":"3", "casualty_CATEGORIES":"TOTAL NON-HOSTILE DEATHS" … "total":"448", "casualty_CATEGORIES":"WOUNDED IN ACTION (WIA)" … "extractionDate":"October 28, 2026"”
[Operation Epic Fury, monthly] "month_Year":"FEBRUARY 2026" … "tot_kia":"0" … "tot_acc":"0" … "tot_wia":"36" … "month_Year":"MARCH 2026" … "tot_kia":"7" … "tot_acc":"7" … "tot_total":"14" … "tot_wia":"342" … "month_Year":"APRIL 2026" … "tot_wia":"34" … "month_Year":"JUNE 2026" … "tot_wia":"5" … "month_Year":"JULY 2026" … "tot_kia":"0" … "tot_acc":"1" … "tot_wia":"0" … [Overseas Operations, monthly] "month_Year":"JULY 2026" … "tot_kia":"4" … "tot_acc":"0" … "tot_wia":"350" … "month_Year":"SEPTEMBER 2026" … "tot_acc":"2" … "tot_wia":"94" … "month_Year":"OCTOBER 2026" … "tot_acc":"1" … "tot_wia":"4" … [category totals] Epic Fury "total":"15", "casualty_CATEGORIES":"TOTAL DEATHS" … "airforce":"6","spaceforce":"0","total":"6", "casualty_CATEGORIES":"ACCIDENT" … "total":"8", "casualty_CATEGORIES":"TOTAL NON-HOSTILE DEATHS" … "total":"417", "casualty_CATEGORIES":"WOUNDED IN ACTION (WIA)" … Overseas Operations "total":"7", "casualty_CATEGORIES":"TOTAL DEATHS" … "total":"3", "casualty_CATEGORIES":"TOTAL NON-HOSTILE DEATHS" … "total":"448", "casualty_CATEGORIES":"WOUNDED IN ACTION (WIA)" … "extractionDate":"October 28, 2026"
Oil, Shipping and Prices, 1974–2026
- Europe Brent Spot Price FOB, daily (RBRTE)
US Energy Information Administration, 2026-10-28 · supports
“Europe Brent Spot Price FOB (Dollars per Barrel) … 2026 Feb-23 to Feb-27 71.90 71.21 70.69 71.66 71.32 … 2026 Apr- 6 to Apr-10 138.21 122.11 119.03 119.07 … 2026 Sep-28 to Oct- 2 119.97 113.96 115.91 114.82 135.51 … 2026 Oct-26 to Oct-30 128.12 123.10 … 2008 Jun-30 to Jul- 4 138.40 140.67 141.24 143.95 … 2022 Mar- 7 to Mar-11 129.02 133.18 116.58 114.54 118.11 … Release Date: 10/28/2026”
Europe Brent Spot Price FOB (Dollars per Barrel) … 2026 Feb-23 to Feb-27 71.90 71.21 70.69 71.66 71.32 … 2026 Apr- 6 to Apr-10 138.21 122.11 119.03 119.07 … 2026 Sep-28 to Oct- 2 119.97 113.96 115.91 114.82 135.51 … 2026 Oct-26 to Oct-30 128.12 123.10 … 2008 Jun-30 to Jul- 4 138.40 140.67 141.24 143.95 … 2022 Mar- 7 to Mar-11 129.02 133.18 116.58 114.54 118.11 … Release Date: 10/28/2026
- Cushing, OK WTI Spot Price FOB, daily (RWTC)
US Energy Information Administration, 2026-10-28 · supports
“Cushing, OK WTI Spot Price FOB (Dollars per Barrel) … 2026 Feb-23 to Feb-27 66.36 65.62 65.30 65.10 66.96 … 2026 Apr- 6 to Apr-10 114.01 114.58 96.17 99.62 98.34 … 2026 Oct-26 to Oct-30 105.25 103.37 … 2008 Jun-30 to Jul- 4 139.96 141.06 143.74 145.31 … Release Date: 10/28/2026”
Cushing, OK WTI Spot Price FOB (Dollars per Barrel) … 2026 Feb-23 to Feb-27 66.36 65.62 65.30 65.10 66.96 … 2026 Apr- 6 to Apr-10 114.01 114.58 96.17 99.62 98.34 … 2026 Oct-26 to Oct-30 105.25 103.37 … 2008 Jun-30 to Jul- 4 139.96 141.06 143.74 145.31 … Release Date: 10/28/2026
- Weekly U.S. Regular All Formulations Retail Gasoline Prices
US Energy Information Administration, 2026-10-27 · supports
“Weekly U.S. Regular All Formulations Retail Gasoline Prices (Dollars per Gallon) … 2026-Feb 02/02 2.867 02/09 2.902 02/16 2.924 02/23 2.937 … 2026-May 05/04 4.452 05/11 4.500 05/18 4.490 05/25 4.475 … 2026-Oct 10/05 4.354 10/12 4.331 10/19 4.284 10/26 4.269 … 2022-Jun 06/06 4.876 06/13 5.006 06/20 4.962 06/27 4.872 … Release Date: 10/27/2026”
Weekly U.S. Regular All Formulations Retail Gasoline Prices (Dollars per Gallon) … 2026-Feb 02/02 2.867 02/09 2.902 02/16 2.924 02/23 2.937 … 2026-May 05/04 4.452 05/11 4.500 05/18 4.490 05/25 4.475 … 2026-Oct 10/05 4.354 10/12 4.331 10/19 4.284 10/26 4.269 … 2022-Jun 06/06 4.876 06/13 5.006 06/20 4.962 06/27 4.872 … Release Date: 10/27/2026
- Consumer Price Index Summary - 2026 M09 Results (archived 24 October 2026)
US Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2026-10-14 · supports
“The all items index rose 3.7 percent for the 12 months ending September, a larger increase than the 3.4-percent increase reported for the 12 months ending in August. The all items less food and energy index rose 2.6 percent over the year... The energy index increased 20.4 percent for the 12 months ending September. … The index for energy increased 20.4 percent over the past 12 months due in large part to the index for gasoline rising 34.2 percent over the same period. … The index for gasoline rose 9.1 percent in September, accounting for over half of the monthly all items increase.”
The all items index rose 3.7 percent for the 12 months ending September, a larger increase than the 3.4-percent increase reported for the 12 months ending in August. The all items less food and energy index rose 2.6 percent over the year... The energy index increased 20.4 percent for the 12 months ending September. … The index for energy increased 20.4 percent over the past 12 months due in large part to the index for gasoline rising 34.2 percent over the same period. … The index for gasoline rose 9.1 percent in September, accounting for over half of the monthly all items increase.
- Costs of the Armed Conflict With Iran (letter, 15 September 2026; archived 1 October 2026)
Congressional Budget Office, 2026-09-15 · supports
“in the first quarter of 2027, inflation (measured year over year) in the price index for personal consumption expenditures (PCE) is now estimated to be 0.5 percentage points higher than the agency projected in February 2026, and core PCE inflation is estimated to be 0.3 percentage points higher”
in the first quarter of 2027, inflation (measured year over year) in the price index for personal consumption expenditures (PCE) is now estimated to be 0.5 percentage points higher than the agency projected in February 2026, and core PCE inflation is estimated to be 0.3 percentage points higher
- Federal Reserve issues FOMC statement
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2026-09-16 · complicates
“The Committee decided to raise the target range for the federal funds rate by 1/4 percentage point to 3-3/4 to 4 percent... While uncertainty remains elevated owing, in part, to geopolitical developments, domestic spending has been resilient.”
The Committee decided to raise the target range for the federal funds rate by 1/4 percentage point to 3-3/4 to 4 percent... While uncertainty remains elevated owing, in part, to geopolitical developments, domestic spending has been resilient.
- Short-Term Energy Outlook, October 2026: Global oil markets
US Energy Information Administration, 2026-10-06 · supports
“We assess that crude oil production shut-ins averaged 4.8 million b/d in September, down from 5.8 million b/d in August and down from 10.9 million b/d at the peak in May. We forecast the Brent crude oil spot price will average $105/b in the fourth quarter of 2026 (4Q26), $14/b higher than in last month's STEO.”
We assess that crude oil production shut-ins averaged 4.8 million b/d in September, down from 5.8 million b/d in August and down from 10.9 million b/d at the peak in May. We forecast the Brent crude oil spot price will average $105/b in the fourth quarter of 2026 (4Q26), $14/b higher than in last month's STEO.
- Amid regional conflict, the Strait of Hormuz remains critical oil chokepoint
US Energy Information Administration, 2025-06-16 · supports
“In 2024, oil flow through the strait averaged 20 million barrels per day (b/d), or the equivalent of about 20% of global petroleum liquids consumption.”
In 2024, oil flow through the strait averaged 20 million barrels per day (b/d), or the equivalent of about 20% of global petroleum liquids consumption.
- U.S. Central Command Media: Official Photos and Videos (captions, April–May 2026)
US Central Command, 2026-05-20 · supports
“The Marines rappelled onto the Iranian-flagged vessel, April 19, after guided-missile destroyer USS Spruance (DDG 111) disabled Touska’s propulsion when the commercial ship failed to comply with repeated warnings from U.S. forces over a six-hour period. … U.S. Marines from the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit boarded M/T Celestial Sea, an Iranian-flagged commercial oil tanker suspected of attempting to violate the U.S. blockade by transiting toward an Iranian port, May 20, in the Gulf of Oman. … U.S. forces continue to fully enforce the blockade and have now redirected 91 commercial ships to ensure compliance.”
The Marines rappelled onto the Iranian-flagged vessel, April 19, after guided-missile destroyer USS Spruance (DDG 111) disabled Touska’s propulsion when the commercial ship failed to comply with repeated warnings from U.S. forces over a six-hour period. … U.S. Marines from the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit boarded M/T Celestial Sea, an Iranian-flagged commercial oil tanker suspected of attempting to violate the U.S. blockade by transiting toward an Iranian port, May 20, in the Gulf of Oman. … U.S. forces continue to fully enforce the blockade and have now redirected 91 commercial ships to ensure compliance.
- CENTCOM Maintains Strict Enforcement of U.S. Blockade Against Iran
US Central Command, 2026-10-05 · supports
“On Oct. 5, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) forces redirected the 130th commercial vessel in the Middle East during strict enforcement of the ongoing U.S. naval blockade against Iran. CENTCOM forces resumed the blockade against ships attempting to enter or depart Iranian ports July 14 at the Commander in Chief's direction. In addition to redirecting 130 vessels, American forces have disabled three ships that refused to comply. Over the past 12 weeks, CENTCOM has destroyed 13 commercial vessels that were violating the blockade or part of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' multibillion-dollar shadow network.”
On Oct. 5, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) forces redirected the 130th commercial vessel in the Middle East during strict enforcement of the ongoing U.S. naval blockade against Iran. CENTCOM forces resumed the blockade against ships attempting to enter or depart Iranian ports July 14 at the Commander in Chief's direction. In addition to redirecting 130 vessels, American forces have disabled three ships that refused to comply. Over the past 12 weeks, CENTCOM has destroyed 13 commercial vessels that were violating the blockade or part of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' multibillion-dollar shadow network.
- U.S. Forces Disable Cargo Vessel Attempting to Violate Blockade
US Central Command, 2026-10-10 · supports
“CENTCOM forces resumed America’s blockade against all ships entering or departing Iranian ports on July 14. Four commercial vessels have been disabled and 135 ships have been turned around during three months of strict enforcement. Additionally, U.S. forces have destroyed 10 tankers linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' multibillion-dollar shadow network over the same period.”
CENTCOM forces resumed America’s blockade against all ships entering or departing Iranian ports on July 14. Four commercial vessels have been disabled and 135 ships have been turned around during three months of strict enforcement. Additionally, U.S. forces have destroyed 10 tankers linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' multibillion-dollar shadow network over the same period.
- CENTCOM Commander Visits Strait of Hormuz during Milestone Week
US Central Command, 2026-10-25 · complicates
“The commander of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) visited the Strait of Hormuz, Oct. 25, as U.S. forces reach the milestone of assisting Gulf partners in exporting more than 1.5 billion barrels of crude oil since summer. … More than 3,000 commercial vessels have successfully transited the Strait of Hormuz with support from CENTCOM forces over the last six months. … In recent months, over 95% of ships navigating the Strait of Hormuz have sailed through safely despite the IRGC's unwarranted aggression”
The commander of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) visited the Strait of Hormuz, Oct. 25, as U.S. forces reach the milestone of assisting Gulf partners in exporting more than 1.5 billion barrels of crude oil since summer. … More than 3,000 commercial vessels have successfully transited the Strait of Hormuz with support from CENTCOM forces over the last six months. … In recent months, over 95% of ships navigating the Strait of Hormuz have sailed through safely despite the IRGC's unwarranted aggression
- Iran Update, October 21, 2026
Institute for the Study of War and AEI Critical Threats Project, 2026-10-21 · complicates
“Several shipping and maritime security officials told Bloomberg on October 20 that at least five of the 23 recorded attacks on vessels in or near the Strait of Hormuz in the first two weeks of October struck commercial vessels' engine rooms. … The Washington Post, citing oil price-tracking firm Kpler, reported that the number of barrels of oil exported per day is approaching prewar daily averages after increasing from mid-August to late September.”
Several shipping and maritime security officials told Bloomberg on October 20 that at least five of the 23 recorded attacks on vessels in or near the Strait of Hormuz in the first two weeks of October struck commercial vessels' engine rooms. … The Washington Post, citing oil price-tracking firm Kpler, reported that the number of barrels of oil exported per day is approaching prewar daily averages after increasing from mid-August to late September.
- Iran oil exports feel the squeeze, hitting a six-year low (Reuters)
Reuters (via Baird Maritime), 2026-06-04 · supports
“The US began enforcing the blockade on April 13, choking Iranian exports as the oil market faces a supply crunch due to Iran's effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz cutting exports from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq and the United Arab Emirates. Iran's exports averaged about 209,000 bpd in May, Vortexa data shows, down sharply from 1.34 million bpd in April and nearly 1.9 million bpd in March. This marks their lowest level since late 2019 and early 2020”
The US began enforcing the blockade on April 13, choking Iranian exports as the oil market faces a supply crunch due to Iran's effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz cutting exports from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq and the United Arab Emirates. Iran's exports averaged about 209,000 bpd in May, Vortexa data shows, down sharply from 1.34 million bpd in April and nearly 1.9 million bpd in March. This marks their lowest level since late 2019 and early 2020
- Strait of Hormuz: Tanker War
Robert Strauss Center for International Security and Law, University of Texas at Austin, 2026-10 · complicates
“61 percent of the ships attacked during the Tanker War were oil tankers. In total, only 55 of the 239 petroleum tankers (23 percent) were completely sunk or declared CTL … Initially, the Tanker War led to a 25 percent drop in commercial shipping and a sharp rise in the price of crude oil. But the Tanker War did not significantly disrupt oil shipments. In fact, Iran lowered the price of oil to offset higher insurance premiums on shipments, and the real global oil price steadily declined during the 1980s. Even at the its most intense point, the Tanker War failed to disrupt more than two percent of ships passing through the Persian Gulf.”
61 percent of the ships attacked during the Tanker War were oil tankers. In total, only 55 of the 239 petroleum tankers (23 percent) were completely sunk or declared CTL … Initially, the Tanker War led to a 25 percent drop in commercial shipping and a sharp rise in the price of crude oil. But the Tanker War did not significantly disrupt oil shipments. In fact, Iran lowered the price of oil to offset higher insurance premiums on shipments, and the real global oil price steadily declined during the 1980s. Even at the its most intense point, the Tanker War failed to disrupt more than two percent of ships passing through the Persian Gulf.
- At least 7,650 killed in 40 days of war, including 1,030 civilians — Hengaw’s tenth report
Hengaw Organization for Human Rights, 2026-04-08 · supports
“The war began on the morning of Saturday, February 28, 2026, with airstrikes by U.S. and Israeli forces targeting more than 10 provinces across Iran”
The war began on the morning of Saturday, February 28, 2026, with airstrikes by U.S. and Israeli forces targeting more than 10 provinces across Iran
- Iran Update Special Report, July 13, 2026
Institute for the Study of War and AEI Critical Threats Project, 2026-07-13 · supports
“Iran has continuously made efforts to reconstitute its ballistic missile and drone programs since the ceasefire on April 8. … The United States will resume its blockade of Iranian ports beginning on July 14 at 4:00 PM ET. … The US naval blockade had a limited but notable effect on Iranian willingness to continue fighting in Spring 2026 and was critical to securing the MoU.”
Iran has continuously made efforts to reconstitute its ballistic missile and drone programs since the ceasefire on April 8. … The United States will resume its blockade of Iranian ports beginning on July 14 at 4:00 PM ET. … The US naval blockade had a limited but notable effect on Iranian willingness to continue fighting in Spring 2026 and was critical to securing the MoU.
- War Powers report to Congress (House Document 119-167)
The White House (via GovInfo), 2026-06-29 · supports
“These efforts led to my signing a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran on June 17, 2026.”
These efforts led to my signing a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran on June 17, 2026.
- War Powers report to Congress (House Document 119-193)
The White House (via GovInfo), 2026-09-03 · supports
“military action commenced on September 1, 2026, against the Islamic Republic of Iran … oil tankers belonging to the National Iranian Oil Company”
military action commenced on September 1, 2026, against the Islamic Republic of Iran … oil tankers belonging to the National Iranian Oil Company
- Trump says US will not resume military strikes on Iran before midterm elections
Associated Press (via WCAX), 2026-10-08 · supports
“But Trump in a social media post on Thursday said the U.S. "will not be attacking Iran at any time prior to the Midterm Elections to be held in the United States on November 3rd."”
But Trump in a social media post on Thursday said the U.S. "will not be attacking Iran at any time prior to the Midterm Elections to be held in the United States on November 3rd."
- Europe Brent Spot Price FOB, monthly (RBRTE)
US Energy Information Administration, 2026-10-28 · supports
“Europe Brent Spot Price FOB (Dollars per Barrel) … 1987 18.58 18.86 19.86 18.98 18.31 18.76 17.78 17.05 … 2008 92.18 94.99 103.64 109.07 122.80 132.32 132.72 113.24 97.23 71.58 52.45 39.95 … 2022 86.51 97.13 117.25 104.58 113.34 122.71 111.93 100.45 89.76 93.33 91.42 80.92 … 2026 66.60 70.89 103.13 117.29 107.14 85.40 83.76 91.08 114.16 … Release Date: 10/28/2026”
Europe Brent Spot Price FOB (Dollars per Barrel) … 1987 18.58 18.86 19.86 18.98 18.31 18.76 17.78 17.05 … 2008 92.18 94.99 103.64 109.07 122.80 132.32 132.72 113.24 97.23 71.58 52.45 39.95 … 2022 86.51 97.13 117.25 104.58 113.34 122.71 111.93 100.45 89.76 93.33 91.42 80.92 … 2026 66.60 70.89 103.13 117.29 107.14 85.40 83.76 91.08 114.16 … Release Date: 10/28/2026
- Cushing, OK WTI Spot Price FOB, monthly (RWTC)
US Energy Information Administration, 2026-10-28 · supports
“Cushing, OK WTI Spot Price FOB (Dollars per Barrel) … 1986 22.93 15.46 12.61 12.84 15.38 13.43 11.59 15.10 14.87 14.90 15.22 16.11 … 2008 92.97 95.39 105.45 112.58 125.40 133.88 133.37 116.67 104.11 76.61 57.31 41.12 … 2026 60.04 64.51 91.38 100.32 102.13 84.81 80.46 83.90 97.31 … Release Date: 10/28/2026”
Cushing, OK WTI Spot Price FOB (Dollars per Barrel) … 1986 22.93 15.46 12.61 12.84 15.38 13.43 11.59 15.10 14.87 14.90 15.22 16.11 … 2008 92.97 95.39 105.45 112.58 125.40 133.88 133.37 116.67 104.11 76.61 57.31 41.12 … 2026 60.04 64.51 91.38 100.32 102.13 84.81 80.46 83.90 97.31 … Release Date: 10/28/2026
- Real Prices Viewer: Monthly Average Imported Crude Oil Price (real_prices.xlsx, sheet "Crude Oil-M")
US Energy Information Administration, 2026-10-06 · supports
“EIA Short-Term Energy Outlook, … Monthly Average Imported Crude Oil Price … Consumer Price Index (1982-84=1) … Imported Crude Oil Price ($/barrel) … Nominal … Real … Forecast Values … May 2026 3.340 99.01 98.85 0 … Base CPI (10/2026) … Data Source: EIA Short-Term Energy Outlook, October 2026 … Forecast / estimated values shown in blue … real price (Oct 2026 $)”
EIA Short-Term Energy Outlook, … Monthly Average Imported Crude Oil Price … Consumer Price Index (1982-84=1) … Imported Crude Oil Price ($/barrel) … Nominal … Real … Forecast Values … May 2026 3.340 99.01 98.85 0 … Base CPI (10/2026) … Data Source: EIA Short-Term Energy Outlook, October 2026 … Forecast / estimated values shown in blue … real price (Oct 2026 $)
- U.S. Regular All Formulations Retail Gasoline Prices, monthly
US Energy Information Administration, 2026-10-27 · supports
“U.S. Regular All Formulations Retail Gasoline Prices (Dollars per Gallon) … 1990 NA 1.258 1.335 1.324 NA … 2022 3.315 3.517 4.222 4.109 4.444 4.929 4.559 3.975 3.700 3.815 3.685 3.210 … 2026 2.809 2.908 3.638 4.103 4.479 4.050 3.932 4.058 4.355 4.310 … Release Date: 10/27/2026”
U.S. Regular All Formulations Retail Gasoline Prices (Dollars per Gallon) … 1990 NA 1.258 1.335 1.324 NA … 2022 3.315 3.517 4.222 4.109 4.444 4.929 4.559 3.975 3.700 3.815 3.685 3.210 … 2026 2.809 2.908 3.638 4.103 4.479 4.050 3.932 4.058 4.355 4.310 … Release Date: 10/27/2026
- PortWatch Daily Chokepoints Data (Strait of Hormuz, portid chokepoint6), queried 29 October 2026
IMF PortWatch, 2026-10-28 · supports
“{"attributes":{"date":"2019-01-01","year":2019,"month":1,"day":1,"n_total":52,"n_tanker":33} … {"attributes":{"date":"2026-02-28","year":2026,"month":2,"day":28,"n_total":57,"n_tanker":36} … {"attributes":{"date":"2026-03-04","year":2026,"month":3,"day":4,"n_total":0,"n_tanker":0} … {"attributes":{"date":"2026-06-24","year":2026,"month":6,"day":24,"n_total":51,"n_tanker":20} … {"attributes":{"date":"2026-10-25","year":2026,"month":10,"day":25,"n_total":2,"n_tanker":1}”
{"attributes":{"date":"2019-01-01","year":2019,"month":1,"day":1,"n_total":52,"n_tanker":33} … {"attributes":{"date":"2026-02-28","year":2026,"month":2,"day":28,"n_total":57,"n_tanker":36} … {"attributes":{"date":"2026-03-04","year":2026,"month":3,"day":4,"n_total":0,"n_tanker":0} … {"attributes":{"date":"2026-06-24","year":2026,"month":6,"day":24,"n_total":51,"n_tanker":20} … {"attributes":{"date":"2026-10-25","year":2026,"month":10,"day":25,"n_total":2,"n_tanker":1}
- Short-Term Energy Outlook: Global Energy Security Data, Table 4
US Energy Information Administration, 2026-08-12 · supports
“Table 4. Volume of crude oil, condensate, petroleum products, and liquefied natural gas transported through the Strait of Hormuz, 1Q25–2Q26 million barrels per day 1Q25 2Q25 3Q25 4Q25 1Q26 2Q26 Total oil flows through the Strait of Hormuz 20.9 21.0 21.3 21.6 14.9 4.9 Crude oil and condensate 14.8 14.9 15.0 15.9 10.9 3.7 Petroleum products 6.2 6.2 6.3 5.7 4.0 1.1 LNG flows through the Strait of Hormuz (billion cubic feet per day) 11.7 11.0 10.9 10.5 7.4 0.8 … Since the end of February 2026, AIS signal data for ships transiting the Strait of Hormuz have become especially unreliable. For 2026 Hormuz volumes, tanker tracking data are being revised frequently based on the best available information.”
Table 4. Volume of crude oil, condensate, petroleum products, and liquefied natural gas transported through the Strait of Hormuz, 1Q25–2Q26 million barrels per day 1Q25 2Q25 3Q25 4Q25 1Q26 2Q26 Total oil flows through the Strait of Hormuz 20.9 21.0 21.3 21.6 14.9 4.9 Crude oil and condensate 14.8 14.9 15.0 15.9 10.9 3.7 Petroleum products 6.2 6.2 6.3 5.7 4.0 1.1 LNG flows through the Strait of Hormuz (billion cubic feet per day) 11.7 11.0 10.9 10.5 7.4 0.8 … Since the end of February 2026, AIS signal data for ships transiting the Strait of Hormuz have become especially unreliable. For 2026 Hormuz volumes, tanker tracking data are being revised frequently based on the best available information.
Outside Attempts to Topple, Coerce or Disarm Hostile Regimes, 1816–2023
- Jervis Forum Roundtable 17-6 on Downes, Catastrophic Success: Why Foreign-Imposed Regime Change Goes Wrong (Cornell University Press, 2021)
H-Diplo/RJISSF (reviewers' summaries, with page numbers in Downes's book), 2025-10 · supports
“Marshaling a new dataset of 120 cases of FIRC (1816–2008) … One-third of all FIRCs descend into civil war in the first post-intervention decade (94), especially in low-income countries, where FIRCs increase the risk of civil war by eight percentage points (100). … Foreign-imposed regime change more than doubles the likelihood of civil war in the decade that follows (94-96). … Civil war is four and a half times more likely to follow a leadership regime change than in other cases (98). And, whereas 47 percent of installed leaders have been forcibly removed from power, two-third of leaders installed through leadership regime change have lost power through irregular means (168). … Regime change also appears to have no significant effect on the probability of a future militarized dispute between the target and intervener (251-2). And indeed, leadership regime changes more than double the risk of a dispute occurring (252). … These states are no more likely to vote together in the United Nations General Assembly or to share alliance portfolios than other types of states (254-5). … Regime changes that seek to restore previously ousted rulers to power tend to have best outcomes … the base rate is quite low, and so even if FIRC doubles the risk of civil war onset, would-be interveners might view this as acceptable compared to maintaining the status quo.”
Marshaling a new dataset of 120 cases of FIRC (1816–2008) … One-third of all FIRCs descend into civil war in the first post-intervention decade (94), especially in low-income countries, where FIRCs increase the risk of civil war by eight percentage points (100). … Foreign-imposed regime change more than doubles the likelihood of civil war in the decade that follows (94-96). … Civil war is four and a half times more likely to follow a leadership regime change than in other cases (98). And, whereas 47 percent of installed leaders have been forcibly removed from power, two-third of leaders installed through leadership regime change have lost power through irregular means (168). … Regime change also appears to have no significant effect on the probability of a future militarized dispute between the target and intervener (251-2). And indeed, leadership regime changes more than double the risk of a dispute occurring (252). … These states are no more likely to vote together in the United Nations General Assembly or to share alliance portfolios than other types of states (254-5). … Regime changes that seek to restore previously ousted rulers to power tend to have best outcomes … the base rate is quite low, and so even if FIRC doubles the risk of civil war onset, would-be interveners might view this as acceptable compared to maintaining the status quo.
- You Can't Always Get What You Want: Why Foreign-Imposed Regime Change Seldom Improves Interstate Relations (Downes and O'Rourke, International Security 41:2), abstract
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, 2016 · supports
“A new dataset and an analysis of foreign interventions in the Congo Wars show that FIRC damages relations between intervener and target state more often than it improves them.”
A new dataset and an analysis of foreign interventions in the Congo Wars show that FIRC damages relations between intervener and target state more often than it improves them.
- Forced to Be Free? Why Foreign-Imposed Regime Change Rarely Leads to Democratization (Downes and Monten, International Security 37:4), abstract
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, 2013 · supports
“A statistical examination of seventy instances of foreign-imposed regime change (FIRC) in the twentieth century shows that implementing prodemocratic institutional reforms, such as sponsoring elections, is not enough to induce democratization; interveners will meet with little success unless conditions in the target state—in the form of high levels of economic development and societal homogeneity, and previous experience with representative governance—are favorable to democracy. Given that prospective regime change operations are likely to target regimes in poor, diverse countries, policymakers should scale back their expectations that democracy will flourish after FIRC.”
A statistical examination of seventy instances of foreign-imposed regime change (FIRC) in the twentieth century shows that implementing prodemocratic institutional reforms, such as sponsoring elections, is not enough to induce democratization; interveners will meet with little success unless conditions in the target state—in the form of high levels of economic development and societal homogeneity, and previous experience with representative governance—are favorable to democracy. Given that prospective regime change operations are likely to target regimes in poor, diverse countries, policymakers should scale back their expectations that democracy will flourish after FIRC.
- H-Diplo/ISSF Article Review 26 on Downes and Monten, "Forced to Be Free?"
H-Diplo/ISSF (review by Mark Peceny), 2014-02-14 · complicates
“They have collected data on 107 examples of this phenomenon from 1816 to the contemporary era, from Austria’s removal of revolutionaries from the government of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies in 1821 through the 2003 overthrow of Saddam Hussein. … Iran in 1953, Guatemala in 1954, and Chile in 1973 are included, but the Reagan Doctrine cases of covert action in the 1980s are excluded.”
They have collected data on 107 examples of this phenomenon from 1816 to the contemporary era, from Austria’s removal of revolutionaries from the government of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies in 1821 through the 2003 overthrow of Saddam Hussein. … Iran in 1953, Guatemala in 1954, and Chile in 1973 are included, but the Reagan Doctrine cases of covert action in the 1980s are excluded.
- Boston College Political Scientist Wins Award for Her Foreign Policy Book
Boston College News, 2019-11 · supports
“U.S. covert operations during the Cold War were unsuccessful more than 60 percent of the time and most failed to remain covert, often resulting in unforeseen, and disastrous, consequences, according to O’Rourke, who found that states targeted for regime change were more likely to experience civil war in the 10 years following intervention.”
U.S. covert operations during the Cold War were unsuccessful more than 60 percent of the time and most failed to remain covert, often resulting in unforeseen, and disastrous, consequences, according to O’Rourke, who found that states targeted for regime change were more likely to experience civil war in the 10 years following intervention.
- Covert Wars to What End?
War on the Rocks, 2019-08-07 · supports
“O'Rourke compiled an original dataset of U.S. regime-change operations carried out between 1947 and 1989, including 64 covert cases. … more than two thirds (44 of 64) were undertaken in support of authoritarian forces, 'including at least six operations that sought to replace liberal democratic governments with illiberal authoritarian regimes.'”
O'Rourke compiled an original dataset of U.S. regime-change operations carried out between 1947 and 1989, including 64 covert cases. … more than two thirds (44 of 64) were undertaken in support of authoritarian forces, 'including at least six operations that sought to replace liberal democratic governments with illiberal authoritarian regimes.'
- Review of Lindsey A. O'Rourke, Covert Regime Change: America's Secret Cold War
H-War (review by Paxton Stover), 2024-08 · supports
“covert operations are most likely to succeed against democratic governments, weak states, and American allies”
covert operations are most likely to succeed against democratic governments, weak states, and American allies
- Attacking the Atom: Does Bombing Nuclear Facilities Affect Proliferation? (Kreps and Fuhrmann, Journal of Strategic Studies), abstract
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, 2011-04 · supports
“This article addresses these questions by conducting an analysis of 16 attacks against nuclear facilities from 1942 to 2007. … There is evidence that the peacetime attacks delayed the target's nuclear program, although the size of this effect is rather modest. The wartime cases were less successful, as attacks often missed their targets either due to operational failure or limited intelligence on the location of critical targets. In our concluding section we show that many of the conditions that were conducive to past success are not present in the contemporary Iran case. Overall, our findings reveal an interesting paradox. The historical cases that have successfully delayed proliferation are those when the attacking state struck well before a nuclear threat was imminent.”
This article addresses these questions by conducting an analysis of 16 attacks against nuclear facilities from 1942 to 2007. … There is evidence that the peacetime attacks delayed the target's nuclear program, although the size of this effect is rather modest. The wartime cases were less successful, as attacks often missed their targets either due to operational failure or limited intelligence on the location of critical targets. In our concluding section we show that many of the conditions that were conducive to past success are not present in the contemporary Iran case. Overall, our findings reveal an interesting paradox. The historical cases that have successfully delayed proliferation are those when the attacking state struck well before a nuclear threat was imminent.
- Revisiting Osirak: Preventive Attacks and Nuclear Proliferation Risks (Braut-Hegghammer, International Security 36:1), abstract
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, 2011 · complicates
“The attack had mixed effects: it triggered a covert nuclear weapons program that did not previously exist, while necessitating a more difficult and timeconsuming technical route to developing nuclear weapons. Notwithstanding gross inefficiencies in the ensuing program, a decade later Iraq stood on the threshold of a nuclear weapons capability.”
The attack had mixed effects: it triggered a covert nuclear weapons program that did not previously exist, while necessitating a more difficult and timeconsuming technical route to developing nuclear weapons. Notwithstanding gross inefficiencies in the ensuing program, a decade later Iraq stood on the threshold of a nuclear weapons capability.
- When Did (and Didn’t) States Proliferate? Chronicling the Spread of Nuclear Weapons (Philipp C. Bleek), text and Table 1
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, 2017-06 · supports
“Thirty-one countries at least opened the door to potential nuclear weapons programs, seventeen of those launched weapons programs, and ten acquired deliverable nuclear weapons. But proliferation has also been complemented by de-proliferation: one state that developed nuclear weapons subsequently gave them up, seven of those who launched programs never or have not yet acquired, and fourteen countries halted their exploration of nuclear weapons without launching programs. … Libya returned to no activity in 2003, when Libya announced that it was abandoning its weapons of mass destruction programs and allowing international inspections. … Iraqi exploration is coded as 1975, though the evidence is somewhat circumstantial, and pursuit is coded as 1981, returning to no activity in 1991. … Jo and Gartzke code pursuit as 1973. … Iraq’s activities prior to 1981, including as described by Braut-Hegghammer, are sufficiently robust that one might reasonably code them as pursuit rather than merely exploration … Iraq’s pursuit ended in 1991, when in the aftermath of the first Gulf War it was forced to give up its mass destruction capabilities and submit to an intensive verification regime. … one could reasonably code Iran as dropping from pursuit down to exploration either after 2003, based on the 2007 National Intelligence Assessment, or in 2015, when Iran agreed to significantly constrain its nuclear program under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. … Syria returned to exploring in 2007 following the destruction of the Al-Kibar facility by Israel on September 6, 2007. There is no publicly available evidence of political decisions to either continue or cease activity on which to base a coding of continued exploration.”
Thirty-one countries at least opened the door to potential nuclear weapons programs, seventeen of those launched weapons programs, and ten acquired deliverable nuclear weapons. But proliferation has also been complemented by de-proliferation: one state that developed nuclear weapons subsequently gave them up, seven of those who launched programs never or have not yet acquired, and fourteen countries halted their exploration of nuclear weapons without launching programs. … Libya returned to no activity in 2003, when Libya announced that it was abandoning its weapons of mass destruction programs and allowing international inspections. … Iraqi exploration is coded as 1975, though the evidence is somewhat circumstantial, and pursuit is coded as 1981, returning to no activity in 1991. … Jo and Gartzke code pursuit as 1973. … Iraq’s activities prior to 1981, including as described by Braut-Hegghammer, are sufficiently robust that one might reasonably code them as pursuit rather than merely exploration … Iraq’s pursuit ended in 1991, when in the aftermath of the first Gulf War it was forced to give up its mass destruction capabilities and submit to an intensive verification regime. … one could reasonably code Iran as dropping from pursuit down to exploration either after 2003, based on the 2007 National Intelligence Assessment, or in 2015, when Iran agreed to significantly constrain its nuclear program under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. … Syria returned to exploring in 2007 following the destruction of the Al-Kibar facility by Israel on September 6, 2007. There is no publicly available evidence of political decisions to either continue or cease activity on which to base a coding of continued exploration.
- Economic Sanctions: New Directions for the 21st Century (presentation of Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 3rd edition)
Peterson Institute for International Economics (Hufbauer, Schott, Elliott and Oegg), 2008-07 · supports
“204 observations from World War I to 2000 … Sanctions “succeed” in about one-third of the cases overall, but the success rate depends importantly on the type of objectives sought … Success means sanctions contributed significantly to the partial or full achievement of the foreign policy goal … Targets are friendly or democratic countries, rather than enemies, autocrats … Libya – Success at Last? … But only after 20+ years … Destabilization of either existing regime unlikely … Carrots plus sticks strategy more effective than sticks alone … Do not expect quick success against autocratic regimes”
204 observations from World War I to 2000 … Sanctions “succeed” in about one-third of the cases overall, but the success rate depends importantly on the type of objectives sought … Success means sanctions contributed significantly to the partial or full achievement of the foreign policy goal … Targets are friendly or democratic countries, rather than enemies, autocrats … Libya – Success at Last? … But only after 20+ years … Destabilization of either existing regime unlikely … Carrots plus sticks strategy more effective than sticks alone … Do not expect quick success against autocratic regimes
- Why Economic Sanctions Still Do Not Work (Pape, International Security, with Elliott's reply), abstract
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, 1998 · contests
“Robert Pape of Dartmouth College challenged the findings in Economic Sanctions Reconsidered … One of the study’s coauthors, Kimberly Ann Elliott of the Institute of International Economics, argues here that Pape mischaracterizes the principal objective of the work, which, according to Elliott, was to determine if and how economic sanctions contributed to desired foreign policy outcomes—not, as Pape contends, whether they caused them.”
Robert Pape of Dartmouth College challenged the findings in Economic Sanctions Reconsidered … One of the study’s coauthors, Kimberly Ann Elliott of the Institute of International Economics, argues here that Pape mischaracterizes the principal objective of the work, which, according to Elliott, was to determine if and how economic sanctions contributed to desired foreign policy outcomes—not, as Pape contends, whether they caused them.
- Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions 1945–2005: Updating the TIES Dataset (Morgan, Bapat and Kobayashi, Conflict Management and Peace Science 31:5), accepted manuscript
White Rose Research Online (University of Leeds), 2014 · supports
“The new version of the Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions (TIES) data set includes 1,412 cases in which one or more states threatened and/or imposed economic sanctions on a single target during the 1945-2005 period. … Sanctions were imposed in 845 of these cases (60%) leaving 567 cases that involved only threats (40%). … The U.S. is the primary sender in a bit over 48% of the cases … we see 384 cases identified as successful if we employ the strict definition of sanctions that requires total or partial acquiescence on the part of the target. Under this definition of ‘success’ sanctions may be considered successful in 27.2% of the cases, if we consider all cases, or in 37.5% of the cases for which we have data for the final outcome. … We see a 40.8% success rate in the pool of all cases and a remarkable 56% success rate when cases with missing final outcomes are removed. … The third definition based on the settlement nature scores identifies 454 successes, which translates to a 32.2% success rate in the full sample and a 44% success rate in the restricted sample.”
The new version of the Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions (TIES) data set includes 1,412 cases in which one or more states threatened and/or imposed economic sanctions on a single target during the 1945-2005 period. … Sanctions were imposed in 845 of these cases (60%) leaving 567 cases that involved only threats (40%). … The U.S. is the primary sender in a bit over 48% of the cases … we see 384 cases identified as successful if we employ the strict definition of sanctions that requires total or partial acquiescence on the part of the target. Under this definition of ‘success’ sanctions may be considered successful in 27.2% of the cases, if we consider all cases, or in 37.5% of the cases for which we have data for the final outcome. … We see a 40.8% success rate in the pool of all cases and a remarkable 56% success rate when cases with missing final outcomes are removed. … The third definition based on the settlement nature scores identifies 454 successes, which translates to a 32.2% success rate in the full sample and a 44% success rate in the restricted sample.
- The Global Sanctions Data Base – Release 4 (WIFO Working Paper 681/2024)
Austrian Institute of Economic Research (WIFO), 2024-07 · complicates
“Covering the period 1950-2023, it contains 1,547 sanction cases … The GSDB excludes sanction threats. Additionally, the GSDB defines nine political objectives (policy change, regime destabilization, ending territorial conflict, war prevention, ending war, terrorism, human rights violation, restoration of democracy, and other objectives that do not fit into any of the aforementioned categories) and five objective-specific success score categories (total success, partial success, negotiation settlement, failure, and ongoing for cases that have not been repealed) for each sanction objective.”
Covering the period 1950-2023, it contains 1,547 sanction cases … The GSDB excludes sanction threats. Additionally, the GSDB defines nine political objectives (policy change, regime destabilization, ending territorial conflict, war prevention, ending war, terrorism, human rights violation, restoration of democracy, and other objectives that do not fit into any of the aforementioned categories) and five objective-specific success score categories (total success, partial success, negotiation settlement, failure, and ongoing for cases that have not been repealed) for each sanction objective.
- Economics Faculty Create First-Ever Global Sanctions Data Base
Drexel University LeBow College of Business, 2021-08-06 · complicates
“Among other things, they found that more than 190 countries have imposed sanctions, and that the rate of success has been 30 to 50 percent.”
Among other things, they found that more than 190 countries have imposed sanctions, and that the rate of success has been 30 to 50 percent.
- When Does Aerial Bombing Work? (Horowitz and Reiter, Journal of Conflict Resolution 45:2), abstract
IDEAS/RePEc, 2001-04 · supports
“Multivariate probit analysis is used to test three hypotheses on all instances of air power coercion from 1917 to 1999 … Results show that coercion is more likely to work if the target's military vulnerability is higher, but higher levels of civilian vulnerability have no effect on the chances of coercion success; that target regime type has no effect; and that success is less likely when the attacker demands the target change its leadership.”
Multivariate probit analysis is used to test three hypotheses on all instances of air power coercion from 1917 to 1999 … Results show that coercion is more likely to work if the target's military vulnerability is higher, but higher levels of civilian vulnerability have no effect on the chances of coercion success; that target regime type has no effect; and that success is less likely when the attacker demands the target change its leadership.
- Why Bombing Syria Isn't Likely to Work
Reason (Ronald Bailey), 2013-09-06 · supports
“"Of our 53 cases of air power coercion, 19 (36 percent) were successes and 34 (64 percent) were failures," they report. Horowitz and Reiter define air power coercion a "success" when a target changes its behavior as demanded without being attacked.”
"Of our 53 cases of air power coercion, 19 (36 percent) were successes and 34 (64 percent) were failures," they report. Horowitz and Reiter define air power coercion a "success" when a target changes its behavior as demanded without being attacked.
- H-Diplo/ISSF Roundtable XI-9 on Nicholas L. Miller, Stopping the Bomb (Cornell University Press, 2018), review by Matthew Fuhrmann
H-Diplo/ISSF, 2019-01-27 · complicates
“As Miller’s analysis shows, once a program had started, sanctions succeeded in only three of 22 cases (135). Thus, based on this analysis, sanctions appear to work about 14 percent of the time—a pretty dismal success rate. … Miller correctly points out, however, that we cannot infer much about the value of sanctions as an instrument of nonproliferation by limiting our analysis to these episodes. We must also look at the cases where the prospect of sanctions deterred a country from starting a bomb program in the first place. Once we do that, a much more sanguine picture emerges. … Sanctions threats can work if they are credible and if the potential proliferator is highly dependent on the United States.”
As Miller’s analysis shows, once a program had started, sanctions succeeded in only three of 22 cases (135). Thus, based on this analysis, sanctions appear to work about 14 percent of the time—a pretty dismal success rate. … Miller correctly points out, however, that we cannot infer much about the value of sanctions as an instrument of nonproliferation by limiting our analysis to these episodes. We must also look at the cases where the prospect of sanctions deterred a country from starting a bomb program in the first place. Once we do that, a much more sanguine picture emerges. … Sanctions threats can work if they are credible and if the potential proliferator is highly dependent on the United States.
- Rupal Mehta, Delaying Doomsday: The Politics of Nuclear Reversal (event summary)
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Center for Global Security Research, 2020-02-25 · supports
“the important role that external incentives—sanctions and rewards can play in nuclear negotiations, especially when the threat to use force remains 'on the table'. Specifically, this book argues that nuclear reversal is most likely when states are threatened with sanctions and offered face-saving rewards that help them withstand domestic political opposition. … the study employs a unified, multi-method observational research design to identify patterns of behavior over time among all proliferators. In addition to quantitative analyses that systematically explores nuclear reversal historically, the book incorporates three in-depth case studies comparing the Indian, Iranian, and North Korean nuclear programs”
the important role that external incentives—sanctions and rewards can play in nuclear negotiations, especially when the threat to use force remains 'on the table'. Specifically, this book argues that nuclear reversal is most likely when states are threatened with sanctions and offered face-saving rewards that help them withstand domestic political opposition. … the study employs a unified, multi-method observational research design to identify patterns of behavior over time among all proliferators. In addition to quantitative analyses that systematically explores nuclear reversal historically, the book incorporates three in-depth case studies comparing the Indian, Iranian, and North Korean nuclear programs
- 'Cross the Line and I'm Gonna Do Nothing' (Boston Globe)
Dartmouth News, 2013-06-24 · contests
“In his 2006 book, Calculating Credibility, Press examined three 20th-century cases … 'When I went into this, I was certain that backing down was going to hurt credibility,' Press said. But what he found was that even if the leaders backed down from their original threats, they were still taken seriously in the future.”
In his 2006 book, Calculating Credibility, Press examined three 20th-century cases … 'When I went into this, I was certain that backing down was going to hurt credibility,' Press said. But what he found was that even if the leaders backed down from their original threats, they were still taken seriously in the future.
- Revisiting Reputation: How Past Actions Matter in International Politics (Weisiger and Yarhi-Milo, International Organization 69:2)
Princeton University, 2015-11-11 · supports
“We find that past action is closely connected to subsequent dispute initiation and that the effects of reputation generalize beyond the immediate circumstances of the past dispute. Although reputation is not all-important, leaders are well advised to consider the reputational implications of policy decisions in international conflict. … juxtaposing reputation for resolve to power and interests is misleading when past actions influence observers' beliefs about interests”
We find that past action is closely connected to subsequent dispute initiation and that the effects of reputation generalize beyond the immediate circumstances of the past dispute. Although reputation is not all-important, leaders are well advised to consider the reputational implications of policy decisions in international conflict. … juxtaposing reputation for resolve to power and interests is misleading when past actions influence observers' beliefs about interests
- Saudi crown prince says will develop nuclear bomb if Iran does
Al Jazeera, 2018-03-15 · supports
“'Saudi Arabia does not want to acquire any nuclear bomb, but without a doubt, if Iran developed a nuclear bomb, we will follow suit as soon as possible,' Mohammad bin Salman, popularly known as MBS, told US broadcaster CBS in an interview set to air on Sunday.”
'Saudi Arabia does not want to acquire any nuclear bomb, but without a doubt, if Iran developed a nuclear bomb, we will follow suit as soon as possible,' Mohammad bin Salman, popularly known as MBS, told US broadcaster CBS in an interview set to air on Sunday.
- Divining Nuclear Intentions: A Review Essay (Potter and Mukhatzhanova, International Security), abstract
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, 2008 · contests
“Both works challenge conventional conceptions of the sources of nuclear weapons decisions and offer new insights into why past predictions of rapid proliferation failed to materialize and why current prognoses about rampant proliferation are similarly flawed.”
Both works challenge conventional conceptions of the sources of nuclear weapons decisions and offer new insights into why past predictions of rapid proliferation failed to materialize and why current prognoses about rampant proliferation are similarly flawed.
- Peace Time: Cease-Fire Agreements and the Durability of Peace (Fortna), book page
Princeton University Press, 2004 · supports
“Strong agreements markedly lessen the risk of further war. Mechanisms such as demilitarized zones, dispute resolution commissions, peacekeeping, and external guarantees can help maintain peace between even the deadliest of foes.”
Strong agreements markedly lessen the risk of further war. Mechanisms such as demilitarized zones, dispute resolution commissions, peacekeeping, and external guarantees can help maintain peace between even the deadliest of foes.