Steelview

Oil, Shipping and Prices, 1974–2026

Oil and US petrol prices jumped after the war began, though real crude stayed below earlier peaks, and tracked traffic through Hormuz has stayed far below normal amid attacks on shipping and a US blockade. [1][3][10][13][23][25]

Brent crude oil spot price, monthly average, May 1987 – September 2026

Brent, US$ a barrel

Monthly average of the daily Brent spot price, in US dollars a barrel, not adjusted for inflation, over the whole period EIA publishes. Daily values to 27 October 2026 are given in the observations.

US$ a barrel (nominal), by month

Monthly average of the daily Brent spot price, in US dollars a barrel, not adjusted for inflation, over the whole period EIA publishes. Daily values to 27 October 2026 are given in the observations. Read as brent, US$ a barrel: US$ a barrel (nominal). 6 dated events are numbered on a strip under the graph and listed below it. Use the Table switch to see every value.

  • Brent spot, monthly average
040801201987200020202026020406080100120140198719902000201020202026

Events marked above

  1. US and Israeli strikes on Iran begin
  2. Ceasefire
  3. US blockade of Iranian ports begins
  4. US–Iran memorandum signed
  5. US blockade resumes
  6. US strikes on Iran, including oil tankers

Source: US Energy Information Administration [21]

Observations 2
Brent nearly doubled by the April peak and rose again in the autumn

Brent went from $71.32 a barrel on the last trading day before the strikes to $138.21 in early April. 1

After falling in June and July, it climbed again to $135.51 in early October. 1

The latest daily price, $123.10 on 27 October, was still nearly three-quarters above the prewar level. 1

The 2026 peak is below the 2008 record in money terms

Brent's daily record is $143.95, set in July 2008. 1 Its high in 2022 was $133.18. 1

Monthly averages in 2026 also stayed below the 2008 peak (chart). 21

About this data

Full published range: 1987-05–2026-09. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – EIA's monthly Brent series starts in May 1987, when its daily series starts (20 May 1987), and the latest complete month is September 2026 (release of 28 October 2026). The monthly series is used because the daily one has more than 9,100 values. October 2026 daily values are in source 1.

Brent, US$ a barrel

Every value is copied from EIA's monthly table (source above), in US dollars a barrel; the chart's "count" unit is used because there is no dollar unit.

WTI crude oil spot price, monthly average, January 1986 – September 2026

WTI, US$ a barrel

Monthly average of the daily West Texas Intermediate spot price at Cushing, Oklahoma, in US dollars a barrel, not adjusted for inflation, over the whole period EIA publishes.

US$ a barrel (nominal), by month

Monthly average of the daily West Texas Intermediate spot price at Cushing, Oklahoma, in US dollars a barrel, not adjusted for inflation, over the whole period EIA publishes. Read as WTI, US$ a barrel: US$ a barrel (nominal). 6 dated events are numbered on a strip under the graph and listed below it. Use the Table switch to see every value.

  • WTI spot, monthly average
040801201986200020202026020406080100120140198619902000201020202026

Events marked above

  1. US and Israeli strikes on Iran begin
  2. Ceasefire
  3. US blockade of Iranian ports begins
  4. US–Iran memorandum signed
  5. US blockade resumes
  6. US strikes on Iran, including oil tankers

Source: US Energy Information Administration [22]

Observations 1
US crude rose less than Brent

WTI, the US benchmark, went from $66.96 before the strikes to $114.58 at its April peak. 2 In proportion, its rise was smaller than Brent's.

About this data

Full published range: 1986-01–2026-09. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – EIA's WTI series starts in January 1986, a year before Brent's, so the two are separate charts. Latest complete month September 2026.

WTI, US$ a barrel

Every value is copied from EIA's monthly table (source above), in US dollars a barrel.

Real price of imported crude oil, monthly, January 1974 – August 2026 (October 2026 dollars)

Imported crude, October 2026 US$ a barrel

The average price US refiners paid for imported crude oil each month, adjusted to October 2026 dollars with the consumer price index, over the whole historical period EIA publishes.

US$ a barrel (Oct 2026 dollars), by month

The average price US refiners paid for imported crude oil each month, adjusted to October 2026 dollars with the consumer price index, over the whole historical period EIA publishes. Read as imported crude, October 2026 US$ a barrel: US$ a barrel (Oct 2026 dollars). 1 dated event is numbered on a strip under the graph and listed below it. Use the Table switch to see every value.

  • Real imported crude price
0100200197419802000202020260501001502001974198019902000201020202026

Events marked above

  1. US and Israeli strikes on Iran begin

Source: US Energy Information Administration [23]

Observations 1
Adjusted for inflation, crude stayed below the 1981, 2008 and 2022 peaks

In October 2026 dollars, the refiner price of imported crude peaked at $98.85 in May 2026 (chart). 23

That is well below January 1981, July 2008 and June 2022 in the same series, and above the 1974 and 1990 levels. 23 EIA's estimates for September and October 2026 are close to May's, so the autumn may set a slightly higher 2026 peak.

About this data

Full published range: 1974-01–2026-08. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – EIA's real-price file starts in January 1974. Its values from September 2026 onward are estimates and forecasts ("Forecast / estimated values shown in blue"), so they are left out: the series stops at the last historical month, August 2026. This is the refiner imported crude cost, not Brent.

Imported crude, October 2026 US$ a barrel

Every value is column "Real" of the sheet, rounded to the cent; rows whose "Forecast Values" flag is 1 (September 2026 onward) are excluded. Peaks: January 1981 $148.55, July 2008 $194.52, June 2022 $126.68, May 2026 $98.85. Left out: the September 2026 estimate ($97.89) and October forecast ($100.00).

US regular petrol (gasoline) retail price, monthly average, September 1990 – October 2026

Regular gasoline, US$ a gallon

Average US retail price of regular gasoline, all formulations, in dollars a gallon including taxes, not adjusted for inflation. Weekly values are given in the observations.

US$ a gallon (nominal), by month

Average US retail price of regular gasoline, all formulations, in dollars a gallon including taxes, not adjusted for inflation. Weekly values are given in the observations. Read as regular gasoline, US$ a gallon: US$ a gallon (nominal). 7 dated events are numbered on a strip under the graph and listed below it. Use the Table switch to see every value.

  • US regular gasoline, monthly average
024199020002020202601234519902000201020202026

Events marked above

  1. US and Israeli strikes on Iran begin
  2. Ceasefire
  3. US blockade of Iranian ports begins
  4. US–Iran memorandum signed
  5. US blockade resumes
  6. US strikes on Iran, including oil tankers
  7. President pledges no strikes before the midterms

Source: US Energy Information Administration [24]

Observations 1
Petrol rose by about half, and has fallen only slightly

The weekly US average for regular rose from $2.937 a gallon just before the war to $4.500 in mid-May. 3

In the latest week it was $4.269, below the record of $5.006 set in mid-2022. 3

About this data

Full published range: 1990-09–2026-10. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – EIA's monthly series starts in September 1990 (its weekly series on 20 August 1990); EIA marks December 1990 and January 1991 "NA", so those months are blank. October 2026 is EIA's published average of the October weeks to 26 October.

Regular gasoline, US$ a gallon

Every value is copied from EIA's monthly table (source above), in dollars a gallon.

US consumer prices, change over the 12 months to September 2026

Percentage change in the consumer price index over the year to September 2026, for all items, for all items less food and energy, for energy and for gasoline (BLS).

% change on a year earlier

  1. All items3.7%
  2. All items less food and energy2.6%
  3. Energy20.4%
  4. Gasoline34.2%

Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics [4]

Observations 2
Gasoline prices drove most of the rise in inflation

BLS reports gasoline up 34.2 percent over the year to September, accounting for most of the energy index's rise. 4 Prices excluding food and energy rose far less (chart).

CBO attributes about half a point of extra inflation to the war

CBO estimates headline PCE inflation in early 2027 will be 0.5 percentage points higher than it projected before the war, and core inflation 0.3 points higher. 5

BLS does not attribute the rise, and the Federal Reserve's September statement cites only "geopolitical developments". 4 6

About this data

September 2026 is the latest month published; October CPI is due in mid-November. BLS does not say what caused the rise.

Ships passing through the Strait of Hormuz each day, monthly average, January 2019 – October 2026

Ships a day, monthly average

Average number of ships a day recorded passing through the strait by satellite ship tracking (AIS), all vessel types and tankers, as published by IMF PortWatch. October 2026 runs to 25 October.

Ships a day, by month

Average number of ships a day recorded passing through the strait by satellite ship tracking (AIS), all vessel types and tankers, as published by IMF PortWatch. October 2026 runs to 25 October. Read as ships a day, monthly average: Ships a day. Dashed segments cross 1 definitional break in the source, explained in Method Changes below this graph. 7 dated events are numbered on a strip under the graph and listed below it. Use the Table switch to see every value.

  • Strait of HormuzThe narrow sea route between the Persian Gulf and the open ocean, used by ships carrying oil and gas from the Gulf states.
  • Tankers
040801202019202020212022202320242025202602040608010012020192020202120222023202420252026

Events marked above

  1. US and Israeli strikes on Iran begin
  2. Ceasefire
  3. US blockade of Iranian ports begins
  4. US–Iran memorandum signed
  5. US blockade resumes
  6. US strikes on Iran, including oil tankers
  7. President pledges no strikes before the midterms

Vertical dashed lines mark measurement changes. See method changes.

Source: IMF PortWatch [25]

Observations 3
Tracked traffic through Hormuz fell to almost nothing within days

PortWatch counted 57 ships on the day of the first strikes and none four days later. 25

Monthly averages have stayed far below any earlier month since PortWatch's records began in 2019 (chart).

The strait normally carries oil equal to about 20% of world consumption. 8

The June reopening was brief

Traffic picked up after the June memorandum, peaking at 51 ships on 24 June, then fell back after the blockade resumed in July (chart). 25 18

Other sources report much more traffic than the tracking counts

CENTCOM says more than 3,000 vessels passed through with US support in six months, and that Gulf partners exported more than 1.5 billion barrels since summer. 12 Kpler, via the Washington Post, reports Gulf exports approaching prewar daily averages. 13

EIA warns that ship-tracking signals in the strait have been "especially unreliable" since February. 26 Recorded transits are therefore a floor, and the true level is unsettled.

Method Changes
2026-03: Tracking signals unreliable

EIA: "Since the end of February 2026, AIS signal data for ships transiting the Strait of Hormuz have become especially unreliable." PortWatch counts are built from the same AIS signals. [25]

About this data

Full published range: 2019-01–2026-10. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – PortWatch publishes daily counts from 1 January 2019; the latest value queried on 29 October 2026 is for 25 October. Each point is our average of PortWatch's daily "n_total" (all ships) or "n_tanker" values for the month, not a figure PortWatch publishes. Since late February 2026, ship tracking in the strait has been unreliable (see the EIA flows chart), so these counts are likely to miss ships sailing with transponders off.

Ships a day, monthly average

Our monthly means of PortWatch daily counts (all days of each month that PortWatch publishes).

Oil and LNG through the Strait of Hormuz, quarterly, 1Q 2025 – 2Q 2026

Oil, million barrels a day

EIA's estimates of crude oil, condensate and petroleum products, and of liquefied natural gas, moved through the strait each quarter, based on Vortexa tanker tracking.

Million barrels a day, by quarter

EIA's estimates of crude oil, condensate and petroleum products, and of liquefied natural gas, moved through the strait each quarter, based on Vortexa tanker tracking. Read as oil, million barrels a day: Million barrels a day. 1 dated event is numbered on a strip under the graph and listed below it. Use the Table switch to see every value.

  • Total oil flows
2.57.512.517.522.5Apr 2025JulOctJan 2026Apr2.557.51012.51517.52022.5Feb 2025AprMayJunJulAugSepOctNovDecJan 2026FebMarAprMay

Events marked above

  1. US and Israeli strikes on Iran begin

Source: US Energy Information Administration [26]

Observations 1
Oil through the strait fell by more than three-quarters by the second quarter

EIA puts oil flows in the second quarter of 2026 at under a quarter of their 2025 level, and LNG flows near zero (chart). 26

EIA estimates production shut in across the region peaked at 10.9 million barrels a day in May and fell to 4.8 million in September. 7

LNG, billion cubic feet a day

Billion cubic feet a day, by quarter

EIA's estimates of crude oil, condensate and petroleum products, and of liquefied natural gas, moved through the strait each quarter, based on Vortexa tanker tracking. Read as LNG, billion cubic feet a day: Billion cubic feet a day. 1 dated event is numbered on a strip under the graph and listed below it. Use the Table switch to see every value.

  • LNG flows
04812Apr 2025JulOctJan 2026Apr024681012Feb 2025AprMayJunJulAugSepOctNovDecJan 2026FebMarAprMay

Events marked above

  1. US and Israeli strikes on Iran begin

Source: US Energy Information Administration [26]

About this data

Full published range: 2025-02–2026-05. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – EIA's table covers 1Q25 to 2Q26 only (release of 12 August 2026; the October STEO did not update it). Each quarter is plotted at its middle month (February for 1Q, and so on). EIA says 2026 tracking data "are being revised frequently".

Traffic through every PortWatch chokepoint in September 2026, as a share of its 2025 average

Average ships a day in September 2026 divided by the average for 2025, for each of the 28 chokepoints IMF PortWatch tracks. 100% means traffic as usual.

% of 2025 daily average

  1. Bering Strait399%
  2. Mindoro Strait159%
  3. Magellan Strait153%
  4. Luzon Strait140%
  5. Makassar Strait118%
  6. Tsugaru Strait118%
  7. Mona Passage109%
  8. Lombok Strait106%
  9. Yucatan Channel106%
  10. Suez Canal105%
  11. Balabac Strait103%
  12. Sunda Strait103%
  13. Korea Strait100%
  14. Gibraltar Strait98%
  15. Taiwan Strait97%
  16. Cape of Good Hope96%
  17. Dover Strait96%
  18. Malacca Strait94%
  19. Windward Passage92%
  20. Bohai Strait91%
  21. Ombai Strait90%
  22. Panama Canal90%
  23. Torres Strait89%
  24. Oresund Strait81%
  25. Bab el-Mandeb Strait79%
  26. Bosporus Strait55%
  27. Strait of Hormuz4%
  28. Kerch Strait0%

Source: IMF PortWatch [25]

Observations 1
Hormuz is the outlier among the world's chokepoints

In September, most of the 28 chokepoints PortWatch tracks were close to their 2025 traffic (chart). 25 Only the Kerch Strait, near zero, ran lower than Hormuz.

About this data

Our arithmetic from PortWatch's daily "n_total" counts: the mean of September 2026's 30 days divided by the mean of 2025's 365 days. The full set of chokepoints is shown, in descending order. Small chokepoints swing widely: the Bering Strait averaged about one ship a day in 2025.

Iran's oil exports, March–May 2026 (Vortexa, via Reuters)

Average barrels a day of Iranian oil exports in each month, from the tanker tracker Vortexa as reported by Reuters on 4 June 2026. The US blockade of Iranian ports began on 13 April.

Million barrels a day

  1. March 20261.9
  2. April 2026 (blockade from 13 April)1.34
  3. May 20260.21

Source: Reuters (via Baird Maritime) [14]

Observations 1
Iran's exports collapsed after the first blockade began

Vortexa data put Iran's exports in May at about 209,000 barrels a day, the lowest since early 2020 (chart). 14 The first blockade had begun in mid-April. 14

ISW/CTP judges the spring blockade had "a limited but notable effect" on Iran's willingness to keep fighting. 17

About this data

Million barrels a day. March is Reuters' "nearly 1.9 million"; May is 209,000 barrels a day (0.209 million). Vortexa's data are proprietary, so no longer series could be checked; no figure after May was confirmed at source.

The US blockade in CENTCOM's own figures

Single-party claims from US Central Command, as worded in each release.

One row per release
ReleasePeriodRedirected or turned aroundDisabledDestroyed
20 May 2026 (caption) [9]First blockade, from 13 April91 ships——
5 Oct 2026 [10]Since 14 July130 vessels3 ships13 commercial vessels, "over the past 12 weeks"
10 Oct 2026 [11]Since 14 July135 ships4 vessels10 tankers linked to the IRGC

Sources: US Central Command [9]; US Central Command [10]; US Central Command [11]; US Central Command [12]

Observations 3
CENTCOM reports enforcing the blockade by force

CENTCOM reports turning around 135 ships and disabling four by 10 October, and says enforcement will continue against "any vessels trying to run the blockade". 11 10 These figures have no independent check.

US forces are also destroying ships

CENTCOM's early-October releases say US forces destroyed 13 commercial vessels in one, and 10 IRGC-linked tankers in the other. 10 11

The two releases use different categories, and CENTCOM does not explain the difference. The 1 September War Powers letter reported strikes on Iranian state oil tankers. 19

Attacks on shipping continued in October

Officials told Bloomberg of 23 recorded attacks on vessels in or near Hormuz in the first two weeks of October, at least five hitting engine rooms. 13 The report, relayed by ISW/CTP, does not say who carried out each attack.

About this data

A release of 25 October 2026 adds that more than 3,000 vessels transited with US support over the "last six months", and that "over 95%" of ships passed safely.

The 1980s Tanker War

The last Gulf shipping war disrupted far less traffic

The Strauss Center says the 1980s Tanker War "failed to disrupt more than two percent of ships" in the Gulf even at its height, and real oil prices fell through the decade. 15

Tracked Hormuz traffic in 2026 has fallen much further than that (Hormuz chart). 25

About this data

What this measures. Crude oil spot prices (Brent, the world benchmark, and WTI, the US one), the real price US refiners paid for imported crude, US retail petrol, consumer prices, and ships and oil passing through the Strait of Hormuz, as of late October 2026.

Frequency. The price charts use EIA's monthly averages over each full published range, because the daily and weekly series have thousands of points. Daily and weekly values are quoted in the observations.

How confident to be. Prices are measured, not estimated. Hormuz counts and flows rest on ship tracking that EIA calls unreliable since February, and CENTCOM's tallies are claims by one side in the war.

Causes. A price rising after an event does not show the event caused all of it. CBO is the only source here that attributes inflation to the war. 5

Commonly mistaken for. A record in money terms is not a record in real terms: adjusted for inflation, 2026's crude prices were below several earlier peaks. 23 For the war's cost to the US government, see the war's human and financial costs.

Related Data

Decisions, Law and Diplomacy: Congress, the President, Ceasefires and Negotiations, 2024–2026

Both chambers of Congress adopted a resolution to end the war, of doubtful legal force, while the administration declared hostilities over and then reported new strikes, and most Americans disapprove. [4][7][10][18][28]

House votes on resolutions to end the Iran war, by party, March–September 2026

Yes and no votes

Every House roll call on a concurrent resolution directing the President to remove US forces from hostilities with Iran, 5 March to 15 September 2026. The first reading shows yes and no votes; the second shows members who voted against their party's majority.

Members voting, by date of roll call

Every House roll call on a concurrent resolution directing the President to remove US forces from hostilities with Iran, 5 March to 15 September 2026. The first reading shows yes and no votes; the second shows members who voted against their party's majority. Read as yes and no votes: Members voting. Use the Table switch to see every value.

  • Yes (end the war)
  • No
202.5207.5212.5217.5Apr 2026Jul202.5205207.5210212.5215217.5220Apr 2026MayJunJulAugSep

Source: Office of the Clerk, US House of Representatives [52]

Observations 2
A House majority voted to end the war three times

The House rejected the first three resolutions by margins of seven votes or fewer, including a tie, then adopted the next three, from June to September (chart). 1 3 6

Every vote was on a concurrent resolution under section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution. The House has held no roll call of any kind since mid-September, as of 29 October (see the chart note).

The resolutions do not bind the President in practice

A concurrent resolution is not sent to the President to sign or veto. CRS calls its effect "uncertain" since the Supreme Court's 1983 Chadha ruling, and Lawfare says it was brought into "serious constitutional doubt". 11 10

A joint resolution would be binding but faces a veto, which two-thirds of each chamber would have to override. 10

Members voting against their party

Members, by date of roll call

Every House roll call on a concurrent resolution directing the President to remove US forces from hostilities with Iran, 5 March to 15 September 2026. The first reading shows yes and no votes; the second shows members who voted against their party's majority. Read as members voting against their party: Members. Use the Table switch to see every value.

  • Republicans voting yes
  • Democrats voting no
0246Apr 2026Jul01234567Apr 2026MayJunJulAugSep

Source: Office of the Clerk, US House of Representatives [52]

Observations 1
Republican defections grew but stayed small

Republicans voting to end the war rose from two in March to seven in September, out of more than 200 Republicans voting. Democrats voting against fell to none from June on (chart). 1 6

In the Senate, Republican yes votes rose from one to four (chart below). With the House this evenly divided, these few members and absences decided each result.

About this data

Full published range: 2026-03-05–2026-09-15. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – The Clerk's 2026 roll calls run to number 314 (16 September 2026); numbers 315 and above returned no file when checked on 29 October 2026, so there has been no House vote of any kind since then. Six of the 314 are Iran war-powers resolutions.

Yes and no votes

Totals from the totals-by-vote field of each roll call. Members voting "present" or not voting are excluded.

Members voting against their party

From the totals-by-party field of each roll call: Republican yea-total and Democratic nay-total.

Senate votes on measures to end the Iran war, by party, March–September 2026

Yes and no votes

All 14 Senate roll calls on Iran war-powers measures, 4 March to 24 September 2026: motions to discharge or proceed to joint resolutions, and votes on two House concurrent resolutions. The second reading shows senators who voted against their party's majority.

Senators voting, by date of roll call

All 14 Senate roll calls on Iran war-powers measures, 4 March to 24 September 2026: motions to discharge or proceed to joint resolutions, and votes on two House concurrent resolutions. The second reading shows senators who voted against their party's majority. Read as yes and no votes: Senators voting. Use the Table switch to see every value.

  • Yes (end the war)
  • No
46485052Apr 2026Jul4647484950515253Apr 2026MayJunJulAugSep

Source: United States Senate [53]

Observations 1
The Senate voted 14 times and succeeded twice

Twelve of the Senate's votes failed. A motion to discharge succeeded in May, but the resolution then failed a motion to proceed. In June the Senate adopted H.Con.Res.86, which the House had passed, so both chambers adopted one resolution (chart). 7 8

The Senate rejected the next House resolution, H.Con.Res.89, by one vote in September. GovTrack's list shows no Iran war-powers vote after that, as of late October. 9

Senators voting against their party

Senators, by date of roll call

All 14 Senate roll calls on Iran war-powers measures, 4 March to 24 September 2026: motions to discharge or proceed to joint resolutions, and votes on two House concurrent resolutions. The second reading shows senators who voted against their party's majority. Read as senators voting against their party: Senators. Use the Table switch to see every value.

  • Republicans voting yes
  • Democrats voting no
1234Apr 2026Jul11.522.533.54Apr 2026MayJunJulAugSep

Source: United States Senate [53]

Observations 1
Senate defections were steady at a handful

One Republican voted yes on each of the first five votes, and up to four from May. One Democrat voted no on every vote with a member record (chart). 7 8

The same pattern, one Republican yes and one Democratic no, appeared in the failed June 2025 Senate vote on an Iran war-powers resolution. 26

About this data

Full published range: 2026-03-04–2026-09-24. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – The Senate's own vote list (archived 10 October 2026) and GovTrack's list (captured 26–29 October 2026, latest vote 30 September) show no Iran war-powers vote after 24 September. Party counts are tallied from the member records in each roll-call file; the file for 23 July (vote 207) has no archived copy, so that date has totals only.

Yes and no votes

Yeas and nays as printed in the Senate vote list. A yes vote favours ending the war in every case.

Senators voting against their party

Derived: Republicans recorded "Yea" and Democrats recorded "Nay", counted from the member records of each archived roll-call XML file (votes 46, 58, 69, 79, 88, 113, 118, 129, 174, 184, 192, 216 and 244). The two independents voted yes every time. On 24 June one further Republican voted "Present".

Approval of the war in Pew's surveys, with the war's main events, March–October 2026

Approve of Trump's handling

Share of US adults who approve of President Trump's handling of the military action against Iran, and who say using force was the right decision, in Pew's two surveys (March and early October 2026). The markers below the chart date the ceasefire, blockade, War Powers letters, memorandum of understanding, strikes and the latest reported plans.

% who approve, by survey fieldwork month

Share of US adults who approve of President Trump's handling of the military action against Iran, and who say using force was the right decision, in Pew's two surveys (March and early October 2026). The markers below the chart date the ceasefire, blockade, War Powers letters, memorandum of understanding, strikes and the latest reported plans. Read as approve of Trump's handling: % who approve. 16 dated events are numbered on a strip under the graph and listed below it. Use the Table switch to see every value.

  • All adults
  • Rep/lean Rep
  • Dem/lean Dem
0%20%40%60%Apr 2026JulOct0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%Mar 2026AprMayJunJulAugSepOct

Events marked above

  1. War Powers report cites Article II

    48-hour report on strikes begun 28 February, filed "consistent with" the War Powers Resolution.

    Source: The White House (copy published by Just Security) [12]

  2. Ceasefire

    The President ordered a two-week ceasefire on 7 April; it was then extended.

    Source: The White House (US Government Publishing Office) [14]

  3. US blockade of Iranian ports begins

    Source: Lawfare [10]

  4. Letter: hostilities "have terminated"

    Known only through quotation by Lawfare and Jack Goldsmith; the letter itself was not found on govinfo.

    Source: Lawfare [10]

  5. Iran downs a US Apache; US strikes from 9 June

    As reported in the President's War Powers letter of 12 June.

    Source: The White House (US Government Publishing Office) [14]

  6. US–Iran memorandum of understanding signed

    The President's letter gives 17 June; ISW/CTP calls it "the June 18 MoU".

    Source: The White House (US Government Publishing Office) [15]

  7. US strikes on 26 and 28 June

    After Iranian attacks on vessels on 25 and 27 June, per the President's letter.

    Source: The White House (US Government Publishing Office) [15]

  8. US strikes resume; memorandum breaks down
  9. Blockade reimposed
  10. US strikes in Iraq on Iran-backed militias
  11. US strikes on Iran, including state oil tankers

    AP reports no US strike on Iran since early September (as of 28 October).

    Source: The White House (US Government Publishing Office) [18]

  12. Trump: no attack before the 3 November midterms
  13. NYT: plans for a short operation after the midterms
  14. DNI memo: Iran in "advanced stages" of attack planning

    As reported by ISW/CTP; the memo itself could not be fetched.

    Source: Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project [45]

  15. Saudi, Pakistani and Turkish officials in Tehran; Qatari plan

    Reported plan: Iran reopens Hormuz, US lifts the blockade, over five days. ISW/CTP reports no progress.

    Source: Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project [47]

  16. US tells allies to prepare for possible renewed strikes

    AP, citing two diplomats; no final decision by the President.

    Source: Associated Press (via WCAX) [49]

Source: Pew Research Center [54]

Observations 2
Most Americans disapprove, and approval has slipped

In Pew's surveys about a third of adults approve of the President's handling of the war, down slightly since March; Pew's separate question on whether force was the right decision moved the same way (chart). 28 29

Gallup in June and Quinnipiac in March, asking about the military action itself, also found majorities against (charts below). 30 31

Most Republicans still approve, in falling numbers

Pew finds the whole decline in approval came from Republicans; Democrats' views did not change. 28 Republican support is still a clear majority in every poll here, highest in Quinnipiac's March poll and Gallup's June poll, which exclude leaners (charts below). 30 31

Say using force was the right decision

% right decision, by survey fieldwork month

Share of US adults who approve of President Trump's handling of the military action against Iran, and who say using force was the right decision, in Pew's two surveys (March and early October 2026). The markers below the chart date the ceasefire, blockade, War Powers letters, memorandum of understanding, strikes and the latest reported plans. Read as say using force was the right decision: % right decision. 16 dated events are numbered on a strip under the graph and listed below it. Use the Table switch to see every value.

  • All adults
  • Rep/lean Rep
30%50%70%Apr 2026JulOct30%40%50%60%70%80%Mar 2026AprMayJunJulAugSepOct

Events marked above

  1. War Powers report cites Article II

    48-hour report on strikes begun 28 February, filed "consistent with" the War Powers Resolution.

    Source: The White House (copy published by Just Security) [12]

  2. Ceasefire

    The President ordered a two-week ceasefire on 7 April; it was then extended.

    Source: The White House (US Government Publishing Office) [14]

  3. US blockade of Iranian ports begins

    Source: Lawfare [10]

  4. Letter: hostilities "have terminated"

    Known only through quotation by Lawfare and Jack Goldsmith; the letter itself was not found on govinfo.

    Source: Lawfare [10]

  5. Iran downs a US Apache; US strikes from 9 June

    As reported in the President's War Powers letter of 12 June.

    Source: The White House (US Government Publishing Office) [14]

  6. US–Iran memorandum of understanding signed

    The President's letter gives 17 June; ISW/CTP calls it "the June 18 MoU".

    Source: The White House (US Government Publishing Office) [15]

  7. US strikes on 26 and 28 June

    After Iranian attacks on vessels on 25 and 27 June, per the President's letter.

    Source: The White House (US Government Publishing Office) [15]

  8. US strikes resume; memorandum breaks down
  9. Blockade reimposed
  10. US strikes in Iraq on Iran-backed militias
  11. US strikes on Iran, including state oil tankers

    AP reports no US strike on Iran since early September (as of 28 October).

    Source: The White House (US Government Publishing Office) [18]

  12. Trump: no attack before the 3 November midterms
  13. NYT: plans for a short operation after the midterms
  14. DNI memo: Iran in "advanced stages" of attack planning

    As reported by ISW/CTP; the memo itself could not be fetched.

    Source: Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project [45]

  15. Saudi, Pakistani and Turkish officials in Tehran; Qatari plan

    Reported plan: Iran reopens Hormuz, US lifts the blockade, over five days. ISW/CTP reports no progress.

    Source: Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project [47]

  16. US tells allies to prepare for possible renewed strikes

    AP, citing two diplomats; no final decision by the President.

    Source: Associated Press (via WCAX) [49]

Source: Pew Research Center [54]

About this data

Full published range: 2026-03–2026-10. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – Pew asked both questions in March (16–22 March, 3,524 adults) and from 28 September to 4 October (labelled October by Pew). Republicans and Democrats include leaners. Pew prints no Democratic figure for the right-decision question ("one-in-ten" in October), so that line is omitted. Event markers run to 28 October 2026.

Say using force was the right decision

October total is Pew's 34%, "down 4 percentage points from March" (38%).

Approval of the US military action against Iran, by party (Gallup), June 2026

Share of US adults who approve or disapprove of "this U.S. military action against Iran" (Gallup, telephone, 1–15 June 2026, 1,001 adults).

Compare by answer

Approve · % of adults

  1. Republicans79%
  2. All adults34%
  3. Independents26%
  4. Democrats8%
Show all breakdowns
Approval of the US military action against Iran, by party (Gallup), June 2026, by answer
CategoryApproveDisapproveNo opinionTotal
All adults34%63%4%101%
Republicans79%19%2%100%
Independents26%68%6%100%
Democrats8%90%2%100%

Source: Gallup [30]

Observations 1
Independents opposed the war by about two to one or more

Gallup's June poll found independents opposed by more than two to one, and Quinnipiac's March poll by nearly two to one (charts). 30 31 Pew does not report independents separately.

About this data

From the party table for question 24 of Gallup's final topline. Gallup's party groups exclude leaners. Each bar is the sum of the three published shares, which is 101 for all adults because of rounding. Gallup published this question once, so there is no Gallup trend.

Support for the US military action against Iran, by party (Quinnipiac), March 2026

Share of registered voters who support or oppose "the U.S. military action against Iran" (Quinnipiac, 6–8 March 2026, 1,002 registered voters).

Compare by answer

Support · % of registered voters

  1. Republicans85%
  2. All voters40%
  3. Independents31%
  4. Democrats7%
Show all breakdowns
Support for the US military action against Iran, by party (Quinnipiac), March 2026, by answer
CategorySupportOpposeDon't knowTotal
All voters40%53%7%100%
Republicans85%11%5%101%
Independents31%60%9%100%
Democrats7%89%4%100%

Source: Quinnipiac University Poll [31]

Observations 1
Support split almost entirely along party lines

In Quinnipiac's poll a week after the war began, Republicans supported the action and Democrats opposed it by similar margins; independents sat closer to Democrats (chart). 31

About this data

From question 10 of the release. Party groups exclude leaners. Each bar is the sum of the three published shares (101 for Republicans, from rounding).

Should the President have received Congress's approval before acting? By party (Quinnipiac), March 2026

Answers of registered voters to "Do you think President Trump should have received approval from Congress before taking military action against Iran, or not?" (Quinnipiac, 6–8 March 2026).

Compare by answer

Should have · % of registered voters

  1. Democrats92%
  2. Independents64%
  3. All voters59%
  4. Republicans22%
Show all breakdowns
Should the President have received Congress's approval before acting? By party (Quinnipiac), March 2026, by answer
CategoryShould haveShould not haveDon't knowTotal
All voters59%38%3%100%
Republicans22%76%2%100%
Independents64%33%3%100%
Democrats92%5%3%100%

Source: Quinnipiac University Poll [31]

Observations 1
Most voters said Congress should have been asked first

In March, 59% of registered voters said the President should have received approval from Congress before acting, including most independents and about a fifth of Republicans (chart). 31 This is one poll; no later reading was found.

About this data

From question 15 of the release. Each bar is the sum of the three published shares. No other pollster found asked this question, so there is no trend or comparison.

War Powers reports by presidents, and those that started the 60-day clock, 1975–March 2017

Reports submitted to Congress under the War Powers Resolution from 1975 to March 2017, and the number that cited section 4(a)(1), which starts the 60-day withdrawal requirement (CRS).

Reports

  1. All War Powers reports168
  2. Reports citing section 4(a)(1)1

Source: Congressional Research Service [11]

Observations 1
Presidents have almost never started the 60-day clock themselves

Of the War Powers reports filed from 1975 to March 2017, CRS finds only one cited the section that starts the 60-day withdrawal requirement (chart). 11

Each 2026 letter that could be read cites the President's Article II authority and is filed "consistent with" the Act. 12 18

About this data

CRS R42699, updated 8 March 2019. The one report citing section 4(a)(1) was the 1975 Mayaguez seizure, by which time the operation was over. CRS publishes no count after March 2017.

What has the President said about war and about Iran?

Four statements, from the 2024 campaign to October 2026.

  • I was the first president in modern times to start no new wars. … Iran is very close to having a nuclear weapon, which would have never happened.

    Donald Trump, CandidateConvention acceptance speechSource: The American Presidency Project (UC Santa Barbara) [32]
  • They said: 'He will start a war.' I'm not going to start a war. I'm going to stop wars.

    Donald Trump, President-electElection-night remarksSource: The American Presidency Project (UC Santa Barbara) [33]
  • I acted pursuant to my constitutional authority as Commander in Chief … in collective self-defense of our regional allies, including Israel.

    Donald Trump, President48-hour War Powers reportSource: The White House (copy published by Just Security) [12]
  • will not be attacking Iran at any time prior to the Midterm Elections … having productive discussions with the Islamic Republic of Iran

    Donald Trump, PresidentSocial media postSource: Associated Press (via WCAX) [42]

Sources: The White House (copy published by Just Security) [12]; The American Presidency Project (UC Santa Barbara) [32]; The American Presidency Project (UC Santa Barbara) [33]; Associated Press (via WCAX) [42]

Observations 2
The 2024 campaign promised to stop wars

On election night 2024 the President said "I'm not going to start a war. I'm going to stop wars." The remarks did not mention Iran. 33

The same campaign called Iran "very close" to a weapon

In his 2024 convention speech he said Iran was "very close to having a nuclear weapon" and blamed his predecessor. 32 Both lines were said by the same candidate in the same year.

War Powers letters, 2026

Each letter the President sent Congress under the War Powers Resolution in 2026, by date. Letters from June on report new military action.

Filled marker: major event Hollow: minor

Showing 7 of 7 events

2026

  1. · Reports military action

    Strikes on Iran from 28 Feb

    Article II; "consistent with" the Act.

    Source: The White House (copy published by Just Security) [12]

  2. · Says hostilities have ended · major event

    Hostilities that began 28 Feb "have terminated"

    No exchange of fire since 7 Apr. Quoted by Lawfare and Goldsmith; letter not found.

    Source: Lawfare [10]

  3. · Reports military action

    Iran downed a US Apache (8 Jun); US strikes from 9 Jun

    House Doc 119-162

    Source: The White House (US Government Publishing Office) [14]

  4. · Reports military action

    US strikes on 26 and 28 Jun; MoU signed 17 Jun

    House Doc 119-167

    Source: The White House (US Government Publishing Office) [15]

  5. · Reports military action

    US strikes from 7 Jul

    House Doc 119-169

    Source: The White House (US Government Publishing Office) [16]

  6. · Reports military action

    US strikes in Iraq from 27 Jul on Iran-directed militias

    House Doc 119-183

    Source: The White House (US Government Publishing Office) [17]

  7. · Reports military action

    US strikes on Iran from 1 Sep, including state oil tankers

    House Doc 119-193

    Source: The White House (US Government Publishing Office) [18]

Sources: Lawfare [10]; The White House (copy published by Just Security) [12]; Executive Functions (Jack Goldsmith) [13]; The White House (US Government Publishing Office) [14]; The White House (US Government Publishing Office) [15]; The White House (US Government Publishing Office) [16]; The White House (US Government Publishing Office) [17]; The White House (US Government Publishing Office) [18]

Observations 2
Hostilities were declared over, then new strikes were reported

The 1 May letter said hostilities "have terminated" because there had been no exchange of fire since the ceasefire. 10 The blockade that began in April was still running, and from June the administration filed at least five letters reporting new military action (timeline). 14 18

Goldsmith calls the "no exchange of fire" claim "highly misleading". 13 The 1 May letter is known only through these quotations.

Each new letter treats the strikes as a separate action

Each later letter reports military action "commenced" on a new date, in response to a named Iranian or militia attack. 14 16 Lawfare notes the tension between this and treating the blockade as anything but a continuation of the March operation. 10

The same text makes the President "Commander in Chief".

The Congress shall have Power … To declare War

The Constitution of the United StatesArticle I, Section 8Source: U.S. National Archives [51]

Earlier uses of force without authorisation, and Congress's votes, 2011–2025

The main roll calls found on earlier operations, and the count of all uses of force since 1798.

One row per vote or count
OperationVoteResult
Libya, 2011House: authorise the operation (24 Jun 2011)Failed, 123–295 [20]
Libya, 2011House: limit funding (24 Jun 2011)Failed, 180–238 [21]
Yemen (Saudi-led war), 2019S.J.Res.7: Senate 54–46, House 247–175Vetoed; override failed 53–45 (2 May 2019) [22] [23]
Iran, 2020S.J.Res.68: Senate 55–45, House 227–186Vetoed; override failed 49–44 (7 May 2020) [24] [25]
Iran, 2025S.J.Res.59: Senate (27 Jun 2025)Failed, 47–53 [26]
All uses of force, 1798–2023—"Hundreds of instances"; 11 declarations of war covering five wars [19]

Sources: Congressional Research Service [19]; Office of the Clerk, US House of Representatives [20]; Office of the Clerk, US House of Representatives [21]; Office of the Clerk, US House of Representatives [22]; United States Senate [23]; Office of the Clerk, US House of Representatives [24]; United States Senate [25]; Senate Democrats (Senate Periodical Press Gallery floor log) [26]

Observations 3
Congress has declared war eleven times, in five wars

The Constitution gives Congress the power "To declare War" and makes the President "Commander in Chief". 51

CRS counts eleven declarations of war covering five wars, and "hundreds of instances" of US forces used abroad in conflict or potential conflict. 19 The administration did not seek authorisation for this war before the 60-day mark. 10

CRS does not code the instances by authorisation, length or scale (see Data still needed).

Every binding attempt since 2011 to end an operation failed

Joint resolutions on Yemen in 2019 and Iran in 2020 passed both chambers and were vetoed; neither override reached two-thirds. In 2011 the House rejected both authorising the Libya operation and limiting its funding; the 2025 Iran resolution failed in the Senate (table). 20 21 23 25 26

Research finds Congress shapes wars without binding votes

Kriner's study, as described on its publisher's page, finds that Congress "materially shapes the initiation, scope, and duration of major military actions", and that the party balance in Congress helps explain how long conflicts last. 27 The publisher's page gives no effect sizes.

The ceasefire record, April–July 2026

Attacks, strikes and agreements during the ceasefire, from the President's letters and ISW/CTP. No Iranian or neutral record was found.

Filled marker: major event Hollow: minor

Showing 11 of 11 events

2026

  1. – · Both · major event

    Two-week ceasefire ordered, then extended

    Source: The White House (US Government Publishing Office) [14]

  2. · Iran acted

    Engaged a US Army Apache, "forcing its crash landing"

    Source: The White House (US Government Publishing Office) [14]

  3. · US acted

    Strikes on missile sites, mining, air defences, command

    Source: The White House (US Government Publishing Office) [14]

  4. · Both · major event

    Memorandum of understanding signed

    Source: The White House (US Government Publishing Office) [15]

  5. – · Iran acted

    Attacks on neutral-flagged vessels in Hormuz, on 25 and 27 Jun

    Source: The White House (US Government Publishing Office) [15]

  6. – · US acted

    Strikes on drone, missile and command sites, on 26 and 28 Jun

    Source: The White House (US Government Publishing Office) [15]

  7. – · Iran acted

    Attacks on several neutral-flagged vessels

    Source: The White House (US Government Publishing Office) [16]

  8. · US acted

    Strikes resume

    Source: The White House (US Government Publishing Office) [16]

  9. – · Iran acted

    IRGC Navy announced the strait closed and struck two vessels

    Source: Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project [34]

  10. · US acted

    Struck "dozens of Iranian military targets"

    Source: Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project [34]

  11. · US acted

    Blockade reimposed

    Source: Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project [34]

Sources: The White House (US Government Publishing Office) [14]; The White House (US Government Publishing Office) [15]; The White House (US Government Publishing Office) [16]; Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project [34]; US Central Command [50]

Observations 2
Both sides used force during the ceasefire

The President's own letters record Iranian attacks and US strikes during the ceasefire, before and after the memorandum (timeline). 14 15 In each letter the US strikes answer a named Iranian attack.

Every entry comes from the US government or ISW/CTP. No Iranian or neutral record was found to check the sequence.

The memorandum broke down within three weeks

Within nine days of the signing, the President reported Iranian attacks on shipping and US strikes in reply. 15 Strikes resumed from early July, and ISW/CTP judged that they and the renewed blockade "mark the end of the ceasefire". 16 34

Negotiations and agreements, 2016–2026

The talks and agreements between the US and Iran, from the 2015 deal to the latest proposals.

Filled marker: major event Hollow: minor

Showing 8 of 8 events

2016

  1. · Agreement

    Implementation Day of the 2015 nuclear deal (JCPOA)

    Enrichment capped at 3.67 percent for 15 years, stockpile under 300 kg.

    Source: Arms Control Association [40]

2025

  1. – · Talks and proposals

    Five rounds of US–Iran talks

    The sixth (15 Jun) suspended after Israel's attack. Wikipedia (tertiary).

    Source: Wikipedia [41]

2026

  1. · Talks and proposals

    Indirect US–Iran talks in Geneva on 17 and 26 Feb

    Attended by the IAEA Director General.

    Source: International Atomic Energy Agency [38]

  2. · Strikes · major event

    US and Israeli strikes; IAEA stops verification in Iran

    Source: International Atomic Energy Agency [38]

  3. · Agreement · major event

    Memorandum: "Iran reaffirms that it shall not procure or develop nuclear weapons"

    Also safe passage for shipping.

    Source: Congressional Research Service [39]

  4. · Talks and proposals

    President rejects Iran's proposal to reopen Hormuz within seven days on conditions

    Source: Associated Press (via WCAX) [42]

  5. · Talks and proposals

    Qatari plan reported: Hormuz reopened for blockade lifted, over five days

    Dispute over sequencing. ISW/CTP citing the NYT.

    Source: Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project [47]

  6. · Talks and proposals

    Iran's foreign minister: Tehran "continues to give diplomacy a chance to succeed"

    Source: Associated Press (via WCAX) [49]

Sources: The White House (US Government Publishing Office) [15]; International Atomic Energy Agency [38]; Congressional Research Service [39]; Arms Control Association [40]; Wikipedia [41]; Associated Press (via WCAX) [42]; Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project [47]; Associated Press (via WCAX) [49]

Observations 3
Talks were under way when the strikes began

The IAEA records indirect US–Iran talks in Geneva on two dates in February 2026, the second two days before the strikes. 38 In 2025 a sixth round was suspended after Israel's attack, according to Wikipedia's account. 41

Iran signed a no-weapons pledge in June

The June memorandum states that "Iran reaffirms that it shall not procure or develop nuclear weapons". 39 Its other terms, including any on inspections, have not been published in any source found, so it cannot be compared clause by clause with the 2015 deal.

Talks continued alongside strike planning in October

The President's pledge spoke of "productive discussions", and in late October Qatar, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey were pressing a deal. 42 47 Regional sources told ISW/CTP the Tehran meeting "made no progress on any issue". 48

Where have allies and regional governments stood on the war?

The statements found, not a complete record of allied positions.

Sources: UK Government (Prime Minister's Office) [36]; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sultanate of Oman [37]; Associated Press (via WCAX) [49]

Observations 2
Key European allies did not join the strikes

The British, French and German leaders said they "did not participate", while condemning Iran's attacks on its neighbours "in the strongest terms". 36 This list is the statements found, not a complete record of allied positions.

Oman's foreign minister says the war lacked UN authorisation

Oman's foreign minister describes the war as "a catastrophe" launched "without United Nations authorisation". 37 This is his statement; no UN legal text was checked, and resolution 2817 could not be fetched.

About this data

UN Security Council resolution 2817 (11 March 2026) could not be checked at source, because UN sites refused the fetch. On 26 October 2026 Oman's foreign minister also called for a Gulf non-aggression pact with Iran (ISW/CTP).

The latest events, July–October 2026

Assessments and reports since the ceasefire ended. Most come from one source, named on each entry, and are not official findings.

Showing 8 of 8 events

2026

  1. · Iran's forces, as assessed

    ISW/CTP: Iran "continuously made efforts to reconstitute its ballistic missile and drone programs"

    From the April ceasefire on.

    Source: Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project [34]

  2. – · Attacks

    23 attacks on vessels near Hormuz

    Officials told Bloomberg, via ISW/CTP.

    Source: Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project [43]

  3. · US plans and pledges

    The President pledges no attack on Iran before the midterms

    Source: Associated Press (via WCAX) [42]

  4. · Iran's forces, as assessed

    New defence minister plans to rebuild "in mountains and security structures"

    ISW/CTP reads his appointment as prioritising missiles.

    Source: Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project [35]

  5. · US plans and pledges

    NYT reports plans for "a short and intensive operation" after 3 November

    Source: Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project [44]

  6. · Iran's forces, as assessed

    Intelligence chief warns of Iran's "advanced stages" of planning attacks on US targets

    As reported by ISW/CTP; the memo itself could not be fetched.

    Source: Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project [45]

  7. · Attacks

    Houthis fire missiles and drones at Saudi Arabia

    ISW/CTP.

    Source: Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project [46]

  8. · US plans and pledges

    AP: allies told to prepare for renewed action and Iranian retaliation

    AP's diplomats say the President has made no final decision.

    Source: Associated Press (via WCAX) [49]

Sources: Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project [34]; Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project [35]; Associated Press (via WCAX) [42]; Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project [43]; Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project [44]; Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project [45]; Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project [46]; Associated Press (via WCAX) [49]

Observations 4
Iran worked to rebuild missiles and drones, in ISW/CTP's assessment

ISW/CTP assesses that Iran "continuously made efforts to reconstitute its ballistic missile and drone programs" from the April ceasefire. 34 In October it read the new defence minister's appointment, and his plan to rebuild "in mountains and security structures", as prioritising missiles. 35

These are assessments by ISW and AEI's Critical Threats Project, not imagery or official findings.

A new round of strikes is reported to be planned after the midterms

The NYT reported plans for "a short and intensive operation" after 3 November, and AP reports allies were told to prepare for renewed action and Iranian retaliation. 44 49 AP's diplomats say the President has made no final decision.

AP reports no US strike on Iran since early September (as of 28 October). 49

The intelligence chief warned of Iranian attack planning, as reported

ISW/CTP reports that the Director of National Intelligence warned on 23 October that Iran is in the "advanced stages" of planning attacks on US targets in the region. 45 The memo itself could not be fetched, so this rests on ISW/CTP's account.

Fighting spread to shipping and Saudi Arabia in October

Officials told Bloomberg of 23 attacks on vessels near Hormuz in the first two weeks of October, and the Houthis fired missiles and drones at Saudi Arabia from 24 October (ISW/CTP). 43 46 The US blockade of Iranian ports was still in force in late October. 50 47

Subtleties

Several Senate votes were on procedure, not the resolution

Eleven of the 14 Senate votes were motions to discharge a committee, and one was a motion to proceed. A yes vote on each favoured ending the war, but only the two votes on House resolutions were votes on a resolution itself. 7

Polls asked different questions

Pew asks about the President's handling and about whether force was the right decision; Gallup asks about approval of "this U.S. military action"; Quinnipiac about support for it. Gallup and Quinnipiac exclude leaners from their party groups; Pew includes them. The pollsters are shown separately for this reason. 28 30 31

Most claims about the latest events come from one side

The incident record comes from the President's letters; the reconstitution and October assessments from ISW/CTP, which is affiliated with the American Enterprise Institute; blockade figures from US Central Command. Each is labelled as such above.

About this data

What this measures. Recorded votes in Congress, the President's War Powers letters, public statements, three pollsters' surveys, and the dated record of the ceasefire and talks. It does not measure whether the war is lawful; that is a legal and constitutional question the records inform but do not settle.

As of. House and Senate votes as of 29 October 2026 (no votes after 16 and 30 September respectively). Polls run from March to early October 2026. Events run to 28 October; ISW/CTP's 29 October update was not yet published when checked.

How it compares. Earlier operations come from CRS's list (1798–2023) and its count of War Powers reports (1975–March 2017); neither has a newer edition on EveryCRSReport. The earlier votes table covers the main roll calls found on Libya (2011), Yemen (2019) and Iran (2020, 2025).

How confident to be. The vote counts and letters are primary records. The 1 May letter, the DNI memo, the NYT report and resolution 2817 are known only second-hand. Gallup gives a margin of error of ±4 points; small moves within one pollster's series may be noise.

Commonly mistaken for. "Congress voted to end the war" is true of a concurrent resolution that the President need not sign; it is not a law. Pew's 33% is approval of the President's handling, not of the war as such.

The War's Human and Financial Costs, with Earlier Wars for Scale, 2026

Every count puts Iranian deaths in the thousands by early April, though counters disagree on how many were civilians, while US deaths are far below Iraq's and official costs reach tens of billions. [1][2][3][9][11][16][23]

US service members wounded and killed in the Iran war, by month (DCAS), February–October 2026

Wounded in action

Wounded in action, and deaths split into hostile and non-hostile, in each month since the war began, as recorded by the Defense Department's casualty database. Data extracted 28 October 2026; October is a part month.

Service members wounded in the month, by calendar month of the casualty

Wounded in action, and deaths split into hostile and non-hostile, in each month since the war began, as recorded by the Defense Department's casualty database. Data extracted 28 October 2026; October is a part month. Read as wounded in action: Service members wounded in the month. Dashed segments cross 1 definitional break in the source, explained in Method Changes below this graph. 4 dated events are numbered on a strip under the graph and listed below it. Use the Table switch to see every value.

  • Wounded in action
0100200300Apr 2026JulOct050100150200250300350Feb 2026MarAprMayJunJulAugSepOct

Events marked above

  1. Ceasefire
  2. US strikes on Iran resume
  3. US blockade of Iranian ports resumes
  4. President pledges no strikes before the midterms

Vertical dashed lines mark measurement changes. See method changes.

Source: US Department of Defense, Defense Casualty Analysis System [23]

Observations 1
Wounded rose with each round of fighting

Wounded came in two surges, in March and in July, when US strikes resumed (chart). 23 More than half of all the wounded were recorded after the July split into a second category. 8

Few were wounded in the quieter months of May, June and August, and a smaller rise followed in September. 23

Method Changes
2026-07: Casualties split into a second category

"This summer the Pentagon split deaths and injuries in the war into two separate categories: one for Operation Epic Fury and one listed as 'overseas operations,' covering casualties since July." Most casualties from July onward are recorded under Overseas Operations. [23]

Deaths, hostile and non-hostile

Service members who died in the month, by calendar month of the casualty

Wounded in action, and deaths split into hostile and non-hostile, in each month since the war began, as recorded by the Defense Department's casualty database. Data extracted 28 October 2026; October is a part month. Read as deaths, hostile and non-hostile: Service members who died in the month. Dashed segments cross 1 definitional break in the source, explained in Method Changes below this graph. 4 dated events are numbered on a strip under the graph and listed below it. Use the Table switch to see every value.

  • Hostile deaths
  • Non-hostile deaths
0246Apr 2026JulOct01234567Feb 2026MarAprMayJunJulAugSepOct

Events marked above

  1. Ceasefire
  2. US strikes on Iran resume
  3. US blockade of Iranian ports resumes
  4. President pledges no strikes before the midterms

Vertical dashed lines mark measurement changes. See method changes.

Source: US Department of Defense, Defense Casualty Analysis System [23]

Observations 1
Half of the US deaths were not from hostile action

Of the US deaths DCAS records by late October, half were non-hostile, mostly Air Force accidents in March (chart). 23

Reports in early October gave a total of 21; DCAS has since added one more non-hostile death, in October. 8 23

Method Changes
2026-07: Casualties split into a second category

"This summer the Pentagon split deaths and injuries in the war into two separate categories: one for Operation Epic Fury and one listed as 'overseas operations,' covering casualties since July." Most casualties from July onward are recorded under Overseas Operations. [23]

About this data

Full published range: 2026-02–2026-10. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – DCAS publishes monthly tables from February 2026 (Operation Epic Fury) and from June 2026 ("Overseas Operations"). Each value here is the sum of the two categories' published monthly values; months a category does not list count as zero. The deaths add up to the DCAS category totals (15 + 7 = 22) and the wounded to 417 + 448 = 865.

Wounded in action

Sum of the Epic Fury and Overseas Operations monthly "tot_wia" values.

Deaths, hostile and non-hostile

Hostile deaths are the monthly "tot_kia" column (killed in action and died of wounds; it sums to the 7 + 4 hostile deaths in the category tables). Non-hostile deaths are the "tot_acc" column (accidents, illness, undetermined and pending; it sums to the 8 + 3 non-hostile deaths).

Deaths in Iran from the war, by counter, early April 2026 (and the government count to 21 July)

Deaths each counter reports, split into civilians, military, and deaths it does not classify. HRANA to 7 April and Hengaw to 8 April cover the 40 days to the ceasefire; the Iranian authorities' count, relayed by WHO, runs to 21 July and is not split.

Compare by category

Civilian · People killed

  1. HRANA, to 7 April1,701
  2. Hengaw, to 8 April1,030
  3. Iranian authorities via WHO, to 21 July0
Show all breakdowns
Deaths in Iran from the war, by counter, early April 2026 (and the government count to 21 July), by category
CategoryCivilianMilitaryNot classified by the counterTotal
HRANA, to 7 April1,7011,2217143,636
Hengaw, to 8 April1,0306,62007,650
Iranian authorities via WHO, to 21 July003,3753,375

Source: HRANA (Human Rights Activists News Agency) [1]; Hengaw Organization for Human Rights [2]; World Health Organization [3]

Observations 3
At least 1,701 Iranian civilians were killed by early April, by HRANA's minimum count

HRANA counted 1,701 civilians killed by the April ceasefire, including at least 254 children. 1 It counts incident by incident, takes minimums, and warns of undercounting.

By Hengaw's count, most of those killed were military

Hengaw counts 6,620 military personnel killed, mostly Revolutionary Guards and army. Its civilians are 13.5% of its total. 2

Its method is not published, and it also alleges that military units moved into civilian buildings. 2

The counters disagree on the split more than on the scale

All three counts put deaths in the thousands by spring. HRANA's civilians are slightly under half of its total; Hengaw's are about one in seven (chart). 1 2

The government's count has no split at all, so it cannot settle the question. 3

About this data

HRANA publishes the three parts (1,701 civilians, 1,221 military, 714 unclassified) but no total; the 3,636 total and the 46.8% civilian share (1,701 ÷ 3,636) are our arithmetic. Hengaw publishes 7,650 killed, 1,030 civilians (13.5%) and 6,620 military, which add up. The authorities' 3,375 deaths have no civilian–military split, so all of it is shown as not classified. Each counter is a separate bar; none is merged with another. All are minimums or reported counts, not estimates of the true total.

How each count of Iranian deaths works

What each counter covers and how it counts. Only the first two separate civilians, and their counts stop at the April ceasefire.

One row per counter
CounterCoversDeathsCiviliansMethod
HRANA28 Feb – 7 Aprcivilian, military and unclassified listed separately1,701 [1]Incident by incident, minimum values; excludes state-media totals
Hengaw28 Feb – 8 Apr7,650 [2]1,030 [2]Not published
Iranian authorities (via WHO)28 Feb – 21 Jul3,375 [3]Not splitReported by national authorities; WHO does not count
Iranian Red Crescent (via UN mission)28 Feb – 3 Mar787 [7]Not splitSingle statement
Airwars40-day war; June onwardIncidents, not deaths [5]—Tracks and publishes civilian-harm incidents

Sources: HRANA (Human Rights Activists News Agency) [1]; Hengaw Organization for Human Rights [2]; World Health Organization [3]; Airwars [5]; UN Human Rights Council [7]

Observations 2
No count covers the fighting after April except the government's

HRANA's and Hengaw's counts end at the April ceasefire. 1 2 After that, only the authorities' totals and Airwars' incident tallies exist. 3 5

Airwars tracked 267 civilian-harm incidents before the ceasefire and 34 more after strikes resumed in June. 5 WHO notes the authorities have yet to publish cumulative figures. 3

Other reports reuse HRANA's figures

Airwars' one-month report of at least 1,443 civilians killed is HRANA's count, not a separate one. 6

People displaced inside Iran, against its population, as of 21 July 2026

WHO's estimate of people displaced in Iran, and the deaths reported by the Iranian authorities, each shown as a share of Iran's 2025 population (World Bank).

People

  1. Displaced (WHO estimate)3,200,000
  2. Deaths reported by the authorities3,375
  3. Population of Iran, 202592,417,681

Source: World Health Organization [3]; World Bank [4]

Observations 1
WHO estimates 3.2 million people displaced inside Iran

That is about one in every 29 people in Iran (chart). 3 4 WHO calls the figure an estimate and does not say how many have returned home.

About this data

WHO labels its displacement figure an estimate ("All numbers are estimates"). The share is our arithmetic: 3,200,000 ÷ 92,417,681 = 3.5%. The population is the World Bank's 2025 figure (WDI SP.POP.TOTL, last updated 8 October 2026). Population is shown as the 100% reference bar.

Estimates of what the war has cost the US military, by estimator and date, April–October 2026

Each published estimate of the war's cost to the Defense Department, in the order of the date it runs to. Values are in billions of US dollars, not adjusted for inflation.

US$ billions

  1. AEI, to 8 Apr (low end)25
  2. AEI, to 8 Apr (high end)35
  3. Pentagon, testimony 29 Apr25
  4. CSIS, 23 Jun (range 34–42)40
  5. DoD Inspector General, through June33.4
  6. CBO, to 1 Aug38
  7. Pentagon to Congress, to 3 Sep43.6
  8. Hegseth, July projection to end of Sep37.5
  9. Pentagon to Congress, reported by AP 29 Oct47.1

Source: Roll Call [9]; NPR (via KASU) [10]; Congressional Budget Office [11]; Center for Strategic and International Studies [12]; American Enterprise Institute [13]; Associated Press (via WCAX) [22]

Observations 2
Official estimates have risen from $25 billion to over $40 billion

CBO put the cost at about $38 billion by August, and the Pentagon at $43.6 billion by early September (chart). 11 9

AP reports a later Pentagon figure of $47.1 billion, without its as-of date. 22 Most of the Pentagon's September figure is replacing munitions and equipment, not operating costs. 9

More fighting would add $2–3 billion a month, by CBO's estimate

CBO estimates each further month at $2 billion at the low intensity of May and June, and $3 billion at July's level. 11

CBO notes that DoD did not answer its requests for information, so it worked from public reports. 11

About this data

Values are US$ billions (the chart's "count" unit is used because the chart has no dollar unit). AEI published a range ($25–35 bn), shown as its two ends; CSIS's central estimate is shown, with its $34–42 bn range in the label. Roll Call reports CBO's figure as $38.1 bn "through July"; CBO's letter says "approximately $38 billion" as of 1 August. Hegseth's $37.5 bn was a projection to the end of September made in July. AP's $47.1 bn is "the latest estimate the Pentagon has provided to Congress", reported 29 October; AP does not give the date it runs to. Estimators count different things (CBO and DoD include replacing munitions and equipment), so the bars are not one series.

US military deaths: the Iran war (to 28 October 2026) and the Iraq and Afghanistan operations

Total US service member deaths, hostile and non-hostile, in each operation as recorded by the Defense Department.

US service members killed

  1. Iran war, Feb–Oct 202622
  2. Operation New Dawn (Iraq, 2010–11)74
  3. Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan)2,349
  4. Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003–10)4,418

Source: Congressional Research Service [16]; US Department of Defense, Defense Casualty Analysis System [23]

Observations 1
US deaths are a small fraction of the Iraq war's

The Iran war's US deaths are about one two-hundredth of Operation Iraqi Freedom's (chart). 23 16

CBO attributes the war's lower cost to "relatively few U.S. forces" being involved compared with Iraq and Afghanistan. 11 The comparison is of totals: Iraq ran for years, this war for eight months.

About this data

Iran war: DCAS, Operation Epic Fury plus Overseas Operations (15 + 7), extracted 28 October 2026, of which 11 hostile and 11 non-hostile. Earlier operations: CRS RL32492 as of 16 July 2020 (OIF 3,481 hostile and 937 non-hostile). The Iran war has lasted eight months; OIF ran 2003–2010, OEF 2001–2014 and New Dawn 2010–2011, so this compares totals, not rates.

War costs for scale: the Iran war against Iraq and Afghanistan appropriations

The latest Defense Department estimate of the Iran war's cost, beside what Congress appropriated for the Iraq and Afghanistan operations over FY2001–2014. Billions of US dollars, not adjusted for inflation.

US$ billions

  1. Iran war, Pentagon to 3 Sep 202643.6
  2. Iran war, Pentagon as reported 29 Oct 202647.1
  3. Afghanistan and other counterterror (OEF), FY2001–14686
  4. Iraq (OIF and New Dawn), FY2001–14815

Source: Roll Call [9]; Congressional Research Service [17]; Associated Press (via WCAX) [22]

Observations 1
So far the war has cost a small fraction of Iraq's appropriations

The Pentagon's latest figure is about a seventeenth of the $815 billion appropriated for Iraq through FY2014 (chart). 22 17 Iraq's appropriations built up over 13 years.

About this data

Values are US$ billions in the dollars of each year. Iraq is OIF plus New Dawn; Afghanistan is OEF "for Afghanistan and other counterterror operations" (CRS RL33110). The $1.6 trillion often quoted is all post-9/11 operations together, not Iraq alone. The Iran figures are cost estimates; the Iraq and Afghanistan figures are appropriations.

The Iraq war: early cost estimates against what Congress appropriated

The upper end of each total-cost estimate for the Iraq war, with the date it was made, beside the appropriations for Iraq through FY2014. Billions of US dollars.

US$ billions

  1. Daniels (White House budget office), 200260
  2. Lindsey (White House economic adviser), Sep 2002200
  3. Brookings, Aug 2003 (after the invasion)300
  4. Appropriated for Iraq, FY2001–14815

Source: Congressional Research Service [17]; Council on Foreign Relations [18]

Observations 1
Iraq cost far more than the White House forecast

In 2002 the White House budget director put the war at $50–60 billion. 18

Congress appropriated $815 billion for Iraq through FY2014, more than thirteen times the top of that range. 17

Even the high estimate the budget director called "very, very high" was a quarter of the outcome (chart). 18

About this data

Values are US$ billions. Each estimate is shown at its upper end (Daniels $50–60 bn; Lindsey $100–200 bn; Brookings $150–300 bn), which is the most generous reading of the estimates. Brookings' estimate was made in August 2003, five months after the invasion, so it is not a prewar estimate. The CFR task force's March 2003 figure ($20 bn a year "for several years") is a yearly rate, not a total, so it is not charted.

US interceptor stocks, CSIS estimates

CSIS's estimates of US inventories on 27 July 2026, built from budget documents, not Pentagon figures.

Patriot interceptors
fewer than 1,000
27 Jul 2026 [14]
THAAD interceptors
about 250
27 Jul 2026 [14]

Source: Center for Strategic and International Studies [14]

Observations 1
CSIS estimates interceptor stocks have been drawn down

CSIS says the war "required extensive use of interceptors", and that lower stocks "may force" the US and its partners "to take more risks with interceptions". 14

These are CSIS estimates built from budget documents, with deductions for testing and training, not Pentagon figures. 15

About this data

What this measures. Deaths, injuries and displacement in Iran, US military casualties, and estimates of the war's cost to the Defense Department, as of late October 2026. Each figure carries the date it runs to: Iranian independent counts stop in April, costs run to September or later, US casualties to 28 October.

What it does not measure. Deaths in Israel, Iraq, Lebanon and the Gulf states, costs to the wider US economy (see oil, shipping and prices), and Iran's own costs.

US casualty data. DCAS publishes its tables through a JSON interface behind its web app; the series sums its two categories. The July split means a month's casualties appear in one category or the other, so neither category alone is a complete record.

How confident to be. The independent Iranian counts are minimums from organisations working without access to the country. The government count has no split and is relayed by WHO without checking. Cost estimates differ in what they include; none is an audited figure.

Commonly mistaken for. The $1.6 trillion figure for "the Iraq war" is all post-9/11 operations; Iraq's share was $815 billion. 17 The Brookings estimate of $150–300 billion is often called prewar, but was made in August 2003. 18

Data still needed

  • A non-proprietary monthly series of Iranian crude exports from 2025 through October 2026 (for example OPEC secondary sources or EIA STEO tables)Only three months of Vortexa figures could be checked, so how far the resumed blockade since July has cut Iran's exports cannot be shown.
  • Hormuz transits counted without relying on ship transponders (for example Lloyd's List or satellite imagery), for March–October 2026PortWatch shows a few ships a day, while CENTCOM reports more than 3,000 transits in six months and Kpler reports Gulf exports near prewar levels. Which is right decides how far the strait is actually closed.
  • An independent count of attacks on and seizures of ships in and near Hormuz, by attacker, since February 2026The only figures are CENTCOM's own tallies and a single Bloomberg count reported by ISW/CTP, so neither side's share of attacks on shipping can be checked.
  • Estimates beside CBO's of the war's contribution to US inflationCBO's attribution is the only one found; BLS and the Federal Reserve do not attribute the rise in prices to the war.
Sources

Oil, Shipping and Prices, 1974–2026

  1. Europe Brent Spot Price FOB, daily (RBRTE)

    US Energy Information Administration, 2026-10-28 · supports

    “Europe Brent Spot Price FOB (Dollars per Barrel) … 2026 Feb-23 to Feb-27 71.90 71.21 70.69 71.66 71.32 … 2026 Apr- 6 to Apr-10 138.21 122.11 119.03 119.07 … 2026 Sep-28 to Oct- 2 119.97 113.96 115.91 114.82 135.51 … 2026 Oct-26 to Oct-30 128.12 123.10 … 2008 Jun-30 to Jul- 4 138.40 140.67 141.24 143.95 … 2022 Mar- 7 to Mar-11 129.02 133.18 116.58 114.54 118.11 … Release Date: 10/28/2026”Hide quote
    Europe Brent Spot Price FOB (Dollars per Barrel) … 2026 Feb-23 to Feb-27 71.90 71.21 70.69 71.66 71.32 … 2026 Apr- 6 to Apr-10 138.21 122.11 119.03 119.07 … 2026 Sep-28 to Oct- 2 119.97 113.96 115.91 114.82 135.51 … 2026 Oct-26 to Oct-30 128.12 123.10 … 2008 Jun-30 to Jul- 4 138.40 140.67 141.24 143.95 … 2022 Mar- 7 to Mar-11 129.02 133.18 116.58 114.54 118.11 … Release Date: 10/28/2026
  2. Cushing, OK WTI Spot Price FOB, daily (RWTC)

    US Energy Information Administration, 2026-10-28 · supports

    “Cushing, OK WTI Spot Price FOB (Dollars per Barrel) … 2026 Feb-23 to Feb-27 66.36 65.62 65.30 65.10 66.96 … 2026 Apr- 6 to Apr-10 114.01 114.58 96.17 99.62 98.34 … 2026 Oct-26 to Oct-30 105.25 103.37 … 2008 Jun-30 to Jul- 4 139.96 141.06 143.74 145.31 … Release Date: 10/28/2026”Hide quote
    Cushing, OK WTI Spot Price FOB (Dollars per Barrel) … 2026 Feb-23 to Feb-27 66.36 65.62 65.30 65.10 66.96 … 2026 Apr- 6 to Apr-10 114.01 114.58 96.17 99.62 98.34 … 2026 Oct-26 to Oct-30 105.25 103.37 … 2008 Jun-30 to Jul- 4 139.96 141.06 143.74 145.31 … Release Date: 10/28/2026
  3. Weekly U.S. Regular All Formulations Retail Gasoline Prices

    US Energy Information Administration, 2026-10-27 · supports

    “Weekly U.S. Regular All Formulations Retail Gasoline Prices (Dollars per Gallon) … 2026-Feb 02/02 2.867 02/09 2.902 02/16 2.924 02/23 2.937 … 2026-May 05/04 4.452 05/11 4.500 05/18 4.490 05/25 4.475 … 2026-Oct 10/05 4.354 10/12 4.331 10/19 4.284 10/26 4.269 … 2022-Jun 06/06 4.876 06/13 5.006 06/20 4.962 06/27 4.872 … Release Date: 10/27/2026”Hide quote
    Weekly U.S. Regular All Formulations Retail Gasoline Prices (Dollars per Gallon) … 2026-Feb 02/02 2.867 02/09 2.902 02/16 2.924 02/23 2.937 … 2026-May 05/04 4.452 05/11 4.500 05/18 4.490 05/25 4.475 … 2026-Oct 10/05 4.354 10/12 4.331 10/19 4.284 10/26 4.269 … 2022-Jun 06/06 4.876 06/13 5.006 06/20 4.962 06/27 4.872 … Release Date: 10/27/2026
  4. Consumer Price Index Summary - 2026 M09 Results (archived 24 October 2026)

    US Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2026-10-14 · supports

    “The all items index rose 3.7 percent for the 12 months ending September, a larger increase than the 3.4-percent increase reported for the 12 months ending in August. The all items less food and energy index rose 2.6 percent over the year... The energy index increased 20.4 percent for the 12 months ending September. … The index for energy increased 20.4 percent over the past 12 months due in large part to the index for gasoline rising 34.2 percent over the same period. … The index for gasoline rose 9.1 percent in September, accounting for over half of the monthly all items increase.”Hide quote
    The all items index rose 3.7 percent for the 12 months ending September, a larger increase than the 3.4-percent increase reported for the 12 months ending in August. The all items less food and energy index rose 2.6 percent over the year... The energy index increased 20.4 percent for the 12 months ending September. … The index for energy increased 20.4 percent over the past 12 months due in large part to the index for gasoline rising 34.2 percent over the same period. … The index for gasoline rose 9.1 percent in September, accounting for over half of the monthly all items increase.
  5. Costs of the Armed Conflict With Iran (letter, 15 September 2026; archived 1 October 2026)

    Congressional Budget Office, 2026-09-15 · supports

    “in the first quarter of 2027, inflation (measured year over year) in the price index for personal consumption expenditures (PCE) is now estimated to be 0.5 percentage points higher than the agency projected in February 2026, and core PCE inflation is estimated to be 0.3 percentage points higher”Hide quote
    in the first quarter of 2027, inflation (measured year over year) in the price index for personal consumption expenditures (PCE) is now estimated to be 0.5 percentage points higher than the agency projected in February 2026, and core PCE inflation is estimated to be 0.3 percentage points higher
  6. Federal Reserve issues FOMC statement

    Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2026-09-16 · complicates

    “The Committee decided to raise the target range for the federal funds rate by 1/4 percentage point to 3-3/4 to 4 percent... While uncertainty remains elevated owing, in part, to geopolitical developments, domestic spending has been resilient.”Hide quote
    The Committee decided to raise the target range for the federal funds rate by 1/4 percentage point to 3-3/4 to 4 percent... While uncertainty remains elevated owing, in part, to geopolitical developments, domestic spending has been resilient.
  7. Short-Term Energy Outlook, October 2026: Global oil markets

    US Energy Information Administration, 2026-10-06 · supports

    “We assess that crude oil production shut-ins averaged 4.8 million b/d in September, down from 5.8 million b/d in August and down from 10.9 million b/d at the peak in May. We forecast the Brent crude oil spot price will average $105/b in the fourth quarter of 2026 (4Q26), $14/b higher than in last month's STEO.”Hide quote
    We assess that crude oil production shut-ins averaged 4.8 million b/d in September, down from 5.8 million b/d in August and down from 10.9 million b/d at the peak in May. We forecast the Brent crude oil spot price will average $105/b in the fourth quarter of 2026 (4Q26), $14/b higher than in last month's STEO.
  8. Amid regional conflict, the Strait of Hormuz remains critical oil chokepoint

    US Energy Information Administration, 2025-06-16 · supports

    “In 2024, oil flow through the strait averaged 20 million barrels per day (b/d), or the equivalent of about 20% of global petroleum liquids consumption.”Hide quote
    In 2024, oil flow through the strait averaged 20 million barrels per day (b/d), or the equivalent of about 20% of global petroleum liquids consumption.
  9. U.S. Central Command Media: Official Photos and Videos (captions, April–May 2026)

    US Central Command, 2026-05-20 · supports

    “The Marines rappelled onto the Iranian-flagged vessel, April 19, after guided-missile destroyer USS Spruance (DDG 111) disabled Touska’s propulsion when the commercial ship failed to comply with repeated warnings from U.S. forces over a six-hour period. … U.S. Marines from the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit boarded M/T Celestial Sea, an Iranian-flagged commercial oil tanker suspected of attempting to violate the U.S. blockade by transiting toward an Iranian port, May 20, in the Gulf of Oman. … U.S. forces continue to fully enforce the blockade and have now redirected 91 commercial ships to ensure compliance.”Hide quote
    The Marines rappelled onto the Iranian-flagged vessel, April 19, after guided-missile destroyer USS Spruance (DDG 111) disabled Touska’s propulsion when the commercial ship failed to comply with repeated warnings from U.S. forces over a six-hour period. … U.S. Marines from the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit boarded M/T Celestial Sea, an Iranian-flagged commercial oil tanker suspected of attempting to violate the U.S. blockade by transiting toward an Iranian port, May 20, in the Gulf of Oman. … U.S. forces continue to fully enforce the blockade and have now redirected 91 commercial ships to ensure compliance.
  10. CENTCOM Maintains Strict Enforcement of U.S. Blockade Against Iran

    US Central Command, 2026-10-05 · supports

    “On Oct. 5, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) forces redirected the 130th commercial vessel in the Middle East during strict enforcement of the ongoing U.S. naval blockade against Iran. CENTCOM forces resumed the blockade against ships attempting to enter or depart Iranian ports July 14 at the Commander in Chief's direction. In addition to redirecting 130 vessels, American forces have disabled three ships that refused to comply. Over the past 12 weeks, CENTCOM has destroyed 13 commercial vessels that were violating the blockade or part of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' multibillion-dollar shadow network.”Hide quote
    On Oct. 5, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) forces redirected the 130th commercial vessel in the Middle East during strict enforcement of the ongoing U.S. naval blockade against Iran. CENTCOM forces resumed the blockade against ships attempting to enter or depart Iranian ports July 14 at the Commander in Chief's direction. In addition to redirecting 130 vessels, American forces have disabled three ships that refused to comply. Over the past 12 weeks, CENTCOM has destroyed 13 commercial vessels that were violating the blockade or part of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' multibillion-dollar shadow network.
  11. U.S. Forces Disable Cargo Vessel Attempting to Violate Blockade

    US Central Command, 2026-10-10 · supports

    “CENTCOM forces resumed America’s blockade against all ships entering or departing Iranian ports on July 14. Four commercial vessels have been disabled and 135 ships have been turned around during three months of strict enforcement. Additionally, U.S. forces have destroyed 10 tankers linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' multibillion-dollar shadow network over the same period.”Hide quote
    CENTCOM forces resumed America’s blockade against all ships entering or departing Iranian ports on July 14. Four commercial vessels have been disabled and 135 ships have been turned around during three months of strict enforcement. Additionally, U.S. forces have destroyed 10 tankers linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' multibillion-dollar shadow network over the same period.
  12. CENTCOM Commander Visits Strait of Hormuz during Milestone Week

    US Central Command, 2026-10-25 · complicates

    “The commander of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) visited the Strait of Hormuz, Oct. 25, as U.S. forces reach the milestone of assisting Gulf partners in exporting more than 1.5 billion barrels of crude oil since summer. … More than 3,000 commercial vessels have successfully transited the Strait of Hormuz with support from CENTCOM forces over the last six months. … In recent months, over 95% of ships navigating the Strait of Hormuz have sailed through safely despite the IRGC's unwarranted aggression”Hide quote
    The commander of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) visited the Strait of Hormuz, Oct. 25, as U.S. forces reach the milestone of assisting Gulf partners in exporting more than 1.5 billion barrels of crude oil since summer. … More than 3,000 commercial vessels have successfully transited the Strait of Hormuz with support from CENTCOM forces over the last six months. … In recent months, over 95% of ships navigating the Strait of Hormuz have sailed through safely despite the IRGC's unwarranted aggression
  13. Iran Update, October 21, 2026

    Institute for the Study of War and AEI Critical Threats Project, 2026-10-21 · complicates

    “Several shipping and maritime security officials told Bloomberg on October 20 that at least five of the 23 recorded attacks on vessels in or near the Strait of Hormuz in the first two weeks of October struck commercial vessels' engine rooms. … The Washington Post, citing oil price-tracking firm Kpler, reported that the number of barrels of oil exported per day is approaching prewar daily averages after increasing from mid-August to late September.”Hide quote
    Several shipping and maritime security officials told Bloomberg on October 20 that at least five of the 23 recorded attacks on vessels in or near the Strait of Hormuz in the first two weeks of October struck commercial vessels' engine rooms. … The Washington Post, citing oil price-tracking firm Kpler, reported that the number of barrels of oil exported per day is approaching prewar daily averages after increasing from mid-August to late September.
  14. Iran oil exports feel the squeeze, hitting a six-year low (Reuters)

    Reuters (via Baird Maritime), 2026-06-04 · supports

    “The US began enforcing the blockade on April 13, choking Iranian exports as the oil market faces a supply crunch due to Iran's effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz cutting exports from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq and the United Arab Emirates. Iran's exports averaged about 209,000 bpd in May, Vortexa data shows, down sharply from 1.34 million bpd in April and nearly 1.9 million bpd in March. This marks their lowest level since late 2019 and early 2020”Hide quote
    The US began enforcing the blockade on April 13, choking Iranian exports as the oil market faces a supply crunch due to Iran's effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz cutting exports from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq and the United Arab Emirates. Iran's exports averaged about 209,000 bpd in May, Vortexa data shows, down sharply from 1.34 million bpd in April and nearly 1.9 million bpd in March. This marks their lowest level since late 2019 and early 2020
  15. Strait of Hormuz: Tanker War

    Robert Strauss Center for International Security and Law, University of Texas at Austin, 2026-10 · complicates

    “61 percent of the ships attacked during the Tanker War were oil tankers. In total, only 55 of the 239 petroleum tankers (23 percent) were completely sunk or declared CTL … Initially, the Tanker War led to a 25 percent drop in commercial shipping and a sharp rise in the price of crude oil. But the Tanker War did not significantly disrupt oil shipments. In fact, Iran lowered the price of oil to offset higher insurance premiums on shipments, and the real global oil price steadily declined during the 1980s. Even at the its most intense point, the Tanker War failed to disrupt more than two percent of ships passing through the Persian Gulf.”Hide quote
    61 percent of the ships attacked during the Tanker War were oil tankers. In total, only 55 of the 239 petroleum tankers (23 percent) were completely sunk or declared CTL … Initially, the Tanker War led to a 25 percent drop in commercial shipping and a sharp rise in the price of crude oil. But the Tanker War did not significantly disrupt oil shipments. In fact, Iran lowered the price of oil to offset higher insurance premiums on shipments, and the real global oil price steadily declined during the 1980s. Even at the its most intense point, the Tanker War failed to disrupt more than two percent of ships passing through the Persian Gulf.
  16. At least 7,650 killed in 40 days of war, including 1,030 civilians — Hengaw’s tenth report

    Hengaw Organization for Human Rights, 2026-04-08 · supports

    “The war began on the morning of Saturday, February 28, 2026, with airstrikes by U.S. and Israeli forces targeting more than 10 provinces across Iran”Hide quote
    The war began on the morning of Saturday, February 28, 2026, with airstrikes by U.S. and Israeli forces targeting more than 10 provinces across Iran
  17. Iran Update Special Report, July 13, 2026

    Institute for the Study of War and AEI Critical Threats Project, 2026-07-13 · supports

    “Iran has continuously made efforts to reconstitute its ballistic missile and drone programs since the ceasefire on April 8. … The United States will resume its blockade of Iranian ports beginning on July 14 at 4:00 PM ET. … The US naval blockade had a limited but notable effect on Iranian willingness to continue fighting in Spring 2026 and was critical to securing the MoU.”Hide quote
    Iran has continuously made efforts to reconstitute its ballistic missile and drone programs since the ceasefire on April 8. … The United States will resume its blockade of Iranian ports beginning on July 14 at 4:00 PM ET. … The US naval blockade had a limited but notable effect on Iranian willingness to continue fighting in Spring 2026 and was critical to securing the MoU.
  18. War Powers report to Congress (House Document 119-167)

    The White House (via GovInfo), 2026-06-29 · supports

    “These efforts led to my signing a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran on June 17, 2026.”Hide quote
    These efforts led to my signing a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran on June 17, 2026.
  19. War Powers report to Congress (House Document 119-193)

    The White House (via GovInfo), 2026-09-03 · supports

    “military action commenced on September 1, 2026, against the Islamic Republic of Iran … oil tankers belonging to the National Iranian Oil Company”Hide quote
    military action commenced on September 1, 2026, against the Islamic Republic of Iran … oil tankers belonging to the National Iranian Oil Company
  20. Trump says US will not resume military strikes on Iran before midterm elections

    Associated Press (via WCAX), 2026-10-08 · supports

    “But Trump in a social media post on Thursday said the U.S. "will not be attacking Iran at any time prior to the Midterm Elections to be held in the United States on November 3rd."”Hide quote
    But Trump in a social media post on Thursday said the U.S. "will not be attacking Iran at any time prior to the Midterm Elections to be held in the United States on November 3rd."
  21. Europe Brent Spot Price FOB, monthly (RBRTE)

    US Energy Information Administration, 2026-10-28 · supports

    “Europe Brent Spot Price FOB (Dollars per Barrel) … 1987 18.58 18.86 19.86 18.98 18.31 18.76 17.78 17.05 … 2008 92.18 94.99 103.64 109.07 122.80 132.32 132.72 113.24 97.23 71.58 52.45 39.95 … 2022 86.51 97.13 117.25 104.58 113.34 122.71 111.93 100.45 89.76 93.33 91.42 80.92 … 2026 66.60 70.89 103.13 117.29 107.14 85.40 83.76 91.08 114.16 … Release Date: 10/28/2026”Hide quote
    Europe Brent Spot Price FOB (Dollars per Barrel) … 1987 18.58 18.86 19.86 18.98 18.31 18.76 17.78 17.05 … 2008 92.18 94.99 103.64 109.07 122.80 132.32 132.72 113.24 97.23 71.58 52.45 39.95 … 2022 86.51 97.13 117.25 104.58 113.34 122.71 111.93 100.45 89.76 93.33 91.42 80.92 … 2026 66.60 70.89 103.13 117.29 107.14 85.40 83.76 91.08 114.16 … Release Date: 10/28/2026
  22. Cushing, OK WTI Spot Price FOB, monthly (RWTC)

    US Energy Information Administration, 2026-10-28 · supports

    “Cushing, OK WTI Spot Price FOB (Dollars per Barrel) … 1986 22.93 15.46 12.61 12.84 15.38 13.43 11.59 15.10 14.87 14.90 15.22 16.11 … 2008 92.97 95.39 105.45 112.58 125.40 133.88 133.37 116.67 104.11 76.61 57.31 41.12 … 2026 60.04 64.51 91.38 100.32 102.13 84.81 80.46 83.90 97.31 … Release Date: 10/28/2026”Hide quote
    Cushing, OK WTI Spot Price FOB (Dollars per Barrel) … 1986 22.93 15.46 12.61 12.84 15.38 13.43 11.59 15.10 14.87 14.90 15.22 16.11 … 2008 92.97 95.39 105.45 112.58 125.40 133.88 133.37 116.67 104.11 76.61 57.31 41.12 … 2026 60.04 64.51 91.38 100.32 102.13 84.81 80.46 83.90 97.31 … Release Date: 10/28/2026
  23. Real Prices Viewer: Monthly Average Imported Crude Oil Price (real_prices.xlsx, sheet "Crude Oil-M")

    US Energy Information Administration, 2026-10-06 · supports

    “EIA Short-Term Energy Outlook, … Monthly Average Imported Crude Oil Price … Consumer Price Index (1982-84=1) … Imported Crude Oil Price ($/barrel) … Nominal … Real … Forecast Values … May 2026 3.340 99.01 98.85 0 … Base CPI (10/2026) … Data Source: EIA Short-Term Energy Outlook, October 2026 … Forecast / estimated values shown in blue … real price (Oct 2026 $)”Hide quote
    EIA Short-Term Energy Outlook, … Monthly Average Imported Crude Oil Price … Consumer Price Index (1982-84=1) … Imported Crude Oil Price ($/barrel) … Nominal … Real … Forecast Values … May 2026 3.340 99.01 98.85 0 … Base CPI (10/2026) … Data Source: EIA Short-Term Energy Outlook, October 2026 … Forecast / estimated values shown in blue … real price (Oct 2026 $)
  24. U.S. Regular All Formulations Retail Gasoline Prices, monthly

    US Energy Information Administration, 2026-10-27 · supports

    “U.S. Regular All Formulations Retail Gasoline Prices (Dollars per Gallon) … 1990 NA 1.258 1.335 1.324 NA … 2022 3.315 3.517 4.222 4.109 4.444 4.929 4.559 3.975 3.700 3.815 3.685 3.210 … 2026 2.809 2.908 3.638 4.103 4.479 4.050 3.932 4.058 4.355 4.310 … Release Date: 10/27/2026”Hide quote
    U.S. Regular All Formulations Retail Gasoline Prices (Dollars per Gallon) … 1990 NA 1.258 1.335 1.324 NA … 2022 3.315 3.517 4.222 4.109 4.444 4.929 4.559 3.975 3.700 3.815 3.685 3.210 … 2026 2.809 2.908 3.638 4.103 4.479 4.050 3.932 4.058 4.355 4.310 … Release Date: 10/27/2026
  25. PortWatch Daily Chokepoints Data (Strait of Hormuz, portid chokepoint6), queried 29 October 2026

    IMF PortWatch, 2026-10-28 · supports

    “{"attributes":{"date":"2019-01-01","year":2019,"month":1,"day":1,"n_total":52,"n_tanker":33} … {"attributes":{"date":"2026-02-28","year":2026,"month":2,"day":28,"n_total":57,"n_tanker":36} … {"attributes":{"date":"2026-03-04","year":2026,"month":3,"day":4,"n_total":0,"n_tanker":0} … {"attributes":{"date":"2026-06-24","year":2026,"month":6,"day":24,"n_total":51,"n_tanker":20} … {"attributes":{"date":"2026-10-25","year":2026,"month":10,"day":25,"n_total":2,"n_tanker":1}”Hide quote
    {"attributes":{"date":"2019-01-01","year":2019,"month":1,"day":1,"n_total":52,"n_tanker":33} … {"attributes":{"date":"2026-02-28","year":2026,"month":2,"day":28,"n_total":57,"n_tanker":36} … {"attributes":{"date":"2026-03-04","year":2026,"month":3,"day":4,"n_total":0,"n_tanker":0} … {"attributes":{"date":"2026-06-24","year":2026,"month":6,"day":24,"n_total":51,"n_tanker":20} … {"attributes":{"date":"2026-10-25","year":2026,"month":10,"day":25,"n_total":2,"n_tanker":1}
  26. Short-Term Energy Outlook: Global Energy Security Data, Table 4

    US Energy Information Administration, 2026-08-12 · supports

    “Table 4. Volume of crude oil, condensate, petroleum products, and liquefied natural gas transported through the Strait of Hormuz, 1Q25–2Q26 million barrels per day 1Q25 2Q25 3Q25 4Q25 1Q26 2Q26 Total oil flows through the Strait of Hormuz 20.9 21.0 21.3 21.6 14.9 4.9 Crude oil and condensate 14.8 14.9 15.0 15.9 10.9 3.7 Petroleum products 6.2 6.2 6.3 5.7 4.0 1.1 LNG flows through the Strait of Hormuz (billion cubic feet per day) 11.7 11.0 10.9 10.5 7.4 0.8 … Since the end of February 2026, AIS signal data for ships transiting the Strait of Hormuz have become especially unreliable. For 2026 Hormuz volumes, tanker tracking data are being revised frequently based on the best available information.”Hide quote
    Table 4. Volume of crude oil, condensate, petroleum products, and liquefied natural gas transported through the Strait of Hormuz, 1Q25–2Q26 million barrels per day 1Q25 2Q25 3Q25 4Q25 1Q26 2Q26 Total oil flows through the Strait of Hormuz 20.9 21.0 21.3 21.6 14.9 4.9 Crude oil and condensate 14.8 14.9 15.0 15.9 10.9 3.7 Petroleum products 6.2 6.2 6.3 5.7 4.0 1.1 LNG flows through the Strait of Hormuz (billion cubic feet per day) 11.7 11.0 10.9 10.5 7.4 0.8 … Since the end of February 2026, AIS signal data for ships transiting the Strait of Hormuz have become especially unreliable. For 2026 Hormuz volumes, tanker tracking data are being revised frequently based on the best available information.

Decisions, Law and Diplomacy: Congress, the President, Ceasefires and Negotiations, 2024–2026

  1. Roll Call 85, H.Con.Res.38, 5 March 2026 (XML)

    Office of the Clerk, US House of Representatives, 2026-03-05 · supports

    “<legis-num>H CON RES 38</legis-num> ... <vote-question>On Agreeing to the Resolution</vote-question> ... <vote-result>Failed</vote-result> ... <action-date>5-Mar-2026</action-date> ... <vote-desc>Directing the President pursuant to section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution to remove United States Armed Forces from unauthorized hostilities in the Islamic Republic of Iran</vote-desc> ... <party>Republican</party><yea-total>2</yea-total><nay-total>215</nay-total><present-total>0</present-total><not-voting-total>1</not-voting-total> ... <party>Democratic</party><yea-total>210</yea-total><nay-total>4</nay-total><present-total>0</present-total><not-voting-total>0</not-voting-total> ... <total-stub>Totals</total-stub><yea-total>212</yea-total><nay-total>219</nay-total><present-total>0</present-total><not-voting-total>1</not-voting-total>”Hide quote
    <legis-num>H CON RES 38</legis-num> ... <vote-question>On Agreeing to the Resolution</vote-question> ... <vote-result>Failed</vote-result> ... <action-date>5-Mar-2026</action-date> ... <vote-desc>Directing the President pursuant to section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution to remove United States Armed Forces from unauthorized hostilities in the Islamic Republic of Iran</vote-desc> ... <party>Republican</party><yea-total>2</yea-total><nay-total>215</nay-total><present-total>0</present-total><not-voting-total>1</not-voting-total> ... <party>Democratic</party><yea-total>210</yea-total><nay-total>4</nay-total><present-total>0</present-total><not-voting-total>0</not-voting-total> ... <total-stub>Totals</total-stub><yea-total>212</yea-total><nay-total>219</nay-total><present-total>0</present-total><not-voting-total>1</not-voting-total>
  2. Roll Call 114, H.Con.Res.40, 16 April 2026 (XML)

    Office of the Clerk, US House of Representatives, 2026-04-16 · supports

    “<legis-num>H CON RES 40</legis-num> ... <vote-result>Failed</vote-result> ... <action-date>16-Apr-2026</action-date> ... <party>Republican</party><yea-total>1</yea-total><nay-total>212</nay-total><present-total>1</present-total><not-voting-total>3</not-voting-total> ... <party>Democratic</party><yea-total>212</yea-total><nay-total>1</nay-total><present-total>0</present-total><not-voting-total>0</not-voting-total> ... <party>Independent</party><yea-total>0</yea-total><nay-total>1</nay-total> ... <total-stub>Totals</total-stub><yea-total>213</yea-total><nay-total>214</nay-total><present-total>1</present-total><not-voting-total>3</not-voting-total>”Hide quote
    <legis-num>H CON RES 40</legis-num> ... <vote-result>Failed</vote-result> ... <action-date>16-Apr-2026</action-date> ... <party>Republican</party><yea-total>1</yea-total><nay-total>212</nay-total><present-total>1</present-total><not-voting-total>3</not-voting-total> ... <party>Democratic</party><yea-total>212</yea-total><nay-total>1</nay-total><present-total>0</present-total><not-voting-total>0</not-voting-total> ... <party>Independent</party><yea-total>0</yea-total><nay-total>1</nay-total> ... <total-stub>Totals</total-stub><yea-total>213</yea-total><nay-total>214</nay-total><present-total>1</present-total><not-voting-total>3</not-voting-total>
  3. Roll Call 170, H.Con.Res.75, 14 May 2026 (XML)

    Office of the Clerk, US House of Representatives, 2026-05-14 · supports

    “<legis-num>H CON RES 75</legis-num> ... <vote-result>Failed</vote-result> ... <action-date>14-May-2026</action-date> ... <party>Republican</party><yea-total>3</yea-total><nay-total>210</nay-total><present-total>0</present-total><not-voting-total>4</not-voting-total> ... <party>Democratic</party><yea-total>209</yea-total><nay-total>1</nay-total><present-total>0</present-total><not-voting-total>2</not-voting-total> ... <total-stub>Totals</total-stub><yea-total>212</yea-total><nay-total>212</nay-total><present-total>0</present-total><not-voting-total>6</not-voting-total>”Hide quote
    <legis-num>H CON RES 75</legis-num> ... <vote-result>Failed</vote-result> ... <action-date>14-May-2026</action-date> ... <party>Republican</party><yea-total>3</yea-total><nay-total>210</nay-total><present-total>0</present-total><not-voting-total>4</not-voting-total> ... <party>Democratic</party><yea-total>209</yea-total><nay-total>1</nay-total><present-total>0</present-total><not-voting-total>2</not-voting-total> ... <total-stub>Totals</total-stub><yea-total>212</yea-total><nay-total>212</nay-total><present-total>0</present-total><not-voting-total>6</not-voting-total>
  4. Roll Call 199, H.Con.Res.86, 3 June 2026 (XML)

    Office of the Clerk, US House of Representatives, 2026-06-03 · supports

    “<legis-num>H CON RES 86</legis-num> ... <vote-result>Passed</vote-result> ... <action-date>3-Jun-2026</action-date> ... <vote-desc>Directing the President, pursuant to section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution, to remove United States Armed Forces from hostilities with Iran</vote-desc> ... <party>Republican</party><yea-total>4</yea-total><nay-total>207</nay-total><present-total>0</present-total><not-voting-total>6</not-voting-total> ... <party>Democratic</party><yea-total>211</yea-total><nay-total>0</nay-total><present-total>0</present-total><not-voting-total>1</not-voting-total> ... <total-stub>Totals</total-stub><yea-total>215</yea-total><nay-total>208</nay-total><present-total>0</present-total><not-voting-total>7</not-voting-total>”Hide quote
    <legis-num>H CON RES 86</legis-num> ... <vote-result>Passed</vote-result> ... <action-date>3-Jun-2026</action-date> ... <vote-desc>Directing the President, pursuant to section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution, to remove United States Armed Forces from hostilities with Iran</vote-desc> ... <party>Republican</party><yea-total>4</yea-total><nay-total>207</nay-total><present-total>0</present-total><not-voting-total>6</not-voting-total> ... <party>Democratic</party><yea-total>211</yea-total><nay-total>0</nay-total><present-total>0</present-total><not-voting-total>1</not-voting-total> ... <total-stub>Totals</total-stub><yea-total>215</yea-total><nay-total>208</nay-total><present-total>0</present-total><not-voting-total>7</not-voting-total>
  5. Roll Call 282, H.Con.Res.89, 23 July 2026 (XML)

    Office of the Clerk, US House of Representatives, 2026-07-23 · supports

    “<legis-num>H CON RES 89</legis-num> ... <vote-result>Passed</vote-result> ... <action-date>23-Jul-2026</action-date> ... <party>Republican</party><yea-total>4</yea-total><nay-total>207</nay-total><present-total>0</present-total><not-voting-total>7</not-voting-total> ... <party>Democratic</party><yea-total>210</yea-total><nay-total>0</nay-total><present-total>0</present-total><not-voting-total>2</not-voting-total> ... <total-stub>Totals</total-stub><yea-total>214</yea-total><nay-total>208</nay-total><present-total>0</present-total><not-voting-total>9</not-voting-total>”Hide quote
    <legis-num>H CON RES 89</legis-num> ... <vote-result>Passed</vote-result> ... <action-date>23-Jul-2026</action-date> ... <party>Republican</party><yea-total>4</yea-total><nay-total>207</nay-total><present-total>0</present-total><not-voting-total>7</not-voting-total> ... <party>Democratic</party><yea-total>210</yea-total><nay-total>0</nay-total><present-total>0</present-total><not-voting-total>2</not-voting-total> ... <total-stub>Totals</total-stub><yea-total>214</yea-total><nay-total>208</nay-total><present-total>0</present-total><not-voting-total>9</not-voting-total>
  6. Roll Call 307, H.Con.Res.93, 15 September 2026 (XML)

    Office of the Clerk, US House of Representatives, 2026-09-15 · supports

    “<legis-num>H CON RES 93</legis-num> ... <vote-result>Passed</vote-result> ... <action-date>15-Sep-2026</action-date> ... <party>Republican</party><yea-total>7</yea-total><nay-total>203</nay-total><present-total>0</present-total><not-voting-total>8</not-voting-total> ... <party>Democratic</party><yea-total>213</yea-total><nay-total>0</nay-total><present-total>0</present-total><not-voting-total>1</not-voting-total> ... <total-stub>Totals</total-stub><yea-total>220</yea-total><nay-total>204</nay-total><present-total>0</present-total><not-voting-total>9</not-voting-total>”Hide quote
    <legis-num>H CON RES 93</legis-num> ... <vote-result>Passed</vote-result> ... <action-date>15-Sep-2026</action-date> ... <party>Republican</party><yea-total>7</yea-total><nay-total>203</nay-total><present-total>0</present-total><not-voting-total>8</not-voting-total> ... <party>Democratic</party><yea-total>213</yea-total><nay-total>0</nay-total><present-total>0</present-total><not-voting-total>1</not-voting-total> ... <total-stub>Totals</total-stub><yea-total>220</yea-total><nay-total>204</nay-total><present-total>0</present-total><not-voting-total>9</not-voting-total>
  7. Senate Roll Call Votes, 119th Congress, 2nd Session (vote menu XML; Internet Archive copy of 10 October 2026)

    United States Senate, 2026-10-10 · supports

    “00244 24-Sep H.Con.Res. 89 On the Concurrent Resolution Rejected 49 50 H. Con. Res. 89; A concurrent resolution directing the President, pursuant to section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution, to remove United States Armed Forces from hostilities with Iran. ... 00216 30-Jul S.J.Res. 181 On the Motion to Discharge Rejected 49 50 ... 00207 23-Jul S.J.Res. 180 On the Motion to Discharge Rejected 47 49 ... 00192 24-Jun S.J.Res. 185 On the Motion to Proceed Rejected 47 50 ... 00184 23-Jun H.Con.Res. 86 On the Concurrent Resolution Agreed to 50 48 ... 00174 16-Jun S.J.Res. 172 On the Motion to Discharge Rejected 47 48 ... 00129 19-May S.J.Res. 185 On the Motion to Discharge Agreed to 50 47 ... 00118 13-May S.J.Res. 163 On the Motion to Discharge Rejected 49 50 ... 00113 30-Apr S.J.Res. 184 On the Motion to Discharge Rejected 47 50 ... 00088 22-Apr S.J.Res. 114 On the Motion to Discharge Rejected 46 51 ... 00079 15-Apr S.J.Res. 123 On the Motion to Discharge Rejected 47 52 ... 00069 24-Mar S.J.Res. 116 On the Motion to Discharge Rejected 47 53 ... 00058 18-Mar S.J.Res. 118 On the Motion to Discharge Rejected 47 53 ... 00046 04-Mar S.J.Res. 104 On the Motion to Discharge Rejected 47 53 Motion to Discharge S.J. Res. 104; A joint resolution to direct the removal of United States Armed Forces from hostilities within or against the Islamic Republic of Iran that have not been authorized by Congress.”Hide quote
    00244 24-Sep H.Con.Res. 89 On the Concurrent Resolution Rejected 49 50 H. Con. Res. 89; A concurrent resolution directing the President, pursuant to section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution, to remove United States Armed Forces from hostilities with Iran. ... 00216 30-Jul S.J.Res. 181 On the Motion to Discharge Rejected 49 50 ... 00207 23-Jul S.J.Res. 180 On the Motion to Discharge Rejected 47 49 ... 00192 24-Jun S.J.Res. 185 On the Motion to Proceed Rejected 47 50 ... 00184 23-Jun H.Con.Res. 86 On the Concurrent Resolution Agreed to 50 48 ... 00174 16-Jun S.J.Res. 172 On the Motion to Discharge Rejected 47 48 ... 00129 19-May S.J.Res. 185 On the Motion to Discharge Agreed to 50 47 ... 00118 13-May S.J.Res. 163 On the Motion to Discharge Rejected 49 50 ... 00113 30-Apr S.J.Res. 184 On the Motion to Discharge Rejected 47 50 ... 00088 22-Apr S.J.Res. 114 On the Motion to Discharge Rejected 46 51 ... 00079 15-Apr S.J.Res. 123 On the Motion to Discharge Rejected 47 52 ... 00069 24-Mar S.J.Res. 116 On the Motion to Discharge Rejected 47 53 ... 00058 18-Mar S.J.Res. 118 On the Motion to Discharge Rejected 47 53 ... 00046 04-Mar S.J.Res. 104 On the Motion to Discharge Rejected 47 53 Motion to Discharge S.J. Res. 104; A joint resolution to direct the removal of United States Armed Forces from hostilities within or against the Islamic Republic of Iran that have not been authorized by Congress.
  8. Roll Call Vote 184, 119th Congress, 2nd Session: H.Con.Res.86 (XML; Internet Archive copy)

    United States Senate, 2026-06-23 · supports

    “Concurrent Resolution Agreed to (50-48) ... Collins (R-ME) Collins Susan R ME Yea”Hide quote
    Concurrent Resolution Agreed to (50-48) ... Collins (R-ME) Collins Susan R ME Yea
  9. Congressional Votes Database

    GovTrack.us, 2026-10 · supports

    “Analysis and Commentary Oct. 26, 2026: What Comes After the Election? ... On the Nomination PN1129: Keith Sonderling, of Florida, to be Secretary of Labor Senate Vote Nomination #256 Confirmed 47/41 Sept. 30, 2026 ... H.Con.Res. 89: Directing the President, pursuant to section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution, to remove United States Armed Forces from hostilities with Iran. Senate Vote Concurrent #244 Resolution Sept. 24, Rejected 49/50”Hide quote
    Analysis and Commentary Oct. 26, 2026: What Comes After the Election? ... On the Nomination PN1129: Keith Sonderling, of Florida, to be Secretary of Labor Senate Vote Nomination #256 Confirmed 47/41 Sept. 30, 2026 ... H.Con.Res. 89: Directing the President, pursuant to section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution, to remove United States Armed Forces from hostilities with Iran. Senate Vote Concurrent #244 Resolution Sept. 24, Rejected 49/50
  10. Law and the Iran War: After the First 60 Days

    Lawfare, 2026-05-08 · supports

    “this past Friday, May 1, President Trump argued that the administration had already complied with the War Powers Resolution’s 60-day cut-off. “There has been no exchange of fire between United States Forces and Iran since April 7, 2026,” the letter asserted ... Hence, in the Trump administration’s view, “[t]he hostilities that began on February 28, 2026”—the day when Operation Epic Fury against Iran began—”have terminated[,]” ... the May 1 letter also notes that “the threat posed by Iran to the United States and our Armed Forces remains significant[.]” ... If the administration viewed the blockade that began on April 13 ... While Section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution initially gave Congress the power to compel the president to remove U.S. armed forces from ongoing hostilities through a concurrent resolution, the Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in INS v. Chadha brought such arrangements into serious constitutional doubt. And while joint resolutions avoid Chadha concerns, they only do so because they are subject to a presidential veto. ... voiced frustration with the Trump administration’s refusal to seek congressional authorization before the 60-day mark”Hide quote
    this past Friday, May 1, President Trump argued that the administration had already complied with the War Powers Resolution’s 60-day cut-off. “There has been no exchange of fire between United States Forces and Iran since April 7, 2026,” the letter asserted ... Hence, in the Trump administration’s view, “[t]he hostilities that began on February 28, 2026”—the day when Operation Epic Fury against Iran began—”have terminated[,]” ... the May 1 letter also notes that “the threat posed by Iran to the United States and our Armed Forces remains significant[.]” ... If the administration viewed the blockade that began on April 13 ... While Section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution initially gave Congress the power to compel the president to remove U.S. armed forces from ongoing hostilities through a concurrent resolution, the Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in INS v. Chadha brought such arrangements into serious constitutional doubt. And while joint resolutions avoid Chadha concerns, they only do so because they are subject to a presidential veto. ... voiced frustration with the Trump administration’s refusal to seek congressional authorization before the 60-day mark
  11. The War Powers Resolution: Concepts and Practice (R42699)

    Congressional Research Service, 2019-03-08 · supports

    “From 1975 through March 2017, Presidents have submitted 168 reports as the result of the War Powers Resolution, but only one, the 1975 Mayaguez seizure, cited Section 4(a)(1), which triggers the 60-day withdrawal requirement ... Section 5(c) requires the President to remove the forces at any time if Congress so directs by concurrent resolution; the effectiveness of this subsection is uncertain because of the 1983 Supreme Court decision on the legislative veto. ... A concurrent resolution is adopted by both chambers, but it does not require presentment to the President for signature or veto.”Hide quote
    From 1975 through March 2017, Presidents have submitted 168 reports as the result of the War Powers Resolution, but only one, the 1975 Mayaguez seizure, cited Section 4(a)(1), which triggers the 60-day withdrawal requirement ... Section 5(c) requires the President to remove the forces at any time if Congress so directs by concurrent resolution; the effectiveness of this subsection is uncertain because of the 1983 Supreme Court decision on the legislative veto. ... A concurrent resolution is adopted by both chambers, but it does not require presentment to the President for signature or veto.
  12. Letter to the President pro tempore of the Senate on Operation Epic Fury (War Powers report), March 2, 2026

    The White House (copy published by Just Security), 2026-03-02 · supports

    “I acted pursuant to my constitutional authority as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive to conduct United States foreign relations. ... I am providing this report as part of my efforts to keep the Congress fully informed, consistent with the War Powers Resolution (Public Law 93-148). ... in collective self-defense of our regional allies, including Israel.”Hide quote
    I acted pursuant to my constitutional authority as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive to conduct United States foreign relations. ... I am providing this report as part of my efforts to keep the Congress fully informed, consistent with the War Powers Resolution (Public Law 93-148). ... in collective self-defense of our regional allies, including Israel.
  13. Trump’s Interpretation of the War Powers Resolution

    Executive Functions (Jack Goldsmith), 2026-05-04 · supports

    “the 'hostilities' ... that began on Feb. 28 had 'terminated' due to the April 7 ceasefire ... highly misleading”Hide quote
    the 'hostilities' ... that began on Feb. 28 had 'terminated' due to the April 7 ceasefire ... highly misleading
  14. Letter Informing Congress of Military Action Commenced on June 9, 2026 (House Document 119-162)

    The White House (US Government Publishing Office), 2026-06-12 · supports

    “I write today to apprise you of military action commenced on June 9, 2026, at my direction against the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran. ... As previously communicated to the Congress, I ordered a 2-week ceasefire on April 7, 2026. The ceasefire was then extended. ... On June 8, 2026, despite these good-faith diplomatic efforts and the ongoing ceasefire, Iran engaged a United States Army AH-64 Apache helicopter, forcing its crash landing. In response, at my direction, on June 9, 2026, United States Armed Forces commenced precision strikes against numerous targets within Iran ... I acted pursuant to my constitutional authority as Commander in Chief and as Chief Executive to conduct United States foreign relations.”Hide quote
    I write today to apprise you of military action commenced on June 9, 2026, at my direction against the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran. ... As previously communicated to the Congress, I ordered a 2-week ceasefire on April 7, 2026. The ceasefire was then extended. ... On June 8, 2026, despite these good-faith diplomatic efforts and the ongoing ceasefire, Iran engaged a United States Army AH-64 Apache helicopter, forcing its crash landing. In response, at my direction, on June 9, 2026, United States Armed Forces commenced precision strikes against numerous targets within Iran ... I acted pursuant to my constitutional authority as Commander in Chief and as Chief Executive to conduct United States foreign relations.
  15. Letter Informing Congress of Military Actions Taken on June 26 and June 28, 2026 (House Document 119-167)

    The White House (US Government Publishing Office), 2026-06-29 · supports

    “I write today to apprise you of military actions taken at my direction against the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran on June 26 and June 28, 2026. ... These efforts led to my signing a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran on June 17, 2026. The MOU requires the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to make arrangements using its best efforts for the safe passage of commercial vessels . . . from the Persian Gulf to the Sea of Oman. Despite this commitment, Iran attacked a neutral-flagged commercial vessel transiting the Strait of Hormuz on June 25, 2026. At my direction, United States Armed Forces responded on June 26, 2026, with defensive strikes ... Following another Iranian attack against a neutral-flagged commercial vessel on June 27, 2026, United States Armed Forces responded at my direction on June 28, 2026, with precision strikes”Hide quote
    I write today to apprise you of military actions taken at my direction against the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran on June 26 and June 28, 2026. ... These efforts led to my signing a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran on June 17, 2026. The MOU requires the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to make arrangements using its best efforts for the safe passage of commercial vessels . . . from the Persian Gulf to the Sea of Oman. Despite this commitment, Iran attacked a neutral-flagged commercial vessel transiting the Strait of Hormuz on June 25, 2026. At my direction, United States Armed Forces responded on June 26, 2026, with defensive strikes ... Following another Iranian attack against a neutral-flagged commercial vessel on June 27, 2026, United States Armed Forces responded at my direction on June 28, 2026, with precision strikes
  16. Letter Informing Congress of Military Action Commenced on July 7, 2026 (House Document 119-169)

    The White House (US Government Publishing Office), 2026-07-10 · supports

    “I write to apprise you of military action commenced on July 7, 2026, against the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran. ... Despite this commitment, Iran again attacked several neutral-flagged commercial vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz between July 6-7, 2026. At my direction, United States Armed Forces responded, commencing on July 7, 2026, with defensive strikes against targets within Iran”Hide quote
    I write to apprise you of military action commenced on July 7, 2026, against the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran. ... Despite this commitment, Iran again attacked several neutral-flagged commercial vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz between July 6-7, 2026. At my direction, United States Armed Forces responded, commencing on July 7, 2026, with defensive strikes against targets within Iran
  17. Letter Informing Congress of Military Action Commenced on July 27, 2026 (House Document 119-183)

    The White House (US Government Publishing Office), 2026-08-03 · supports

    “I write to apprise you of military action commenced on July 27, 2026, against targets in the Republic of Iraq following Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-directed attacks by Iranian aligned militia groups (IAMGs).”Hide quote
    I write to apprise you of military action commenced on July 27, 2026, against targets in the Republic of Iraq following Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-directed attacks by Iranian aligned militia groups (IAMGs).
  18. Letter Informing Congress of Military Action Commenced on September 1, 2026 (House Document 119-193)

    The White House (US Government Publishing Office), 2026-09-03 · supports

    “I write today to apprise you of military action commenced on September 1, 2026, against the Islamic Republic of Iran. At my direction, United States Armed Forces responded to Iran's late August 2026 attacks against United States Armed Forces with defensive strikes against targets within Iran and Iranian territorial waters including ... oil tankers belonging to the National Iranian Oil Company ... I acted pursuant to my constitutional authority as Commander in Chief and as Chief Executive to conduct United States foreign relations. I am providing this report as part of my efforts to keep the Congress fully informed, consistent with the War Powers Resolution (Public Law 93-148).”Hide quote
    I write today to apprise you of military action commenced on September 1, 2026, against the Islamic Republic of Iran. At my direction, United States Armed Forces responded to Iran's late August 2026 attacks against United States Armed Forces with defensive strikes against targets within Iran and Iranian territorial waters including ... oil tankers belonging to the National Iranian Oil Company ... I acted pursuant to my constitutional authority as Commander in Chief and as Chief Executive to conduct United States foreign relations. I am providing this report as part of my efforts to keep the Congress fully informed, consistent with the War Powers Resolution (Public Law 93-148).
  19. Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798–2023 (R42738)

    Congressional Research Service, 2023-06-07 · complicates

    “The following list reviews hundreds of instances in which the United States has used military forces abroad in situations of military conflict or potential conflict to protect U.S. citizens or promote U.S. interests. The list does not include covert actions or the many occurrences in which U.S. forces have been stationed abroad... Eleven times in its history, the United States has formally declared war against foreign nations. These 11 U.S. war declarations encompassed five separate wars”Hide quote
    The following list reviews hundreds of instances in which the United States has used military forces abroad in situations of military conflict or potential conflict to protect U.S. citizens or promote U.S. interests. The list does not include covert actions or the many occurrences in which U.S. forces have been stationed abroad... Eleven times in its history, the United States has formally declared war against foreign nations. These 11 U.S. war declarations encompassed five separate wars
  20. Roll Call 493, H.J.Res.68, 24 June 2011 (XML)

    Office of the Clerk, US House of Representatives, 2011-06-24 · complicates

    “<legis-num>H J RES 68</legis-num> <vote-question>On Passage</vote-question> <vote-result>Failed</vote-result> <action-date>24-Jun-2011</action-date> <vote-desc>Authorizing the limited use of the United States Armed Forces in support of the NATO mission in Libya</vote-desc> ... <total-stub>Totals</total-stub><yea-total>123</yea-total><nay-total>295</nay-total>”Hide quote
    <legis-num>H J RES 68</legis-num> <vote-question>On Passage</vote-question> <vote-result>Failed</vote-result> <action-date>24-Jun-2011</action-date> <vote-desc>Authorizing the limited use of the United States Armed Forces in support of the NATO mission in Libya</vote-desc> ... <total-stub>Totals</total-stub><yea-total>123</yea-total><nay-total>295</nay-total>
  21. Roll Call 494, H.R.2278, 24 June 2011 (XML)

    Office of the Clerk, US House of Representatives, 2011-06-24 · complicates

    “<legis-num>H R 2278</legis-num> <vote-question>On Passage</vote-question> <vote-result>Failed</vote-result> <action-date>24-Jun-2011</action-date> <vote-desc>To limit the use of funds appropriated to the Department of Defense for United States Armed Forces in support of North Atlantic Treaty Organization Operation Unified Protector with respect to Libya, unless otherwise specifically authorized by law</vote-desc> ... <total-stub>Totals</total-stub><yea-total>180</yea-total><nay-total>238</nay-total>”Hide quote
    <legis-num>H R 2278</legis-num> <vote-question>On Passage</vote-question> <vote-result>Failed</vote-result> <action-date>24-Jun-2011</action-date> <vote-desc>To limit the use of funds appropriated to the Department of Defense for United States Armed Forces in support of North Atlantic Treaty Organization Operation Unified Protector with respect to Libya, unless otherwise specifically authorized by law</vote-desc> ... <total-stub>Totals</total-stub><yea-total>180</yea-total><nay-total>238</nay-total>
  22. Roll Call 153, S.J.Res.7, 4 April 2019 (XML)

    Office of the Clerk, US House of Representatives, 2019-04-04 · complicates

    “<legis-num>S J RES 7</legis-num> <vote-question>On Passage</vote-question> <vote-result>Passed</vote-result> <action-date>4-Apr-2019</action-date> <vote-desc>To direct the removal of the United States Armed Forces from hostilities in the Republic of Yemen that have not been authorized by Congress</vote-desc> ... <total-stub>Totals</total-stub><yea-total>247</yea-total><nay-total>175</nay-total><present-total>1</present-total>”Hide quote
    <legis-num>S J RES 7</legis-num> <vote-question>On Passage</vote-question> <vote-result>Passed</vote-result> <action-date>4-Apr-2019</action-date> <vote-desc>To direct the removal of the United States Armed Forces from hostilities in the Republic of Yemen that have not been authorized by Congress</vote-desc> ... <total-stub>Totals</total-stub><yea-total>247</yea-total><nay-total>175</nay-total><present-total>1</present-total>
  23. Senate Roll Call Votes, 116th Congress, 1st Session (vote menu XML; Internet Archive copy)

    United States Senate, 2019 · complicates

    “00094 02-May S.J.Res. 7 On Overriding the Veto Veto Sustained 53 45 Shall the Joint Resolution S.J. Res. 7 Pass, the Objections of the President of the United States Notwithstanding; A joint resolution to direct the removal of United States Armed Forces from hostilities in the Republic of Yemen that have not been authorized by Congress. ... 00048 13-Mar S.J.Res. 7 On the Joint Resolution Passed 54 46”Hide quote
    00094 02-May S.J.Res. 7 On Overriding the Veto Veto Sustained 53 45 Shall the Joint Resolution S.J. Res. 7 Pass, the Objections of the President of the United States Notwithstanding; A joint resolution to direct the removal of United States Armed Forces from hostilities in the Republic of Yemen that have not been authorized by Congress. ... 00048 13-Mar S.J.Res. 7 On the Joint Resolution Passed 54 46
  24. Roll Call 101, S.J.Res.68, 11 March 2020 (XML)

    Office of the Clerk, US House of Representatives, 2020-03-11 · complicates

    “<legis-num>S J RES 68</legis-num> <vote-question>On Passage</vote-question> <vote-result>Passed</vote-result> <action-date>11-Mar-2020</action-date> <vote-desc>To direct the removal of United States Armed Forces from hostilities against the Islamic Republic of Iran that have not been authorized by Congress</vote-desc> ... <total-stub>Totals</total-stub><yea-total>227</yea-total><nay-total>186</nay-total>”Hide quote
    <legis-num>S J RES 68</legis-num> <vote-question>On Passage</vote-question> <vote-result>Passed</vote-result> <action-date>11-Mar-2020</action-date> <vote-desc>To direct the removal of United States Armed Forces from hostilities against the Islamic Republic of Iran that have not been authorized by Congress</vote-desc> ... <total-stub>Totals</total-stub><yea-total>227</yea-total><nay-total>186</nay-total>
  25. Senate Roll Call Votes, 116th Congress, 2nd Session (vote menu XML; Internet Archive copy)

    United States Senate, 2020 · complicates

    “00084 07-May S.J.Res. 68 On Overriding the Veto Veto Sustained 49 44 Shall the Joint Resolution S.J. Res. 68 Pass, the Objections of the President of the United States to the Contrary Notwithstanding?; A joint resolution to direct the removal of United States Armed Forces from hostilities against the Islamic Republic of Iran that have not been authorized by Congress. ... 00052 13-Feb S.J.Res. 68 On the Joint Resolution Passed 55 45”Hide quote
    00084 07-May S.J.Res. 68 On Overriding the Veto Veto Sustained 49 44 Shall the Joint Resolution S.J. Res. 68 Pass, the Objections of the President of the United States to the Contrary Notwithstanding?; A joint resolution to direct the removal of United States Armed Forces from hostilities against the Islamic Republic of Iran that have not been authorized by Congress. ... 00052 13-Feb S.J.Res. 68 On the Joint Resolution Passed 55 45
  26. Friday, June 27, 2025 (Senate floor wrap-up)

    Senate Democrats (Senate Periodical Press Gallery floor log), 2025-06-27 · complicates

    “By a vote of 47-53, the Senate did not agree to S.J. Res.59, the Kaine War Powers Resolution on Iran. Senator Paul (R) voted aye and Senator Fetterman (D) voted no.”Hide quote
    By a vote of 47-53, the Senate did not agree to S.J. Res.59, the Kaine War Powers Resolution on Iran. Senator Paul (R) voted aye and Senator Fetterman (D) voted no.
  27. After the Rubicon: Congress, Presidents, and the Politics of Waging War (publisher's description)

    University of Chicago Press, 2010 · supports

    “Kriner expertly demonstrates the full extent to which Congress materially shapes the initiation, scope, and duration of major military actions ... He shows how the balance of party power in the legislature trumps conventional strategic variables in explaining the duration of U.S. military conflicts.”Hide quote
    Kriner expertly demonstrates the full extent to which Congress materially shapes the initiation, scope, and duration of major military actions ... He shows how the balance of party power in the legislature trumps conventional strategic variables in explaining the duration of U.S. military conflicts.
  28. Iran conflict remains deeply unpopular, as many Americans expect it to go on for months

    Pew Research Center, 2026-10-08 · supports

    “Around two-thirds of Americans (65%) disapprove of the way President Donald Trump is handling the U.S. military action in Iran, while a third (33%) approve ... Evaluations of the initial decision to use force are similar: 34% now view this as the right decision – down 4 percentage points from March. ... Today, 33% of adults say they approve of how Trump is handling the U.S. military action against Iran – down from 37% in March. This decline has come entirely from Republicans: At the start of the conflict, 69% approved of his handling of the conflict. Today, 63% do. Democrats’ views are unchanged. ... Today, 65% of Republicans say the decision to use force in Iran was the right one – down from 71% in March.”Hide quote
    Around two-thirds of Americans (65%) disapprove of the way President Donald Trump is handling the U.S. military action in Iran, while a third (33%) approve ... Evaluations of the initial decision to use force are similar: 34% now view this as the right decision – down 4 percentage points from March. ... Today, 33% of adults say they approve of how Trump is handling the U.S. military action against Iran – down from 37% in March. This decline has come entirely from Republicans: At the start of the conflict, 69% approved of his handling of the conflict. Today, 63% do. Democrats’ views are unchanged. ... Today, 65% of Republicans say the decision to use force in Iran was the right one – down from 71% in March.
  29. Americans Broadly Disapprove of U.S. Military Action in Iran

    Pew Research Center, 2026-03-25 · supports

    “About six-in-ten Americans (61%) disapprove of Trump’s handling of the conflict, while 37% approve. ... The new Pew Research Center survey of 3,524 U.S. adults, conducted March 16-22, also finds a similar balance of opinion on whether the initial decision to use military force was right (38%) or wrong (59%). ... In contrast, about seven-in-ten Republicans and Republican leaners approve of how Trump is handling the conflict (69%) and think the U.S. made the right decision (71%).”Hide quote
    About six-in-ten Americans (61%) disapprove of Trump’s handling of the conflict, while 37% approve. ... The new Pew Research Center survey of 3,524 U.S. adults, conducted March 16-22, also finds a similar balance of opinion on whether the initial decision to use military force was right (38%) or wrong (59%). ... In contrast, about seven-in-ten Republicans and Republican leaners approve of how Trump is handling the conflict (69%) and think the U.S. made the right decision (71%).
  30. Gallup News Service, June Wave 1, Final Topline (June 1–15, 2026)

    Gallup, 2026-06 · supports

    “Results are based on telephone interviews conducted June 1-15, 2026, with a random sample of –1,001—adults ... QN24: Do you approve or disapprove of this U.S. military action against Iran? ... Total ... Republican Independent Democrat ... Approve 34% ... 79% 26% 8% ... Disapprove 63% ... 19% 68% 90% ... (DK)/(Refused) 4% ... 2% 6% 2%”Hide quote
    Results are based on telephone interviews conducted June 1-15, 2026, with a random sample of –1,001—adults ... QN24: Do you approve or disapprove of this U.S. military action against Iran? ... Total ... Republican Independent Democrat ... Approve 34% ... 79% 26% 8% ... Disapprove 63% ... 19% 68% 90% ... (DK)/(Refused) 4% ... 2% 6% 2%
  31. Quinnipiac University National Poll, released March 9, 2026

    Quinnipiac University Poll, 2026-03-09 · supports

    “Fifty-three percent of voters oppose the U.S. military action against Iran, while 40 percent support it. Democrats (89 – 7 percent) and independents (60 – 31 percent) oppose the U.S. military action against Iran, while Republicans (85 – 11 percent) support it. ... 10. Do you support or oppose the U.S. military action against Iran? ... Tot Rep Dem Ind ... Support 40% 85% 7% 31% ... Oppose 53 11 89 60 ... DK/NA 7 5 4 9 ... 15. Do you think President Trump should have received approval from Congress before taking military action against Iran, or not? ... Tot Rep Dem Ind ... Yes/Should have 59% 22% 92% 64% ... No 38 76 5 33 ... DK/NA 3 2 3 3 ... 1,002 self-identified registered voters nationwide were surveyed from March 6th – 8th”Hide quote
    Fifty-three percent of voters oppose the U.S. military action against Iran, while 40 percent support it. Democrats (89 – 7 percent) and independents (60 – 31 percent) oppose the U.S. military action against Iran, while Republicans (85 – 11 percent) support it. ... 10. Do you support or oppose the U.S. military action against Iran? ... Tot Rep Dem Ind ... Support 40% 85% 7% 31% ... Oppose 53 11 89 60 ... DK/NA 7 5 4 9 ... 15. Do you think President Trump should have received approval from Congress before taking military action against Iran, or not? ... Tot Rep Dem Ind ... Yes/Should have 59% 22% 92% 64% ... No 38 76 5 33 ... DK/NA 3 2 3 3 ... 1,002 self-identified registered voters nationwide were surveyed from March 6th – 8th
  32. Address Accepting the Presidential Nomination at the Republican National Convention in Milwaukee, Wisconsin

    The American Presidency Project (UC Santa Barbara), 2024-07-18 · supports

    “I was the first president in modern times to start no new wars. ... With our victory in November, the years of war, weakness and chaos will be over. I don't have wars. ... they did everything possible for Iran and now Iran is very close to having a nuclear weapon, which would have never happened.”Hide quote
    I was the first president in modern times to start no new wars. ... With our victory in November, the years of war, weakness and chaos will be over. I don't have wars. ... they did everything possible for Iran and now Iran is very close to having a nuclear weapon, which would have never happened.
  33. Remarks Accepting Election as the 47th President of the United States in Palm Beach, Florida

    The American Presidency Project (UC Santa Barbara), 2024-11-06 · supports

    “They said: 'He will start a war.' I'm not going to start a war. I'm going to stop wars.”Hide quote
    They said: 'He will start a war.' I'm not going to start a war. I'm going to stop wars.
  34. Iran Update Special Report, July 13, 2026

    Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project, 2026-07-13 · supports

    “The US-Iran ceasefire has effectively ended with relatively more intense and consistent exchanges of fire in the Persian Gulf. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy announced on July 11 that it closed the strait, struck a Cyprus-flagged vessel, and then struck a second unspecified vessel on July 12. The United States struck dozens of Iranian military targets on July 12 to degrade Iran’s ability to threaten shipping. ... Iran has continuously made efforts to reconstitute its ballistic missile and drone programs since the ceasefire on April 8. ... The United States will resume its blockade of Iranian ports beginning on July 14 at 4:00 PM ET.”Hide quote
    The US-Iran ceasefire has effectively ended with relatively more intense and consistent exchanges of fire in the Persian Gulf. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy announced on July 11 that it closed the strait, struck a Cyprus-flagged vessel, and then struck a second unspecified vessel on July 12. The United States struck dozens of Iranian military targets on July 12 to degrade Iran’s ability to threaten shipping. ... Iran has continuously made efforts to reconstitute its ballistic missile and drone programs since the ceasefire on April 8. ... The United States will resume its blockade of Iranian ports beginning on July 14 at 4:00 PM ET.
  35. Iran Update, October 19, 2026

    Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project, 2026-10-19 · supports

    “The Iranian regime's appointment of Mehrdad Akhlaghi, who has extensive experience in missile technology, as Iran's new defense minister indicates that the regime is prioritizing the reconstitution of its missile program. ... stated on October 19 that Iran will not rebuild defense industrial facilities at old locations but will instead construct them 'in mountains and security structures.'”Hide quote
    The Iranian regime's appointment of Mehrdad Akhlaghi, who has extensive experience in missile technology, as Iran's new defense minister indicates that the regime is prioritizing the reconstitution of its missile program. ... stated on October 19 that Iran will not rebuild defense industrial facilities at old locations but will instead construct them 'in mountains and security structures.'
  36. Joint E3 leaders’ statement on Iran: 28 February 2026

    UK Government (Prime Minister's Office), 2026-02-28 · complicates

    “We did not participate in these strikes, but are in close contact with our international partners, including the United States, Israel, and partners in the region. ... We condemn Iranian attacks on countries in the region in the strongest terms. … Ultimately, the Iranian people must be allowed to determine their future.”Hide quote
    We did not participate in these strikes, but are in close contact with our international partners, including the United States, Israel, and partners in the region. ... We condemn Iranian attacks on countries in the region in the strongest terms. … Ultimately, the Iranian people must be allowed to determine their future.
  37. Foreign Minister's article in Le Monde

    Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sultanate of Oman, 2026-07-14 · complicates

    “Sayyid Badr describes the war as "a catastrophe". He notes that it has been launched without United Nations authorisation and has failed to achieve the objectives cited to justify it.”Hide quote
    Sayyid Badr describes the war as "a catastrophe". He notes that it has been launched without United Nations authorisation and has failed to achieve the objectives cited to justify it.
  38. NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran (GOV/2026/50)

    International Atomic Energy Agency, 2026-09-01 · supports

    “The Director General was in attendance at the indirect negotiations between the United States of America and Iran that took place on 17 and 26 February 2026 in Geneva ... On 28 February 2026, the United States of America and Israel launched further military attacks on Iran, including on the sites of some nuclear facilities. Consequently, the Agency stopped conducting verification activities in Iran.”Hide quote
    The Director General was in attendance at the indirect negotiations between the United States of America and Iran that took place on 17 and 26 February 2026 in Geneva ... On 28 February 2026, the United States of America and Israel launched further military attacks on Iran, including on the sites of some nuclear facilities. Consequently, the Agency stopped conducting verification activities in Iran.
  39. Iran and Nuclear Weapons Production (IF12106)

    Congressional Research Service, 2026-10-13 · supports

    “A June 2026 memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the United States and Iran states that 'Iran reaffirms that it shall not procure or develop nuclear weapons.'”Hide quote
    A June 2026 memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the United States and Iran states that 'Iran reaffirms that it shall not procure or develop nuclear weapons.'
  40. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) at a Glance

    Arms Control Association, 2025-02 · supports

    “For 10 years operating centrifuges reduced to 5,060 IR-1 machines … For 15 years level of uranium enrichment capped at 3.67 percent uranium-235 … For 15 years the stockpile is kept under 300 kilograms of 3.67 percent enriched uranium in total (all forms) ... January 16, 2016, Implementation Day”Hide quote
    For 10 years operating centrifuges reduced to 5,060 IR-1 machines … For 15 years level of uranium enrichment capped at 3.67 percent uranium-235 … For 15 years the stockpile is kept under 300 kilograms of 3.67 percent enriched uranium in total (all forms) ... January 16, 2016, Implementation Day
  41. 2025 Iran–United States negotiations

    Wikipedia, 2026-10 · supports

    “The third round of high-level negotiations took place on April 26, 2025 ... The fourth round of talks were held on May 11 in Oman ... The fifth round of talks, held on May 23 in Rome ... the sixth round of US-Iran talks, scheduled in Oman on June 15, were indefinitely suspended”Hide quote
    The third round of high-level negotiations took place on April 26, 2025 ... The fourth round of talks were held on May 11 in Oman ... The fifth round of talks, held on May 23 in Rome ... the sixth round of US-Iran talks, scheduled in Oman on June 15, were indefinitely suspended
  42. Trump says US will not resume military strikes on Iran before midterm elections

    Associated Press (via WCAX), 2026-10-08 · supports

    “But Trump in a social media post on Thursday said the U.S. "will not be attacking Iran at any time prior to the Midterm Elections to be held in the United States on November 3rd." Trump added that his team has been "having productive discussions with the Islamic Republic of Iran." ... Negotiations had appeared at a standstill since Trump late last month publicly rejected Iran's proposal to reopen the Strait of Hormuz within seven days if the U.S. met certain conditions.”Hide quote
    But Trump in a social media post on Thursday said the U.S. "will not be attacking Iran at any time prior to the Midterm Elections to be held in the United States on November 3rd." Trump added that his team has been "having productive discussions with the Islamic Republic of Iran." ... Negotiations had appeared at a standstill since Trump late last month publicly rejected Iran's proposal to reopen the Strait of Hormuz within seven days if the U.S. met certain conditions.
  43. Iran Update, October 21, 2026

    Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project, 2026-10-21 · supports

    “Several shipping and maritime security officials told Bloomberg on October 20 that at least five of the 23 recorded attacks on vessels in or near the Strait of Hormuz in the first two weeks of October struck commercial vessels' engine rooms.”Hide quote
    Several shipping and maritime security officials told Bloomberg on October 20 that at least five of the 23 recorded attacks on vessels in or near the Strait of Hormuz in the first two weeks of October struck commercial vessels' engine rooms.
  44. Iran Update, October 22, 2026

    Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project, 2026-10-22 · supports

    “The New York Times reported on October 21 that the US and Israeli militaries have developed specific plans for a short and intensive operation against Iran after the US midterm elections on November 3, citing US officials and other people briefed on the deliberations.”Hide quote
    The New York Times reported on October 21 that the US and Israeli militaries have developed specific plans for a short and intensive operation against Iran after the US midterm elections on November 3, citing US officials and other people briefed on the deliberations.
  45. Iran Update, October 24, 2026

    Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project, 2026-10-24 · supports

    “Director of National Intelligence Jay Clayton warned on October 23 that US intelligence assessments indicate that Iran is in the "advanced stages" of planning attacks against US targets in the region.”Hide quote
    Director of National Intelligence Jay Clayton warned on October 23 that US intelligence assessments indicate that Iran is in the "advanced stages" of planning attacks against US targets in the region.
  46. Iran Update, October 25, 2026

    Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project, 2026-10-25 · supports

    “The Houthis have fired at least 12 missiles and two drones targeting Saudi Arabia since October 24”Hide quote
    The Houthis have fired at least 12 missiles and two drones targeting Saudi Arabia since October 24
  47. Iran Update, October 26, 2026

    Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project, 2026-10-26 · supports

    “Senior officials from the Mecca Pact’s three signatories met with senior Iranian officials in Tehran on October 26 to discuss a new US-Iran ceasefire amid reported US and Israeli preparations for another round of strikes in Iran. ... Two diplomats briefed on the ongoing talks told the New York Times on October 26 that Qatari mediators are trying to secure an agreement in which the United States and Iran would make "a series of concessions over a five-day period." The diplomats added that those concessions include Iran reopening the Strait of Hormuz in exchange for the United States lifting its naval blockade on Iranian ports. ... The United States and Iran reportedly continue to disagree on the sequencing of the agreement.”Hide quote
    Senior officials from the Mecca Pact’s three signatories met with senior Iranian officials in Tehran on October 26 to discuss a new US-Iran ceasefire amid reported US and Israeli preparations for another round of strikes in Iran. ... Two diplomats briefed on the ongoing talks told the New York Times on October 26 that Qatari mediators are trying to secure an agreement in which the United States and Iran would make "a series of concessions over a five-day period." The diplomats added that those concessions include Iran reopening the Strait of Hormuz in exchange for the United States lifting its naval blockade on Iranian ports. ... The United States and Iran reportedly continue to disagree on the sequencing of the agreement.
  48. Iran Update, October 27, 2026

    Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project, 2026-10-27 · supports

    “This threat comes as Director of National Intelligence Jay Clayton warned in a memo on October 23 that Iran has “substantially increased” its efforts to target US personnel. ... Omani Foreign Affairs Minister Badr al Busaidi called for a Gulf non-aggression pact with Iran on October 26, but Iran is unlikely to accept such an agreement unless it can also secure a US withdrawal from the region. Regional sources said that the summit made no progress on any issue.”Hide quote
    This threat comes as Director of National Intelligence Jay Clayton warned in a memo on October 23 that Iran has “substantially increased” its efforts to target US personnel. ... Omani Foreign Affairs Minister Badr al Busaidi called for a Gulf non-aggression pact with Iran on October 26, but Iran is unlikely to accept such an agreement unless it can also secure a US withdrawal from the region. Regional sources said that the summit made no progress on any issue.
  49. US warns allies to prepare for possible Iran strikes, retaliation after elections, AP sources say

    Associated Press (via WCAX), 2026-10-29 · supports

    “U.S. officials have told several Middle East countries and regional allies to be prepared for potential renewed military action against Iran after next week’s midterm elections in the United States — as well as the possibility that Iran will attempt to retaliate against them, according to two diplomats briefed on the matter. ... President Donald Trump has not made a final decision on whether to carry out new strikes against Iran, the diplomats stressed. ... Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said Wednesday in a post on X that Tehran “continues to give diplomacy a chance to succeed” ... the United Arab Emirates foreign ministry issued a statement urging the sides to “exercise wisdom and pursue political solutions to help contain tensions” ... While the U.S. has not carried out a strike against Iran since early September, the situation in the Middle East has become more complicated.”Hide quote
    U.S. officials have told several Middle East countries and regional allies to be prepared for potential renewed military action against Iran after next week’s midterm elections in the United States — as well as the possibility that Iran will attempt to retaliate against them, according to two diplomats briefed on the matter. ... President Donald Trump has not made a final decision on whether to carry out new strikes against Iran, the diplomats stressed. ... Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said Wednesday in a post on X that Tehran “continues to give diplomacy a chance to succeed” ... the United Arab Emirates foreign ministry issued a statement urging the sides to “exercise wisdom and pursue political solutions to help contain tensions” ... While the U.S. has not carried out a strike against Iran since early September, the situation in the Middle East has become more complicated.
  50. U.S. Forces Disable Cargo Vessel Attempting to Violate Blockade

    US Central Command, 2026-10-10 · supports

    “CENTCOM forces resumed America’s blockade against all ships entering or departing Iranian ports on July 14. Four commercial vessels have been disabled and 135 ships have been turned around during three months of strict enforcement.”Hide quote
    CENTCOM forces resumed America’s blockade against all ships entering or departing Iranian ports on July 14. Four commercial vessels have been disabled and 135 ships have been turned around during three months of strict enforcement.
  51. The Constitution of the United States: A Transcription (Article I, Section 8; Article II, Section 2)

    U.S. National Archives, 1787-09-17 · supports

    “Section. 8. The Congress shall have Power … To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water; To raise and support Armies … Section. 2. The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States”Hide quote
    Section. 8. The Congress shall have Power … To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water; To raise and support Armies … Section. 2. The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States
  52. House roll-call XML files 85, 114, 170, 199, 282 and 307 (2026); latest shown

    Office of the Clerk, US House of Representatives, 2026-09-15 · supports

    “<legis-num>H CON RES 93</legis-num> ... <vote-result>Passed</vote-result> ... <action-date>15-Sep-2026</action-date> ... <party>Republican</party><yea-total>7</yea-total><nay-total>203</nay-total> ... <party>Democratic</party><yea-total>213</yea-total><nay-total>0</nay-total> ... <total-stub>Totals</total-stub><yea-total>220</yea-total><nay-total>204</nay-total>”Hide quote
    <legis-num>H CON RES 93</legis-num> ... <vote-result>Passed</vote-result> ... <action-date>15-Sep-2026</action-date> ... <party>Republican</party><yea-total>7</yea-total><nay-total>203</nay-total> ... <party>Democratic</party><yea-total>213</yea-total><nay-total>0</nay-total> ... <total-stub>Totals</total-stub><yea-total>220</yea-total><nay-total>204</nay-total>
  53. Senate Roll Call Votes, 119th Congress, 2nd Session (vote menu XML; Internet Archive copy of 10 October 2026)

    United States Senate, 2026-10-10 · supports

    “00244 24-Sep H.Con.Res. 89 On the Concurrent Resolution Rejected 49 50 ... 00184 23-Jun H.Con.Res. 86 On the Concurrent Resolution Agreed to 50 48 ... 00129 19-May S.J.Res. 185 On the Motion to Discharge Agreed to 50 47 ... 00046 04-Mar S.J.Res. 104 On the Motion to Discharge Rejected 47 53”Hide quote
    00244 24-Sep H.Con.Res. 89 On the Concurrent Resolution Rejected 49 50 ... 00184 23-Jun H.Con.Res. 86 On the Concurrent Resolution Agreed to 50 48 ... 00129 19-May S.J.Res. 185 On the Motion to Discharge Agreed to 50 47 ... 00046 04-Mar S.J.Res. 104 On the Motion to Discharge Rejected 47 53
  54. Iran conflict remains deeply unpopular (chart data: approval of Trump's handling, by party)

    Pew Research Center, 2026-10-08 · supports

    “% who say they approve of how Donald Trump is handling the U.S. military action against Iran Date March October Total 37 33 Rep/Lean Rep 69 63 Dem/Lean Dem 9 9 ... Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted Sept. 28-Oct. 4, 2026.”Hide quote
    % who say they approve of how Donald Trump is handling the U.S. military action against Iran Date March October Total 37 33 Rep/Lean Rep 69 63 Dem/Lean Dem 9 9 ... Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted Sept. 28-Oct. 4, 2026.

The War's Human and Financial Costs, with Earlier Wars for Scale, 2026

  1. Day 39 of U.S. and Israeli Attacks on Iran: Extensive Damage to the Rail Network and Roads

    HRANA (Human Rights Activists News Agency), 2026-04-07 · supports

    “Aggregated data since the beginning of the conflict on February 28, 2026, based on incidents recorded in the incident tab and using minimum values for figures marked "more than": • Civilian fatalities: 1,701 people (including at least 254 children) • Military fatalities: 1,221 people • Unclassified fatalities (civilian/military): 714 people … Delays in medical reporting, difficulties in confirming identities, and restricted access to certain provinces may result in temporary undercounting. … they have not been included in the event-based calculations”Hide quote
    Aggregated data since the beginning of the conflict on February 28, 2026, based on incidents recorded in the incident tab and using minimum values for figures marked "more than": • Civilian fatalities: 1,701 people (including at least 254 children) • Military fatalities: 1,221 people • Unclassified fatalities (civilian/military): 714 people … Delays in medical reporting, difficulties in confirming identities, and restricted access to certain provinces may result in temporary undercounting. … they have not been included in the event-based calculations
  2. At least 7,650 killed in 40 days of war, including 1,030 civilians — Hengaw’s tenth report

    Hengaw Organization for Human Rights, 2026-04-08 · complicates

    “According to data collected by Hengaw, at least 7,650 people were killed during the recent war, of whom 1,030 (equivalent to 13.5%) were civilians. … At least 6,620 military personnel were killed, the majority of whom were members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the army. … Hengaw has repeatedly emphasized during the conflict that Iranian military forces abandoned official bases and were stationed in civilian locations, including schools, student dormitories, and mosques within residential areas. … To date, no comprehensive official report on military casualties has been issued by state authorities.”Hide quote
    According to data collected by Hengaw, at least 7,650 people were killed during the recent war, of whom 1,030 (equivalent to 13.5%) were civilians. … At least 6,620 military personnel were killed, the majority of whom were members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the army. … Hengaw has repeatedly emphasized during the conflict that Iranian military forces abandoned official bases and were stationed in civilian locations, including schools, student dormitories, and mosques within residential areas. … To date, no comprehensive official report on military casualties has been issued by state authorities.
  3. Middle East escalation of conflict — Global external situation report #10 (data as of 21 July)

    World Health Organization, 2026-07-22 · supports

    “Iran 3 200 000 [Displaced] 33 806 [Injured] 3 375 [Deaths] … All numbers are estimates and may differ from other sources due to data cutoff times. … Since the beginning of the hostilities on 28 February, national authorities reported 3375 deaths and 33 806 injuries in the Islamic Republic of Iran, including 15 injuries following strikes on 7 June. An additional 50 deaths and more than 517 injuries have been reported as occurring between 27 June – 19 July … Cumulative figures since 28 February have yet to be reported.”Hide quote
    Iran 3 200 000 [Displaced] 33 806 [Injured] 3 375 [Deaths] … All numbers are estimates and may differ from other sources due to data cutoff times. … Since the beginning of the hostilities on 28 February, national authorities reported 3375 deaths and 33 806 injuries in the Islamic Republic of Iran, including 15 injuries following strikes on 7 June. An additional 50 deaths and more than 517 injuries have been reported as occurring between 27 June – 19 July … Cumulative figures since 28 February have yet to be reported.
  4. World Development Indicators: Population, total (SP.POP.TOTL), Iran

    World Bank, 2026-10-08 · supports

    “"indicator":{"id":"SP.POP.TOTL","value":"Population, total"},"country":{"id":"IR","value":"Iran, Islamic Rep."},"countryiso3code":"IRN","date":"2025","value":92417681”Hide quote
    "indicator":{"id":"SP.POP.TOTL","value":"Population, total"},"country":{"id":"IR","value":"Iran, Islamic Rep."},"countryiso3code":"IRN","date":"2025","value":92417681
  5. Israeli, Iranian and US forces in Iran 2026 (conflict page)

    Airwars, 2026-10 · supports

    “Over 40 days Airwars tracked 267 civilian harm incidents and has published 71. … In June, U.S. strikes began again after negotiations faltered. Airwars' rapid response team has tracked 34 further incidents of civilian harm, of which 23 have been published.”Hide quote
    Over 40 days Airwars tracked 267 civilian harm incidents and has published 71. … In June, U.S. strikes began again after negotiations faltered. Airwars' rapid response team has tracked 34 further incidents of civilian harm, of which 23 have been published.
  6. Civilian harm in Iran after one month of war

    Airwars, 2026-03-27 · complicates

    “At least 1,443 civilians have been killed by U.S. and Israeli forces, including 217 children, according to HRA.”Hide quote
    At least 1,443 civilians have been killed by U.S. and Israeli forces, including 217 children, according to HRA.
  7. Report of the independent international fact-finding mission on the Islamic Republic of Iran (A/HRC/61/60)

    UN Human Rights Council, 2026-03-19 · complicates

    “On 3 March, the Iranian Red Crescent Society reported that 787 people had been killed in the Islamic Republic of Iran since the air strikes had begun.”Hide quote
    On 3 March, the Iranian Red Crescent Society reported that 787 people had been killed in the Islamic Republic of Iran since the air strikes had begun.
  8. Pentagon raises Iran war death toll to 21

    Task & Purpose, 2026-10-10 · supports

    “Since Feb. 28, 865 service members have been wounded in the war, the majority since July 7. … This summer the Pentagon split deaths and injuries in the war into two separate categories: one for Operation Epic Fury and one listed as 'overseas operations,' covering casualties since July.”Hide quote
    Since Feb. 28, 865 service members have been wounded in the war, the majority since July 7. … This summer the Pentagon split deaths and injuries in the war into two separate categories: one for Operation Epic Fury and one listed as 'overseas operations,' covering casualties since July.
  9. Pentagon's latest Iran war cost estimate: $43.6 billion

    Roll Call, 2026-09-18 · supports

    “The Pentagon's latest figure comprises $11.2 billion already obligated for operating expenses ... plus $32.4 billion in unfunded replacement costs for munitions, damaged aircraft and other assets … The new Pentagon estimate of $43.6 billion is current as of Sept. 3, the document said … the CBO said the war cost $38.1 billion through July … The IG, meanwhile, put the figure at $33.4 billion. Its estimate ran through June. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth testified in July that the war would cost $37.5 billion through the end of September. The Pentagon has asked Congress for $67.1 billion in supplemental spending”Hide quote
    The Pentagon's latest figure comprises $11.2 billion already obligated for operating expenses ... plus $32.4 billion in unfunded replacement costs for munitions, damaged aircraft and other assets … The new Pentagon estimate of $43.6 billion is current as of Sept. 3, the document said … the CBO said the war cost $38.1 billion through July … The IG, meanwhile, put the figure at $33.4 billion. Its estimate ran through June. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth testified in July that the war would cost $37.5 billion through the end of September. The Pentagon has asked Congress for $67.1 billion in supplemental spending
  10. DOD officials say Iran war has cost $25 billion so far during congressional grilling

    NPR (via KASU), 2026-04-29 · supports

    “Twenty-five billion dollars - that's how much the Pentagon estimates the war with Iran is costing.”Hide quote
    Twenty-five billion dollars - that's how much the Pentagon estimates the war with Iran is costing.
  11. Costs of the Armed Conflict With Iran (letter, 15 September 2026; archived 1 October 2026)

    Congressional Budget Office, 2026-09-15 · supports

    “CBO estimates that as of August 1, 2026, the armed conflict with Iran has cost DoD approximately $38 billion. … if the level of violence remained as low as it was in May and June, an additional month of conflict would cost $2 billion; if the intensity of the conflict increased to roughly the level experienced in July, the cost per month would increase to $3 billion. … CBO relied on government databases and public reports because DoD did not respond to CBO's requests for information. … This past June, the Administration requested $87.6 billion in supplemental appropriations, of which $67.1 billion was for DoD to pay for the conflict. … relatively few U.S. forces have been involved compared with the much larger and longer U.S. operations in Iraq and Afghanistan … in the first quarter of 2027, inflation (measured year over year) in the price index for personal consumption expenditures (PCE) is now estimated to be 0.5 percentage points higher than the agency projected in February 2026, and core PCE inflation is estimated to be 0.3 percentage points higher”Hide quote
    CBO estimates that as of August 1, 2026, the armed conflict with Iran has cost DoD approximately $38 billion. … if the level of violence remained as low as it was in May and June, an additional month of conflict would cost $2 billion; if the intensity of the conflict increased to roughly the level experienced in July, the cost per month would increase to $3 billion. … CBO relied on government databases and public reports because DoD did not respond to CBO's requests for information. … This past June, the Administration requested $87.6 billion in supplemental appropriations, of which $67.1 billion was for DoD to pay for the conflict. … relatively few U.S. forces have been involved compared with the much larger and longer U.S. operations in Iraq and Afghanistan … in the first quarter of 2027, inflation (measured year over year) in the price index for personal consumption expenditures (PCE) is now estimated to be 0.5 percentage points higher than the agency projected in February 2026, and core PCE inflation is estimated to be 0.3 percentage points higher
  12. The War May Be Ending: What Did Epic Fury Cost?

    Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2026-06-23 · supports

    “CSIS estimates war costs to be around $40 billion ($34 billion to $42 billion).”Hide quote
    CSIS estimates war costs to be around $40 billion ($34 billion to $42 billion).
  13. Epic Fury costs as of the April 8 cease-fire

    American Enterprise Institute, 2026-04-10 · supports

    “we estimate an incremental cost to date of between $25 and $35 billion.”Hide quote
    we estimate an incremental cost to date of between $25 and $35 billion.
  14. A Renewed Iran War Would Test Diminished Interceptor Inventories

    Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2026-07-27 · supports

    “This has required extensive use of interceptors, with Patriot inventories now under 1,000 and THAAD inventories at about 250. Diminished stockpiles may force the United States and its coalition partners to take more risks with interceptions.”Hide quote
    This has required extensive use of interceptors, with Patriot inventories now under 1,000 and THAAD inventories at about 250. Diminished stockpiles may force the United States and its coalition partners to take more risks with interceptions.
  15. Last Rounds? The Status of Key Munitions at the Iran War Ceasefire

    Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2026-04-21 · complicates

    “Of the total deliveries, 5 percent was deducted for training, lot testing, and other nonoperational uses. … Up to 400 of the older PAC-2 missiles may also still be in the stockpile but are not included in Figure 9.”Hide quote
    Of the total deliveries, 5 percent was deducted for training, lot testing, and other nonoperational uses. … Up to 400 of the older PAC-2 missiles may also still be in the stockpile but are not included in Figure 9.
  16. American War and Military Operations Casualties: Lists and Statistics (RL32492)

    Congressional Research Service, 2020-07-29 · supports

    “Table 12. Operation Iraqi Freedom: Casualty Summary by Casualty Category (as of July 16, 2020) … Total Hostile Deaths 3,481 ... Total Nonhostile Deaths 937 ... Total Deaths 4,418 ... Total Wounded in Action 31,994 … [Operation Enduring Freedom] Total Deaths 2,349 ... Total Wounded In Action 20,149 … [Operation New Dawn] Total Deaths 74”Hide quote
    Table 12. Operation Iraqi Freedom: Casualty Summary by Casualty Category (as of July 16, 2020) … Total Hostile Deaths 3,481 ... Total Nonhostile Deaths 937 ... Total Deaths 4,418 ... Total Wounded in Action 31,994 … [Operation Enduring Freedom] Total Deaths 2,349 ... Total Wounded In Action 20,149 … [Operation New Dawn] Total Deaths 74
  17. The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11 (RL33110)

    Congressional Research Service, 2014-12-08 · supports

    “Congress has approved appropriations for the past 13 years of war that total $1.6 trillion ... $686 billion (43%) for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) for Afghanistan and other counterterror operations received; $815 billion (51%) for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)/Operation New Dawn (OND)”Hide quote
    Congress has approved appropriations for the past 13 years of war that total $1.6 trillion ... $686 billion (43%) for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) for Afghanistan and other counterterror operations received; $815 billion (51%) for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)/Operation New Dawn (OND)
  18. Iraq War's Price Tag

    Council on Foreign Relations, 2005-02-02 · supports

    “In September 2002, White House economic adviser Lawrence Lindsey told The Wall Street Journal that a U.S. intervention in Iraq could cost between $100 billion and $200 billion... White House Budget Director Mitchell E. Daniels Jr. labeled that figure as 'very, very high' and estimated total war costs at between $50 billion to $60 billion. … Brookings Institution senior fellows Michael O'Hanlon and Lael Brainard estimated in August 2003 that military and reconstruction costs could range from $150 billion to $300 billion. … On the eve of the war in March 2003, an independent task force report from the Council on Foreign Relations estimated that stabilizing Iraq could cost some $20 billion a year for several years”Hide quote
    In September 2002, White House economic adviser Lawrence Lindsey told The Wall Street Journal that a U.S. intervention in Iraq could cost between $100 billion and $200 billion... White House Budget Director Mitchell E. Daniels Jr. labeled that figure as 'very, very high' and estimated total war costs at between $50 billion to $60 billion. … Brookings Institution senior fellows Michael O'Hanlon and Lael Brainard estimated in August 2003 that military and reconstruction costs could range from $150 billion to $300 billion. … On the eve of the war in March 2003, an independent task force report from the Council on Foreign Relations estimated that stabilizing Iraq could cost some $20 billion a year for several years
  19. Iran Update Special Report, July 13, 2026

    Institute for the Study of War and AEI Critical Threats Project, 2026-07-13 · supports

    “Iran has continuously made efforts to reconstitute its ballistic missile and drone programs since the ceasefire on April 8. … The United States will resume its blockade of Iranian ports beginning on July 14 at 4:00 PM ET.”Hide quote
    Iran has continuously made efforts to reconstitute its ballistic missile and drone programs since the ceasefire on April 8. … The United States will resume its blockade of Iranian ports beginning on July 14 at 4:00 PM ET.
  20. War Powers report to Congress (House Document 119-169)

    The White House (via GovInfo), 2026-07-10 · supports

    “military action commenced on July 7, 2026, against the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran”Hide quote
    military action commenced on July 7, 2026, against the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran
  21. Trump says US will not resume military strikes on Iran before midterm elections

    Associated Press (via WCAX), 2026-10-08 · supports

    “But Trump in a social media post on Thursday said the U.S. "will not be attacking Iran at any time prior to the Midterm Elections to be held in the United States on November 3rd."”Hide quote
    But Trump in a social media post on Thursday said the U.S. "will not be attacking Iran at any time prior to the Midterm Elections to be held in the United States on November 3rd."
  22. US warns allies to prepare for possible Iran strikes, retaliation after elections, AP sources say

    Associated Press (via WCAX), 2026-10-29 · supports

    “The cost of fighting the Iran war to American taxpayers has grown to $47.1 billion, according to the latest estimate the Pentagon has provided to Congress.”Hide quote
    The cost of fighting the Iran war to American taxpayers has grown to $47.1 billion, according to the latest estimate the Pentagon has provided to Congress.
  23. Defense Casualty Analysis System: conflict casualty summaries, Operation Epic Fury and Overseas Operations (monthly and by category)

    US Department of Defense, Defense Casualty Analysis System, 2026-10-28 · supports

    “[Operation Epic Fury, monthly] "month_Year":"FEBRUARY 2026" … "tot_kia":"0" … "tot_acc":"0" … "tot_wia":"36" … "month_Year":"MARCH 2026" … "tot_kia":"7" … "tot_acc":"7" … "tot_total":"14" … "tot_wia":"342" … "month_Year":"APRIL 2026" … "tot_wia":"34" … "month_Year":"JUNE 2026" … "tot_wia":"5" … "month_Year":"JULY 2026" … "tot_kia":"0" … "tot_acc":"1" … "tot_wia":"0" … [Overseas Operations, monthly] "month_Year":"JULY 2026" … "tot_kia":"4" … "tot_acc":"0" … "tot_wia":"350" … "month_Year":"SEPTEMBER 2026" … "tot_acc":"2" … "tot_wia":"94" … "month_Year":"OCTOBER 2026" … "tot_acc":"1" … "tot_wia":"4" … [category totals] Epic Fury "total":"15", "casualty_CATEGORIES":"TOTAL DEATHS" … "airforce":"6","spaceforce":"0","total":"6", "casualty_CATEGORIES":"ACCIDENT" … "total":"8", "casualty_CATEGORIES":"TOTAL NON-HOSTILE DEATHS" … "total":"417", "casualty_CATEGORIES":"WOUNDED IN ACTION (WIA)" … Overseas Operations "total":"7", "casualty_CATEGORIES":"TOTAL DEATHS" … "total":"3", "casualty_CATEGORIES":"TOTAL NON-HOSTILE DEATHS" … "total":"448", "casualty_CATEGORIES":"WOUNDED IN ACTION (WIA)" … "extractionDate":"October 28, 2026"”Hide quote
    [Operation Epic Fury, monthly] "month_Year":"FEBRUARY 2026" … "tot_kia":"0" … "tot_acc":"0" … "tot_wia":"36" … "month_Year":"MARCH 2026" … "tot_kia":"7" … "tot_acc":"7" … "tot_total":"14" … "tot_wia":"342" … "month_Year":"APRIL 2026" … "tot_wia":"34" … "month_Year":"JUNE 2026" … "tot_wia":"5" … "month_Year":"JULY 2026" … "tot_kia":"0" … "tot_acc":"1" … "tot_wia":"0" … [Overseas Operations, monthly] "month_Year":"JULY 2026" … "tot_kia":"4" … "tot_acc":"0" … "tot_wia":"350" … "month_Year":"SEPTEMBER 2026" … "tot_acc":"2" … "tot_wia":"94" … "month_Year":"OCTOBER 2026" … "tot_acc":"1" … "tot_wia":"4" … [category totals] Epic Fury "total":"15", "casualty_CATEGORIES":"TOTAL DEATHS" … "airforce":"6","spaceforce":"0","total":"6", "casualty_CATEGORIES":"ACCIDENT" … "total":"8", "casualty_CATEGORIES":"TOTAL NON-HOSTILE DEATHS" … "total":"417", "casualty_CATEGORIES":"WOUNDED IN ACTION (WIA)" … Overseas Operations "total":"7", "casualty_CATEGORIES":"TOTAL DEATHS" … "total":"3", "casualty_CATEGORIES":"TOTAL NON-HOSTILE DEATHS" … "total":"448", "casualty_CATEGORIES":"WOUNDED IN ACTION (WIA)" … "extractionDate":"October 28, 2026"