Outside Attempts to Topple, Coerce or Disarm Hostile Regimes, 1816–2023

Outside Attempts to Topple, Coerce or Disarm Hostile Regimes, 1816–2023

1. Jervis Forum Roundtable 17-6 on Downes, Catastrophic Success: Why Foreign-Imposed Regime Change Goes Wrong (Cornell University Press, 2021)

   H-Diplo/RJISSF (reviewers' summaries, with page numbers in Downes's book), 2025-10 · supports

   “Marshaling a new dataset of 120 cases of FIRC (1816–2008) … One-third of all FIRCs descend into civil war in the first post-intervention decade (94), especially in low-income countries, where FIRCs increase the risk of civil war by eight percentage points (100). … Foreign-imposed regime change more than doubles the likelihood of civil war in the decade that follows (94-96). … Civil war is four and a half times more likely to follow a leadership regime change than in other cases (98). And, whereas 47 percent of installed leaders have been forcibly removed from power, two-third of leaders installed through leadership regime change have lost power through irregular means (168). … Regime change also appears to have no significant effect on the probability of a future militarized dispute between the target and intervener (251-2). And indeed, leadership regime changes more than double the risk of a dispute occurring (252). … These states are no more likely to vote together in the United Nations General Assembly or to share alliance portfolios than other types of states (254-5). … Regime changes that seek to restore previously ousted rulers to power tend to have best outcomes … the base rate is quite low, and so even if FIRC doubles the risk of civil war onset, would-be interveners might view this as acceptable compared to maintaining the status quo.”Hide quote

   Marshaling a new dataset of 120 cases of FIRC (1816–2008) … One-third of all FIRCs descend into civil war in the first post-intervention decade (94), especially in low-income countries, where FIRCs increase the risk of civil war by eight percentage points (100). … Foreign-imposed regime change more than doubles the likelihood of civil war in the decade that follows (94-96). … Civil war is four and a half times more likely to follow a leadership regime change than in other cases (98). And, whereas 47 percent of installed leaders have been forcibly removed from power, two-third of leaders installed through leadership regime change have lost power through irregular means (168). … Regime change also appears to have no significant effect on the probability of a future militarized dispute between the target and intervener (251-2). And indeed, leadership regime changes more than double the risk of a dispute occurring (252). … These states are no more likely to vote together in the United Nations General Assembly or to share alliance portfolios than other types of states (254-5). … Regime changes that seek to restore previously ousted rulers to power tend to have best outcomes … the base rate is quite low, and so even if FIRC doubles the risk of civil war onset, would-be interveners might view this as acceptable compared to maintaining the status quo.

2. You Can't Always Get What You Want: Why Foreign-Imposed Regime Change Seldom Improves Interstate Relations (Downes and O'Rourke, International Security 41:2), abstract

   Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, 2016 · supports

   “A new dataset and an analysis of foreign interventions in the Congo Wars show that FIRC damages relations between intervener and target state more often than it improves them.”Hide quote

   A new dataset and an analysis of foreign interventions in the Congo Wars show that FIRC damages relations between intervener and target state more often than it improves them.

3. Forced to Be Free? Why Foreign-Imposed Regime Change Rarely Leads to Democratization (Downes and Monten, International Security 37:4), abstract

   Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, 2013 · supports

   “A statistical examination of seventy instances of foreign-imposed regime change (FIRC) in the twentieth century shows that implementing prodemocratic institutional reforms, such as sponsoring elections, is not enough to induce democratization; interveners will meet with little success unless conditions in the target state—in the form of high levels of economic development and societal homogeneity, and previous experience with representative governance—are favorable to democracy. Given that prospective regime change operations are likely to target regimes in poor, diverse countries, policymakers should scale back their expectations that democracy will flourish after FIRC.”Hide quote

   A statistical examination of seventy instances of foreign-imposed regime change (FIRC) in the twentieth century shows that implementing prodemocratic institutional reforms, such as sponsoring elections, is not enough to induce democratization; interveners will meet with little success unless conditions in the target state—in the form of high levels of economic development and societal homogeneity, and previous experience with representative governance—are favorable to democracy. Given that prospective regime change operations are likely to target regimes in poor, diverse countries, policymakers should scale back their expectations that democracy will flourish after FIRC.

4. H-Diplo/ISSF Article Review 26 on Downes and Monten, "Forced to Be Free?"

   H-Diplo/ISSF (review by Mark Peceny), 2014-02-14 · complicates

   “They have collected data on 107 examples of this phenomenon from 1816 to the contemporary era, from Austria’s removal of revolutionaries from the government of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies in 1821 through the 2003 overthrow of Saddam Hussein. … Iran in 1953, Guatemala in 1954, and Chile in 1973 are included, but the Reagan Doctrine cases of covert action in the 1980s are excluded.”Hide quote

   They have collected data on 107 examples of this phenomenon from 1816 to the contemporary era, from Austria’s removal of revolutionaries from the government of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies in 1821 through the 2003 overthrow of Saddam Hussein. … Iran in 1953, Guatemala in 1954, and Chile in 1973 are included, but the Reagan Doctrine cases of covert action in the 1980s are excluded.

5. Boston College Political Scientist Wins Award for Her Foreign Policy Book

   Boston College News, 2019-11 · supports

   “U.S. covert operations during the Cold War were unsuccessful more than 60 percent of the time and most failed to remain covert, often resulting in unforeseen, and disastrous, consequences, according to O’Rourke, who found that states targeted for regime change were more likely to experience civil war in the 10 years following intervention.”Hide quote

   U.S. covert operations during the Cold War were unsuccessful more than 60 percent of the time and most failed to remain covert, often resulting in unforeseen, and disastrous, consequences, according to O’Rourke, who found that states targeted for regime change were more likely to experience civil war in the 10 years following intervention.

6. Covert Wars to What End?

   War on the Rocks, 2019-08-07 · supports

   “O'Rourke compiled an original dataset of U.S. regime-change operations carried out between 1947 and 1989, including 64 covert cases. … more than two thirds (44 of 64) were undertaken in support of authoritarian forces, 'including at least six operations that sought to replace liberal democratic governments with illiberal authoritarian regimes.'”Hide quote

   O'Rourke compiled an original dataset of U.S. regime-change operations carried out between 1947 and 1989, including 64 covert cases. … more than two thirds (44 of 64) were undertaken in support of authoritarian forces, 'including at least six operations that sought to replace liberal democratic governments with illiberal authoritarian regimes.'

7. Review of Lindsey A. O'Rourke, Covert Regime Change: America's Secret Cold War

   H-War (review by Paxton Stover), 2024-08 · supports

   “covert operations are most likely to succeed against democratic governments, weak states, and American allies”Hide quote

   covert operations are most likely to succeed against democratic governments, weak states, and American allies

8. Attacking the Atom: Does Bombing Nuclear Facilities Affect Proliferation? (Kreps and Fuhrmann, Journal of Strategic Studies), abstract

   Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, 2011-04 · supports

   “This article addresses these questions by conducting an analysis of 16 attacks against nuclear facilities from 1942 to 2007. … There is evidence that the peacetime attacks delayed the target's nuclear program, although the size of this effect is rather modest. The wartime cases were less successful, as attacks often missed their targets either due to operational failure or limited intelligence on the location of critical targets. In our concluding section we show that many of the conditions that were conducive to past success are not present in the contemporary Iran case. Overall, our findings reveal an interesting paradox. The historical cases that have successfully delayed proliferation are those when the attacking state struck well before a nuclear threat was imminent.”Hide quote

   This article addresses these questions by conducting an analysis of 16 attacks against nuclear facilities from 1942 to 2007. … There is evidence that the peacetime attacks delayed the target's nuclear program, although the size of this effect is rather modest. The wartime cases were less successful, as attacks often missed their targets either due to operational failure or limited intelligence on the location of critical targets. In our concluding section we show that many of the conditions that were conducive to past success are not present in the contemporary Iran case. Overall, our findings reveal an interesting paradox. The historical cases that have successfully delayed proliferation are those when the attacking state struck well before a nuclear threat was imminent.

9. Revisiting Osirak: Preventive Attacks and Nuclear Proliferation Risks (Braut-Hegghammer, International Security 36:1), abstract

   Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, 2011 · complicates

   “The attack had mixed effects: it triggered a covert nuclear weapons program that did not previously exist, while necessitating a more difficult and timeconsuming technical route to developing nuclear weapons. Notwithstanding gross inefficiencies in the ensuing program, a decade later Iraq stood on the threshold of a nuclear weapons capability.”Hide quote

   The attack had mixed effects: it triggered a covert nuclear weapons program that did not previously exist, while necessitating a more difficult and timeconsuming technical route to developing nuclear weapons. Notwithstanding gross inefficiencies in the ensuing program, a decade later Iraq stood on the threshold of a nuclear weapons capability.

10. When Did (and Didn’t) States Proliferate? Chronicling the Spread of Nuclear Weapons (Philipp C. Bleek), text and Table 1

    Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, 2017-06 · supports

    “Thirty-one countries at least opened the door to potential nuclear weapons programs, seventeen of those launched weapons programs, and ten acquired deliverable nuclear weapons. But proliferation has also been complemented by de-proliferation: one state that developed nuclear weapons subsequently gave them up, seven of those who launched programs never or have not yet acquired, and fourteen countries halted their exploration of nuclear weapons without launching programs. … Libya returned to no activity in 2003, when Libya announced that it was abandoning its weapons of mass destruction programs and allowing international inspections. … Iraqi exploration is coded as 1975, though the evidence is somewhat circumstantial, and pursuit is coded as 1981, returning to no activity in 1991. … Jo and Gartzke code pursuit as 1973. … Iraq’s activities prior to 1981, including as described by Braut-Hegghammer, are sufficiently robust that one might reasonably code them as pursuit rather than merely exploration … Iraq’s pursuit ended in 1991, when in the aftermath of the first Gulf War it was forced to give up its mass destruction capabilities and submit to an intensive verification regime. … one could reasonably code Iran as dropping from pursuit down to exploration either after 2003, based on the 2007 National Intelligence Assessment, or in 2015, when Iran agreed to significantly constrain its nuclear program under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. … Syria returned to exploring in 2007 following the destruction of the Al-Kibar facility by Israel on September 6, 2007. There is no publicly available evidence of political decisions to either continue or cease activity on which to base a coding of continued exploration.”Hide quote

    Thirty-one countries at least opened the door to potential nuclear weapons programs, seventeen of those launched weapons programs, and ten acquired deliverable nuclear weapons. But proliferation has also been complemented by de-proliferation: one state that developed nuclear weapons subsequently gave them up, seven of those who launched programs never or have not yet acquired, and fourteen countries halted their exploration of nuclear weapons without launching programs. … Libya returned to no activity in 2003, when Libya announced that it was abandoning its weapons of mass destruction programs and allowing international inspections. … Iraqi exploration is coded as 1975, though the evidence is somewhat circumstantial, and pursuit is coded as 1981, returning to no activity in 1991. … Jo and Gartzke code pursuit as 1973. … Iraq’s activities prior to 1981, including as described by Braut-Hegghammer, are sufficiently robust that one might reasonably code them as pursuit rather than merely exploration … Iraq’s pursuit ended in 1991, when in the aftermath of the first Gulf War it was forced to give up its mass destruction capabilities and submit to an intensive verification regime. … one could reasonably code Iran as dropping from pursuit down to exploration either after 2003, based on the 2007 National Intelligence Assessment, or in 2015, when Iran agreed to significantly constrain its nuclear program under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. … Syria returned to exploring in 2007 following the destruction of the Al-Kibar facility by Israel on September 6, 2007. There is no publicly available evidence of political decisions to either continue or cease activity on which to base a coding of continued exploration.

11. Economic Sanctions: New Directions for the 21st Century (presentation of Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 3rd edition)

    Peterson Institute for International Economics (Hufbauer, Schott, Elliott and Oegg), 2008-07 · supports

    “204 observations from World War I to 2000 … Sanctions “succeed” in about one-third of the cases overall, but the success rate depends importantly on the type of objectives sought … Success means sanctions contributed significantly to the partial or full achievement of the foreign policy goal … Targets are friendly or democratic countries, rather than enemies, autocrats … Libya – Success at Last? … But only after 20+ years … Destabilization of either existing regime unlikely … Carrots plus sticks strategy more effective than sticks alone … Do not expect quick success against autocratic regimes”Hide quote

    204 observations from World War I to 2000 … Sanctions “succeed” in about one-third of the cases overall, but the success rate depends importantly on the type of objectives sought … Success means sanctions contributed significantly to the partial or full achievement of the foreign policy goal … Targets are friendly or democratic countries, rather than enemies, autocrats … Libya – Success at Last? … But only after 20+ years … Destabilization of either existing regime unlikely … Carrots plus sticks strategy more effective than sticks alone … Do not expect quick success against autocratic regimes

12. Why Economic Sanctions Still Do Not Work (Pape, International Security, with Elliott's reply), abstract

    Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, 1998 · contests

    “Robert Pape of Dartmouth College challenged the findings in Economic Sanctions Reconsidered … One of the study’s coauthors, Kimberly Ann Elliott of the Institute of International Economics, argues here that Pape mischaracterizes the principal objective of the work, which, according to Elliott, was to determine if and how economic sanctions contributed to desired foreign policy outcomes—not, as Pape contends, whether they caused them.”Hide quote

    Robert Pape of Dartmouth College challenged the findings in Economic Sanctions Reconsidered … One of the study’s coauthors, Kimberly Ann Elliott of the Institute of International Economics, argues here that Pape mischaracterizes the principal objective of the work, which, according to Elliott, was to determine if and how economic sanctions contributed to desired foreign policy outcomes—not, as Pape contends, whether they caused them.

13. Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions 1945–2005: Updating the TIES Dataset (Morgan, Bapat and Kobayashi, Conflict Management and Peace Science 31:5), accepted manuscript

    White Rose Research Online (University of Leeds), 2014 · supports

    “The new version of the Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions (TIES) data set includes 1,412 cases in which one or more states threatened and/or imposed economic sanctions on a single target during the 1945-2005 period. … Sanctions were imposed in 845 of these cases (60%) leaving 567 cases that involved only threats (40%). … The U.S. is the primary sender in a bit over 48% of the cases … we see 384 cases identified as successful if we employ the strict definition of sanctions that requires total or partial acquiescence on the part of the target. Under this definition of ‘success’ sanctions may be considered successful in 27.2% of the cases, if we consider all cases, or in 37.5% of the cases for which we have data for the final outcome. … We see a 40.8% success rate in the pool of all cases and a remarkable 56% success rate when cases with missing final outcomes are removed. … The third definition based on the settlement nature scores identifies 454 successes, which translates to a 32.2% success rate in the full sample and a 44% success rate in the restricted sample.”Hide quote

    The new version of the Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions (TIES) data set includes 1,412 cases in which one or more states threatened and/or imposed economic sanctions on a single target during the 1945-2005 period. … Sanctions were imposed in 845 of these cases (60%) leaving 567 cases that involved only threats (40%). … The U.S. is the primary sender in a bit over 48% of the cases … we see 384 cases identified as successful if we employ the strict definition of sanctions that requires total or partial acquiescence on the part of the target. Under this definition of ‘success’ sanctions may be considered successful in 27.2% of the cases, if we consider all cases, or in 37.5% of the cases for which we have data for the final outcome. … We see a 40.8% success rate in the pool of all cases and a remarkable 56% success rate when cases with missing final outcomes are removed. … The third definition based on the settlement nature scores identifies 454 successes, which translates to a 32.2% success rate in the full sample and a 44% success rate in the restricted sample.

14. The Global Sanctions Data Base – Release 4 (WIFO Working Paper 681/2024)

    Austrian Institute of Economic Research (WIFO), 2024-07 · complicates

    “Covering the period 1950-2023, it contains 1,547 sanction cases … The GSDB excludes sanction threats. Additionally, the GSDB defines nine political objectives (policy change, regime destabilization, ending territorial conflict, war prevention, ending war, terrorism, human rights violation, restoration of democracy, and other objectives that do not fit into any of the aforementioned categories) and five objective-specific success score categories (total success, partial success, negotiation settlement, failure, and ongoing for cases that have not been repealed) for each sanction objective.”Hide quote

    Covering the period 1950-2023, it contains 1,547 sanction cases … The GSDB excludes sanction threats. Additionally, the GSDB defines nine political objectives (policy change, regime destabilization, ending territorial conflict, war prevention, ending war, terrorism, human rights violation, restoration of democracy, and other objectives that do not fit into any of the aforementioned categories) and five objective-specific success score categories (total success, partial success, negotiation settlement, failure, and ongoing for cases that have not been repealed) for each sanction objective.

15. Economics Faculty Create First-Ever Global Sanctions Data Base

    Drexel University LeBow College of Business, 2021-08-06 · complicates

    “Among other things, they found that more than 190 countries have imposed sanctions, and that the rate of success has been 30 to 50 percent.”Hide quote

    Among other things, they found that more than 190 countries have imposed sanctions, and that the rate of success has been 30 to 50 percent.

16. When Does Aerial Bombing Work? (Horowitz and Reiter, Journal of Conflict Resolution 45:2), abstract

    IDEAS/RePEc, 2001-04 · supports

    “Multivariate probit analysis is used to test three hypotheses on all instances of air power coercion from 1917 to 1999 … Results show that coercion is more likely to work if the target's military vulnerability is higher, but higher levels of civilian vulnerability have no effect on the chances of coercion success; that target regime type has no effect; and that success is less likely when the attacker demands the target change its leadership.”Hide quote

    Multivariate probit analysis is used to test three hypotheses on all instances of air power coercion from 1917 to 1999 … Results show that coercion is more likely to work if the target's military vulnerability is higher, but higher levels of civilian vulnerability have no effect on the chances of coercion success; that target regime type has no effect; and that success is less likely when the attacker demands the target change its leadership.

17. Why Bombing Syria Isn't Likely to Work

    Reason (Ronald Bailey), 2013-09-06 · supports

    “"Of our 53 cases of air power coercion, 19 (36 percent) were successes and 34 (64 percent) were failures," they report. Horowitz and Reiter define air power coercion a "success" when a target changes its behavior as demanded without being attacked.”Hide quote

    "Of our 53 cases of air power coercion, 19 (36 percent) were successes and 34 (64 percent) were failures," they report. Horowitz and Reiter define air power coercion a "success" when a target changes its behavior as demanded without being attacked.

18. H-Diplo/ISSF Roundtable XI-9 on Nicholas L. Miller, Stopping the Bomb (Cornell University Press, 2018), review by Matthew Fuhrmann

    H-Diplo/ISSF, 2019-01-27 · complicates

    “As Miller’s analysis shows, once a program had started, sanctions succeeded in only three of 22 cases (135). Thus, based on this analysis, sanctions appear to work about 14 percent of the time—a pretty dismal success rate. … Miller correctly points out, however, that we cannot infer much about the value of sanctions as an instrument of nonproliferation by limiting our analysis to these episodes. We must also look at the cases where the prospect of sanctions deterred a country from starting a bomb program in the first place. Once we do that, a much more sanguine picture emerges. … Sanctions threats can work if they are credible and if the potential proliferator is highly dependent on the United States.”Hide quote

    As Miller’s analysis shows, once a program had started, sanctions succeeded in only three of 22 cases (135). Thus, based on this analysis, sanctions appear to work about 14 percent of the time—a pretty dismal success rate. … Miller correctly points out, however, that we cannot infer much about the value of sanctions as an instrument of nonproliferation by limiting our analysis to these episodes. We must also look at the cases where the prospect of sanctions deterred a country from starting a bomb program in the first place. Once we do that, a much more sanguine picture emerges. … Sanctions threats can work if they are credible and if the potential proliferator is highly dependent on the United States.

19. Rupal Mehta, Delaying Doomsday: The Politics of Nuclear Reversal (event summary)

    Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Center for Global Security Research, 2020-02-25 · supports

    “the important role that external incentives—sanctions and rewards can play in nuclear negotiations, especially when the threat to use force remains 'on the table'. Specifically, this book argues that nuclear reversal is most likely when states are threatened with sanctions and offered face-saving rewards that help them withstand domestic political opposition. … the study employs a unified, multi-method observational research design to identify patterns of behavior over time among all proliferators. In addition to quantitative analyses that systematically explores nuclear reversal historically, the book incorporates three in-depth case studies comparing the Indian, Iranian, and North Korean nuclear programs”Hide quote

    the important role that external incentives—sanctions and rewards can play in nuclear negotiations, especially when the threat to use force remains 'on the table'. Specifically, this book argues that nuclear reversal is most likely when states are threatened with sanctions and offered face-saving rewards that help them withstand domestic political opposition. … the study employs a unified, multi-method observational research design to identify patterns of behavior over time among all proliferators. In addition to quantitative analyses that systematically explores nuclear reversal historically, the book incorporates three in-depth case studies comparing the Indian, Iranian, and North Korean nuclear programs

20. 'Cross the Line and I'm Gonna Do Nothing' (Boston Globe)

    Dartmouth News, 2013-06-24 · contests

    “In his 2006 book, Calculating Credibility, Press examined three 20th-century cases … 'When I went into this, I was certain that backing down was going to hurt credibility,' Press said. But what he found was that even if the leaders backed down from their original threats, they were still taken seriously in the future.”Hide quote

    In his 2006 book, Calculating Credibility, Press examined three 20th-century cases … 'When I went into this, I was certain that backing down was going to hurt credibility,' Press said. But what he found was that even if the leaders backed down from their original threats, they were still taken seriously in the future.

21. Revisiting Reputation: How Past Actions Matter in International Politics (Weisiger and Yarhi-Milo, International Organization 69:2)

    Princeton University, 2015-11-11 · supports

    “We find that past action is closely connected to subsequent dispute initiation and that the effects of reputation generalize beyond the immediate circumstances of the past dispute. Although reputation is not all-important, leaders are well advised to consider the reputational implications of policy decisions in international conflict. … juxtaposing reputation for resolve to power and interests is misleading when past actions influence observers' beliefs about interests”Hide quote

    We find that past action is closely connected to subsequent dispute initiation and that the effects of reputation generalize beyond the immediate circumstances of the past dispute. Although reputation is not all-important, leaders are well advised to consider the reputational implications of policy decisions in international conflict. … juxtaposing reputation for resolve to power and interests is misleading when past actions influence observers' beliefs about interests

22. Saudi crown prince says will develop nuclear bomb if Iran does

    Al Jazeera, 2018-03-15 · supports

    “'Saudi Arabia does not want to acquire any nuclear bomb, but without a doubt, if Iran developed a nuclear bomb, we will follow suit as soon as possible,' Mohammad bin Salman, popularly known as MBS, told US broadcaster CBS in an interview set to air on Sunday.”Hide quote

    'Saudi Arabia does not want to acquire any nuclear bomb, but without a doubt, if Iran developed a nuclear bomb, we will follow suit as soon as possible,' Mohammad bin Salman, popularly known as MBS, told US broadcaster CBS in an interview set to air on Sunday.

23. Divining Nuclear Intentions: A Review Essay (Potter and Mukhatzhanova, International Security), abstract

    Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, 2008 · contests

    “Both works challenge conventional conceptions of the sources of nuclear weapons decisions and offer new insights into why past predictions of rapid proliferation failed to materialize and why current prognoses about rampant proliferation are similarly flawed.”Hide quote

    Both works challenge conventional conceptions of the sources of nuclear weapons decisions and offer new insights into why past predictions of rapid proliferation failed to materialize and why current prognoses about rampant proliferation are similarly flawed.

24. Peace Time: Cease-Fire Agreements and the Durability of Peace (Fortna), book page

    Princeton University Press, 2004 · supports

    “Strong agreements markedly lessen the risk of further war. Mechanisms such as demilitarized zones, dispute resolution commissions, peacekeeping, and external guarantees can help maintain peace between even the deadliest of foes.”Hide quote

    Strong agreements markedly lessen the risk of further war. Mechanisms such as demilitarized zones, dispute resolution commissions, peacekeeping, and external guarantees can help maintain peace between even the deadliest of foes.

Iran's Nuclear Programme: Stockpile, Inspections and Assessments, 2011–2026

1. Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of United Nations Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, GOV/2026/50, paras 2–16, 28, 39, 45

   International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2026-09-01 · supports

   “These attacks took place between 13–24 June 2025. On 22 June 2025, the United States conducted attacks on three of Iran’s nuclear facilities. The Agency stopped conducting verification activities in Iran at the commencement of the military attacks and, by the end of June 2025, had decided to withdraw all of its inspectors from Iran for safety reasons. … On 2 July 2025, the President of Iran signed into force a law suspending cooperation with the Agency. … On 9 September 2025, the Director General signed an agreement with the Foreign Minister of Iran, Dr Abbas Araghchi, in Cairo – referred to as the ‘Cairo agreement’ … Iran, in a letter of 20 November 2025, informed the Director General that the Cairo agreement was “no longer valid and shall henceforth be regarded as terminated”. … The Director General was in attendance at the indirect negotiations between the United States of America and Iran that took place on 17 and 26 February 2026 in Geneva, in which he provided advice on issues relevant to the verification of Iran’s nuclear programme. On 28 February 2026, the United States of America and Israel launched further military attacks on Iran, including on the sites of some nuclear facilities. Consequently, the Agency stopped conducting verification activities in Iran. … On 1–3 June 2026, the Agency conducted an inspection and DIV at the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP) … On 10 June 2026, the Board adopted resolution GOV/2026/40 in which, inter alia, it: recalled that “Iran’s many failures to provide the Agency with full and timely cooperation regarding undeclared nuclear material and activities at multiple undeclared locations in Iran, as detailed in GOV/2025/25, constitute non-compliance with its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement …” … further reiterated that “consistent with Article 19 of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement, the Agency is not able to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded under the Agreement to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices” … Due to the lack of information about, and access to, any of Iran’s four declared enrichment facilities to perform verification activities the Agency cannot provide any information on the current size, composition or whereabouts of the stockpile of enriched uranium in Iran or whether Iran has suspended all enrichment related activities, including R&D. … The Board considered the Director General’s report and, on 12 June 2025, adopted resolution GOV/2025/38 … Since Iran stopped provisionally applying its Additional Protocol in February 2021, the Agency has not been able, inter alia, to conduct complementary access to any sites or other locations in Iran.”Hide quote

   These attacks took place between 13–24 June 2025. On 22 June 2025, the United States conducted attacks on three of Iran’s nuclear facilities. The Agency stopped conducting verification activities in Iran at the commencement of the military attacks and, by the end of June 2025, had decided to withdraw all of its inspectors from Iran for safety reasons. … On 2 July 2025, the President of Iran signed into force a law suspending cooperation with the Agency. … On 9 September 2025, the Director General signed an agreement with the Foreign Minister of Iran, Dr Abbas Araghchi, in Cairo – referred to as the ‘Cairo agreement’ … Iran, in a letter of 20 November 2025, informed the Director General that the Cairo agreement was “no longer valid and shall henceforth be regarded as terminated”. … The Director General was in attendance at the indirect negotiations between the United States of America and Iran that took place on 17 and 26 February 2026 in Geneva, in which he provided advice on issues relevant to the verification of Iran’s nuclear programme. On 28 February 2026, the United States of America and Israel launched further military attacks on Iran, including on the sites of some nuclear facilities. Consequently, the Agency stopped conducting verification activities in Iran. … On 1–3 June 2026, the Agency conducted an inspection and DIV at the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP) … On 10 June 2026, the Board adopted resolution GOV/2026/40 in which, inter alia, it: recalled that “Iran’s many failures to provide the Agency with full and timely cooperation regarding undeclared nuclear material and activities at multiple undeclared locations in Iran, as detailed in GOV/2025/25, constitute non-compliance with its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement …” … further reiterated that “consistent with Article 19 of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement, the Agency is not able to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded under the Agreement to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices” … Due to the lack of information about, and access to, any of Iran’s four declared enrichment facilities to perform verification activities the Agency cannot provide any information on the current size, composition or whereabouts of the stockpile of enriched uranium in Iran or whether Iran has suspended all enrichment related activities, including R&D. … The Board considered the Director General’s report and, on 12 June 2025, adopted resolution GOV/2025/38 … Since Iran stopped provisionally applying its Additional Protocol in February 2021, the Agency has not been able, inter alia, to conduct complementary access to any sites or other locations in Iran.

2. Analysis of IAEA Iran Verification and Monitoring and NPT Safeguards Reports — June 2026

   Institute for Science and International Security (David Albright, Sarah Burkhard, Spencer Faragasso, Andrea Stricker), 2026-06-09 · complicates

   “The IAEA conducted an inspection and a DIV between June 1-3, 2026, at Bushehr. The IAEA stated in its February 2026 NPT report that “the Agency had conducted inspections/DIVs at 7 of the 13 unaffected facilities, but had yet to conduct inspections/DIVs at any of the 8 affected facilities or at the Isfahan Fuel Enrichment Plant).” … With the massive destruction of its gas centrifuge program and installed centrifuge cascades, for the first time in 20 years, Iran has no identifiable route to produce weapon-grade uranium (WGU) in its centrifuge enrichment plants. … While before the strikes, Iran could have made its first non-missile deliverable nuclear weapon within months, it would need more than a year today and face significant new uncertainties in knowing whether the weapon would work. Director General Grossi stated after the June 2025 strikes that the IAEA believes that most of the HEU, but less than 70 percent of the stock, is located inside the Esfahan tunnel complex. … The IAEA emphasizes that “Iran is the only NPT non-nuclear-weapon State to have produced and accumulated uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 …” … no breakout estimate to WGU is included in the Institute’s analysis of the IAEA report, since to do so would require unsubstantiated speculation”Hide quote

   The IAEA conducted an inspection and a DIV between June 1-3, 2026, at Bushehr. The IAEA stated in its February 2026 NPT report that “the Agency had conducted inspections/DIVs at 7 of the 13 unaffected facilities, but had yet to conduct inspections/DIVs at any of the 8 affected facilities or at the Isfahan Fuel Enrichment Plant).” … With the massive destruction of its gas centrifuge program and installed centrifuge cascades, for the first time in 20 years, Iran has no identifiable route to produce weapon-grade uranium (WGU) in its centrifuge enrichment plants. … While before the strikes, Iran could have made its first non-missile deliverable nuclear weapon within months, it would need more than a year today and face significant new uncertainties in knowing whether the weapon would work. Director General Grossi stated after the June 2025 strikes that the IAEA believes that most of the HEU, but less than 70 percent of the stock, is located inside the Esfahan tunnel complex. … The IAEA emphasizes that “Iran is the only NPT non-nuclear-weapon State to have produced and accumulated uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 …” … no breakout estimate to WGU is included in the Institute’s analysis of the IAEA report, since to do so would require unsubstantiated speculation

3. Iran and Nuclear Weapons Production (IF12106)

   Congressional Research Service (Paul K. Kerr), via EveryCRSReport, 2026-10-13 · complicates

   “The status of Iran’s nuclear program is unclear. … A November 2024 ODNI report explained that Iran’s fissile material stockpile would, if further enriched, have been sufficient for “more than a dozen nuclear weapons.” The U.S. government estimated that Iran would have needed as little as one week to produce enough weapons-grade HEU for one nuclear weapon, according to a State Department (DOS) official in March 2022. The Defense Intelligence Agency assessed in May 2025 that Iran would have needed “probably less than one week” to produce this amount of HEU. … HEU used in nuclear weapons typically contains about 90% u-235. … The latter two categories of UF6 are of particular concern because relatively little additional effort would be necessary to produce weapons-grade HEU using UF6 containing these amounts of u-235. … Iran’s Foreign Minister Seyed Abbas Araghchi stated on March 15, 2026, that the country’s enriched uranium is “under the rubble” created by the June 2025 attacks on Iran’s enrichment facilities. Iran has “no plan” to recover this material, he added. In 2026, U.S. and Iranian officials have said that Iran has not resumed enriching uranium. … Grossi stated on March 4, 2026, that the IAEA in June 2025 had no “information indicating that there was a structured systematic [Iranian] program to build or to construct a nuclear weapon.” … The 2024 ATA observed that “Iran is not currently undertaking the key nuclear weapons-development activities necessary to produce a testable nuclear device.” … The 2026 ATA states that the United States is “monitoring Iranian WMD-related capabilities and actions following” the 2026 attacks; the ATA does not address Iran’s nuclear weapons activities. … A June 2026 memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the United States and Iran states that “Iran reaffirms that it shall not procure or develop nuclear weapons.” … The current assessed timeline is unclear. … Neither the U.S. government nor the IAEA have publicly described evidence that Iran is conducting covert fissile material production nuclear activities.”Hide quote

   The status of Iran’s nuclear program is unclear. … A November 2024 ODNI report explained that Iran’s fissile material stockpile would, if further enriched, have been sufficient for “more than a dozen nuclear weapons.” The U.S. government estimated that Iran would have needed as little as one week to produce enough weapons-grade HEU for one nuclear weapon, according to a State Department (DOS) official in March 2022. The Defense Intelligence Agency assessed in May 2025 that Iran would have needed “probably less than one week” to produce this amount of HEU. … HEU used in nuclear weapons typically contains about 90% u-235. … The latter two categories of UF6 are of particular concern because relatively little additional effort would be necessary to produce weapons-grade HEU using UF6 containing these amounts of u-235. … Iran’s Foreign Minister Seyed Abbas Araghchi stated on March 15, 2026, that the country’s enriched uranium is “under the rubble” created by the June 2025 attacks on Iran’s enrichment facilities. Iran has “no plan” to recover this material, he added. In 2026, U.S. and Iranian officials have said that Iran has not resumed enriching uranium. … Grossi stated on March 4, 2026, that the IAEA in June 2025 had no “information indicating that there was a structured systematic [Iranian] program to build or to construct a nuclear weapon.” … The 2024 ATA observed that “Iran is not currently undertaking the key nuclear weapons-development activities necessary to produce a testable nuclear device.” … The 2026 ATA states that the United States is “monitoring Iranian WMD-related capabilities and actions following” the 2026 attacks; the ATA does not address Iran’s nuclear weapons activities. … A June 2026 memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the United States and Iran states that “Iran reaffirms that it shall not procure or develop nuclear weapons.” … The current assessed timeline is unclear. … Neither the U.S. government nor the IAEA have publicly described evidence that Iran is conducting covert fissile material production nuclear activities.

4. Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, 2025

   Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2025-03 · complicates

   “We continue to assess Iran is not building a nuclear weapon and that Khamenei has not reauthorized the nuclear weapons program he suspended in 2003, though pressure has probably built on him to do so. In the past year, there has been an erosion of a decades-long taboo on discussing nuclear weapons in public that has emboldened nuclear weapons advocates within Iran's decisionmaking apparatus.”Hide quote

   We continue to assess Iran is not building a nuclear weapon and that Khamenei has not reauthorized the nuclear weapons program he suspended in 2003, though pressure has probably built on him to do so. In the past year, there has been an erosion of a decades-long taboo on discussing nuclear weapons in public that has emboldened nuclear weapons advocates within Iran's decisionmaking apparatus.

5. Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, 2026

   Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2026-03 · complicates

   “Prior to Operation Epic Fury, Iran was … intending to try to recover from the devastation of its nuclear infrastructure sustained during the 12-Day War, and refused to live up to its nuclear obligations with the IAEA, including refusing to allow IAEA access to key nuclear facilities. … We are monitoring Iranian WMD-related capabilities and actions following the initiation of Operation Epic Fury.”Hide quote

   Prior to Operation Epic Fury, Iran was … intending to try to recover from the devastation of its nuclear infrastructure sustained during the 12-Day War, and refused to live up to its nuclear obligations with the IAEA, including refusing to allow IAEA access to key nuclear facilities. … We are monitoring Iranian WMD-related capabilities and actions following the initiation of Operation Epic Fury.

6. NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran, GOV/2025/25, paras 17, 77–81, 86

   International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2025-05-31 · supports

   “these three locations, and other possible related locations, were part of an undeclared structured nuclear programme carried out by Iran until the early 2000s and that some activities used undeclared nuclear material. … the Agency concludes that approximately 10 kg of natural uranium metal, which had not been declared by Iran, was available to the Applied Physics Institute (API) operating at Lavisan-Shian in the period 2002-2003. … Iran retained unknown nuclear material and/or heavily contaminated equipment, and other assets, arising from the former undeclared structured nuclear programme, at Turquzabad in the period 2009 until 2018, after which items were removed from the location. … The Agency has no credible indications of an ongoing, undeclared structured nuclear programme of the type described above in Iran and notes the statements of the highest officials in Iran that the use of nuclear weapons is incompatible with Islamic Law. … the fact that Iran is the only non-nuclear-weapon State in the world that is producing and accumulating uranium enriched to 60% remains a matter of serious concern … has sanitised locations as listed in this report, which has impeded Agency verification activities. … the Agency will not be in a position to provide assurance that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful.”Hide quote

   these three locations, and other possible related locations, were part of an undeclared structured nuclear programme carried out by Iran until the early 2000s and that some activities used undeclared nuclear material. … the Agency concludes that approximately 10 kg of natural uranium metal, which had not been declared by Iran, was available to the Applied Physics Institute (API) operating at Lavisan-Shian in the period 2002-2003. … Iran retained unknown nuclear material and/or heavily contaminated equipment, and other assets, arising from the former undeclared structured nuclear programme, at Turquzabad in the period 2009 until 2018, after which items were removed from the location. … The Agency has no credible indications of an ongoing, undeclared structured nuclear programme of the type described above in Iran and notes the statements of the highest officials in Iran that the use of nuclear weapons is incompatible with Islamic Law. … the fact that Iran is the only non-nuclear-weapon State in the world that is producing and accumulating uranium enriched to 60% remains a matter of serious concern … has sanitised locations as listed in this report, which has impeded Agency verification activities. … the Agency will not be in a position to provide assurance that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful.

7. Final Assessment on Past and Present Outstanding Issues regarding Iran’s Nuclear Programme, GOV/2015/68, para 87

   International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2015-12-02 · complicates

   “The Agency assesses that a range of activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device were conducted in Iran prior to the end of 2003 as a coordinated effort, and some activities took place after 2003. The Agency also assesses that these activities did not advance beyond feasibility and scientific studies, and the acquisition of certain relevant technical competences and capabilities. The Agency has no credible indications of activities in Iran relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device after 2009.”Hide quote

   The Agency assesses that a range of activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device were conducted in Iran prior to the end of 2003 as a coordinated effort, and some activities took place after 2003. The Agency also assesses that these activities did not advance beyond feasibility and scientific studies, and the acquisition of certain relevant technical competences and capabilities. The Agency has no credible indications of activities in Iran relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device after 2009.

8. Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, GOV/2011/65, Annex para 53

   International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2011-11-08 · supports

   “After assessing carefully and critically the extensive information available to it, the Agency finds the information to be, overall, credible. The information indicates that Iran has carried out activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device. The information also indicates that prior to the end of 2003, these activities took place under a structured programme, and that some activities may still be ongoing.”Hide quote

   After assessing carefully and critically the extensive information available to it, the Agency finds the information to be, overall, credible. The information indicates that Iran has carried out activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device. The information also indicates that prior to the end of 2003, these activities took place under a structured programme, and that some activities may still be ongoing.

9. Timeline of Nuclear Diplomacy With Iran

   Arms Control Association, 2023-01 · supports

   “Iran is meeting its nuclear obligations, although it slightly exceeded a cap set on the stockpile of heavy water … bringing Iran back within the limit … May 8, 2018: President Trump announces that he is withdrawing the United States from the JCPOA … May 8, 2019: Iran announces that it will no longer be bound by stockpiles limitations … July 1, 2019: Iran announces that it breached the 300 kilogram limit … The IAEA confirms that Iran has exceeded the limit. … April 13, 2021: Iran notifies the International Atomic Energy Agency that it has begun to boost enrichment levels to 60 percent … in response to the April 11 attack.”Hide quote

   Iran is meeting its nuclear obligations, although it slightly exceeded a cap set on the stockpile of heavy water … bringing Iran back within the limit … May 8, 2018: President Trump announces that he is withdrawing the United States from the JCPOA … May 8, 2019: Iran announces that it will no longer be bound by stockpiles limitations … July 1, 2019: Iran announces that it breached the 300 kilogram limit … The IAEA confirms that Iran has exceeded the limit. … April 13, 2021: Iran notifies the International Atomic Energy Agency that it has begun to boost enrichment levels to 60 percent … in response to the April 11 attack.

10. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) at a Glance

    Arms Control Association, 2025-02 · supports

    “For 10 years operating centrifuges reduced to 5,060 IR-1 machines … For 15 years level of uranium enrichment capped at 3.67 percent uranium-235 … For 15 years the stockpile is kept under 300 kilograms of 3.67 percent enriched uranium in total (all forms) … January 16, 2016, Implementation Day”Hide quote

    For 10 years operating centrifuges reduced to 5,060 IR-1 machines … For 15 years level of uranium enrichment capped at 3.67 percent uranium-235 … For 15 years the stockpile is kept under 300 kilograms of 3.67 percent enriched uranium in total (all forms) … January 16, 2016, Implementation Day

11. Hegseth and Caine Hold a Briefing on Iran (transcript)

    Rev (transcript of a US Department of Defense briefing), 2026-04-08 · complicates

    “nearly 80% of Iran's nuclear industrial base was hit, further degrading their attempts to attain a nuclear weapon. … So right now it's buried and we're watching it. We know exactly what they have”Hide quote

    nearly 80% of Iran's nuclear industrial base was hit, further degrading their attempts to attain a nuclear weapon. … So right now it's buried and we're watching it. We know exactly what they have

12. Oversights Mar Low-End Estimate of Tehran's Nuclear Weapons Timeline

    Foundation for Defense of Democracies (Andrea Stricker), 2026-05-06 · complicates

    “U.S. intelligence assessments have concluded that Iran is now 9 to 12 months away from being able to build a nuclear weapon, according to a Reuters report. … In July 2025, the Pentagon estimated that the June strikes had pushed Iran back to roughly two years … prior to this conflict and the 12-Day War, U.S. intelligence reportedly placed Iran's breakout time at three to six months. … Any realistic assessment accounting for all these setbacks would place the timeline at two and a half years at least, absent foreign assistance.”Hide quote

    U.S. intelligence assessments have concluded that Iran is now 9 to 12 months away from being able to build a nuclear weapon, according to a Reuters report. … In July 2025, the Pentagon estimated that the June strikes had pushed Iran back to roughly two years … prior to this conflict and the 12-Day War, U.S. intelligence reportedly placed Iran's breakout time at three to six months. … Any realistic assessment accounting for all these setbacks would place the timeline at two and a half years at least, absent foreign assistance.

13. NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran, Board resolution GOV/2026/40

    International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors, via Iran Watch, 2026-06-10 · supports

    “The resolution was adopted with 21 in favour, 3 against and 10 abstentions.”Hide quote

    The resolution was adopted with 21 in favour, 3 against and 10 abstentions.

14. NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran, Board resolution GOV/2026/61

    International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors, via Iran Watch, 2026-09-09 · supports

    “The resolution was adopted with 23 in favour, 3 against and 8 abstentions. … Requests the Director General to report this resolution and the previously adopted resolutions contained in GOV/2025/38 and GOV/2026/40, as well as the Director General’s report contained in GOV/2026/50, to all Members of the Agency and to the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations”Hide quote

    The resolution was adopted with 23 in favour, 3 against and 8 abstentions. … Requests the Director General to report this resolution and the previously adopted resolutions contained in GOV/2025/38 and GOV/2026/40, as well as the Director General’s report contained in GOV/2026/50, to all Members of the Agency and to the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations

15. Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/INF/2019/8

    International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2019-07-01 · supports

    “On 1 July 2019, the Agency verified that the quantity of Iran’s uranium enriched up to 3.67% U-235 was 205.0 kg, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission. Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile, therefore, has exceeded 300 kg of UF6 enriched up to 3.67% U-235 (or the equivalent in different chemical forms), as the quantity of 300 kg of UF6 corresponds to 202.8 kg of uranium.”Hide quote

    On 1 July 2019, the Agency verified that the quantity of Iran’s uranium enriched up to 3.67% U-235 was 205.0 kg, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission. Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile, therefore, has exceeded 300 kg of UF6 enriched up to 3.67% U-235 (or the equivalent in different chemical forms), as the quantity of 300 kg of UF6 corresponds to 202.8 kg of uranium.

16. Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/INF/2019/9

    International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2019-07-08 · supports

    “On 8 July 2019, the Agency, using its on-line enrichment monitors, verified that Iran was enriching UF6 above 3.67% U-235 at FEP.”Hide quote

    On 8 July 2019, the Agency, using its on-line enrichment monitors, verified that Iran was enriching UF6 above 3.67% U-235 at FEP.

17. Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2017/10

    International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2017-02-24 · supports

    “Iran has not enriched uranium above 3.67% U-235 (para. 28). … Throughout the reporting period, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile has not exceeded 300 kg of UF6 enriched up to 3.67% U-235 (or the equivalent in different chemical forms) (para. 56). … As of 18 February 2017, the quantity of Iran’s uranium enriched up to 3.67% U-235 was 101.7 kg, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission.”Hide quote

    Iran has not enriched uranium above 3.67% U-235 (para. 28). … Throughout the reporting period, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile has not exceeded 300 kg of UF6 enriched up to 3.67% U-235 (or the equivalent in different chemical forms) (para. 56). … As of 18 February 2017, the quantity of Iran’s uranium enriched up to 3.67% U-235 was 101.7 kg, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission.

18. Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2017/24

    International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2017-06-02 · supports

    “Iran has not enriched uranium above 3.67% U-235 (para. 28). … Throughout the reporting period, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile has not exceeded 300 kg of UF6 enriched up to 3.67% U-235 (or the equivalent in different chemical forms) (para. 56). … As of 27 May 2017, the quantity of Iran’s uranium enriched up to 3.67% U-235 was 79.8 kg, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission.”Hide quote

    Iran has not enriched uranium above 3.67% U-235 (para. 28). … Throughout the reporting period, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile has not exceeded 300 kg of UF6 enriched up to 3.67% U-235 (or the equivalent in different chemical forms) (para. 56). … As of 27 May 2017, the quantity of Iran’s uranium enriched up to 3.67% U-235 was 79.8 kg, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission.

19. Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2017/35

    International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2017-08-31 · supports

    “Iran has not enriched uranium above 3.67% U-235 (para. 28). … Throughout the reporting period, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile has not exceeded 300 kg of UF6 enriched up to 3.67% U-235 (or the equivalent in different chemical forms) (para. 56). … As of 21 August 2017, the quantity of Iran’s uranium enriched up to 3.67% U-235 was 88.4 kg, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission.”Hide quote

    Iran has not enriched uranium above 3.67% U-235 (para. 28). … Throughout the reporting period, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile has not exceeded 300 kg of UF6 enriched up to 3.67% U-235 (or the equivalent in different chemical forms) (para. 56). … As of 21 August 2017, the quantity of Iran’s uranium enriched up to 3.67% U-235 was 88.4 kg, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission.

20. Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2017/48

    International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2017-11-13 · supports

    “Iran has not enriched uranium above 3.67% U-235 (para. 28). … Throughout the reporting period, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile has not exceeded 300 kg of UF6 enriched up to 3.67% U-235 (or the equivalent in different chemical forms) (para. 56). … As of 5 November 2017, the quantity of Iran’s uranium enriched up to 3.67% U-235 was 96.7 kg, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission.”Hide quote

    Iran has not enriched uranium above 3.67% U-235 (para. 28). … Throughout the reporting period, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile has not exceeded 300 kg of UF6 enriched up to 3.67% U-235 (or the equivalent in different chemical forms) (para. 56). … As of 5 November 2017, the quantity of Iran’s uranium enriched up to 3.67% U-235 was 96.7 kg, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission.

21. Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2018/7

    International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2018-02-22 · supports

    “Iran has not enriched uranium above 3.67% U-235 (para. 28). … Throughout the reporting period, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile has not exceeded 300 kg of UF6 enriched up to 3.67% U-235 (or the equivalent in different chemical forms) (para. 56). … As of 12 February 2018, the quantity of Iran’s uranium enriched up to 3.67% U-235 was 109.5 kg, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission.”Hide quote

    Iran has not enriched uranium above 3.67% U-235 (para. 28). … Throughout the reporting period, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile has not exceeded 300 kg of UF6 enriched up to 3.67% U-235 (or the equivalent in different chemical forms) (para. 56). … As of 12 February 2018, the quantity of Iran’s uranium enriched up to 3.67% U-235 was 109.5 kg, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission.

22. Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2018/24

    International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2018-05-24 · supports

    “Iran has not enriched uranium above 3.67% U-235 (para. 28). … Throughout the reporting period, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile has not exceeded 300 kg of UF6 enriched up to 3.67% U-235 (or the equivalent in different chemical forms) (para. 56). … As of 14 May 2018, the quantity of Iran’s uranium enriched up to 3.67% U-235 was 123.9 kg, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission.”Hide quote

    Iran has not enriched uranium above 3.67% U-235 (para. 28). … Throughout the reporting period, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile has not exceeded 300 kg of UF6 enriched up to 3.67% U-235 (or the equivalent in different chemical forms) (para. 56). … As of 14 May 2018, the quantity of Iran’s uranium enriched up to 3.67% U-235 was 123.9 kg, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission.

23. Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2018/33

    International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2018-08-30 · supports

    “Iran has not enriched uranium above 3.67% U-235 (para. 28). … Throughout the reporting period, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile has not exceeded 300 kg of UF6 enriched up to 3.67% U-235 (or the equivalent in different chemical forms) (para. 56). … As of 18 August 2018, the quantity of Iran’s uranium enriched up to 3.67% U-235 was 139.4 kg, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission. … The Agency has continued to evaluate Iran’s declarations under the Additional Protocol, and has conducted complementary accesses under the Additional Protocol to all the sites and locations in Iran which it needed to visit.”Hide quote

    Iran has not enriched uranium above 3.67% U-235 (para. 28). … Throughout the reporting period, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile has not exceeded 300 kg of UF6 enriched up to 3.67% U-235 (or the equivalent in different chemical forms) (para. 56). … As of 18 August 2018, the quantity of Iran’s uranium enriched up to 3.67% U-235 was 139.4 kg, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission. … The Agency has continued to evaluate Iran’s declarations under the Additional Protocol, and has conducted complementary accesses under the Additional Protocol to all the sites and locations in Iran which it needed to visit.

24. Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2018/47

    International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2018-11-12 · supports

    “Iran has not enriched uranium above 3.67% U-235 (para. 28). … Throughout the reporting period, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile has not exceeded 300 kg of UF6 enriched up to 3.67% U-235 (or the equivalent in different chemical forms) (para. 56). … As of 4 November 2018, the quantity of Iran’s uranium enriched up to 3.67% U-235 was 149.4 kg, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission.”Hide quote

    Iran has not enriched uranium above 3.67% U-235 (para. 28). … Throughout the reporting period, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile has not exceeded 300 kg of UF6 enriched up to 3.67% U-235 (or the equivalent in different chemical forms) (para. 56). … As of 4 November 2018, the quantity of Iran’s uranium enriched up to 3.67% U-235 was 149.4 kg, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission.

25. Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2019/10

    International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2019-02-22 · supports

    “Iran has not enriched uranium above 3.67% U-235 (para. 28). … Throughout the reporting period, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile has not exceeded 300 kg of UF6 enriched up to 3.67% U-235 (or the equivalent in different chemical forms) (para. 56). … As of 16 February 2019, the quantity of Iran’s uranium enriched up to 3.67% U-235 was 163.8 kg, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission.”Hide quote

    Iran has not enriched uranium above 3.67% U-235 (para. 28). … Throughout the reporting period, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile has not exceeded 300 kg of UF6 enriched up to 3.67% U-235 (or the equivalent in different chemical forms) (para. 56). … As of 16 February 2019, the quantity of Iran’s uranium enriched up to 3.67% U-235 was 163.8 kg, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission.

26. Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2019/21

    International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2019-05-31 · supports

    “Iran has not enriched uranium above 3.67% U-235 (para. 28). … Throughout the reporting period, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile has not exceeded 300 kg of UF6 enriched up to 3.67% U-235 (or the equivalent in different chemical forms) (para. 56). … As of 20 May 2019, the quantity of Iran’s uranium enriched up to 3.67% U-235 was 174.1 kg, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission.”Hide quote

    Iran has not enriched uranium above 3.67% U-235 (para. 28). … Throughout the reporting period, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile has not exceeded 300 kg of UF6 enriched up to 3.67% U-235 (or the equivalent in different chemical forms) (para. 56). … As of 20 May 2019, the quantity of Iran’s uranium enriched up to 3.67% U-235 was 174.1 kg, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission.

27. Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2019/32

    International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2019-08-30 · supports

    “As of 19 August 2019, the Agency verified that Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 241.6 kg, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission.”Hide quote

    As of 19 August 2019, the Agency verified that Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 241.6 kg, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission.

28. Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2019/55

    International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2019-11-11 · supports

    “As of 3 November 2019, the Agency verified that, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 372.3 kg (+130.7 kg since the Acting Director General’s previous quarterly report).”Hide quote

    As of 3 November 2019, the Agency verified that, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 372.3 kg (+130.7 kg since the Acting Director General’s previous quarterly report).

29. Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2020/5

    International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2020-03-03 · supports

    “As of 19 February 2020, the Agency verified that, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile, comprising enriched uranium produced at FEP, PFEP and FFEP was 1020.9 kg (+648.6 kg since the previous quarterly report).”Hide quote

    As of 19 February 2020, the Agency verified that, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile, comprising enriched uranium produced at FEP, PFEP and FFEP was 1020.9 kg (+648.6 kg since the previous quarterly report).

30. Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2020/26

    International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2020-06-05 · supports

    “As of 20 May 2020, the Agency verified that, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile, comprising enriched uranium produced at FEP, PFEP and FFEP was 1571.6 kg (+550.7 kg since the previous quarterly report).”Hide quote

    As of 20 May 2020, the Agency verified that, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile, comprising enriched uranium produced at FEP, PFEP and FFEP was 1571.6 kg (+550.7 kg since the previous quarterly report).

31. Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2020/41

    International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2020-09-04 · supports

    “As of 25 August 2020, the Agency verified that, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile, comprising enriched uranium produced at FEP, PFEP and FFEP was 2105.4 kg (+533.8 kg since the previous quarterly report).”Hide quote

    As of 25 August 2020, the Agency verified that, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile, comprising enriched uranium produced at FEP, PFEP and FFEP was 2105.4 kg (+533.8 kg since the previous quarterly report).

32. Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2020/51

    International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2020-11-11 · supports

    “As of 2 November 2020, the Agency verified that, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile, comprising enriched uranium produced at FEP, PFEP and FFEP was 2442.9 kg (+337.5 kg since the previous quarterly report).”Hide quote

    As of 2 November 2020, the Agency verified that, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile, comprising enriched uranium produced at FEP, PFEP and FFEP was 2442.9 kg (+337.5 kg since the previous quarterly report).

33. Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2021/10

    International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2021-02-23 · supports

    “As of 16 February 2021, the Agency verified that, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile, comprising enriched uranium produced at FEP, PFEP and FFEP was 2967.8 kg (+524.9 kg since the previous quarterly report).”Hide quote

    As of 16 February 2021, the Agency verified that, based on the JCPOA and decisions of the Joint Commission, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile, comprising enriched uranium produced at FEP, PFEP and FFEP was 2967.8 kg (+524.9 kg since the previous quarterly report).

34. Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2021/28

    International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2021-05-31 · supports

    “For this reporting period, the Agency has not been able to verify Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile, comprising enriched uranium produced at FEP, PFEP and FFEP. … the Agency has estimated that, as of 22 May 2021, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 3241.0 kg (+273.2 kg since the previous quarterly report). … 2.4 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235. … has been enriching UF6 up to 60% U-235 since 17 April 2021. … Since 23 February 2021, while centrifuges and associated infrastructure in storage remained under continuous monitoring by Agency surveillance equipment, the Agency has not had access to the data and recordings collected by its equipment (paras 29, 47, 48 and 70).”Hide quote

    For this reporting period, the Agency has not been able to verify Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile, comprising enriched uranium produced at FEP, PFEP and FFEP. … the Agency has estimated that, as of 22 May 2021, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 3241.0 kg (+273.2 kg since the previous quarterly report). … 2.4 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235. … has been enriching UF6 up to 60% U-235 since 17 April 2021. … Since 23 February 2021, while centrifuges and associated infrastructure in storage remained under continuous monitoring by Agency surveillance equipment, the Agency has not had access to the data and recordings collected by its equipment (paras 29, 47, 48 and 70).

35. Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2021/39

    International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2021-09-07 · supports

    “… the Agency has estimated that, as of 30 August 2021, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 2441.3 kg. This figure represents a decrease of 799.7 kg since the previous quarterly report, which is due to the use of uranium enriched up to 2% U-235 to produce uranium enriched up to 5% U-235. … 10.0 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (+7.6 kg).”Hide quote

    … the Agency has estimated that, as of 30 August 2021, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 2441.3 kg. This figure represents a decrease of 799.7 kg since the previous quarterly report, which is due to the use of uranium enriched up to 2% U-235 to produce uranium enriched up to 5% U-235. … 10.0 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (+7.6 kg).

36. Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2021/51

    International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2021-11-17 · supports

    “… the Agency has estimated that, as of 6 November 2021, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 2489.7 kg. … 17.7 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (+7.7 kg).”Hide quote

    … the Agency has estimated that, as of 6 November 2021, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 2489.7 kg. … 17.7 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (+7.7 kg).

37. Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2022/4

    International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2022-03-03 · supports

    “… the Agency has estimated that, as of 19 February 2022, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 3197.1 kg. … 33.2 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (+15.5 kg).”Hide quote

    … the Agency has estimated that, as of 19 February 2022, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 3197.1 kg. … 33.2 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (+15.5 kg).

38. Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2022/24

    International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2022-05-30 · supports

    “… the Agency has estimated that, as of 15 May 2022, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 3809.3 kg. … 43.1 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (+9.9 kg).”Hide quote

    … the Agency has estimated that, as of 15 May 2022, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 3809.3 kg. … 43.1 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (+9.9 kg).

39. Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2022/39

    International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2022-09-07 · supports

    “… the Agency has estimated that, as of 21 August 2022, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 3940.9 kg. … 55.6 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (+12.5 kg).”Hide quote

    … the Agency has estimated that, as of 21 August 2022, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 3940.9 kg. … 55.6 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (+12.5 kg).

40. Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2022/62

    International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2022-11-10 · supports

    “… the Agency has estimated that, as of 22 October 2022, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 3673.7 kg. … 62.3 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (+6.7 kg).”Hide quote

    … the Agency has estimated that, as of 22 October 2022, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 3673.7 kg. … 62.3 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (+6.7 kg).

41. Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2023/8

    International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2023-02-28 · supports

    “… the Agency has estimated that, as of 12 February 2023, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 3760.8 kg. … 87.5 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (+25.2 kg).”Hide quote

    … the Agency has estimated that, as of 12 February 2023, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 3760.8 kg. … 87.5 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (+25.2 kg).

42. Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2023/24

    International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2023-05-31 · supports

    “… the Agency has estimated that, as of 13 May 2023, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 4744.5 kg. … 114.1 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (+26.6 kg).”Hide quote

    … the Agency has estimated that, as of 13 May 2023, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 4744.5 kg. … 114.1 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (+26.6 kg).

43. Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2023/39

    International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2023-09-04 · supports

    “… the Agency has estimated that, as of 19 August 2023, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 3795.5 kg. … 121.6 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (+7.5 kg).”Hide quote

    … the Agency has estimated that, as of 19 August 2023, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 3795.5 kg. … 121.6 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (+7.5 kg).

44. Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2023/57

    International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2023-11-15 · supports

    “… the Agency has estimated that, as of 28 October 2023, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 4486.8 kg. … 128.3 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (+6.7 kg).”Hide quote

    … the Agency has estimated that, as of 28 October 2023, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 4486.8 kg. … 128.3 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (+6.7 kg).

45. Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2024/7

    International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2024-02-26 · supports

    “… the Agency has estimated that, as of 10 February 2024, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 5525.5 kg. … 121.5 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (–6.8 kg).”Hide quote

    … the Agency has estimated that, as of 10 February 2024, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 5525.5 kg. … 121.5 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (–6.8 kg).

46. Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2024/26

    International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2024-05-27 · supports

    “… the Agency has estimated that, as of 11 May 2024, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 6201.3 kg. … 142.1 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (+20.6 kg).”Hide quote

    … the Agency has estimated that, as of 11 May 2024, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 6201.3 kg. … 142.1 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (+20.6 kg).

47. Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2024/41

    International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2024-08-29 · supports

    “… the Agency has estimated that, as of 17 August 2024, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 5751.8 kg. … 164.7 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (+22.6 kg).”Hide quote

    … the Agency has estimated that, as of 17 August 2024, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 5751.8 kg. … 164.7 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (+22.6 kg).

48. Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2024/61

    International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2024-11-19 · supports

    “… the Agency has estimated that, as of 26 October 2024, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 6604.4 kg. … 182.3 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (+17.6 kg).”Hide quote

    … the Agency has estimated that, as of 26 October 2024, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 6604.4 kg. … 182.3 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (+17.6 kg).

49. Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2025/8

    International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2025-02-26 · supports

    “… the Agency has estimated that, as of 8 February 2025, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 8294.4 kg. … 274.8 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (+92.5 kg).”Hide quote

    … the Agency has estimated that, as of 8 February 2025, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 8294.4 kg. … 274.8 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (+92.5 kg).

50. Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of United Nations Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, GOV/2026/50, para 27 and footnote 17

    International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2026-09-01 · supports

    “Based on the information provided by Iran up to 12 June 2025, previous Agency verification activities and estimates based on the past operating records of the relevant declared facilities, the Agency’s estimate of Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile, as of 13 June 2025, was 9874.9 kg, comprising 9040.5 kg of uranium in the form of UF6 and 834.4 kg of uranium in other forms. The total enriched uranium stockpile of 9040.5 kg in the form of UF6 comprised: 8599.6 kg of LEU – 2391.1 kg of uranium enriched up to 2% U-235, 6024.4 kg of uranium enriched up to 5% U-235, and 184.1 kg of uranium enriched up to 20% U-235; and 440.9 kg of HEU – uranium enriched up to 60% U-235. … The Agency has verified 432.9 kg of this 440.9 kg of uranium in the form of UF6 enriched up to 60% U-235.”Hide quote

    Based on the information provided by Iran up to 12 June 2025, previous Agency verification activities and estimates based on the past operating records of the relevant declared facilities, the Agency’s estimate of Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile, as of 13 June 2025, was 9874.9 kg, comprising 9040.5 kg of uranium in the form of UF6 and 834.4 kg of uranium in other forms. The total enriched uranium stockpile of 9040.5 kg in the form of UF6 comprised: 8599.6 kg of LEU – 2391.1 kg of uranium enriched up to 2% U-235, 6024.4 kg of uranium enriched up to 5% U-235, and 184.1 kg of uranium enriched up to 20% U-235; and 440.9 kg of HEU – uranium enriched up to 60% U-235. … The Agency has verified 432.9 kg of this 440.9 kg of uranium in the form of UF6 enriched up to 60% U-235.

51. Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), GOV/2025/24, paras 26–27

    International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2025-05-31 · supports

    “the Agency has estimated that, as of 17 May 2025, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 9247.6 kg. This figure represents an increase of 953.2 kg since the previous quarterly report. … 408.6 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (+133.8 kg).”Hide quote

    the Agency has estimated that, as of 17 May 2025, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 9247.6 kg. This figure represents an increase of 953.2 kg since the previous quarterly report. … 408.6 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235 (+133.8 kg).