Absentee and Mail Ballot Fraud and Manipulation of the Count in the US, 1936–2026
Organised absentee-ballot schemes have voided US elections; each known case was local, caught and rerun, but only detected fraud can be counted, so the record shows neither how common nor how rare it is. [1][3][9][11]
Elections voided or overturned in Heritage's fraud list, by what was found
Every election-level voiding, overturning or court-ordered rerun in the Heritage Foundation's Election Fraud Map data file (archived July 2026), grouped by what the court or board found. Cases are local and state legislative races and one congressional seat, 1992–2023.
Elections voided or overturned
- Mainly absentee or mail ballots16 · 50%
- Absentee or mail ballots, plus other illegal votes5 · 15.6%
- Ineligible or out-of-district voters, or ballot order8 · 25%
- Votes ruled invalid, voting method not stated2 · 6.3%
- Vote buying1 · 3.1%
Source: The Heritage Foundation [10]; The Heritage Foundation [11]
Observations 3
Most elections voided in Heritage's list involved absentee ballots
Not every voided election was an absentee case
Eleven were not. Georgia's 28th House District in 2018 was overturned over out-of-district voters, Compton's 2001 election over ballot order, and Pembroke, North Carolina, redid elections over residency. 10
No voided election is in a long-standing all-mail state
None of the 32 is in Colorado, Oregon, Utah or Washington. Their entries are individuals, often casting a dead or absent relative's ballot; one Washington man was caught because his wife's signature did not match. 10
Subtleties
This is a hand count of a sample
Heritage tags its entries inconsistently, so each election was coded from Heritage's own description; the chart note lists every case. A different reader could place one or two mixed cases differently. Elections voided without a fraud finding, or never entered by Heritage, are missing. 11
About this data
Hand-coded by this report from the outcome text of every entry in the archived file (1,619 entries, outcomes dated 1982–2025) that describes a whole election being voided, overturned, decertified or rerun; several entries about one election are counted once. Heritage tags only 30 entries "Election Overturned" and its tags are inconsistent, so the tag alone was not used. Mainly absentee or mail (16): Philadelphia state senate special 1993; Fresno County school boards (entry 1993); Hardee County, Fla., sheriff 1992; Hialeah, Fla., mayor 1993; East Chicago 2003; Guntersville, Ala. (entry 2004); Weslaco, Tex., 2013; Perth Amboy, N.J. (entry 2015); Brighton, Ala., 2016; Missouri House District 78 primary 2016; Wetumpka, Ala. (entry 2017); Kaufman County, Tex., primary (entry 2018); North Carolina's 9th District 2018; Aberdeen, Miss., 2020; Paterson, N.J., 2020; Bridgeport, Conn., 2023. Absentee plus other illegal votes (5): Lincoln County, W.Va., 2010 (a county clerk also stuffed boxes); Mission, Tex. (entry 2018, also bribery and improper help at the polls); Vernon, Calif. (entry 2012); Harris County, Tex., 180th District Court (entry 2024); Caddo Parish, La., 2023. Ineligible or out-of-district voters, or ballot order (8): Woodlands Road Utility District, Tex. (entries 2012–2014); Compton, Calif., 2001 (ballot order and non-citizen registration); Pembroke, N.C., 2013 and 2015; Lumberton, N.C. (entry 2016); Kleberg County, Tex. (entry 2018); Georgia House District 28, 2018; Compton, Calif., 2021. Method not stated (2): Lorain, Ohio (entry 2015); Eatonville, Fla., 2020. Vote buying (1): Turkey Creek, La., 2014. An "entry" year is the year Heritage gives the record, used where the text does not date the election. Heritage's list is a sample, not a complete record.
Winning margin against ballots ruled invalid, voided elections involving absentee ballots
For each voided election involving absentee or mail ballots whose record gives both numbers: the winning margin as first counted, and the number of ballots a court ruled invalid or illegal.
Votes or ballots
- East Chicago, Ind., 2003 primary: winning margin278
- East Chicago: absentee votes ruled invalid155
- Vernon, Calif. (entry 2012): winning margin4
- Vernon: ballots ruled invalid7
- Weslaco, Tex., 2013: winning margin16
- Weslaco: ballots illegally cast30
- Perth Amboy, N.J. (entry 2015): winning margin10
- Perth Amboy: illegal absentee ballots (at least)13
- Wetumpka, Ala. (entry 2017): winning margin3
- Wetumpka: absentee ballots thrown out8
- Aberdeen, Miss., 2020 primary: winning margin37
- Aberdeen: absentee ballots not valid66
- Caddo Parish, La., 2023 runoff: winning margin1
- Caddo Parish: illegal votes (at least)11
- Harris County, Tex., judicial race (entry 2024): winning margin449
- Harris County: illegal votes1,482
Source: Supreme Court of Indiana (via Caselaw Access Project) [3]; The Heritage Foundation [10]
Observations 2
The voided races were small and very close
Courts voided results when tainted ballots could have changed the winner
In each charted case the invalid ballots outnumbered the margin, except East Chicago. There the Indiana Supreme Court ordered a new election anyway, holding that the scheme "perverted the absentee voting process", whether 155 or 100 ballots were invalid. 3
About this data
Selection: every election in the voided-elections chart that involved absentee or mail ballots and whose source gives both a margin and a count of invalid ballots. East Chicago is from the Indiana Supreme Court; the rest are from Heritage's entries. Wetumpka's "three" and "eight" are written as words in the source. Vernon's 7 is derived: five non-resident voters plus two ballots not properly mailed. Caddo's 11 include 7 involving mail ballots (2 double votes by mail and in person, 5 defective absentee ballots); Harris County's 1,482 are mostly residency problems (983 votes), with 48 absentee ballots. Other voided elections give a margin but no count of invalid ballots: North Carolina's 9th District (905; the board found the number of affected ballots could not be determined) and Bridgeport (251). Four non-absentee voidings give both numbers and show similar small margins (Eatonville 1, Kleberg County 6, Turkey Creek 4, Compton 2021 1).
Absentee fraud and in-person impersonation in two case compilations
Entries in Heritage's Election Fraud Map data file (outcomes 1982–2025) and alleged cases in News21's 2012 database (since 2000), for the two categories both compilations name.
Cases or entries
- Heritage: tagged absentee-ballot fraud387
- Heritage: tagged impersonation at the polls34
- News21: absentee ballot fraud491
- News21: in-person voter impersonation10
Source: The Heritage Foundation [10]; The Heritage Foundation [11]; News21 [12]
Observations 2
Both compilations list far more absentee fraud than impersonation
Detected cases are few against the mail ballots cast
Heritage's absentee entries span four decades. In the 2024 general election alone, 47,629,437 returned mail ballots were counted. 14 No source turns the case counts into a rate per ballot.
Subtleties
Detected fraud is a floor, not a measure
Three things keep fraud out of the counts:
- Pressure at home goes unreported. Britain's 2016 fraud review heard that people hide household undue influence for reasons like those of domestic-abuse victims. 16
- Checks miss some signing by others. Cobb County's 2020 audit found an envelope "mistakenly signed by the elector's spouse" that had passed. 15
- The lists are samples. Heritage calls its map "a sampling" that is "not comprehensive". 11
About this data
Heritage counts are this report's count of the 1,619 entries in the archived data file whose fraud_type contains "absentee" or "impersonation" (case-insensitive, so Heritage's misspellings are included); 14 of the 34 impersonation entries are also tagged absentee. Heritage calls its list "a sampling" that is "not comprehensive". News21 counts are as published, out of 2,068 alleged cases, and are allegations: of those whose outcome could be determined, News21 found 46 percent ended without a conviction or charge. Neither compilation has a denominator of ballots cast; for scale, 47,629,437 returned mail ballots were counted in the 2024 general election alone (EAVS).
Organised absentee and mail-ballot cases, 1980–2026
How each scheme worked, how it came to light and how it ended. A dash means the source read does not say.
| How it was done | Margin | How it came to light | Remedy | Criminal outcome, as of | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| St. Louis, 1980 | Ward organisation opened absentee ballots and punched holes in them [30] | Not given | Informant [30] | — | Convictions affirmed in part, 1988 |
| Alexander County, N.C., 1982 | A deputy sheriff and deputy court clerk voted nursing-home residents' absentee ballots [29] | Not given | Federal prosecution | — | Five convicted (by April 1984) |
| Philadelphia, 1993 state senate special | Campaign workers' absentee scheme; two city commissioners and an elections supervisor complicit [10] | Not given | Surge in absentee ballots | Overturned by a federal judge | Two campaign workers convicted of misdemeanours; candidate not convicted (Heritage, as of 2026) |
| Miami mayoral election (dated 1998 by Carter–Baker) | Absentee ballot fraud [13] | Not given | — | A judge "called for a new election" | Not covered by the source read |
| East Chicago, Ind., 2003 primary | Cash incentives to vote absentee, among acts that "perverted the absentee voting process" [3] | 278 | Losing candidate's election contest | Special election ordered, 2004 | 47 convicted or pleaded guilty (by October 2008) [4] |
| North Carolina 9th District, 2018 | Paid workers collected request forms and ballots, faked witness signatures, filled out ballots [1] | 905 | Lopsided mail vote [10] | New election ordered, 2019 | All workers but Dowless pleaded guilty; Dowless died before trial (as of March 2025) [2] |
| Paterson, N.J., 2020 | Hundreds of mail ballots found bundled in mailboxes; the winner charged with mail-ballot fraud [6] [7] | Not given | Postal Inspection Service [7] | New election ordered, August 2020 | No convictions. Mendez indictment dismissed April 2026, state appealing; Jackson's charges being dropped (as of May 2026) [8] |
| Aberdeen, Miss., 2020 primary | 66 of 84 absentee ballots invalid; a notary charged [10] | 37 | Losing candidate's lawsuit | New election ordered | Notary arrested; no outcome in the source |
| Bridgeport, Conn., 2023 primary | Absentee ballots stuffed into drop boxes by party workers [9] | 251 | Drop-box surveillance video [9] | New primary ordered, November 2023 | Not covered by the sources read |
Sources: North Carolina State Board of Elections [1]; WSOC-TV [2]; Supreme Court of Indiana (via Caselaw Access Project) [3]; NBC News [4]; New Jersey Globe [6]; New Jersey Globe [7]; New Jersey Globe [8]; CT Mirror [9]; The Heritage Foundation [10]; Commission on Federal Election Reform (Carter–Baker) [13]; US Department of Justice, Public Integrity Section [29]; US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit (via Caselaw Access Project) [30]
Observations 5
Organised absentee schemes have voided elections
Each case was local, caught and rerun
Paterson: a court voided the election, but no one has been convicted
Carter–Baker called absentee ballots the largest source of potential fraud
The 2005 bipartisan commission wrote that "absentee ballots remain the largest source of potential voter fraud", and that voters at home or in nursing homes are more open to pressure. It urged states to stop candidates and party workers handling absentee ballots. 13
The same commission found little fraud in all-mail Oregon
It found "little evidence of fraud in Oregon, where the entire state votes by mail", and "no evidence of extensive fraud in U.S. elections". It still asked Oregon for better precautions against intercepted ballots. 13
Officials and the count
Cases where officials tampered with a count, or refused or challenged a result.
| What officials did | Outcome, as of | |
|---|---|---|
| Texas Senate primary, 1948 (Box 13) | Not confirmed: Stevenson alleged votes "fraudulently counted for Johnson"; no primary source read describes the method [23] | Johnson's win stood |
| Chicago, 1982 | Election judges cast ballots in the names of voters who had moved or died [20] | See the in-person fraud table |
| Philadelphia, 1993 | Two city commissioners and an elections supervisor complicit in an absentee scheme [10] | Election overturned |
| Lincoln County, W.Va., 2010 primary | The county clerk stuffed boxes and falsified absentee ballots; the sheriff pleaded guilty too [10] | Election overturned; clerk sentenced to 18 months (Heritage, as of 2026) |
| Otero County, N.M., 2022 primary | County commissioners refused to certify [24] | Certified after a state supreme court order, June 2022 |
| Cochise County, Ariz., 2022 general | Two supervisors voted to delay certification past the deadline [25] | Certified on a judge's order; Judd pleaded guilty to a misdemeanour, Crosby awaiting trial (as of September 2025) |
| Arizona governor, 2022 | The losing candidate sued, claiming Maricopa County did not verify mail-ballot signatures [26] | Claim rejected, May 2023 |
Sources: The Heritage Foundation [10]; US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (via Caselaw Access Project) [20]; US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (via Caselaw Access Project) [23]; KOB 4 [24]; Votebeat [25]; Associated Press (via KSAT) [26]
Observations 3
Officials have manipulated the count, including through absentee ballots
Recent refusals to certify ended in certification
No case was found of signature review used to change a result
The record read contains no case of officials rejecting ballots on signatures to change a winner. The closest is the reverse: Arizona's losing candidate for governor claimed in 2022 that signatures were not checked, and the court found she had not proved it. 26 The search was incomplete (see Data still needed).
In-person and machine fraud over the same era
Large polling-place cases from the same record, for comparison with the absentee cases.
| How it was done | Outcome, as of | |
|---|---|---|
| Kansas City, 1936 | Officials wrote in ballots for padded "ghosts and sleepers" and stuffed boxes [22] | 259 convictions [21] |
| Chicago, 1982 | Election judges cast ballots for "phantom voters"; voters paid $2.00 a vote [20] | 58 convicted by April 1985; 63 of 65 prosecuted [18] [19] |
| Duval County, Tex., 1982 primary | Votes bought with food stamps and welfare benefits [18] | 21 of 29 indicted convicted (by April 1985) |
| Clay County, N.C., 1982 | Votes bought for $50 to $125 [29] | Eight convicted (by April 1984) |
Sources: US Department of Justice, Public Integrity Section [18]; Abraham Lincoln Presidential Library [19]; US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (via Caselaw Access Project) [20]; US Attorney's Office, Western District of Missouri [21]; US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit (via Caselaw Access Project) [22]; US Department of Justice, Public Integrity Section [29]
Observations 1
Polling-place fraud of the same era produced more convictions
Observations
A widely cited survey of mail voters is not a fraud estimate
A 2023 Rasmussen–Heartland poll reported that about one in five 2020 mail voters filled out a ballot "in part or in full" for a friend or relative. 27 Its questions include lawful help, and critics note an opt-in panel and results "wildly out of line" with signature-flag rates. 28 It is weighed beside stronger surveys in the secret-ballot report.
About this data
What is measured. Named cases where a court, an election board or a federal prosecutor described absentee or mail-ballot fraud, or officials' handling of the count. Added to these are two compilations of detected cases (Heritage, News21) and the 2024 EAVS count of mail ballots.
What is not measured. Undetected fraud, and fraud as a rate per ballot. No source publishes either.
How the Heritage counts were made. The voided-elections chart is this report's own coding of Heritage's descriptions; the note under it lists every election. The type counts match on Heritage's own tags. Heritage presents the list as showing "vulnerabilities in the election process" and says it is a sample, not a complete record.
Why there is no time series. No source publishes a consistent count of absentee-fraud cases by year; the Justice Department's reports list examples, not totals, and the compilations differ in method.
Commonly mistaken for. A count of detected cases is not a count of fraud, in either direction. A low count does not show fraud is rare, and a voided election does not show fraud is common: the voided cases are local races caught by existing checks.
Left out. Wayne County, Michigan (2020) and Georgia's State Election Board (2024) are often cited as officials contesting certification, but only secondary accounts were reached, so they are not in the table (see Data still needed). Britain's postal-fraud court cases are in the secret-ballot report.
Related Data
Mail Ballot Rejection, Signature Checks and Curing, 2012–2026
About one returned mail ballot in a hundred is rejected in a general election, with signature problems now the largest listed reason, and rates differ widely by state, county and voter group. [1][2][4][19][21]
Share of returned mail ballots rejected
The share of returned mail (before 2016, absentee) ballots that states rejected in each November general election, and the share of those rejections given each of the three most common listed reasons, as reported to the federal Election Administration and Voting Survey.
Rejected, % of returned mail ballots, by November general election
The share of returned mail (before 2016, absentee) ballots that states rejected in each November general election, and the share of those rejections given each of the three most common listed reasons, as reported to the federal Election Administration and Voting Survey. Read as share of returned mail ballots rejected: Rejected, % of returned mail ballots. Dashed segments cross 2 definitional breaks in the source, explained in Method Changes below this graph. 3 dated events are numbered on a strip under the graph and listed below it. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- United States
Events marked above
New Hampshire: rejection without notice ruled unconstitutional
A federal court held that rejecting mail ballots for a signature mismatch without notice or a chance to respond violated due process.
Source: U.S. District Court for the District of New Hampshire [32]
Fifth Circuit lets Texas reject without notice-and-cure
The appeals court stayed an order requiring Texas to notify voters of a mismatch before rejecting their ballot.
Pennsylvania: no rejection on signature comparison
The state supreme court held that the Election Code does not let county boards reject mail ballots on a signature comparison.
Vertical dashed lines mark measurement changes. See method changes.
Source: U.S. Election Assistance Commission [38]
Observations 2
About one returned mail ballot in a hundred is rejected
Subtleties
In-person votes have no matching rejection rate
A ballot cast at a polling place is checked before the voter votes, not afterwards, so the survey has no in-person rate to set beside these. Its nearest counterpart, provisional ballots, is cast only when a voter's registration or eligibility is already in doubt, so it is a different group. 1
Method Changes
2016: Absentee ballots as each state defined them, then mail ballots
The 2012 and 2014 reports count "absentee" ballots, and the 2014 report notes that "States vary in whether they consider vote-by-mail ballots to be absentee ballots". Some states counted in-person early votes as absentee: the 2012 report gives Georgia an absentee voting rate of 48.8%. From 2016 the survey separates by-mail from in-person early voting. The 2012 and 2014 "Lack of valid signature" category is shown on the missing-signature line. [38]
2022: Signature reason widened to "non-matching or incomplete"
From 2022 the survey's signature reason reads "non-matching or incomplete signature", and the questionnaire items were renumbered (C4 to C9). [38]
Share of rejections, by listed reason
% of rejected mail ballots, by November general election
The share of returned mail (before 2016, absentee) ballots that states rejected in each November general election, and the share of those rejections given each of the three most common listed reasons, as reported to the federal Election Administration and Voting Survey. Read as share of rejections, by listed reason: % of rejected mail ballots. Dashed segments cross 2 definitional breaks in the source, explained in Method Changes below this graph. 3 dated events are numbered on a strip under the graph and listed below it. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- Non-matching signature
- Missing voter signature
- Arrived after the deadline
Events marked above
New Hampshire: rejection without notice ruled unconstitutional
A federal court held that rejecting mail ballots for a signature mismatch without notice or a chance to respond violated due process.
Source: U.S. District Court for the District of New Hampshire [32]
Fifth Circuit lets Texas reject without notice-and-cure
The appeals court stayed an order requiring Texas to notify voters of a mismatch before rejecting their ballot.
Pennsylvania: no rejection on signature comparison
The state supreme court held that the Election Code does not let county boards reject mail ballots on a signature comparison.
Vertical dashed lines mark measurement changes. See method changes.
Source: U.S. Election Assistance Commission [38]
Observations 3
Mismatched signatures are now the most common listed reason
Ballots arriving after the deadline remain a leading reason
Late arrival was the third-largest reason in 2024, behind signatures and "other". 2 How many late ballots states count depends on their receipt deadlines, which a separate report covers.
Subtleties
Method Changes
2016: Absentee ballots as each state defined them, then mail ballots
The 2012 and 2014 reports count "absentee" ballots, and the 2014 report notes that "States vary in whether they consider vote-by-mail ballots to be absentee ballots". Some states counted in-person early votes as absentee: the 2012 report gives Georgia an absentee voting rate of 48.8%. From 2016 the survey separates by-mail from in-person early voting. The 2012 and 2014 "Lack of valid signature" category is shown on the missing-signature line. [38]
2022: Signature reason widened to "non-matching or incomplete"
From 2022 the survey's signature reason reads "non-matching or incomplete signature", and the questionnaire items were renumbered (C4 to C9). [38]
About this data
Full published range: 2012–2024. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – The survey began in 2004. The 2012 and 2014 reports are the earliest retrieved: older reports are no longer linked from the EAC's site and their previous addresses return errors, so 2004–2010 are listed under data still needed. 2024 is the latest release; 2026 data are due in 2027.
Share of returned mail ballots rejected
Each point is the national rejection rate printed in that cycle's report: 2012 and 2014 as a share of absentee ballots submitted for counting [10, 9]; 2016 from Table 1 [8]; 2018 [7]; 2020 [6]; 2022 [5]; 2024 [1]. National rates use only states that reported both rejected and returned ballots (casewise deletion). A second denominator, all votes cast, gives a much smaller share: MIT's Elections Performance Index puts rejected mail ballots at 0.34% of all votes in both 2020 and 2024 [11].
Share of rejections, by listed reason
Values are each report's own table of rejection reasons: 2012 "Top Reasons for Rejecting Absentee Ballots" [10]; 2014 Exhibit 5 [9]; 2016 Table 1 [8]; 2018 Table 1 [7]; 2020 Table 2 [6]; 2022 Table 1 [5]; 2024 Table 1 [2]. Each reason's share is calculated only over states that reported that reason, so shares do not add to 100% and are not shares of one fixed total. The large "other" category (14.8% to 34.9% where reported; not listed in 2012 or 2014) is not drawn; the 2022 report says about a quarter of its "other" rejections were "All Signature Issues".
Share of returned mail ballots rejected
Share of returned mail ballots that were rejected (2024: not counted) in Texas, which added an ID-number check in 2021, and Georgia, which replaced signature matching with an ID number in 2021, beside the national rate.
Rejected, % of returned mail ballots, by November general election
Share of returned mail ballots that were rejected (2024: not counted) in Texas, which added an ID-number check in 2021, and Georgia, which replaced signature matching with an ID number in 2021, beside the national rate. Read as share of returned mail ballots rejected: Rejected, % of returned mail ballots. Dashed segments cross 2 definitional breaks in the source, explained in Method Changes below this graph. 3 dated events are numbered on a strip under the graph and listed below it. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- Texas
- Georgia
- United States
Events marked above
Texas SB 1: ID number required on mail ballots
The ID or Social Security number on the envelope must match the voter's records.
Georgia SB 202: ID number replaces signature matching
Absentee applications and ballots are checked against a licence or state ID number instead of a signature.
Source: MIT Election Data and Science Lab (report by M.V. Hood III and Seth C. McKee) [17]
Texas primary under SB 1: 12.38% rejected
The first election under the new rule; 24,636 mail ballots were rejected. Primaries are not part of this series.
Vertical dashed lines mark measurement changes. See method changes.
Source: U.S. Election Assistance Commission [39]
Observations 3
Texas's rejections rose under its ID-number check and stayed above the national rate
Georgia's rate fell after it replaced signature matching with an ID number
Subtleties
Texas's 2020 rate was its low point
Method Changes
2020: Georgia's 2020 rejections incomplete
The EAC notes that Georgia's 2020 rejection count includes only ballots counties had entered into the state registration system by February 2021, "which does not necessarily include all ballots rejected by counties", so Georgia's 2020 rate is a floor. [39]
2024: Counted share only
The 2024 state data briefs publish the share of returned mail ballots counted but not the share rejected, so the Texas and Georgia 2024 points are 100 minus the counted share; they match the report's own "not counted" column for both states (3.5% and 1.7%). [39]
About this data
Full published range: 2016–2024. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – Before 2016 the survey's Georgia figures count in-person early votes as absentee ballots (see the break on the national chart), so earlier state points are not comparable. Primaries are not covered by the survey; Texas's March 2022 primary is marked as an event.
Share of returned mail ballots rejected
Texas and Georgia 2016: rejected divided by returned, calculated from the counts in the 2016 Overview Table 2 [39] (its own percentage column divides by ballots sent out): Texas 8,177 / 468,150 = 1.75%, Georgia 13,677 / 213,033 = 6.42%. 2018 [7] and 2020 [6]: each report's rejected share of returned ballots. 2022: the state data briefs [13, 15]. 2024: 100 minus the briefs' counted share [14, 16]. The US line is the national chart's line for the same years.
Why returned mail ballots were rejected, 2024 general election
Share of rejected mail ballots given each reason, in states that reported that reason. Shares are calculated separately for each reason and do not add to 100%.
% of rejected mail ballots
- Non-matching or incomplete signature40.7%
- Other reason not listed18.1%
- Arrived after the deadline17.8%
- Voter already cast another ballot that was accepted11.1%
- No voter signature10%
- No witness signature5.6%
- Required ID or other document missing or incomplete4.4%
- Not in required secrecy envelope3.7%
- Voter not eligible in the jurisdiction3.4%
- Envelope not sealed2%
- Voter deceased1.5%
- Ballot missing from envelope1.1%
- No required postmark0.9%
- Unofficial envelope0.4%
- No resident address on envelope0.2%
- Several ballots in one envelope0.2%
- No ballot application on record0%
Source: U.S. Election Assistance Commission [2]
Observations 2
One rejected ballot in nine came from a voter who had already voted
In 2024, 11.1% of rejected mail ballots were from voters who had already cast another ballot that was accepted. 2 The check stops a second ballot being counted; the survey does not say whether the second ballot was a mistake or an attempt to vote twice.
Other envelope requirements account for smaller shares
A missing witness signature was the next-largest specific reason, at 5.6%, and each remaining requirement accounted for less. 2 None of the survey's reasons is fraud: every category is a failed procedural check.
About this data
All 17 reasons in the EAVS 2024 report's Chapter 1 Table 1, in its order. "Other reason not listed" includes reasons states described themselves, among them "All signature issues"; Oregon reported 96.1% of its rejections as "other". The survey records procedural reasons only; none of its categories is fraud.
Returned mail ballots not counted, by state, 2024 general election
Share of returned mail ballots not counted in each state and DC, with the eight all-mail states and DC highlighted and the national rate for comparison.
Not counted, % of returned mail ballots
- Arkansas8.8%
- Delaware5.1%
- Oklahoma4.3%
- Texas3.5%
- Kentucky3.4%
- Michigan3.1%
- New York3%
- Missouri2.9%
- North Carolina2.9%
- South Carolina2.8%
- Louisiana2.4%
- Tennessee2.1%
- Minnesota2%
- Nevada (all-mail)2%
- Utah (all-mail)1.9%
- Alaska1.8%
- Georgia1.7%
- Oregon (all-mail)1.7%
- Illinois1.6%
- New Hampshire1.6%
- Idaho1.5%
- Colorado (all-mail)1.4%
- New Jersey1.3%
- United States1.2%
- Massachusetts1.1%
- West Virginia1.1%
- Pennsylvania1%
- Virginia1%
- Arizona0.9%
- California (all-mail)0.9%
- Hawaii (all-mail)0.9%
- New Mexico0.9%
- Washington (all-mail)0.9%
- Ohio0.8%
- District of Columbia (all-mail)0.7%
- Florida0.7%
- North Dakota0.6%
- Rhode Island0.6%
- Iowa0.5%
- Montana0.5%
- Nebraska0.5%
- South Dakota0.5%
- Wisconsin0.5%
- Wyoming0.5%
- Kansas0.4%
- Maryland0.4%
- Indiana0.2%
- Maine0.2%
- Vermont (all-mail)0.2%
Source: U.S. Election Assistance Commission [4]; National Conference of State Legislatures [31]
Observations 3
State rates ranged from 0.2% to 8.8%
Arkansas, Delaware and Oklahoma rejected the largest shares in 2024; Vermont, Maine and Indiana the smallest. 4 Where a voter lives makes a large difference to the chance their ballot is not counted.
All-mail states were not significantly different from the rest
The highest rates were not all in signature-matching states
About this data
EAVS 2024 Overview Table 1, column "Mail Ballots Not Counted, % of Returned" (rejected ballots divided by returned ballots). Every state with a published rate is shown; Alabama, Connecticut and Mississippi did not report the returned count, so the survey gives no rate for them. The territories are left out of the chart: Puerto Rico 1.7%, US Virgin Islands 1.0%, American Samoa 0.5% and Guam 16.7% (9 ballots); the Northern Mariana Islands has no rate. All-mail states are NCSL's list as of August 2026; Vermont's applies to general elections only.
Washington, 2020 general election: ballots rejected by race and ethnicity
Share of each group's ballots rejected for any reason except lateness, with race and ethnicity estimated from surname and address.
Rejected, % of ballots cast
- Black2.49%
- Native American1.59%
- Hispanic1.57%
- Asian/Pacific Islander1.24%
- White0.63%
Source: Office of the Washington State Auditor [19]
Observations 3
In Washington, Black voters' ballots were rejected at four times white voters' rate
Every group shown was rejected more often than white voters, and the gap was statistically significant for all but Native Americans. After controlling for other factors, the auditor estimated Black voters were twice as likely as white voters to have a ballot rejected. 19
The racial gaps include unsigned ballots, not just mismatches
Men and voters using non-English ballots were also rejected more
Men were 42 percent more likely than women to have a ballot rejected. In King County, voters casting non-English ballots were 47 percent more likely to be rejected than those casting English ones. 20
About this data
Washington State Auditor, Exhibit 6. Washington votes almost entirely by mail. Late ballots are excluded, so these rates are not comparable with EAVS rates, which include them. The auditor's model put only 30 voters in the multiracial group, none rejected; the Native American gap was not statistically significant because of small numbers.
Washington, 2020 general election: ballots rejected by age
Share of each age group's ballots rejected for any reason except lateness.
Rejected, % of ballots cast
- 18–212.68%
- 22–252.04%
- 26–291.56%
- 30–440.88%
- 45–640.38%
- 65 and over0.17%
Source: Office of the Washington State Auditor [19]
Observations 2
Young and first-time voters were rejected most
Florida studies found the same pattern
In Florida's 2018 election, younger voters and voters needing assistance were "disproportionately likely" to have mail ballots rejected, with "significant variation" across counties. 26 Inexperienced mail voters were about three times as likely to be rejected in 2016 and 2018. 27 Both come from the authors' summaries; the full papers were not read.
About this data
Washington State Auditor, Exhibit 5. Late ballots are excluded.
Washington, 2020 general election: ballots rejected by county
Share of ballots rejected in each of Washington's 39 counties, for any reason except lateness, before any adjustment for who votes there.
Rejected, % of ballots cast
- Franklin1.5%
- Okanogan1.28%
- Adams1.15%
- Kittitas1.14%
- Snohomish0.99%
- Wahkiakum0.98%
- King0.86%
- Kitsap0.85%
- Clark0.76%
- Asotin0.72%
- Benton0.72%
- Whitman0.7%
- Lincoln0.65%
- Clallam0.64%
- Skagit0.63%
- Pierce0.63%
- Pacific0.59%
- Lewis0.57%
- Island0.56%
- Thurston0.51%
- Grant0.5%
- Klickitat0.49%
- Cowlitz0.48%
- Whatcom0.47%
- Spokane0.46%
- Grays Harbor0.46%
- Mason0.44%
- Skamania0.38%
- Walla Walla0.36%
- Yakima0.29%
- Jefferson0.29%
- Chelan0.28%
- Garfield0.27%
- Stevens0.26%
- Ferry0.25%
- San Juan0.25%
- Douglas0.25%
- Pend Oreille0.2%
- Columbia0.04%
Source: Office of the Washington State Auditor [18]
Observations 3
The county a ballot was cast in mattered more than anything else
After controlling for age, race, education and income, ballots in some counties were four to seven times as likely as in others to be rejected for a mismatched or missing signature. For mismatches alone, two counties were 18 times as likely as another. 21
Low-rejection counties accepted less conclusive signatures
Counties with lower rejection rates were more likely to accept less conclusive signature matches, which could explain part of the difference. 22 Some of the gap is a choice about how much doubt to allow, not only error.
Low-rejection counties also cured more ballots
Among the ten audited counties, those with lower rejection rates got 65 percent of flagged ballots cured, against 50 percent in the others. 25
About this data
Washington State Auditor, Exhibit 3 (all 39 counties). Late ballots are excluded. Statewide rate: 0.72%. These are raw rates; the audit's county comparisons after controlling for age, race, education and income are in the observations below.
Mail ballots set aside for curing, and what happened to them, 2024
Ballots flagged for a fixable problem, such as a missing or mismatched signature, in states that reported curing data, and how many voters then fixed.
Mail ballots
- Set aside for curing585,457
- Cured by the voter and counted317,191
- Not cured and rejected270,753
Source: U.S. Election Assistance Commission [3]
Observations 3
More than half the ballots set aside for curing were cured
In states that reported curing, more than half the ballots flagged for a fixable problem were corrected by voters and counted. 3 Without curing, those ballots would have been rejected.
Not every state cures, or reports it
The EAC counted 43 states that let voters cure in 2024, but twelve of them could not report how many ballots entered curing, including Georgia, Oregon and Pennsylvania. 3 The national figures cover only the states that reported.
About this data
EAVS 2024 report, curing section. Twelve states, including Georgia, Oregon and Pennsylvania, could not report how many ballots entered curing, and New Jersey reported only cured ballots, so the cured and rejected counts do not add up to the number set aside. See About this data for the cure rate.
How states check and cure mail ballots, October 2026
The checks a returned ballot can face, and where each applies. Some states use more than one.
| Where it applies | |
|---|---|
| Signature compared with the one on file | 32 states and Puerto Rico [28] |
| Envelope must be signed, but the signature is not compared | Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Maryland, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Vermont, Virginia, Wyoming, DC and the US Virgin Islands [28] |
| ID or Social Security number on the envelope | Georgia, Minnesota, New Mexico, Ohio, Texas, Virginia; Utah from 2029 [28] |
| Witness signature | Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Louisiana, Minnesota, North Carolina, South Carolina, Wisconsin [28] |
| Notarised envelope | Mississippi, Missouri, Oklahoma [28] |
| Statewide duty to tell voters of a missing or mismatched signature and let them fix it | 35 states and DC [30] |
Sources: National Conference of State Legislatures [28]; National Conference of State Legislatures [30]
Observations 3
States check mail ballots in very different ways
Some states require training and bipartisan review
Most states must let voters fix signature problems
Thirty-five states and DC require officials to tell voters of a missing signature or a discrepancy and give them a chance to correct it. 30 The count includes states that do not compare signatures, which can only be curing missing ones.
Washington's re-check of its counties' signature decisions, 2020
What the state auditor's review found when it repeated the counties' work.
| Finding | |
|---|---|
| How the audit describes matching | "inherently subjective"; "even experienced reviewers can come to different conclusions" [23] |
| Ballots re-checked | A random sample of more than 7,200 [22] |
| Method | Software screening, then auditors trained by the State Patrol, then two state reviewers [22] |
| Agreement with counties | More than 98 percent of signatures reviewed [22] |
| Decisions estimated to be appropriate | 98.7 percent, projected to all ballots [22] |
| Evidence of bias in decisions | None found [24] |
Sources: Office of the Washington State Auditor [22]; Office of the Washington State Auditor [23]; Office of the Washington State Auditor [24]
Observations 3
The auditor agreed with almost all county decisions
Re-checking a random sample, the auditor agreed with counties on more than 98 percent of signatures. 22 Most errors that remain are matters of degree: lower-rejection counties accepted less conclusive signatures.
The audit found no evidence of bias in individual decisions
In the auditor's words: "We found no evidence of bias in those decisions. While that is good news, it also means we are not able to explain what causes rejection rates to vary for these groups of voters." 24
Trained reviewers, the auditors included, disagreed about matches
The audit calls matching "inherently subjective". It found that "even experienced reviewers can come to different conclusions", that its own team disagreed on many signatures, and that counties read the state's criteria differently. 23
Court rulings on rejecting ballots for a signature mismatch
What courts have held about signature rejections, notice and the chance to fix a ballot.
| Case | What the court held or said | |
|---|---|---|
| US District Court, New Hampshire, 14 Aug 2018 | Saucedo v. Gardner | The process was "fundamentally flawed": no notice, no handwriting training, no standards, no appeal. Rejecting without notice violated due process. [32] |
| Fifth Circuit, 19 Oct 2020 | Richardson v. Texas Secretary of State | Stayed an order requiring notice and a chance to cure, quoting "the potential and reality of fraud is much greater in the mail-in ballot context"; a stay ruling, not a final one. [33] |
| Fifth Circuit, same day (concurring) | Richardson, Higginbotham, J. | About 5,000 Texas ballots were rejected for "perceived signature mismatches" in 2016 and 2018. [34] |
| Pennsylvania Supreme Court, 23 Oct 2020 | In re November 3, 2020 General Election | The Election Code "does not authorize or require" county boards to reject ballots on a signature comparison. [35] |
| Arizona trial court, May 2023 | Lake v. Hobbs | The losing candidate for governor failed to prove that Maricopa County had not verified signatures. [36] |
Sources: U.S. District Court for the District of New Hampshire [32]; U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit [33]; U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit [34]; Supreme Court of Pennsylvania [35]; Associated Press (via KSAT) [36]
Observations 5
A federal court required notice before a mismatch rejection in New Hampshire
The Fifth Circuit let Texas keep rejecting without notice, citing fraud risk
The majority held Texas's interest in stopping fraud "far outweighs" the burden, and quoted an earlier ruling that fraud risk is "much greater in the mail-in ballot context than with in-person voting". 33 Its view that voting by mail carries no due-process interest was a prediction at the stay stage ("likely to show").
A concurring judge pointed to thousands of perceived mismatches
Judge Higginbotham, who concurred "only in the decision to stay", wrote that such "small" differences "have the potential to decide both local and national elections". 34 The 5,000 figure is in his separate opinion, not the majority's.
Pennsylvania's top court barred rejection on signature comparison
A losing candidate's claim about signature checks failed
Kari Lake, who lost Arizona's 2022 governor's race by about 17,000 votes, asked the courts to install her or order a new election, claiming signatures had not been checked as the law required. The trial court found she had not proved it. 36
Cobb County, Georgia: the state's 2020 signature audit
What state investigators found when they re-examined a sample of the county's accepted absentee envelopes.
| Finding | |
|---|---|
| Envelopes re-examined | 15,118, about a tenth of the county's absentee ballots |
| Which envelopes | Only ballots already accepted |
| Fraudulent ballots found | "no fraudulent absentee ballots" |
| Envelopes that should have been flagged | Two, one "mistakenly signed by the elector's spouse"; in both cases the voter had filled in the ballot |
Source: Georgia Secretary of State [37]
Observations 4
Cobb County's 2020 audit found no fraudulent absentee ballots
Georgia's Secretary of State and the state Bureau of Investigation re-examined 15,118 envelopes, about a tenth of the county's absentee ballots, and found "no fraudulent absentee ballots". 37 Georgia used signature matching in 2020; SB 202 replaced it the next year.
A ballot signed by the voter's spouse had passed the county's check
The audit found two envelopes that should have been flagged. One was "mistakenly signed by the elector's spouse"; in both cases the voter had filled in the ballot. 37 So a signature that was not the voter's got through, which shows a check can miss one.
The audit sampled only accepted ballots
The envelopes came from boxes of "accepted" ballots. 37 The audit could find wrongly accepted ballots, but not valid ballots wrongly rejected, and finding no fraud in a sample shows little about how many forged signatures checks miss.
No case was found of signature review being used to change a result
The sources gathered for this report contain no case of officials using signature review to change an election result. The one attempt found to overturn a result over signature checks, Arizona's 2022 governor's race, failed in court. 36 The search was not exhaustive; see Data still needed.
Figures are for November general elections, from the federal Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS) unless stated. A rejected ballot is a returned ballot that was not counted because it failed a check: it arrived late, was unsigned, its signature did not match, or similar.
Subtleties
A rejected ballot is not a fraudulent ballot, and a counted one is not proven genuine
Washington's rates are not comparable with the national ones
Washington's 0.72 percent excludes late ballots; the EAVS rates include them. 18 Washington is also one state in one year, the only state with a published audit of this kind found for this report.
About this data
National series. Each point is the rate the EAC printed in that cycle's report, as a share of ballots returned (for 2012 and 2014, "submitted for counting"). The EAC calculates national rates only over states that reported both numbers, so the rates are not simply the national totals divided.
Reasons. Each report's own reasons table is used. Categories changed: "Lack of valid signature" (2012, 2014) is drawn as a missing signature, and the signature reason became "non-matching or incomplete" in 2022. These are marked as method changes on the chart.
Texas and Georgia. 2016 rates are calculated from the counts in the 2016 overview table, because its percentage column divides by ballots sent out. The 2024 state points are 100 minus the counted share in the state data briefs, and match the report's own "not counted" column.
Cure rate. Dividing the published totals, 317,191 cured of 585,457 set aside, gives 54.2%. 3 The EAC prints 54.3%, because it divides state by state and leaves out states missing either number; New Jersey, for example, reported cured ballots only. The prose says "more than half", which both support.
Washington. The auditor estimated each voter's race from surname and address (a method called BISG), because Washington does not record race, and used a regression model to compare groups and counties with other factors held constant. Late ballots were excluded because county data on them were inconsistent.
Florida. Baringer, Herron and Smith's full paper could not be fetched (the journal blocks automated access and the draft link is dead), so only its abstract is used.
State rules. The verification and cure lists are NCSL's tables as updated on 26 October and 31 August 2026. They change often, and the 3 November 2026 election may be run under rules that differ in detail.
The Secret Ballot and Postal Voting in Other Democracies, 1872–2026
Few countries let every voter vote by post at home, but several large democracies do; mail voters often have others present yet rarely report pressure, and Britain tightened its rules after large frauds. [3][9][14][21][28]
About this data
Full published range: 1957–2025. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – The Federal Returning Officer's file starts in 1957, the first Bundestag election with postal voting, and runs to the February 2025 election.
Share of voters voting by post
Values are the source's column "Anteil Wählende mit Briefwahlschein an den Wählenden insgesamt" for the "Bund" rows, printed with decimal commas (for example "47,3"). They are shares of voters, not of the electorate.
About this data
Full published range: 1945–2019. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – The Commons Library table runs 1945–2019. The Electoral Commission's 2024 report gives no share of valid votes cast by post, so 2024 is not on the line; its postal figures are in the table further down.
Postal votes as a share of valid votes
From the table's last column. 1974 had two general elections, in February and October. Read from an Internet Archive copy, because the Commons Library site refused automated download.
Countries allowing in-country postal voting, 2025
Of the 204 countries International IDEA codes, how many let every voter vote by post inside the country, how many let some voters, and how many offer no in-country postal vote. Data as of 20 August 2025.
Countries
- All voters may vote by post11 · 5.4%
- Some voters, by country-specific criteria21 · 10.3%
- No in-country postal voting (derived)172 · 84.3%
Source: International IDEA [3]; International IDEA [4]
Observations 3
Few countries offer postal voting to every voter
The countries that do include several large democracies
The 11 include the US, the UK, Germany, Switzerland and Canada. France and Australia allow it only for some voters. 3
Curing a rejected mail ballot is unusual abroad
IDEA notes that letting voters correct an invalid ballot, as many US states do, "is uncommon globally". 3
About this data
All voters (11): Canada, Germany, Iceland, South Korea, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Poland, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States. Some voters (21): Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Fiji, France, Greece, India, Ireland, Japan, Lithuania, Malaysia, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Netherlands, Pakistan, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Slovenia, Spain, Zimbabwe. The counts are from IDEA's printed lists; a pie chart in the same fact sheet shows a different split (37.5% and 62.5%), which does not match its own lists. "None" is derived: 204 countries coded, minus the 32 listed; IDEA prints no list of them. The denominator, 204, is from IDEA's overview page, whose data date from 2021 to 2023, so the two dates differ. Postal voting from abroad is a separate dataset and is not counted here.
France, average abstention before and after postal voting was abolished in 1975
Average abstention at each type of French election before the law of 31 December 1975 and from then to 1988, as the Interior Ministry gave it when it refused to restore postal voting.
Average abstention (%)
- Presidential, before 197518.4%
- Presidential, after16.6%
- Legislative, before 197521.5%
- Legislative, after25.7%
- Municipal, before 197523.1%
- Municipal, after21.4%
- Cantonal, before 197539%
- Cantonal, after33.6%
Source: Assemblée nationale [5]
Observations 4
France abolished postal voting in 1975, citing serious fraud
The Interior Ministry said in 1988 that every party had condemned postal voting as the occasion of "fraudes graves" (serious fraud) after each election. With no voter ever appearing in person, it allowed votes for "electeurs fictifs" (fictitious voters; the source prints French without accents). 5 IDEA gives the same reason. 8
France widened proxy voting instead
Abstention did not rise overall after abolition, by the government's figures
Abstention fell at presidential, municipal and cantonal elections and rose at legislative ones, which the ministry put down to low turnout in June 1988. 5 These are a government's own averages, not a test of cause.
About this data
The ministry's own averages, printed in French form ("18,4 p 100"). They are period averages chosen by a government defending abolition, not a controlled comparison; the ministry attributed the legislative rise to low turnout in June 1988. The source does not say which elections each average covers.
The secret ballot: when and why it was adopted
Where the secret ballot came in, and what it was for.
| When | What the sources say | |
|---|---|---|
| Australian colonies | 1850s (dates not confirmed in a primary source read) | "Some Australian provinces adopted a series of reforms intended to secure the secrecy of an elector’s vote" [1] |
| England | 1872 | The Australian system was enacted after a committee found it "the best possible remedy" [1] |
| Louisville, Massachusetts, New York | 1888 | First US adoptions [1] |
| US states | By 1896 | "Almost 90 percent of the States" [1] |
| Chile | 1958 | The right's stronger vote in landlord-patronage areas "completely disappeared" [2] |
Sources: Supreme Court of the United States (via Caselaw Access Project) [1]; American Economic Review (Baland and Robinson) [2]
Observations 3
The secret ballot was adopted so no one could watch a vote
In Chile, the secret ballot removed the landlords' vote
Before Chile's 1958 reform, places with more patron-client ties voted more strongly for the right; afterwards "this difference across localities completely disappeared". 2 The abstract gives no figures.
How private is a mail ballot? Surveys, ranked by method
Strongest method first. The questions differ, so the figures cannot share one chart.
| Sample and method | What was asked | Finding | Mode | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dowling et al., December 2010 (published 2019) | YouGov matched sample approximating a random sample; mail voters were a few hundred respondents | Was anyone else in the room; did you discuss, ask advice, show your ballot | "Over 23 percent" had someone in the room; 17.8 percent discussed their vote; "more than six percent" showed their ballot; mail voters "almost 10 percentage points" likelier to say their choices were not kept secret [21] | |
| Same survey, in-person comparison | As above | Privacy at the polling place | "22 percent said there was no curtain or privacy screen"; "over 20 percent" said someone walking by could see [21] | In person |
| Rasmussen–Heartland, December 2023 | Opt-in, mostly online panel, which critics say "cannot have a margin of error"; about 325 mail voters; asked three years after 2020 | Did someone fill out your ballot, or did you fill out another's, "in part or in full" (lawful help included) | 19% said someone filled out theirs; 21% filled out another's. Only 30% said they voted by mail, against "about 43%" in official data; Levitt calls the results "wildly out of line" with signature-flag rates [24] [25] [26] | |
| Rose pilot, Washington County, Oregon, 2000 | Unpublished pilot of 818 respondents, reported in a newspaper | Not published | "About 5%" said others marked their ballots; 2.4% said others signed their envelopes [27] | |
| Oregon, 1990s, reported second-hand | Two surveys as described by Orr and Johnson; the cited one covered a 1996 special election | Not available | "As many as a third" completed ballots with others present; "1%, or fewer" felt pressured [28] | |
| Democracy Volunteers, UK, July 2024 | Observers at polling stations | Observed family voting | Seen at 21% of stations, affecting 3.5% of voters observed; they cannot measure it for postal votes [30] [31] | In person |
Sources: PLOS ONE (Dowling, Doherty, Hill, Gerber and Huber) [21]; Rasmussen Reports [24]; Rasmussen Reports [25]; FactCheck.org [26]; Los Angeles Times [27]; The Conversation (Susan Orr and James Johnson) [28]; Democracy Volunteers [30]; Democracy Volunteers [31]
Observations 6
Mail ballots are often filled in with others present
In the strongest survey, over 23 percent of mail voters had someone else in the room and more than six percent showed their ballot. Mail voters were likelier than Election Day voters to doubt their vote was secret. 21
Doubts about secrecy change behaviour
The Rasmussen–Heartland poll is a weak measure of lost secrecy, not a fraud estimate
Few voters report pressure
Pressure may be under-reported
Britain: election-court cases and the reforms that followed
Postal voting on demand, the frauds found in court, and the rule changes that came after.
Filled marker: major event Hollow: minor
Showing 10 of 10 events
2001
· Rule change · major event
Postal voting on demand
No reason needed.
Source: House of Commons Library [35]
2005
· Election court · major event
Birmingham (Bordesley Green and Aston)
Thousands of postal votes falsified; fraud "that would disgrace a banana republic".
Source: High Court, Election Court (The National Archives, Find Case Law) [10]
2006
· Rule change
Electoral Administration Act
Postal-vote applications must carry "signature and date of birth".
Source: legislation.gov.uk [12]
2008
· Election court
Slough
Register fraud: "several hundred" non-resident or invented voters; new election ordered.
Source: High Court, Election Court (The National Archives, Find Case Law) [10]
2013
· Election court
Woking
Election "avoided by such corrupt or illegal practices"; 64 suspect postal votes.
Source: High Court, Election Court (The National Archives, Find Case Law) [10]
2015
· Election court
Tower Hamlets
Mayor's 2014 election "void".
Source: High Court, Election Court (The National Archives, Find Case Law) [11]
2016
· Review or data
Pickles review
Recommended extending ballot-secrecy offences to postal ballots.
2019
– · Review or data
Electoral Commission fraud data
1,462 alleged cases of all kinds, 11 convictions; "no evidence of large-scale electoral fraud".
Source: Electoral Commission [15]
2022
· Rule change
Elections Act: postal votes lapse
Postal votes lapse after about three years.
Source: legislation.gov.uk [13]
· Rule change
Elections Act: campaigners barred
Campaigners may not handle others' postal votes.
Source: legislation.gov.uk [14]
Sources: Election Court (unofficial mirror, law.slough.info) [9]; High Court, Election Court (The National Archives, Find Case Law) [10]; High Court, Election Court (The National Archives, Find Case Law) [11]; legislation.gov.uk [12]; legislation.gov.uk [13]; legislation.gov.uk [14]; Electoral Commission [15]; UK Government (Cabinet Office) [32]; House of Commons Library [35]
Observations 3
British election courts found organised postal fraud and voided elections
Britain kept postal voting on demand and added checks
Recent detected fraud in Britain is low
The Electoral Commission found "no evidence of large-scale electoral fraud" in 2019–2023: 11 convictions from 1,462 allegations of every kind. 15 Like all detected counts, these are a floor (see the US fraud report).
Britain's 2024 general election: postal voting
How postal voting went in 2024, with 2019 where the report gives it.
| 2024 | 2019 | |
|---|---|---|
| Share of people registered for a postal vote | 20% | 18% |
| Postal votes returned | 80.7% | 83.9% |
| Returned postal votes rejected because signature or date of birth could not be verified | 2.2% (approximately 168,000) | "Broadly similar" |
| Postal voters satisfied with voting | 89% | — |
| Postal voters who had help filling in their ballot | 3% | — |
| Of those, main reason "another adult insisted on helping me choose who to vote for" | 9% | — |
| People who thought voting was safe from fraud and abuse | 87% | 72% |
Source: Electoral Commission [16]
Observations 3
Britain's identifier check rejected 2.2% of returned postal votes
In 2024, 2.2% of returned postal votes were rejected because the signature and date of birth could not be verified, a level "broadly similar" to earlier polls. 16 Britain's check pairs a signature with a fact that needs no judgement, the date of birth.
Some British postal voters said another adult insisted on helping them choose
Of the 3% of postal voters who had help, 9% gave that reason. The Commission said it could not judge how far this was unwanted, but "some of these instances" may have been coercive. 16
The Commission found no systemic postal-voting problems in 2024
Some ballots arrived late, but it found "no widespread, systemic issues with postal voting", and 89% of postal voters were satisfied. 16
Does postal voting weaken the secret ballot? What courts and reviews said
What courts, reviews and researchers have said, for and against.
| Said | |
|---|---|
| Germany's Constitutional Court, 2013 | Public control of how the vote is cast is reduced, but postal voting serves the widest participation; election principles being hollowed out is "plainly not the case at present" (translated) [17] |
| Birmingham election court, 2005 | "All political parties welcomed and supported postal voting on demand. Until very recently, none has treated electoral fraud as representing a problem." [9] |
| Pickles review, 2016 (reporting submissions) | "Unrestricted postal voting undermines the fundamental secrecy of the ballot" [32] |
| Birch and Watt, 2004 (as summarised by Essex) | Remote voting risks "the loss of ballot secrecy and the possibility of undue influence" [33] |
| Southwell (Oregon), 2020 | "No evidence that undue influence on voters – like bribes or threats – has been a problem" [29] |
| swissinfo, 2026 | Switzerland's postal voting "hasn’t led to major political debates about security or fraud" [18] |
Sources: Election Court (unofficial mirror, law.slough.info) [9]; Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court of Germany) [17]; SWI swissinfo.ch [18]; The Conversation (Priscilla Southwell) [29]; UK Government (Cabinet Office) [32]; University of Essex (REF 2014) [33]
Observations 2
Even supporters concede postal voting gives up supervised secrecy
Germany's court upheld postal voting while conceding reduced control and integrity. 17 Britain's 2016 review recorded the argument that unrestricted postal voting "can never guarantee that the voter has not been influenced". 32 Where they differ is whether the loss has, in practice, led to coercion.
No study here measures coercion of mail voters
Observers who count family voting at polling stations say they "are unable to collect data" on it for postal votes. 31 The surveys above measure presence and help, not pressure (see Data still needed).
About this data
What is measured. How many countries allow postal voting (IDEA), how much of the vote is cast by post in Germany and the UK (official series), what Britain's and France's governments and courts found, and survey measures of who is present when a mail ballot is filled in.
Comparators. IDEA's full coded set is used, not a hand-picked group. Germany and the UK are charted because they publish official long-run postal series; Switzerland has no national series.
The two series differ. Germany's is postal voters as a share of all voters; the UK's is postal votes counted as a share of valid votes. Both are the source's own measure, but they are not identical.
Translations. French and German quotations are given as published; translations in the text are this report's.
Commonly mistaken for. "Most democracies do not offer postal voting" is true of all-voter postal voting, but the countries that do offer it include most of the large Western democracies the US is usually compared with. "Others were present" is not the same as coercion, and a survey of lawful help is not a fraud estimate.
Secondary only. Australia's 1856 adoption dates, South Carolina's 1950 adoption and the 1838 Chartist petition are widely cited but were not confirmed in a primary source read here, so they are left out.
Confidence in Mail Voting and Disputed Election Results
Confidence in the mail count is lower than in the in-person count, splits by party and moves with who wins; each of six recent disputes ended with the original winner in office. [1][6][11][12][13][14][18][20]
Very or somewhat confident
Share of US adults very or somewhat confident, asked before each election. Changes of president and the disputed results in this report are marked under the chart.
% confident, by election year
Share of US adults very or somewhat confident, asked before each election. Changes of president and the disputed results in this report are marked under the chart. Read as very or somewhat confident: % confident. 7 dated events are numbered on a strip under the graph and listed below it. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- All adults
- Republicans
- Independents
- Democrats
Events marked above
Ohio objection rejected
The House and Senate each rejected an objection to Ohio's 2004 electoral votes.
Source: Congressional Research Service (via EveryCRSReport) [12]
Obama takes office
Source: Gallup [4]
Trump takes office
Source: Gallup [4]
Abrams ends Georgia race without conceding
Source: Georgia Public Broadcasting [13]
Trump questions mail voting
Gallup links that year's fall in Republican confidence to "then-President Donald Trump's public questioning of the validity of mail voting".
Source: Gallup [3]
House rejects objections; Biden takes office
Lake's signature claim dismissed
Source: Associated Press (via KSAT) [18]
Source: Gallup [21]
Observations 3
Confidence in the count follows the party in power
Republicans were more confident than Democrats under George W. Bush, and Democrats more confident under Barack Obama and Joe Biden (changes of president are marked under the chart). 2 3 The gap reached a record 56 points in 2024. 2
A study pooling about 30 national surveys from 2000 to 2012 finds "a consistent relationship between voting for the winner and confidence in election administration". 6
In 2020 Republican confidence fell before the count, amid attacks on mail voting
Gallup's 2020 reading was taken before the election. It ties that year's fall in Republican confidence, under a Republican president, to "then-President Donald Trump's public questioning of the validity of mail voting". 3
After the result, Republican confidence fell further, to 22% in MIT's post-election survey (chart below). 5
About this data
Full published range: 2004–2024. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – Gallup's whole series. It was not asked in 2010, 2012 or 2014. Midterm years (2006, 2018, 2022) ask about "the votes" rather than "the votes for president". Where a year had two readings (2004, 2016) the value is the one Gallup charts; the chart tables label each year "Jan-04" and so on. The 2024 values are from the 2024 article (all adults: "Fifty-seven percent"). Party groups exclude leaners. The Florida 2000 dispute falls before the series begins.
Votes cast in person
Share of registered voters very or somewhat confident that votes cast each way across the US will be counted as intended, asked each October. Groups are supporters of each party's candidates (president in 2020 and 2024, House in 2022 and 2026).
% confident, by October of each election year
Share of registered voters very or somewhat confident that votes cast each way across the US will be counted as intended, asked each October. Groups are supporters of each party's candidates (president in 2020 and 2024, House in 2022 and 2026). Read as votes cast in person: % confident. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- All voters
- Republican candidate supporters
- Democratic candidate supporters
Source: Pew Research Center [22]
Votes cast by absentee or mail-in ballot
% confident, by October of each election year
Share of registered voters very or somewhat confident that votes cast each way across the US will be counted as intended, asked each October. Groups are supporters of each party's candidates (president in 2020 and 2024, House in 2022 and 2026). Read as votes cast by absentee or mail-in ballot: % confident. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- All voters
- Republican candidate supporters
- Democratic candidate supporters
Source: Pew Research Center [22]
Observations 2
Voters trust the mail count less than the in-person count
In each of Pew's four October readings since 2020, fewer voters were confident that mail and absentee votes would be counted as intended than votes cast in person (chart, both panels). 22
Republicans have stayed low on the mail count; Democrats fell in 2026
At most 42% of Republican candidates' supporters have been confident in the mail count in any reading. 22
Democratic confidence in it fell from 85% among Harris voters in 2024 to 64% in October 2026. 1
In-person confidence also rose among Republicans and fell among Democrats between 2024 and 2026. 22
About this data
Full published range: 2020-10–2026-10. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – Pew's four October readings. "All voters" includes registered voters who back neither party's candidates.
Confident mail and absentee votes will be counted as intended, by how the respondent votes, October 2026
Share of registered voters very or somewhat confident that mail and absentee votes across the US will be counted as voters intend, among those voting by mail or absentee and those voting in person (Pew, September 28–October 4, 2026).
% confident
- Mail and absentee voters76%
- In-person voters47%
Source: Pew Research Center [1]
Observations 1
People who vote by mail trust the mail count
About three in four mail and absentee voters are confident their kind of ballot will be counted as intended, against about half of in-person voters (chart). 1 Confidence in the mail count is highest among the people who use it.
About this data
Pew's text gives these two figures; it does not publish the same split for confidence in the in-person count.
Very or somewhat confident (voters, post-election)
Share of voters very or somewhat confident, asked in the weeks after each November election. Winners of the presidency: Democratic 2012 and 2020, Republican 2016 and 2024.
% confident, by election year
Share of voters very or somewhat confident, asked in the weeks after each November election. Winners of the presidency: Democratic 2012 and 2020, Republican 2016 and 2024. Read as very or somewhat confident (voters, post-election): % confident. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- Republicans
- Democrats
Source: MIT Election Data and Science Lab [23]
Observations 3
After each election the winner's side becomes more confident
In MIT's post-election survey, each party's confidence in the nationwide count rises when its candidate wins the presidency and falls when he or she loses (chart). 5
In surveys from the 2000s, winners' confidence in their own vote rose about 20 points after an election, against a fall of about 2 points among losers. 6
The winner effect has outweighed what leaders say, with exceptions
About this data
Full published range: 2012–2024. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – Survey of the Performance of American Elections, as charted in Figure 25 of How We Voted in 2024. The source's chart has no 2018 point, and its 2014 Democratic point is unlabelled, so 2014 is omitted. Values are the labels printed on the source chart.
Confident in the honesty of elections
Share of US adults answering yes to whether they have confidence in the honesty of elections, the same question Gallup asks in more than 100 countries.
% answering yes, by survey year
Share of US adults answering yes to whether they have confidence in the honesty of elections, the same question Gallup asks in more than 100 countries. Read as confident in the honesty of elections: % answering yes. 4 dated events are numbered on a strip under the graph and listed below it. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- US adults
Events marked above
Obama takes office
Source: Gallup [4]
Trump takes office
Source: Gallup [4]
Biden takes office
Source: Gallup [4]
Trump returns to office
Source: Gallup [4]
Source: Gallup [24]
Observations 1
US confidence in the honesty of elections has been low for two decades
US confidence in the honesty of elections has averaged 45% since 2006, with its low in 2016 (chart). 4 This is a different question from Gallup's vote-count item and gives lower figures.
Party was recorded only from 2024. The Democratic–Republican gap was 55 points that year, closed to 4 points in 2025 and reopened in 2026. 4
About this data
Full published range: 2006–2026. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – Gallup's whole US World Poll series. The 2026 US survey was fielded May 1–June 10, 2026, by telephone, among adults aged 15 and older. Party is published only from 2024.
Approvers and disapprovers of national leadership confident in election honesty: world median and the US
Share confident in the honesty of elections among those who approve and disapprove of their national leadership (Gallup World Poll). The world figure is the 2025 median across more than 100 countries.
% confident
- World median 2025: approvers70%
- World median 2025: disapprovers30%
- US 2026: approvers41%
- US 2026: disapprovers52%
Source: Gallup [4]
Observations 1
A winner–loser gap is the global norm; in 2026 the US ran the other way
About this data
Gallup publishes only the global median, not each country's figures, so the full distribution cannot be shown here. The world median is for 2025 because Gallup's 2026 global collection was incomplete at publication. The US 2025 values are not published separately; Gallup gives the two-year average (46% of approvers, 48% of disapprovers) and the 2026 values, so the US bars show 2026 only.
Six disputed results, and how each ended
What was challenged in each dispute, whether mail ballots were central, and how it ended.
| What was challenged | Mail ballots central? | How it ended, as of | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Florida, presidential, 2000 | Machine-uncounted punch-card ballots ("undervotes") and the hand recount | No | Supreme Court stopped the recount, Dec 2000 [11] |
| Ohio, presidential electoral votes, 2004 | "reported voting irregularities in Ohio" | No | House and Senate each rejected the objection, Jan 2005 [12] |
| Georgia, governor, 2018 | Long lines, provisional ballots and voters removed from the rolls | No | Abrams said there was "no further viable remedy" and ended her campaign without conceding, Nov 2018 [13] |
| United States, presidential, 2020 | The validity of mail voting, and other states' conduct of their elections | Yes | Supreme Court refused Texas's suit, Dec 2020; House rejected objections by 121–303 and 138–282, Jan 2021 [3] [14] [15] [16] |
| Arizona, governor, 2022 | Maricopa County's signature verification of mail ballots | Yes | Trial court found the claim unproven, May 2023 (later appeals not checked here) [17] [18] |
| Bridgeport, Connecticut, mayoral primary, 2023 | Absentee ballots mishandled and stuffed into drop boxes | Yes | Court voided the primary; the same candidate won the rerun primary and the do-over general election, Feb 2024 [19] [20] |
Sources: Gallup [3]; Supreme Court of the United States (via Cornell Legal Information Institute) [11]; Congressional Research Service (via EveryCRSReport) [12]; Georgia Public Broadcasting [13]; Supreme Court of the United States [14]; Office of the Clerk, U.S. House of Representatives [15]; Office of the Clerk, U.S. House of Representatives [16]; Arizona Supreme Court (copy hosted by States United Democracy Center) [17]; Associated Press (via KSAT) [18]; CT Mirror [19]; CBS New York (Associated Press) [20]
Observations 5
Six disputed results, and how each ended
These are prominent recent cases in which a losing side challenged a result, not a complete list.
Mail ballots were central in the three most recent disputes
Every dispute ended with the original winner in office
Five disputes were settled by a court or by Congress; in Georgia the losing candidate ended her campaign without conceding. 13 In every case the original winner ended up in office. 11 12 14 18 In Arizona, the losing candidate "did not contest whether voters' signatures on ballot envelopes matched". 18
Bridgeport's dispute was about real ballot misconduct
No survey measured confidence just before and after each dispute
The Gallup, Pew and MIT series above are annual, pre-election or post-election snapshots, and Florida 2000 predates them. None measures confidence immediately before and after a dispute, so whether disputes themselves lower trust cannot be read from them.
Do election rules change how much voters trust results?
Two pieces of the nearest evidence. No study found tests whether tighter mail rules raise the losing side's confidence.
voters are less likely to express confidence in election results conducted using procedures they oppose
Joshua Clinton, American Political Science ReviewSource: Election Law Blog (Rick Hasen, reproducing the APSR abstract) [9] it is possible that Republican confidence rebounded in 2022 because of the noted winner’s effect
M.V. Hood III and Seth C. McKee, MIT Election Data and Science LabOn Georgia's 2021 election law, SB 202Source: MIT Election Data and Science Lab (M.V. Hood III and Seth C. McKee) [10]
Sources: Election Law Blog (Rick Hasen, reproducing the APSR abstract) [9]; MIT Election Data and Science Lab (M.V. Hood III and Seth C. McKee) [10]
Observations 2
No study tests whether restricting mail voting would raise losers' confidence
No study found tests whether tighter mail rules raise the losing side's confidence in results. The nearest evidence points both ways at once.
Clinton finds voters "less likely to express confidence in election results conducted using procedures they oppose", beyond who wins. 9 In Georgia, 59.1% of Republicans said the state's 2021 election law, which tightened ID rules for mail ballots, raised their confidence, while a 46.8% plurality of Democrats said it lowered theirs. 10
A rule's confidence effect is hard to separate from winning
Georgia Republicans' confidence in the statewide count rebounded in 2022, the first general election under that law (SB 202). The authors caution this may be "the noted winner's effect", since the party won almost every statewide office that year. 10
About this data
What this measures. Opinion surveys of adults (Gallup) or registered voters (Pew, MIT), and the court and congressional record of six disputed results. Pew counts independents who lean to a party with that party; Gallup does not, so each pollster's series is shown separately.
What it does not measure. Confidence is belief, not evidence about whether ballots were counted correctly. For what is known about late ballots and counting, see ballot deadlines and counting speed.
How it compares. The only consistent cross-country measure here is Gallup's World Poll honesty question, published as a global median rather than country by country.
Why these six disputes. They are prominent recent cases in which a losing side challenged a result, not a complete list. Bridgeport is included because a court voided the result; most local disputes are not shown.
Common mistakes. Lower confidence in mail ballots is often read as evidence of mail fraud; it measures belief, and the people who use mail ballots trust them most.
Data still needed
- Any estimate of how much mail-ballot fraud and household pressure goes undetected, for example from audits that contact a random sample of mail voters to confirm they cast and signed their own ballots.Every count here is of detected cases, so it is a floor. Whether the undetected share is tiny or large decides whether the low case counts show that mail fraud is rare, which is the main factual disagreement about mail voting's safety.
- A consistent national series of absentee and mail-ballot fraud prosecutions and court voidings by year, with mail ballots cast as the denominator.Heritage and News21 are compilations without a denominator, so no rate of detected mail fraud per ballot, by state or over time, can be shown.
- Primary records for Wayne County, Michigan's 2020 certification deadlock and the Georgia State Election Board's 2024 certification rules and their court rulings, and the method used in Texas's 1948 Box 13 case.Only secondary accounts were reached, so these cases of officials contesting or altering the count are left out or marked unconfirmed.
- A search of court and state records for any case where signature review was used by officials to reject ballots in order to change a result.None was found, but the search was not complete; a case would bear on whether discretion over which ballots count has been abused.
Sources
Absentee and Mail Ballot Fraud and Manipulation of the Count in the US, 1936–2026
- Order in the Matter of Investigation of Election Irregularities Affecting Counties Within the 9th Congressional District
North Carolina State Board of Elections, 2019-03-13 · supports
“After the 2018 General Election, districtwide, the apparent results of CD-9 were as follows: Harris 139,246, McCready 138,341, and Scott 5,130. Accordingly, Harris led by a margin of 905 votes, or 0.3% of the total number of votes tallied. … Dowless hired workers he paid in cash to collect absentee request forms, to collect absentee ballots, and to falsify absentee ballot witness certifications. … such as falsely witnessing ballots, filling out ballots, and tracing over signatures of witnesses to match the ink color of the voter. … the 2018 General Election for North Carolina’s 9th Congressional District was corrupted by fraud, improprieties, and irregularities so pervasive that its results are tainted as the fruit of an operation manifestly unfair to the voters and corrosive to our system of representative government.”
After the 2018 General Election, districtwide, the apparent results of CD-9 were as follows: Harris 139,246, McCready 138,341, and Scott 5,130. Accordingly, Harris led by a margin of 905 votes, or 0.3% of the total number of votes tallied. … Dowless hired workers he paid in cash to collect absentee request forms, to collect absentee ballots, and to falsify absentee ballot witness certifications. … such as falsely witnessing ballots, filling out ballots, and tracing over signatures of witnesses to match the ink color of the voter. … the 2018 General Election for North Carolina’s 9th Congressional District was corrupted by fraud, improprieties, and irregularities so pervasive that its results are tainted as the fruit of an operation manifestly unfair to the voters and corrosive to our system of representative government.
- With two guilty pleas, NC9 election fraud saga comes to an end
WSOC-TV, 2025-03-21 · supports
“Wake County District Attorney Lorrin Freeman confirmed Lisa Britt and Woody Hester both pleaded guilty to charges stemming from the investigation. … Dowless died before facing a judge. All other workers pleaded guilty.”
Wake County District Attorney Lorrin Freeman confirmed Lisa Britt and Woody Hester both pleaded guilty to charges stemming from the investigation. … Dowless died before facing a judge. All other workers pleaded guilty.
- Pabey v. Pastrick, 816 N.E.2d 1138 (Ind. 2004)
Supreme Court of Indiana (via Caselaw Access Project), 2004-08-06 · supports
“Of the 8,227 votes personally cast on election day, Pabey received 199 more votes than Pastrick. But of the 1,950 absentee ballots, Pastrick defeated Pabey by 477 votes, producing a 278-vote final vieto-ry for Pastrick. The trial court concluded that Pabey had proven "that a deliberate series of actions occurred" that "perverted the absentee voting process and compromised the integrity and results of that election." … The trial court declared 155 votes to be invalid … The extensive evidence presented established that, at the least thirty-nine separate individuals ... fell within the ambit of those activities that engaged cash incentives to encourage absentee voting … Our conclusion is not altered whether the number of invalidated absentee ballots is 155 as found by the trial court, or 100, as urged by the Lake County Election Board. Conclusion We reverse the trial court's determination denying a special election and remand to the trial court with directions to promptly order a special election”
Of the 8,227 votes personally cast on election day, Pabey received 199 more votes than Pastrick. But of the 1,950 absentee ballots, Pastrick defeated Pabey by 477 votes, producing a 278-vote final vieto-ry for Pastrick. The trial court concluded that Pabey had proven "that a deliberate series of actions occurred" that "perverted the absentee voting process and compromised the integrity and results of that election." … The trial court declared 155 votes to be invalid … The extensive evidence presented established that, at the least thirty-nine separate individuals ... fell within the ambit of those activities that engaged cash incentives to encourage absentee voting … Our conclusion is not altered whether the number of invalidated absentee ballots is 155 as found by the trial court, or 100, as urged by the Lake County Election Board. Conclusion We reverse the trial court's determination denying a special election and remand to the trial court with directions to promptly order a special election
- Do absentee ballots facilitate fraud?
NBC News, 2008-10-16 · supports
“Forty-seven people either pleaded guilty or were convicted of various crimes as a result of the investigation.”
Forty-seven people either pleaded guilty or were convicted of various crimes as a result of the investigation.
- Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, 553 U.S. 181 (2008), lead opinion
Supreme Court of the United States (via Caselaw Access Project), 2008-04-28 · supports
“The only kind of voter fraud that SEA 483 addresses is in-person voter impersonation at polling places. The record contains no evidence of any such fraud actually occurring in Indiana at any time in its history. … It remains true, however, that flagrant examples of such fraud in other parts of the country have been documented throughout this Nation’s history by respected historians and journalists, that occasional examples have surfaced in recent years, and that Indiana’s own experience with fraudulent voting in the 2003 Democratic primary for East Chicago Mayor — though perpetrated using absentee ballots and not in-person fraud — demonstrate that not only is the risk of voter fraud real but that it could affect the outcome of a close election.”
The only kind of voter fraud that SEA 483 addresses is in-person voter impersonation at polling places. The record contains no evidence of any such fraud actually occurring in Indiana at any time in its history. … It remains true, however, that flagrant examples of such fraud in other parts of the country have been documented throughout this Nation’s history by respected historians and journalists, that occasional examples have surfaced in recent years, and that Indiana’s own experience with fraudulent voting in the 2003 Democratic primary for East Chicago Mayor — though perpetrated using absentee ballots and not in-person fraud — demonstrate that not only is the risk of voter fraud real but that it could affect the outcome of a close election.
- After voter fraud allegations, judge orders new election in Paterson
New Jersey Globe, 2020-08-19 · supports
“Judge Ernest Caposela today ordered a new election in a Paterson city council election that led to criminal charges against the winner and others. … Mendez is accused of fraud in casting mail-in votes, unauthorized possession of ballots, tampering with public records, and falsifying or tampering with records.”
Judge Ernest Caposela today ordered a new election in a Paterson city council election that led to criminal charges against the winner and others. … Mendez is accused of fraud in casting mail-in votes, unauthorized possession of ballots, tampering with public records, and falsifying or tampering with records.
- Voter fraud charges against Paterson councilman dropped after six years
New Jersey Globe, 2026-04-13 · complicates
“Superior Court Judge Sohail Mohammed dismissed the case on speedy trial grounds and the state prosecutors’ failure to disclose an immunity agreement that had been reached with a key witness, according to the Paterson Press. … when the U.S. Postal Inspection Service found hundreds of mail-in ballots bound together in a series of mail deposit boxes.”
Superior Court Judge Sohail Mohammed dismissed the case on speedy trial grounds and the state prosecutors’ failure to disclose an immunity agreement that had been reached with a key witness, according to the Paterson Press. … when the U.S. Postal Inspection Service found hundreds of mail-in ballots bound together in a series of mail deposit boxes.
- Prosecutors will drop criminal charges against Paterson’s Michael Jackson
New Jersey Globe, 2026-05-15 · complicates
“While vacating the charges against Jackson, Davenport is taking a different approach with Mendez. Her office moved yesterday to appeal the dismissal of his indictment by a Superior Court judge last month.”
While vacating the charges against Jackson, Davenport is taking a different approach with Mendez. Her office moved yesterday to appeal the dismissal of his indictment by a Superior Court judge last month.
- Judge orders new Bridgeport primary
CT Mirror, 2023-11-01 · supports
“"Given the volume of votes at issue, the miscounting of those statutorily invalid votes leaves this court unable to determine the result of the primary." ... Bloss based his argument that a new primary is needed on numbers — arguing that as many as 1,253 were submitted through drop boxes, while 2,100 hours of surveillance videos of the city's four drop boxes show only about 420 people placing ballots in them. … Ganim defeated Gomes by 251 votes in the Sept.”
"Given the volume of votes at issue, the miscounting of those statutorily invalid votes leaves this court unable to determine the result of the primary." ... Bloss based his argument that a new primary is needed on numbers — arguing that as many as 1,253 were submitted through drop boxes, while 2,100 hours of surveillance videos of the city's four drop boxes show only about 420 people placing ballots in them. … Ganim defeated Gomes by 251 votes in the Sept.
- Election Fraud Map data file (vfdb.csv), archived 27 July 2026
The Heritage Foundation, 2026-07-27 · supports
“A 1993 special Pennsylvania state senate election was overturned by a federal district court judge due to absentee ballot fraud. … After a surprising and extraordinary surge in absentee ballots seemed to result in a victory for Stinson, an investigation was undertaken. Stinson was indicted for his role in the scheme but was not convicted. Two campaign workers, Ramon Pratt and Barbara Landers, were convicted of misdemeanor offenses. … Two Democratic city commissioners, Margaret Tartaglione and Alexander Talmadge, Jr., and an elections supervisor, Dennis Kelly, were also found to have been complicit in allowing the fraud to occur. … County Clerk Donald Whitten pleaded guilty to stuffing ballot boxes with fraudulent ballots and falsifying absentee ballots in an effort to rig the 2010 Democratic primary. He won the election, but a judge overturned the election after throwing out 300 fraudulent ballots. Whitten was sentenced to 18 months in prison and three years of supervised release, with a $5,000 fine. … Sheriff Jerry Bowman pleaded guilty to stuffing ballot boxes with fraudulent ballots and falsifying absentee ballots in an effort to rig the 2010 Democratic primary. … Officials became suspicious when 61% of the vote-by-mail ballots were cast for the Republican candidate, despite the fact that only 16% of the mail-by-ballot were registered Republicans. … Nicholas Holliday was declared the winner of the June primary by a margin of 37 votes over Robert Devaull. After Devaull filed a lawsuit challenging the results of the race, the Monroe County District court found that 66 of the 84 absentee ballots cast should not have been counted because they were not valid. A notary, Dallas Jones, was arrested for election fraud for notarizing ballots without watching voters sign ballots or checking their identification. … The results of the 2023 Caddo Parish Sheriff Runoff Election, which was decided by one vote, were overturned by a judge due to at least 11 illegal votes that were cast. … The court found that 2 individuals voted twice in the election, by mail and again in person. Four individuals voted who were under court interdiction (declared mentally incompetent) and thus ineligible to vote. Five individuals submitted absentee ballots that did not have proper signatures or comply with witness requirements under Louisiana law. … The fraud took place during Rivera's 2013 re-election bid, which he won by a scant 16 votes. His challenger sued alleging fraud, and a judge determined that 30 ballots had been illegally cast, enough to alter the outcome of the election. … Fernando Gonzalez won a seat on the Perth Amboy City Council by 10 votes in an election where at least 13 illegal absentee ballots were cast. … had won by three votes. … the judge threw out eight absentee ballots that had case for Gill … The margin of victory was only 449 votes in an election in which over one million votes were cast. … In total, the court ruled that 1,482 illegal votes were cast in the election … A City Council election (originally decided by four votes) in Vernon, California is overturned when it is determined that five people who voted for the winner were not residents of the city, and two others had not properly mailed in their ballots. … The 2018 election for Georgia's 28th House district was overturned twice by Senior Superior Court Judge David Sweat because some out-of-district voters submitted ballots, some voters moved out of the district between the first and second runoff elections, and there was at least one instance of duplicate voting. … Superior Court Judge Judith Chirlin overturned the election, returning Bradley to power based on the fact that the city clerk had improperly placed Perrodin's name at the top of the ballot rather than select the order randomly. … Donald L. Woodward was charged by Asotin County with one felony count of perjury after he filled out and signed his deceased wife's mail-in ballot for the 2016 general election. Election officials detected the forgery because the signature did not match the signature for her that was on file”
A 1993 special Pennsylvania state senate election was overturned by a federal district court judge due to absentee ballot fraud. … After a surprising and extraordinary surge in absentee ballots seemed to result in a victory for Stinson, an investigation was undertaken. Stinson was indicted for his role in the scheme but was not convicted. Two campaign workers, Ramon Pratt and Barbara Landers, were convicted of misdemeanor offenses. … Two Democratic city commissioners, Margaret Tartaglione and Alexander Talmadge, Jr., and an elections supervisor, Dennis Kelly, were also found to have been complicit in allowing the fraud to occur. … County Clerk Donald Whitten pleaded guilty to stuffing ballot boxes with fraudulent ballots and falsifying absentee ballots in an effort to rig the 2010 Democratic primary. He won the election, but a judge overturned the election after throwing out 300 fraudulent ballots. Whitten was sentenced to 18 months in prison and three years of supervised release, with a $5,000 fine. … Sheriff Jerry Bowman pleaded guilty to stuffing ballot boxes with fraudulent ballots and falsifying absentee ballots in an effort to rig the 2010 Democratic primary. … Officials became suspicious when 61% of the vote-by-mail ballots were cast for the Republican candidate, despite the fact that only 16% of the mail-by-ballot were registered Republicans. … Nicholas Holliday was declared the winner of the June primary by a margin of 37 votes over Robert Devaull. After Devaull filed a lawsuit challenging the results of the race, the Monroe County District court found that 66 of the 84 absentee ballots cast should not have been counted because they were not valid. A notary, Dallas Jones, was arrested for election fraud for notarizing ballots without watching voters sign ballots or checking their identification. … The results of the 2023 Caddo Parish Sheriff Runoff Election, which was decided by one vote, were overturned by a judge due to at least 11 illegal votes that were cast. … The court found that 2 individuals voted twice in the election, by mail and again in person. Four individuals voted who were under court interdiction (declared mentally incompetent) and thus ineligible to vote. Five individuals submitted absentee ballots that did not have proper signatures or comply with witness requirements under Louisiana law. … The fraud took place during Rivera's 2013 re-election bid, which he won by a scant 16 votes. His challenger sued alleging fraud, and a judge determined that 30 ballots had been illegally cast, enough to alter the outcome of the election. … Fernando Gonzalez won a seat on the Perth Amboy City Council by 10 votes in an election where at least 13 illegal absentee ballots were cast. … had won by three votes. … the judge threw out eight absentee ballots that had case for Gill … The margin of victory was only 449 votes in an election in which over one million votes were cast. … In total, the court ruled that 1,482 illegal votes were cast in the election … A City Council election (originally decided by four votes) in Vernon, California is overturned when it is determined that five people who voted for the winner were not residents of the city, and two others had not properly mailed in their ballots. … The 2018 election for Georgia's 28th House district was overturned twice by Senior Superior Court Judge David Sweat because some out-of-district voters submitted ballots, some voters moved out of the district between the first and second runoff elections, and there was at least one instance of duplicate voting. … Superior Court Judge Judith Chirlin overturned the election, returning Bradley to power based on the fact that the city clerk had improperly placed Perrodin's name at the top of the ballot rather than select the order randomly. … Donald L. Woodward was charged by Asotin County with one felony count of perjury after he filled out and signed his deceased wife's mail-in ballot for the 2016 general election. Election officials detected the forgery because the signature did not match the signature for her that was on file
- Election Fraud Map: A Sampling of Proven Instances of Election Fraud
The Heritage Foundation, 2025-12-12 · complicates
“The Election Fraud Map displays a sampling of proven instances of election fraud. Every case ended in a finding that the individual engaged in wrongdoing in an election hoping to affect its outcome—or that the results were sufficiently in question to be overturned. While not comprehensive, this map demonstrates vulnerabilities in the election process and the ways in which fraud is committed.”
The Election Fraud Map displays a sampling of proven instances of election fraud. Every case ended in a finding that the individual engaged in wrongdoing in an election hoping to affect its outcome—or that the results were sufficiently in question to be overturned. While not comprehensive, this map demonstrates vulnerabilities in the election process and the ways in which fraud is committed.
- Comprehensive Database of U.S. Voter Fraud Uncovers No Evidence That Photo ID Is Needed
News21, 2012-08-12 · supports
“A News21 analysis of 2,068 alleged election-fraud cases since 2000 shows that while fraud has occurred, the rate is infinitesimal, and in-person voter impersonation on Election Day, which prompted 37 state legislatures to enact or consider tough voter ID laws, is virtually non-existent. … Analysis of the resulting comprehensive News21 election fraud database turned up 10 cases of voter impersonation. … There is more fraud in absentee ballots and voter registration than any other categories. The analysis shows 491 cases of absentee ballot fraud and 400 cases of registration fraud. A required photo ID at the polls would not have prevented these cases. … Of reported election-fraud allegations in the database whose resolution could be determined, 46 percent resulted in acquittals, dropped charges or decisions not to bring charges.”
A News21 analysis of 2,068 alleged election-fraud cases since 2000 shows that while fraud has occurred, the rate is infinitesimal, and in-person voter impersonation on Election Day, which prompted 37 state legislatures to enact or consider tough voter ID laws, is virtually non-existent. … Analysis of the resulting comprehensive News21 election fraud database turned up 10 cases of voter impersonation. … There is more fraud in absentee ballots and voter registration than any other categories. The analysis shows 491 cases of absentee ballot fraud and 400 cases of registration fraud. A required photo ID at the polls would not have prevented these cases. … Of reported election-fraud allegations in the database whose resolution could be determined, 46 percent resulted in acquittals, dropped charges or decisions not to bring charges.
- Building Confidence in U.S. Elections
Commission on Federal Election Reform (Carter–Baker), 2005-09 · supports
“There is no evidence of extensive fraud in U.S. elections or of multiple voting, but both occur, and it could affect the outcome of a close election. … While there is little evidence of fraud in Oregon, where the entire state votes by mail, absentee balloting in other states has been one of the major sources of fraud. Even in Oregon, better precautions are needed to ensure that the return of ballots is not intercepted. … Fraud occurs in several ways. Absentee ballots remain the largest source of potential voter fraud. A notorious recent case of absentee ballot fraud was Miami’s mayoral election of 1998, and in that case, the judge declared the election fraudulent and called for a new election. … Citizens who vote at home, at nursing homes, at the workplace, or in church are more susceptible to pressure, overt and subtle, or to intimidation. Vote buying schemes are far more difficult to detect when citizens vote by mail. … 5.2.1 State and local jurisdictions should prohibit a person from handling absentee ballots other than the voter, an acknowledged family member, the U.S. Postal Service or other legitimate shipper, or election officials. The practice in some states of allowing candidates or party workers to pick up and deliver absentee ballots should be eliminated.”
There is no evidence of extensive fraud in U.S. elections or of multiple voting, but both occur, and it could affect the outcome of a close election. … While there is little evidence of fraud in Oregon, where the entire state votes by mail, absentee balloting in other states has been one of the major sources of fraud. Even in Oregon, better precautions are needed to ensure that the return of ballots is not intercepted. … Fraud occurs in several ways. Absentee ballots remain the largest source of potential voter fraud. A notorious recent case of absentee ballot fraud was Miami’s mayoral election of 1998, and in that case, the judge declared the election fraudulent and called for a new election. … Citizens who vote at home, at nursing homes, at the workplace, or in church are more susceptible to pressure, overt and subtle, or to intimidation. Vote buying schemes are far more difficult to detect when citizens vote by mail. … 5.2.1 State and local jurisdictions should prohibit a person from handling absentee ballots other than the voter, an acknowledged family member, the U.S. Postal Service or other legitimate shipper, or election officials. The practice in some states of allowing candidates or party workers to pick up and deliver absentee ballots should be eliminated.
- Election Administration and Voting Survey 2024 Comprehensive Report
U.S. Election Assistance Commission, 2025-06-30 · supports
“Of the mail ballots that were returned by voters, 47,629,437 were reported as being counted and 584,463 were reported as being rejected, for a count rate of 98.8% of the mail ballots that were returned and a rejection rate of 1.2% of the mail ballots that were returned.”
Of the mail ballots that were returned by voters, 47,629,437 were reported as being counted and 584,463 were reported as being rejected, for a count rate of 98.8% of the mail ballots that were returned and a rejection rate of 1.2% of the mail ballots that were returned.
- 3rd Strike Against Voter Fraud Claims Means They're Out After Signature Audit Finds No Fraud
Georgia Secretary of State, 2020-12-29 · complicates
“A signature match audit in Cobb County found "no fraudulent absentee ballots" and found that the Cobb County Elections Department had "a 99.99% accuracy rate in performing correct signature verification procedures." ... The audit found that only two ballots should have been identified by Cobb County Elections Officials for cure notification that weren't. In one case, the ballot was "mistakenly signed by the elector's spouse," and in the other, the voter "reported signing the front of the envelope only." In both cases, the identified voters filled out the ballots themselves.”
A signature match audit in Cobb County found "no fraudulent absentee ballots" and found that the Cobb County Elections Department had "a 99.99% accuracy rate in performing correct signature verification procedures." ... The audit found that only two ballots should have been identified by Cobb County Elections Officials for cure notification that weren't. In one case, the ballot was "mistakenly signed by the elector's spouse," and in the other, the voter "reported signing the front of the envelope only." In both cases, the identified voters filled out the ballots themselves.
- Securing the ballot: Report of Sir Eric Pickles' review into electoral fraud
UK Government (Cabinet Office), 2016-08 · complicates
“The ability to prove undue influence within households is hampered by the reluctance of individuals to report it. Evidence to the review maintained the reasons were considered similar to those which prevent sufferers of domestic abuse from coming forward.”
The ability to prove undue influence within households is hampered by the reluctance of individuals to report it. Evidence to the review maintained the reasons were considered similar to those which prevent sufferers of domestic abuse from coming forward.
- A 'Modern' Democracy That Can't Count Votes
Los Angeles Times, 2000-12-11 · complicates
“In a pilot study, Rose gathered preliminary survey data this year on voters in Washington County, outside Portland. About 5% of 818 respondents said other people marked their ballots, and 2.4% said other people signed their ballot envelopes. Rose suspects the real number is higher, because people are reluctant to admit being party to a crime.”
In a pilot study, Rose gathered preliminary survey data this year on voters in Washington County, outside Portland. About 5% of 818 respondents said other people marked their ballots, and 2.4% said other people signed their ballot envelopes. Rose suspects the real number is higher, because people are reluctant to admit being party to a crime.
- Report to Congress on the Activities and Operations of the Public Integrity Section for 1984
US Department of Justice, Public Integrity Section, 1985-04 · supports
“Illinois, N.D. - In an investigation in the City of Chicago, fifty-eight individuals, including city employees and election judges, thus far have been convicted of vote fraud in the November 1982, general election. The investigation continues. … Texas, S.D. - A total of twenty-nine persons were indicted, and twenty-one persons convicted, of buying votes with food stamps and welfare benefits in Duval County, Texas. This series of cases focused on the 1982 Texas primary election, and was investigated jointly by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Texas Rangers.”
Illinois, N.D. - In an investigation in the City of Chicago, fifty-eight individuals, including city employees and election judges, thus far have been convicted of vote fraud in the November 1982, general election. The investigation continues. … Texas, S.D. - A total of twenty-nine persons were indicted, and twenty-one persons convicted, of buying votes with food stamps and welfare benefits in Duval County, Texas. This series of cases focused on the 1982 Texas primary election, and was investigated jointly by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Texas Rangers.
- An Interview with Dan Webb (IST-A-L-2016-034), abstract
Abraham Lincoln Presidential Library, 2016-12 · supports
“The FBI conducted an extensive investigation, and a grand jury issued a report detailing the scope and breadth of the vote fraud. Webb’s office cooperated with the FBI during its investigation and prosecuted sixty five individuals for federal election crimes; sixty-three of those were convicted.”
The FBI conducted an extensive investigation, and a grand jury issued a report detailing the scope and breadth of the vote fraud. Webb’s office cooperated with the FBI during its investigation and prosecuted sixty five individuals for federal election crimes; sixty-three of those were convicted.
- United States v. Olinger, 759 F.2d 1293 (7th Cir. 1985)
US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (via Caselaw Access Project), 1985-04-15 · supports
“On the day of the general election, Hicks distributed ballot applications, along with the names of registered voters who had moved away or died, to the election judges, including the appellant. The election judges completed the ballot applications with the names of the phantom voters. Then, using the fraudulent ballot applications, the election judges cast votes according to Hicks’ instructions. … Appellant watched as Hicks solicited voters and paid them $2.00 per vote. As a result of these activities, more than one-third of the 330 votes cast in the 17th precinct that election day were fraudulent. … In over two hours of voting, approximately 52 residents voted. Appellant and the other election judges cast nearly all of those votes for the straight Democratic Party ticket by punching 10. During the voting, a Democratic Party election judge paid residents small amounts of money for their votes as appellant watched.”
On the day of the general election, Hicks distributed ballot applications, along with the names of registered voters who had moved away or died, to the election judges, including the appellant. The election judges completed the ballot applications with the names of the phantom voters. Then, using the fraudulent ballot applications, the election judges cast votes according to Hicks’ instructions. … Appellant watched as Hicks solicited voters and paid them $2.00 per vote. As a result of these activities, more than one-third of the 330 votes cast in the 17th precinct that election day were fraudulent. … In over two hours of voting, approximately 52 residents voted. Appellant and the other election judges cast nearly all of those votes for the straight Democratic Party ticket by punching 10. During the voting, a Democratic Party election judge paid residents small amounts of money for their votes as appellant watched.
- Snapshot History: Maurice Milligan
US Attorney's Office, Western District of Missouri, 2015-02-26 · supports
“Local election results often showed vote totals for machine candidates that exceeded the total population in several wards and precincts. … U.S. Attorney Maurice M. Milligan and his staff prosecuted the resulting vote fraud cases for a total of 259 convictions.”
Local election results often showed vote totals for machine candidates that exceeded the total population in several wards and precincts. … U.S. Attorney Maurice M. Milligan and his staff prosecuted the resulting vote fraud cases for a total of 259 convictions.
- Devoe v. United States, 103 F.2d 584 (8th Cir. 1939)
US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit (via Caselaw Access Project), 1939-05-03 · supports
“Hayde succeeded in getting upon the list about 150 “ghosts and sleepers”; that late in October, 1936, Hayde asked Frances Ryan and Devoe how they were going to handle the precinct with respect to the “ghosts and sleepers” and whether they were going to send people to cast the “ghost and sleeper” vote; that they told him that they were not sending repeaters to the precinct, and that it would be easier to write in the votes for the “ghosts and sleepers” … that he prepared the ballots for the “ghosts and sleepers”, and, with some considerable difficulty, succeeded in stuffing the ballot box with these votes; that the stuffing was completed before the polls were closed; that the votes which had been cast were not counted … The Republican candidate for Congress received in fact 120 votes … His Democratic opponent was given 605 votes, when in fact he received 515 votes. … The judgment is affirmed.”
Hayde succeeded in getting upon the list about 150 “ghosts and sleepers”; that late in October, 1936, Hayde asked Frances Ryan and Devoe how they were going to handle the precinct with respect to the “ghosts and sleepers” and whether they were going to send people to cast the “ghost and sleeper” vote; that they told him that they were not sending repeaters to the precinct, and that it would be easier to write in the votes for the “ghosts and sleepers” … that he prepared the ballots for the “ghosts and sleepers”, and, with some considerable difficulty, succeeded in stuffing the ballot box with these votes; that the stuffing was completed before the polls were closed; that the votes which had been cast were not counted … The Republican candidate for Congress received in fact 120 votes … His Democratic opponent was given 605 votes, when in fact he received 515 votes. … The judgment is affirmed.
- Johnson v. Stevenson, 170 F.2d 108 (5th Cir. 1948)
US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (via Caselaw Access Project), 1948-10-07 · complicates
“Johnson also filed under oath what he calls an opposition to the temporary injunction which takes issue with some of the factual allegations of the petition and proposes at a proper time and in a proper forum to show illegal votes in larger numbers which were counted for Stevenson than those Stevenson claims were fraudulently counted for Johnson.”
Johnson also filed under oath what he calls an opposition to the temporary injunction which takes issue with some of the factual allegations of the petition and proposes at a proper time and in a proper forum to show illegal votes in larger numbers which were counted for Stevenson than those Stevenson claims were fraudulently counted for Johnson.
- New Mexico election standoff and ‘attack on democracy’ ends
KOB 4, 2022-06-18 · supports
“A standoff ended Friday when a group of defiant local officials in New Mexico gave in to the state and voted to certify their June 7 primary election results, after they had been refusing to do so. … The New Mexico Supreme Court unanimously ordered them to certify the votes by Friday’s deadline”
A standoff ended Friday when a group of defiant local officials in New Mexico gave in to the state and voted to certify their June 7 primary election results, after they had been refusing to do so. … The New Mexico Supreme Court unanimously ordered them to certify the votes by Friday’s deadline
- Arizona’s Cochise County wants federal investigation of 2022 election
Votebeat, 2025-09-17 · supports
“two Republican Cochise supervisors in November 2022 to vote to delay the certification of the county’s midterm election results past the legal deadline. A judge later ordered the supervisors to certify the election. A year after their vote to delay the certification, a state grand jury indicted the two supervisors, Tom Crosby and Peggy Judd, on charges of conspiracy and interference with an elections officer. Judd has since pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor. But Crosby pleaded not guilty, and is awaiting a trial.”
two Republican Cochise supervisors in November 2022 to vote to delay the certification of the county’s midterm election results past the legal deadline. A judge later ordered the supervisors to certify the election. A year after their vote to delay the certification, a state grand jury indicted the two supervisors, Tom Crosby and Peggy Judd, on charges of conspiracy and interference with an elections officer. Judd has since pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor. But Crosby pleaded not guilty, and is awaiting a trial.
- Judge dismisses Kari Lake's final claim in election loss for Arizona governor
Associated Press (via KSAT), 2023-05-23 · complicates
“Thompson said Lake failed to prove her claim that Maricopa County did not verify signatures on mail ballots as required by law. ... She filed suit after losing to Hobbs by about 17,000 votes, asking the courts to install her as governor or order a new election.”
Thompson said Lake failed to prove her claim that Maricopa County did not verify signatures on mail ballots as required by law. ... She filed suit after losing to Hobbs by about 17,000 votes, asking the courts to install her as governor or order a new election.
- One-in-Five Mail-In Voters Admit They Cheated in 2020 Election
Rasmussen Reports, 2023-12-12 · complicates
“A new national telephone and online survey by Rasmussen Reports and The Heartland Institute finds that 21% of Likely U.S. voters who voted by absentee or mail-in ballot in the 2020 election say they filled out a ballot, in part or in full, on behalf of a friend or family member, such as a spouse or child, while 78% say they didn't. ... The survey of 1,085 U.S. Likely Voters was conducted on November 30-December 6, 2023 by Rasmussen Reports and The Heartland Institute.”
A new national telephone and online survey by Rasmussen Reports and The Heartland Institute finds that 21% of Likely U.S. voters who voted by absentee or mail-in ballot in the 2020 election say they filled out a ballot, in part or in full, on behalf of a friend or family member, such as a spouse or child, while 78% say they didn't. ... The survey of 1,085 U.S. Likely Voters was conducted on November 30-December 6, 2023 by Rasmussen Reports and The Heartland Institute.
- Trump's Latest Bogus Claim About Mail-In Vote Fraud in Pennsylvania
FactCheck.org, 2024-09-20 · contests
“"[T]he vast majority of Rasmussen data come from an ordinary opt-in online panel" in which participants actively seek to join rather than being randomly selected, "which AAPOR tells you cannot have a margin of error, because there is no systematic sampling involved," Krosnick said. … "[T]he results are wildly out of line with literally all other incoming information, including the rate of ballots flagged in any jurisdiction anywhere in the country for signature mismatches," Levitt told us via email.”
"[T]he vast majority of Rasmussen data come from an ordinary opt-in online panel" in which participants actively seek to join rather than being randomly selected, "which AAPOR tells you cannot have a margin of error, because there is no systematic sampling involved," Krosnick said. … "[T]he results are wildly out of line with literally all other incoming information, including the rate of ballots flagged in any jurisdiction anywhere in the country for signature mismatches," Levitt told us via email.
- Report to Congress on the Activities and Operations of the Public Integrity Section for 1983
US Department of Justice, Public Integrity Section, 1984-04 · supports
“Alice Mae Yarborough and her daughter Vernie Mae Yarborough pled guilty to one count of multiple voting in the June 8, 1982 primary election in Darlington County, South Carolina … In Statesville, North Carolina, five defendants were convicted and sentenced for their roles in subverting the 1982 general election in Alexander County, North Carolina. … The Yarboroughs were poil officials who utilized their access to the poll list an voting machine to forge voter's names and vote numerous ballots for "no show" voters during the election. … The indictment alleged that the defendants defrauded the voters of Luzerne County of their right to fair and non-corrupt elections by submitting false and fraudulent absentee ballot materials. … A federal jury had convicted four of the defendants of mail fraud, conspiracy, and multiple-voting for their fraudulent voting of absentee ballots of nursing home residents. … The lead defendants, Deputy Sheriff Mark Douglas Odom and Deputy Clerk of Court Joyce Geraldine Beach … In Bryson City, North Carolina, eight defendants were convicted and sentenced for their roles in subverting the November 1982 election in Clay County, North Carolina. The trial evidence showed a massive vote-buying scheme, with the detendants purchasing votes for the Democratic Party slate at prices ranging between $50 and $125 per voter. … Former Republican Sheriff Hartsell Moore, who was defeated by Barnard in his 1982 reelection effort, received a prison term of 15 months and a $2,000 fine on his guilty plea to two counts of vote-buying. … a successful scheme to fraudulently affect the outcome of a close legislative contest for Missouri State Representative in 1980.”
Alice Mae Yarborough and her daughter Vernie Mae Yarborough pled guilty to one count of multiple voting in the June 8, 1982 primary election in Darlington County, South Carolina … In Statesville, North Carolina, five defendants were convicted and sentenced for their roles in subverting the 1982 general election in Alexander County, North Carolina. … The Yarboroughs were poil officials who utilized their access to the poll list an voting machine to forge voter's names and vote numerous ballots for "no show" voters during the election. … The indictment alleged that the defendants defrauded the voters of Luzerne County of their right to fair and non-corrupt elections by submitting false and fraudulent absentee ballot materials. … A federal jury had convicted four of the defendants of mail fraud, conspiracy, and multiple-voting for their fraudulent voting of absentee ballots of nursing home residents. … The lead defendants, Deputy Sheriff Mark Douglas Odom and Deputy Clerk of Court Joyce Geraldine Beach … In Bryson City, North Carolina, eight defendants were convicted and sentenced for their roles in subverting the November 1982 election in Clay County, North Carolina. The trial evidence showed a massive vote-buying scheme, with the detendants purchasing votes for the Democratic Party slate at prices ranging between $50 and $125 per voter. … Former Republican Sheriff Hartsell Moore, who was defeated by Barnard in his 1982 reelection effort, received a prison term of 15 months and a $2,000 fine on his guilty plea to two counts of vote-buying. … a successful scheme to fraudulently affect the outcome of a close legislative contest for Missouri State Representative in 1980.
- United States v. Townsley, 843 F.2d 1070 (8th Cir. 1988)
US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit (via Caselaw Access Project), 1988-03-25 · supports
“On one occasion Wellington Hamilton Lemmer (a campaign worker for the Seventh Ward Organization and a confidential government informant) entered Webbe’s office at the Seventh Ward Organization. Lemmer saw Webbe, Townsley (a close associate of Webbe, Jr. and an integral member of the Seventh Ward Organization) and two others with opened absentee ballots and observed that they were punching holes in the ballots. … For reasons to be stated, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”
On one occasion Wellington Hamilton Lemmer (a campaign worker for the Seventh Ward Organization and a confidential government informant) entered Webbe’s office at the Seventh Ward Organization. Lemmer saw Webbe, Townsley (a close associate of Webbe, Jr. and an integral member of the Seventh Ward Organization) and two others with opened absentee ballots and observed that they were punching holes in the ballots. … For reasons to be stated, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Mail Ballot Rejection, Signature Checks and Curing, 2012–2026
- Election Administration and Voting Survey 2024 Comprehensive Report
U.S. Election Assistance Commission, 2025-06-30 · supports
“States reported transmitting 66,867,671 mail ballots for the 2024 general election (a decrease of 26.3% over the 90,687,978 mail ballots transmitted for the 2020 general election), of which 47,957,093 were returned by voters, for a rate of 72% of transmitted mail ballots being returned by voters. Of the mail ballots that were returned by voters, 47,629,437 were reported as being counted and 584,463 were reported as being rejected, for a count rate of 98.8% of the mail ballots that were returned and a rejection rate of 1.2% of the mail ballots that were returned. … The percentage of returned mail ballots that were counted and rejected was not significantly different across these three elections. For the 2024 general election, the percentage of counted and rejected mail ballots was not significantly different when comparing states that conducted an all-mail election at a state level to those that did not. … HAVA expanded and standardized the use of provisional voting as a way for a voter to cast a ballot when their registration status cannot be verified at the time of voting, when there is some indication that the voter may have already cast another ballot (e.g., by mail), or when the voter’s eligibility to vote in an election is challenged.”
States reported transmitting 66,867,671 mail ballots for the 2024 general election (a decrease of 26.3% over the 90,687,978 mail ballots transmitted for the 2020 general election), of which 47,957,093 were returned by voters, for a rate of 72% of transmitted mail ballots being returned by voters. Of the mail ballots that were returned by voters, 47,629,437 were reported as being counted and 584,463 were reported as being rejected, for a count rate of 98.8% of the mail ballots that were returned and a rejection rate of 1.2% of the mail ballots that were returned. … The percentage of returned mail ballots that were counted and rejected was not significantly different across these three elections. For the 2024 general election, the percentage of counted and rejected mail ballots was not significantly different when comparing states that conducted an all-mail election at a state level to those that did not. … HAVA expanded and standardized the use of provisional voting as a way for a voter to cast a ballot when their registration status cannot be verified at the time of voting, when there is some indication that the voter may have already cast another ballot (e.g., by mail), or when the voter’s eligibility to vote in an election is challenged.
- Election Administration and Voting Survey 2024 Comprehensive Report (Chapter 1, Table 1)
U.S. Election Assistance Commission, 2025-06-30 · supports
“Table 1. Most Common Reason For Mail Ballot Rejection Was a Non-Matching Or Incomplete Signature … Ballot envelope had a non-matching or incomplete signature 40.7% Other reason not listed 18.1% Ballot was not received on time/missed the deadline 17.8% Voter already cast another ballot that was accepted 11.1% Ballot envelope did not have a voter signature 10% Ballot envelope did not have a witness signature 5.6% Voter did not provide the required documentation (e.g., identification, affidavit, statement) or documentation was incomplete 4.4% Ballot was not placed in a required secrecy envelope 3.7% Voter was not eligible to cast a ballot in the jurisdiction 3.4% Envelope was not sealed 2% Voter was deceased 1.5% Ballot was missing from the envelope 1.1% Returned ballot envelope did not have required postmark 0.9% Ballot was returned in an unofficial envelope 0.4% No resident address was on the envelope 0.2% Multiple ballots were returned in one envelope 0.2% No ballot application on record 0% … Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating national percentages, and because of this, percentages do not total 100%. … About two-fifths of the mail ballots that were rejected for this election were rejected for this reason. … The states with the highest percentage of mail ballots rejected for other reasons were Oregon (96.1%), Idaho (65.1%), Ohio (41.5%), Wisconsin (38.6%), Virginia (37.4%), and Arizona (37.1%). Other common reasons for rejection reported in the data descriptions included “All signature issues,” “Neither returned undeliverable nor returned by the voter,” multiple issues with a single mail ballot, and the rejection reason not being specified.”
Table 1. Most Common Reason For Mail Ballot Rejection Was a Non-Matching Or Incomplete Signature … Ballot envelope had a non-matching or incomplete signature 40.7% Other reason not listed 18.1% Ballot was not received on time/missed the deadline 17.8% Voter already cast another ballot that was accepted 11.1% Ballot envelope did not have a voter signature 10% Ballot envelope did not have a witness signature 5.6% Voter did not provide the required documentation (e.g., identification, affidavit, statement) or documentation was incomplete 4.4% Ballot was not placed in a required secrecy envelope 3.7% Voter was not eligible to cast a ballot in the jurisdiction 3.4% Envelope was not sealed 2% Voter was deceased 1.5% Ballot was missing from the envelope 1.1% Returned ballot envelope did not have required postmark 0.9% Ballot was returned in an unofficial envelope 0.4% No resident address was on the envelope 0.2% Multiple ballots were returned in one envelope 0.2% No ballot application on record 0% … Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating national percentages, and because of this, percentages do not total 100%. … About two-fifths of the mail ballots that were rejected for this election were rejected for this reason. … The states with the highest percentage of mail ballots rejected for other reasons were Oregon (96.1%), Idaho (65.1%), Ohio (41.5%), Wisconsin (38.6%), Virginia (37.4%), and Arizona (37.1%). Other common reasons for rejection reported in the data descriptions included “All signature issues,” “Neither returned undeliverable nor returned by the voter,” multiple issues with a single mail ballot, and the rejection reason not being specified.
- Election Administration and Voting Survey 2024 Comprehensive Report (Chapter 1, curing)
U.S. Election Assistance Commission, 2025-06-30 · supports
“According to the 2024 Policy Survey, 43 states allowed voters to cure their mail ballots for the 2024 general election — that is, making their ballot eligible to be counted for the election by correcting missing information or signature errors. … Among states that reported these data, 585,457 ballots were reported to have been set aside for curing, of which 317,191 were successfully cured by voters and 270,753 were ultimately rejected. … At the national level, 1.5% of returned mail ballots entered the curing process, with 54.3% of these ballots being successfully cured by voters. Maryland had the highest successful cure rate at 94.8% and the District of Columbia had the lowest rate at 21.4%. … Not all states that cure ballots were able to report data on the number of ballots that were cured. Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, and Wisconsin were unable to report data on the total number of mail ballots that entered the cure process in C7a. New Jersey was able to report data on successfully cured mail ballots in C7b only. … The percentage of successfully cured mail ballots was calculated as C7b/C7a x 100. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating the national percentages.”
According to the 2024 Policy Survey, 43 states allowed voters to cure their mail ballots for the 2024 general election — that is, making their ballot eligible to be counted for the election by correcting missing information or signature errors. … Among states that reported these data, 585,457 ballots were reported to have been set aside for curing, of which 317,191 were successfully cured by voters and 270,753 were ultimately rejected. … At the national level, 1.5% of returned mail ballots entered the curing process, with 54.3% of these ballots being successfully cured by voters. Maryland had the highest successful cure rate at 94.8% and the District of Columbia had the lowest rate at 21.4%. … Not all states that cure ballots were able to report data on the number of ballots that were cured. Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, and Wisconsin were unable to report data on the total number of mail ballots that entered the cure process in C7a. New Jersey was able to report data on successfully cured mail ballots in C7b only. … The percentage of successfully cured mail ballots was calculated as C7b/C7a x 100. Casewise deletion was used at the state level in calculating the national percentages.
- Election Administration and Voting Survey 2024 Comprehensive Report (Chapter 1, Appendix A, Overview Table 1)
U.S. Election Assistance Commission, 2025-06-30 · supports
“Overview Table 1: Mail Voting in the 2024 General Election … Mail Ballots Not Counted Total % of Returned … Alabama 1,779 -- … Alaska [1] 872 1.8% … American Samoa [2] 1 0.5% … Arizona [3] 25,071 0.9% … Arkansas 2,274 8.8% … California 123,248 0.9% … Colorado [4] 42,751 1.4% … Connecticut 2,642 -- … Delaware 1,816 5.1% … District of Columbia 1,169 0.7% … Florida [5] 21,126 0.7% … Georgia [6] 4,761 1.7% … Guam [7] 9 16.7% … Hawaii 4,161 0.9% … Idaho [8] 2,657 1.5% … Illinois [9] 16,559 1.6% … Indiana [10] 3,432 0.2% … Iowa 1,169 0.5% … Kansas 561 0.4% … Kentucky 4,076 3.4% … Louisiana [11] 2,921 2.4% … Maine [12] 511 0.2% … Maryland 2,796 0.4% … Massachusetts [13] 13,198 1.1% … Michigan 63,561 3.1% … Minnesota 9,122 2.0% … Mississippi [14] -- -- … Missouri 5,238 2.9% … Montana [15] 2,235 0.5% … Nebraska [16] 1,466 0.5% … Nevada 13,305 2.0% … New Hampshire 1,552 1.6% … New Jersey [17] 11,191 1.3% … New Mexico 967 0.9% … New York 25,750 3.0% … North Carolina [18] 8,916 2.9% … North Dakota 501 0.6% … Northern Mariana Islands 13 -- … Ohio 8,335 0.8% … Oklahoma 4,477 4.3% … Oregon [19] 38,465 1.7% … Pennsylvania [20] 19,270 1.0% … Puerto Rico [21] 2,239 1.7% … Rhode Island 306 0.6% … South Carolina 2,803 2.8% … South Dakota 738 0.5% … Tennessee 1,844 2.1% … Texas 14,049 3.5% … U.S. Virgin Islands 6 1.0% … Utah 23,819 1.9% … Vermont [22] 467 0.2% … Virginia 4,807 1.0% … Washington [23] 36,187 0.9% … West Virginia 247 1.1% … Wisconsin [24] 2,823 0.5% … Wyoming 204 0.5% … U.S. Total 584,463 1.2% … Mail Ballots Not Counted, % of Returned uses C9a/C1b x 100.”
Overview Table 1: Mail Voting in the 2024 General Election … Mail Ballots Not Counted Total % of Returned … Alabama 1,779 -- … Alaska [1] 872 1.8% … American Samoa [2] 1 0.5% … Arizona [3] 25,071 0.9% … Arkansas 2,274 8.8% … California 123,248 0.9% … Colorado [4] 42,751 1.4% … Connecticut 2,642 -- … Delaware 1,816 5.1% … District of Columbia 1,169 0.7% … Florida [5] 21,126 0.7% … Georgia [6] 4,761 1.7% … Guam [7] 9 16.7% … Hawaii 4,161 0.9% … Idaho [8] 2,657 1.5% … Illinois [9] 16,559 1.6% … Indiana [10] 3,432 0.2% … Iowa 1,169 0.5% … Kansas 561 0.4% … Kentucky 4,076 3.4% … Louisiana [11] 2,921 2.4% … Maine [12] 511 0.2% … Maryland 2,796 0.4% … Massachusetts [13] 13,198 1.1% … Michigan 63,561 3.1% … Minnesota 9,122 2.0% … Mississippi [14] -- -- … Missouri 5,238 2.9% … Montana [15] 2,235 0.5% … Nebraska [16] 1,466 0.5% … Nevada 13,305 2.0% … New Hampshire 1,552 1.6% … New Jersey [17] 11,191 1.3% … New Mexico 967 0.9% … New York 25,750 3.0% … North Carolina [18] 8,916 2.9% … North Dakota 501 0.6% … Northern Mariana Islands 13 -- … Ohio 8,335 0.8% … Oklahoma 4,477 4.3% … Oregon [19] 38,465 1.7% … Pennsylvania [20] 19,270 1.0% … Puerto Rico [21] 2,239 1.7% … Rhode Island 306 0.6% … South Carolina 2,803 2.8% … South Dakota 738 0.5% … Tennessee 1,844 2.1% … Texas 14,049 3.5% … U.S. Virgin Islands 6 1.0% … Utah 23,819 1.9% … Vermont [22] 467 0.2% … Virginia 4,807 1.0% … Washington [23] 36,187 0.9% … West Virginia 247 1.1% … Wisconsin [24] 2,823 0.5% … Wyoming 204 0.5% … U.S. Total 584,463 1.2% … Mail Ballots Not Counted, % of Returned uses C9a/C1b x 100.
- Election Administration and Voting Survey 2022 Comprehensive Report
U.S. Election Assistance Commission, 2023-06-29 · supports
“Of the mail ballots that were returned by voters, 35,718,700 were reported as being counted and 549,824 were reported as being rejected, for a count rate of 97.4% of the mail ballots that were returned and a rejection rate of 1.5% of the mail ballots that were returned. … Table 1. Most Common Reason for Mail Ballot Rejection was “Other” … Other reason not listed 32.7% Ballot had a non-matching or incomplete signature 26.9% Ballot was not received on time/missed the deadline 23.1% Ballot did not have a voter signature 9.8% … The most common other reasons reported were ”Undeliverable/Void/Final Not Counted“ (comprising approximately half of mail ballots rejected for other reasons) and “All Signature Issues” (comprising approximately one-quarter of mail ballots rejected for other reasons).”
Of the mail ballots that were returned by voters, 35,718,700 were reported as being counted and 549,824 were reported as being rejected, for a count rate of 97.4% of the mail ballots that were returned and a rejection rate of 1.5% of the mail ballots that were returned. … Table 1. Most Common Reason for Mail Ballot Rejection was “Other” … Other reason not listed 32.7% Ballot had a non-matching or incomplete signature 26.9% Ballot was not received on time/missed the deadline 23.1% Ballot did not have a voter signature 9.8% … The most common other reasons reported were ”Undeliverable/Void/Final Not Counted“ (comprising approximately half of mail ballots rejected for other reasons) and “All Signature Issues” (comprising approximately one-quarter of mail ballots rejected for other reasons).
- Election Administration and Voting Survey 2020 Comprehensive Report
U.S. Election Assistance Commission, 2021-08 · supports
“This means that 77.8% of the transmitted mailed ballots were returned by voters, and of the returned ballots, 98.8% were counted and 0.8% were rejected. Although the number of mailed ballots that were transmitted more than doubled since 2016—when 41,651,526 transmitted mailed ballots were reported—the mailed ballot return, count, and rejection rates were not significantly different between the 2016 and 2020 general elections at the national level. … Table 2. The Most Common Reason for Rejecting Mailed Ballots Was for a Non-Matching Signature … Non-matching signature 32.8% Other reason given 22.5% Voter already voted in person 13.5% Ballot not received on time/missed deadline 12.1% No voter signature 12.1% … Overview Table 2: Voter Turnout by Mail … Mailed Ballots Rejected, Total, % of Returned … Georgia [2] 1,311,361 99.6 4,804 0.4 … Texas 982,362 99.4 8,304 0.8 … [2] Data on rejected mailed ballots for Georgia include rejected ballots entered by counties into the state voter registration system as of February 2021, which does not necessarily include all ballots rejected by counties.”
This means that 77.8% of the transmitted mailed ballots were returned by voters, and of the returned ballots, 98.8% were counted and 0.8% were rejected. Although the number of mailed ballots that were transmitted more than doubled since 2016—when 41,651,526 transmitted mailed ballots were reported—the mailed ballot return, count, and rejection rates were not significantly different between the 2016 and 2020 general elections at the national level. … Table 2. The Most Common Reason for Rejecting Mailed Ballots Was for a Non-Matching Signature … Non-matching signature 32.8% Other reason given 22.5% Voter already voted in person 13.5% Ballot not received on time/missed deadline 12.1% No voter signature 12.1% … Overview Table 2: Voter Turnout by Mail … Mailed Ballots Rejected, Total, % of Returned … Georgia [2] 1,311,361 99.6 4,804 0.4 … Texas 982,362 99.4 8,304 0.8 … [2] Data on rejected mailed ballots for Georgia include rejected ballots entered by counties into the state voter registration system as of February 2021, which does not necessarily include all ballots rejected by counties.
- The Election Administration and Voting Survey: 2018 Comprehensive Report
U.S. Election Assistance Commission, 2019-06 · supports
“Of these returned ballots, 91.8 percent were counted in the 2018 general elections and 1.4 percent were rejected. … Table 1. Most Common Reason for By-Mail Ballot Rejection is “Other” … “Other” reason given 34.9% Ballot not received on time/missed deadline 26.9% Non-matching signature 15.8% No voter signature 13.0% … Overview Table 2: By-Mail and In-Person Early Voting … Georgia 3,951,876 281,490 242,661 86.21 218,858 90.19 7,512 3.10 16,291 6.71 … Texas 7,976,548 621,386 533,566 85.87 527,787 98.92 9,377 1.76 -3,598 -0.67”
Of these returned ballots, 91.8 percent were counted in the 2018 general elections and 1.4 percent were rejected. … Table 1. Most Common Reason for By-Mail Ballot Rejection is “Other” … “Other” reason given 34.9% Ballot not received on time/missed deadline 26.9% Non-matching signature 15.8% No voter signature 13.0% … Overview Table 2: By-Mail and In-Person Early Voting … Georgia 3,951,876 281,490 242,661 86.21 218,858 90.19 7,512 3.10 16,291 6.71 … Texas 7,976,548 621,386 533,566 85.87 527,787 98.92 9,377 1.76 -3,598 -0.67
- The Election Administration and Voting Survey 2016 Comprehensive Report
U.S. Election Assistance Commission, 2017-06 · supports
“Table 1. Top Reasons for Rejecting Absentee Ballots Percentage of ballots returned and submitted for counting Rejected (total) 1.0% Non-matching signature 27.5% Ballot not received on time/missed deadline 23.1% No voter signature 20.0% “Other” reason given 14.8% Uncategorized 5.7% … In 2016, there were seven states that did not report the reasons why absentee ballots are rejected, which leaves an incomplete picture of why those ballots were not counted.”
Table 1. Top Reasons for Rejecting Absentee Ballots Percentage of ballots returned and submitted for counting Rejected (total) 1.0% Non-matching signature 27.5% Ballot not received on time/missed deadline 23.1% No voter signature 20.0% “Other” reason given 14.8% Uncategorized 5.7% … In 2016, there were seven states that did not report the reasons why absentee ballots are rejected, which leaves an incomplete picture of why those ballots were not counted.
- The EAC 2014 Election Administration and Voting Survey Comprehensive Report: A Summary of Key Findings
U.S. Election Assistance Commission, 2015-06-30 · supports
“States reported counting 18,968,173 absentee ballots (98.2%) and rejecting 268,720 (1.4%) (see Tables 32, 33a, 33b, and 33c). Arkansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, and New York reported rejecting over 5% of their absentee ballots, and Illinois and American Samoa rejected over 15% of their absentee ballots. … Exhibit 5. Top Reasons for Rejecting Domestic Absentee Ballots Reason Number Percent Missed deadline 78,833 29.3% Lack of valid signature 43,644 16.2% Nonmatching signature 42,266 15.7% … 14 States vary in whether they consider vote-by-mail ballots to be absentee ballots; some States with vote by mail reserve the term “absentee” for specific circumstances.”
States reported counting 18,968,173 absentee ballots (98.2%) and rejecting 268,720 (1.4%) (see Tables 32, 33a, 33b, and 33c). Arkansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, and New York reported rejecting over 5% of their absentee ballots, and Illinois and American Samoa rejected over 15% of their absentee ballots. … Exhibit 5. Top Reasons for Rejecting Domestic Absentee Ballots Reason Number Percent Missed deadline 78,833 29.3% Lack of valid signature 43,644 16.2% Nonmatching signature 42,266 15.7% … 14 States vary in whether they consider vote-by-mail ballots to be absentee ballots; some States with vote by mail reserve the term “absentee” for specific circumstances.
- The 2012 Election Administration and Voting Survey: A Summary of Key Findings
U.S. Election Assistance Commission, 2013-09 · supports
“States reported counting 26,834,076 absentee ballots (97.1%), and rejecting 258,380 (0.9%) (see Tables 32, 33a, 33b, and 33c). … Readers should note that the “Reasons for Rejected Absentee Ballots” listed below are for ballots submitted for counting … TOP REASONS FOR REJECTING ABSENTEE BALLOTS Number Percent Missed deadline 82,922 32.1% Non-matching signature 45,392 17.6% Lack of valid signature 44,748 17.3% … HIGHEST ABSENTEE VOTING RATES Colorado 71.4% Arizona 65.9% Montana 57.5% Georgia 48.8%”
States reported counting 26,834,076 absentee ballots (97.1%), and rejecting 258,380 (0.9%) (see Tables 32, 33a, 33b, and 33c). … Readers should note that the “Reasons for Rejected Absentee Ballots” listed below are for ballots submitted for counting … TOP REASONS FOR REJECTING ABSENTEE BALLOTS Number Percent Missed deadline 82,922 32.1% Non-matching signature 45,392 17.6% Lack of valid signature 44,748 17.3% … HIGHEST ABSENTEE VOTING RATES Colorado 71.4% Arizona 65.9% Montana 57.5% Georgia 48.8%
- Administration of Mail-In Voting (Elections Performance Index), by Arianna Conte
MIT Election Data and Science Lab, 2026-06-25 · supports
“The EPI’s “ mail ballots rejected ” indicator measures the degree to which mail and absentee ballots are rejected as a percentage of all votes cast. The nationwide average in 2024 was 0.34%, the same as 2020 and slightly above the mail ballot rejection rate of the 2016, 2012, and 2008 elections.”
The EPI’s “ mail ballots rejected ” indicator measures the degree to which mail and absentee ballots are rejected as a percentage of all votes cast. The nationwide average in 2024 was 0.34%, the same as 2020 and slightly above the mail ballot rejection rate of the 2016, 2012, and 2008 elections.
- Texas officials say they're rejecting fewer mail ballots than the primary's big spike
NPR (via Texas Public Radio), 2022-11-06 · complicates
“During the state's primary in March, state officials said 24,636 mail-in ballots were rejected in that election. That's a 12.38% rejection rate — far higher than in previous contests. According to the U.S. Election Assistance Commission, Texas' mail ballot rejection rate during the 2020 general election was 0.8% and it was 1.5% in 2018. The surge in the rejection rate in March followed a voting law passed by Republicans in the state legislature in 2021 that created new ID requirements for mail ballots. Local officials said confusion created by the law, known as Senate Bill 1, tripped up many voters. In many cases, voters completely missed the field on the ballot return envelope that requires either a partial Social Security number or driver's license number. … Sam Taylor, assistant secretary of state for communications, attributes the decrease in the mail ballot rejection rate to updates to the return ballot in some Texas counties, as well as additional voter information included in mail ballots by local officials. He says various voter education campaigns following the March primary have also helped. … Taylor also said rejection rates were always likely to improve as "voters got used to" the new mail ballot process.”
During the state's primary in March, state officials said 24,636 mail-in ballots were rejected in that election. That's a 12.38% rejection rate — far higher than in previous contests. According to the U.S. Election Assistance Commission, Texas' mail ballot rejection rate during the 2020 general election was 0.8% and it was 1.5% in 2018. The surge in the rejection rate in March followed a voting law passed by Republicans in the state legislature in 2021 that created new ID requirements for mail ballots. Local officials said confusion created by the law, known as Senate Bill 1, tripped up many voters. In many cases, voters completely missed the field on the ballot return envelope that requires either a partial Social Security number or driver's license number. … Sam Taylor, assistant secretary of state for communications, attributes the decrease in the mail ballot rejection rate to updates to the return ballot in some Texas counties, as well as additional voter information included in mail ballots by local officials. He says various voter education campaigns following the March primary have also helped. … Taylor also said rejection rates were always likely to improve as "voters got used to" the new mail ballot process.
- 2022 EAVS Data Brief: Texas
U.S. Election Assistance Commission, 2023-08 · complicates
“444,150 mail ballots transmitted • 83.2% of transmitted mail ballots returned by voters • 96.6% of returned mail ballots counted • 3.4% of returned mail ballots rejected”
444,150 mail ballots transmitted • 83.2% of transmitted mail ballots returned by voters • 96.6% of returned mail ballots counted • 3.4% of returned mail ballots rejected
- 2024 EAVS Data Brief: Texas
U.S. Election Assistance Commission, 2025 · complicates
“463,200 mail ballots transmitted 86.0% of transmitted mail ballots returned by voters 96.5% of returned mail ballots counted … 5.8% of mail ballots entered ballot curing process”
463,200 mail ballots transmitted 86.0% of transmitted mail ballots returned by voters 96.5% of returned mail ballots counted … 5.8% of mail ballots entered ballot curing process
- 2022 EAVS Data Brief: Georgia
U.S. Election Assistance Commission, 2023-08 · supports
“280,897 mail ballots transmitted • 89.8% of transmitted mail ballots returned by voters • 98.5% of returned mail ballots counted • 1.5% of returned mail ballots rejected”
280,897 mail ballots transmitted • 89.8% of transmitted mail ballots returned by voters • 98.5% of returned mail ballots counted • 1.5% of returned mail ballots rejected
- 2024 EAVS Data Brief: Georgia
U.S. Election Assistance Commission, 2025 · supports
“327,241 mail ballots transmitted 83.6% of transmitted mail ballots returned by voters 98.3% of returned mail ballots counted”
327,241 mail ballots transmitted 83.6% of transmitted mail ballots returned by voters 98.3% of returned mail ballots counted
- Gauging the Effects of SB 202 on Voting in Georgia
MIT Election Data and Science Lab (report by M.V. Hood III and Seth C. McKee), 2024-05 · complicates
“Within this context the Republican-controlled General Assembly passed an omnibus reform bill known as the Election Integrity Act of 2021 (hereafter referred to as SB 202). … A plurality of LEOs indicated that the absentee ballot/application verification process did not result in fewer rejections … SB 202 altered verification for absentee applications and ballots from signature verification to use of a driver’s license or state ID number. Almost half of the counties responding indicated that processing of absentee applications (49%) and ballots (46%) was faster in 2022. In addition, 34% of counties reported fewer ABM applications rejected and 32% reported fewer ABM ballots rejected as compared to 2022.”
Within this context the Republican-controlled General Assembly passed an omnibus reform bill known as the Election Integrity Act of 2021 (hereafter referred to as SB 202). … A plurality of LEOs indicated that the absentee ballot/application verification process did not result in fewer rejections … SB 202 altered verification for absentee applications and ballots from signature verification to use of a driver’s license or state ID number. Almost half of the counties responding indicated that processing of absentee applications (49%) and ballots (46%) was faster in 2022. In addition, 34% of counties reported fewer ABM applications rejected and 32% reported fewer ABM ballots rejected as compared to 2022.
- Evaluating Washington's Ballot Rejection Rates (Performance Audit Report No. 1029711)
Office of the Washington State Auditor, 2022-02-01 · supports
“Although county election officials can reject ballots for several reasons, 97 percent are rejected because they are late (postmarked after Election Day), unsigned, or the ballot signature does not match the voter signature on file. … For the 2020 general election, the overall ballot rejection rate in Washington was 0.72 percent, or fewer than 30,000 ballots out of about 4.2 million cast, excluding late ballots. County ballot rejection rates ranged from less than one-tenth of a percent to about 1.5 percent of ballots cast, listed in Exhibit 3. … Exhibit 3 – Rejection rates by county from highest to lowest in the 2020 general election County Rate County Rate County Rate County Rate Franklin 1.50% Benton 0.72% Grant 0.50% Jefferson 0.29% Okanogan 1.28% Whitman 0.70% Klickitat 0.49% Chelan 0.28% Adams 1.15% Lincoln 0.65% Cowlitz 0.48% Garfield 0.27% Kittitas 1.14% Clallam 0.64% Whatcom 0.47% Stevens 0.26% Snohomish 0.99% Skagit 0.63% Spokane 0.46% Ferry 0.25% Wahkiakum 0.98% Pierce 0.63% Grays Harbor 0.46% San Juan 0.25% King 0.86% Pacific 0.59% Mason 0.44% Douglas 0.25% Kitsap 0.85% Lewis 0.57% Skamania 0.38% Pend Oreille 0.20% Clark 0.76% Island 0.56% Walla Walla 0.36% Columbia 0.04% Asotin 0.72% Thurston 0.51% Yakima 0.29% Note: Data excludes late ballots.”
Although county election officials can reject ballots for several reasons, 97 percent are rejected because they are late (postmarked after Election Day), unsigned, or the ballot signature does not match the voter signature on file. … For the 2020 general election, the overall ballot rejection rate in Washington was 0.72 percent, or fewer than 30,000 ballots out of about 4.2 million cast, excluding late ballots. County ballot rejection rates ranged from less than one-tenth of a percent to about 1.5 percent of ballots cast, listed in Exhibit 3. … Exhibit 3 – Rejection rates by county from highest to lowest in the 2020 general election County Rate County Rate County Rate County Rate Franklin 1.50% Benton 0.72% Grant 0.50% Jefferson 0.29% Okanogan 1.28% Whitman 0.70% Klickitat 0.49% Chelan 0.28% Adams 1.15% Lincoln 0.65% Cowlitz 0.48% Garfield 0.27% Kittitas 1.14% Clallam 0.64% Whatcom 0.47% Stevens 0.26% Snohomish 0.99% Skagit 0.63% Spokane 0.46% Ferry 0.25% Wahkiakum 0.98% Pierce 0.63% Grays Harbor 0.46% San Juan 0.25% King 0.86% Pacific 0.59% Mason 0.44% Douglas 0.25% Kitsap 0.85% Lewis 0.57% Skamania 0.38% Pend Oreille 0.20% Clark 0.76% Island 0.56% Walla Walla 0.36% Columbia 0.04% Asotin 0.72% Thurston 0.51% Yakima 0.29% Note: Data excludes late ballots.
- Evaluating Washington's Ballot Rejection Rates (Performance Audit Report No. 1029711)
Office of the Washington State Auditor, 2022-02-01 · supports
“Exhibit 5 – Ballots of younger voters were rejected at a higher rate than those of older voters 2020 general election; Rate of rejection by age group 2.68% 2.04% 1.56% 0.88% 0.38% 0.17% 18-21 22-25 26-29 30-44 45-64 65+ … voters had a rejection rate of 2.68 percent, while the oldest voters had a rejection rate of just 0.17 percent. After accounting for other variables with our regression analysis, we estimated that Washington's youngest voters were almost three times more likely to have their ballots rejected than Washington's oldest voters. This was consistent when we considered only ballots rejected for mismatched signatures. … We found a statistically significant difference in ballot rejection rates between white voters and voters from all other racial and ethnic groups, except Native Americans and multiracial voters. … We also found the greatest disparity was between white and Black voters, with rejection rates at 0.63 percent and 2.49 percent, respectively (shown in Exhibit 6). Even when controlling for other variables, we estimated Black voters were twice as likely to have ballots rejected than white voters. Exhibit 6 – Ballots of white voters were rejected at a lower rate than those of all other racial and ethnic groups 2020 general election; Rate of rejection by race/ethnic group 2.49% 1.59% 1.57% 1.24% 0.63% Black Native American Hispanic Asian/ Pacific Islander White”
Exhibit 5 – Ballots of younger voters were rejected at a higher rate than those of older voters 2020 general election; Rate of rejection by age group 2.68% 2.04% 1.56% 0.88% 0.38% 0.17% 18-21 22-25 26-29 30-44 45-64 65+ … voters had a rejection rate of 2.68 percent, while the oldest voters had a rejection rate of just 0.17 percent. After accounting for other variables with our regression analysis, we estimated that Washington's youngest voters were almost three times more likely to have their ballots rejected than Washington's oldest voters. This was consistent when we considered only ballots rejected for mismatched signatures. … We found a statistically significant difference in ballot rejection rates between white voters and voters from all other racial and ethnic groups, except Native Americans and multiracial voters. … We also found the greatest disparity was between white and Black voters, with rejection rates at 0.63 percent and 2.49 percent, respectively (shown in Exhibit 6). Even when controlling for other variables, we estimated Black voters were twice as likely to have ballots rejected than white voters. Exhibit 6 – Ballots of white voters were rejected at a lower rate than those of all other racial and ethnic groups 2020 general election; Rate of rejection by race/ethnic group 2.49% 1.59% 1.57% 1.24% 0.63% Black Native American Hispanic Asian/ Pacific Islander White
- Evaluating Washington's Ballot Rejection Rates (Performance Audit Report No. 1029711)
Office of the Washington State Auditor, 2022-02-01 · supports
“The rejection rate of ballots cast by first-time voters was more than five times greater than for voters with previous voting experience. … We estimated that male voters were 42 percent more likely than female voters to have ballots rejected. … We estimated that voters in the county casting non-English ballots had a 47 percent greater likelihood of ballot rejection than voters who cast English-language ballots.”
The rejection rate of ballots cast by first-time voters was more than five times greater than for voters with previous voting experience. … We estimated that male voters were 42 percent more likely than female voters to have ballots rejected. … We estimated that voters in the county casting non-English ballots had a 47 percent greater likelihood of ballot rejection than voters who cast English-language ballots.
- Evaluating Washington's Ballot Rejection Rates (Performance Audit Report No. 1029711)
Office of the Washington State Auditor, 2022-02-01 · supports
“For the 2020 general election, the county where a ballot was cast was the most significant variable related to rejection. … After accounting for demographic variables like age, race, education levels and income in our regression analysis, we estimated that ballots submitted to some counties were four to seven times more likely to be rejected for signature mismatches or being unsigned than ballots submitted to other counties. The disparity was even greater when analyzing the likelihood a ballot would be rejected for just signature mismatches, with ballots from two counties having 18 times the likelihood of rejection as another county.”
For the 2020 general election, the county where a ballot was cast was the most significant variable related to rejection. … After accounting for demographic variables like age, race, education levels and income in our regression analysis, we estimated that ballots submitted to some counties were four to seven times more likely to be rejected for signature mismatches or being unsigned than ballots submitted to other counties. The disparity was even greater when analyzing the likelihood a ballot would be rejected for just signature mismatches, with ballots from two counties having 18 times the likelihood of rejection as another county.
- Evaluating Washington's Ballot Rejection Rates (Performance Audit Report No. 1029711)
Office of the Washington State Auditor, 2022-02-01 · complicates
“we used automatic signature verification software that compared a statistically significant random sample of more than 7,200 voter ballot signatures to those on file from the 2020 general election. … Auditors trained by the State Patrol in signature review then reviewed all cases where the software disagreed with the county's decision or where it deemed the signature as a possible forgery. … We agreed with county determinations for more than 98 percent of the signatures reviewed, but found counties with lower rejection rates were more likely to accept less conclusive signatures. When applying results from our sample to the entire population of signatures, we estimated that 98.7 percent of county decisions were appropriate.”
we used automatic signature verification software that compared a statistically significant random sample of more than 7,200 voter ballot signatures to those on file from the 2020 general election. … Auditors trained by the State Patrol in signature review then reviewed all cases where the software disagreed with the county's decision or where it deemed the signature as a possible forgery. … We agreed with county determinations for more than 98 percent of the signatures reviewed, but found counties with lower rejection rates were more likely to accept less conclusive signatures. When applying results from our sample to the entire population of signatures, we estimated that 98.7 percent of county decisions were appropriate.
- Evaluating Washington's Ballot Rejection Rates (Performance Audit Report No. 1029711)
Office of the Washington State Auditor, 2022-02-01 · supports
“Unlike the other main reasons ballots are rejected – late postmarks and missing signatures – deciding whether a signature matches is inherently subjective and requires some level of human judgment … Although trainings and statewide criteria may help standardize processes, we found that even experienced reviewers can come to different conclusions. … Members of our own team participating in the review also disagreed on whether many of the signatures matched. We also found that county officials interpreted statewide criteria for signature verification differently.”
Unlike the other main reasons ballots are rejected – late postmarks and missing signatures – deciding whether a signature matches is inherently subjective and requires some level of human judgment … Although trainings and statewide criteria may help standardize processes, we found that even experienced reviewers can come to different conclusions. … Members of our own team participating in the review also disagreed on whether many of the signatures matched. We also found that county officials interpreted statewide criteria for signature verification differently.
- Evaluating Washington's Ballot Rejection Rates (Performance Audit Report No. 1029711)
Office of the Washington State Auditor, 2022-02-01 · complicates
“We found no evidence of bias when counties accepted or rejected ballots … We specifically looked for evidence of this by reviewing a random sample of accepted ballots and those rejected for mismatched signatures. … Disparities in rejection rates for different racial and ethnic groups are unacceptable, and we explicitly looked for bias in the decisions to accept or reject individual ballots, to see if that could help explain the differences. We found no evidence of bias in those decisions. While that is good news, it also means we are not able to explain what causes rejection rates to vary for these groups of voters.”
We found no evidence of bias when counties accepted or rejected ballots … We specifically looked for evidence of this by reviewing a random sample of accepted ballots and those rejected for mismatched signatures. … Disparities in rejection rates for different racial and ethnic groups are unacceptable, and we explicitly looked for bias in the decisions to accept or reject individual ballots, to see if that could help explain the differences. We found no evidence of bias in those decisions. While that is good news, it also means we are not able to explain what causes rejection rates to vary for these groups of voters.
- Evaluating Washington's Ballot Rejection Rates (Performance Audit Report No. 1029711)
Office of the Washington State Auditor, 2022-02-01 · complicates
“Counties with lower rejection rates had higher cure rates (65 percent cured) than the other counties (50 percent cured). … All 10 counties reported training employees before reviewing any signatures, and sometimes also taking subsequent trainings to increase their expertise.”
Counties with lower rejection rates had higher cure rates (65 percent cured) than the other counties (50 percent cured). … All 10 counties reported training employees before reviewing any signatures, and sometimes also taking subsequent trainings to increase their expertise.
- Voting by Mail and Ballot Rejection: Lessons from Florida for Elections in the Age of the Coronavirus (draft abstract by Baringer, Herron and Smith; published in Election Law Journal 19(3))
Election Law Blog, 2020-04-18 · supports
“This motivates our examination of over 8.2 million ballots cast in the 2018 General Election in Florida, including 2.6 million VBM ballots, of which approximately 1.2 percent were rejected by local election officials. ... We find that younger voters and voters needing assistance are disproportionately likely to have their VBM ballots rejected. ... Lastly, we find significant variation in the rejection rates of VBM ballots cast across Florida's 67 counties, suggesting a non-uniformity in the way local election officials verify these ballots.”
This motivates our examination of over 8.2 million ballots cast in the 2018 General Election in Florida, including 2.6 million VBM ballots, of which approximately 1.2 percent were rejected by local election officials. ... We find that younger voters and voters needing assistance are disproportionately likely to have their VBM ballots rejected. ... Lastly, we find significant variation in the rejection rates of VBM ballots cast across Florida's 67 counties, suggesting a non-uniformity in the way local election officials verify these ballots.
- QSS Faculty Publish Paper on Voting By Mail (abstract of Cottrell, Herron and Smith, "Vote-by-mail ballot rejection and experience with mail-in voting")
Dartmouth Program in Quantitative Social Science, 2020-10-12 · supports
“Our analysis of ballot rejections in the political battleground state of Florida shows that inexperienced mail voters were three and 2.75 times more likely, respectively, in the 2016 and 2018 General Elections to have their ballots rejected than experienced mail voters. ... Moreover, the effect of inexperience on vote-by-mail ballot rejection rates varies by party affiliation, race/ethnicity, age, and gender.”
Our analysis of ballot rejections in the political battleground state of Florida shows that inexperienced mail voters were three and 2.75 times more likely, respectively, in the 2016 and 2018 General Elections to have their ballots rejected than experienced mail voters. ... Moreover, the effect of inexperience on vote-by-mail ballot rejection rates varies by party affiliation, race/ethnicity, age, and gender.
- Table 14: How States Verify Voted Absentee/Mail Ballots
National Conference of State Legislatures, 2026-10-26 · supports
“Thirty-two states and Puerto Rico conduct signature verification on returned absentee/mail ballots: Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Puerto Rico, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Washington and West Virginia. Nine states, the Virgin Islands and Washington, D.C., verify that an absentee/mail ballot envelope has been signed but do not conduct signature verification: Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Maryland, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Vermont, Virginia and Wyoming. Eight states require the signature of a witness in addition to the voter’s signature: Alabama (two witnesses or a notary), Alaska (witness or notary), Arkansas, Louisiana, Minnesota (witness or notary), North Carolina (two witnesses or a notary), South Carolina and Wisconsin. Six states require voters to provide information such as a state ID, driver’s license, or Social Security number on their ballot envelope. This information is verified with the voter’s registration and/or absentee ballot application. Georgia (state ID/driver’s license number) Minnesota (state ID/driver’s license number or last four digits of Social Security number and a witness signature or notary) New Mexico (last four digits of Social Security number) Ohio (state ID/driver’s license number or last four digits of Social Security number) Texas (state ID/driver’s license number or last four digits of SSN) Virginia (last four digits of Social Security number) Note: Starting in 2029, Utah will verify mail ballots with the last four digits of a voter’s state ID/driver’s license number or the last four digits of their Social Security number, rather than completing signature verification. Three states require the absentee/mail ballot envelope to be notarized: Mississippi, Missouri, and Oklahoma.”
Thirty-two states and Puerto Rico conduct signature verification on returned absentee/mail ballots: Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Puerto Rico, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Washington and West Virginia. Nine states, the Virgin Islands and Washington, D.C., verify that an absentee/mail ballot envelope has been signed but do not conduct signature verification: Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Maryland, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Vermont, Virginia and Wyoming. Eight states require the signature of a witness in addition to the voter’s signature: Alabama (two witnesses or a notary), Alaska (witness or notary), Arkansas, Louisiana, Minnesota (witness or notary), North Carolina (two witnesses or a notary), South Carolina and Wisconsin. Six states require voters to provide information such as a state ID, driver’s license, or Social Security number on their ballot envelope. This information is verified with the voter’s registration and/or absentee ballot application. Georgia (state ID/driver’s license number) Minnesota (state ID/driver’s license number or last four digits of Social Security number and a witness signature or notary) New Mexico (last four digits of Social Security number) Ohio (state ID/driver’s license number or last four digits of Social Security number) Texas (state ID/driver’s license number or last four digits of SSN) Virginia (last four digits of Social Security number) Note: Starting in 2029, Utah will verify mail ballots with the last four digits of a voter’s state ID/driver’s license number or the last four digits of their Social Security number, rather than completing signature verification. Three states require the absentee/mail ballot envelope to be notarized: Mississippi, Missouri, and Oklahoma.
- Table 14: How States Verify Voted Absentee/Mail Ballots (Washington and Colorado rows)
National Conference of State Legislatures, 2026-10-26 · complicates
“Election officials compare the signature on the declaration with the signature in the voter's registration file. All personnel assigned to verify signatures must receive training on statewide standards for signature verification. … If the election judge determines the signatures do not match, two other election judges of different political party affiliations shall simultaneously compare the signatures.”
Election officials compare the signature on the declaration with the signature in the voter's registration file. All personnel assigned to verify signatures must receive training on statewide standards for signature verification. … If the election judge determines the signatures do not match, two other election judges of different political party affiliations shall simultaneously compare the signatures.
- Table 15: States With Absentee/Mail Ballot Cure Processes
National Conference of State Legislatures, 2026-08-31 · complicates
“Thirty-five states and Washington, D.C., have ballot curing processes statewide requiring election officials to notify voters when there is a missing signature or a signature discrepancy—and requiring that voters must be given an opportunity to correct it.”
Thirty-five states and Washington, D.C., have ballot curing processes statewide requiring election officials to notify voters when there is a missing signature or a signature discrepancy—and requiring that voters must be given an opportunity to correct it.
- Table 18: States With Mostly Mail Elections
National Conference of State Legislatures, 2026-08-07 · supports
“Eight states and Washington, D.C., allow all elections to be conducted entirely by mail: California, Colorado, Hawaii, Nevada, Oregon, Utah, Vermont and Washington state.”
Eight states and Washington, D.C., allow all elections to be conducted entirely by mail: California, Colorado, Hawaii, Nevada, Oregon, Utah, Vermont and Washington state.
- Saucedo v. Gardner, No. 17-cv-183-LM, Opinion No. 2018 DNH 160
U.S. District Court for the District of New Hampshire, 2018-08-14 · supports
“As will become evident, this signature-matching process is fundamentally flawed. Not only is the disenfranchised voter given no right to participate in this process, but the voter is not even given notice that her ballot has been rejected due to a signature mismatch. Moreover, moderators receive no training in handwriting analysis or signature comparison; no statute, regulation, or guidance from the State provides functional standards to distinguish the natural variations of one writer from other variations that suggest two different writers; and the moderator's assessment is final, without any review or appeal. … In the 2016 General Election, .35% of all absentee ballots submitted were rejected due to a signature mismatch (275 rejections out of 78,430 absentee ballots). … plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment on their procedural due process claim. The court grants plaintiffs' request for declaratory relief insofar as RSA 659:50, III is unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment”
As will become evident, this signature-matching process is fundamentally flawed. Not only is the disenfranchised voter given no right to participate in this process, but the voter is not even given notice that her ballot has been rejected due to a signature mismatch. Moreover, moderators receive no training in handwriting analysis or signature comparison; no statute, regulation, or guidance from the State provides functional standards to distinguish the natural variations of one writer from other variations that suggest two different writers; and the moderator's assessment is final, without any review or appeal. … In the 2016 General Election, .35% of all absentee ballots submitted were rejected due to a signature mismatch (275 rejections out of 78,430 absentee ballots). … plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment on their procedural due process claim. The court grants plaintiffs' request for declaratory relief insofar as RSA 659:50, III is unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment
- Richardson v. Texas Secretary of State, No. 20-50774 (opinion of Smith, J.)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 2020-10-19 · complicates
“Because Texas's strong interest in safeguarding the integrity of its elections from voter fraud far outweighs any burden the state's voting procedures place on the right to vote, we stay the injunction pending appeal. … It seeks to stop voter fraud where the problem is most acute—in the context of mail-in voting. "[T]he potential and reality of fraud is much greater in the mail-in ballot context than with in-person voting." … Thus, the Secretary is likely to show that voting does not implicate any state-created liberty interest under the Due Process Clause.”
Because Texas's strong interest in safeguarding the integrity of its elections from voter fraud far outweighs any burden the state's voting procedures place on the right to vote, we stay the injunction pending appeal. … It seeks to stop voter fraud where the problem is most acute—in the context of mail-in voting. "[T]he potential and reality of fraud is much greater in the mail-in ballot context than with in-person voting." … Thus, the Secretary is likely to show that voting does not implicate any state-created liberty interest under the Due Process Clause.
- Richardson v. Texas Secretary of State, No. 20-50774 (Higginbotham, J., concurring)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 2020-10-19 · supports
“I concur only in the decision to stay pending appeal of the district court’s injunction changing the election rules. … In 2016 and 2018, “approximately 5,000 [Texas] ballots were rejected on the basis of perceived signature mismatches.” Such "small" differences have the potential to decide both local and national elections. And with the large increase in votes cast by mail in our ongoing pandemic that error rate would toss out far greater numbers.”
I concur only in the decision to stay pending appeal of the district court’s injunction changing the election rules. … In 2016 and 2018, “approximately 5,000 [Texas] ballots were rejected on the basis of perceived signature mismatches.” Such "small" differences have the potential to decide both local and national elections. And with the large increase in votes cast by mail in our ongoing pandemic that error rate would toss out far greater numbers.
- In re: November 3, 2020 General Election, Petition of Kathy Boockvar, No. 149 MM 2020 [J-113-2020]
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 2020-10-23 · supports
“For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the Election Code does not authorize or require county election boards to reject absentee or mail-in ballots during the canvassing process based on an analysis of a voter's signature on the "declaration" contained on the official ballot return envelope for the absentee or mail-in ballot. We, therefore, grant the Secretary's petition for declarative relief, and direct the county boards of elections not to reject absentee or mail-in ballots for counting, computing, and tallying based on signature comparisons conducted by county election officials or employees, or as the result of third-party challenges based on such comparisons.”
For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the Election Code does not authorize or require county election boards to reject absentee or mail-in ballots during the canvassing process based on an analysis of a voter's signature on the "declaration" contained on the official ballot return envelope for the absentee or mail-in ballot. We, therefore, grant the Secretary's petition for declarative relief, and direct the county boards of elections not to reject absentee or mail-in ballots for counting, computing, and tallying based on signature comparisons conducted by county election officials or employees, or as the result of third-party challenges based on such comparisons.
- Judge dismisses Kari Lake's final claim in election loss for Arizona governor
Associated Press (via KSAT), 2023-05-23 · complicates
“Thompson said Lake failed to prove her claim that Maricopa County did not verify signatures on mail ballots as required by law. ... She filed suit after losing to Hobbs by about 17,000 votes, asking the courts to install her as governor or order a new election.”
Thompson said Lake failed to prove her claim that Maricopa County did not verify signatures on mail ballots as required by law. ... She filed suit after losing to Hobbs by about 17,000 votes, asking the courts to install her as governor or order a new election.
- 3rd Strike Against Voter Fraud Claims Means They're Out After Signature Audit Finds No Fraud
Georgia Secretary of State, 2020-12-29 · complicates
“A signature match audit in Cobb County found “no fraudulent absentee ballots” and found that the Cobb County Elections Department had “a 99.99% accuracy rate in performing correct signature verification procedures.” … Of the 150,431 absentee ballots received by Cobb County elections officials during the November elections, the audit “reviewed 15,118 ABM ballot oath envelopes from randomly selected boxes,” or around 10% of the total. The sample size was originally chosen to meet the 99% confidence threshold. … The Secretary of State’s Office partnered with the Georgia Bureau of Investigation (GBI) to conduct the audit. … The audit found that only two ballots should have been identified by Cobb County Elections Officials for cure notification that weren’t. In one case, the ballot was “mistakenly signed by the elector’s spouse,” and in the other, the voter “reported signing the front of the envelope only.” In both cases, the identified voters filled out the ballots themselves. The absentee ballot envelopes for the audit were “pulled from 30 randomly selected boxes of the accepted ABM ballots and one box identified as accepted Electronic Ballot Delivery ABM ballots.””
A signature match audit in Cobb County found “no fraudulent absentee ballots” and found that the Cobb County Elections Department had “a 99.99% accuracy rate in performing correct signature verification procedures.” … Of the 150,431 absentee ballots received by Cobb County elections officials during the November elections, the audit “reviewed 15,118 ABM ballot oath envelopes from randomly selected boxes,” or around 10% of the total. The sample size was originally chosen to meet the 99% confidence threshold. … The Secretary of State’s Office partnered with the Georgia Bureau of Investigation (GBI) to conduct the audit. … The audit found that only two ballots should have been identified by Cobb County Elections Officials for cure notification that weren’t. In one case, the ballot was “mistakenly signed by the elector’s spouse,” and in the other, the voter “reported signing the front of the envelope only.” In both cases, the identified voters filled out the ballots themselves. The absentee ballot envelopes for the audit were “pulled from 30 randomly selected boxes of the accepted ABM ballots and one box identified as accepted Electronic Ballot Delivery ABM ballots.”
- Election Administration and Voting Survey 2022 Comprehensive Report (rate definitions)
U.S. Election Assistance Commission, 2023-06-29 · supports
“Data on the number of mail ballots counted were collected in item C8a and data on mail ballots rejected were collected in item C9a of the 2022 EAVS. The count rate was calculated as C8a/C1b x 100 and the rejection rate was calculated as C9a/C1b x 100 for the 2022 EAVS. For the 2018 and 2020 EAVS, the count rate was calculated as C3a/C1b x 100, and the rejection rate was calculated as C4a/C1b x 100. Casewise deletion was used at the state level; the count and rejection rate may not sum to 100% because of the casewise deletion and due to rounding.”
Data on the number of mail ballots counted were collected in item C8a and data on mail ballots rejected were collected in item C9a of the 2022 EAVS. The count rate was calculated as C8a/C1b x 100 and the rejection rate was calculated as C9a/C1b x 100 for the 2022 EAVS. For the 2018 and 2020 EAVS, the count rate was calculated as C3a/C1b x 100, and the rejection rate was calculated as C4a/C1b x 100. Casewise deletion was used at the state level; the count and rejection rate may not sum to 100% because of the casewise deletion and due to rounding.
- The Election Administration and Voting Survey 2016 Comprehensive Report (Overview Table 2)
U.S. Election Assistance Commission, 2017-06 · supports
“Overview Table 2: Absentee Voting … Total Voter Turnout, Total Ballots Transmitted, Total Ballots Returned, Counted Total, Pct. Returned, Rejected Total, Pct. Transmitted … Georgia 4,147,161 236,925 213,033 199,356 93.58 13,677 5.77 0 0.00 … Texas 8,701,152 520,027 468,150 449,258 95.96 8,177 1.57 10,715 2.29 … U.S. TOTAL 140,114,502 41,651,526 33,378,450 32,982,211 98.81 318,728 0.77 77,511 0.23 … (7) Ballots Rejected, Pct uses question C4b divided by question C1a”
Overview Table 2: Absentee Voting … Total Voter Turnout, Total Ballots Transmitted, Total Ballots Returned, Counted Total, Pct. Returned, Rejected Total, Pct. Transmitted … Georgia 4,147,161 236,925 213,033 199,356 93.58 13,677 5.77 0 0.00 … Texas 8,701,152 520,027 468,150 449,258 95.96 8,177 1.57 10,715 2.29 … U.S. TOTAL 140,114,502 41,651,526 33,378,450 32,982,211 98.81 318,728 0.77 77,511 0.23 … (7) Ballots Rejected, Pct uses question C4b divided by question C1a
The Secret Ballot and Postal Voting in Other Democracies, 1872–2026
- Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992), plurality opinion
Supreme Court of the United States (via Caselaw Access Project), 1992-05-26 · supports
“The opportunities that the viva voce system gave for bribery and intimidation gradually led to its repeal. … State attempts to standardize the ballots were easily thwarted — the vote buyer could simply place a ballot in the hands of the bribed voter and watch until he placed it in the polling box. … Some Australian provinces adopted a series of reforms intended to secure the secrecy of an elector’s vote. … The Australian system was enacted in England in 1872 after a study by the committee of election practices identified Australia’s ballot as the best possible remedy for the existing situation. … Commentators argued that it would diminish the growing evil of bribery by removing the knowledge of whether it had been successful. Another argument strongly urged in favor of the reform was that it would protect the weak and dependent against intimidation and coercion by employers and creditors. … After several failed attempts to adopt the Australian system in Michigan and Wisconsin, the Louisville, Kentucky, municipal government, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, and the State of New York adopted the Australian system in 1888. … By 1896, almost 90 percent of the States had adopted the Australian system.”
The opportunities that the viva voce system gave for bribery and intimidation gradually led to its repeal. … State attempts to standardize the ballots were easily thwarted — the vote buyer could simply place a ballot in the hands of the bribed voter and watch until he placed it in the polling box. … Some Australian provinces adopted a series of reforms intended to secure the secrecy of an elector’s vote. … The Australian system was enacted in England in 1872 after a study by the committee of election practices identified Australia’s ballot as the best possible remedy for the existing situation. … Commentators argued that it would diminish the growing evil of bribery by removing the knowledge of whether it had been successful. Another argument strongly urged in favor of the reform was that it would protect the weak and dependent against intimidation and coercion by employers and creditors. … After several failed attempts to adopt the Australian system in Michigan and Wisconsin, the Louisville, Kentucky, municipal government, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, and the State of New York adopted the Australian system in 1888. … By 1896, almost 90 percent of the States had adopted the Australian system.
- Land and Power: Theory and Evidence from Chile (abstract)
American Economic Review (Baland and Robinson), 2008-12 · supports
“We examine the effects of the introduction of the secret ballot in Chile in 1958 on voting behavior. Before the reforms, localities with more pervasive patron-client relationships tended to exhibit a much stronger support for the right-wing parties, traditionally associated with the landed oligarchy. After the reform, however, this difference across localities completely disappeared.”
We examine the effects of the introduction of the secret ballot in Chile in 1958 on voting behavior. Before the reforms, localities with more pervasive patron-client relationships tended to exhibit a much stronger support for the right-wing parties, traditionally associated with the landed oligarchy. After the reform, however, this difference across localities completely disappeared.
- Global postal voting: Special Voting Arrangements data
International IDEA, 2025-08 · supports
“Countries that allow in-country postal voting for all voters Canada New Zealand Germany Poland Iceland Switzerland Korea, Republic of United Kingdom Liechtenstein United States Luxembourg Countries that allow in-country postal voting for some voters (based on country-specific criteria) Australia Malaysia Austria Marshall Islands Bangladesh Micronesia, Federated States of Bhutan Netherlands Fiji Pakistan France Palau Greece Papua New Guinea India Slovenia Ireland Spain Japan Zimbabwe Lithuania … Postal data last updated as of 20 August 2025. … The option to correct an invalidly submitted ballot (‘curing the ballot’) is uncommon globally.”
Countries that allow in-country postal voting for all voters Canada New Zealand Germany Poland Iceland Switzerland Korea, Republic of United Kingdom Liechtenstein United States Luxembourg Countries that allow in-country postal voting for some voters (based on country-specific criteria) Australia Malaysia Austria Marshall Islands Bangladesh Micronesia, Federated States of Bhutan Netherlands Fiji Pakistan France Palau Greece Papua New Guinea India Slovenia Ireland Spain Japan Zimbabwe Lithuania … Postal data last updated as of 20 August 2025. … The option to correct an invalidly submitted ballot (‘curing the ballot’) is uncommon globally.
- Special Voting Arrangements
International IDEA, 2023-11 · supports
“International IDEA's comparative SVA data provides insight into postal, early, mobile and proxy voting for in-country voting in 204 countries. … 27% of OECD countries allow in-country postal voting for all voters, while only one country (Liechtenstein) in non-OECD group does the same. In-country postal voting is available for some voters in 24% of OECD countries, while this figure is only 9% in non-OECD countries.”
International IDEA's comparative SVA data provides insight into postal, early, mobile and proxy voting for in-country voting in 204 countries. … 27% of OECD countries allow in-country postal voting for all voters, while only one country (Liechtenstein) in non-OECD group does the same. In-country postal voting is available for some voters in 24% of OECD countries, while this figure is only 9% in non-OECD countries.
- Question écrite n° 1703 (M. Pierre-Rémy Houssin), réponse du ministère de l'Intérieur
Assemblée nationale, 1988-08-22 · supports
“Lors des debats qui ont precede le vote de la loi no 75-1329 du 31 decembre 1975, toutes les tendances politiques representees au Parlement ont unanimement condamne le vote par correspondance, qui etait l'occasion de fraudes graves denoncees apres chaque consultation. Le legislateur a reconnu que cette procedure de vote n'etait pas reellement perfectible, notamment dans la mesure ou elle n'implique a aucun moment la comparution personnelle de l'electeur devant une autorite independante, d'ou la possibilite d'y avoir recours pour faire voter des electeurs fictifs. C'est pourquoi la loi precitee a abroge le vote par correspondance, tout en etendant de facon concomitante le champ d'application du vote par procuration. … Le taux moyen des abstentions municipales generales etait de 23,1 p 100 avant l'intervention de la loi du 31 decembre 1975 ; il est de 21,4 p 100 pour les elections municipales generales qui ont eu lieu depuis lors. Pour les elections presidentielles, les taux homologues sont de 18,4 p 100 et de 16,6 p 100 ; pour les elections cantonales generales, de 39 p 100 et de 33,6 p 100 ; pour les elections legislatives generales, de 21,5 p 100 et de 25,7 p 100.”
Lors des debats qui ont precede le vote de la loi no 75-1329 du 31 decembre 1975, toutes les tendances politiques representees au Parlement ont unanimement condamne le vote par correspondance, qui etait l'occasion de fraudes graves denoncees apres chaque consultation. Le legislateur a reconnu que cette procedure de vote n'etait pas reellement perfectible, notamment dans la mesure ou elle n'implique a aucun moment la comparution personnelle de l'electeur devant une autorite independante, d'ou la possibilite d'y avoir recours pour faire voter des electeurs fictifs. C'est pourquoi la loi precitee a abroge le vote par correspondance, tout en etendant de facon concomitante le champ d'application du vote par procuration. … Le taux moyen des abstentions municipales generales etait de 23,1 p 100 avant l'intervention de la loi du 31 decembre 1975 ; il est de 21,4 p 100 pour les elections municipales generales qui ont eu lieu depuis lors. Pour les elections presidentielles, les taux homologues sont de 18,4 p 100 et de 16,6 p 100 ; pour les elections cantonales generales, de 39 p 100 et de 33,6 p 100 ; pour les elections legislatives generales, de 21,5 p 100 et de 25,7 p 100.
- Dossier législatif « Vote par correspondance »
Assemblée nationale, 2022-02-03 · complicates
“Proposition de loi rejetée par l'Assemblée nationale, visant à rétablir le vote par correspondance le 3 février 2022, T.A. n° 783”
Proposition de loi rejetée par l'Assemblée nationale, visant à rétablir le vote par correspondance le 3 février 2022, T.A. n° 783
- Proposition de loi organique visant à instaurer le vote par correspondance pour l'élection du Président de la République (ppl23-116)
Sénat, 2026-10-16 · complicates
“Cette proposition de loi organique est caduque”
Cette proposition de loi organique est caduque
- Voting from Abroad answer (France)
International IDEA, 2013 · supports
“In 1975, France introduced personal voting and abolished postal voting because of the incidence of fraud (update was conducted in 2013).”
In 1975, France introduced personal voting and abolished postal voting because of the incidence of fraud (update was conducted in 2013).
- Election Petition Judgment, Bordesley Green and Aston Wards, Birmingham (Richard Mawrey QC), Afterword
Election Court (unofficial mirror, law.slough.info), 2005-04-04 · supports
“Anybody who has sat through the case I have just tried and listened to evidence of electoral fraud that would disgrace a banana republic would find this statement surprising. To assert that "The systems already in place to deal with the allegations of electoral fraud are clearly working" indicates a state not simply of complacency but of denial. … All political parties welcomed and supported postal voting on demand. Until very recently, none has treated electoral fraud as representing a problem.”
Anybody who has sat through the case I have just tried and listened to evidence of electoral fraud that would disgrace a banana republic would find this statement surprising. To assert that "The systems already in place to deal with the allegations of electoral fraud are clearly working" indicates a state not simply of complacency but of denial. … All political parties welcomed and supported postal voting on demand. Until very recently, none has treated electoral fraud as representing a problem.
- Ali v Bashir [2013] EWHC 2572 (QB) (Woking)
High Court, Election Court (The National Archives, Find Case Law), 2013-07-29 · supports
“I identified some fourteen different ways in which the system could be successfully defrauded … In that judgment I held that in the two wards concerned (and in all probability in a number of other Birmingham wards) the Labour party candidates and their associates had falsified literally thousands of votes to secure election to the City Council. In the two wards challenged it seemed likely that as many as half the votes cast for the winning candidates had been the product of fraud. … The problem was universal and had the potential to undermine the democratic process. … In 2008 I heard the Slough Election Case. … the main fraud was a fifteenth, the use of false names on the electoral register for which I borrowed the Australian term ‘roll-stuffing’ … the successful candidate and his team had registered several hundred voters in the Central Ward who did not reside at the addresses stated and who, in many cases, were the figments of the candidate’s imagination. 24. As a result, the judgment found the candidate and his associates guilty of corrupt and illegal practices and ordered a new election to be held. … winnowing process of the Scrutiny produced a list of 22 suspect personal votes for Mr Bashir and 64 suspect postal votes. … Consequently I declare the election of Mr Bashir as councillor for the Maybury and Sheerwater Ward of Woking to have been avoided by such corrupt or illegal practices”
I identified some fourteen different ways in which the system could be successfully defrauded … In that judgment I held that in the two wards concerned (and in all probability in a number of other Birmingham wards) the Labour party candidates and their associates had falsified literally thousands of votes to secure election to the City Council. In the two wards challenged it seemed likely that as many as half the votes cast for the winning candidates had been the product of fraud. … The problem was universal and had the potential to undermine the democratic process. … In 2008 I heard the Slough Election Case. … the main fraud was a fifteenth, the use of false names on the electoral register for which I borrowed the Australian term ‘roll-stuffing’ … the successful candidate and his team had registered several hundred voters in the Central Ward who did not reside at the addresses stated and who, in many cases, were the figments of the candidate’s imagination. 24. As a result, the judgment found the candidate and his associates guilty of corrupt and illegal practices and ordered a new election to be held. … winnowing process of the Scrutiny produced a list of 22 suspect personal votes for Mr Bashir and 64 suspect postal votes. … Consequently I declare the election of Mr Bashir as councillor for the Maybury and Sheerwater Ward of Woking to have been avoided by such corrupt or illegal practices
- Erlam v Rahman [2015] EWHC 1215 (QB) (Tower Hamlets)
High Court, Election Court (The National Archives, Find Case Law), 2015-04-23 · supports
“By the 21st century, however, a combination of the extremely lax rules relating to the registration of electors and the introduction of postal voting on demand made personation once again viable. The ease of postal vote fraud and the difficulty of policing it led to such a great upsurge in personation that, in the Birmingham Case, the number of false votes was virtually half of all votes recorded as having been cast for the winning candidates. … Their effect is firstly that Mr Rahman’s election as Mayor on 22 May 2014 was void, that is to say, it is as if it had never taken place.”
By the 21st century, however, a combination of the extremely lax rules relating to the registration of electors and the introduction of postal voting on demand made personation once again viable. The ease of postal vote fraud and the difficulty of policing it led to such a great upsurge in personation that, in the Birmingham Case, the number of false votes was virtually half of all votes recorded as having been cast for the winning candidates. … Their effect is firstly that Mr Rahman’s election as Mayor on 22 May 2014 was void, that is to say, it is as if it had never taken place.
- Electoral Administration Act 2006, section 14 (Absent voting personal identifiers)
legislation.gov.uk, 2006 · supports
“contains the applicant's signature and date of birth and”
contains the applicant's signature and date of birth and
- Elections Act 2022, Schedule 3
legislation.gov.uk, 2022 · supports
“the period ending with the third 31 January following the date on which the application is granted”
the period ending with the third 31 January following the date on which the application is granted
- Elections Act 2022, section 4
legislation.gov.uk, 2022 · supports
“A person who is a political campaigner in respect of a relevant election commits an offence if the person handles a postal voting document that has been issued to another person for use in that election.”
A person who is a political campaigner in respect of a relevant election commits an offence if the person handles a postal voting document that has been issued to another person for use in that election.
- Electoral fraud data
Electoral Commission, 2024-12 · contests
“In the past 5 years, there is no evidence of large-scale electoral fraud. … Of the 1,462 cases of alleged electoral fraud reported to police between 2019 and 2023, 11 led to convictions and the police issued 4 cautions.”
In the past 5 years, there is no evidence of large-scale electoral fraud. … Of the 1,462 cases of alleged electoral fraud reported to police between 2019 and 2023, 11 led to convictions and the police issued 4 cautions.
- Report on the 2024 UK Parliamentary general election and the May 2024 elections
Electoral Commission, 2024-11 · complicates
“Data provided by Returning Officers on the proportion of postal votes rejected (where the personal identifiers of signature and date of birth cannot be verified) shows that levels of rejection are broadly similar to those recorded at previous polls. Overall, at the 2024 general election, 2.2% of returned postal votes (approximately 168,000 votes in total) were rejected and not able to be included in the count. … There was a small number of voters who said they needed help to fill in their ballot paper – 3% of those who voted in person and 3% of those who voted by post. … Another adult insisted on helping 20% 9% me choose who to vote for … We cannot judge from this data the degree to which the voter did not want help or the extent of any input from another person. However, it is possible that some of these instances involved assistance that the voter did not want or which they found coercive. … Our analysis finds that there were no widespread, systemic issues with postal voting and that most people were satisfied with this method of voting. Across the UK, 89% of postal voters told us they were satisfied with the process of voting … There has been a notable increase in the proportion of people registered for a postal vote since the 2019 UK general election – from 18% to 20%. … turnout among postal voters remained high although, as with overall turnout, it dropped in comparison to 2019 (80.7% of postal votes returned in 2024 compared to 83.9% in 2019). … This is probably because postal voting on demand is not available in Northern Ireland … 87% of people said that they thought voting in general was safe from fraud and abuse … This is a positive change from the 2019 general election when 72% said that they thought voting was safe from fraud and abuse.”
Data provided by Returning Officers on the proportion of postal votes rejected (where the personal identifiers of signature and date of birth cannot be verified) shows that levels of rejection are broadly similar to those recorded at previous polls. Overall, at the 2024 general election, 2.2% of returned postal votes (approximately 168,000 votes in total) were rejected and not able to be included in the count. … There was a small number of voters who said they needed help to fill in their ballot paper – 3% of those who voted in person and 3% of those who voted by post. … Another adult insisted on helping 20% 9% me choose who to vote for … We cannot judge from this data the degree to which the voter did not want help or the extent of any input from another person. However, it is possible that some of these instances involved assistance that the voter did not want or which they found coercive. … Our analysis finds that there were no widespread, systemic issues with postal voting and that most people were satisfied with this method of voting. Across the UK, 89% of postal voters told us they were satisfied with the process of voting … There has been a notable increase in the proportion of people registered for a postal vote since the 2019 UK general election – from 18% to 20%. … turnout among postal voters remained high although, as with overall turnout, it dropped in comparison to 2019 (80.7% of postal votes returned in 2024 compared to 83.9% in 2019). … This is probably because postal voting on demand is not available in Northern Ireland … 87% of people said that they thought voting in general was safe from fraud and abuse … This is a positive change from the 2019 general election when 72% said that they thought voting was safe from fraud and abuse.
- BVerfG, Beschluss des Zweiten Senats, 2 BvC 7/10
Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court of Germany), 2013-07-09 · complicates
“Damit bedarf die Erteilung eines Wahlscheines als Voraussetzung insbesondere der Briefwahl nicht mehr der Glaubhaftmachung von Gründen. … Bei der Briefwahl ist die öffentliche Kontrolle der Stimmabgabe zurückgenommen (vgl. BVerfGE 123, 39 <75>). Auch ist die Integrität der Wahl nicht gleichermaßen gewährleistet wie bei der Urnenwahl im Wahllokal (vgl. BVerfGE 59, 119 <127>). Die Zulassung der Briefwahl dient aber dem Ziel, eine möglichst umfassende Wahlbeteiligung zu erreichen und damit dem Grundsatz der Allgemeinheit der Wahl Rechnung zu tragen. … Dabei muss er jedoch dafür Sorge tragen, dass keiner der vor allem das Demokratieprinzip konkretisierenden Wahlrechtsgrundsätze unverhältnismäßig eingeschränkt wird oder in erheblichem Umfang leer zu laufen droht (vgl. BVerfGE 59, 119 <125>). Das ist derzeit jedoch offenkundig nicht der Fall. … Dass ein erheblicher Anstieg der Briefwahlbeteiligung durch den Wegfall der Glaubhaftmachung von Antragsgründen jedoch nicht zu befürchten ist”
Damit bedarf die Erteilung eines Wahlscheines als Voraussetzung insbesondere der Briefwahl nicht mehr der Glaubhaftmachung von Gründen. … Bei der Briefwahl ist die öffentliche Kontrolle der Stimmabgabe zurückgenommen (vgl. BVerfGE 123, 39 <75>). Auch ist die Integrität der Wahl nicht gleichermaßen gewährleistet wie bei der Urnenwahl im Wahllokal (vgl. BVerfGE 59, 119 <127>). Die Zulassung der Briefwahl dient aber dem Ziel, eine möglichst umfassende Wahlbeteiligung zu erreichen und damit dem Grundsatz der Allgemeinheit der Wahl Rechnung zu tragen. … Dabei muss er jedoch dafür Sorge tragen, dass keiner der vor allem das Demokratieprinzip konkretisierenden Wahlrechtsgrundsätze unverhältnismäßig eingeschränkt wird oder in erheblichem Umfang leer zu laufen droht (vgl. BVerfGE 59, 119 <125>). Das ist derzeit jedoch offenkundig nicht der Fall. … Dass ein erheblicher Anstieg der Briefwahlbeteiligung durch den Wegfall der Glaubhaftmachung von Antragsgründen jedoch nicht zu befürchten ist
- How does postal voting work in Switzerland?
SWI swissinfo.ch, 2026-09-17 · supports
“It’s estimated that over 90% of voters in Switzerland cast their ballots via mail – a proportion which stands out globally, yet which hasn’t led to major political debates about security or fraud.”
It’s estimated that over 90% of voters in Switzerland cast their ballots via mail – a proportion which stands out globally, yet which hasn’t led to major political debates about security or fraud.
- How the world’s most frequent voters handle postal ballots
SWI swissinfo.ch, 2020-10-02 · complicates
“Cantons report that around 90% of citizens now vote by post, and some have reported figures up to 97% (Aargau, 2017). … In Bern, 300 votes in the 2016 local elections were declared void after investigators discovered they all had the same handwriting”
Cantons report that around 90% of citizens now vote by post, and some have reported figures up to 97% (Aargau, 2017). … In Bern, 300 votes in the 2016 local elections were declared void after investigators discovered they all had the same handwriting
- Wallis leitet nach Wahlbetrug Administrativuntersuchung ein (SDA)
SWI swissinfo.ch, 2018-09-20 · complicates
“Anfang September verurteilte das Bezirksgericht in Brig den angeklagten Wahlfälscher zu zwölf Monaten Gefängnis bedingt mit drei Jahren Bewährung und einer Busse von 2000 Franken. … Der Schwindel flog auf, nachdem 269 Bürger den Gemeinden gemeldet hatten, keine Wahlunterlagen erhalten zu haben. … Die Justiz konnte dem Mann, der zum Zeitpunkt des Wahlbetrugs Mitglied der SVP war, die Fälschung von mindestens 193 Wahlzetteln nachweisen.”
Anfang September verurteilte das Bezirksgericht in Brig den angeklagten Wahlfälscher zu zwölf Monaten Gefängnis bedingt mit drei Jahren Bewährung und einer Busse von 2000 Franken. … Der Schwindel flog auf, nachdem 269 Bürger den Gemeinden gemeldet hatten, keine Wahlunterlagen erhalten zu haben. … Die Justiz konnte dem Mann, der zum Zeitpunkt des Wahlbetrugs Mitglied der SVP war, die Fälschung von mindestens 193 Wahlzetteln nachweisen.
- The voting experience and beliefs about ballot secrecy
PLOS ONE (Dowling, Doherty, Hill, Gerber and Huber), 2019-01-07 · supports
“To investigate these questions, we fielded a survey in December of 2010 through YouGov/Polimetrix, which uses a combination of sampling and matching techniques to approximate a random digit dialing sample. … For example, we asked these voters whether anyone else was in the room with them when they cast their ballot and over 23 percent of respondents said that at least one other person was in the room with them when they filled out their ballot. ... Additionally, 17.2 percent of all respondents who voted by mail said that at least one other person in the room with them while they filled out their ballot was also filling out a ballot, 17.8 percent said they discussed who they were voting for with someone else in the room, and 8.5 percent said they asked someone else for advice about how to vote on a particular race or issue while filling out their ballot. More than six percent of our mail voters reported showing their ballot to someone else after filling it out. … However, Fig 2 shows a clear pattern where those who reported voting by mail harbor greater doubts about secrecy (compared to those who voted in-person on Election Day). They were almost 10 percentage points more likely to say their choices were not kept secret … Only three percent said someone at the polling place asked them who they were voting for and only five percent said that they were able to see who another voter was voting for. However, 22 percent said there was no curtain or privacy screen around their voting space and over 20 percent said that someone walking by could see who they were voting for.”
To investigate these questions, we fielded a survey in December of 2010 through YouGov/Polimetrix, which uses a combination of sampling and matching techniques to approximate a random digit dialing sample. … For example, we asked these voters whether anyone else was in the room with them when they cast their ballot and over 23 percent of respondents said that at least one other person was in the room with them when they filled out their ballot. ... Additionally, 17.2 percent of all respondents who voted by mail said that at least one other person in the room with them while they filled out their ballot was also filling out a ballot, 17.8 percent said they discussed who they were voting for with someone else in the room, and 8.5 percent said they asked someone else for advice about how to vote on a particular race or issue while filling out their ballot. More than six percent of our mail voters reported showing their ballot to someone else after filling it out. … However, Fig 2 shows a clear pattern where those who reported voting by mail harbor greater doubts about secrecy (compared to those who voted in-person on Election Day). They were almost 10 percentage points more likely to say their choices were not kept secret … Only three percent said someone at the polling place asked them who they were voting for and only five percent said that they were able to see who another voter was voting for. However, 22 percent said there was no curtain or privacy screen around their voting space and over 20 percent said that someone walking by could see who they were voting for.
- Do Perceptions of Ballot Secrecy Influence Turnout? Results from a Field Experiment (NBER Working Paper 17673)
National Bureau of Economic Research (Gerber, Huber, Doherty, Dowling and Hill), 2011-12 · supports
“In particular, the experiment shows that providing information about the anonymity of the ballot and the protections against intimidation at the polls to those who had not previously voted increased turnout in the November 2010 election by an estimated 3.4 percentage points. … We find that these letters increased turnout for registered citizens without records of previous turnout, but did not appear to influence the behavior of citizens who had previously voted.”
In particular, the experiment shows that providing information about the anonymity of the ballot and the protections against intimidation at the polls to those who had not previously voted increased turnout in the November 2010 election by an estimated 3.4 percentage points. … We find that these letters increased turnout for registered citizens without records of previous turnout, but did not appear to influence the behavior of citizens who had previously voted.
- Is There a Secret Ballot? Ballot Secrecy Perceptions and Their Implications for Voting Behaviour (abstract)
British Journal of Political Science (Gerber, Huber, Doherty and Dowling), 2013 · supports
“Novel items added to a nationally representative survey show that 25 per cent of respondents report not believing their ballot choices are kept secret and over 70 per cent report sharing their vote choices with others. ... Consistent with this view, regression analysis shows that social forces appear to have a greater effect on vote choices among people who doubt the formal secrecy of the ballot.”
Novel items added to a nationally representative survey show that 25 per cent of respondents report not believing their ballot choices are kept secret and over 70 per cent report sharing their vote choices with others. ... Consistent with this view, regression analysis shows that social forces appear to have a greater effect on vote choices among people who doubt the formal secrecy of the ballot.
- One-in-Five Mail-In Voters Admit They Cheated in 2020 Election
Rasmussen Reports, 2023-12-12 · complicates
“A new national telephone and online survey by Rasmussen Reports and The Heartland Institute finds that 21% of Likely U.S. voters who voted by absentee or mail-in ballot in the 2020 election say they filled out a ballot, in part or in full, on behalf of a friend or family member, such as a spouse or child, while 78% say they didn't. ... The survey of 1,085 U.S. Likely Voters was conducted on November 30-December 6, 2023 by Rasmussen Reports and The Heartland Institute. The margin of sampling error is +/- 3 percentage points with a 95% level of confidence. Field work for all Rasmussen Reports surveys is conducted by Pulse Opinion Research, LLC.”
A new national telephone and online survey by Rasmussen Reports and The Heartland Institute finds that 21% of Likely U.S. voters who voted by absentee or mail-in ballot in the 2020 election say they filled out a ballot, in part or in full, on behalf of a friend or family member, such as a spouse or child, while 78% say they didn't. ... The survey of 1,085 U.S. Likely Voters was conducted on November 30-December 6, 2023 by Rasmussen Reports and The Heartland Institute. The margin of sampling error is +/- 3 percentage points with a 95% level of confidence. Field work for all Rasmussen Reports surveys is conducted by Pulse Opinion Research, LLC.
- Toplines - Voters Fraud - Heartland December 2023
Rasmussen Reports, 2023-12-12 · complicates
“Did you vote with an absentee or mail-in ballot in the 2020 election? 30% yes 68% no 2% not sure … Answered by the 30% of respondents who voted by absentee or mail-in ballot: During the 2020 election, did a friend or family member fill out your ballot, in part or in full, on your behalf? 19% yes 79% no 2% not sure”
Did you vote with an absentee or mail-in ballot in the 2020 election? 30% yes 68% no 2% not sure … Answered by the 30% of respondents who voted by absentee or mail-in ballot: During the 2020 election, did a friend or family member fill out your ballot, in part or in full, on your behalf? 19% yes 79% no 2% not sure
- Trump's Latest Bogus Claim About Mail-In Vote Fraud in Pennsylvania
FactCheck.org, 2024-09-20 · contests
“"[T]he vast majority of Rasmussen data come from an ordinary opt-in online panel" in which participants actively seek to join rather than being randomly selected, "which AAPOR tells you cannot have a margin of error, because there is no systematic sampling involved," Krosnick said. … According to Jon Krosnick, director of the Political Psychology Research Group at Stanford University, Rasmussen "is known to produce very biased results, typically pro-Republican." … but only 30% of those surveyed responded that they voted in 2020 via absentee or mail-in ballot. So those who said they voted by mail-in ballots represent a subset of the larger polling group. (The Election Assistance Commission reported that about 43% of the electorate voted by mail in 2020. … "[T]he results are wildly out of line with literally all other incoming information, including the rate of ballots flagged in any jurisdiction anywhere in the country for signature mismatches," Levitt told us via email. … "It is indeed perfectly legal in every state to help a disabled person to fill out a mail-in ballot. It's actually protected by federal law."”
"[T]he vast majority of Rasmussen data come from an ordinary opt-in online panel" in which participants actively seek to join rather than being randomly selected, "which AAPOR tells you cannot have a margin of error, because there is no systematic sampling involved," Krosnick said. … According to Jon Krosnick, director of the Political Psychology Research Group at Stanford University, Rasmussen "is known to produce very biased results, typically pro-Republican." … but only 30% of those surveyed responded that they voted in 2020 via absentee or mail-in ballot. So those who said they voted by mail-in ballots represent a subset of the larger polling group. (The Election Assistance Commission reported that about 43% of the electorate voted by mail in 2020. … "[T]he results are wildly out of line with literally all other incoming information, including the rate of ballots flagged in any jurisdiction anywhere in the country for signature mismatches," Levitt told us via email. … "It is indeed perfectly legal in every state to help a disabled person to fill out a mail-in ballot. It's actually protected by federal law."
- A 'Modern' Democracy That Can't Count Votes
Los Angeles Times, 2000-12-11 · complicates
“In a pilot study, Rose gathered preliminary survey data this year on voters in Washington County, outside Portland. About 5% of 818 respondents said other people marked their ballots, and 2.4% said other people signed their ballot envelopes. Rose suspects the real number is higher, because people are reluctant to admit being party to a crime.”
In a pilot study, Rose gathered preliminary survey data this year on voters in Washington County, outside Portland. About 5% of 818 respondents said other people marked their ballots, and 2.4% said other people signed their ballot envelopes. Rose suspects the real number is higher, because people are reluctant to admit being party to a crime.
- Voting by mail is convenient, but not always secret
The Conversation (Susan Orr and James Johnson), 2020-08-24 · complicates
“There is not a lot of research about bribery and coercion in mail-in elections in the U.S. But two surveys undertaken taken after Oregon introduced universal vote by mail in 1998 found that as many as a third of voters completed their votes while others were present. Just 1%, or fewer, reported feeling pressured by the presence of another person.”
There is not a lot of research about bribery and coercion in mail-in elections in the U.S. But two surveys undertaken taken after Oregon introduced universal vote by mail in 1998 found that as many as a third of voters completed their votes while others were present. Just 1%, or fewer, reported feeling pressured by the presence of another person.
- Mail-in voting lessons from Oregon, the state with the longest history of voting by mail
The Conversation (Priscilla Southwell), 2020-09-03 · contests
“Some are concerned that the system provides no guarantee of a secret ballot, but there has been no evidence that undue influence on voters – like bribes or threats – has been a problem in Oregon elections conducted by mail.”
Some are concerned that the system provides no guarantee of a secret ballot, but there has been no evidence that undue influence on voters – like bribes or threats – has been a problem in Oregon elections conducted by mail.
- Final Report: Westminster General Election July 2024
Democracy Volunteers, 2024-07-22 · complicates
“Our team saw family voting in 21% of all the polling stations that we observed. ... In total, 3.5% of all the 20,289 voters we observed voting at these elections were either causing, or were affected by, Family Voting, some 706 people.”
Our team saw family voting in 21% of all the polling stations that we observed. ... In total, 3.5% of all the 20,289 voters we observed voting at these elections were either causing, or were affected by, Family Voting, some 706 people.
- Democracy Volunteers GE Report 2024 (PDF)
Democracy Volunteers, 2024-07 · complicates
“As an unsupervised route for voting, postal voters are potentially subject to intimidation and coercion, family voting, in a similar fashion to what we can observe at polling booths. Due to the nature of this practice, we are unable to collect data on this issue”
As an unsupervised route for voting, postal voters are potentially subject to intimidation and coercion, family voting, in a similar fashion to what we can observe at polling booths. Due to the nature of this practice, we are unable to collect data on this issue
- Securing the ballot: Report of Sir Eric Pickles' review into electoral fraud
UK Government (Cabinet Office), 2016-08 · supports
“Some considered that postal voting should be restricted to those unable to get to a polling station to vote in person for reasons of health or disability. It was argued that unrestricted postal voting undermines the fundamental secrecy of the ballot and that despite existing safeguards can never guarantee that the voter has not been influenced in some way. … The ability to prove undue influence within households is hampered by the reluctance of individuals to report it. Evidence to the review maintained the reasons were considered similar to those which prevent sufferers of domestic abuse from coming forward. … R18. The offences contained in section 66 of the Representation of the People Act 1983 which protect the secrecy of the ballot in relation to in person voting should be extended to postal ballots.”
Some considered that postal voting should be restricted to those unable to get to a polling station to vote in person for reasons of health or disability. It was argued that unrestricted postal voting undermines the fundamental secrecy of the ballot and that despite existing safeguards can never guarantee that the voter has not been influenced in some way. … The ability to prove undue influence within households is hampered by the reluctance of individuals to report it. Evidence to the review maintained the reasons were considered similar to those which prevent sufferers of domestic abuse from coming forward. … R18. The offences contained in section 66 of the Representation of the People Act 1983 which protect the secrecy of the ballot in relation to in person voting should be extended to postal ballots.
- Research on electoral malpractice (REF 2014 Impact Case Study 43401)
University of Essex (REF 2014), 2014 · supports
“In 2004 Birch produced an article for Political Quarterly (co-written with an Essex lawyer, Bob Watt) that considered family voting in the context of remote electronic voting and postal voting. This paper highlighted the potential problems with remote voting, including the loss of ballot secrecy and the possibility of undue influence.”
In 2004 Birch produced an article for Political Quarterly (co-written with an Essex lawyer, Bob Watt) that considered family voting in the context of remote electronic voting and postal voting. This paper highlighted the potential problems with remote voting, including the loss of ballot secrecy and the possibility of undue influence.
- Wahlberechtigte mit Wahlschein, Wählende mit einfachem und Briefwahlschein seit 1957 (btw_ab57_wahlschein.csv)
Die Bundeswahlleiterin (Federal Returning Officer), 2025 · supports
“Wahlberechtigte mit Wahlschein, Wählende mit einfachem und Briefwahlschein seit 1957 … Anteil Wählende mit Briefwahlschein an den Wählenden insgesamt … Bund ;1957;35.400.923 ;33.484.012 ;1.916.911 ;5,4;31.072.894 ;29.311.394 ;94,3;224.406 ;1.537.094 ;4,9;87,8;87,5;91,9; … Bund ;2021;61.172.771 ;37.903.207 ;23.269.564 ;38,0;46.707.343 ;24.501.980 ;52,5;130.321 ;22.075.042 ;47,3;76,4;64,6;95,4; … Bund ;2025;60.510.631 ;40.946.464 ;19.564.167 ;32,3;49.928.653 ;31.263.732 ;62,6;167.125 ;18.497.796 ;37,0;82,5;76,4;95,4;”
Wahlberechtigte mit Wahlschein, Wählende mit einfachem und Briefwahlschein seit 1957 … Anteil Wählende mit Briefwahlschein an den Wählenden insgesamt … Bund ;1957;35.400.923 ;33.484.012 ;1.916.911 ;5,4;31.072.894 ;29.311.394 ;94,3;224.406 ;1.537.094 ;4,9;87,8;87,5;91,9; … Bund ;2021;61.172.771 ;37.903.207 ;23.269.564 ;38,0;46.707.343 ;24.501.980 ;52,5;130.321 ;22.075.042 ;47,3;76,4;64,6;95,4; … Bund ;2025;60.510.631 ;40.946.464 ;19.564.167 ;32,3;49.928.653 ;31.263.732 ;62,6;167.125 ;18.497.796 ;37,0;82,5;76,4;95,4;
- UK Election Statistics: 1918-2023, A Long Century of Elections (CBP-7529), Table 4
House of Commons Library, 2023-08-09 · supports
“Since February 2001 it is possible to get a postal vote on demand; electors no longer have to state a reason for applying for an absent vote or to obtain attestation of illness (etc.) from a medical practitioner or employer. … Table 4: Postal Ballot Papers in UK Elections, 1945-2019 … 1945 1,219,519 1,032,688 1,018,329 83.5% 3.9% 1950 507,717 478,038 466,347 91.9% 1.6% 1951 831,877 756,967 742,574 89.3% 2.5% 1955 595,000 526,904 515,593 86.7% 1.9% 1959 692,827 612,231 598,559 86.4% 2.1% 1964 818,901 723,927 707,636 86.4% 2.5% 1966 617,481 528,006 513,041 83.1% 1.8% 1970 731,249 639,674 625,355 85.5% 2.2% 1974 Feb 743,441 645,080 628,907 84.6% 2.0% 1974 Oct 1,075,131 875,324 850,105 79.1% 2.8% 1979 847,335 714,892 691,969 81.7% 2.2% 1983 757,604 643,634 623,554 82.3% 2.0% 1987 947,948 818,349 793,062 83.7% 2.4% 1992 835,074 714,895 692,139 82.9% 2.0% 1997 937,205 764,366 738,614 78.8% 2.3% 2001 1,758,055 1,402,073 1,402,073 79.8% 5.0% 2005 5,362,501 4,110,039 3,963,792 73.9% 12.7% 2010 6,996,006 5,818,853 5,596,865 80.0% 18.8% 2015 7,592,735 6,516,228 6,302,073 83.0% 20.5% 2017 8,412,060 7,155,315 6,986,581 83.1% 21.7% 2019 8,034,718 6,866,494 6,717,670 83.6% 21.0%”
Since February 2001 it is possible to get a postal vote on demand; electors no longer have to state a reason for applying for an absent vote or to obtain attestation of illness (etc.) from a medical practitioner or employer. … Table 4: Postal Ballot Papers in UK Elections, 1945-2019 … 1945 1,219,519 1,032,688 1,018,329 83.5% 3.9% 1950 507,717 478,038 466,347 91.9% 1.6% 1951 831,877 756,967 742,574 89.3% 2.5% 1955 595,000 526,904 515,593 86.7% 1.9% 1959 692,827 612,231 598,559 86.4% 2.1% 1964 818,901 723,927 707,636 86.4% 2.5% 1966 617,481 528,006 513,041 83.1% 1.8% 1970 731,249 639,674 625,355 85.5% 2.2% 1974 Feb 743,441 645,080 628,907 84.6% 2.0% 1974 Oct 1,075,131 875,324 850,105 79.1% 2.8% 1979 847,335 714,892 691,969 81.7% 2.2% 1983 757,604 643,634 623,554 82.3% 2.0% 1987 947,948 818,349 793,062 83.7% 2.4% 1992 835,074 714,895 692,139 82.9% 2.0% 1997 937,205 764,366 738,614 78.8% 2.3% 2001 1,758,055 1,402,073 1,402,073 79.8% 5.0% 2005 5,362,501 4,110,039 3,963,792 73.9% 12.7% 2010 6,996,006 5,818,853 5,596,865 80.0% 18.8% 2015 7,592,735 6,516,228 6,302,073 83.0% 20.5% 2017 8,412,060 7,155,315 6,986,581 83.1% 21.7% 2019 8,034,718 6,866,494 6,717,670 83.6% 21.0%
Confidence in Mail Voting and Disputed Election Results
- Broad Public Confidence in Elections in the U.S. – but Partisans Differ Over Concerns About Access, Security
Pew Research Center, 2026-10-20 · supports
“We surveyed 5,062 U.S. adults, including 3,917 registered voters, from Sept. 28 to Oct. 4, 2026. ... 90% of those who back Democratic candidates for the House of Representatives in this year’s elections are confident that if noncitizens try to vote they will be stopped. A far smaller share of Republican candidate backers – 45% – are confident that noncitizens will be prevented from casting ballots. Still, Republican voters express a higher level of confidence that noncitizens will be stopped from voting than President Donald Trump’s voters did in 2024 (35% then). ... 90% of Republican voters are at least somewhat confident in this. A narrower majority of Democratic voters (72%) express confidence that all qualified voters will be able to vote if they want to. ... 64% of Democratic voters say they are confident mail and absentee votes will be counted as voters intend – down from 88% in the 2022 midterm elections and 85% among Kamala Harris’ voters in the 2024 presidential election. 42% of GOP voters say they are confident mail and absentee votes will be counted as intended – modestly higher than in past recent elections. ... 19% of Republican voters mention concerns about illegitimate voters casting ballots, or fraudulent votes. In contrast, Democratic voters are more likely to raise concerns about legitimate voters being denied access (10%) or interference with election administration by the Trump administration (11%). ... Roughly three-quarters of mail and absentee voters (76%) are confident votes cast this way will be counted as voters intend. By comparison, about half of in-person voters (47%) are confident this will happen.”
We surveyed 5,062 U.S. adults, including 3,917 registered voters, from Sept. 28 to Oct. 4, 2026. ... 90% of those who back Democratic candidates for the House of Representatives in this year’s elections are confident that if noncitizens try to vote they will be stopped. A far smaller share of Republican candidate backers – 45% – are confident that noncitizens will be prevented from casting ballots. Still, Republican voters express a higher level of confidence that noncitizens will be stopped from voting than President Donald Trump’s voters did in 2024 (35% then). ... 90% of Republican voters are at least somewhat confident in this. A narrower majority of Democratic voters (72%) express confidence that all qualified voters will be able to vote if they want to. ... 64% of Democratic voters say they are confident mail and absentee votes will be counted as voters intend – down from 88% in the 2022 midterm elections and 85% among Kamala Harris’ voters in the 2024 presidential election. 42% of GOP voters say they are confident mail and absentee votes will be counted as intended – modestly higher than in past recent elections. ... 19% of Republican voters mention concerns about illegitimate voters casting ballots, or fraudulent votes. In contrast, Democratic voters are more likely to raise concerns about legitimate voters being denied access (10%) or interference with election administration by the Trump administration (11%). ... Roughly three-quarters of mail and absentee voters (76%) are confident votes cast this way will be counted as voters intend. By comparison, about half of in-person voters (47%) are confident this will happen.
- Partisan Split on Election Integrity Gets Even Wider
Gallup, 2024-09-25 · supports
“Fifty-seven percent of Americans say they are very or somewhat confident that the votes for president this year will be accurately cast and counted. ... This has led to a record-high 56-percentage-point partisan gap, with 84% of Democrats versus 28% of Republicans having faith in the accuracy of the vote. ... At the same time, the percentage of Americans saying they are “not at all confident” in the vote has steadily climbed from 6% in 2004 to 19% today. ... In 2004, when George W. Bush was in office, Republicans were more confident than Democrats ... Americans are far more positive about the integrity of the vote at their own polling place, as 76% say they are very or somewhat confident the votes will be accurately cast and counted there. ... Seventy-four percent of Republicans versus just under half of independents and fewer Democrats say each of these irregularities will be a major problem across the country. ... Smaller percentages of all party groups -- 37% of Democrats, 34% of Republicans and 32% of independents -- expect eligible voters to be prevented from voting. ... the percentages of Democrats and independents calling this a major problem spiked in 2020, to 62% and 47%, respectively.”
Fifty-seven percent of Americans say they are very or somewhat confident that the votes for president this year will be accurately cast and counted. ... This has led to a record-high 56-percentage-point partisan gap, with 84% of Democrats versus 28% of Republicans having faith in the accuracy of the vote. ... At the same time, the percentage of Americans saying they are “not at all confident” in the vote has steadily climbed from 6% in 2004 to 19% today. ... In 2004, when George W. Bush was in office, Republicans were more confident than Democrats ... Americans are far more positive about the integrity of the vote at their own polling place, as 76% say they are very or somewhat confident the votes will be accurately cast and counted there. ... Seventy-four percent of Republicans versus just under half of independents and fewer Democrats say each of these irregularities will be a major problem across the country. ... Smaller percentages of all party groups -- 37% of Democrats, 34% of Republicans and 32% of independents -- expect eligible voters to be prevented from voting. ... the percentages of Democrats and independents calling this a major problem spiked in 2020, to 62% and 47%, respectively.
- Confidence in Election Integrity Hides Deep Partisan Divide
Gallup, 2022-11-04 · supports
“More than half of Americans have consistently expressed confidence in the accuracy of elections throughout Gallup's trend since 2004, but confidence was highest leading up to the 2004 presidential and 2006 midterm elections. ... In most election years since 2004, Gallup has found that Americans who self-identify with the political party of the incumbent president have expressed greater confidence in election accuracy -- with two exceptions, 2008 and 2020. In October 2008, during the global economic crisis, Republicans' and Democrats' confidence in the accuracy of that year's presidential election each fell to 57% ... In 2020, amid then-President Donald Trump's public questioning of the validity of mail voting in the upcoming election, Republicans' confidence in voting integrity dropped to a new low of 44%, while Democrats' confidence remained high, slightly higher (76%) than in the previous election year. The current 45 percentage points that separate Republicans' (40%) and Democrats' (85%) confidence represents the largest gap Gallup has recorded on this measure since 2004.”
More than half of Americans have consistently expressed confidence in the accuracy of elections throughout Gallup's trend since 2004, but confidence was highest leading up to the 2004 presidential and 2006 midterm elections. ... In most election years since 2004, Gallup has found that Americans who self-identify with the political party of the incumbent president have expressed greater confidence in election accuracy -- with two exceptions, 2008 and 2020. In October 2008, during the global economic crisis, Republicans' and Democrats' confidence in the accuracy of that year's presidential election each fell to 57% ... In 2020, amid then-President Donald Trump's public questioning of the validity of mail voting in the upcoming election, Republicans' confidence in voting integrity dropped to a new low of 44%, while Democrats' confidence remained high, slightly higher (76%) than in the previous election year. The current 45 percentage points that separate Republicans' (40%) and Democrats' (85%) confidence represents the largest gap Gallup has recorded on this measure since 2004.
- U.S. Trust in Elections Diverges From Global Pattern
Gallup, 2026-10-07 · supports
“Forty-nine percent are confident in electoral honesty, while 51% are not. Americans’ relative lack of confidence in the integrity of elections is nothing new — it has averaged 45% since 2006 — but who lacks confidence is. In 2026, 63% of Democrats are confident in the honesty of elections, higher than either Republicans (37%) or political independents (35%). The World Poll has asked about party identification in the U.S. only since 2024, when there was a 55-percentage-point divide in confidence between Democrats and Republicans. This divide closed to just four points in 2025 but has reopened this year ... In 2026, confidence in the honesty of elections is, for the first time, significantly higher among Americans who disapprove (52%) of their country’s leadership than approve (41%) ... Over the past two years, an average of 46% of approvers have expressed confidence in the honesty of elections, compared with 48% of disapprovers. ... In 2025 (with final global data collection not yet complete in 2026), a median of 70% of approvers of their national leadership had confidence in the honesty of their elections, compared with 30% of disapprovers — a gap of 40 points. ... No other country in the world in the past 15 years has seen this pattern, in which people disapproving of their leadership are significantly more confident in the honesty of elections than those approving of their leadership. ... From 2006 to 2020, there was a consistent and large gap in electoral confidence between Americans who approved of and those who disapproved of U.S. leadership under the administrations of George W. Bush (averaging 35 points), Barack Obama (averaging 30 points) and Donald Trump (averaging 35 points). After Joe Biden won the presidency in the 2020 election, the results of which Trump challenged, this confidence gap ballooned to 51 points.”
Forty-nine percent are confident in electoral honesty, while 51% are not. Americans’ relative lack of confidence in the integrity of elections is nothing new — it has averaged 45% since 2006 — but who lacks confidence is. In 2026, 63% of Democrats are confident in the honesty of elections, higher than either Republicans (37%) or political independents (35%). The World Poll has asked about party identification in the U.S. only since 2024, when there was a 55-percentage-point divide in confidence between Democrats and Republicans. This divide closed to just four points in 2025 but has reopened this year ... In 2026, confidence in the honesty of elections is, for the first time, significantly higher among Americans who disapprove (52%) of their country’s leadership than approve (41%) ... Over the past two years, an average of 46% of approvers have expressed confidence in the honesty of elections, compared with 48% of disapprovers. ... In 2025 (with final global data collection not yet complete in 2026), a median of 70% of approvers of their national leadership had confidence in the honesty of their elections, compared with 30% of disapprovers — a gap of 40 points. ... No other country in the world in the past 15 years has seen this pattern, in which people disapproving of their leadership are significantly more confident in the honesty of elections than those approving of their leadership. ... From 2006 to 2020, there was a consistent and large gap in electoral confidence between Americans who approved of and those who disapproved of U.S. leadership under the administrations of George W. Bush (averaging 35 points), Barack Obama (averaging 30 points) and Donald Trump (averaging 35 points). After Joe Biden won the presidency in the 2020 election, the results of which Trump challenged, this confidence gap ballooned to 51 points.
- How We Voted in 2024
MIT Election Data and Science Lab, 2025-07 · supports
“During presidential election years, the nationwide confidence measure particularly reflects the well-known winner-loser effect, where supporters of the presidential winner experience a rise in confidence while supporters of the loser see a decline. In 2016, 80% of Republicans stated they were very or somewhat confident that votes across the country were counted as intended (nationwide confidence), compared to 69% of Democrats. ... In 2024, 88% of Republicans and 79% of Democrats expressed confidence in the nationwide vote count, compared to 22% and 93% in 2020, respectively. ... Since 2008, support among Republicans has steadily increased to the point where it is nearly unanimously favored by Republican respondents (92.4% support in 2024). Support among Democrats weakened in the early years covered by the data but has rebounded in recent years.”
During presidential election years, the nationwide confidence measure particularly reflects the well-known winner-loser effect, where supporters of the presidential winner experience a rise in confidence while supporters of the loser see a decline. In 2016, 80% of Republicans stated they were very or somewhat confident that votes across the country were counted as intended (nationwide confidence), compared to 69% of Democrats. ... In 2024, 88% of Republicans and 79% of Democrats expressed confidence in the nationwide vote count, compared to 22% and 93% in 2020, respectively. ... Since 2008, support among Republicans has steadily increased to the point where it is nearly unanimously favored by Republican respondents (92.4% support in 2024). Support among Democrats weakened in the early years covered by the data but has rebounded in recent years.
- Partisanship and Voter Confidence, 2000–2012 (VTP Working Paper #125)
Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project, 2014-06-01 · supports
“Using approximately 30 national surveys over the past decade, we find a consistent relationship between voting for the winner and confidence in election administration. ... Across the decade, aggregate confidence in the country's vote declined about 30 percentage points. However, this overall decline is due almost entirely to a forty-point decline among Republicans during this period. ... among those who voted for the winning candidate, confidence in one's own vote increases by about 20 percentage points after an election. Among those who voted for the loser, confidence declines slightly, by about 2 percentage points.”
Using approximately 30 national surveys over the past decade, we find a consistent relationship between voting for the winner and confidence in election administration. ... Across the decade, aggregate confidence in the country's vote declined about 30 percentage points. However, this overall decline is due almost entirely to a forty-point decline among Republicans during this period. ... among those who voted for the winning candidate, confidence in one's own vote increases by about 20 percentage points after an election. Among those who voted for the loser, confidence declines slightly, by about 2 percentage points.
- Voter Confidence in the 2018 Election: So Long to the Winner’s Effect?
Election Updates (Charles Stewart III, MIT), 2018-12-19 · complicates
“For the past two decades, Americans have consistently exhibited a “winner’s effect” in judging whether votes were counted fairly in elections. The 2018 election broke that pattern. ... Good electoral news for Republicans was followed by a 14-point increase in Republican confidence and a slight decrease in confidence among Democrats. In 2016, the even-more-dramatic electoral results produced an even greater shift in partisan confidence. One month before the election, Democrats were more confident by a margin of 15 points. Right after the election, Democrats were less confident, by 13 points.”
For the past two decades, Americans have consistently exhibited a “winner’s effect” in judging whether votes were counted fairly in elections. The 2018 election broke that pattern. ... Good electoral news for Republicans was followed by a 14-point increase in Republican confidence and a slight decrease in confidence among Democrats. In 2016, the even-more-dramatic electoral results produced an even greater shift in partisan confidence. One month before the election, Democrats were more confident by a margin of 15 points. Right after the election, Democrats were less confident, by 13 points.
- It’s Largely a Rigged System: Voter Confidence and the Winner Effect in 2016 (Political Research Quarterly)
Yale Institution for Social and Policy Studies (Betsy Sinclair, Steven S. Smith and Patrick D. Tucker), 2018-04-21 · supports
“Second, literature on voter confidence has established a “winner effect”—voters who cast ballots for winners are more likely than voters on the losing side to believe their vote was counted correctly. ... In this paper, we find that the “winner” effect mitigates the effects from strong pre-election cues from elites.”
Second, literature on voter confidence has established a “winner effect”—voters who cast ballots for winners are more likely than voters on the losing side to believe their vote was counted correctly. ... In this paper, we find that the “winner” effect mitigates the effects from strong pre-election cues from elites.
- “Procedural Polarization: How Election Rules Shape Voters’ Confidence” (Joshua Clinton, American Political Science Review; abstract)
Election Law Blog (Rick Hasen, reproducing the APSR abstract), 2026-05-11 · complicates
“Prior research demonstrates voters’ confidence in elections depends on whether their preferred candidate wins, but does agreement with the electoral rules being used also matter? Leveraging growing procedural polarization in election laws, public opinion data from 2008 to 2024, and a large-scale survey experiment conducted before the 2024 election, I show that agreement with election procedures matters for voter confidence beyond well-established effects related to partisan control and electoral outcomes. Observational and experimental analyses consistently reveal that voters are less likely to express confidence in election results conducted using procedures they oppose. The effects are particularly large for voter identification laws and among Republicans and independents.”
Prior research demonstrates voters’ confidence in elections depends on whether their preferred candidate wins, but does agreement with the electoral rules being used also matter? Leveraging growing procedural polarization in election laws, public opinion data from 2008 to 2024, and a large-scale survey experiment conducted before the 2024 election, I show that agreement with election procedures matters for voter confidence beyond well-established effects related to partisan control and electoral outcomes. Observational and experimental analyses consistently reveal that voters are less likely to express confidence in election results conducted using procedures they oppose. The effects are particularly large for voter identification laws and among Republicans and independents.
- Gauging the Effects of SB 202 on Voting in Georgia
MIT Election Data and Science Lab (M.V. Hood III and Seth C. McKee), 2024-05 · complicates
“In 2020 state-level voter confidence for Republicans craters at only 26%, but rebounds to 70% in 2022. In contrast, Democratic voters’ confidence shows relatively little movement and is extremely high (94% in 2020 and 85% in 2022) ... Among Republicans, 59.1% indicated that SB 202 had increased (greatly or somewhat) their confidence in Georgia elections, as compared to 36.6% of Independents and a much lower 29.1% of Democrats holding this view. Conversely, a 46.8% plurality of Democrats expressed a decrease (greatly or somewhat) in confidence in Georgia elections because of SB 202 ... However, we cannot make any definitive statements from a causal standpoint as we are unable to completely rule out competing explanations. For example, it is possible that Republican confidence rebounded in 2022 because of the noted winner’s effect (the fact that the Georgia GOP won all statewide offices with the exception of a U.S. Senate seat). ... Overall, only 1.1% of survey respondents reported they encountered an issue while casting their ballot.”
In 2020 state-level voter confidence for Republicans craters at only 26%, but rebounds to 70% in 2022. In contrast, Democratic voters’ confidence shows relatively little movement and is extremely high (94% in 2020 and 85% in 2022) ... Among Republicans, 59.1% indicated that SB 202 had increased (greatly or somewhat) their confidence in Georgia elections, as compared to 36.6% of Independents and a much lower 29.1% of Democrats holding this view. Conversely, a 46.8% plurality of Democrats expressed a decrease (greatly or somewhat) in confidence in Georgia elections because of SB 202 ... However, we cannot make any definitive statements from a causal standpoint as we are unable to completely rule out competing explanations. For example, it is possible that Republican confidence rebounded in 2022 because of the noted winner’s effect (the fact that the Georgia GOP won all statewide offices with the exception of a U.S. Senate seat). ... Overall, only 1.1% of survey respondents reported they encountered an issue while casting their ballot.
- Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), per curiam
Supreme Court of the United States (via Cornell Legal Information Institute), 2000-12-12 · supports
“The Supreme Court held that Vice President Gore had satisfied his burden of proof under §102.168(3)(c) with respect to his challenge to Miami-Dade County’s failure to tabulate, by manual count, 9,000 ballots on which the machines had failed to detect a vote for President (“undervotes”). ... This case has shown that punch card balloting machines can produce an unfortunate number of ballots which are not punched in a clean, complete way by the voter. ... Upon due consideration of the difficulties identified to this point, it is obvious that the recount cannot be conducted in compliance with the requirements of equal protection and due process without substantial additional work.”
The Supreme Court held that Vice President Gore had satisfied his burden of proof under §102.168(3)(c) with respect to his challenge to Miami-Dade County’s failure to tabulate, by manual count, 9,000 ballots on which the machines had failed to detect a vote for President (“undervotes”). ... This case has shown that punch card balloting machines can produce an unfortunate number of ballots which are not punched in a clean, complete way by the voter. ... Upon due consideration of the difficulties identified to this point, it is obvious that the recount cannot be conducted in compliance with the requirements of equal protection and due process without substantial additional work.
- Counting Electoral Votes: An Overview of Procedures at the Joint Session (RL32717)
Congressional Research Service (via EveryCRSReport), 2020 · supports
“The second instance related to reported voting irregularities in Ohio. In 2005, a Representative (Stephanie Tubbs Jones of Ohio) and a Senator (Barbara Boxer of California) objected in writing to the Ohio electoral votes. The chambers withdrew from the joint session to consider the objection, and the House and Senate each rejected the objection. When the House and Senate resumed the joint session, the electoral votes were counted as cast.”
The second instance related to reported voting irregularities in Ohio. In 2005, a Representative (Stephanie Tubbs Jones of Ohio) and a Senator (Barbara Boxer of California) objected in writing to the Ohio electoral votes. The chambers withdrew from the joint session to consider the objection, and the House and Senate each rejected the objection. When the House and Senate resumed the joint session, the electoral votes were counted as cast.
- Abrams Ends Gov Run, Vows To Continue Voting Rights Fight
Georgia Public Broadcasting, 2018-11-16 · supports
“Abrams said there was “no further viable remedy” to continue the fight for a runoff with Republican Brian Kemp. A glimpse at the teleprompter on the floor showed her speech was called “I Will Not Concede,” and Abrams, who would have been the country's first black female governor, said this was not meant to be a speech of concession. ... After recounting an assortment of problems voters faced in the election, from long lines at the polls to being issued provisional paper ballots to the hundreds of thousands of Georgians that have been removed from the voting rolls in recent years, Abrams said there were two things she would do next.”
Abrams said there was “no further viable remedy” to continue the fight for a runoff with Republican Brian Kemp. A glimpse at the teleprompter on the floor showed her speech was called “I Will Not Concede,” and Abrams, who would have been the country's first black female governor, said this was not meant to be a speech of concession. ... After recounting an assortment of problems voters faced in the election, from long lines at the polls to being issued provisional paper ballots to the hundreds of thousands of Georgians that have been removed from the voting rolls in recent years, Abrams said there were two things she would do next.
- Texas v. Pennsylvania, No. 155, Orig. (order)
Supreme Court of the United States, 2020-12-11 · supports
“The State of Texas's motion for leave to file a bill of complaint is denied for lack of standing under Article III of the Constitution. Texas has not demonstrated a judicially cognizable interest in the manner in which another State conducts its elections.”
The State of Texas's motion for leave to file a bill of complaint is denied for lack of standing under Article III of the Constitution. Texas has not demonstrated a judicially cognizable interest in the manner in which another State conducts its elections.
- Roll Call 10, 117th Congress, 1st Session (vote record; fields are congress, session, chamber, roll call number, question, vote type, result, date, and totals of yeas, nays, present and not voting)
Office of the Clerk, U.S. House of Representatives, 2021-01-06 · supports
“117 1st U.S. House of Representatives 10 MOTION On Agreeing to the Objection YEA-AND-NAY Failed 6-Jan-2021 ... Totals 121 303 0 7”
117 1st U.S. House of Representatives 10 MOTION On Agreeing to the Objection YEA-AND-NAY Failed 6-Jan-2021 ... Totals 121 303 0 7
- Roll Call 11, 117th Congress, 1st Session (vote record, same fields)
Office of the Clerk, U.S. House of Representatives, 2021-01-07 · supports
“117 1st U.S. House of Representatives 11 MOTION On Agreeing to the Objection YEA-AND-NAY Failed 7-Jan-2021 ... Totals 138 282 0 11”
117 1st U.S. House of Representatives 11 MOTION On Agreeing to the Objection YEA-AND-NAY Failed 7-Jan-2021 ... Totals 138 282 0 11
- Lake v. Hobbs, No. CV-23-0046-PR (order)
Arizona Supreme Court (copy hosted by States United Democracy Center), 2023-03-22 · supports
“Issue number six asks, "Did the panel err in dismissing the signature-verification claim on laches[,] mischaracterizing Lake's claim as a challenge to existing signature verification policies, when Lake in fact alleged that Maricopa failed to follow these”
Issue number six asks, "Did the panel err in dismissing the signature-verification claim on laches[,] mischaracterizing Lake's claim as a challenge to existing signature verification policies, when Lake in fact alleged that Maricopa failed to follow these
- Judge dismisses Kari Lake’s final claim in election loss for Arizona governor
Associated Press (via KSAT), 2023-05-23 · supports
“Maricopa County Superior Court Judge Peter A. Thompson said Lake failed to prove her claim that Maricopa County did not verify signatures on mail ballots as required by law. ... She filed suit after losing to Hobbs by about 17,000 votes, asking the courts to install her as governor or order a new election. ... She did not contest whether voters’ signatures on ballot envelopes matched those in their voting records.”
Maricopa County Superior Court Judge Peter A. Thompson said Lake failed to prove her claim that Maricopa County did not verify signatures on mail ballots as required by law. ... She filed suit after losing to Hobbs by about 17,000 votes, asking the courts to install her as governor or order a new election. ... She did not contest whether voters’ signatures on ballot envelopes matched those in their voting records.
- Judge orders new Bridgeport primary
CT Mirror, 2023-11-01 · supports
“"Given the volume of votes at issue, the miscounting of those statutorily invalid votes leaves this court unable to determine the result of the primary." ... Bloss based his argument that a new primary is needed on numbers — arguing that as many as 1,253 were submitted through drop boxes, while 2,100 hours of surveillance videos of the city's four drop boxes show only about 420 people placing ballots in them. ... Ganim defeated Gomes by 251 votes in the Sept. 12 Democratic primary”
"Given the volume of votes at issue, the miscounting of those statutorily invalid votes leaves this court unable to determine the result of the primary." ... Bloss based his argument that a new primary is needed on numbers — arguing that as many as 1,253 were submitted through drop boxes, while 2,100 hours of surveillance videos of the city's four drop boxes show only about 420 people placing ballots in them. ... Ganim defeated Gomes by 251 votes in the Sept. 12 Democratic primary
- Bridgeport Mayor Joe Ganim wins do-over election, Associated Press projects
CBS New York (Associated Press), 2024-02-27 · supports
“Bridgeport Mayor Joe Ganim has won a do-over election in Connecticut's most populous city, months after a judge threw out the results of the first one because of allegations of absentee ballot box stuffing during a Democratic primary. ... A new Democratic primary was held on Jan. 23. Ganim won again, this time more comfortably”
Bridgeport Mayor Joe Ganim has won a do-over election in Connecticut's most populous city, months after a judge threw out the results of the first one because of allegations of absentee ballot box stuffing during a Democratic primary. ... A new Democratic primary was held on Jan. 23. Ganim won again, this time more comfortably
- Confidence in Election Integrity Hides Deep Partisan Divide (chart tables, 2004–2022); Partisan Split on Election Integrity Gets Even Wider (2024)
Gallup, 2022-11-04 · supports
“Americans' Confidence in the Accuracy of U.S. Elections % Very/Somewhat confident Jan-04 72 Jan-06 75 Jan-08 59 Jan-16 66 Jan-18 70 Jan-20 59 Jan-22 63 ... Americans' Confidence in the Accuracy of U.S. Elections, by Party Republicans Independents Democrats Jan-04 87 69 59 Jan-06 92 70 66 Jan-08 57 63 57 Jan-16 55 59 85 Jan-18 77 64 69 Jan-20 44 57 76 Jan-22 40 67 85 ... Confidence in Accuracy of Each Presidential Election, by Party Republicans Independents Democrats 2004 87 69 59 2008 57 63 57 2016 55 59 85 2020 44 57 76 2024 28 58 84”
Americans' Confidence in the Accuracy of U.S. Elections % Very/Somewhat confident Jan-04 72 Jan-06 75 Jan-08 59 Jan-16 66 Jan-18 70 Jan-20 59 Jan-22 63 ... Americans' Confidence in the Accuracy of U.S. Elections, by Party Republicans Independents Democrats Jan-04 87 69 59 Jan-06 92 70 66 Jan-08 57 63 57 Jan-16 55 59 85 Jan-18 77 64 69 Jan-20 44 57 76 Jan-22 40 67 85 ... Confidence in Accuracy of Each Presidential Election, by Party Republicans Independents Democrats 2004 87 69 59 2008 57 63 57 2016 55 59 85 2020 44 57 76 2024 28 58 84
- Broad Public Confidence in Elections in the U.S. – but Partisans Differ Over Concerns About Access, Security (chart data)
Pew Research Center, 2026-10-20 · supports
“Widespread confidence that in-person ballots will be counted accurately, but public confidence in count of mail ballots is lower, down among Democratic voters ... 2020-10 Oct ’20 In person 91 90 92 2022-10 Oct ’22 In person 84 95 79 2024-10 Oct ’24 In person 85 93 77 2026-10 Oct ’26 In person 79 81 84 2020-10 Oct ’20 By absentee or mail-in ballot 59 77 36 2022-10 Oct ’22 By absentee or mail-in ballot 62 88 37 2024-10 Oct ’24 By absentee or mail-in ballot 61 85 38 2026-10 Oct ’26 By absentee or mail-in ballot 53 64 42”
Widespread confidence that in-person ballots will be counted accurately, but public confidence in count of mail ballots is lower, down among Democratic voters ... 2020-10 Oct ’20 In person 91 90 92 2022-10 Oct ’22 In person 84 95 79 2024-10 Oct ’24 In person 85 93 77 2026-10 Oct ’26 In person 79 81 84 2020-10 Oct ’20 By absentee or mail-in ballot 59 77 36 2022-10 Oct ’22 By absentee or mail-in ballot 62 88 37 2024-10 Oct ’24 By absentee or mail-in ballot 61 85 38 2026-10 Oct ’26 By absentee or mail-in ballot 53 64 42
- How We Voted in 2024, Figure 25: Confidence in Nationwide Vote Counting by Party, 2012–2024
MIT Election Data and Science Lab, 2025-07 · supports
“In 2020, confidence among Democrats rose to 93%, while the percentage of Republicans who were either very or somewhat confident fell to 22%. Democratic confidence remained essentially unchanged in 2022, whereas Republican confidence increased by twenty points. By 2024, Democrats and Republicans became more aligned in the nationwide confidence measure, with Republican confidence rising to 88% and Democratic confidence decreasing to 79%.”
In 2020, confidence among Democrats rose to 93%, while the percentage of Republicans who were either very or somewhat confident fell to 22%. Democratic confidence remained essentially unchanged in 2022, whereas Republican confidence increased by twenty points. By 2024, Democrats and Republicans became more aligned in the nationwide confidence measure, with Republican confidence rising to 88% and Democratic confidence decreasing to 79%.
- U.S. Trust in Elections Diverges From Global Pattern (trend table)
Gallup, 2026-10-07 · supports
“Americans Divided on Honesty of Elections ... Time Yes No 2026 49% 51% 2025 47% 53% 2024 51% 49% 2023 44% 55% 2022 49% 51% 2021 50% 50% 2020 45% 54% 2019 40% 59% 2018 37% 62% 2017 47% 52% 2016 30% 69% 2015 40% 59% 2014 40% 59% 2013 39% 60% 2012 42% 57% 2011 48% 49% 2010 44% 55% 2009 59% 40% 2008 47% 53% 2007 50% 49% 2006 52% 47% ”
Americans Divided on Honesty of Elections ... Time Yes No 2026 49% 51% 2025 47% 53% 2024 51% 49% 2023 44% 55% 2022 49% 51% 2021 50% 50% 2020 45% 54% 2019 40% 59% 2018 37% 62% 2017 47% 52% 2016 30% 69% 2015 40% 59% 2014 40% 59% 2013 39% 60% 2012 42% 57% 2011 48% 49% 2010 44% 55% 2009 59% 40% 2008 47% 53% 2007 50% 49% 2006 52% 47%