Work and Study Visas and the Care Workforce
Work visas more than tripled to a 2023 peak and have since fallen most of the way back, driven above all by care workers. [1][2][3][5][14][21]
By route
Work visas issued each year to people applying from abroad, counting both the workers and the family members who came with them. These are entry clearance visas by calendar year, main applicants and dependants together, split into route families that add up to the total. Health and Care Worker is the route that took care workers from February 2022 until it closed to new overseas recruits in July 2025.
Work visas issued in the year, by year
Work visas issued each year to people applying from abroad, counting both the workers and the family members who came with them. These are entry clearance visas by calendar year, main applicants and dependants together, split into route families that add up to the total. Health and Care Worker is the route that took care workers from February 2022 until it closed to new overseas recruits in July 2025. Read as by route: Work visas issued in the year. Dashed segments cross 2 definitional breaks in the source, explained in Method Changes below this graph. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- All work visas
- Health and Care Worker
- Other sponsored work
- Temporary work
- Talent, innovator and entrepreneur
- Other work routes
Vertical dashed lines mark measurement changes. See method changes.
Source: Home Office [55]
Observations 3
Work visas more than doubled in two years and have fallen back most of the way
For the eleven years to mid-2021 there were fewer than 200,000 work visas a year, partly because EU nationals needed no visa while free movement lasted. Health and Care Worker and Skilled Worker visas drove the rise to 613,627 in 2023, and together made up 76% of work visas that year. 2 The total was 234,841 in the year to June 2026. 1
The skill threshold was lowered in 2020 and raised again in July 2025
The post-Brexit system cut the skill threshold for a work visa from degree level (RQF 6) to A-level equivalent (RQF 3), opening sponsored visas to mid-skilled occupations. Care workers were added to the Health and Care Worker route separately, in February 2022. 8 2 On 22 July 2025 the threshold went back to RQF 6. 9
Talent, innovator and entrepreneur routes are a small slice and have not grown since 2023
These routes (Global Talent, High Potential Individual, Innovator Founder, Scale-up and their predecessors) were under one in twenty-five work visas in every year shown, and their number in 2025 was below 2023's. The chart counts visas applied for abroad only, so it misses people who switch onto these routes from inside the UK.
Subtleties
Main applicants and dependants in the latest year
The 234,841 work visas in the year to June 2026 were 158,722 main applicants and 76,119 dependants. 1
How the 2025 change is described
The Migration Advisory Committee describes the return to RQF 6 on 22 July 2025 as ending the 2020 relaxation. 9
Method Changes
2008: Points-based system tiers begin
Home Office: "Prior to the Q3 2019 publication, each PBS visa type (Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 4 and Tier 5) included 'pre-PBS equivalent' visa types, which relate to non-PBS visas that were in place before the PBS was introduced. From Q3 2019, the non-PBS equivalent visas have been recategorised, and in the latest published data all Work non-PBS visas are included in the 'Other work visas and exemptions' visa type". Before the points-based tiers, every work visa therefore sits in "Other work routes". [55]
2021: EU nationals start needing work visas
Home Office: "During this time the UK was a member of the European Union (EU) and, as such, EU nationals did not require a visa to work in the UK due to freedom of movement." Free movement ended on 1 January 2021, so from 2021 the count covers EU workers too. [55]
Main applicants and dependants
Work visas issued in the year, by year
Work visas issued each year to people applying from abroad, counting both the workers and the family members who came with them. These are entry clearance visas by calendar year, main applicants and dependants together, split into route families that add up to the total. Health and Care Worker is the route that took care workers from February 2022 until it closed to new overseas recruits in July 2025. Read as main applicants and dependants: Work visas issued in the year. Dashed segments cross 2 definitional breaks in the source, explained in Method Changes below this graph. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- Main applicants
- Dependants
Vertical dashed lines mark measurement changes. See method changes.
Source: Home Office [55]
Observations 1
Dependants were close to half of work visas at the peak
The Migration Advisory Committee found that Health and Care Worker visa holders brought 1.21 dependants each between October 2022 and September 2023, against 0.77 for other Skilled Worker occupations. 10 The dependant line fell after care workers lost the right to bring family in spring 2024, but more slowly than main applicants. 4 13
Subtleties
Why the dependant line fell more slowly
The Migration Advisory Committee counted 173,900 dependants on the Health and Care Worker route in a year. 10 The dependant line fell more slowly than main applicants because people recruited before the change could still bring family from abroad. In the year to June 2026, 79% of Health and Care Worker visas went to dependants. 4 13
Method Changes
2008: Points-based system tiers begin
Home Office: "Prior to the Q3 2019 publication, each PBS visa type (Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 4 and Tier 5) included 'pre-PBS equivalent' visa types, which relate to non-PBS visas that were in place before the PBS was introduced. From Q3 2019, the non-PBS equivalent visas have been recategorised, and in the latest published data all Work non-PBS visas are included in the 'Other work visas and exemptions' visa type". Before the points-based tiers, every work visa therefore sits in "Other work routes". [55]
2021: EU nationals start needing work visas
Home Office: "During this time the UK was a member of the European Union (EU) and, as such, EU nationals did not require a visa to work in the UK due to freedom of movement." Free movement ended on 1 January 2021, so from 2021 the count covers EU workers too. [55]
About this data
Full published range: 2005–2025. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – The Home Office detailed dataset runs from 2005 to the second quarter of 2026; the chart stops at the last complete calendar year. It counts visas applied for outside the UK only, so it leaves out in-country grants and switches between routes, including the Graduate route and most extensions. Route families are our grouping of the dataset’s visa types: "Talent, innovator and entrepreneur" is Global Talent, Tier 1 Exceptional Talent, High Potential Individual, Innovator Founder, Start-up, Tier 1 Entrepreneur, Tier 1 Graduate Entrepreneur and Scale-up; "Other sponsored work" is every other visa in the Worker category (Skilled Worker and Tier 2, intra-company transfers, Global Business Mobility, sportspeople and ministers of religion, including Tier 2 dependants); "Temporary work" is the Temporary Worker category (seasonal workers, youth mobility, creative and exchange schemes); "Other work routes" is everything else, including Tier 1 General and Post-Study Work, investors, UK Ancestry, overseas domestic workers and all pre-2008 work permits. The five families sum exactly to the total in every year.
By route
Health and Care Worker visas are zero before 2020 because the route opened in August 2020; health workers sponsored before then are in "Other sponsored work". Main applicants and dependants are counted together because the dataset assigns dependants on points-based routes to their main applicant’s route.
Main applicants and dependants
The Health and Care Worker route lets people from abroad work in UK health and care; this counts its visas issued each quarter. The visas are those issued to people applying from abroad, main applicants and the dependants who came with or joined them. Care workers became eligible in February 2022; restrictions announced in December 2023, including a bar on care workers bringing dependants, took effect in spring 2024; the route closed to new overseas care recruits in July 2025.
Visas issued in the quarter, by quarter ending
The Health and Care Worker route lets people from abroad work in UK health and care; this counts its visas issued each quarter. The visas are those issued to people applying from abroad, main applicants and the dependants who came with or joined them. Care workers became eligible in February 2022; restrictions announced in December 2023, including a bar on care workers bringing dependants, took effect in spring 2024; the route closed to new overseas care recruits in July 2025. Read as main applicants and dependants: Visas issued in the quarter. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- Main applicants
- Dependants
Source: Home Office [56]
Observations 1
Main applicants fell first; dependants followed after the spring 2024 rules
Main applicants on the route peaked in the third quarter of 2023 and dropped by four-fifths within two quarters. Dependants stayed high into early 2024, then fell by about two-thirds in the quarter after care workers lost the right to bring them. 13
Subtleties
The government's account of the fall
The government's technical annex puts the 2023-to-2024 fall in the whole route at 68%, to 110,800, and attributes it to Home Office scrutiny of employers, compliance action and the spring 2024 dependant rule. 11
About this data
Full published range: 2020-12–2026-06. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – The route opened in August 2020 and its first grants fall in the last quarter of 2020; the dataset runs to the second quarter of 2026. Figures from the first quarter of 2026 are provisional.
By occupation
Work visas each quarter for care workers, nurses and doctors sponsored by an employer, with all sponsored jobs shown for scale. These are entry clearance grants to sponsored work main applicants. Dependants are not included, because the dataset records occupation only for the person sponsored.
Main applicants granted visas in the quarter, by quarter ending
Work visas each quarter for care workers, nurses and doctors sponsored by an employer, with all sponsored jobs shown for scale. These are entry clearance grants to sponsored work main applicants. Dependants are not included, because the dataset records occupation only for the person sponsored. Read as by occupation: Main applicants granted visas in the quarter. Dashed segments cross 1 definitional break in the source, explained in Method Changes below this graph. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- All sponsored occupations
- Care workers and senior care workers
- Nurses
- Doctors
Vertical dashed lines mark measurement changes. See method changes.
Source: Home Office [57]
Observations 2
Care-worker visas collapsed in late 2023 and early 2024, long before the 2025 closure
Sponsored care-worker grants fell by about nine-tenths from the third quarter of 2023 to the first of 2024. The Home Office attributes the start to closer scrutiny of health and social care sponsors, before the 2024 rule changes. 3 When the route closed to new overseas care recruits in July 2025, grants were already about a thousand a quarter. 12
Nurse recruitment from abroad fell almost as steeply
Health and Care Worker visas for nursing professionals fell 95%, from 22,858 to 1,125, between 2023 and the year to June 2026; the Department of Health and Social Care links this to the end of its centrally supported international recruitment programme and lower demand. Doctors fell less, and were 59% of the route's visas in the latest year. 6
Subtleties
The closure's estimated effect, and a different Home Office summary
The Home Office also attributes the start of the fall to compliance action against employers. 3 The government's own impact estimate for the closure was about 7,000 main applicants a year. 12 The Home Office summary nonetheless describes the fall from 107,772 to 344 as following "the end to overseas recruitment of care workers in July 2025". 5
Method Changes
2024-12: Recorded SOC 2020 codes replace modelled estimates
Home Office: "Data between Q1 2021 and Q3 2024 are modelled estimates, based on converting occupations under the Office for National Statistics' (ONS) Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) 2010 framework for classifying occupations, and converting these to occupations under the SOC 2020 framework." [57]
About this data
Full published range: 2021-03–2026-06. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – The occupation dataset starts in the first quarter of 2021 and runs to the second quarter of 2026; figures from 2026 are provisional. It covers only applications matched to a certificate of sponsorship, so totals are slightly below the visa dataset. "Care workers and senior care workers" is the SOC 2020 minor group 613, Caring Personal Services.
Vacancy rate
Three views of people working in adult social care in England: unfilled posts, the nationality of staff, and care workers’ pay. Each financial year shows the vacancy rate, the nationality of the people filling posts, and how far care workers’ average pay sits above the legal minimum wage.
Vacant posts as a percentage of all posts, by financial year ending March
Three views of people working in adult social care in England: unfilled posts, the nationality of staff, and care workers’ pay. Each financial year shows the vacancy rate, the nationality of the people filling posts, and how far care workers’ average pay sits above the legal minimum wage. Read as vacancy rate: Vacant posts as a percentage of all posts. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- All job roles
- Care workers and support workers
Source: Skills for Care [58]
Observations 3
Care vacancies fell from their 2021/22 peak to the lowest rate in the series
Skills for Care puts the 2021/22 vacancy rate at 10.4%, the highest since its records began in 2012/13, and the 2025/26 rate at 6.1%, one point below 2018/19. 14 It credits international recruitment with part of the fall, and changes in economic inactivity and fewer vacancies elsewhere with another part; it does not say how much each contributed. 16 17
Vacancies did not rise as overseas recruitment ran down
About 105,000 people arrived from abroad and started direct care jobs in 2023/24, 50,000 in 2024/25 and 30,000 in 2025/26. 13 19 The monthly vacancy rate stayed between 6.4% and 6.1% from March to August 2026. 18 15 That is under a year of data after the route closed, so the effect of the closure on vacancies is not yet known.
Employers that recruited abroad saw the largest fall in vacancies
The vacancy rate among employers with internationally recruited care staff fell from 9.9% in March 2022 to 5.6% in March 2026. 20
Nationality of the workforce
Percentage of filled posts, by financial year ending March
Three views of people working in adult social care in England: unfilled posts, the nationality of staff, and care workers’ pay. Each financial year shows the vacancy rate, the nationality of the people filling posts, and how far care workers’ average pay sits above the legal minimum wage. Read as nationality of the workforce: Percentage of filled posts. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- British
- EU (non-British)
- Non-EU
Source: Skills for Care [59]
Observations 2
British-held care posts fell by about 130,000
Posts filled by British nationals fell from 85% of the workforce in 2020/21 to 67% in 2025/26, about 130,000 fewer posts, 40,000 of them in the last year. 21 Skills for Care attributes the decline to fewer British people starting care jobs, not to more leaving. 23 About 150,000 posts were held by people on Health and Care Worker visas in March 2026. 19
Subtleties
A narrower measure of the fall
Elsewhere in the same Skills for Care report, measured from 2021/22 across local authority and independent employers only, the fall is 83% to 65%, or about 107,000 posts. 22
About this data
Full published range: 2017–2026. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – Each point is a financial year from April to March, labelled by the year it ends: 2026 is 2025/26. The statistical appendix publishes these trend tables from 2016/17 on the method revised in October 2026; earlier editions ran back to 2012/13 on the old method and are not joined on. Figures cover England only.
Vacancy rate
All sectors, from appendix table 3.12.2. The appendix was revised in October 2026 and gives a 2021/22 peak of 10.1% for all job roles; the main report’s text still quotes 10.4% for that year and 6.2% for 2025/26 in places. The chart uses the revised appendix.
Nationality of the workforce
All sectors and job roles, from appendix table 4.8.1, which publishes shares rounded to whole percentages. The three groups sum to 100% in every year.
Care worker pay above the minimum wage
Derived by us from appendix table 5.4.1: the independent-sector mean hourly rate for care workers and support workers, minus the National Minimum Wage or National Living Wage in force during the year, divided by that wage. The inputs run from £7.77 against £7.20 in 2016/17 to £12.84 against £12.21 in 2025/26. A mean, not the median the report quotes in its text.
Licences revoked
A sponsor licence lets an organisation bring in overseas workers or students; this counts those the Home Office revoked each year. Revocations are counted by calendar year and by route. A revoked sponsor can no longer employ or recruit people on that route.
Licences revoked in the year, by year
A sponsor licence lets an organisation bring in overseas workers or students; this counts those the Home Office revoked each year. Revocations are counted by calendar year and by route. A revoked sponsor can no longer employ or recruit people on that route. Read as licences revoked: Licences revoked in the year. Dashed segments cross 1 definitional break in the source, explained in Method Changes below this graph. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- Skilled Worker
- Temporary Worker
- Student
Vertical dashed lines mark measurement changes. See method changes.
Source: UK Visas and Immigration [61]
Observations 1
Revocations of sponsor licences are at a record number
The Home Office revoked 1,948 worker sponsor licences between July 2024 and June 2025, against 937 the year before. It names adult social care among the sectors with the most abuse, and gives underpayment, helping people get round the rules and failing to provide promised work as reasons. 27 28 The series records licences, not the workers employed.
Subtleties
Method Changes
2016: Administrative revocations counted
Home Office: "Following a review of the definitions used in producing this data, there has been a change in the way this data is reported from Q2 2016. Figures now include administrative revocations and the suspension of a licence when an immediate revocation is completed. This means that these figures are not directly comparable to those published previously." [61]
About this data
Full published range: 2012–2025. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – The transparency table runs from the first quarter of 2012 to the second quarter of 2026; the chart sums complete calendar years. Licences covering several routes are counted under each. The table has no breakdown by sector, by reason, or by the number of workers each sponsor employed.
Registered sponsors
How many organisations were licensed to bring in overseas workers or students, and how often Skilled Worker licences were revoked. Sponsor counts are at the end of each year. The revocation rate is Skilled Worker revocations in the year as a share of Skilled Worker sponsors.
Sponsors registered at the end of the year, by year
How many organisations were licensed to bring in overseas workers or students, and how often Skilled Worker licences were revoked. Sponsor counts are at the end of each year. The revocation rate is Skilled Worker revocations in the year as a share of Skilled Worker sponsors. Read as registered sponsors: Sponsors registered at the end of the year. Dashed segments cross 1 definitional break in the source, explained in Method Changes below this graph. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- Skilled Worker
- Temporary Worker
- Student
Vertical dashed lines mark measurement changes. See method changes.
Source: UK Visas and Immigration [62]
Method Changes
2016: Administrative revocations counted
Home Office: "Following a review of the definitions used in producing this data, there has been a change in the way this data is reported from Q2 2016. Figures now include administrative revocations and the suspension of a licence when an immediate revocation is completed." [62]
Skilled Worker revocation rate
Licences revoked as % of registered sponsors, by year
How many organisations were licensed to bring in overseas workers or students, and how often Skilled Worker licences were revoked. Sponsor counts are at the end of each year. The revocation rate is Skilled Worker revocations in the year as a share of Skilled Worker sponsors. Read as skilled Worker revocation rate: Licences revoked as % of registered sponsors. Dashed segments cross 1 definitional break in the source, explained in Method Changes below this graph. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- Skilled Worker
Vertical dashed lines mark measurement changes. See method changes.
Source: UK Visas and Immigration [62]
Observations 1
As a share of sponsors, revocations are back to their mid-2010s level, not a record
Registered Skilled Worker sponsors roughly quadrupled between 2019 and 2025. Measured against that larger base, revocations in 2025 were about the same share of sponsors as in 2014 to 2017, after very low rates during 2021 to 2023 while sponsor numbers were climbing fastest.
Method Changes
2016: Administrative revocations counted
Home Office: "Following a review of the definitions used in producing this data, there has been a change in the way this data is reported from Q2 2016. Figures now include administrative revocations and the suspension of a licence when an immediate revocation is completed." [62]
About this data
Full published range: 2014–2025. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – The sponsor register table starts in the first quarter of 2014; each point is the count at the end of the year. The revocation rate is derived by us: Skilled Worker licences revoked in the calendar year (table SC_01) divided by Skilled Worker sponsors registered at the end of that year (table SP_01).
New joiners by place of education
People joining the UK's register of nurses, midwives and nursing associates for the first time, by where they were educated. The register is the Nursing and Midwifery Council's. Each year runs to March, and joiners are split by whether they were educated in the UK or abroad.
People joining the register for the first time, by year ending March
People joining the UK's register of nurses, midwives and nursing associates for the first time, by where they were educated. The register is the Nursing and Midwifery Council's. Each year runs to March, and joiners are split by whether they were educated in the UK or abroad. Read as new joiners by place of education: People joining the register for the first time. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- Educated in the UK
- Educated abroad
Source: Nursing and Midwifery Council [64]
Observations 3
UK-trained nurses joining rose while overseas recruitment peaked
UK-educated joiners to the nursing register rose 11.9% in 2023-24 and 5.9% in 2024-25, while internationally educated joiners reached their 2023-24 peak and stayed high; they were 49.4% of new joiners in 2023-24 and 26.4% in 2025-26. 29 30 The two counts moved together, which does not by itself show whether one affects the other.
Then both fell
Research on training predates the sponsored system
The Migration Advisory Committee's 2018 review found "no evidence that migration has had a negative impact on the training of the UK-born workforce" under EU free movement, before sponsorship and salary thresholds. 33 The 2025 white paper reads the recent period the other way, from two trends moving in opposite directions rather than from a study. 34
Subtleties
Sources of international joiners
Two of the three largest sources of international joiners, Nigeria and Ghana, are on the list of countries where active recruitment is barred under ethical codes. 31
More on training research
For more on the 2018 research, which covered EU free movement, see Immigration and Domestic Workforce Training.
About this data
Full published range: 2021–2026. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – The data tables publish six-month counts from the half-year to September 2020; each point sums the two halves of a year from April to March, so 2026 is April 2025 to March 2026. The sums reproduce the report’s own figures for the last two years.
About this data
Full published range: 2010-09–2025-06. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – The House of Commons Library tables give eight dates from September 2010 to June 2025, unevenly spaced; NHS Digital’s monthly series behind them could not be downloaded. Each value is 100 minus the Library’s "UK as % of known". Excludes GPs and social care. The share of staff with unknown nationality fell from about one in six in 2010 to about one in eighty in 2025, so early figures are less certain.
All claims by entry route
Everyone who claimed asylum each year, split by how they last came to be in the UK and, for visa holders, by which visa. The groups are an illegal entry route, a visa or other leave, or neither.
People claiming asylum in the year, by year
Everyone who claimed asylum each year, split by how they last came to be in the UK and, for visa holders, by which visa. The groups are an illegal entry route, a visa or other leave, or neither. Read as all claims by entry route: People claiming asylum in the year. Dashed segments cross 1 definitional break in the source, explained in Method Changes below this graph. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- Illegal entry routes
- Held a visa or other leave
- Other or unmatched
Vertical dashed lines mark measurement changes. See method changes.
Source: Home Office [66]
Observations 1
Two in five people claiming asylum had held a visa
Of 85,891 people who claimed asylum in the year to June 2026, 41% (34,999) had held a visa or other leave, slightly more than the 40% (33,949) who arrived by small boat. 50 51 52 The Home Office notes the rise coincided with the rise in visa grants up to 2023, and that a claim can come long after the visa was granted, during or after the period of leave. 53
Method Changes
2020: Exact counts and work sub-routes begin
Home Office: "Figures for 2018 and 2019 have been rounded to the nearest 100, or nearest 10 for values under 100." Health and Care Worker and Graduate show zero before 2020 and 2021 because those routes did not yet exist. [66]
Claims by visa held
People claiming asylum in the year, by year
Everyone who claimed asylum each year, split by how they last came to be in the UK and, for visa holders, by which visa. The groups are an illegal entry route, a visa or other leave, or neither. Read as claims by visa held: People claiming asylum in the year. Dashed segments cross 1 definitional break in the source, explained in Method Changes below this graph. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- Study
- Visitor
- Health and Care Worker
- Graduate
- Other work
- Other leave
Vertical dashed lines mark measurement changes. See method changes.
Source: Home Office [66]
Observations 1
Graduate visa claims doubled as study-visa claims fell
In the year to June 2026, claims from people who last held a study visa fell 35% and claims from work-visa holders rose 16%; Graduate visa holders' claims more than doubled to 5,130. 54 Each route's claims are a small fraction of the visas it issued. The dataset records the last leave held, not how the person first entered.
Subtleties
Other work visas, and rough ratios
In the year to June 2026, claims from work visas other than the Graduate visa fell 9% to 9,021. 54 Rough ratios of claims to visas issued are in About this data.
Method Changes
2020: Exact counts and work sub-routes begin
Home Office: "Figures for 2018 and 2019 have been rounded to the nearest 100, or nearest 10 for values under 100." Health and Care Worker and Graduate show zero before 2020 and 2021 because those routes did not yet exist. [66]
About this data
Full published range: 2018–2025. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – The dataset runs from the first quarter of 2018 to the second quarter of 2026; the chart shows complete calendar years. It records the most recent leave held before the claim, so a student who switched to a work visa is counted under work. "Other work" is Skilled Worker, Seasonal Worker and every other work visa except Health and Care and Graduate; for 2018 and 2019 the Home Office gives only a work total. "Other leave" includes family visas and Electronic Travel Authorisations. Rough scale: claims from Health and Care Worker visa holders in 2024 were about 1% of the Health and Care visas issued in 2022 and 2023 together (first chart), and study-visa claims in 2024 were about 3% of the sponsored study visas issued in 2023; these are cross-year ratios of our own, not published rates.
Foreign-trained doctors across the OECD
The share of doctors in each OECD country who got their first medical degree abroad, in 2023 or the latest year shown in brackets. Every country the OECD reports is shown, and the UK is highlighted.
% of doctors trained abroad
- Israel58.5%
- Norway44%
- Ireland43.4%
- New Zealand42.4%
- Switzerland40.3%
- United Kingdom (England and Wales)38.3%
- Australia31.4%
- Sweden (2022)28.4%
- United States (2016)25%
- Chile24.9%
- Canada24.6%
- Greece22%
- OECD average (28 countries)19.6%
- Slovenia15.4%
- Germany15%
- Finland (2022)14.1%
- Belgium14%
- Denmark11.7%
- France11%
- Hungary8.3%
- Czechia8.2%
- Austria7.5%
- Latvia6.7%
- Colombia5.1%
- Estonia4.5%
- Netherlands3.8%
- Poland (2022)3.8%
- Italy1%
- Lithuania0.8%
Source: OECD [38]
Observations 1
The UK relies on foreign-trained doctors more than most OECD countries
Subtleties
Most growth is still domestic
Across the OECD, domestically trained doctors still made up most of the growth in physician numbers between 2010 and 2023. 40
About this data
OECD Health Statistics 2025, Figure 8.23 workbook (stat.link/cuf5an). UK data cover England and Wales only. Germany counts foreign nationals rather than foreign-trained doctors, and some registries include licensed doctors who are not working, which the OECD names as the main comparability limit. The OECD average is the unweighted mean of the 28 countries with data in both years.
Foreign-trained nurses across the OECD
The share of nurses in each OECD country who got their first nursing degree abroad, in 2023 or the latest year shown in brackets. Every country the OECD reports is shown, and the UK is highlighted.
% of nurses trained abroad
- Ireland51.8%
- New Zealand33.1%
- Switzerland26.6%
- United Kingdom22.7%
- Australia17.9%
- Austria13.7%
- Israel11.4%
- Germany10.1%
- Canada10%
- OECD average (28 countries)8.8%
- United States (2024)6.8%
- Norway6.5%
- Italy5.2%
- Belgium4.6%
- Sweden (2022)3.7%
- Czechia3.5%
- France (2021)3.1%
- Latvia2.9%
- Denmark2.8%
- Slovenia2.1%
- Hungary1.9%
- Chile1.8%
- Netherlands1.5%
- Finland (2022)0.9%
- Greece0.9%
- Colombia0.6%
- Lithuania0.5%
- Poland (2022)0.4%
- Estonia0.2%
Source: OECD [41]
Observations 1
For nurses the UK is fourth, and foreign-trained nurses made up most of its growth
The OECD average share of foreign-trained nurses was 8.8% in 2023; the UK ranks fourth. 41 Foreign-trained nurses accounted for 83% of the increase in UK nurse numbers from 2010 to 2023. 42 Registries differ in whether they count only practising nurses, and Germany counts nationality instead of place of training. 43
About this data
OECD Health Statistics 2025, Figure 8.26 workbook (stat.link/op6rgz). Germany counts foreign nationals rather than foreign-trained nurses. The OECD average is the unweighted mean of 28 countries.
First-year earnings of Graduate route visa holders and UK graduates
The Graduate route is a work visa held by international graduates; this compares their early earnings with those of UK graduates. It shows median annual earnings of people in work: Graduate route holders over their first year on the visa and in its last three months, against UK-domiciled first-degree graduates about 15 months after graduating.
Median annual earnings
- Graduate route, first year£21,000
- Graduate route, last three months of first year£24,240
- UK graduates, 15 months after graduating£26,000
Source: Migration Advisory Committee [44]; Migration Advisory Committee [45]
Observations 1
Graduate route holders earned less than UK graduates in their first year
The median Graduate visa holder in work earned £1,750 a month in the first year (£21,000 a year), rising to £2,020 a month (£24,240) in the last three months; UK graduates earned a median £26,000 about 15 months after graduating. 44 45 These are first-year figures only; nothing published follows the same people further.
Subtleties
Why some gap was expected
The Migration Advisory Committee expected some gap because international graduates have less experience of the UK labour market. 45
How many reached £2,500 a month
Of Graduate visa holders, 19% earned at least £2,500 in their first full month, and 38% by the twelfth month. 46
About this data
Migration Advisory Committee, from HMRC PAYE records for Graduate visa holders who started before April 2022, and the Graduate Outcomes survey for UK graduates of 2020/21. Annual figures are the MAC’s conversions of monthly medians. No later year has been published.
Jobs taken by people switching into sponsored work
Share of people moving onto an employer-sponsored work visa who took graduate-level jobs, by earlier visa, beside UK graduates. Graduate-level jobs here are managerial, professional or associate professional and technical occupations. The groups are people switching to a sponsored work visa from the Graduate route, people switching straight from a student visa, and UK graduates.
% in graduate-level occupations
- UK graduates75%
- Switched from the Graduate route69%
- Switched straight from a student visa42%
Source: Migration Advisory Committee [47]
Observations 1
Graduate route switchers took graduate-level jobs at nearly the UK graduate rate; students who switched directly did not
69% of people who switched from the Graduate route to a sponsored work visa went into managerial, professional or associate professional jobs, against 75% of UK graduates and 42% of people who switched straight from a student visa. 47 49% of direct student switchers became care workers or senior care workers. 48
Subtleties
Comparing switchers in caring jobs
49% of direct student switchers became care workers or senior care workers, against 20% of Graduate route switchers and 6% of UK graduates in the whole caring, leisure and other service group. 48
Students are staying longer
Students are also staying longer than they used to: 41% of the 2020 study cohort still held leave five years later, against 17% to 18% for the 2012 to 2016 cohorts; see Student Migration and Subsequent Residence. 49
About this data
Migration Advisory Committee, from corrected Home Office management information on switches made between July 2021 and December 2023.
Work visas issued to people coming from abroad rose to 613,627 in 2023 and fell to 234,841 in the year to June 2026, 62% below the peak. 2 1 Care workers account for most of both the rise and the fall: visas for caring occupations fell from 107,772 in 2023 to 344, and the fall began at the end of 2023, more than eighteen months before the route closed to new overseas recruits in July 2025. 5 3 In England's adult social care, the share of posts held by British nationals fell from 85% to 67% between 2020/21 and 2025/26, and the vacancy rate came down from its 2021/22 peak to 6.1%. 21 14
The report then follows the same workers into the NHS and nursing register, sets UK reliance on foreign-trained staff against every OECD country that reports it, and covers two questions about study and work routes: what Graduate route holders earn, and how many visa holders later claim asylum.
Subtleties
Fewer arrivals is not fewer visa holders
Every visa chart here counts people applying from abroad. Health and Care Worker extensions granted inside the UK rose 19% to 336,215 in the year to June 2026, as people who arrived in 2022 and 2023 renewed their leave. 7 The number of people holding these visas has therefore not fallen in step with new grants.
The care route's own data cannot measure exploitation
The Migration Advisory Committee reported exploitation on the route and tied it to low pay and visas linked to one employer, but this report found no official series that counts exploited workers by visa route, and licence revocations count employers rather than victims. 26 27 See Data still needed.
Related Data
Immigration, the Economy and the Public Finances
GDP per head has barely grown since 2019, and migration's effect on the public finances depends on who comes: skilled workers are a large gain, care workers a cost. [1][6][8][17][21][22][62][55][57]
GDP per head
Gross domestic product (GDP), the UK's total economic output, divided by its population and measured at 2023 prices. This is real GDP for every year the Office for National Statistics series publishes. It is output per person, not income per person or how that output is shared.
£ per person, 2023 prices, by year
Gross domestic product (GDP), the UK's total economic output, divided by its population and measured at 2023 prices. This is real GDP for every year the Office for National Statistics series publishes. It is output per person, not income per person or how that output is shared. Read as GDP per head: £ per person, 2023 prices. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- UK GDP per head
Source: Office for National Statistics [79]
Observations 2
GDP per head has barely grown since 2019
In pounds per person at 2023 prices, UK GDP per head was 40,125 in 2019 and 40,546 in 2025. It fell to 36,033 in 2020, recovered to 40,554 in 2022, then slipped to 40,126 in 2023 and 40,153 in 2024. Between 2007 and 2019 it had risen from 37,625 to 40,125, with the 2009 recession in between. 1
The series shows timing, not cause
The 2019–2025 window contains the 2020 pandemic fall in output as well as other shocks. A series of GDP per head cannot by itself say how much of the stall, if any, is due to migration; that needs a model, and the OBR's scenarios are further down. No study attributing the stall among its causes was found. 1 8
About this data
Full published range: 1955–2025. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – The ONS annual series IHXW starts in 1955 (earlier cells are blank or zero) and ends in 2025; quarterly values run to 2026 Q2. Values are from the release of 13 August 2026, the latest the ONS series page returned on 29 October 2026.
Total GDP
Gross domestic product (GDP), the total output of the whole UK economy, at 2023 prices, in £ billion. This is real GDP, shown beside GDP per head because a larger population raises total output even when output per person does not change.
£ billion, 2023 prices, by year
Gross domestic product (GDP), the total output of the whole UK economy, at 2023 prices, in £ billion. This is real GDP, shown beside GDP per head because a larger population raises total output even when output per person does not change. Read as total GDP: £ billion, 2023 prices. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- UK GDP
Source: Office for National Statistics [80]
Observations 1
Total GDP kept growing while GDP per head stalled
About this data
Full published range: 1948–2025. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – ONS series ABMI, chained volume measure, published in £ million and shown here divided by 1,000. The annual series starts in 1948. Release of 13 August 2026.
GDP per head, G7
Economic output per person in the seven large economies of the G7, in US dollars at 2015 prices and market exchange rates. This is real GDP per person, from the World Bank. All seven G7 members are shown; the UK is the subject.
US$ per person, 2015 prices, by year
Economic output per person in the seven large economies of the G7, in US dollars at 2015 prices and market exchange rates. This is real GDP per person, from the World Bank. All seven G7 members are shown; the UK is the subject. Read as GDP per head, G7: US$ per person, 2015 prices. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- United Kingdom
- United States
- Germany
- France
- Italy
- Japan
- Canada
Source: World Bank [81]
Observations 1
Read changes within each country, not levels across them
The World Bank series uses market exchange rates, so the gaps between countries' levels move with currencies. The ranking of growth since 2019 is in the bar chart below. 81
About this data
Full published range: 1960–2025. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – World Bank World Development Indicators, NY.GDP.PCAP.KD, last updated 8 October 2026. The series starts in 1960 for all seven countries. Market exchange rates, not purchasing-power parities, so levels across countries are only roughly comparable; changes within a country are the more reliable reading.
Change in GDP per head, 2019 to 2025, G7
How much output per person changed between 2019 and 2025 in each of the seven large economies of the G7, ranked. This is the cumulative change in real GDP per person. The UK is highlighted.
% change in GDP per head, 2019–2025
- United States11.3%
- Italy7.9%
- Japan4.8%
- France3.1%
- United Kingdom1.2%
- Canada0.7%
- Germany−0.2%
Source: World Bank [81]
Observations 1
The UK was fifth of the seven G7 countries for growth in GDP per head after 2019
On the World Bank series, GDP per head rose more between 2019 and 2025 in the United States, Italy, Japan and France than in the UK; Canada grew less and Germany shrank slightly. The UK's stall was shared by other large economies, so on its own it is not evidence about migration. 81
Subtleties
Net migration is not shown here
Net migration per head for these countries over the same years is not shown here (see Data still needed). 81
About this data
Derived from the World Bank series charted above: 2025 value divided by 2019 value, minus one. Not published as a growth rate by the World Bank. Net migration per head over the same years is not shown here.
OBR: GDP per person if net migration were 200,000 a year higher
Scenario estimates of output per person in 2028-29 if net migration (arrivals minus departures) ran above the official forecast. Each bar is the difference from the Office for Budget Responsibility's central forecast, in its March 2024 scenarios. The lower-migration scenario is the mirror image.
GDP per person, % difference from central forecast
- Migrants work like residents; nearly all adults on work visas (about 90% participation)0.8%
- Migrants as productive as residents; capital keeps pace0%
- Capital stock does not adjust−0.4%
Source: Office for Budget Responsibility [3]; Office for Budget Responsibility [4]; Office for Budget Responsibility [5]
Observations 2
The OBR finds the per-head effect small and of uncertain sign
In March 2026 the OBR said effects on real GDP per person "are relatively small in either a positive or negative direction". 8 11 In March 2024 scenarios, 200,000 more net migrants a year leave it "largely unchanged" if as productive as residents, 0.4% lower if the capital stock does not adjust, and 0.8% higher if nearly all adults arrive on work visas. 3 4 5
March 2026: a lower migration forecast left output per person unchanged
After the ONS revised up emigration by British nationals, the OBR cut its net migration forecast by around 60,000 people a year, lowering the adult population in 2030 by around 200,000. Because the extra emigrants were assumed to be younger and lower-paid, the change left potential output per person "broadly unchanged". 9 10
Subtleties
The lower-migration scenario
About this data
The OBR describes the first case as "largely unchanged" and gives no number; it is plotted at zero. All three cases assume net migration 200,000 a year higher, settling at 515,000 in 2028-29.
OBR: total GDP if net migration were 200,000 a year higher
Scenario estimates of total output (GDP) in 2028-29 if net migration (arrivals minus departures) ran above the official forecast. Each bar is the difference from the Office for Budget Responsibility's central forecast, in the same three cases as the GDP-per-person chart, from March 2024.
Total GDP, % difference from central forecast
- Nearly all adults on work visas (about 90% participation)2.2%
- Migrants as productive as residents; capital keeps pace1.5%
- Capital stock does not adjust1%
Source: Office for Budget Responsibility [3]; Office for Budget Responsibility [4]; Office for Budget Responsibility [5]
OBR: borrowing in 2028-29 under higher or lower net migration
Estimated change in government borrowing in 2028-29 if net migration (arrivals minus departures) ran above or below forecast. This is the change in public sector net borrowing against the Office for Budget Responsibility's central forecast, in its March 2024 scenarios with net migration 200,000 a year higher or lower. Negative means less borrowing.
Change in borrowing in 2028-29
- Lower migration, spending left as planned£19,900,000,000
- Lower migration, spending per person held£13,100,000,000
- Higher migration, spending per person held−£13,100,000,000
- Higher migration, spending left as planned−£19,900,000,000
Source: Office for Budget Responsibility [6]; Office for Budget Responsibility [7]
Observations 3
Lower migration raises borrowing in the OBR's five-year scenarios
With departmental spending left as planned, 200,000 more net migrants a year cut borrowing in 2028-29 by £19.9 billion, and 200,000 fewer raise it by the same amount. If spending is raised to keep services per person unchanged — about £6.1 billion extra in the higher scenario — the effect is £13.1 billion either way. 6 7
The five-year window leaves out later costs
The Migration Observatory notes short-term forecasts "are particularly likely to find a positive impact from migration, because they do not account for the costs that come later as migrants age". The OBR's 2023 projection had higher net migration cut the primary deficit by 1.1% of GDP by 2072/73, without stopping debt rising towards 300% of GDP. 12 13 14
An independent forecaster puts a similar figure on lower migration
Oxford Economics, expecting net migration to stay low, estimated in February 2026 that if the OBR followed its forecast, borrowing would be £19bn (0.5% of GDP) higher. That is a private forecast, not an OBR figure. 15
Subtleties
Delaying the ageing challenge, not resolving it
The 2024 long-run scenarios
In its 2024 long-run scenarios, a shorter average stay lowered debt by about 23 per cent of GDP by 2073-74 and higher migrant earnings by about 40 per cent of GDP; in neither case did debt stop rising. Migrants earning half the average instead raised debt to 351 per cent of GDP, 76 per cent of GDP above the baseline. 35 36
About this data
Two spending assumptions: departmental spending left as planned, or raised to keep spending per person unchanged (about £6.1 billion extra in the higher scenario). Five-year horizon only; later pension and health costs of an ageing cohort fall outside it.
Modelled lifetime net fiscal contribution, by visa route and against UK residents
Modelled taxes paid minus public spending received over the rest of a person's life, by visa route and for UK residents. Figures are present values from 2022/23. Migrant groups are the 2022/23 Skilled Worker and Partner-route cohorts; UK resident rows are the comparators used by the Migration Advisory Committee.
Mean lifetime net contribution per person (present value)
- Skilled Worker main applicants (outside health and care)£689,000
- Other health and care occupations (mainly nurses and doctors)£166,000
- Age-matched UK resident (comparator, mean)£117,000
- Health and Care main applicants (all)£54,000
- Skilled Worker adult dependants£3,000
- Care workers (Health and Care visa)−£36,000
- All UK residents (comparator, mean)−£39,000
- Health and Care adult dependants−£67,000
- Partner route (2022/23 cohort)−£109,000
- All UK residents (comparator, median)−£145,000
Source: Migration Advisory Committee [18]; Migration Advisory Committee [21]; Migration Advisory Committee [20]; Migration Advisory Committee [22]; Migration Advisory Committee [23]; Migration Advisory Committee [28]
Observations 5
Skilled Workers are a large net gain; care workers and Health and Care dependants are net costs
The Migration Advisory Committee models the 329,200 people who arrived on the Skilled Worker route in 2022/23, including Health and Care visas and dependants, at a net £47.1bn over their lifetimes, or +£143,000 each. Main applicants outside health and care average +£689,000, care workers −£36,000 and Health and Care adult dependants −£67,000. 17 18 20 21 22
The average UK resident is a lifetime net cost too
Most of the gain comes from top earners and from those who stay
The top 10% of earners outside health and care (salary at least £131,000) account for 39% of that group's contribution. Main applicants who stay are modelled at +£931,000 and those who leave at +£174,000. The MAC concludes that for lower earners temporary migration is fiscally better than permanent, and for higher earners the reverse. 24 19 27
Discounting can change the sign
The MAC uses a 3.0% real discount rate, "broadly in line with HMT Green Book". Without discounting, the future contribution of a 25-year-old UK resident would be −£186,000 rather than +£184,000, because old-age costs fall late in life. Any lifetime figure has to state its discount rate to be compared with another. 26 25
Most routes have not been modelled
The MAC has not estimated lifetime effects for refugees, students or other routes; the Migration Observatory expects refugees to be more negative because of lower employment and greater need for support. 29
Subtleties
The other groups on the route
Why the route was bound to come out positive
The MAC calls the route "clearly fiscally positive", which it says is "almost inevitable" given the salary thresholds. 16
Comparing like with like on age
About this data
MAC baseline: 3.0% real discount rate and 1.8% real growth in taxes and spending. "Age-matched UK resident" has the same starting-age mix as Skilled Worker main applicants outside health and care. The Partner route (partners of British citizens and settled residents) comes from the MAC annual report. Students, Graduate route, refugees and other family routes have not been modelled. All values are means except the UK resident median, shown because most residents are below the mean.
OBR: cumulative fiscal impact by age 66
Illustrative running totals of tax paid minus public spending received to age 66, for migrant workers and for a UK resident. These are stylised profiles from the Office for Budget Responsibility: a migrant worker arriving at 25 on three wage levels, and a representative UK resident counted from birth. Not discounted.
Cumulative taxes minus spending to age 66
- High-wage migrant (30% above average pay)£1,247,000
- Average-wage migrant£722,000
- Representative UK resident£309,000
- Low-wage migrant (half of average pay)−£198,000
Source: Office for Budget Responsibility [37]; Office for Budget Responsibility [30]; Office for Budget Responsibility [33]
Observations 1
Earnings and age at arrival decide the result
In the OBR's stylised profiles, a migrant arriving at 25 on average pay is a net contributor "by their second year", while a resident of the same age becomes one only in their 40s. A migrant earning 30 per cent above average stays a net benefit even living to 100; one on half the average falls behind the average resident in their early 40s. 30 31 32
About this data
Read from the OBR's published chart data (sheet C4.13, as corrected on 14 November 2024), in £ thousand and rounded here to the nearest £1,000. Cumulative tax paid minus public spending received, from birth for the resident and from arrival at 25 for the migrants. The migrant lines include visa fees and the health surcharge, no welfare for five years, and £20,000 of public investment per arrival; they exclude dependants. The OBR presents this as a stylised illustration, not a forecast for any real cohort.
OBR: cumulative fiscal impact by age 82
Illustrative running totals of tax paid minus public spending received to age 82, for migrant workers and for a UK resident. These are stylised profiles from the Office for Budget Responsibility: a migrant worker arriving at 25 on three wage levels, and a representative UK resident counted from birth. Not discounted.
Cumulative taxes minus spending to age 82
- High-wage migrant (30% above average pay)£1,010,000
- Average-wage migrant£405,000
- Representative UK resident−£7,000
- Low-wage migrant (half of average pay)−£653,000
Source: Office for Budget Responsibility [37]; Office for Budget Responsibility [30]; Office for Budget Responsibility [33]
About this data
Read from the OBR's published chart data (sheet C4.13, as corrected on 14 November 2024), in £ thousand and rounded here to the nearest £1,000. Cumulative tax paid minus public spending received, from birth for the resident and from arrival at 25 for the migrants. The migrant lines include visa fees and the health surcharge, no welfare for five years, and £20,000 of public investment per arrival; they exclude dependants. The OBR presents this as a stylised illustration, not a forecast for any real cohort.
OBR: cumulative fiscal impact by age 100
Illustrative running totals of tax paid minus public spending received to age 100, for migrant workers and for a UK resident. These are stylised profiles from the Office for Budget Responsibility: a migrant worker arriving at 25 on three wage levels, and a representative UK resident counted from birth. Not discounted.
Cumulative taxes minus spending to age 100
- High-wage migrant (30% above average pay)£252,000
- Average-wage migrant−£405,000
- Representative UK resident−£818,000
- Low-wage migrant (half of average pay)−£1,555,000
Source: Office for Budget Responsibility [37]; Office for Budget Responsibility [30]; Office for Budget Responsibility [33]
Observations 1
Old age reverses most of the gains
Every line falls after state pension age as health, care and pension costs mount. The correction of November 2024 made the low-wage migrant "significantly less fiscally beneficial, and substantially so at older ages". The OBR's representative migrant has no dependants; the OBR says it chose "a more typical migrant on a work visa and no dependants". 33 34 37
About this data
Read from the OBR's published chart data (sheet C4.13, as corrected on 14 November 2024), in £ thousand and rounded here to the nearest £1,000. Cumulative tax paid minus public spending received, from birth for the resident and from arrival at 25 for the migrants. The migrant lines include visa fees and the health surcharge, no welfare for five years, and £20,000 of public investment per arrival; they exclude dependants. The OBR presents this as a stylised illustration, not a forecast for any real cohort.
Median earnings by visa route, 2023/24
Median (middle) yearly earnings in 2023/24 of people granted UK entry visas, by visa route, beside the UK full-time median. These are median annual adjusted PAYE earnings in financial year 2023/24 of people aged 18–65 granted entry clearance visas from April 2019 to March 2023. The UK full-time median is there for reference.
Median annual earnings
- Skilled Worker main applicants£56,600
- Senior or Specialist Worker main applicants£47,900
- UK full-time employees (ASHE, reference)£37,430
- Health and Care main applicants£30,900
- Skilled Worker dependants£30,200
- Senior care workers£25,800
- Care workers and home carers£23,100
- Health and Care dependants£22,100
- Family-route visa holders£20,200
Source: Home Office [38]; Home Office [39]; Home Office [40]; Office for National Statistics [43]
Observations 2
Earnings differ widely by route
In 2023/24 median annual earnings were £56,600 for Skilled Worker main applicants, £47,900 for Senior or Specialist Workers and £30,900 for Health and Care main applicants; care workers and home carers earned £23,100. 38 39 40 43 The Home Office advises caution in comparing routes, because work eligibility differs. 41 42
Recent non-EU cohorts caught up quickly; the 2024 and 2025 cohorts started lower
HMRC payroll data show each non-EU cohort from 2021 to 2023 earning around 95% of the UK median after one full year, falling to 90% for the 2024 cohort. The 2021 and 2023 entrants passed the overall median within two years; 2015 entrants took about six. The Migration Observatory says faster catch-up may reflect lower earners leaving the payroll. 44 45 46 47
Subtleties
Dependants, family visas and the ONS median
The 2025 fall, and part-time work
Who stayed on the payroll
Of non-EU migrants first on payroll in 2015, 60% were still there in 2025; of EU migrants, 45%. These data are by nationality, not by visa route. 48
About this data
Home Office–HMRC linked data, 93% of records matched. "Adjusted" scales part-year earnings to a full year; part-time work is included, and self-employment is not. The UK figure is the ONS ASHE median for full-time employees in April 2024, a different measure, shown only as a reference point. Care workers and senior care workers are occupations within the Health and Care route.
Implied effect of EU immigration on UK-born wages, 1993–2017, by wage level
Implied effect on UK-born workers' wages, at each pay level, of the rise in the EU-born share of the working-age population. This is the Migration Advisory Committee's update of work by Dustmann, Frattini and Preston, giving the total effect implied by the 6.7-point rise in that share at each point of the UK-born wage distribution. Ordered from lowest to highest paid.
% change in UK-born nominal wages
- 5th percentile (lowest paid)−5.2%
- 10th percentile−4.9%
- 25th percentile−1.6%
- Median1.6%
- 75th percentile2.2%
- 90th percentile4.4%
- 95th percentile (highest paid)3.1%
Source: Migration Advisory Committee [66]
Observations 2
Average wage effects are small; slightly negative at the bottom, positive further up
The Migration Advisory Committee found migration "is not a major determinate of the wages of UK-born workers". Its update implies EU immigration over 1993–2017 lowered UK-born wages by 5.2% at the 5th percentile and raised them by 1.6% at the median and by 4.4 and 3.1 per cent at the 90th and 95th percentiles, as short-run estimates. 65 66
Subtleties
Lower-skilled and higher-skilled workers
Other estimates
Expressed per year, a 2022 study found immigration over 1994–2016 cut the hourly wage at the 5th percentile by about half a penny a year and raised it by 1.7p a year at the 90th. In low-wage service jobs, a one-point rise in the migrant share lowered average occupational wages by about 0.2%. An earlier estimate for semi- and unskilled services, a 1.9 per cent fall per 10-point rise, revised down an even earlier 5.2 per cent. 68 69 67
About this data
The MAC says this kind of exercise "should be interpreted with caution as the model only estimates the short-run response to migration". It covers EU free movement before 2018, not the post-Brexit system. Spread over 24 years, the effects are small per year.
Who pays UK universities' course fees, 2024/25
Course fees received by UK higher-education providers in 2024/25, split between students from the UK and those from elsewhere. Students are grouped by where they are domiciled.
Course fee income, 2024/25
- Students domiciled in the UK£14,364,460,000 · 53.7%
- Students domiciled outside the UK£12,396,906,000 · 46.3%
Source: HESA / Office for Students [74]
Observations 2
A third of English universities are in deficit
About this data
HESA DT031 Table 6, total row, in £000s. Non-UK is the sum of the "Total Non-UK fees" column (providers that report only a UK/non-UK split) and the EU and non-EU columns (providers that report them separately); together with UK fees it equals the published total of HE course fees exactly. Excludes research training grants, non-credit-bearing courses and further education. Fees are not total income, so this is not a share of university income.
This collection covers what is measured about immigration's effect on output, on the public finances and on wages: GDP and GDP per head over time and across the G7, the OBR's migration scenarios, modelled lifetime fiscal contributions by visa route, earnings by route, the record of headline cost estimates, wage effects by pay level, universities' reliance on international fees, and founders of fast-growing firms. Fiscal figures are model estimates resting on stated assumptions; the assumptions are given beside each one.
Observations
The £234bn was withdrawn by its author
The Centre for Policy Studies' February 2025 report put "the lifetime net fiscal cost to the state" of settling recent migrants at £234 billion, or £8,200 per household. Its research page now says "the overall cost estimates should no longer be used" because the OBR fiscal data it relied on are disputed; its projections of how many will settle stand. 53 55 56
Full Fact found the figure was a net lifetime cost, not a benefits bill, and that the Daily Mail corrected an article describing it as benefits. 57
The CPS says the OBR revised its data after the report was published; the OBR's correction slip to its migrant profiles is dated 14 November 2024, before the report. Which revision the CPS means is not stated. 56 33
Reform UK's £622.5bn is undiscounted; its own discounted figure is £154bn
Reform UK's April 2026 report puts the lifetime cost of 2021–2025 arrivals expected to settle in 2026–2030 at £622.5 bn undiscounted and £154 bn discounted at 3.5%; the £20,000-per-household figure goes with the undiscounted total. It maps migrants onto ONS income quintiles as "a proxy", which it says "likely understates heterogeneity within groups". 58 59
Reform argues that discounting understates long-run costs. Madeleine Sumption (Migration Observatory) said the absence of discounting is "the main reason the headline figures are so high"; Jonathan Portes said Reform "invented their own numbers for migrant earnings" instead of using the MAC's HMRC data. Reform called its assumptions "entirely defensible". 60 61 63 64
There is no estimate for the whole post-Brexit system
The record of estimates, side by side
| Estimate | Covers | Figure | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| Centre for Policy Studies (2025) | Lifetime cost of settling recent migrants, from OBR profiles | £234 billion cost (£8,200 per household) | Withdrawn by the CPS |
| Reform UK (2026) | 2021–2025 arrivals settling in 2026–2030, to old age | £622.5 bn undiscounted; £154 bn discounted | Reform's own figures; method disputed |
| MAC (2025) | 2022/23 Skilled Worker cohort, lifetime, discounted | +£47.1bn | Current |
| MAC (2025) | 2022/23 Partner-route cohort, lifetime, discounted | −£109,000 per applicant | Current |
| Oxford Economics (2018) | One year, 2016/17: EEA, non-EEA, UK-born | +£4.7b, −£9.0b, −£41.4b | Static, pre-Brexit |
| Dustmann and Frattini (2014) | 1995–2011: EEA, non-EEA, UK-born | +£4.4b, −£118b, −£591b | Static, pre-Brexit |
| Migration Watch (2014) | 1995–2011: EEA, non-EEA, UK-born | −£13.6b, −£134.9b, −£565b | Static, pre-Brexit |
Static estimates count one period's taxes and spending; lifetime estimates project and discount. The two kinds are not comparable. 53 58 17 28 51 52
Observations
Foreign-born founders are over-represented among the fastest-growing firms
The Entrepreneurs Network found that 54 of the UK's 100 fastest-growing companies had a foreign-born founder or co-founder, and 91 of 219 founders (42%) were born overseas, against a foreign-born population of around 16%. The sample is 100 companies selected on valuation growth between June 2024 and May 2025; it says nothing about migrants on most visa routes. No UK measure of foreign-born inventors was found. 75 76 77 78
Settlement and Migrants' Immigration Status
Grants of settlement are at their highest since 2011, with about 1.6 million more expected by 2030, and EU settled status covers far more people still. [1][3][2][4][5]
Grants of settlement
Settlement, or indefinite leave to remain, lets a person live in the UK permanently; this counts grants made each calendar year. It leaves out the EU Settlement Scheme and splits grants by the kind of leave the person held immediately before settling. The parts add up to the total in every year. The 2012 policy change named in the observations lengthened the family route from two years to five.
People granted settlement that year, by year
Settlement, or indefinite leave to remain, lets a person live in the UK permanently; this counts grants made each calendar year. It leaves out the EU Settlement Scheme and splits grants by the kind of leave the person held immediately before settling. The parts add up to the total in every year. The 2012 policy change named in the observations lengthened the family route from two years to five. Read as grants of settlement: People granted settlement that year. Dashed segments cross 3 definitional breaks in the source, explained in Method Changes below this graph. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- All settlement grants
- Work
- Family
- Refugee and protection
- Other (including BN(O))
Vertical dashed lines mark measurement changes. See method changes.
Source: Home Office [107]
Observations 5
2010: a one-off peak from clearing a backlog
2012–2016: the family route lengthened from two years to five
The fall from 2010 to 2016 was partly due to the July 2012 change that raised the family route's qualifying period from two to five years, delaying grants that would otherwise have come earlier. 11 The Home Office's cohort data show people arriving on family routes after the change typically took longer to settle. 52
2017–2026: rising again, now led by work and Hong Kong BN(O)
Grants have risen since 2017, mostly to people whose last leave was on a work route: 80,409 in the year to June 2026, up 36%. 7 Grants to Hong Kong BN(O) visa holders rose to 38,373 as the first cohorts completed five years. 8 Grants to refugees fell 40% to 22,799, reflecting fewer protection decisions during the pandemic in 2020. 9
About 1.6 million are expected to qualify in 2026–30
The Home Office forecasts 1.3 million to 2.2 million people settling in 2026–2030 (central estimate 1.6m). 3 It names three drivers: Hong Kong BN(O) visas granted in 2021–22, and Health and Care and Skilled Worker entry visas in 2022–24. 12 13 The forecast is under current rules, before any of the proposed changes, and excludes the EU Settlement Scheme.
The Centre for Policy Studies' 801,000 and £234 billion
A Centre for Policy Studies projection covering visas from January 2021 to June 2024 found more than 801,000 recent migrants would get indefinite leave in its base case. 15 It put the lifetime net fiscal cost at £234 billion. 16 After the Office for Budget Responsibility revised the data used, the CPS said the cost estimates "should no longer be used". 17
Subtleties
When the BN(O) route opened
The Hong Kong BN(O) route opened in January 2021. 8
The forecast peak and its assumption
The three drivers in detail
The Home Office names three drivers: 154,000 visas granted to Hong Kong BN(O) holders in 2021–22 (an extra 92,000 applications in 2026 and 54,000 in 2027); 616,000 Health and Care entry visas in 2022–24 (384,000 extra applications in 2027–29, peaking at 210,000 in 2028); and 344,000 Skilled Worker entry visas in 2022–24 (around 222,000 applications). 12 13
The alternative case, and what the CPS stands by
What the £234 billion was
The £234 billion was a lifetime net cost of people settling, not a benefits bill or a saving from removing existing settlement.
Method Changes
2019: Immediate settlement on arrival drops out
Home Office: "From May 2019, the data excludes people admitted to the UK with an immediate settlement visa. This was due to the Governments decision to remove the requirement for passengers to complete a landing card." [107]
2020: New caseworking system
Home Office: "Due to data quality issues associated with the transition from the Home Office’s Case Information Database (CID) to a newer caseworking system, Atlas, data from 2020 onwards cannot be provided at the same level of detail as previous years." [107]
2021: EEA and Swiss nationals enter the count
Home Office: the table "Excludes EEA and Swiss nationals before 2021 with nationals of EU accession countries included or excluded according to their accession date." [107]
About this data
Full published range: 2010–2025. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – Table Se_02 in the year-ending-June-2026 release publishes calendar years 2010 to 2025 plus rolling years to June 2025 and June 2026; the rolling years are left out so every point is a calendar year. Older releases carried a series from 2004 that is not in the current table. EU Settlement Scheme status is counted separately and is not in these figures.
Cumulative compensation paid
Compensation for the Windrush generation: Commonwealth migrants up to 1973 with a right to stay but no papers to prove it. They are named after HMT Windrush, which brought the first post-war migrants from the Caribbean in 1948. The 1971 Immigration Act gave those who had arrived from Commonwealth countries before January 1973 the right to stay, but the government gave them no documents, and some were later treated as if they had no such right. Their children and grandchildren, close family and some later arrivals can also claim. This is the total the scheme has paid out since it opened on 3 April 2019, in pounds, at the end of each quarter to June 2020 and each month after that.
Pounds paid since the scheme opened, by end of quarter or month
Compensation for the Windrush generation: Commonwealth migrants up to 1973 with a right to stay but no papers to prove it. They are named after HMT Windrush, which brought the first post-war migrants from the Caribbean in 1948. The 1971 Immigration Act gave those who had arrived from Commonwealth countries before January 1973 the right to stay, but the government gave them no documents, and some were later treated as if they had no such right. Their children and grandchildren, close family and some later arrivals can also claim. This is the total the scheme has paid out since it opened on 3 April 2019, in pounds, at the end of each quarter to June 2020 and each month after that. Read as cumulative compensation paid: Pounds paid since the scheme opened. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- Cumulative amount paid (£)
Source: Home Office [108]
Observations 1
Windrush: people with a lawful right to stay were treated as if they had none
The Windrush Lessons Learned Review found the scandal "foreseeable and avoidable": the government removed and detained people, and denied others work, housing and services, even though they were lawfully entitled to them. 93 94 By August 2026 the compensation scheme had paid £133,475,539.07 on 4,221 claims. 97 96
Subtleties
Who the Windrush generation were
The generation is named after HMT Windrush, which "brought the first post-war migrants from the Caribbean in 1948". 104 The 1971 Immigration Act let people who had arrived from Commonwealth countries before January 1973 remain, "but the government gave them no documents to demonstrate this status". 105 The compensation scheme also covers their children and grandchildren, close family, and people from any country who arrived before 31 December 1988 and are now settled. 106
People detained or removed
The Home Office identified 164 people in the UK before 1973 who had been detained or removed since 2002. 95
Compensation decisions
Windrush and the current proposal
The Windrush victims were entitled to stay under the law as it stood; the current proposal leaves Windrush grants out of scope. 55
About this data
Full published range: 2019-06–2026-08. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – The table reports quarters from Q2 2019 to Q2 2020 and months from July 2020 to August 2026; each quarter is plotted at its last month. The data come from a live operational system, and earlier months are revised between releases.
Who holds settlement, and who is on a path to it
Three separate measures of people with, or on a route to, settlement, which is the right to live in the UK permanently. Each is the best available: EU Settlement Scheme settled-status grants since 2018, the estimated stock of non-EU citizens with indefinite leave at the end of 2024 (lower and upper estimates), and people on temporary visas with a five-year path to settlement at the end of 2024.
People
- EU Settlement Scheme: settled-status grants since 20184,592,322
- On a temporary visa with a five-year path to settlement (end of 2024)2,200,000
- Non-EU citizens holding indefinite leave, upper estimate (end of 2024)820,000
- Non-EU citizens holding indefinite leave, lower estimate (end of 2024)621,000
Source: Home Office [2]; The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford [4]; The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford [5]; The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford [6]
Observations 3
EU Settlement Scheme holders far outnumber non-EU holders of indefinite leave
Just under 4.6 million settled-status grants have been made under the EU Settlement Scheme since 2018. 2 The Migration Observatory estimates that 621,000 to 820,000 non-EU citizens held indefinite leave at the end of 2024. 4 5 EU scheme status is outside the government's proposed reforms, under the Withdrawal Agreement. 55
No official count of holders exists
The non-EU estimate combines the 2021 Census for England and Wales with visa data. It leaves out Scotland and Northern Ireland, and some people counted will have left the UK or become British citizens since. 18
About 2.2 million are on a five-year path
About this data
No official count of people holding indefinite leave exists: the Home Office publishes grants, not holders. The EU figure is grants, so it counts people who have since left or naturalised; it is the 4,476,552 applications concluded as settled in table EUSS_QTR plus 115,770 automated grants, which the Home Office describes as "just under 4.6 million". The non-EU range is the Migration Observatory's estimate from the 2021 Census (England and Wales only) and visa data. The path-to-settlement figure is the Migration Observatory's rounded "around 2.2 million". The bars measure different things and should not be added together.
People on a five-year path to settlement, by visa group, end of 2024
People on temporary visas that can lead to settlement, the right to live in the UK permanently, after five years, by type of visa. This is the breakdown by the Migration Observatory at the University of Oxford of the roughly 2.2 million holders of those visas, by the visa they held at the end of 2024.
People holding the visa
- Worker visa main applicants756,000
- Dependants of worker visa holders645,000
- Family visa holders352,000
- Refugees and humanitarian protection230,000
- Hong Kong BN(O) visa holders189,000
Source: The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford [20]; The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford [19]
Observations 1
Dependants and family visa holders are the groups least often in work
HMRC data for 2023/24 show around half of adult Skilled Worker dependants were not working, and a third of Health and Care dependants. About a third of adults on family visas were not working by their fifth year, and around 45% of refugees. On current circumstances, hundreds of thousands would fail the proposed employment requirement. 19
Subtleties
Adult BN(O) visa holders
About a third of adults on family visas were not working by their fifth year, around 45% of refugees, and 30% of adult BN(O) visa holders. 19
About this data
These five groups are the ones the Migration Observatory names; together they come to 2,172,000 against its rounded total of "around 2.2 million". The worker figure includes some people on visas that do not lead to settlement, such as intra-company transfers.
Where the 2020 arrivals were five years on, by route of entry
People who began what the Home Office calls a "migrant journey" in 2020, by route of entry and by their status at the end of 2025. Status means indefinite leave (the right to stay permanently), still on temporary leave, or leave expired (expected to have left). Ranked by size of route.
Indefinite leave to remain · People
- Work30,397
- Family15,566
- Dependants joining or accompanying2,056
- Asylum (granted protection or other leave)652
- Study282
- Safe and legal routes147
Show all breakdowns
| Category | Indefinite leave to remain | Still on temporary leave | Leave expired | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Study | 282 | 72,605 | 106,274 | 179,161 |
| Work | 30,397 | 27,623 | 41,665 | 99,685 |
| Family | 15,566 | 13,306 | 4,631 | 33,503 |
| Asylum (granted protection or other leave) | 652 | 22,596 | 237 | 23,485 |
| Dependants joining or accompanying | 2,056 | 2,365 | 3,040 | 7,461 |
| Safe and legal routes | 147 | 379 | 237 | 763 |
Source: Home Office [30]
Observations 2
Settling is common on family routes and rare from study
Of the 344,058 people who began a migrant journey in 2020, 55% still held leave five years later. 23 On work routes, 30% had indefinite leave and 28% were still on temporary leave. 24 On family routes, 86% still held leave and 46% had indefinite leave. 25 Less than 1% of those who came to study had settled within five years. 26
More recent work arrivals are settling faster
Among people who started on a work route in 2015, 20% had settled after ten years — fewer than the 30% of the 2020 work cohort who had settled after five. 27 24 Settlement grants recorded in the migrant-journey data fell 9% to 153,204 in 2025, which the Home Office attributes to fewer arrivals in 2020. 29
Subtleties
People granted protection
Most people granted protection go on to settle: 89% of those who claimed asylum in 2015 had indefinite leave within ten years. 28
About this data
From Home Office table MJ_03. The six routes are the table's complete set and add up to its total of 344,058. Asylum covers claims made in 2020 that ended in a grant of protection or other leave; refused claims are not in the data. Visitors are excluded.
People on Universal Credit by immigration status, July 2025
Universal Credit is a benefit; this splits the people receiving it in Great Britain by their recorded immigration status. The figures are for July 2025 and show the share of the 8.0 million people on Universal Credit in each status group the Department for Work and Pensions records.
Share of people on Universal Credit
- UK, Irish or right of abode83.8%
- EU Settlement Scheme9.6%
- Indefinite leave to remain (not EU scheme)2.7%
- Refugee1.5%
- Limited leave to remain, including family reunion0.9%
- Humanitarian0.7%
- Other0.4%
- No immigration status recorded0.4%
Source: Department for Work and Pensions [31]; Department for Work and Pensions [32]; Department for Work and Pensions [33]
Observations 3
No official data on what indefinite-leave holders earn or claim
No published series reports the employment, earnings or benefit receipt of people with indefinite leave by route. The closest measure is Universal Credit by recorded status: 2.7% of people on Universal Credit in July 2025 were in the indefinite-leave group (not the EU scheme), against 9.6% in the EU Settlement Scheme group. 31
The Universal Credit count overstates indefinite-leave holders
Status is recorded at the claim and the Department for Work and Pensions is not usually told when someone becomes a citizen, so the indefinite-leave group includes some British citizens; the Migration Observatory says its estimates of holders cannot be compared with it. 36 These are "statistics in development". 35
Subtleties
The command paper's count, and employment on Universal Credit
No reliable claim rate
Dividing the 213,000 claimants by the 621,000 to 820,000 estimated holders gives no reliable claim rate, because the Universal Credit group includes some British citizens and cannot be compared with those estimates.
About this data
Every group the Department for Work and Pensions publishes; they sum to 100.0%. These are "statistics in development". Status is recorded when someone claims or their circumstances change, and the department is not usually told when someone with indefinite leave becomes a British citizen, so the indefinite-leave group includes some citizens.
Home Office fees for main applications, against its own estimated unit cost
What the Home Office charges for the main application on each major route, with its estimated processing cost in the label. Fees are those from 8 October 2026. Two fees are below their unit cost.
Fee per applicant (£)
- Indefinite leave to remain (unit cost £310)£3,226
- Family or other route to settlement, from overseas (unit cost £639)£2,064
- Naturalisation as a British citizen (table shows a unit cost of £1.23)£1,709
- Skilled Worker, over three years, from overseas (unit cost £153)£1,618
- Graduate route (unit cost £110)£937
- Student, from overseas (unit cost £176)£558
- Health and Care Worker, up to three years, from overseas (unit cost £153)£324
- Global Talent with an approval letter, from overseas (unit cost £488)£205
- Visit visa, up to six months (unit cost £159)£135
Source: Home Office [73]; Home Office [74]; Home Office [79]; Home Office [82]; Home Office [75]; Home Office [78]; Home Office [77]; Home Office [76]; Home Office [81]; Home Office [80]
Observations 3
Indefinite leave costs ten times its processing cost
The fee for indefinite leave is £3,226 against a Home Office estimated unit cost of £310. 74 A Skilled Worker visa of over three years from overseas is £1,618 against £153. 75 Across UK Visas and Immigration, fees recovered 256% of cost in 2024/25. 83 Not every fee is above cost: a short visit visa is £135 against £159. 80 81
The health surcharge is set at expected average use
Most adults pay a £1,035 surcharge per year of their visa. 84 The Home Office sets it on "how much healthcare an 'average' Health Charge payer is expected to use", not each person's use. 85 It comes on top of tax and national insurance. A single Skilled Worker's fees before settlement come to around £9,900 over five years and would be £16,900 over ten. 87
No recourse to public funds: council costs are measured, numbers are not
People on temporary visas are usually barred from most benefits until they settle. 41 The 91 councils that reported to the NRPF Network spent £94 million supporting households with no recourse in 2024/25. 91 No official count exists of how many people, or how many children, are subject to the condition. 92
Subtleties
The Lords committee's view
A Lords committee found the calculation "unconvincing" and slightly high: £1,036 per person where it should have been £1,013. 86
Why ten years costs more
For a single Skilled Worker, the rise in fees before settlement from around £9,900 over five years to £16,900 over ten is mostly because the surcharge is paid every year. 87
Longer routes and child poverty
The Home Affairs Committee expects longer routes to increase child poverty. 92
About this data
The table lists more than 150 fees. Shown here is the standard main-applicant fee for settlement, citizenship, and each main work, study, family and visit route, including the two below cost; extensions, priority services and sponsor fees are left out. The naturalisation unit cost of £1.23 is as printed and is almost certainly an error in the table. The Immigration Health Surcharge is paid on top of most temporary visas and is not included.
Cost of applying for permanent residence, UK and European science nations, 2025
What an applicant pays for the right to stay permanently in the UK and other European countries in a Royal Society comparison. Each bar is the applicant fee for permanent residence (or the nearest equivalent for researchers) in every European country in the comparison, 2025, in pounds at nominal exchange rates.
Applicant cost (£)
- Switzerland – settlement for skilled workers£3,871
- UK – Global Talent visa settlement£3,029
- Denmark – residence permit for researchers£812
- Netherlands – settlement for dedicated researchers£207
- France – settlement for dedicated researchers£192
- Germany – settlement for dedicated researchers£170
- Italy – EU Blue Card£152
- Sweden – settlement for dedicated researchers£117
- Spain – settlement for dedicated researchers£37
Source: The Royal Society [90]; The Royal Society [88]
Observations 1
The UK charges more for settlement than most European comparators
About this data
All nine countries in the Royal Society's Table 12, which compares European countries with dedicated researcher or skilled-worker settlement routes; non-European countries in the study are not in this table. The UK figure is the 2025 fee; the Home Office fee table from 8 October 2026 puts it at £3,226. Adjusted for purchasing power the UK ranks first.
Support for ending and for removing indefinite leave, September 2025
A poll on ending new grants of indefinite leave, the right to live in the UK permanently, and removing it from those who hold it. YouGov asked adults in Great Britain in September 2025, and the bars show support and opposition on each question.
Share of respondents
- End new grants of indefinite leave: support44%
- End new grants of indefinite leave: oppose43%
- Remove it from current holders: support29%
- Remove it from current holders: oppose58%
Source: YouGov [98]; YouGov [99]; YouGov [100]
Observations 2
Removing existing indefinite leave is opposed 58–29
In September 2025, 58% opposed removing indefinite leave from those who hold it and 29% supported it. 100 99 Even among those who supported ending new grants, only 41% backed removing it from current holders. 99 Reform UK voters supported removal by 54%; Conservative voters split 44% to 42%; Labour, Liberal Democrat and Green voters opposed it by 71-80%. 101 102
Ending it for new arrivals splits evenly
About this data
One poll by one pollster. The article does not give fieldwork dates, sample size or the "don't know" shares, so the bars for each question do not add up to 100. No second pollster asking both questions was found.
Indefinite leave to remain, also called settlement, lets a person live in the UK permanently, claim benefits on the same terms as British citizens, and later apply for citizenship. 41 This report covers how many people are granted it, how many hold it, how many are on a path to it, what the rules have said and may say, what it costs, and what the public thinks about ending or removing it. Several of these are records rather than numbers that change year to year — the law on revocation, what route guidance promised, the status of the government's proposal — and are set out as tables rather than charts.
Two things are often run together. Grants are a flow: 199,628 people were granted settlement in the year to June 2026, the most since 2011. 1 Holders are a stock, and no official count of them exists; the best estimate for non-EU citizens is 621,000 to 820,000 at the end of 2024, against just under 4.6 million settled-status grants under the separate EU Settlement Scheme. 4 5 2
The rules on settlement: a record
This is a record of texts and rulings, not a measurement, so it has no chart.
| Date | Text or ruling | What it says |
|---|---|---|
| 2002 | Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, s.76 | Indefinite leave may be revoked where the person is liable to deportation but cannot be deported for legal reasons, where it was obtained by deception, or where a refugee ceases to be one through their own acts. 45 46 |
| 2008 | R (HSMP Forum Ltd) v Secretary of State (High Court) | Applying tougher 2006 extension rules to migrants already on the Highly Skilled Migrant Programme was "conspicuous unfairness and an abuse of power", because the scheme promised the terms "prevailing at the date he joined". 47 48 |
| 2012 | Family route change | The qualifying period for family settlement rose from two to five years. 11 52 |
| 2020 | Hong Kong BN(O) policy statement | After five years, holders who have "stayed free of criminality" and "supported themselves financially" can apply for settled status; the route reflects "the UK's historic and moral commitment to BN(O) citizens". 43 44 |
| current | Skilled Worker visa guidance | "After 5 years, you may be able to apply to settle permanently in the UK". 42 |
| Nov 2025 | A Fairer Pathway to Settlement (CP 1448) | Proposes applying the changes "to everyone in the country today who has not already received indefinite leave to remain", and says the government "would never" take away settled status already granted. 53 54 |
| Mar 2026 | Home Affairs Committee report | Calls applying the changes to people already here "not unprecedented", but sees no justification for applying them to pre-2021 arrivals. 51 61 |
| Sep 2026 | Home Secretary to the Home Affairs Committee | The new policy, including any transitional arrangements, will be set out "later this year"; a large group who arrived in 2022 would otherwise qualify in February 2027. 64 |
Observations
Guidance said "may be able to apply"
The High Court struck down a mid-route change in 2008
In HSMP Forum, the minister had argued that migrants could not expect the rules at their first grant to apply for the rest of their stay. 49 The court held that the scheme's terms and guidance made "a clear representation" that migrants would keep the terms in force when they joined, and found no public interest outweighing the unfairness. 47 48 The ruling turned on what that scheme's documents said; whether a court would read today's "may be able to apply" the same way has not been tested.
Applying changes to people already here has precedent both ways
The Home Affairs Committee found it "common" for the Home Office to give transitional protection, "but there is also precedent" for applying rule changes to people already in the UK. 50 It accepted that extending routes for at least some people already here is "essential" to the government's aim. 62
Removing settlement already granted would need new law
The earned-settlement proposal and its status
| Element | Proposal (CP 1448, November 2025) |
|---|---|
| Standard wait | Ten years instead of five; five for family members of British citizens and BN(O) holders; three for Innovator Founder and Global Talent. 57 |
| Longer baselines | Fifteen years for Skilled Workers in jobs below degree level, including care; twenty for refugees. 57 |
| Reductions and additions | Five years off for taxable income of at least £50,270 and seven off for £125,140; five or ten years added for receiving public funds; up to 20 added for illegal entry, to a maximum of 30 years. 58 |
| New minimum conditions | B2 English, and national insurance contributions for at least three years, in effect earnings of at least £12,570 a year. 59 |
| Benefits after settlement | Asks whether benefits should be reserved for British citizens. 56 |
| Who is out of scope | EU Settlement Scheme status, Windrush Scheme grants, and anyone already settled. 55 |
Observations
A year on, the core changes are not in the rules
The consultation closed on 12 February 2026. 60 The tougher English requirement was laid on 5 March 2026, to take effect on 26 March 2027. 63 In September 2026 the Home Secretary said the new settlement policy would be set out "later this year", and that transitional options ranged from "passporting certain cohorts through" on five years to other arrangements. 64 65 The most recent statement of changes to the Immigration Rules listed by the Home Office is HC 584 of 3 September 2026, before those remarks. 66
Most work dependants would face the longer route
Employed Skilled Worker dependants had median earnings of £30,200 in 2023/24 and Health and Care dependants £22,100, well below the £50,270 needed for a five-year route, so most would face ten years. 67
Waits for permanent residence elsewhere
No source found sets out standard waits for every high-income country from official rules, so there is no chart. What the sources say:
| Country or group | Rule | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Most high-income countries | Standard settlement period "usually five years" | Home Affairs Committee 68 |
| Switzerland and Japan | Ten-year routes to settlement | Home Affairs Committee; Migration Observatory 68 69 |
| Denmark, Sweden, Italy | Minimum employment requirements for permanent residence | Migration Observatory 69 |
| Singapore (Work Permit holders) | No route described here; holders may not marry a citizen or permanent resident without approval, or give birth in Singapore | Ministry of Manpower 70 |
Observations
A ten-year baseline would make the UK an outlier
The Home Affairs Committee says the changes would make the UK "an outlier among most high-income countries, where the standard settlement period is usually five years", although Switzerland and Japan have ten-year routes. 68 The Migration Observatory says waits of 15 to 30 years "would be unusual among high-income countries". 69
Whether waits change behaviour is not established
The Migration Observatory finds "limited evidence" on how longer paths affect migration, citing one survey-based study that found no significant effect on prospective migrants' decisions. 71 On integration the evidence points both ways: a Swedish reform making permanent residence easier was followed by more unemployment, while a Danish study found stricter employment and language conditions reduced employment. 72
Data still needed
- Earnings and employment of Graduate route holders beyond their first year, and of those who later switched to work routes, against UK graduates over the same yearsThe only published comparison is first-year earnings for people who started before April 2022, so whether the route’s graduates catch up with or fall behind UK graduates is unknown.
- Workers employed by sponsors whose licences were revoked, by sector and by reason for revocationThe official revocation series counts licences only. Without the sector, the reason or the number of workers affected, it cannot show how much of the rise was care-sector exploitation rather than paperwork failures elsewhere.
- Prevalence of exploitation among sponsored care workers, with a visa-route flag in modern-slavery and labour-enforcement dataThe Migration Advisory Committee described exploitation on the care route, but helpline and referral data do not record visa route, so its scale cannot be measured.
- Medical school places and doctors joining the UK register by place of qualification, as annual series alongside overseas recruitmentWhether domestic training of doctors was capped while overseas recruitment rose is central to the training argument; the GMC and NHS England sources could not be retrieved for this report, so the doctor side rests on OECD stock figures.
Sources
Work and Study Visas and the Care Workforce
- Why do people come to the UK? Work
Home Office, 2026-08-27 · supports
“There were 234,841 visas issued (including dependants) in all work categories in the YE June 2026, of which 158,722 were to main applicants and 76,119 were to dependants. This represents a fall of 18% compared to the previous year and 62% fewer than the YE December 2023 when the number of work visas peaked.”
There were 234,841 visas issued (including dependants) in all work categories in the YE June 2026, of which 158,722 were to main applicants and 76,119 were to dependants. This represents a fall of 18% compared to the previous year and 62% fewer than the YE December 2023 when the number of work visas peaked.
- Why do people come to the UK? Work
Home Office, 2026-08-27 · supports
“Figure 1 shows between the YE June 2010 and YE June 2021 there were less than 200,000 work visas issued each year, of which over two-thirds were to main applicants. During this time the UK was a member of the European Union (EU) and, as such, EU nationals did not require a visa to work in the UK due to freedom of movement. Between 2021 and 2023, there was an increase in the number of work visas granted. Visas on the Health and Care Worker route, in particular, grew sharply following the expansion of the route in February 2022 to boost the social care workforce and was accompanied by a large increase in the number of dependants. Skilled Worker visas also contributed to the increase over this period. The growth in these routes caused work visas to peak in the YE December 2023 at 613,627. Combined Skilled Worker and Health and Care Worker accounted for 76% of all work visas in the same period.”
Figure 1 shows between the YE June 2010 and YE June 2021 there were less than 200,000 work visas issued each year, of which over two-thirds were to main applicants. During this time the UK was a member of the European Union (EU) and, as such, EU nationals did not require a visa to work in the UK due to freedom of movement. Between 2021 and 2023, there was an increase in the number of work visas granted. Visas on the Health and Care Worker route, in particular, grew sharply following the expansion of the route in February 2022 to boost the social care workforce and was accompanied by a large increase in the number of dependants. Skilled Worker visas also contributed to the increase over this period. The growth in these routes caused work visas to peak in the YE December 2023 at 613,627. Combined Skilled Worker and Health and Care Worker accounted for 76% of all work visas in the same period.
- Why do people come to the UK? Work
Home Office, 2026-08-27 · supports
“The number of work visas issued began to fall towards the end of 2023, driven by a decrease in Health and Care Worker visas, due to more scrutiny applied by the Home Office to employers in the health and social care sector, and compliance activity taken against employers who did not fulfil their obligations as employers of migrant workers.”
The number of work visas issued began to fall towards the end of 2023, driven by a decrease in Health and Care Worker visas, due to more scrutiny applied by the Home Office to employers in the health and social care sector, and compliance activity taken against employers who did not fulfil their obligations as employers of migrant workers.
- Why do people come to the UK? Work
Home Office, 2026-08-27 · supports
“Dependants accounted for 79% of Health and Care Worker visas issued in the YE June 2026. The higher number of dependants compared to main applicants may be partly due to migrants already in the UK, many of whom will have been sponsored prior to the changes in July 2025 restricting dependents for medium skilled occupations, continuing to be eligible to bring family members from abroad.”
Dependants accounted for 79% of Health and Care Worker visas issued in the YE June 2026. The higher number of dependants compared to main applicants may be partly due to migrants already in the UK, many of whom will have been sponsored prior to the changes in July 2025 restricting dependents for medium skilled occupations, continuing to be eligible to bring family members from abroad.
- Why do people come to the UK? Work
Home Office, 2026-08-27 · supports
“Visas issued to Health and Care Worker main applicants increased from 31,800 in the YE December 2021 to a peak of 145,823 in the YE December 2023. The rise was primarily due to an increase in South Asian (Indian, Pakistani, and Bangladeshi) and Sub-Saharan African (Zimbabwean, Ghanaian, and Nigerian) nationals coming to work as care workers. The number of Health and Care Worker visas issued to migrant workers in a Caring Personal Service occupation fell by over 99% (107,772 to 344) in YE June 2026 when compared with the YE December 2023, following the end to overseas recruitment of care workers in July 2025.”
Visas issued to Health and Care Worker main applicants increased from 31,800 in the YE December 2021 to a peak of 145,823 in the YE December 2023. The rise was primarily due to an increase in South Asian (Indian, Pakistani, and Bangladeshi) and Sub-Saharan African (Zimbabwean, Ghanaian, and Nigerian) nationals coming to work as care workers. The number of Health and Care Worker visas issued to migrant workers in a Caring Personal Service occupation fell by over 99% (107,772 to 344) in YE June 2026 when compared with the YE December 2023, following the end to overseas recruitment of care workers in July 2025.
- Why do people come to the UK? Work
Home Office, 2026-08-27 · supports
“The number of Health and Care Worker visas issued to nursing professionals fell by 95% (22,858 to 1,125) in the YE June 2026, when compared with the YE December 2023. This may be attributable to, according to the Department for Health and Social Care, the end of the centrally supported nurse international recruitment programme and changes in demand for international staff. Medical practitioners account for the majority (59%) of Health and Care Worker visas issued in the YE June 2026, though numbers have decreased by 42% in the latest year.”
The number of Health and Care Worker visas issued to nursing professionals fell by 95% (22,858 to 1,125) in the YE June 2026, when compared with the YE December 2023. This may be attributable to, according to the Department for Health and Social Care, the end of the centrally supported nurse international recruitment programme and changes in demand for international staff. Medical practitioners account for the majority (59%) of Health and Care Worker visas issued in the YE June 2026, though numbers have decreased by 42% in the latest year.
- Why do people come to the UK? Work
Home Office, 2026-08-27 · complicates
“In contrast to the Graduate route, Health and Care Worker extension grants rose by 19% in the YE June 2026, reaching 336,215. Skilled Worker extension grants also increased over the same period, by 11% to 196,097. These increases reflect the high numbers of entry clearance grants issued in 2022 and 2023, with many individuals who arrived during that period now seeking to extend their stay and continue working in the UK.”
In contrast to the Graduate route, Health and Care Worker extension grants rose by 19% in the YE June 2026, reaching 336,215. Skilled Worker extension grants also increased over the same period, by 11% to 196,097. These increases reflect the high numbers of entry clearance grants issued in 2022 and 2023, with many individuals who arrived during that period now seeking to extend their stay and continue working in the UK.
- Restoring control over the immigration system (accessible)
Home Office, 2025-05-12 · supports
“The recent significant increases followed the introduction of new immigration policies in 2020, following the UK’s departure from the EU – a system which made a number of key changes… including reducing the overall skills threshold for migration from degree-level (Regulated Qualifications Framework Level 6 or RQF 6) to A-Level-equivalent (RQF 3), and setting a new basic salary threshold for all countries at £25,600.”
The recent significant increases followed the introduction of new immigration policies in 2020, following the UK’s departure from the EU – a system which made a number of key changes… including reducing the overall skills threshold for migration from degree-level (Regulated Qualifications Framework Level 6 or RQF 6) to A-Level-equivalent (RQF 3), and setting a new basic salary threshold for all countries at £25,600.
- Review of salary requirements (accessible)
Migration Advisory Committee, 2025-12-17 · supports
“On 22 July 2025, the government raised the skill threshold to occupations that are Regulated Qualifications Framework (RQF) Level 6+ (equivalent to an undergraduate degree) to address the growth in visa numbers and concerns about exploitation of overseas recruits in occupations below RQF 6. This ends the changes introduced in 2020 that had relaxed the skills threshold to RQF 3+, allowing companies to make up for a shortfall of workers following the end of free movement.”
On 22 July 2025, the government raised the skill threshold to occupations that are Regulated Qualifications Framework (RQF) Level 6+ (equivalent to an undergraduate degree) to address the growth in visa numbers and concerns about exploitation of overseas recruits in occupations below RQF 6. This ends the changes introduced in 2020 that had relaxed the skills threshold to RQF 3+, allowing companies to make up for a shortfall of workers following the end of free movement.
- Migration Advisory Committee (MAC) annual report, 2023 (accessible)
Migration Advisory Committee, 2023-12-13 · supports
“Between October 2022 to September 2023 (the latest available data point), there have been 173,900 dependants on the H&CW visa. Over this period, the dependant ratio for those on the H&CW visa was 1.21 compared to 0.77 for other occupations on the SW visa (see Table 2.4).”
Between October 2022 to September 2023 (the latest available data point), there have been 173,900 dependants on the H&CW visa. Over this period, the dependant ratio for those on the H&CW visa was 1.21 compared to 0.77 for other occupations on the SW visa (see Table 2.4).
- Restoring control over the immigration system: technical annex
Home Office, 2025-05-12 · supports
“After expanding the Health and Care route to boost the social care workforce in 2022, total visas issued for main applicants and dependants fell by 68% to 110,800 from 2023 to 2024 due to more Home Office scrutiny on employers in the Health and Social Care sector, compliance activity taken against employers of migrant workers and the Spring 2024 policy measures no longer permitting Care Workers to bring dependants.”
After expanding the Health and Care route to boost the social care workforce in 2022, total visas issued for main applicants and dependants fell by 68% to 110,800 from 2023 to 2024 due to more Home Office scrutiny on employers in the Health and Social Care sector, compliance activity taken against employers of migrant workers and the Spring 2024 policy measures no longer permitting Care Workers to bring dependants.
- Restoring control over the immigration system: technical annex
Home Office, 2025-05-12 · supports
“The impact on the volume of Health and Care visas granted, due to Care and Senior Care worker occupations being removed, is estimated to be an annual reduction of approximately 7,000 main applicants (with a range of 6,000 to 8,000 main applicants).”
The impact on the volume of Health and Care visas granted, due to Care and Senior Care worker occupations being removed, is estimated to be an annual reduction of approximately 7,000 main applicants (with a range of 6,000 to 8,000 main applicants).
- The state of the adult social care sector and workforce in England, 2026
Skills for Care, 2026-10-14 · supports
“In March/April 2024, the SOL was replaced by the Immigration Salary List. In addition, restrictions were added that allowed only employers regulated by the CQC to sponsor care workers and senior care workers, the salary threshold was increased for newly sponsored Health and Care Worker visa holders, and dependants were no longer able to accompany or join care workers or senior care workers. Following these changes, the estimated number of people starting direct care providing roles in the independent sector, after having arrived in the UK, showed a large decrease from 105,000 in 2023/24, to 30,000 in 2025/26.”
In March/April 2024, the SOL was replaced by the Immigration Salary List. In addition, restrictions were added that allowed only employers regulated by the CQC to sponsor care workers and senior care workers, the salary threshold was increased for newly sponsored Health and Care Worker visa holders, and dependants were no longer able to accompany or join care workers or senior care workers. Following these changes, the estimated number of people starting direct care providing roles in the independent sector, after having arrived in the UK, showed a large decrease from 105,000 in 2023/24, to 30,000 in 2025/26.
- The state of the adult social care sector and workforce in England, 2026
Skills for Care, 2026-10-14 · supports
“The vacancy rate reached a peak of 10.4% in 2021/22, the highest rate since records began in 2012/13. Since then, the rate has steadily decreased to 6.1% in 2025/26, one percentage point lower than in 2018/19.”
The vacancy rate reached a peak of 10.4% in 2021/22, the highest rate since records began in 2012/13. Since then, the rate has steadily decreased to 6.1% in 2025/26, one percentage point lower than in 2018/19.
- The state of the adult social care sector and workforce in England, 2026
Skills for Care, 2026-10-14 · supports
“From March to August 2026, the vacancy rate has stayed consistently between 6.4% and 6.1%.”
From March to August 2026, the vacancy rate has stayed consistently between 6.4% and 6.1%.
- The state of the adult social care sector and workforce in England, 2026
Skills for Care, 2026-10-14 · supports
“Between 2022/23 and 2025/26, there were substantially more people recruited internationally compared to 2021/22 or earlier, which has played a part in the increase in filled posts and the reduction in vacant posts seen over the period. Between 2024/25 and 2025/26, the number of filled posts increased by around 22,000 and the number of vacant posts decreased by around 11,500. During the same period, 30,000 staff arrived from outside the UK to work in the sector.”
Between 2022/23 and 2025/26, there were substantially more people recruited internationally compared to 2021/22 or earlier, which has played a part in the increase in filled posts and the reduction in vacant posts seen over the period. Between 2024/25 and 2025/26, the number of filled posts increased by around 22,000 and the number of vacant posts decreased by around 11,500. During the same period, 30,000 staff arrived from outside the UK to work in the sector.
- The state of the adult social care sector and workforce in England, 2026
Skills for Care, 2026-10-14 · complicates
“In recent years, changes in economic inactivity and job-seeking behaviour may have affected the number of people available to work in the sector. At the same time, vacancies across the wider economy fell, which may have reduced competition for workers from other sectors. Together, these factors may have supported recruitment activity and contributed to improvements in adult social care vacancy rates.”
In recent years, changes in economic inactivity and job-seeking behaviour may have affected the number of people available to work in the sector. At the same time, vacancies across the wider economy fell, which may have reduced competition for workers from other sectors. Together, these factors may have supported recruitment activity and contributed to improvements in adult social care vacancy rates.
- The state of the adult social care sector and workforce in England, 2026
Skills for Care, 2026-10-14 · supports
“Between April 2026 and June 2026, there were around 2,000 people recruited internationally.”
Between April 2026 and June 2026, there were around 2,000 people recruited internationally.
- The state of the adult social care sector and workforce in England, 2026
Skills for Care, 2026-10-14 · supports
“The estimated number of internationally recruited workers in 2025/26 was 30,000 – a decrease from 50,000 the previous year. This in part was due to the closure of the Health and Care Worker visa route to new overseas applicants from July 2025. ▪ An estimated 150,000 posts were filled by people employed on the Health and Care Worker visa as at March 2026, working in direct care roles at establishments regulated by the Care Quality Commission (CQC) in the independent sector.”
The estimated number of internationally recruited workers in 2025/26 was 30,000 – a decrease from 50,000 the previous year. This in part was due to the closure of the Health and Care Worker visa route to new overseas applicants from July 2025. ▪ An estimated 150,000 posts were filled by people employed on the Health and Care Worker visa as at March 2026, working in direct care roles at establishments regulated by the Care Quality Commission (CQC) in the independent sector.
- The state of the adult social care sector and workforce in England, 2026
Skills for Care, 2026-10-14 · supports
“The vacancy rate for employers with direct care workers recruited internationally decreased by 4.3 percentage points between March 2022 and March 2026, from 9.9% to 5.6%.”
The vacancy rate for employers with direct care workers recruited internationally decreased by 4.3 percentage points between March 2022 and March 2026, from 9.9% to 5.6%.
- The state of the adult social care sector and workforce in England, 2026
Skills for Care, 2026-10-14 · supports
“Domestic recruitment remains challenging for the sector. The overall number of posts filled by British workers across all job roles decreased from 85% of the workforce in 2020/21, to 67% in 2025/26. This is a decrease of 130,000 posts over the period, including 40,000 over the last year.”
Domestic recruitment remains challenging for the sector. The overall number of posts filled by British workers across all job roles decreased from 85% of the workforce in 2020/21, to 67% in 2025/26. This is a decrease of 130,000 posts over the period, including 40,000 over the last year.
- The state of the adult social care sector and workforce in England, 2026
Skills for Care, 2026-10-14 · complicates
“The proportion of workers with a British nationality in the local authority and independent sectors has decreased from 83% in 2021/22 to 65% in 2025/26. This equates to around 107,000 fewer posts filled by people with a British nationality.”
The proportion of workers with a British nationality in the local authority and independent sectors has decreased from 83% in 2021/22 to 65% in 2025/26. This equates to around 107,000 fewer posts filled by people with a British nationality.
- The state of the adult social care sector and workforce in England, 2026
Skills for Care, 2026-10-14 · supports
“These figures indicate that the decreasing number of direct care workers with a British nationality in the workforce is related to fewer people with a British nationality starting in these roles over time, rather than an increase in the number of British workers leaving these roles.”
These figures indicate that the decreasing number of direct care workers with a British nationality in the workforce is related to fewer people with a British nationality starting in these roles over time, rather than an increase in the number of British workers leaving these roles.
- The state of the adult social care sector and workforce in England, 2026
Skills for Care, 2026-10-14 · supports
“The median hourly rate for care workers and support workers in March 2026 was £12.60, which was 39p higher than the National Living Wage (NLW) (£12.21). ▪ The median care worker and support worker hourly rate has nominally increased by 60p (5.0%) since March 2025; however, taking inflation into account, it has increased in real terms by 20p (1.6%). ▪ Care workers and support workers had lower hourly rates (median - £12.60) compared to Band 3 NHS Healthcare Assistants (HCAs) who were new in role (£12.75); however, they were paid more than those in Band 2 who were new in role (£12.51). ▪ Care workers and support workers with five or more years’ experience were, on average, earning around 12p more per hour than those with less than one year’s experience. This is considerably lower than in March 2016, when the gap was 33p per hour.”
The median hourly rate for care workers and support workers in March 2026 was £12.60, which was 39p higher than the National Living Wage (NLW) (£12.21). ▪ The median care worker and support worker hourly rate has nominally increased by 60p (5.0%) since March 2025; however, taking inflation into account, it has increased in real terms by 20p (1.6%). ▪ Care workers and support workers had lower hourly rates (median - £12.60) compared to Band 3 NHS Healthcare Assistants (HCAs) who were new in role (£12.75); however, they were paid more than those in Band 2 who were new in role (£12.51). ▪ Care workers and support workers with five or more years’ experience were, on average, earning around 12p more per hour than those with less than one year’s experience. This is considerably lower than in March 2016, when the gap was 33p per hour.
- Migration Advisory Committee (MAC) annual report, 2023 (accessible)
Migration Advisory Committee, 2023-12-13 · complicates
“However, as we stated at the time, the underlying cause of these workforce difficulties is the underfunding of the social care sector. We recommended the addition of care workers to the H&CW visa as part of a package of 19 other recommendations. We were clear that immigration could not solve these workforce issues alone. Our main recommendation was to introduce a minimum rate of pay, initially at £1 per hour above the National Living Wage (NLW), for care workers in England where care was being provided by public funds, to help tackle the workforce issues faced by the sector in the medium to longer term. To date, the government has not responded to or implemented any of these other recommendations as part of a social care package.”
However, as we stated at the time, the underlying cause of these workforce difficulties is the underfunding of the social care sector. We recommended the addition of care workers to the H&CW visa as part of a package of 19 other recommendations. We were clear that immigration could not solve these workforce issues alone. Our main recommendation was to introduce a minimum rate of pay, initially at £1 per hour above the National Living Wage (NLW), for care workers in England where care was being provided by public funds, to help tackle the workforce issues faced by the sector in the medium to longer term. To date, the government has not responded to or implemented any of these other recommendations as part of a social care package.
- Migration Advisory Committee (MAC) annual report, 2023 (accessible)
Migration Advisory Committee, 2023-12-13 · supports
“Underfunding and consequential low pay contributes to the exploitation of workers in the social care sector. Migrants in the sector on the H&CW visa are even more susceptible to exploitation as their right to reside in the UK is directly linked to their employer, creating a power imbalance.”
Underfunding and consequential low pay contributes to the exploitation of workers in the social care sector. Migrants in the sector on the H&CW visa are even more susceptible to exploitation as their right to reside in the UK is directly linked to their employer, creating a power imbalance.
- Record numbers of visa sponsor licences revoked for rule breaking
Home Office, 2025-09-11 · supports
“Between July 2024 and June 2025, 1,948 licences allowing companies to bring in migrant workers were revoked – more than double the number in the previous 12 months (937). Many of the employers had been using work visas to help migrants circumvent immigration rules, as well as undercutting domestic workers by underpaying and exploiting migrant staff reliant on their jobs to stay in the country. Adult social care, hospitality, retail and construction are among the sectors with the highest levels of abuse, data shows. Based on current trends, sponsor revocations for this year are expected to exceed the record high once again. This surge in compliance activity follows just 261 and 247 licences being revoked in the same period in 2021 to 2022 and 2022 to 2023 respectively.”
Between July 2024 and June 2025, 1,948 licences allowing companies to bring in migrant workers were revoked – more than double the number in the previous 12 months (937). Many of the employers had been using work visas to help migrants circumvent immigration rules, as well as undercutting domestic workers by underpaying and exploiting migrant staff reliant on their jobs to stay in the country. Adult social care, hospitality, retail and construction are among the sectors with the highest levels of abuse, data shows. Based on current trends, sponsor revocations for this year are expected to exceed the record high once again. This surge in compliance activity follows just 261 and 247 licences being revoked in the same period in 2021 to 2022 and 2022 to 2023 respectively.
- Record numbers of visa sponsor licences revoked for rule breaking
Home Office, 2025-09-11 · supports
“Licences have been revoked from companies for a wide range of rule breaking, which includes: underpayment of workers facilitating the entry of individuals to circumvent the immigration rules failing to provide promised work”
Licences have been revoked from companies for a wide range of rule breaking, which includes: underpayment of workers facilitating the entry of individuals to circumvent the immigration rules failing to provide promised work
- The NMC Register: 1 April 2025 – 31 March 2026
Nursing and Midwifery Council, 2026-07 · supports
“This is mainly due to fewer internationally educated professionals joining the Register. In 2025-26, 26.4% of new joiners to the Register were internationally educated, compared to 39.1% the year before and a high of 49.4% in 2023-24.”
This is mainly due to fewer internationally educated professionals joining the Register. In 2025-26, 26.4% of new joiners to the Register were internationally educated, compared to 39.1% the year before and a high of 49.4% in 2023-24.
- The NMC Register: 1 April 2025 – 31 March 2026
Nursing and Midwifery Council, 2026-07 · supports
“Over the past year, 10,961 professionals who were educated outside the UK joined the NMC Register for the first time. That’s 9,708 (47%) fewer than the previous year (20,669 in March 2025). In the same period, 30,581 UK-educated professionals joined the Register – this is 4.9% fewer than the 32,164 who joined the previous year. This fall follows the slowdown seen in 2024-25 where the number of UK-educated new joiners increased by only 5.9%, compared to 11.9% during 2023-24.”
Over the past year, 10,961 professionals who were educated outside the UK joined the NMC Register for the first time. That’s 9,708 (47%) fewer than the previous year (20,669 in March 2025). In the same period, 30,581 UK-educated professionals joined the Register – this is 4.9% fewer than the 32,164 who joined the previous year. This fall follows the slowdown seen in 2024-25 where the number of UK-educated new joiners increased by only 5.9%, compared to 11.9% during 2023-24.
- The NMC Register: 1 April 2025 – 31 March 2026
Nursing and Midwifery Council, 2026-07 · supports
“This means that two of the biggest sources of international joiners – Nigeria and Ghana – are ‘red list’ countries. Active recruitment from these countries is prohibited by the relevant codes of practice which uphold ethical standards on recruitment and support global health equity.”
This means that two of the biggest sources of international joiners – Nigeria and Ghana – are ‘red list’ countries. Active recruitment from these countries is prohibited by the relevant codes of practice which uphold ethical standards on recruitment and support global health equity.
- NHS staffing tracker: training
Nuffield Trust, 2026 · supports
“The number of people actually accepting a nurse training place in 2025 has increased by 140 (or 0.7%) compared to a year prior, but has fallen by 4,755 (18%) since the peak in 2021.”
The number of people actually accepting a nurse training place in 2025 has increased by 140 (or 0.7%) compared to a year prior, but has fallen by 4,755 (18%) since the peak in 2021.
- EEA migration in the UK: final report
Migration Advisory Committee, 2018-09 · complicates
“The research we commissioned showed that overall there is no evidence that migration has had a negative impact on the training of the UK-born workforce. Moreover, there is some evidence to suggest that skilled migrants have a positive impact on the quantity of training available to the UK-born workforce.”
The research we commissioned showed that overall there is no evidence that migration has had a negative impact on the training of the UK-born workforce. Moreover, there is some evidence to suggest that skilled migrants have a positive impact on the quantity of training available to the UK-born workforce.
- Restoring control over the immigration system
HM Government, 2025-05-12 · complicates
“Economic migration shot up while training of the domestic workforce has fallen, and lower skilled migration soared while the proportion of UK residents in work fell.”
Economic migration shot up while training of the domestic workforce has fallen, and lower skilled migration soared while the proportion of UK residents in work fell.
- NHS staff from overseas: statistics
House of Commons Library, 2025-11 · supports
“Overall, 21.3% of staff report a nationality other than British. For doctors this figure is 36.3%, and for nurses it is 30.0%.”
Overall, 21.3% of staff report a nationality other than British. For doctors this figure is 36.3%, and for nurses it is 30.0%.
- NHS staff from overseas: statistics
House of Commons Library, 2025-11 · supports
“In the early 2010s there was a rise in the proportion of staff reporting EU nationality. After the EU referendum this increase stopped and the proportion has fallen slightly. In recent years there has been a sharp increase in the proportion of NHS staff reporting an Asian or African nationality.”
In the early 2010s there was a rise in the proportion of staff reporting EU nationality. After the EU referendum this increase stopped and the proportion has fallen slightly. In recent years there has been a sharp increase in the proportion of NHS staff reporting an Asian or African nationality.
- Migrants in the UK labour market: an overview
The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-05-15 · supports
“In December 2025, a quarter of the jobs held by employees with non-EU nationalities when they registered for a national insurance number (‘adult migrants’) were in the health and care sector (Figure 7). This share stood at 22% in February 2022 but rose sharply after care workers were made eligible for Skilled Worker visas—161,000 Skilled Worker visas had been granted to non-EU care workers by the end of 2025.”
In December 2025, a quarter of the jobs held by employees with non-EU nationalities when they registered for a national insurance number (‘adult migrants’) were in the health and care sector (Figure 7). This share stood at 22% in February 2022 but rose sharply after care workers were made eligible for Skilled Worker visas—161,000 Skilled Worker visas had been granted to non-EU care workers by the end of 2025.
- Health at a Glance 2025: OECD Indicators
OECD, 2025-11-13 · supports
“Foreign-trained doctors represented, on average, 20% of the medical workforce across OECD countries in 2023, up from 16% in 2010 (Figure 8.23). Their numbers rose faster than those of domestically trained physicians in almost every member country, pushing their share upwards. The proportion varied considerably in 2023, from 1% or lower in Lithuania and Italy to more than 40% in Switzerland, New Zealand, Ireland and Norway, and 59% in Israel.”
Foreign-trained doctors represented, on average, 20% of the medical workforce across OECD countries in 2023, up from 16% in 2010 (Figure 8.23). Their numbers rose faster than those of domestically trained physicians in almost every member country, pushing their share upwards. The proportion varied considerably in 2023, from 1% or lower in Lithuania and Italy to more than 40% in Switzerland, New Zealand, Ireland and Norway, and 59% in Israel.
- Health at a Glance 2025: OECD Indicators
OECD, 2025-11-13 · supports
“The United Kingdom admitted more than 18 000 foreign-trained doctors in 2023, its highest annual intake on record and a three-fold increase from 2010.”
The United Kingdom admitted more than 18 000 foreign-trained doctors in 2023, its highest annual intake on record and a three-fold increase from 2010.
- Health at a Glance 2025: OECD Indicators
OECD, 2025-11-13 · complicates
“Growing reliance on foreign-trained physicians has taken place alongside an expansion of domestic training capacity. Between 2010 and 2023, domestically trained doctors still made up most of the growth in physician numbers in most OECD Members (Figure 8.24). Yet in five countries foreign-trained doctors drove more than half of the increase – notably in Switzerland (86%), Norway (70%) and Ireland (57%). Across OECD countries, foreign-trained doctors accounted for roughly one-third of the total growth in physicians’ numbers.”
Growing reliance on foreign-trained physicians has taken place alongside an expansion of domestic training capacity. Between 2010 and 2023, domestically trained doctors still made up most of the growth in physician numbers in most OECD Members (Figure 8.24). Yet in five countries foreign-trained doctors drove more than half of the increase – notably in Switzerland (86%), Norway (70%) and Ireland (57%). Across OECD countries, foreign-trained doctors accounted for roughly one-third of the total growth in physicians’ numbers.
- Health at a Glance 2025: OECD Indicators
OECD, 2025-11-13 · supports
“OECD countries tend to rely less on foreign-trained nurses than doctors. In 2023, 8.8% of nurses were trained abroad (Figure 8.26), far below the 19.6% average for physicians”
OECD countries tend to rely less on foreign-trained nurses than doctors. In 2023, 8.8% of nurses were trained abroad (Figure 8.26), far below the 19.6% average for physicians
- Health at a Glance 2025: OECD Indicators
OECD, 2025-11-13 · supports
“Their contribution was especially marked in the United Kingdom, where foreign-trained nurses represented 83% of the increase in the total number of nurses (increasing from 70 000 to 170 000 in absolute terms).”
Their contribution was especially marked in the United Kingdom, where foreign-trained nurses represented 83% of the increase in the total number of nurses (increasing from 70 000 to 170 000 in absolute terms).
- Health at a Glance 2025: OECD Indicators
OECD, 2025-11-13 · complicates
“The main comparability limitation relates to differences in the activity status of nurses. Some registries are updated regularly, making it possible to distinguish nurses who are actively working in health systems, while others include all nurses licensed to practise, regardless of whether they are still active. Data for Germany are based on nationality, not on place of training.”
The main comparability limitation relates to differences in the activity status of nurses. Some registries are updated regularly, making it possible to distinguish nurses who are actively working in health systems, while others include all nurses licensed to practise, regardless of whether they are still active. Data for Germany are based on nationality, not on place of training.
- Rapid Review of the Graduate Route
Migration Advisory Committee, 2024-05-14 · supports
“The median monthly income of the matched cohort who are in work is £1,750 (equivalent to £21,000 annually). The median monthly income, when looking at only the last 3 months of the first year on the Graduate route, is £2,020 (equivalent to £24,240 annually).”
The median monthly income of the matched cohort who are in work is £1,750 (equivalent to £21,000 annually). The median monthly income, when looking at only the last 3 months of the first year on the Graduate route, is £2,020 (equivalent to £24,240 annually).
- Rapid Review of the Graduate Route
Migration Advisory Committee, 2024-05-14 · complicates
“For domestic graduates it is estimated at £26,000 15 months after graduation, from the Graduate Outcomes Survey (UK domicile 1st degree in 2020/21). Despite a greater proportion of Graduate visa holders being postgraduates compared to domestic graduates, the difference between the 2 median income figures can be expected given that international students are likely to have less experience in the UK labour market.”
For domestic graduates it is estimated at £26,000 15 months after graduation, from the Graduate Outcomes Survey (UK domicile 1st degree in 2020/21). Despite a greater proportion of Graduate visa holders being postgraduates compared to domestic graduates, the difference between the 2 median income figures can be expected given that international students are likely to have less experience in the UK labour market.
- Rapid Review of the Graduate Route
Migration Advisory Committee, 2024-05-14 · supports
“It is interesting to note, in this context, that 19% of Graduate visa holders earn at least £2,500 in their first full month after obtaining the visa. This increases to 38% by the 12th month.”
It is interesting to note, in this context, that 19% of Graduate visa holders earn at least £2,500 in their first full month after obtaining the visa. This increases to 38% by the 12th month.
- Rapid Review of the Graduate Route
Migration Advisory Committee, 2024-05-14 · supports
“Amongst those switching from the Graduate route to a sponsored working visa, 69% were switching into occupations that are classified as: Managers, directors, and senior officials; Professional occupations; or Associate professional and technical occupations. This compares to 75% of domestic graduates who are in these roles. In contrast, only 42% of those switching directly from the Student route to a sponsored working route are in these roles. Crucially, Graduate route switchers are moving into graduate level jobs at the end of their visa in roughly the same proportions as we observe domestic graduates.”
Amongst those switching from the Graduate route to a sponsored working visa, 69% were switching into occupations that are classified as: Managers, directors, and senior officials; Professional occupations; or Associate professional and technical occupations. This compares to 75% of domestic graduates who are in these roles. In contrast, only 42% of those switching directly from the Student route to a sponsored working route are in these roles. Crucially, Graduate route switchers are moving into graduate level jobs at the end of their visa in roughly the same proportions as we observe domestic graduates.
- Rapid Review of the Graduate Route
Migration Advisory Committee, 2024-05-14 · supports
“Almost half of student switchers work as Senior care workers or Care workers (49%), whilst in comparison many fewer Graduate route switchers work in these occupations (20%). However, this is still significantly higher than the domestic graduate population, where only 6% work in the entire ‘Caring, leisure and other service’ occupations.”
Almost half of student switchers work as Senior care workers or Care workers (49%), whilst in comparison many fewer Graduate route switchers work in these occupations (20%). However, this is still significantly higher than the domestic graduate population, where only 6% work in the entire ‘Caring, leisure and other service’ occupations.
- Migrant journey: 2025 report
Home Office, 2026-05-21 · supports
“Within the Study route, and across the time-series covered in this report (from 2008 onwards), the 2020 Study cohort recorded the highest proportion of individuals still holding leave to remain 5 years after arrival. Following the 2012 Immigration Rules changes, outcomes for Study migrants were relatively stable for several years, with around 17% to 18% of those arriving between 2012 and 2016 retaining leave after 5 years. This rose to 25% for the 2019 cohort, before increasing to 41% for the 2020 Study cohorts.”
Within the Study route, and across the time-series covered in this report (from 2008 onwards), the 2020 Study cohort recorded the highest proportion of individuals still holding leave to remain 5 years after arrival. Following the 2012 Immigration Rules changes, outcomes for Study migrants were relatively stable for several years, with around 17% to 18% of those arriving between 2012 and 2016 retaining leave after 5 years. This rose to 25% for the 2019 cohort, before increasing to 41% for the 2020 Study cohorts.
- How many people claim asylum in the UK?
Home Office, 2026-08-27 · supports
“In the YE June 2026, 85,891 people claimed asylum in the UK, 21% fewer than in the previous year.”
In the YE June 2026, 85,891 people claimed asylum in the UK, 21% fewer than in the previous year.
- How many people claim asylum in the UK?
Home Office, 2026-08-27 · supports
“41% (34,999) of asylum seekers held a visa or other leave prior to claiming, including those who held an Electronic Travel Authorization (ETA)”
41% (34,999) of asylum seekers held a visa or other leave prior to claiming, including those who held an Electronic Travel Authorization (ETA)
- How many people claim asylum in the UK?
Home Office, 2026-08-27 · supports
“40% (33,949) of asylum seekers arrived on small boats”
40% (33,949) of asylum seekers arrived on small boats
- How many people claim asylum in the UK?
Home Office, 2026-08-27 · supports
“The increase in claims from people who had previously held a visa or other leave coincides with a rise in visa grants up until 2023. However, there may be a delay between a person being granted a visa and subsequently claiming asylum, as some claim shortly after arrival while others claim later during their period of leave or after their leave has expired.”
The increase in claims from people who had previously held a visa or other leave coincides with a rise in visa grants up until 2023. However, there may be a delay between a person being granted a visa and subsequently claiming asylum, as some claim shortly after arrival while others claim later during their period of leave or after their leave has expired.
- How many people claim asylum in the UK?
Home Office, 2026-08-27 · supports
“The number of people who held a study visa prior to claiming asylum has decreased by over a third (35%) in the latest year. This decline mirrors the fall in the number of study visas issued after restrictions on dependants came into effect on 1 January 2024. In contrast, the number of people who held a work visa prior to claiming asylum increased by 16%, making work visas the most common type of visa held prior to claiming. Most of this increase was driven by claims from Graduate visas, which more than doubled to 5,130 while claims from all other work visas fell 9% to 9,021.”
The number of people who held a study visa prior to claiming asylum has decreased by over a third (35%) in the latest year. This decline mirrors the fall in the number of study visas issued after restrictions on dependants came into effect on 1 January 2024. In contrast, the number of people who held a work visa prior to claiming asylum increased by 16%, making work visas the most common type of visa held prior to claiming. Most of this increase was driven by claims from Graduate visas, which more than doubled to 5,130 while claims from all other work visas fell 9% to 9,021.
- Entry clearance visa applications and outcomes detailed datasets, year ending June 2026 (Data_Vis_D02)
Home Office, 2026-08-27 · supports
“Outcomes of applications for entry clearance visas, 2005 to 2026 Q2 - dataset”
Outcomes of applications for entry clearance visas, 2005 to 2026 Q2 - dataset
- Entry clearance visa applications and outcomes detailed datasets, year ending June 2026 (Data_Vis_D02)
Home Office, 2026-08-27 · supports
“Outcomes of applications for entry clearance visas, 2005 to 2026 Q2 - dataset”
Outcomes of applications for entry clearance visas, 2005 to 2026 Q2 - dataset
- Sponsored work visas by occupation and industry (SOC 2020) detailed datasets, year ending June 2026 (Data_Occ_D02)
Home Office, 2026-08-27 · supports
“Grants of entry clearance visas, by occupation and industry, 2021 to 2026 Q2 - Dataset”
Grants of entry clearance visas, by occupation and industry, 2021 to 2026 Q2 - Dataset
- Adult social care workforce statistical appendix 2026
Skills for Care, 2026-10-14 · supports
“Table 3.12.2. Vacancy rate trend by job role”
Table 3.12.2. Vacancy rate trend by job role
- Adult social care workforce statistical appendix 2026
Skills for Care, 2026-10-14 · supports
“Table 4.8.1. Nationality trends by sector”
Table 4.8.1. Nationality trends by sector
- Adult social care workforce statistical appendix 2026
Skills for Care, 2026-10-14 · supports
“Table 5.4.1. Mean hourly pay trends by sector and job role”
Table 5.4.1. Mean hourly pay trends by sector and job role
- Sponsorship transparency data, April to June 2026 (SC_01)
UK Visas and Immigration, 2026-08-27 · supports
“SC_01: Action taken against Sponsors”
SC_01: Action taken against Sponsors
- Sponsorship transparency data, April to June 2026 (SP_01)
UK Visas and Immigration, 2026-08-27 · supports
“SP_01: Number of sponsoring organisations registered to sponsor an overseas national in Skilled Worker, Temporary Worker and Student routes”
SP_01: Number of sponsoring organisations registered to sponsor an overseas national in Skilled Worker, Temporary Worker and Student routes
- The NMC register: March 2026 UK data tables
Nursing and Midwifery Council, 2026-07 · supports
“Total number of people trained in the UK joining the register for the first time by declared ethnicity”
Total number of people trained in the UK joining the register for the first time by declared ethnicity
- The NMC register: March 2026 UK data tables
Nursing and Midwifery Council, 2026-07 · supports
“Total number of people trained internationally joining the register for the first time by declared ethnicity”
Total number of people trained internationally joining the register for the first time by declared ethnicity
- NHS staff from overseas: statistics
House of Commons Library, 2025-11 · supports
“As of June 2025, 78.7% of NHS staff in England are British. 9.9% report an Asian nationality, 5.2% are EU nationals and 4.2% are African.”
As of June 2025, 78.7% of NHS staff in England are British. 9.9% report an Asian nationality, 5.2% are EU nationals and 4.2% are African.
- Asylum claims and initial decisions detailed datasets, year ending June 2026 (Data_Asy_D01a)
Home Office, 2026-08-27 · supports
“Asy_D01a: People claiming asylum by prior route, 2018 Q1 to 2026 Q2 - dataset”
Asy_D01a: People claiming asylum by prior route, 2018 Q1 to 2026 Q2 - dataset
Immigration, the Economy and the Public Finances
- Gross domestic product (Average) per head, CVM market prices (reference year = 2023), series IHXW, dataset PN2 (rows 2007–2025)
Office for National Statistics, 2026-08-13 · supports
“"2007","37625" "2008","37300" "2009","35339" "2010","35850" "2011","35856" "2012","36160" "2013","36537" "2014","37411" "2015","37937" "2016","38467" "2017","39415" "2018","39831" "2019","40125" "2020","36033" "2021","38972" "2022","40554" "2023","40126" "2024","40153" "2025","40546"”
"2007","37625" "2008","37300" "2009","35339" "2010","35850" "2011","35856" "2012","36160" "2013","36537" "2014","37411" "2015","37937" "2016","38467" "2017","39415" "2018","39831" "2019","40125" "2020","36033" "2021","38972" "2022","40554" "2023","40126" "2024","40153" "2025","40546"
- Gross Domestic Product: chained volume measures: Seasonally adjusted £m, series ABMI, dataset PN2 (rows 2019–2025)
Office for National Statistics, 2026-08-13 · supports
“"2019","2673465" "2020","2404838" "2021","2610286" "2022","2744708" "2023","2752164" "2024","2780853" "2025","2817414"”
"2019","2673465" "2020","2404838" "2021","2610286" "2022","2744708" "2023","2752164" "2024","2780853" "2025","2817414"
- Economic and fiscal outlook – March 2024 (CP 1027), Box 2.3
Office for Budget Responsibility, 2024-03-06 · supports
“Based on these assumptions, GDP is 1.5 per cent higher in 2028-29, but GDP per person is largely unchanged.”
Based on these assumptions, GDP is 1.5 per cent higher in 2028-29, but GDP per person is largely unchanged.
- Economic and fiscal outlook – March 2024 (CP 1027), Box 2.3
Office for Budget Responsibility, 2024-03-06 · supports
“The yellow triangles show what would happen if the capital stock did not adjust at all in response to higher migration, making less capital available per worker and reducing overall productivity. GDP in 2028-29 is still higher but by a smaller amount (1 per cent), but GDP per person is then 0.4 per cent below our central forecast.”
The yellow triangles show what would happen if the capital stock did not adjust at all in response to higher migration, making less capital available per worker and reducing overall productivity. GDP in 2028-29 is still higher but by a smaller amount (1 per cent), but GDP per person is then 0.4 per cent below our central forecast.
- Economic and fiscal outlook – March 2024 (CP 1027), Box 2.3
Office for Budget Responsibility, 2024-03-06 · supports
“This boosts the impact on GDP to 2.2 per cent in 2028-29 and raises GDP per person 0.8 per cent above our forecast. The impacts in the lower migration scenario, in which net migration settles at 115,000 in 2028-29, are symmetric.”
This boosts the impact on GDP to 2.2 per cent in 2028-29 and raises GDP per person 0.8 per cent above our forecast. The impacts in the lower migration scenario, in which net migration settles at 115,000 in 2028-29, are symmetric.
- Economic and fiscal outlook – March 2024 (CP 1027), Box 4.5
Office for Budget Responsibility, 2024-03-06 · supports
“Overall, borrowing is estimated to be £19.9 billion lower and debt 3.1 per cent of GDP lower in 2028-29. The lower migration scenario is symmetric to this, with lower receipts and spending, meaning that borrowing is £19.9 billion higher and debt 3.1 per cent of GDP higher in 2028-29.”
Overall, borrowing is estimated to be £19.9 billion lower and debt 3.1 per cent of GDP lower in 2028-29. The lower migration scenario is symmetric to this, with lower receipts and spending, meaning that borrowing is £19.9 billion higher and debt 3.1 per cent of GDP higher in 2028-29.
- Economic and fiscal outlook – March 2024 (CP 1027), Box 4.5
Office for Budget Responsibility, 2024-03-06 · complicates
“Adjusting for this we estimate that providing equivalent service provision to the additional migrants in the high scenario would require an additional £6.1 billion in 2028-29. On this basis, in this scenario a portion of the higher receipts generated by the additional migrants is offset by higher spending, so that while migration still improves the public finances it does so by less than in the unadjusted DEL scenario, with borrowing £13.1 billion lower and debt 2.5 per cent of GDP lower by 2028-29. The lower migration scenario has the opposite effect with borrowing and debt £13.1 billion and 2.5 per cent of GDP higher.”
Adjusting for this we estimate that providing equivalent service provision to the additional migrants in the high scenario would require an additional £6.1 billion in 2028-29. On this basis, in this scenario a portion of the higher receipts generated by the additional migrants is offset by higher spending, so that while migration still improves the public finances it does so by less than in the unadjusted DEL scenario, with borrowing £13.1 billion lower and debt 2.5 per cent of GDP lower by 2028-29. The lower migration scenario has the opposite effect with borrowing and debt £13.1 billion and 2.5 per cent of GDP higher.
- Economic and fiscal outlook – March 2026, Box 2.1
Office for Budget Responsibility, 2026-03 · supports
“While the level of net migration has a significant impact on the level of real GDP, the size and direction of the impact on real GDP per person, an indicator of living standards, is much more uncertain. Estimates in the economics literature tend to suggest that the impacts of different levels of net inward migration on real GDP per person are relatively small in either a positive or negative direction and depend on a number of uncertain factors.”
While the level of net migration has a significant impact on the level of real GDP, the size and direction of the impact on real GDP per person, an indicator of living standards, is much more uncertain. Estimates in the economics literature tend to suggest that the impacts of different levels of net inward migration on real GDP per person are relatively small in either a positive or negative direction and depend on a number of uncertain factors.
- Economic and fiscal outlook – March 2026, paragraph 2.12
Office for Budget Responsibility, 2026-03 · supports
“Reflecting this revision, we have lowered our central forecast for overall net inward migration by around 60,000 people (50,000 adults) a year on average (Chart 2.6, right panel). This is driven entirely by a more negative assumption for net migration by British nationals. By 2030, this change reduces the adult population by around 200,000 relative to the November forecast.”
Reflecting this revision, we have lowered our central forecast for overall net inward migration by around 60,000 people (50,000 adults) a year on average (Chart 2.6, right panel). This is driven entirely by a more negative assumption for net migration by British nationals. By 2030, this change reduces the adult population by around 200,000 relative to the November forecast.
- Economic and fiscal outlook – March 2026, paragraph 2.14
Office for Budget Responsibility, 2026-03 · supports
“The productivity and participation rate effects largely offset each other, so the change to the net migration forecast results in broadly unchanged potential output per person.”
The productivity and participation rate effects largely offset each other, so the change to the net migration forecast results in broadly unchanged potential output per person.
- Economic and fiscal outlook – March 2026, Box 2.1
Office for Budget Responsibility, 2026-03 · complicates
“Overall, in the medium term, net inward migration is likely to boost participation given migrants’ younger age composition. But the impact on productivity is much more uncertain.”
Overall, in the medium term, net inward migration is likely to boost participation given migrants’ younger age composition. But the impact on productivity is much more uncertain.
- The Fiscal Impact of Immigration in the UK
The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-06-23 · complicates
“Short-term forecasts like these are particularly likely to find a positive impact from migration, because they do not account for the costs that come later as migrants age.”
Short-term forecasts like these are particularly likely to find a positive impact from migration, because they do not account for the costs that come later as migrants age.
- The Fiscal Impact of Immigration in the UK
The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-06-23 · complicates
“In 2023, for example, it projected that by 2072/73 the primary budget deficit (i.e. excluding interest payments on debt) would be 1.1% of GDP lower in a scenario where annual net migration was 245,000 rather than 129,000. It projected that higher net migration would reduce debt as a share of GDP by 30 percentage points by 2072/73, but would not prevent debt from rising from around 100 to 300 percent of GDP.”
In 2023, for example, it projected that by 2072/73 the primary budget deficit (i.e. excluding interest payments on debt) would be 1.1% of GDP lower in a scenario where annual net migration was 245,000 rather than 129,000. It projected that higher net migration would reduce debt as a share of GDP by 30 percentage points by 2072/73, but would not prevent debt from rising from around 100 to 300 percent of GDP.
- The Fiscal Impact of Immigration in the UK
The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-06-23 · complicates
“It concluded that “higher migration could be seen as delaying some of the fiscal challenges of an ageing population rather than a way of resolving them permanently”.”
It concluded that “higher migration could be seen as delaying some of the fiscal challenges of an ageing population rather than a way of resolving them permanently”.
- Lower immigration will hit UK growth and raise borrowing
Oxford Economics, 2026-02-11 · supports
“If the official forecast from the Office for Budget Responsibility moves into line with ours, that would cut its projection for the level of potential output in 2029-2030 by 1ppt. This implies that government borrowing would be £19bn (0.5% of GDP) higher, wiping out most of the Chancellor’s headroom.”
If the official forecast from the Office for Budget Responsibility moves into line with ours, that would cut its projection for the level of potential output in 2029-2030 by 1ppt. This implies that government borrowing would be £19bn (0.5% of GDP) higher, wiping out most of the Chancellor’s headroom.
- The Fiscal Impact of Immigration: Static and Dynamic Estimates for the UK
Migration Advisory Committee, 2025-12-11 · supports
“Overall, the SW visa route is clearly fiscally positive for the UK. This is almost inevitable given that main applicants on the route must have a job offer paying above a set of salary thresholds.”
Overall, the SW visa route is clearly fiscally positive for the UK. This is almost inevitable given that main applicants on the route must have a job offer paying above a set of salary thresholds.
- The Fiscal Impact of Immigration: Static and Dynamic Estimates for the UK
Migration Advisory Committee, 2025-12-11 · supports
“For the entire cohort of 329,200 arrivals, we estimate that they will contribute a net £47.1bn over their lifetime – or +£143,000”
For the entire cohort of 329,200 arrivals, we estimate that they will contribute a net £47.1bn over their lifetime – or +£143,000
- The Fiscal Impact of Immigration: Static and Dynamic Estimates for the UK
Migration Advisory Committee, 2025-12-11 · supports
“For SW (excl. H&C) main applicants (Fig 16), the average lifetime contribution is a substantial +£689,000 in present value (the cumulative total of £47.7bn divided by 69,200 main applicants).”
For SW (excl. H&C) main applicants (Fig 16), the average lifetime contribution is a substantial +£689,000 in present value (the cumulative total of £47.7bn divided by 69,200 main applicants).
- The Fiscal Impact of Immigration: Static and Dynamic Estimates for the UK
Migration Advisory Committee, 2025-12-11 · supports
“The lifetime net contribution of those who remain in the UK is +£931,000, whilst it is only +£174,000 for those who leave.”
The lifetime net contribution of those who remain in the UK is +£931,000, whilst it is only +£174,000 for those who leave.
- The Fiscal Impact of Immigration: Static and Dynamic Estimates for the UK
Migration Advisory Committee, 2025-12-11 · supports
“For the H&C main applicants (Figure 17), the lifetime fiscal contribution is positive (£54,000) but much smaller than for SW (excl. H&C) main applicants.”
For the H&C main applicants (Figure 17), the lifetime fiscal contribution is positive (£54,000) but much smaller than for SW (excl. H&C) main applicants.
- The Fiscal Impact of Immigration: Static and Dynamic Estimates for the UK
Migration Advisory Committee, 2025-12-11 · supports
“For care workers, the lifetime contribution is estimated to be -£36,000, whilst for the other occupations it is +£166,000. Care Workers are therefore fiscally negative over their lifetimes and broadly similar to the UK median for the age group.”
For care workers, the lifetime contribution is estimated to be -£36,000, whilst for the other occupations it is +£166,000. Care Workers are therefore fiscally negative over their lifetimes and broadly similar to the UK median for the age group.
- The Fiscal Impact of Immigration: Static and Dynamic Estimates for the UK
Migration Advisory Committee, 2025-12-11 · supports
“There average lifetime contributions are +£3,000 and -£67,000 respectively. This is in spite of being younger than the average UK resident – the age-adjusted UK comparators are +£107,000 (median of -£55,000) and +£84,000 (median of -£71,000) respectively.”
There average lifetime contributions are +£3,000 and -£67,000 respectively. This is in spite of being younger than the average UK resident – the age-adjusted UK comparators are +£107,000 (median of -£55,000) and +£84,000 (median of -£71,000) respectively.
- The Fiscal Impact of Immigration: Static and Dynamic Estimates for the UK
Migration Advisory Committee, 2025-12-11 · complicates
“Recall that the UK resident population has a mean of -£39,000 overall lifetime contribution and a median of -£145,000. We can adjust the UK comparator group to have the same age distribution as the SW (excl. H&C) main applicants. This in effect compares the contribution of a migrant from 2022/23 onwards to that of a native with the same starting age. For this UK comparator group, the mean lifetime contribution is +£117,000 and median of -£47,000.”
Recall that the UK resident population has a mean of -£39,000 overall lifetime contribution and a median of -£145,000. We can adjust the UK comparator group to have the same age distribution as the SW (excl. H&C) main applicants. This in effect compares the contribution of a migrant from 2022/23 onwards to that of a native with the same starting age. For this UK comparator group, the mean lifetime contribution is +£117,000 and median of -£47,000.
- The Fiscal Impact of Immigration: Static and Dynamic Estimates for the UK
Migration Advisory Committee, 2025-12-11 · supports
“We estimate that the top 10% of earners in the SW (excl. H&C) cohort (with a minimum salary in 2022/23 of £131,000) make an average lifetime contribution of £2.7m and account for 39% of the total contribution of”
We estimate that the top 10% of earners in the SW (excl. H&C) cohort (with a minimum salary in 2022/23 of £131,000) make an average lifetime contribution of £2.7m and account for 39% of the total contribution of
- The Fiscal Impact of Immigration: Static and Dynamic Estimates for the UK, footnote 5
Migration Advisory Committee, 2025-12-11 · complicates
“To understand the role of real discounting, note that if we did not discount (i.e. 𝑟 = 0), the future fiscal contribution of a 25-year-old would be -£186,000 rather than +£184,000.”
To understand the role of real discounting, note that if we did not discount (i.e. 𝑟 = 0), the future fiscal contribution of a 25-year-old would be -£186,000 rather than +£184,000.
- The Fiscal Impact of Immigration: Static and Dynamic Estimates for the UK
Migration Advisory Committee, 2025-12-11 · complicates
“a 3.0% real discount rate which is broadly in line with HMT Green Book”
a 3.0% real discount rate which is broadly in line with HMT Green Book
- The Fiscal Impact of Immigration: Static and Dynamic Estimates for the UK
Migration Advisory Committee, 2025-12-11 · complicates
“Among the lower-earning skilled worker groups, temporary migration will be more beneficial than permanent migration from a fiscal perspective. This is not true higher up the earnings distribution, where having migrants stay in the long-term adds to the fiscal benefit they provide.”
Among the lower-earning skilled worker groups, temporary migration will be more beneficial than permanent migration from a fiscal perspective. This is not true higher up the earnings distribution, where having migrants stay in the long-term adds to the fiscal benefit they provide.
- Migration Advisory Committee (MAC) annual report, 2025 (accessible)
Migration Advisory Committee, 2025-12-17 · supports
“Under the current immigration rules, we estimate that the 2022/23 cohort of successful applicants to the Partner route, which consists of the partners of British citizens and settled residents, will incur a net lifetime fiscal deficit of -£5.6bn in present value terms – an average of -£109,000 per applicant.”
Under the current immigration rules, we estimate that the 2022/23 cohort of successful applicants to the Partner route, which consists of the partners of British citizens and settled residents, will incur a net lifetime fiscal deficit of -£5.6bn in present value terms – an average of -£109,000 per applicant.
- The Fiscal Impact of Immigration in the UK
The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-06-23 · supports
“At the time of writing, the MAC has not yet evaluated the net lifetime fiscal impact of all migration routes. It has not assessed the impact of refugees, for example, a group that is likely to affect the public finances more negatively than the groups discussed above because they have lower employment rates and often require more support from the state.”
At the time of writing, the MAC has not yet evaluated the net lifetime fiscal impact of all migration routes. It has not assessed the impact of refugees, for example, a group that is likely to affect the public finances more negatively than the groups discussed above because they have lower employment rates and often require more support from the state.
- Fiscal risks and sustainability – September 2024 (CP 1142, corrected 14 November 2024), paragraph 4.33
Office for Budget Responsibility, 2024-09-12 · supports
“An illustrative migrant worker arriving to the UK at this age and earning the average UK salary is a net fiscal contributor (green line) by their second year. By contrast, an average resident of the same age is still a net fiscal recipient and does not become a net fiscal contributor until their 40s. This is because, unlike the UK resident, the migrant has not previously consumed UK public services, particularly education and health in their childhood.”
An illustrative migrant worker arriving to the UK at this age and earning the average UK salary is a net fiscal contributor (green line) by their second year. By contrast, an average resident of the same age is still a net fiscal recipient and does not become a net fiscal contributor until their 40s. This is because, unlike the UK resident, the migrant has not previously consumed UK public services, particularly education and health in their childhood.
- Fiscal risks and sustainability – September 2024 (CP 1142, corrected 14 November 2024), paragraph 4.33
Office for Budget Responsibility, 2024-09-12 · supports
“For example, a high-wage migrant earning 30 per cent more than the UK average would still be a net benefit to the public finances even if they lived to”
For example, a high-wage migrant earning 30 per cent more than the UK average would still be a net benefit to the public finances even if they lived to
- Fiscal risks and sustainability – September 2024 (CP 1142, corrected 14 November 2024), paragraph 4.33
Office for Budget Responsibility, 2024-09-12 · supports
“However, an illustrative low wage migrant worker arriving at 25 and earning half the UK average becomes less fiscally beneficial (yellow line) than the average UK resident in their early 40s.”
However, an illustrative low wage migrant worker arriving at 25 and earning half the UK average becomes less fiscally beneficial (yellow line) than the average UK resident in their early 40s.
- Fiscal risks and sustainability – September 2024 (CP 1142, corrected 14 November 2024), correction slip
Office for Budget Responsibility, 2024-11-14 · complicates
“Average-and high-wage representative migrants are more fiscally beneficial in their mid-life compared to the previous chart but broadly unchanged at older ages. The representative low-wage migrant is significantly less fiscally beneficial, and substantially so at older ages.”
Average-and high-wage representative migrants are more fiscally beneficial in their mid-life compared to the previous chart but broadly unchanged at older ages. The representative low-wage migrant is significantly less fiscally beneficial, and substantially so at older ages.
- Fiscal risks and sustainability – September 2024 (CP 1142, corrected 14 November 2024), paragraph 4.34
Office for Budget Responsibility, 2024-09-12 · complicates
“Given the wide range of possible households we have opted to model a more typical migrant on a work visa and no dependants.”
Given the wide range of possible households we have opted to model a more typical migrant on a work visa and no dependants.
- Fiscal risks and sustainability – September 2024 (CP 1142, corrected 14 November 2024), paragraph 1.29
Office for Budget Responsibility, 2024-09-12 · complicates
“In the shorter length of stay scenario, where half of migrants leave after three years, and so generate savings in areas such as welfare and state pensions, debt ends up about 23 per cent of GDP lower by 2073-74. In the higher earnings scenario, where migrants generate extra tax revenue relative to their consumption of government services and benefits, debt as a share of GDP ends up about 40 per cent of GDP lower. However, in both cases, debt is still projected to be on an unsustainable upward trajectory in the long run.”
In the shorter length of stay scenario, where half of migrants leave after three years, and so generate savings in areas such as welfare and state pensions, debt ends up about 23 per cent of GDP lower by 2073-74. In the higher earnings scenario, where migrants generate extra tax revenue relative to their consumption of government services and benefits, debt as a share of GDP ends up about 40 per cent of GDP lower. However, in both cases, debt is still projected to be on an unsustainable upward trajectory in the long run.
- Fiscal risks and sustainability – September 2024 (CP 1142, corrected 14 November 2024), paragraph 4.42
Office for Budget Responsibility, 2024-09-12 · complicates
“The primary balance worsens by 2.9 per cent of GDP and net debt rises in every year to reach 351 per cent of GDP by the end of the forecast horizon, 76 per cent of GDP above the baseline.”
The primary balance worsens by 2.9 per cent of GDP and net debt rises in every year to reach 351 per cent of GDP by the end of the forecast horizon, 76 per cent of GDP above the baseline.
- Fiscal risks and sustainability – September 2024: chapter 4 charts and tables, sheet C4.13
Office for Budget Responsibility, 2024-11-14 · supports
“Chart 4.13: Cumulative fiscal impact of representative migrants”
Chart 4.13: Cumulative fiscal impact of representative migrants
- Sponsored work and family visa earnings, employment and Income Tax
Home Office, 2025-05-12 · supports
“In financial year 2023 to 2024, median annual adjusted earnings for main applicants granted entry clearance visas were £56,600 for Skilled Workers, £30,900 for Health and Care Workers, and £47,900 for Senior or Specialist Workers (Global Business Mobility). For dependants, median annual adjusted earnings were £30,200, £22,100, and £27,200 for the same visa routes, respectively.”
In financial year 2023 to 2024, median annual adjusted earnings for main applicants granted entry clearance visas were £56,600 for Skilled Workers, £30,900 for Health and Care Workers, and £47,900 for Senior or Specialist Workers (Global Business Mobility). For dependants, median annual adjusted earnings were £30,200, £22,100, and £27,200 for the same visa routes, respectively.
- Sponsored work and family visa earnings, employment and Income Tax, Table 5
Home Office, 2025-05-12 · supports
“6145 Care Workers and Home Carers 32,000 £23,100 84% 6146 Senior Care Workers 16,800 £25,800 78%”
6145 Care Workers and Home Carers 32,000 £23,100 84% 6146 Senior Care Workers 16,800 £25,800 78%
- Sponsored work and family visa earnings, employment and Income Tax
Home Office, 2025-05-12 · supports
“In financial year 2023 to 2024, median annual adjusted earnings were £20,200 for a granted Family-related entry clearance visa.”
In financial year 2023 to 2024, median annual adjusted earnings were £20,200 for a granted Family-related entry clearance visa.
- Sponsored work and family visa earnings, employment and Income Tax
Home Office, 2025-05-12 · complicates
“In financial year 2023 to 2024, at least 75% of main applicants granted a Skilled Worker entry clearance visa had PAYE earnings. This was at least 81% for Health and Care Workers and at least 68% for Senior or Specialist Workers (Global Business Mobility). For dependants, proportions were at least 45%, 67%, and 25%, respectively.”
In financial year 2023 to 2024, at least 75% of main applicants granted a Skilled Worker entry clearance visa had PAYE earnings. This was at least 81% for Health and Care Workers and at least 68% for Senior or Specialist Workers (Global Business Mobility). For dependants, proportions were at least 45%, 67%, and 25%, respectively.
- Sponsored work and family visa earnings, employment and Income Tax
Home Office, 2025-05-12 · complicates
“Caution is advised when comparing median annual adjusted earnings across different visa routes, as work eligibility and requirements vary.”
Caution is advised when comparing median annual adjusted earnings across different visa routes, as work eligibility and requirements vary.
- Employee earnings in the UK: 2024
Office for National Statistics, 2024-10-29 · complicates
“Median gross annual earnings for full-time employees were £37,430 in April 2024, compared with £35,004 in April 2023”
Median gross annual earnings for full-time employees were £37,430 in April 2024, compared with £35,004 in April 2023
- Upward mobility? Earnings trajectories for recent immigrants
The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-05-29 · supports
“For the most recent, very large cohorts, we see surprising stability: after one full year in the UK labour market, each cohort from 2021 to 2023 was earning around 95% of the UK average, broadly similar to the pre-Brexit cohorts. However, there was a significant fall for those who arrived in 2024, to 90%.”
For the most recent, very large cohorts, we see surprising stability: after one full year in the UK labour market, each cohort from 2021 to 2023 was earning around 95% of the UK average, broadly similar to the pre-Brexit cohorts. However, there was a significant fall for those who arrived in 2024, to 90%.
- Upward mobility? Earnings trajectories for recent immigrants
The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-05-29 · supports
“For example, while 2015 non-EU entrants took around six years to reach the overall median wage, 2021 entrants had already exceeded it after two years. Indeed, even those who entered in 2023 exceeded overall median earnings after two years. This implies that either more recent non-EU arrivals were seeing strong earnings growth relative to the overall workforce, or that lower earners were disproportionately leaving the employee workforce within the first few years (for example, international students working part-time before leaving the country), or some combination of the two.”
For example, while 2015 non-EU entrants took around six years to reach the overall median wage, 2021 entrants had already exceeded it after two years. Indeed, even those who entered in 2023 exceeded overall median earnings after two years. This implies that either more recent non-EU arrivals were seeing strong earnings growth relative to the overall workforce, or that lower earners were disproportionately leaving the employee workforce within the first few years (for example, international students working part-time before leaving the country), or some combination of the two.
- Upward mobility? Earnings trajectories for recent immigrants
The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-05-29 · complicates
“Entry-year earnings then settled at a lower level between 2020 and 2023, followed by a modest decline in 2024 and a much sharper fall in 2025.”
Entry-year earnings then settled at a lower level between 2020 and 2023, followed by a modest decline in 2024 and a much sharper fall in 2025.
- Upward mobility? Earnings trajectories for recent immigrants
The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-05-29 · complicates
“It includes both full-time and part-time workers, and we cannot distinguish between the two because hours worked are not reported.”
It includes both full-time and part-time workers, and we cannot distinguish between the two because hours worked are not reported.
- Upward mobility? Earnings trajectories for recent immigrants
The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-05-29 · complicates
“Of the EU-origin migrants who first appeared in 2015, 45% were still on payroll in 2025 (Figure 3). For non-EU origin migrants, the figure was 60%.”
Of the EU-origin migrants who first appeared in 2015, 45% were still on payroll in 2025 (Figure 3). For non-EU origin migrants, the figure was 60%.
- The Fiscal Impact of Immigration in the UK
The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-06-23 · supports
“While there are no fiscal analyses covering the entire post-Brexit immigration system, several cover the entire pre-Brexit system.”
While there are no fiscal analyses covering the entire post-Brexit immigration system, several cover the entire pre-Brexit system.
- The Fiscal Impact of Immigration in the UK
The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-06-23 · supports
“Despite differences in methods, some key points emerge consistently. First, in all cases, the impacts were found to be less than +1% or -1% of GDP. Second, recent migrants made a more positive impact than those who had been in the UK for longer.”
Despite differences in methods, some key points emerge consistently. First, in all cases, the impacts were found to be less than +1% or -1% of GDP. Second, recent migrants made a more positive impact than those who had been in the UK for longer.
- The Fiscal Impact of Immigration in the UK, Table 1 (columns: EEA, non-EEA, UK born, then recent EEA and non-EEA migrants)
The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-06-23 · supports
“Oxford Economics (2018) FY 2016/17 (1 year) +£4.7b -£9.0b -£41.4b Migration Watch (2016) FY 2014/15 (1 year) -£1.1b -£15.6b -£87.8b £0.0 -£6.2b Dustmann and Frattini (2014) 1995-2011 (17 years) +£4.4b (+£259m pa) -£118b (-£6.9b pa) -£591b (-£34.8b pa)”
Oxford Economics (2018) FY 2016/17 (1 year) +£4.7b -£9.0b -£41.4b Migration Watch (2016) FY 2014/15 (1 year) -£1.1b -£15.6b -£87.8b £0.0 -£6.2b Dustmann and Frattini (2014) 1995-2011 (17 years) +£4.4b (+£259m pa) -£118b (-£6.9b pa) -£591b (-£34.8b pa)
- The Fiscal Impact of Immigration in the UK, Table 1
The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-06-23 · supports
“Migration Watch (2014) 1995-2011 (17 years) -£13.6b (-£0.8b pa) -£134.9b (-£7.94b pa) -£565b (-£33.2b pa)”
Migration Watch (2014) 1995-2011 (17 years) -£13.6b (-£0.8b pa) -£134.9b (-£7.94b pa) -£565b (-£33.2b pa)
- Here To Stay? Estimating the Scale and Cost of Long-Term Migration
Centre for Policy Studies, 2025-02-09 · supports
“In our central model, using the OBR’s extremely optimistic assumptions about migrant earnings, the lifetime net fiscal cost to the state would be £234 billion – equivalent to a bill of £8,200 for every UK household, albeit spread out over decades.”
In our central model, using the OBR’s extremely optimistic assumptions about migrant earnings, the lifetime net fiscal cost to the state would be £234 billion – equivalent to a bill of £8,200 for every UK household, albeit spread out over decades.
- Here To Stay? Estimating the Scale and Cost of Long-Term Migration
Centre for Policy Studies, 2025-02-09 · complicates
“For example, as the graph below shows, an ‘average-wage’ migrant who arrives aged 25 will make a net lifetime contribution of around £405,000 if they live to the age of 82.”
For example, as the graph below shows, an ‘average-wage’ migrant who arrives aged 25 will make a net lifetime contribution of around £405,000 if they live to the age of 82.
- Here To Stay? Estimating the Scale and Cost of Long-Term Migration (research page)
Centre for Policy Studies, 2025-09-08 · contests
“NOTE: The Office for Budget Responsibility fiscal data contained within this report is the subject of dispute, meaning that the overall cost estimates should no longer be used. We will be publishing an updated estimate in due course. This does not impact on the visa data or projections for the numbers likely to gain ILR on different visa routes.”
NOTE: The Office for Budget Responsibility fiscal data contained within this report is the subject of dispute, meaning that the overall cost estimates should no longer be used. We will be publishing an updated estimate in due course. This does not impact on the visa data or projections for the numbers likely to gain ILR on different visa routes.
- Centre for Policy Studies issues clarification on Indefinite Leave to Remain statistics
Centre for Policy Studies, 2025-09-22 · contests
“After the CPS’ report was published, the Office for Budget Responsibility revised their definitions of some of the fiscal data contained within our report, meaning that the overall cost estimates should no longer be used.”
After the CPS’ report was published, the Office for Budget Responsibility revised their definitions of some of the fiscal data contained within our report, meaning that the overall cost estimates should no longer be used.
- Daily Mail corrects report about Reform UK’s disputed immigration savings
Full Fact, 2025-10-03 · contests
“This is not what this figure refers to, and we’re grateful to the Daily Mail for correcting its article after we got in touch. The figure is actually Reform UK’s estimate of the overall net savings to taxpayers, not just on benefits—though the figure is disputed and based on a now-withdrawn think tank estimate.”
This is not what this figure refers to, and we’re grateful to the Daily Mail for correcting its article after we got in touch. The figure is actually Reform UK’s estimate of the overall net savings to taxpayers, not just on benefits—though the figure is disputed and based on a now-withdrawn think tank estimate.
- The Cost of the Boriswave
Reform UK, 2026-04 · supports
“The total lifetime cost of the 2021-2025 migrants expected to receive ILR in the years from 2026 to 2030 is roughly £622.5 bn in real terms if undiscounted, and £154 bn if discounted at the 3.5% rate suggested by the HM Treasury Green Book. This total fiscal black hole represents a £20,000 liability for every household in the UK.”
The total lifetime cost of the 2021-2025 migrants expected to receive ILR in the years from 2026 to 2030 is roughly £622.5 bn in real terms if undiscounted, and £154 bn if discounted at the 3.5% rate suggested by the HM Treasury Green Book. This total fiscal black hole represents a £20,000 liability for every household in the UK.
- The Cost of the Boriswave
Reform UK, 2026-04 · complicates
“Due to lack of microdata on migrant fiscal incidence, we map migrants to ONS income quintiles as a proxy. This likely understates heterogeneity within groups.”
Due to lack of microdata on migrant fiscal incidence, we map migrants to ONS income quintiles as a proxy. This likely understates heterogeneity within groups.
- The Cost of the Boriswave
Reform UK, 2026-04 · complicates
“The primary source of difference is the lack of additional discounting that the Migration Advisory Committee and the Government generally applies when considering fiscal impact.”
The primary source of difference is the lack of additional discounting that the Migration Advisory Committee and the Government generally applies when considering fiscal impact.
- Economists Slam Reform UK's 'Fantasy' Claims That 'Boriswave' Migrants Will Cost Households £20,000
Byline Times, 2026-04-16 · contests
““The main reason the headline figures are so high in the Reform estimate is that it does not adopt the standard practice of discounting, i.e. valuing costs and benefits now as more important than costs and benefits in the future,” she said. “This has a big impact on the numbers because many of the costs of migration come decades down the line, while benefits come sooner.””
“The main reason the headline figures are so high in the Reform estimate is that it does not adopt the standard practice of discounting, i.e. valuing costs and benefits now as more important than costs and benefits in the future,” she said. “This has a big impact on the numbers because many of the costs of migration come decades down the line, while benefits come sooner.”
- Economists Slam Reform UK's 'Fantasy' Claims That 'Boriswave' Migrants Will Cost Households £20,000
Byline Times, 2026-04-16 · supports
““There is not yet a high-quality estimate for the total fiscal impact of migration under the post-Brexit immigration system,” Sumption said.”
“There is not yet a high-quality estimate for the total fiscal impact of migration under the post-Brexit immigration system,” Sumption said.
- Economists Slam Reform UK's 'Fantasy' Claims That 'Boriswave' Migrants Will Cost Households £20,000
Byline Times, 2026-04-16 · contests
““Reform have simply invented their own numbers for migrant earnings, ignoring the analysis of the independent Migration Advisory Committee (MAC) which used actual data from HMRC,” he said.”
“Reform have simply invented their own numbers for migrant earnings, ignoring the analysis of the independent Migration Advisory Committee (MAC) which used actual data from HMRC,” he said.
- Economists Slam Reform UK's 'Fantasy' Claims That 'Boriswave' Migrants Will Cost Households £20,000
Byline Times, 2026-04-16 · supports
“A Reform UK spokesperson denied the criticisms and said their assumptions and methodology are “entirely defensible”.”
A Reform UK spokesperson denied the criticisms and said their assumptions and methodology are “entirely defensible”.
- EEA migration in the UK: final report
Migration Advisory Committee, 2018-09 · supports
“In terms of wages the existing evidence and the analysis we present in the report suggests that migration is not a major determinate of the wages of UK-born workers. We found some evidence suggesting that lower-skilled workers face a negative impact while higher-skilled workers benefit, however the magnitude of the impacts are generally small.”
In terms of wages the existing evidence and the analysis we present in the report suggests that migration is not a major determinate of the wages of UK-born workers. We found some evidence suggesting that lower-skilled workers face a negative impact while higher-skilled workers benefit, however the magnitude of the impacts are generally small.
- EEA migration in the UK: final report, paragraph 1.39
Migration Advisory Committee, 2018-09 · supports
“Given the 6.7 percentage point increase in the EU-born working age population ratio between 1993 and 2017 the implied total effect on UK-born nominal wages of EU immigration is of the order of a 5.2 per cent reduction to the 5th percentile a 4.9 per cent reduction at the 10th percentile, a 1.6 per cent reduction to the 25th percentile, a 1.6 per cent increase at the median, a 2.2 per cent increase at the 75th percentile and a 4.4 and 3.1 per cent increase at the 90th and 95th percentiles respectively. As previously stated this type exercise should be interpreted with caution as the model only estimates the short-run response to migration.”
Given the 6.7 percentage point increase in the EU-born working age population ratio between 1993 and 2017 the implied total effect on UK-born nominal wages of EU immigration is of the order of a 5.2 per cent reduction to the 5th percentile a 4.9 per cent reduction at the 10th percentile, a 1.6 per cent reduction to the 25th percentile, a 1.6 per cent increase at the median, a 2.2 per cent increase at the 75th percentile and a 4.4 and 3.1 per cent increase at the 90th and 95th percentiles respectively. As previously stated this type exercise should be interpreted with caution as the model only estimates the short-run response to migration.
- EEA migration in the UK: final report, paragraph 1.33
Migration Advisory Committee, 2018-09 · supports
“The 2015 paper estimated that a 10 percentage point rise in the proportion of migrants in this occupation group leads to a 1.9 per cent reduction in pay, compared to the earlier estimate of a 5.2 per cent fall.”
The 2015 paper estimated that a 10 percentage point rise in the proportion of migrants in this occupation group leads to a 1.9 per cent reduction in pay, compared to the earlier estimate of a 5.2 per cent fall.
- The labour market effects of immigration
The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-02-24 · supports
“reduced the hourly wage of UK-born wage earners at the 5 th percentile (i.e. the lowest earners in the labour market) by around half of one pence per year. The gains for top earners were also small: 1.7p per year for people at the 90 th percentile of wage earners.”
reduced the hourly wage of UK-born wage earners at the 5 th percentile (i.e. the lowest earners in the labour market) by around half of one pence per year. The gains for top earners were also small: 1.7p per year for people at the 90 th percentile of wage earners.
- The labour market effects of immigration
The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-02-24 · supports
“in low-wage service sector jobs, a 1 percentage point rise in the share of migrants reduced average wages in that occupation by about 0.2%.”
in low-wage service sector jobs, a 1 percentage point rise in the share of migrants reduced average wages in that occupation by about 0.2%.
- The labour market effects of immigration
The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-02-24 · complicates
“To our knowledge, there are not yet any similar studies on the impacts of post-Brexit migration.”
To our knowledge, there are not yet any similar studies on the impacts of post-Brexit migration.
- The labour market effects of immigration
The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-02-24 · complicates
“one study concludes that the main impact of increased immigration from 1975 to 2005 was on the wages of migrants already in the UK.”
one study concludes that the main impact of increased immigration from 1975 to 2005 was on the wages of migrants already in the UK.
- OfS warns against persistent over-optimism as analysis finds institutions under continued financial pressure
Office for Students, 2026-05-14 · supports
“Data published today shows that more than a third (35.8 per cent) of institutions reported a deficit for 2024-25. While this is lower than expected, this figure is forecast to rise to four in ten institutions (42.7 per cent) for 2025-26.”
Data published today shows that more than a third (35.8 per cent) of institutions reported a deficit for 2024-25. While this is lower than expected, this figure is forecast to rise to four in ten institutions (42.7 per cent) for 2025-26.
- OfS warns against persistent over-optimism as analysis finds institutions under continued financial pressure
Office for Students, 2026-05-14 · complicates
“As well as general recruitment challenges, the report identifies other risks that have persisted for a number of years, such as an overreliance on fee income from international students.”
As well as general recruitment challenges, the report identifies other risks that have persisted for a number of years, such as an overreliance on fee income from international students.
- DT031 Table 6 – Tuition fees and education contracts analysed by HE provider, domicile, mode, level, source, 2024/25 (Total row; £000s; columns: Home, Rest of UK, Total UK, EU, UK and EU, Non-EU, Total Non-UK, Total HE course fees, …)
HESA / Office for Students, 2026 · supports
“"","Total","","784,383","638,072","14,364,460","106,136","1,528,591","1,664,067","10,626,703","26,761,366","433,859","942,152","143,485","28,280,862","438,145"”
"","Total","","784,383","638,072","14,364,460","106,136","1,528,591","1,664,067","10,626,703","26,761,366","433,859","942,152","143,485","28,280,862","438,145"
- Job Creators 2025
The Entrepreneurs Network, 2025 · supports
“Our latest analysis reveals that 54 of the UK’s 100 fastest-growing companies have a foreign-born founder or co-founder.”
Our latest analysis reveals that 54 of the UK’s 100 fastest-growing companies have a foreign-born founder or co-founder.
- Job Creators 2025
The Entrepreneurs Network, 2025 · supports
“Among the 219 founders and co-founders behind this year’s companies, 91 – or 42% – were born overseas.”
Among the 219 founders and co-founders behind this year’s companies, 91 – or 42% – were born overseas.
- Job Creators 2025
The Entrepreneurs Network, 2025 · complicates
“Nevertheless, Migration Observatory analysis of the latest census and Annual Population Survey data shows that the foreign-born population of the United Kingdom stood at around 16% in 2023.”
Nevertheless, Migration Observatory analysis of the latest census and Annual Population Survey data shows that the foreign-born population of the United Kingdom stood at around 16% in 2023.
- Job Creators 2025
The Entrepreneurs Network, 2025 · complicates
“we established a list of the 100 companies which had experienced the greatest growth in reaching a valuation observed between June 2024 and the end of May 2025.”
we established a list of the 100 companies which had experienced the greatest growth in reaching a valuation observed between June 2024 and the end of May 2025.
- Gross domestic product (Average) per head, CVM market prices (reference year = 2023), series IHXW, dataset PN2
Office for National Statistics, 2026-08-13 · supports
“"Title","Gross domestic product (Average) per head, CVM market prices (reference year = 2023) £: SA"”
"Title","Gross domestic product (Average) per head, CVM market prices (reference year = 2023) £: SA"
- Gross Domestic Product: chained volume measures: Seasonally adjusted £m, series ABMI, dataset PN2
Office for National Statistics, 2026-08-13 · supports
“"Title","Gross Domestic Product: chained volume measures: Seasonally adjusted £m"”
"Title","Gross Domestic Product: chained volume measures: Seasonally adjusted £m"
- World Development Indicators: GDP per capita (constant 2015 US$), NY.GDP.PCAP.KD, G7 countries
World Bank, 2026-10-08 · supports
“GDP per capita (constant 2015 US$)”
GDP per capita (constant 2015 US$)
Settlement and Migrants' Immigration Status
- How many Indefinite Leave (Settlement and EUSS settled status) grants have been issued in the UK?
Home Office, 2026-08-27 · supports
“In the YE June 2026, there were 199,628 settlement grants, up 24% from the 161,585 issued in the YE June 2025 and the highest annual total since the YE June 2011.”
In the YE June 2026, there were 199,628 settlement grants, up 24% from the 161,585 issued in the YE June 2025 and the highest annual total since the YE June 2011.
- How many Indefinite Leave (Settlement and EUSS settled status) grants have been issued in the UK?
Home Office, 2026-08-27 · supports
“Since the scheme was launched in 2018, just under 4.6 million settled status grants have been issued.”
Since the scheme was launched in 2018, just under 4.6 million settled status grants have been issued.
- A Fairer Pathway to Settlement: a statement and accompanying consultation on earned settlement (CP 1448)
Home Office, 2025-11-20 · supports
“While significant uncertainty exists over the future behaviour of potential applicants, the Home Office estimates that between 1.3 million and 2.2 million people will settle in the UK between 2026 and 2030 (central estimate 1.6m), peaking at between 359,000 and 620,000 in 2028 (central estimate 450,000).”
While significant uncertainty exists over the future behaviour of potential applicants, the Home Office estimates that between 1.3 million and 2.2 million people will settle in the UK between 2026 and 2030 (central estimate 1.6m), peaking at between 359,000 and 620,000 in 2028 (central estimate 450,000).
- How many migrants in the UK have settlement?
The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2025-11-10 · supports
“The precise number of non-EU citizens with settlement is not known, but our estimates suggest it was likely to have been between 622,000 and 820,000 at the end of 2024. These estimates do not include the approximately 4 million EU citizens who were living in the UK before January 2021 and hold settled or pre-settled status under the EU Settlement Scheme.”
The precise number of non-EU citizens with settlement is not known, but our estimates suggest it was likely to have been between 622,000 and 820,000 at the end of 2024. These estimates do not include the approximately 4 million EU citizens who were living in the UK before January 2021 and hold settled or pre-settled status under the EU Settlement Scheme.
- How many migrants in the UK have settlement?
The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2025-11-10 · complicates
“A more conservative estimate can be reached by combining the number of people who arrived before the end of 2000 with non-EU passports in 2021 (191,000, according to the Census), with the number who arrived from 2005 and had acquired settlement by the end of 2024 (430,000, from visa data). This results in a total of 621,000 people, although this estimate excludes non-EU citizens who first entered the UK between 2001 and 2004.”
A more conservative estimate can be reached by combining the number of people who arrived before the end of 2000 with non-EU passports in 2021 (191,000, according to the Census), with the number who arrived from 2005 and had acquired settlement by the end of 2024 (430,000, from visa data). This results in a total of 621,000 people, although this estimate excludes non-EU citizens who first entered the UK between 2001 and 2004.
- Changes to settlement: what do they mean?
The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-02-10 · supports
“Around 2.2 million people – 53% of all those on temporary visas at the end of 2024 – held temporary visas that currently have a 5-year path to settlement.”
Around 2.2 million people – 53% of all those on temporary visas at the end of 2024 – held temporary visas that currently have a 5-year path to settlement.
- How many Indefinite Leave (Settlement and EUSS settled status) grants have been issued in the UK?
Home Office, 2026-08-27 · supports
“In the YE June 2026, settlement granted to individuals whose most recent leave was on a work route, increased by 36% to 80,409.”
In the YE June 2026, settlement granted to individuals whose most recent leave was on a work route, increased by 36% to 80,409.
- How many Indefinite Leave (Settlement and EUSS settled status) grants have been issued in the UK?
Home Office, 2026-08-27 · supports
“Settlement grants to individuals whose most recent grant of leave was in the ‘Other’ category more than tripled, increasing from 18,183 in the YE June 2025 to 57,433 in the YE June 2026. This increase primarily reflected grants to BN(O) visa holders, rising from 587 to 38,373. Introduced in January 2021, the BN(O) route has now reached the point where many of the earliest cohorts entering the UK on the route have completed the qualifying period of continuous residence required for settlement.”
Settlement grants to individuals whose most recent grant of leave was in the ‘Other’ category more than tripled, increasing from 18,183 in the YE June 2025 to 57,433 in the YE June 2026. This increase primarily reflected grants to BN(O) visa holders, rising from 587 to 38,373. Introduced in January 2021, the BN(O) route has now reached the point where many of the earliest cohorts entering the UK on the route have completed the qualifying period of continuous residence required for settlement.
- How many Indefinite Leave (Settlement and EUSS settled status) grants have been issued in the UK?
Home Office, 2026-08-27 · complicates
“In contrast settlement granted to individuals with Refugee status (or other protection-based leave) declined by 40% to 22,799 in YE June 2026. This reflects lower numbers of protection grants made in 2020, when disruption during the COVID 19 pandemic led to fewer decisions.”
In contrast settlement granted to individuals with Refugee status (or other protection-based leave) declined by 40% to 22,799 in YE June 2026. This reflects lower numbers of protection grants made in 2020, when disruption during the COVID 19 pandemic led to fewer decisions.
- A Fairer Pathway to Settlement: a statement and accompanying consultation on earned settlement (CP 1448)
Home Office, 2025-11-20 · supports
“The number of people granted settlement peaked in 2010 at almost 250,000, but has remained below 200,000 in every subsequent year, averaging 111,000 per year from 2011 to 2024.”
The number of people granted settlement peaked in 2010 at almost 250,000, but has remained below 200,000 in every subsequent year, averaging 111,000 per year from 2011 to 2024.
- A Fairer Pathway to Settlement: a statement and accompanying consultation on earned settlement (CP 1448)
Home Office, 2025-11-20 · complicates
“The spike in settlement in 2010 was due to a large number of grants on a discretionary basis (82,295 grants in 2010), mainly under measures aimed at clearing the backlog of outstanding unresolved cases. 4 The fall in settlement grants from 2010 to 2016 was in part due to a 2012 policy change that increased the residence requirement for Family visas from 2 to 5 years, delaying some grants that would otherwise have been made earlier.”
The spike in settlement in 2010 was due to a large number of grants on a discretionary basis (82,295 grants in 2010), mainly under measures aimed at clearing the backlog of outstanding unresolved cases. 4 The fall in settlement grants from 2010 to 2016 was in part due to a 2012 policy change that increased the residence requirement for Family visas from 2 to 5 years, delaying some grants that would otherwise have been made earlier.
- A Fairer Pathway to Settlement: a statement and accompanying consultation on earned settlement (CP 1448)
Home Office, 2025-11-20 · supports
“First, the 154,000 people granted a Hong Kong BN(O) LTE or LTR visa in 2021 and 2022 will become eligible to settle in 2026 and 2027 18. The Home Office forecasts 92,000 additional settlement applications from this cohort in 2026 and 54,000 in 2027. 19 • Second, the significant increase in people granted a Health and Care entry clearance visa, including a significant cohort working in the care sector, totalling 616,000 between 2022 and 2024 will become eligible for settlement between 2027 and 2029. 20 The Home Office estimates that the UK will see 384,000 additional settlement applications from this cohort over this period, with a peak at 210,000 in 2028.”
First, the 154,000 people granted a Hong Kong BN(O) LTE or LTR visa in 2021 and 2022 will become eligible to settle in 2026 and 2027 18. The Home Office forecasts 92,000 additional settlement applications from this cohort in 2026 and 54,000 in 2027. 19 • Second, the significant increase in people granted a Health and Care entry clearance visa, including a significant cohort working in the care sector, totalling 616,000 between 2022 and 2024 will become eligible for settlement between 2027 and 2029. 20 The Home Office estimates that the UK will see 384,000 additional settlement applications from this cohort over this period, with a peak at 210,000 in 2028.
- A Fairer Pathway to Settlement: a statement and accompanying consultation on earned settlement (CP 1448)
Home Office, 2025-11-20 · supports
“Finally, the number of granted Skilled Worker entry clearance visas also spiked between 2022 and 2024, totalling 344,000. 21 These visas will also become eligible for settlement between 2027 and 2029, and the Home Office estimates that this cohort will account for around 222,000 settlement applications over this period.”
Finally, the number of granted Skilled Worker entry clearance visas also spiked between 2022 and 2024, totalling 344,000. 21 These visas will also become eligible for settlement between 2027 and 2029, and the Home Office estimates that this cohort will account for around 222,000 settlement applications over this period.
- A Fairer Pathway to Settlement: a statement and accompanying consultation on earned settlement (CP 1448)
Home Office, 2025-11-20 · complicates
“These estimates are based on published Home Office data on migrant inflows to the UK through to 2024, and a set of assumptions on the propensity of these individuals to choose to settle in the UK. In essence, the central scenario assumes settlement behaviour in line with historical patterns, with a range modelled around it to reflect uncertainty in the propensity to settle.”
These estimates are based on published Home Office data on migrant inflows to the UK through to 2024, and a set of assumptions on the propensity of these individuals to choose to settle in the UK. In essence, the central scenario assumes settlement behaviour in line with historical patterns, with a range modelled around it to reflect uncertainty in the propensity to settle.
- Here to Stay? Estimating the Scale and Cost of Long-Term Migration
Centre for Policy Studies, 2025-02 · complicates
“In our base case scenario, more than 801,000 recent migrants would receive ILR, the vast majority before 2030. In our alternative scenario, adjusted to take account of early evidence on the behaviour of the post-2021 immigration wave, it could be as high as 1.24 million.”
In our base case scenario, more than 801,000 recent migrants would receive ILR, the vast majority before 2030. In our alternative scenario, adjusted to take account of early evidence on the behaviour of the post-2021 immigration wave, it could be as high as 1.24 million.
- Here to Stay? Estimating the Scale and Cost of Long-Term Migration
Centre for Policy Studies, 2025-02 · complicates
“In our central model, using the OBR’s extremely optimistic assumptions about migrant earnings, the lifetime net fiscal cost to the state would be £234 billion – equivalent to a bill of £8,200 for every UK household, albeit spread out over decades.”
In our central model, using the OBR’s extremely optimistic assumptions about migrant earnings, the lifetime net fiscal cost to the state would be £234 billion – equivalent to a bill of £8,200 for every UK household, albeit spread out over decades.
- Centre for Policy Studies issues clarification on Indefinite Leave to Remain statistics
Centre for Policy Studies, 2025-09-22 · contests
“After the CPS’ report was published, the Office for Budget Responsibility revised their definitions of some of the fiscal data contained within our report, meaning that the overall cost estimates should no longer be used. The CPS has been in communication with the OBR and other experts for clarity and will be publishing an updated estimate in due course. The changes do not impact our analysis of the visa data or projections for the numbers likely to gain ILR on different visa routes.”
After the CPS’ report was published, the Office for Budget Responsibility revised their definitions of some of the fiscal data contained within our report, meaning that the overall cost estimates should no longer be used. The CPS has been in communication with the OBR and other experts for clarity and will be publishing an updated estimate in due course. The changes do not impact our analysis of the visa data or projections for the numbers likely to gain ILR on different visa routes.
- How many migrants in the UK have settlement?
The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2025-11-10 · complicates
“Both data sources have limitations. A (likely small) number of non-EU passport holders who arrived before 2010 will have had a temporary immigration status at the end of 2024, while others may have emigrated between 2021 and 2024. In addition, some individuals who either had temporary leave or settlement in 2021 will have since become British citizens. The Census figures do not include migrants living in Scotland or Northern Ireland.”
Both data sources have limitations. A (likely small) number of non-EU passport holders who arrived before 2010 will have had a temporary immigration status at the end of 2024, while others may have emigrated between 2021 and 2024. In addition, some individuals who either had temporary leave or settlement in 2021 will have since become British citizens. The Census figures do not include migrants living in Scotland or Northern Ireland.
- Changes to settlement: what do they mean?
The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-02-10 · supports
“Dependants of people holding worker visas (645,000, of which 328,000 adults). HMRC data from 2023/24 show that around half of adult Skilled Worker dependants were not working, and a third of dependants on Health & Care visas. Family visa holders (352,000, of which 318,000 adults). The Migration Advisory Committee (MAC) found in 2025 that around a third of adults on family visas were not working by their fifth year in the UK. Many more are likely to earn below £12,570 or not have the required period of continued employment. Refugees and other holders of humanitarian protection (230,000, of which 165,000 adults). A Home Office analysis showed that around 45% of refugees granted protection or resettled between 2015 and 2023 were not working by their fifth year in the UK. BN(O)s from Hong Kong (189,000, of which 145,000 adults). Survey data from 2025 indicated that 30% of adult BN(O)s were not in employment. Hundreds of thousands of migrants would therefore currently not be eligible for settlement under the proposed mandatory employment rule.”
Dependants of people holding worker visas (645,000, of which 328,000 adults). HMRC data from 2023/24 show that around half of adult Skilled Worker dependants were not working, and a third of dependants on Health & Care visas. Family visa holders (352,000, of which 318,000 adults). The Migration Advisory Committee (MAC) found in 2025 that around a third of adults on family visas were not working by their fifth year in the UK. Many more are likely to earn below £12,570 or not have the required period of continued employment. Refugees and other holders of humanitarian protection (230,000, of which 165,000 adults). A Home Office analysis showed that around 45% of refugees granted protection or resettled between 2015 and 2023 were not working by their fifth year in the UK. BN(O)s from Hong Kong (189,000, of which 145,000 adults). Survey data from 2025 indicated that 30% of adult BN(O)s were not in employment. Hundreds of thousands of migrants would therefore currently not be eligible for settlement under the proposed mandatory employment rule.
- Changes to settlement: what do they mean?
The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-02-10 · supports
“Worker visa main applicants (756,000), depending on their earnings. Most long-term work visa holders are currently eligible for settlement after five years, though the figure includes some people on ineligible visas, such as intra-company transfers, which made up 10% of all new worker visas granted in 2024.”
Worker visa main applicants (756,000), depending on their earnings. Most long-term work visa holders are currently eligible for settlement after five years, though the figure includes some people on ineligible visas, such as intra-company transfers, which made up 10% of all new worker visas granted in 2024.
- Changes to settlement: what do they mean?
The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-02-10 · supports
“Around 4.2 million people held a valid temporary visa at the end of 2024. Most of them — around 3.6 million — arrived starting in 2021, under the post-Brexit immigration system.”
Around 4.2 million people held a valid temporary visa at the end of 2024. Most of them — around 3.6 million — arrived starting in 2021, under the post-Brexit immigration system.
- Changes to settlement: what do they mean?
The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-02-10 · supports
“Roughly 430,000 to 520,000 children held temporary visas with a path to settlement at the end of 2024.”
Roughly 430,000 to 520,000 children held temporary visas with a path to settlement at the end of 2024.
- Migrant journey: 2025 report
Home Office, 2026-05-21 · supports
“Of the 344,058 individuals who began their journey in 2020, 55% still held valid leave to remain in the UK 5 years later, at the end of 2025.”
Of the 344,058 individuals who began their journey in 2020, 55% still held valid leave to remain in the UK 5 years later, at the end of 2025.
- Migrant journey: 2025 report
Home Office, 2026-05-21 · supports
“By the end of 2025, 58% of those who had started their journey on a Work route 5 years earlier were still holding some form of leave, with 28% holding a temporary permission to stay and 30% who had obtained ILR.”
By the end of 2025, 58% of those who had started their journey on a Work route 5 years earlier were still holding some form of leave, with 28% holding a temporary permission to stay and 30% who had obtained ILR.
- Migrant journey: 2025 report
Home Office, 2026-05-21 · supports
“Of the 33,503 journeys that began on Family routes in 2020, 86% still held leave to remain after 5 years, with just under half (46%) having obtained indefinite leave to remain (ILR).”
Of the 33,503 journeys that began on Family routes in 2020, 86% still held leave to remain after 5 years, with just under half (46%) having obtained indefinite leave to remain (ILR).
- Migrant journey: 2025 report
Home Office, 2026-05-21 · supports
“Less than 1% of those whose initial journey was a ‘study’ route obtained indefinite leave to remain after 5 years”
Less than 1% of those whose initial journey was a ‘study’ route obtained indefinite leave to remain after 5 years
- Migrant journey: 2025 report
Home Office, 2026-05-21 · complicates
“Among those who began their journey 10 years earlier (in 2015), 20% had obtained ILR by the end of 2025”
Among those who began their journey 10 years earlier (in 2015), 20% had obtained ILR by the end of 2025
- Migrant journey: 2025 report
Home Office, 2026-05-21 · supports
“Among individuals granted asylum or other forms of protection following an asylum claim in 2019, 33% had obtained indefinite leave to remain (ILR) by the end of 2025, 6 years later. This period includes both time spent awaiting a decision and time holding leave. The likelihood of securing settlement increases substantially over time: among those granted leave following asylum claims made in 2015, 89% had obtained ILR within 10 years.”
Among individuals granted asylum or other forms of protection following an asylum claim in 2019, 33% had obtained indefinite leave to remain (ILR) by the end of 2025, 6 years later. This period includes both time spent awaiting a decision and time holding leave. The likelihood of securing settlement increases substantially over time: among those granted leave following asylum claims made in 2015, 89% had obtained ILR within 10 years.
- Migrant journey: 2025 report
Home Office, 2026-05-21 · supports
“In 2025, 153,204 journeys resulted in a grant of settlement, representing a 9% decrease compared with the previous year. This decline largely reflects the effects of COVID-19, as fewer individuals entered the UK in 2020, when application volumes and decision making were disrupted, which have fed through to lower numbers reaching settlement at the 5 year eligibility point.”
In 2025, 153,204 journeys resulted in a grant of settlement, representing a 9% decrease compared with the previous year. This decline largely reflects the effects of COVID-19, as fewer individuals entered the UK in 2020, when application volumes and decision making were disrupted, which have fed through to lower numbers reaching settlement at the 5 year eligibility point.
- Migrant journey: 2025 report, summary tables (MJ_03)
Home Office, 2026-05-21 · supports
“Initial leave type | Expired | Indefinite leave to remain | Valid leave to remain | Total || All leave types | 156084 | 49100 | 138874 | 344058”
Initial leave type | Expired | Indefinite leave to remain | Valid leave to remain | Total || All leave types | 156084 | 49100 | 138874 | 344058
- Universal Credit statistics, 29 April 2013 to 10 July 2025
Department for Work and Pensions, 2025-12-08 · supports
“In July 2025, 9.6% of people on UC were in the “EU Settlement Scheme” group. 2.7% of people on UC were in the “Indefinite Leave to Remain (not EU Settlement Scheme)” group. 1.5% of people on UC were in the “Refugee” group.”
In July 2025, 9.6% of people on UC were in the “EU Settlement Scheme” group. 2.7% of people on UC were in the “Indefinite Leave to Remain (not EU Settlement Scheme)” group. 1.5% of people on UC were in the “Refugee” group.
- Universal Credit statistics, 29 April 2013 to 10 July 2025
Department for Work and Pensions, 2025-12-08 · supports
“There were 8.0 million people on Universal Credit in July 2025, up from 6.9 million people on Universal Credit in July 2024”
There were 8.0 million people on Universal Credit in July 2025, up from 6.9 million people on Universal Credit in July 2024
- Universal Credit statistics, 29 April 2013 to 10 July 2025
Department for Work and Pensions, 2025-12-08 · complicates
““CTA – UK, Ireland, Right of Abode”, “EU Settlement Scheme”, and “Indefinite Leave to Remain (not EU Settlement Scheme)” together account for 96% of the UC caseload, with the remaining 4% being people with other types of immigration status. This is in line with the general principle that only people who are settled in the UK or protected by the EU Exit Withdrawal Agreement should be able to claim Universal Credit.”
“CTA – UK, Ireland, Right of Abode”, “EU Settlement Scheme”, and “Indefinite Leave to Remain (not EU Settlement Scheme)” together account for 96% of the UC caseload, with the remaining 4% being people with other types of immigration status. This is in line with the general principle that only people who are settled in the UK or protected by the EU Exit Withdrawal Agreement should be able to claim Universal Credit.
- Universal Credit statistics, 29 April 2013 to 10 July 2025
Department for Work and Pensions, 2025-12-08 · complicates
“Overall, the employment rate on the UC caseload for June 2025 is 34%. This is broadly consistent with the employment rate for “CTA - UK, Ireland, Right of Abode” at 33%. Similarly, the employment rate for “Indefinite Leave to Remain (not EU Settlement Scheme)”, “Limited Leave to Remain (not EU Settlement Scheme) including family reunion”, and “Other” is 33%, 33%, and 34% respectively. “EU Settlement Scheme” has the highest rate in employment at 47%. “Refugee” has the lowest rate of employment at 23%.”
Overall, the employment rate on the UC caseload for June 2025 is 34%. This is broadly consistent with the employment rate for “CTA - UK, Ireland, Right of Abode” at 33%. Similarly, the employment rate for “Indefinite Leave to Remain (not EU Settlement Scheme)”, “Limited Leave to Remain (not EU Settlement Scheme) including family reunion”, and “Other” is 33%, 33%, and 34% respectively. “EU Settlement Scheme” has the highest rate in employment at 47%. “Refugee” has the lowest rate of employment at 23%.
- Universal Credit statistics, 29 April 2013 to 10 July 2025
Department for Work and Pensions, 2025-12-08 · complicates
“The Immigration and Nationality section of these statistics is being released as statistics in development.”
The Immigration and Nationality section of these statistics is being released as statistics in development.
- How many migrants in the UK have settlement?
The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2025-11-10 · complicates
“Our estimates of non-EU migrants with ILR cannot be compared to Department for Work and Pensions data on Universal Credit (UC) recipients by immigration status. In the UC dataset, immigration status is recorded when an individual makes an initial claim or when their circumstances change. However, the DWP is not usually notified if somebody with settlement acquires British citizenship. As a result, the UC figures for ILR will also include people with citizenship and thus will be higher than in reality.”
Our estimates of non-EU migrants with ILR cannot be compared to Department for Work and Pensions data on Universal Credit (UC) recipients by immigration status. In the UC dataset, immigration status is recorded when an individual makes an initial claim or when their circumstances change. However, the DWP is not usually notified if somebody with settlement acquires British citizenship. As a result, the UC figures for ILR will also include people with citizenship and thus will be higher than in reality.
- A Fairer Pathway to Settlement: a statement and accompanying consultation on earned settlement (CP 1448)
Home Office, 2025-11-20 · supports
“Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) reported that 213,000 migrants with settlement were claiming Universal Credit.”
Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) reported that 213,000 migrants with settlement were claiming Universal Credit.
- Social housing lettings in England, tenants: April 2024 to March 2025
Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, 2025-11-13 · supports
“Most lead tenants of households with a new social letting in 2024/25 were UK nationals (89%, or 233,000 lead tenants). European nationals comprised 4% of lead tenants (10,000) with the remaining 8% from nations outside the European Economic Area (EEA) (20,000).”
Most lead tenants of households with a new social letting in 2024/25 were UK nationals (89%, or 233,000 lead tenants). European nationals comprised 4% of lead tenants (10,000) with the remaining 8% from nations outside the European Economic Area (EEA) (20,000).
- Social housing lettings in England, tenants: April 2024 to March 2025
Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, 2025-11-13 · supports
“Lead tenants with nationality from outside the EEA was broadly stable around 3-4% in 2008/09 to 2020/21, after which it rose to 9% in 2023/24, then fell slightly to 8% in 2024/25.”
Lead tenants with nationality from outside the EEA was broadly stable around 3-4% in 2008/09 to 2020/21, after which it rose to 9% in 2023/24, then fell slightly to 8% in 2024/25.
- Social housing lettings in England, tenants: April 2024 to March 2025
Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, 2025-11-13 · complicates
“3% of households on a housing register had a lead tenant subject to immigration control. Equivalent information is not collected in CORE for new lets.”
3% of households on a housing register had a lead tenant subject to immigration control. Equivalent information is not collected in CORE for new lets.
- Earned Settlement: Examining the Government's proposed reforms (Sixth Report of Session 2024–26)
House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, 2026-03-13 · supports
“Immigrants with temporary permission to be in the UK are usually subject to the No Recourse to Public Funds (NRPF) condition, which means they are not eligible for most benefits. Once an immigrant is granted Indefinite Leave to Remain, they become eligible for accessing benefits on the same terms as British citizens.”
Immigrants with temporary permission to be in the UK are usually subject to the No Recourse to Public Funds (NRPF) condition, which means they are not eligible for most benefits. Once an immigrant is granted Indefinite Leave to Remain, they become eligible for accessing benefits on the same terms as British citizens.
- Skilled Worker visa
GOV.UK (UK Visas and Immigration), 2026-10-29 · complicates
“After 5 years, you may be able to apply to settle permanently in the UK (also known as ‘indefinite leave to remain’). This gives you the right to live, work and study here for as long as you like, and apply for benefits if you’re eligible.”
After 5 years, you may be able to apply to settle permanently in the UK (also known as ‘indefinite leave to remain’). This gives you the right to live, work and study here for as long as you like, and apply for benefits if you’re eligible.
- Hong Kong British National (Overseas) Visa: policy statement
Home Office, 2020-07-22 · supports
“The United Kingdom will create a new bespoke immigration route for British Nationals (Overseas) (BN(O) citizens) from Hong Kong, reflecting the unique and unprecedented circumstances in Hong Kong and the UK’s historic and moral commitment to BN(O) citizens.”
The United Kingdom will create a new bespoke immigration route for British Nationals (Overseas) (BN(O) citizens) from Hong Kong, reflecting the unique and unprecedented circumstances in Hong Kong and the UK’s historic and moral commitment to BN(O) citizens.
- Hong Kong British National (Overseas) Visa: policy statement
Home Office, 2020-07-22 · supports
“After 5 years in the UK and, provided they have stayed free of criminality, have supported themselves financially and otherwise complied with the terms of the visa, they will be able to apply for settled status; after a further year they may apply to naturalise as a British citizen.”
After 5 years in the UK and, provided they have stayed free of criminality, have supported themselves financially and otherwise complied with the terms of the visa, they will be able to apply for settled status; after a further year they may apply to naturalise as a British citizen.
- Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, section 76: Revocation of leave to enter or remain
legislation.gov.uk, 2002-11-07 · supports
“(1)The Secretary of State may revoke a person’s indefinite leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom if the person— (a)is liable to deportation, but (b)cannot be deported for legal reasons. (2)The Secretary of State may revoke a person’s indefinite leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom if— (a)the leave was obtained by deception,”
(1)The Secretary of State may revoke a person’s indefinite leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom if the person— (a)is liable to deportation, but (b)cannot be deported for legal reasons. (2)The Secretary of State may revoke a person’s indefinite leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom if— (a)the leave was obtained by deception,
- Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, section 76: Revocation of leave to enter or remain
legislation.gov.uk, 2002-11-07 · supports
“(3)The Secretary of State may revoke a person’s indefinite leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom if the person, or someone of whom he is a dependant, ceases to be a refugee as a result of—”
(3)The Secretary of State may revoke a person’s indefinite leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom if the person, or someone of whom he is a dependant, ceases to be a refugee as a result of—
- R (HSMP Forum Ltd) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] EWHC 664 (Admin)
High Court of Justice (The National Archives, Find Case Law), 2008-04-08 · supports
“I find that the terms of the scheme, properly interpreted in context and read with the guidance and the rules, contain a clear representation, made by the defendant, that once a migrant had embarked on the scheme he would enjoy the benefits of the scheme according to the terms prevailing at the date he joined.”
I find that the terms of the scheme, properly interpreted in context and read with the guidance and the rules, contain a clear representation, made by the defendant, that once a migrant had embarked on the scheme he would enjoy the benefits of the scheme according to the terms prevailing at the date he joined.
- R (HSMP Forum Ltd) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] EWHC 664 (Admin)
High Court of Justice (The National Archives, Find Case Law), 2008-04-08 · supports
“I am unable to see a sufficient public interest which outweighs the unfairness, which I am satisfied the changes visit upon those already admitted under the programme. In the circumstances, I am satisfied that the terms of the original scheme should be honoured and that there is no good reason why those already on the scheme shall not enjoy the benefits of it as originally offered to them. Good administration and straightforward dealing with the public require it. Not to restrain the impact of the changes would, in my judgment, give rise to conspicuous unfairness and an abuse of power.”
I am unable to see a sufficient public interest which outweighs the unfairness, which I am satisfied the changes visit upon those already admitted under the programme. In the circumstances, I am satisfied that the terms of the original scheme should be honoured and that there is no good reason why those already on the scheme shall not enjoy the benefits of it as originally offered to them. Good administration and straightforward dealing with the public require it. Not to restrain the impact of the changes would, in my judgment, give rise to conspicuous unfairness and an abuse of power.
- R (HSMP Forum Ltd) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] EWHC 664 (Admin)
High Court of Justice (The National Archives, Find Case Law), 2008-04-08 · complicates
““I do not accept that those who receive a grant of leave in a category have a legitimate expectation that the rules for further grants of leave within that category which existed at the time of their first grant of leave will apply to them for the rest of the time that they spend in the UK.”
“I do not accept that those who receive a grant of leave in a category have a legitimate expectation that the rules for further grants of leave within that category which existed at the time of their first grant of leave will apply to them for the rest of the time that they spend in the UK.
- Earned Settlement: Examining the Government's proposed reforms (Sixth Report of Session 2024–26)
House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, 2026-03-13 · complicates
“It is common for the Home Office to apply transitional protections when making changes to the Immigration Rules—so that immigrants are covered by the rules that were in place at the time they received their visa, with regards to both settlement and other aspects of immigration policy189—but there is also precedent for changes to Immigration Rules being applied to people already in the UK.”
It is common for the Home Office to apply transitional protections when making changes to the Immigration Rules—so that immigrants are covered by the rules that were in place at the time they received their visa, with regards to both settlement and other aspects of immigration policy189—but there is also precedent for changes to Immigration Rules being applied to people already in the UK.
- Earned Settlement: Examining the Government's proposed reforms (Sixth Report of Session 2024–26)
House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, 2026-03-13 · complicates
“It is not unprecedented to apply changes to people who are already in the immigration system.”
It is not unprecedented to apply changes to people who are already in the immigration system.
- Migrant journey: 2025 report
Home Office, 2026-05-21 · complicates
“Changes introduced in 2012, which extended the qualifying period for settlement from 2 to 5 years, mean that individuals who arrived for Family reasons after this policy change typically take longer to reach settlement than those who arrived beforehand.”
Changes introduced in 2012, which extended the qualifying period for settlement from 2 to 5 years, mean that individuals who arrived for Family reasons after this policy change typically take longer to reach settlement than those who arrived beforehand.
- A Fairer Pathway to Settlement: a statement and accompanying consultation on earned settlement (CP 1448)
Home Office, 2025-11-20 · supports
“Crucially, for these and every other group mentioned here, we propose to apply these changes to everyone in the country today who has not already received indefinite leave to remain. This would mean that those who are due to reach settlement in the coming months and years would be subject to the new requirements for earned settlement, as soon as our immigration rules have changed.”
Crucially, for these and every other group mentioned here, we propose to apply these changes to everyone in the country today who has not already received indefinite leave to remain. This would mean that those who are due to reach settlement in the coming months and years would be subject to the new requirements for earned settlement, as soon as our immigration rules have changed.
- A Fairer Pathway to Settlement: a statement and accompanying consultation on earned settlement (CP 1448)
Home Office, 2025-11-20 · supports
“We will not, and would never, take away settled status from those who have already been granted it. These are people who have been in our country for years, even decades. They have families here. They have contributed to our society. Fairness is the most fundamental of British values. We made these people a promise when we gave them settlement.”
We will not, and would never, take away settled status from those who have already been granted it. These are people who have been in our country for years, even decades. They have families here. They have contributed to our society. Fairness is the most fundamental of British values. We made these people a promise when we gave them settlement.
- A Fairer Pathway to Settlement: a statement and accompanying consultation on earned settlement (CP 1448)
Home Office, 2025-11-20 · supports
“In line with the UK’s obligations under the Withdrawal Agreement, settled status under the EU Settlement Scheme (EUSS) is out of scope for both this consultation and the planned reforms. Grants of settlement related to the Windrush Scheme are also out of scope for both this consultation and the planned reforms. There will be no changes implemented for either scheme in relation to the settlement reforms.”
In line with the UK’s obligations under the Withdrawal Agreement, settled status under the EU Settlement Scheme (EUSS) is out of scope for both this consultation and the planned reforms. Grants of settlement related to the Windrush Scheme are also out of scope for both this consultation and the planned reforms. There will be no changes implemented for either scheme in relation to the settlement reforms.
- A Fairer Pathway to Settlement: a statement and accompanying consultation on earned settlement (CP 1448)
Home Office, 2025-11-20 · supports
“Specifically, it proposes that benefits should not be available to those who have settled status, and asks whether they should instead be reserved for those who have achieved British citizenship.”
Specifically, it proposes that benefits should not be available to those who have settled status, and asks whether they should instead be reserved for those who have achieved British citizenship.
- Changes to settlement: what do they mean?
The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-02-10 · supports
“Second, the standard waiting period before a migrant becomes eligible for settlement would increase from five to ten years, with important exceptions. Family members of British citizens would continue to be eligible for settlement after five years, as would holders of BN(O) visas under the UK’s humanitarian route for Hong Kongers. Migrants with Innovator Founder or Global Talent visas would continue to be able to obtain settlement after three years. EU citizens and others holding status under the EU Settlement Scheme would also be unaffected by any changes (including those on minimum requirements). Other groups would face longer baseline waiting periods. Migrants on the Skilled Worker route in low or middle-skilled occupations (below RQF level 6) would have to wait fifteen years before applying for settlement. Refugees would face a baseline wait of twenty years, though shorter waits would be available for those who switch onto a separate work and study protection route, details of which remain unclear.”
Second, the standard waiting period before a migrant becomes eligible for settlement would increase from five to ten years, with important exceptions. Family members of British citizens would continue to be eligible for settlement after five years, as would holders of BN(O) visas under the UK’s humanitarian route for Hong Kongers. Migrants with Innovator Founder or Global Talent visas would continue to be able to obtain settlement after three years. EU citizens and others holding status under the EU Settlement Scheme would also be unaffected by any changes (including those on minimum requirements). Other groups would face longer baseline waiting periods. Migrants on the Skilled Worker route in low or middle-skilled occupations (below RQF level 6) would have to wait fifteen years before applying for settlement. Refugees would face a baseline wait of twenty years, though shorter waits would be available for those who switch onto a separate work and study protection route, details of which remain unclear.
- Changes to settlement: what do they mean?
The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-02-10 · supports
“5 years less for migrants with taxable income of at least £50,270 a year 7 years less for migrants with taxable income of at least £125,140 a year 5 years less for migrants in specified public service occupations (such as those working in education or the NHS, though a list is to be confirmed) 3 to 5 years less for migrants working in their community, such as through volunteering (details remain unclear) The following factors would result in longer waiting periods would also apply (only the largest): 5 years longer if the applicant has received public funds for less than 12 months 10 years longer if the applicant has received public funds for more than 12 months Up to 20 years longer for people who entered the UK illegally, first arrived on a visitor visa, or overstayed a visa for more than 6 months (up to a maximum total of 30 years)”
5 years less for migrants with taxable income of at least £50,270 a year 7 years less for migrants with taxable income of at least £125,140 a year 5 years less for migrants in specified public service occupations (such as those working in education or the NHS, though a list is to be confirmed) 3 to 5 years less for migrants working in their community, such as through volunteering (details remain unclear) The following factors would result in longer waiting periods would also apply (only the largest): 5 years longer if the applicant has received public funds for less than 12 months 10 years longer if the applicant has received public funds for more than 12 months Up to 20 years longer for people who entered the UK illegally, first arrived on a visitor visa, or overstayed a visa for more than 6 months (up to a maximum total of 30 years)
- Changes to settlement: what do they mean?
The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-02-10 · supports
“It would also require migrants to have made national insurance contributions for at least three years – in effect, to have been employed with earnings of at least £12,570 a year for this period. This is equivalent to a part-time job (19 hours per week) at the 2026-7 minimum wage.”
It would also require migrants to have made national insurance contributions for at least three years – in effect, to have been employed with earnings of at least £12,570 a year for this period. This is equivalent to a part-time job (19 hours per week) at the 2026-7 minimum wage.
- Earned Settlement: Examining the Government's proposed reforms (Sixth Report of Session 2024–26)
House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, 2026-03-13 · supports
“The Home Office recently held a consultation on its proposed changes, which closed on 12 February.”
The Home Office recently held a consultation on its proposed changes, which closed on 12 February.
- Earned Settlement: Examining the Government's proposed reforms (Sixth Report of Session 2024–26)
House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, 2026-03-13 · complicates
“It is not clear that applying these changes to people who arrived prior to introduction of new immigration rules in 2021—after the UK’s exit from the EU—is necessary for the Government to achieve its stated policy aims, and so it is difficult to see a justification for applying the changes to this cohort.”
It is not clear that applying these changes to people who arrived prior to introduction of new immigration rules in 2021—after the UK’s exit from the EU—is necessary for the Government to achieve its stated policy aims, and so it is difficult to see a justification for applying the changes to this cohort.
- Earned Settlement: Examining the Government's proposed reforms (Sixth Report of Session 2024–26)
House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, 2026-03-13 · supports
“understand that extending routes to settlement for at least some people already in the UK is essential for the Government to be able to meet its objective of reducing the impact of the large number of immigrants who arrived to the UK in recent years.”
understand that extending routes to settlement for at least some people already in the UK is essential for the Government to be able to meet its objective of reducing the impact of the large number of immigrants who arrived to the UK in recent years.
- Earned Settlement: Examining the Government's proposed reforms (Sixth Report of Session 2024–26)
House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, 2026-03-13 · supports
“Changes to English language requirements for settlement, which were not under consultation, were introduced through changes to the immigration rules on 5 March 2026 and will come into force on 26 March 2027.”
Changes to English language requirements for settlement, which were not under consultation, were introduced through changes to the immigration rules on 5 March 2026 and will come into force on 26 March 2027.
- Home Secretary tells MPs that earned settlement policy will be set out later this year
Electronic Immigration Network, 2026-09-24 · supports
“"I am very aware that a large group of people who arrived in 2022, absent any change, would qualify in February 2027. We have to give certainty to the system. It remains the case that the rules that apply to you are the rules in force at the point of your application, not when you arrived in the country. That will continue to apply in the normal way. Later this year we will set out the new policy on settlement, taking into account all the consultation responses we have had, as well as any transitional arrangements we might decide to implement."”
"I am very aware that a large group of people who arrived in 2022, absent any change, would qualify in February 2027. We have to give certainty to the system. It remains the case that the rules that apply to you are the rules in force at the point of your application, not when you arrived in the country. That will continue to apply in the normal way. Later this year we will set out the new policy on settlement, taking into account all the consultation responses we have had, as well as any transitional arrangements we might decide to implement."
- Home Secretary tells MPs that earned settlement policy will be set out later this year
Electronic Immigration Network, 2026-09-24 · supports
“It is everything from passporting certain cohorts through—so no change, and they still qualify at five years—to different options for what you might do with other cohorts over a longer period.”
It is everything from passporting certain cohorts through—so no change, and they still qualify at five years—to different options for what you might do with other cohorts over a longer period.
- Immigration Rules: statement of changes
UK Visas and Immigration, 2026-09-03 · supports
“Added a link to the statement of changes to the Immigration Rules: HC 584, 3 September 2026.”
Added a link to the statement of changes to the Immigration Rules: HC 584, 3 September 2026.
- Changes to settlement: what do they mean?
The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-02-10 · complicates
“Median earnings were £30,200 among employed Skilled Worker dependants in 2023/4, and £22,100 for Health & Care dependants. Most would thus be expected to face a ten-year route.”
Median earnings were £30,200 among employed Skilled Worker dependants in 2023/4, and £22,100 for Health & Care dependants. Most would thus be expected to face a ten-year route.
- Earned Settlement: Examining the Government's proposed reforms (Sixth Report of Session 2024–26)
House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, 2026-03-13 · supports
“The changes will make the UK an outlier among most high-income countries, where the standard settlement period is usually five years for those who have a path to settlement, although Switzerland and Japan both have 10-year routes to settlement.”
The changes will make the UK an outlier among most high-income countries, where the standard settlement period is usually five years for those who have a path to settlement, although Switzerland and Japan both have 10-year routes to settlement.
- Changes to settlement: what do they mean?
The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-02-10 · supports
“Several other European countries impose minimum employment requirements for migrants seeking to obtain permanent residence, including Denmark, Sweden, and Italy. In practice, this means some non-working migrants have no route to permanent status. For those who do have a path to permanent status, a ten-year standard route to settlement for most migrants would make the UK more restrictive than most other high-income countries, though comparable to Switzerland and Japan. Longer waiting periods of 15 to 30 years would be unusual among high-income countries.”
Several other European countries impose minimum employment requirements for migrants seeking to obtain permanent residence, including Denmark, Sweden, and Italy. In practice, this means some non-working migrants have no route to permanent status. For those who do have a path to permanent status, a ten-year standard route to settlement for most migrants would make the UK more restrictive than most other high-income countries, though comparable to Switzerland and Japan. Longer waiting periods of 15 to 30 years would be unusual among high-income countries.
- Work Permit conditions
Ministry of Manpower, Singapore, 2026-10-29 · complicates
“Not marry a Singapore citizen or permanent resident in or outside Singapore without MOM's approval. This applies even after their Work Permits have expired, been cancelled or revoked. Not get pregnant or deliver a child in Singapore during the validity of their Work Permit unless they are already married to a Singapore citizen or permanent resident with MOM's approval.”
Not marry a Singapore citizen or permanent resident in or outside Singapore without MOM's approval. This applies even after their Work Permits have expired, been cancelled or revoked. Not get pregnant or deliver a child in Singapore during the validity of their Work Permit unless they are already married to a Singapore citizen or permanent resident with MOM's approval.
- Changes to settlement: what do they mean?
The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-02-10 · complicates
“There is limited evidence on how more stringent requirements and a longer path to ILR may affect immigration and emigration. In theory, some people may be deterred from coming to the UK in the first place. A recent survey-based study found that the length of time for acquiring settlement at destination did not significantly affect prospective migrants’ decisions about whether to migrate, but the evidence is limited.”
There is limited evidence on how more stringent requirements and a longer path to ILR may affect immigration and emigration. In theory, some people may be deterred from coming to the UK in the first place. A recent survey-based study found that the length of time for acquiring settlement at destination did not significantly affect prospective migrants’ decisions about whether to migrate, but the evidence is limited.
- Changes to settlement: what do they mean?
The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-02-10 · complicates
“Such incentives seem to work in some contexts – for example, a reform making permanent residence more accessible in Sweden led to more unemployment and lower incomes among those affected. However, other research found no connection between labour market integration and the type of status held by migrants. On the other hand, some studies suggest that longer periods of time without the rights that come with permanent status and citizenship can hinder social and economic integration. Migrants with permanent residence have more bargaining power than those on work visas who are tied to their employers, which can lead to better pay and conditions. Some studies of refugees found that having a permanent or more secure immigration status was associated with better labour market outcomes. In Denmark, one study suggests that imposing more stringent employment and language criteria for settlement led to a decrease rather than an increase in employment.”
Such incentives seem to work in some contexts – for example, a reform making permanent residence more accessible in Sweden led to more unemployment and lower incomes among those affected. However, other research found no connection between labour market integration and the type of status held by migrants. On the other hand, some studies suggest that longer periods of time without the rights that come with permanent status and citizenship can hinder social and economic integration. Migrants with permanent residence have more bargaining power than those on work visas who are tied to their employers, which can lead to better pay and conditions. Some studies of refugees found that having a permanent or more secure immigration status was associated with better labour market outcomes. In Denmark, one study suggests that imposing more stringent employment and language criteria for settlement led to a decrease rather than an increase in employment.
- Fees and Unit Cost Table 08 October 2026 (visa fees transparency data)
Home Office, 2026-10-20 · supports
“Enabling Provision (Fees Order) | Method of Calculation | In-Country/Overseas | Fee Category | Current Fee | Fee from 08 October 2026 | % Change | Estimated Unit Cost | Maxima”
Enabling Provision (Fees Order) | Method of Calculation | In-Country/Overseas | Fee Category | Current Fee | Fee from 08 October 2026 | % Change | Estimated Unit Cost | Maxima
- Fees and Unit Cost Table 08 October 2026 (visa fees transparency data)
Home Office, 2026-10-20 · supports
“In-Country | Indefinite leave to remain - main applicant and dependants | £3,226 | £3,226 | 0% | £310 | £3,635”
In-Country | Indefinite leave to remain - main applicant and dependants | £3,226 | £3,226 | 0% | £310 | £3,635
- Fees and Unit Cost Table 08 October 2026 (visa fees transparency data)
Home Office, 2026-10-20 · supports
“Overseas | Skilled Worker, where a certificate of sponsorship has been issued or approval to sponsor under Sponsor a Worker has been given for over three years [Footnote 2] - main applicant and dependants | £1,618 | £1,618 | 0% | £153 | £2,000”
Overseas | Skilled Worker, where a certificate of sponsorship has been issued or approval to sponsor under Sponsor a Worker has been given for over three years [Footnote 2] - main applicant and dependants | £1,618 | £1,618 | 0% | £153 | £2,000
- Fees and Unit Cost Table 08 October 2026 (visa fees transparency data)
Home Office, 2026-10-20 · supports
“Overseas | Skilled Worker - Health and Care Visa - where a certificate of sponsorship has been issued or approval to sponsor under Sponor a Worker has been given for three years or less [Footnotes 2 and 3] - main applicant and dependants | £324 | £324 | 0% | £153 | £2,000”
Overseas | Skilled Worker - Health and Care Visa - where a certificate of sponsorship has been issued or approval to sponsor under Sponor a Worker has been given for three years or less [Footnotes 2 and 3] - main applicant and dependants | £324 | £324 | 0% | £153 | £2,000
- Fees and Unit Cost Table 08 October 2026 (visa fees transparency data)
Home Office, 2026-10-20 · supports
“Overseas | Student - main applicant and dependants | £558 | £558 | 0% | £176 | £600”
Overseas | Student - main applicant and dependants | £558 | £558 | 0% | £176 | £600
- Fees and Unit Cost Table 08 October 2026 (visa fees transparency data)
Home Office, 2026-10-20 · supports
“In-Country | Graduate Route – main applicant and dependants | £937 | £937 | 0% | £110 | £2,000”
In-Country | Graduate Route – main applicant and dependants | £937 | £937 | 0% | £110 | £2,000
- Fees and Unit Cost Table 08 October 2026 (visa fees transparency data)
Home Office, 2026-10-20 · supports
“Entry clearance or limited leave to remain for any purpose (excluding visits) not referred to in the preceding provisions of this table | Fixed Amount | Overseas | Route to Settlement | £2,064 | £2,064 | 0% | £639 | £3,600”
Entry clearance or limited leave to remain for any purpose (excluding visits) not referred to in the preceding provisions of this table | Fixed Amount | Overseas | Route to Settlement | £2,064 | £2,064 | 0% | £639 | £3,600
- Fees and Unit Cost Table 08 October 2026 (visa fees transparency data)
Home Office, 2026-10-20 · supports
“Entry clearance as a Visitor for a period of six months or less. | Fixed Amount | Overseas | Visit visa – short up to 6 months | £135 | £135 | 0% | £159 | £140”
Entry clearance as a Visitor for a period of six months or less. | Fixed Amount | Overseas | Visit visa – short up to 6 months | £135 | £135 | 0% | £159 | £140
- Fees and Unit Cost Table 08 October 2026 (visa fees transparency data)
Home Office, 2026-10-20 · supports
“Overseas | Global Talent - main applicant - where Approval Letter is required | £205 | £205 | 0% | £488 | £2,000”
Overseas | Global Talent - main applicant - where Approval Letter is required | £205 | £205 | 0% | £488 | £2,000
- Fees and Unit Cost Table 08 October 2026 (visa fees transparency data)
Home Office, 2026-10-20 · complicates
“Naturalisation as a British citizen or a British overseas territories citizen. | Fixed Amount | In-Country | Naturalisation (British citizenship) [Footnote 5] | £1,709 | £1,709 | 0% | £1.23 | £1,709”
Naturalisation as a British citizen or a British overseas territories citizen. | Fixed Amount | In-Country | Naturalisation (British citizenship) [Footnote 5] | £1,709 | £1,709 | 0% | £1.23 | £1,709
- Earned Settlement: Examining the Government's proposed reforms (Sixth Report of Session 2024–26)
House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, 2026-03-13 · supports
“In 2024/25 UK Visas and Immigration had an overall income of around £3 billion and a surplus of £1.8 billion once the cost of delivery is taken into account. The cost recovery rate for visa fees was 256%.”
In 2024/25 UK Visas and Immigration had an overall income of around £3 billion and a surplus of £1.8 billion once the cost of delivery is taken into account. The cost recovery rate for visa fees was 256%.
- Pay for UK healthcare as part of your immigration application: how much you have to pay
GOV.UK (UK Visas and Immigration), 2026-10-29 · supports
“£1,035 per year for all other visa and immigration applications, for example £3,105 for a 3-year visa”
£1,035 per year for all other visa and immigration applications, for example £3,105 for a 3-year visa
- 66% increase in Immigration Health Surcharge to be implemented on 6 February 2024
Electronic Immigration Network, 2024-01-18 · complicates
“As the equality impact assessment explains, the IHS is set at a fixed amount which takes no account of an individual's usage: "The charge is based on how much healthcare an 'average' Health Charge payer is expected to use and not directly linked to the healthcare usage of each individual payee."”
As the equality impact assessment explains, the IHS is set at a fixed amount which takes no account of an individual's usage: "The charge is based on how much healthcare an 'average' Health Charge payer is expected to use and not directly linked to the healthcare usage of each individual payee."
- 66% increase in Immigration Health Surcharge to be implemented on 6 February 2024
Electronic Immigration Network, 2024-01-18 · complicates
“The Committee also found that the Home Office's calculations had overstated the current per capita cost for NHS spending when compared to all spending, which meant the IHS was set higher than it otherwise would be. While the difference was only minor (£1,013 instead of £1,036), the Committee called the calculations "unconvincing" and said it was "worrying that the Home Office should use such a questionable methodology and it may cast doubt on the accuracy of other underlying calculations that we have not scrutinised."”
The Committee also found that the Home Office's calculations had overstated the current per capita cost for NHS spending when compared to all spending, which meant the IHS was set higher than it otherwise would be. While the difference was only minor (£1,013 instead of £1,036), the Committee called the calculations "unconvincing" and said it was "worrying that the Home Office should use such a questionable methodology and it may cast doubt on the accuracy of other underlying calculations that we have not scrutinised."
- Changes to settlement: what do they mean?
The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-02-10 · supports
“For example, a migrant with no dependants who comes to the UK on a three-year Skilled Worker visa currently pays a total of around £9,900 in fees before obtaining settlement in five years, not including the employer’s Immigration Skills Charge. If the same person instead waited for ten years, fees would increase to a total of £16,900, mostly because the Immigration Health Surcharge is paid for every year of residence.”
For example, a migrant with no dependants who comes to the UK on a three-year Skilled Worker visa currently pays a total of around £9,900 in fees before obtaining settlement in five years, not including the employer’s Immigration Skills Charge. If the same person instead waited for ten years, fees would increase to a total of £16,900, mostly because the Immigration Health Surcharge is paid for every year of residence.
- UK immigration costs: an international comparison of skilled worker, researcher and student visas in 2025
The Royal Society, 2025-10 · supports
“The UK required the highest settlement fees skilled worker visas in other leading science nations. compared to other European nations in 2025 when controlling for PPP – without PPP adjustment, it ranked second to Switzerland, which topped the list at £3,871.”
The UK required the highest settlement fees skilled worker visas in other leading science nations. compared to other European nations in 2025 when controlling for PPP – without PPP adjustment, it ranked second to Switzerland, which topped the list at £3,871.
- UK immigration costs: an international comparison of skilled worker, researcher and student visas in 2025
The Royal Society, 2025-10 · supports
“In 2025, visa holders incur 336% (404% when adjusting to rise in the UK increasing to £3,029 by 5% in 2024 – for PPP) higher costs to apply for settlement in the UK as 2025 and by 27% in 2021 – 2025, equivalent to 2% in compared to the average costs for permanent residence in real terms after adjusting for inflation. Figure 6 shows a other European countries, and 217% (248% when adjusting comparison of 2025 settlement costs between the UK for PPP) higher if the UK are included in the international”
In 2025, visa holders incur 336% (404% when adjusting to rise in the UK increasing to £3,029 by 5% in 2024 – for PPP) higher costs to apply for settlement in the UK as 2025 and by 27% in 2021 – 2025, equivalent to 2% in compared to the average costs for permanent residence in real terms after adjusting for inflation. Figure 6 shows a other European countries, and 217% (248% when adjusting comparison of 2025 settlement costs between the UK for PPP) higher if the UK are included in the international
- UK immigration costs: an international comparison of skilled worker, researcher and student visas in 2025
The Royal Society, 2025-10 · supports
“Costs of settlement across leading European science nations, 2024 and 2025”
Costs of settlement across leading European science nations, 2024 and 2025
- Earned Settlement: Examining the Government's proposed reforms (Sixth Report of Session 2024–26)
House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, 2026-03-13 · supports
“In 2024/25, the 91 local authorities that provided data to the NRPF Network spent £94 million on support to NRPF households.”
In 2024/25, the 91 local authorities that provided data to the NRPF Network spent £94 million on support to NRPF households.
- Earned Settlement: Examining the Government's proposed reforms (Sixth Report of Session 2024–26)
House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, 2026-03-13 · complicates
“While there is considerable uncertainty about how the Government’s policy will apply to children, it appears likely that no matter how the policy is applied it will lead to more child poverty.”
While there is considerable uncertainty about how the Government’s policy will apply to children, it appears likely that no matter how the policy is applied it will lead to more child poverty.
- Windrush Lessons Learned Review (HC 93)
Home Office (independent review by Wendy Williams), 2020-03-19 · supports
“However, despite the scandal taking the Home Office by surprise my report sets out that what happened to those affected by the Windrush scandal was foreseeable and avoidable.”
However, despite the scandal taking the Home Office by surprise my report sets out that what happened to those affected by the Windrush scandal was foreseeable and avoidable.
- Windrush Lessons Learned Review (HC 93)
Home Office (independent review by Wendy Williams), 2020-03-19 · supports
“It removed and detained others. And through policies designed to combat illegal migration, it denied people access to work, housing and services, even though they were here lawfully and therefore lawfully entitled to access them. Some lost their jobs, their homes, and in many cases their sense of identity and wellbeing.”
It removed and detained others. And through policies designed to combat illegal migration, it denied people access to work, housing and services, even though they were here lawfully and therefore lawfully entitled to access them. Some lost their jobs, their homes, and in many cases their sense of identity and wellbeing.
- Windrush Lessons Learned Review (HC 93)
Home Office (independent review by Wendy Williams), 2020-03-19 · supports
“It identified 164 people in the country before 1973 who’d either been detained or removed – or both – since 2002”
It identified 164 people in the country before 1973 who’d either been detained or removed – or both – since 2002
- Windrush Compensation Scheme data: August 2026 (data tables)
Home Office, 2026-10-29 · supports
“Quarter/Month | Total intake | Total WIP | Total Final Decisions* | Of which | Value offers | No. of zero entitlement claims | Eligibility refused / withdrawn | Suspended | Total Cases Fully Closed** | Of which | Value offers (includes zero entitlement claims that have had a payment on review) | No. of zero entitlement claims | Eligibility refused / withdrawn || Total | 12,414 | 591 | 11,690 | 4,009 | 6,741 | 940 | 133 | 10,068 | 3,438 | 5,690 | 940”
Quarter/Month | Total intake | Total WIP | Total Final Decisions* | Of which | Value offers | No. of zero entitlement claims | Eligibility refused / withdrawn | Suspended | Total Cases Fully Closed** | Of which | Value offers (includes zero entitlement claims that have had a payment on review) | No. of zero entitlement claims | Eligibility refused / withdrawn || Total | 12,414 | 591 | 11,690 | 4,009 | 6,741 | 940 | 133 | 10,068 | 3,438 | 5,690 | 940
- Windrush Compensation Scheme data: August 2026 (data tables)
Home Office, 2026-10-29 · supports
“Quarter/Month | Cumulative amount paid | Cumulative Number of Preliminary claims paid8 | Cumulative number of claims receiving payment* | Cumulative Number of Primary claims receiving payment | Cumulative Number of Estate claims receiving payment | Cumulative Number of Close Family claims receiving payment | Cumulative amount Offered | Cumulative Number of Preliminary offers made | Cumulative number claims receiving value offer | Cumulative No. of Primary claims receiving value offer | Cumulative No. of Estate claims receiving value offer | Cumulative No. of Close Family claims receiving value offer | Cumulative number claims receiving value offer or a zero entitlement | Cumulative No. of Primary claims receiving value offer or a zero entitlement | Cumulative No. of Estate claims receiving value offer or a zero entitlement | Cumulative No. of Close Family claims receiving value offer or a zero entitlement || Aug-2026 | £133,475,539.07 | 2,048 | 4,221 | 2,289 | 238 | 1,694 | £138,849,799.48 | 1,947 | 4,294 | 2,316 | 246 | 1,732 | 10,756 | 6,044 | 1,145 | 3,567”
Quarter/Month | Cumulative amount paid | Cumulative Number of Preliminary claims paid8 | Cumulative number of claims receiving payment* | Cumulative Number of Primary claims receiving payment | Cumulative Number of Estate claims receiving payment | Cumulative Number of Close Family claims receiving payment | Cumulative amount Offered | Cumulative Number of Preliminary offers made | Cumulative number claims receiving value offer | Cumulative No. of Primary claims receiving value offer | Cumulative No. of Estate claims receiving value offer | Cumulative No. of Close Family claims receiving value offer | Cumulative number claims receiving value offer or a zero entitlement | Cumulative No. of Primary claims receiving value offer or a zero entitlement | Cumulative No. of Estate claims receiving value offer or a zero entitlement | Cumulative No. of Close Family claims receiving value offer or a zero entitlement || Aug-2026 | £133,475,539.07 | 2,048 | 4,221 | 2,289 | 238 | 1,694 | £138,849,799.48 | 1,947 | 4,294 | 2,316 | 246 | 1,732 | 10,756 | 6,044 | 1,145 | 3,567
- What do Britons really think about scrapping indefinite leave to remain?
YouGov, 2025-09-27 · supports
“a new YouGov survey finds that the prospect of ending the granting of ILR divides the public: 44% say they support doing so, while 43% are opposed.”
a new YouGov survey finds that the prospect of ending the granting of ILR divides the public: 44% say they support doing so, while 43% are opposed.
- What do Britons really think about scrapping indefinite leave to remain?
YouGov, 2025-09-27 · supports
“If ending the granting of ILR is divisive, removing it from current holders is downright unpopular. Support for removing ILR from those who have already been given permission to reside permanently in the UK falls to 29% – even among those who support ending the granting of ILR, only a minority (41%) agree with stripping permanent residency rights from those already granted them.”
If ending the granting of ILR is divisive, removing it from current holders is downright unpopular. Support for removing ILR from those who have already been given permission to reside permanently in the UK falls to 29% – even among those who support ending the granting of ILR, only a minority (41%) agree with stripping permanent residency rights from those already granted them.
- What do Britons really think about scrapping indefinite leave to remain?
YouGov, 2025-09-27 · supports
“The majority of Britons (58%) are opposed to removing indefinite leave to remain status from those who already hold it.”
The majority of Britons (58%) are opposed to removing indefinite leave to remain status from those who already hold it.
- What do Britons really think about scrapping indefinite leave to remain?
YouGov, 2025-09-27 · complicates
“Two thirds (64%) support ending the granting of ILR, while 54% back removing it from those who already have it. While Conservative voters back no longer granting ILR (51%), they are divided on removing it from those who already hold it, with 44% in favour of doing so and 42% against.”
Two thirds (64%) support ending the granting of ILR, while 54% back removing it from those who already have it. While Conservative voters back no longer granting ILR (51%), they are divided on removing it from those who already hold it, with 44% in favour of doing so and 42% against.
- What do Britons really think about scrapping indefinite leave to remain?
YouGov, 2025-09-27 · complicates
“When it comes to ending the granting of ILR, sizeable minorities of Labour (40%), Lib Dem (37%) and Green (35%) voters are also in favour – but in each case are outnumbered by those opposed (50-57%). However the large majority are opposed to removing the status from those who already have it (71-80%).”
When it comes to ending the granting of ILR, sizeable minorities of Labour (40%), Lib Dem (37%) and Green (35%) voters are also in favour – but in each case are outnumbered by those opposed (50-57%). However the large majority are opposed to removing the status from those who already have it (71-80%).
- What do Britons really think about scrapping indefinite leave to remain?
YouGov, 2025-09-27 · complicates
“In a three-way choice on whether certain groups of current ILR recipients should a) continue to be allowed to stay permanently, b) have to apply for a temporary visa or c) be made to leave the UK, the majority of the public want to continue allowing permanent residency for: those who have lived in Britain for over 10 years; those in full time work and paying taxes; NHS workers; those married to a British citizen, or those with children who are citizens; and those who have set up businesses in the UK.”
In a three-way choice on whether certain groups of current ILR recipients should a) continue to be allowed to stay permanently, b) have to apply for a temporary visa or c) be made to leave the UK, the majority of the public want to continue allowing permanent residency for: those who have lived in Britain for over 10 years; those in full time work and paying taxes; NHS workers; those married to a British citizen, or those with children who are citizens; and those who have set up businesses in the UK.
- Windrush Lessons Learned Review (HC 93)
Home Office (independent review by Wendy Williams), 2020-03-19 · supports
“the context of black people’s experience in the UK since the HMT Windrush brought the first post-war migrants from the Caribbean in 1948”
the context of black people’s experience in the UK since the HMT Windrush brought the first post-war migrants from the Caribbean in 1948
- Windrush Lessons Learned Review (HC 93)
Home Office (independent review by Wendy Williams), 2020-03-19 · supports
“The 1971 Immigration Act entitled people who had arrived from Commonwealth countries before January 1973 to the “right of abode” or “deemed leave” to remain in the UK. But the government gave them no documents to demonstrate this status.”
The 1971 Immigration Act entitled people who had arrived from Commonwealth countries before January 1973 to the “right of abode” or “deemed leave” to remain in the UK. But the government gave them no documents to demonstrate this status.
- Apply to the Windrush Compensation Scheme
GOV.UK, 2026 · supports
“You can apply if: you came to the UK from a Commonwealth country before 1973; your parents or grandparents came to the UK from a Commonwealth country before 1973; you came to the UK from any country before 31 December 1988 and are now settled here”
You can apply if: you came to the UK from a Commonwealth country before 1973; your parents or grandparents came to the UK from a Commonwealth country before 1973; you came to the UK from any country before 31 December 1988 and are now settled here
- Immigration system statistics, year ending June 2026: settlement summary tables (Se_02)
Home Office, 2026-08-27 · supports
“Se_02: Grants of settlement by category of grant, type of applicant and refusals, 2010 to the year ending June 2026 [Notes 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13, 15, 16, 17]”
Se_02: Grants of settlement by category of grant, type of applicant and refusals, 2010 to the year ending June 2026 [Notes 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13, 15, 16, 17]
- Windrush Compensation Scheme data: August 2026 (data tables)
Home Office, 2026-10-29 · supports
“WCS_03: Value of Windrush Compensation Scheme payments made7-11”
WCS_03: Value of Windrush Compensation Scheme payments made7-11