Settlement and Migrants' Immigration Status

Settlement and Migrants' Immigration Status

1. How many Indefinite Leave (Settlement and EUSS settled status) grants have been issued in the UK?

   Home Office, 2026-08-27 · supports

   “In the YE June 2026, there were 199,628 settlement grants, up 24% from the 161,585 issued in the YE June 2025 and the highest annual total since the YE June 2011.”Hide quote

   In the YE June 2026, there were 199,628 settlement grants, up 24% from the 161,585 issued in the YE June 2025 and the highest annual total since the YE June 2011.

2. How many Indefinite Leave (Settlement and EUSS settled status) grants have been issued in the UK?

   Home Office, 2026-08-27 · supports

   “Since the scheme was launched in 2018, just under 4.6 million settled status grants have been issued.”Hide quote

   Since the scheme was launched in 2018, just under 4.6 million settled status grants have been issued.

3. A Fairer Pathway to Settlement: a statement and accompanying consultation on earned settlement (CP 1448)

   Home Office, 2025-11-20 · supports

   “While significant uncertainty exists over the future behaviour of potential applicants, the Home Office estimates that between 1.3 million and 2.2 million people will settle in the UK between 2026 and 2030 (central estimate 1.6m), peaking at between 359,000 and 620,000 in 2028 (central estimate 450,000).”Hide quote

   While significant uncertainty exists over the future behaviour of potential applicants, the Home Office estimates that between 1.3 million and 2.2 million people will settle in the UK between 2026 and 2030 (central estimate 1.6m), peaking at between 359,000 and 620,000 in 2028 (central estimate 450,000).

4. How many migrants in the UK have settlement?

   The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2025-11-10 · supports

   “The precise number of non-EU citizens with settlement is not known, but our estimates suggest it was likely to have been between 622,000 and 820,000 at the end of 2024. These estimates do not include the approximately 4 million EU citizens who were living in the UK before January 2021 and hold settled or pre-settled status under the EU Settlement Scheme.”Hide quote

   The precise number of non-EU citizens with settlement is not known, but our estimates suggest it was likely to have been between 622,000 and 820,000 at the end of 2024. These estimates do not include the approximately 4 million EU citizens who were living in the UK before January 2021 and hold settled or pre-settled status under the EU Settlement Scheme.

5. How many migrants in the UK have settlement?

   The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2025-11-10 · complicates

   “A more conservative estimate can be reached by combining the number of people who arrived before the end of 2000 with non-EU passports in 2021 (191,000, according to the Census), with the number who arrived from 2005 and had acquired settlement by the end of 2024 (430,000, from visa data). This results in a total of 621,000 people, although this estimate excludes non-EU citizens who first entered the UK between 2001 and 2004.”Hide quote

   A more conservative estimate can be reached by combining the number of people who arrived before the end of 2000 with non-EU passports in 2021 (191,000, according to the Census), with the number who arrived from 2005 and had acquired settlement by the end of 2024 (430,000, from visa data). This results in a total of 621,000 people, although this estimate excludes non-EU citizens who first entered the UK between 2001 and 2004.

6. Changes to settlement: what do they mean?

   The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-02-10 · supports

   “Around 2.2 million people – 53% of all those on temporary visas at the end of 2024 – held temporary visas that currently have a 5-year path to settlement.”Hide quote

   Around 2.2 million people – 53% of all those on temporary visas at the end of 2024 – held temporary visas that currently have a 5-year path to settlement.

7. How many Indefinite Leave (Settlement and EUSS settled status) grants have been issued in the UK?

   Home Office, 2026-08-27 · supports

   “In the YE June 2026, settlement granted to individuals whose most recent leave was on a work route, increased by 36% to 80,409.”Hide quote

   In the YE June 2026, settlement granted to individuals whose most recent leave was on a work route, increased by 36% to 80,409.

8. How many Indefinite Leave (Settlement and EUSS settled status) grants have been issued in the UK?

   Home Office, 2026-08-27 · supports

   “Settlement grants to individuals whose most recent grant of leave was in the ‘Other’ category more than tripled, increasing from 18,183 in the YE June 2025 to 57,433 in the YE June 2026. This increase primarily reflected grants to BN(O) visa holders, rising from 587 to 38,373. Introduced in January 2021, the BN(O) route has now reached the point where many of the earliest cohorts entering the UK on the route have completed the qualifying period of continuous residence required for settlement.”Hide quote

   Settlement grants to individuals whose most recent grant of leave was in the ‘Other’ category more than tripled, increasing from 18,183 in the YE June 2025 to 57,433 in the YE June 2026. This increase primarily reflected grants to BN(O) visa holders, rising from 587 to 38,373. Introduced in January 2021, the BN(O) route has now reached the point where many of the earliest cohorts entering the UK on the route have completed the qualifying period of continuous residence required for settlement.

9. How many Indefinite Leave (Settlement and EUSS settled status) grants have been issued in the UK?

   Home Office, 2026-08-27 · complicates

   “In contrast settlement granted to individuals with Refugee status (or other protection-based leave) declined by 40% to 22,799 in YE June 2026. This reflects lower numbers of protection grants made in 2020, when disruption during the COVID 19 pandemic led to fewer decisions.”Hide quote

   In contrast settlement granted to individuals with Refugee status (or other protection-based leave) declined by 40% to 22,799 in YE June 2026. This reflects lower numbers of protection grants made in 2020, when disruption during the COVID 19 pandemic led to fewer decisions.

10. A Fairer Pathway to Settlement: a statement and accompanying consultation on earned settlement (CP 1448)

    Home Office, 2025-11-20 · supports

    “The number of people granted settlement peaked in 2010 at almost 250,000, but has remained below 200,000 in every subsequent year, averaging 111,000 per year from 2011 to 2024.”Hide quote

    The number of people granted settlement peaked in 2010 at almost 250,000, but has remained below 200,000 in every subsequent year, averaging 111,000 per year from 2011 to 2024.

11. A Fairer Pathway to Settlement: a statement and accompanying consultation on earned settlement (CP 1448)

    Home Office, 2025-11-20 · complicates

    “The spike in settlement in 2010 was due to a large number of grants on a discretionary basis (82,295 grants in 2010), mainly under measures aimed at clearing the backlog of outstanding unresolved cases. 4 The fall in settlement grants from 2010 to 2016 was in part due to a 2012 policy change that increased the residence requirement for Family visas from 2 to 5 years, delaying some grants that would otherwise have been made earlier.”Hide quote

    The spike in settlement in 2010 was due to a large number of grants on a discretionary basis (82,295 grants in 2010), mainly under measures aimed at clearing the backlog of outstanding unresolved cases. 4 The fall in settlement grants from 2010 to 2016 was in part due to a 2012 policy change that increased the residence requirement for Family visas from 2 to 5 years, delaying some grants that would otherwise have been made earlier.

12. A Fairer Pathway to Settlement: a statement and accompanying consultation on earned settlement (CP 1448)

    Home Office, 2025-11-20 · supports

    “First, the 154,000 people granted a Hong Kong BN(O) LTE or LTR visa in 2021 and 2022 will become eligible to settle in 2026 and 2027 18. The Home Office forecasts 92,000 additional settlement applications from this cohort in 2026 and 54,000 in 2027. 19 • Second, the significant increase in people granted a Health and Care entry clearance visa, including a significant cohort working in the care sector, totalling 616,000 between 2022 and 2024 will become eligible for settlement between 2027 and 2029. 20 The Home Office estimates that the UK will see 384,000 additional settlement applications from this cohort over this period, with a peak at 210,000 in 2028.”Hide quote

    First, the 154,000 people granted a Hong Kong BN(O) LTE or LTR visa in 2021 and 2022 will become eligible to settle in 2026 and 2027 18. The Home Office forecasts 92,000 additional settlement applications from this cohort in 2026 and 54,000 in 2027. 19 • Second, the significant increase in people granted a Health and Care entry clearance visa, including a significant cohort working in the care sector, totalling 616,000 between 2022 and 2024 will become eligible for settlement between 2027 and 2029. 20 The Home Office estimates that the UK will see 384,000 additional settlement applications from this cohort over this period, with a peak at 210,000 in 2028.

13. A Fairer Pathway to Settlement: a statement and accompanying consultation on earned settlement (CP 1448)

    Home Office, 2025-11-20 · supports

    “Finally, the number of granted Skilled Worker entry clearance visas also spiked between 2022 and 2024, totalling 344,000. 21 These visas will also become eligible for settlement between 2027 and 2029, and the Home Office estimates that this cohort will account for around 222,000 settlement applications over this period.”Hide quote

    Finally, the number of granted Skilled Worker entry clearance visas also spiked between 2022 and 2024, totalling 344,000. 21 These visas will also become eligible for settlement between 2027 and 2029, and the Home Office estimates that this cohort will account for around 222,000 settlement applications over this period.

14. A Fairer Pathway to Settlement: a statement and accompanying consultation on earned settlement (CP 1448)

    Home Office, 2025-11-20 · complicates

    “These estimates are based on published Home Office data on migrant inflows to the UK through to 2024, and a set of assumptions on the propensity of these individuals to choose to settle in the UK. In essence, the central scenario assumes settlement behaviour in line with historical patterns, with a range modelled around it to reflect uncertainty in the propensity to settle.”Hide quote

    These estimates are based on published Home Office data on migrant inflows to the UK through to 2024, and a set of assumptions on the propensity of these individuals to choose to settle in the UK. In essence, the central scenario assumes settlement behaviour in line with historical patterns, with a range modelled around it to reflect uncertainty in the propensity to settle.

15. Here to Stay? Estimating the Scale and Cost of Long-Term Migration

    Centre for Policy Studies, 2025-02 · complicates

    “In our base case scenario, more than 801,000 recent migrants would receive ILR, the vast majority before 2030. In our alternative scenario, adjusted to take account of early evidence on the behaviour of the post-2021 immigration wave, it could be as high as 1.24 million.”Hide quote

    In our base case scenario, more than 801,000 recent migrants would receive ILR, the vast majority before 2030. In our alternative scenario, adjusted to take account of early evidence on the behaviour of the post-2021 immigration wave, it could be as high as 1.24 million.

16. Here to Stay? Estimating the Scale and Cost of Long-Term Migration

    Centre for Policy Studies, 2025-02 · complicates

    “In our central model, using the OBR’s extremely optimistic assumptions about migrant earnings, the lifetime net fiscal cost to the state would be £234 billion – equivalent to a bill of £8,200 for every UK household, albeit spread out over decades.”Hide quote

    In our central model, using the OBR’s extremely optimistic assumptions about migrant earnings, the lifetime net fiscal cost to the state would be £234 billion – equivalent to a bill of £8,200 for every UK household, albeit spread out over decades.

17. Centre for Policy Studies issues clarification on Indefinite Leave to Remain statistics

    Centre for Policy Studies, 2025-09-22 · contests

    “After the CPS’ report was published, the Office for Budget Responsibility revised their definitions of some of the fiscal data contained within our report, meaning that the overall cost estimates should no longer be used. The CPS has been in communication with the OBR and other experts for clarity and will be publishing an updated estimate in due course. The changes do not impact our analysis of the visa data or projections for the numbers likely to gain ILR on different visa routes.”Hide quote

    After the CPS’ report was published, the Office for Budget Responsibility revised their definitions of some of the fiscal data contained within our report, meaning that the overall cost estimates should no longer be used. The CPS has been in communication with the OBR and other experts for clarity and will be publishing an updated estimate in due course. The changes do not impact our analysis of the visa data or projections for the numbers likely to gain ILR on different visa routes.

18. How many migrants in the UK have settlement?

    The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2025-11-10 · complicates

    “Both data sources have limitations. A (likely small) number of non-EU passport holders who arrived before 2010 will have had a temporary immigration status at the end of 2024, while others may have emigrated between 2021 and 2024. In addition, some individuals who either had temporary leave or settlement in 2021 will have since become British citizens. The Census figures do not include migrants living in Scotland or Northern Ireland.”Hide quote

    Both data sources have limitations. A (likely small) number of non-EU passport holders who arrived before 2010 will have had a temporary immigration status at the end of 2024, while others may have emigrated between 2021 and 2024. In addition, some individuals who either had temporary leave or settlement in 2021 will have since become British citizens. The Census figures do not include migrants living in Scotland or Northern Ireland.

19. Changes to settlement: what do they mean?

    The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-02-10 · supports

    “Dependants of people holding worker visas (645,000, of which 328,000 adults). HMRC data from 2023/24 show that around half of adult Skilled Worker dependants were not working, and a third of dependants on Health & Care visas. Family visa holders (352,000, of which 318,000 adults). The Migration Advisory Committee (MAC) found in 2025 that around a third of adults on family visas were not working by their fifth year in the UK. Many more are likely to earn below £12,570 or not have the required period of continued employment. Refugees and other holders of humanitarian protection (230,000, of which 165,000 adults). A Home Office analysis showed that around 45% of refugees granted protection or resettled between 2015 and 2023 were not working by their fifth year in the UK. BN(O)s from Hong Kong (189,000, of which 145,000 adults). Survey data from 2025 indicated that 30% of adult BN(O)s were not in employment. Hundreds of thousands of migrants would therefore currently not be eligible for settlement under the proposed mandatory employment rule.”Hide quote

    Dependants of people holding worker visas (645,000, of which 328,000 adults). HMRC data from 2023/24 show that around half of adult Skilled Worker dependants were not working, and a third of dependants on Health & Care visas. Family visa holders (352,000, of which 318,000 adults). The Migration Advisory Committee (MAC) found in 2025 that around a third of adults on family visas were not working by their fifth year in the UK. Many more are likely to earn below £12,570 or not have the required period of continued employment. Refugees and other holders of humanitarian protection (230,000, of which 165,000 adults). A Home Office analysis showed that around 45% of refugees granted protection or resettled between 2015 and 2023 were not working by their fifth year in the UK. BN(O)s from Hong Kong (189,000, of which 145,000 adults). Survey data from 2025 indicated that 30% of adult BN(O)s were not in employment. Hundreds of thousands of migrants would therefore currently not be eligible for settlement under the proposed mandatory employment rule.

20. Changes to settlement: what do they mean?

    The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-02-10 · supports

    “Worker visa main applicants (756,000), depending on their earnings. Most long-term work visa holders are currently eligible for settlement after five years, though the figure includes some people on ineligible visas, such as intra-company transfers, which made up 10% of all new worker visas granted in 2024.”Hide quote

    Worker visa main applicants (756,000), depending on their earnings. Most long-term work visa holders are currently eligible for settlement after five years, though the figure includes some people on ineligible visas, such as intra-company transfers, which made up 10% of all new worker visas granted in 2024.

21. Changes to settlement: what do they mean?

    The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-02-10 · supports

    “Around 4.2 million people held a valid temporary visa at the end of 2024. Most of them — around 3.6 million — arrived starting in 2021, under the post-Brexit immigration system.”Hide quote

    Around 4.2 million people held a valid temporary visa at the end of 2024. Most of them — around 3.6 million — arrived starting in 2021, under the post-Brexit immigration system.

22. Changes to settlement: what do they mean?

    The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-02-10 · supports

    “Roughly 430,000 to 520,000 children held temporary visas with a path to settlement at the end of 2024.”Hide quote

    Roughly 430,000 to 520,000 children held temporary visas with a path to settlement at the end of 2024.

23. Migrant journey: 2025 report

    Home Office, 2026-05-21 · supports

    “Of the 344,058 individuals who began their journey in 2020, 55% still held valid leave to remain in the UK 5 years later, at the end of 2025.”Hide quote

    Of the 344,058 individuals who began their journey in 2020, 55% still held valid leave to remain in the UK 5 years later, at the end of 2025.

24. Migrant journey: 2025 report

    Home Office, 2026-05-21 · supports

    “By the end of 2025, 58% of those who had started their journey on a Work route 5 years earlier were still holding some form of leave, with 28% holding a temporary permission to stay and 30% who had obtained ILR.”Hide quote

    By the end of 2025, 58% of those who had started their journey on a Work route 5 years earlier were still holding some form of leave, with 28% holding a temporary permission to stay and 30% who had obtained ILR.

25. Migrant journey: 2025 report

    Home Office, 2026-05-21 · supports

    “Of the 33,503 journeys that began on Family routes in 2020, 86% still held leave to remain after 5 years, with just under half (46%) having obtained indefinite leave to remain (ILR).”Hide quote

    Of the 33,503 journeys that began on Family routes in 2020, 86% still held leave to remain after 5 years, with just under half (46%) having obtained indefinite leave to remain (ILR).

26. Migrant journey: 2025 report

    Home Office, 2026-05-21 · supports

    “Less than 1% of those whose initial journey was a ‘study’ route obtained indefinite leave to remain after 5 years”Hide quote

    Less than 1% of those whose initial journey was a ‘study’ route obtained indefinite leave to remain after 5 years

27. Migrant journey: 2025 report

    Home Office, 2026-05-21 · complicates

    “Among those who began their journey 10 years earlier (in 2015), 20% had obtained ILR by the end of 2025”Hide quote

    Among those who began their journey 10 years earlier (in 2015), 20% had obtained ILR by the end of 2025

28. Migrant journey: 2025 report

    Home Office, 2026-05-21 · supports

    “Among individuals granted asylum or other forms of protection following an asylum claim in 2019, 33% had obtained indefinite leave to remain (ILR) by the end of 2025, 6 years later. This period includes both time spent awaiting a decision and time holding leave. The likelihood of securing settlement increases substantially over time: among those granted leave following asylum claims made in 2015, 89% had obtained ILR within 10 years.”Hide quote

    Among individuals granted asylum or other forms of protection following an asylum claim in 2019, 33% had obtained indefinite leave to remain (ILR) by the end of 2025, 6 years later. This period includes both time spent awaiting a decision and time holding leave. The likelihood of securing settlement increases substantially over time: among those granted leave following asylum claims made in 2015, 89% had obtained ILR within 10 years.

29. Migrant journey: 2025 report

    Home Office, 2026-05-21 · supports

    “In 2025, 153,204 journeys resulted in a grant of settlement, representing a 9% decrease compared with the previous year. This decline largely reflects the effects of COVID-19, as fewer individuals entered the UK in 2020, when application volumes and decision making were disrupted, which have fed through to lower numbers reaching settlement at the 5 year eligibility point.”Hide quote

    In 2025, 153,204 journeys resulted in a grant of settlement, representing a 9% decrease compared with the previous year. This decline largely reflects the effects of COVID-19, as fewer individuals entered the UK in 2020, when application volumes and decision making were disrupted, which have fed through to lower numbers reaching settlement at the 5 year eligibility point.

30. Migrant journey: 2025 report, summary tables (MJ_03)

    Home Office, 2026-05-21 · supports

    “Initial leave type | Expired | Indefinite leave to remain | Valid leave to remain | Total || All leave types | 156084 | 49100 | 138874 | 344058”Hide quote

    Initial leave type | Expired | Indefinite leave to remain | Valid leave to remain | Total || All leave types | 156084 | 49100 | 138874 | 344058

31. Universal Credit statistics, 29 April 2013 to 10 July 2025

    Department for Work and Pensions, 2025-12-08 · supports

    “In July 2025, 9.6% of people on UC were in the “EU Settlement Scheme” group. 2.7% of people on UC were in the “Indefinite Leave to Remain (not EU Settlement Scheme)” group. 1.5% of people on UC were in the “Refugee” group.”Hide quote

    In July 2025, 9.6% of people on UC were in the “EU Settlement Scheme” group. 2.7% of people on UC were in the “Indefinite Leave to Remain (not EU Settlement Scheme)” group. 1.5% of people on UC were in the “Refugee” group.

32. Universal Credit statistics, 29 April 2013 to 10 July 2025

    Department for Work and Pensions, 2025-12-08 · supports

    “There were 8.0 million people on Universal Credit in July 2025, up from 6.9 million people on Universal Credit in July 2024”Hide quote

    There were 8.0 million people on Universal Credit in July 2025, up from 6.9 million people on Universal Credit in July 2024

33. Universal Credit statistics, 29 April 2013 to 10 July 2025

    Department for Work and Pensions, 2025-12-08 · complicates

    ““CTA – UK, Ireland, Right of Abode”, “EU Settlement Scheme”, and “Indefinite Leave to Remain (not EU Settlement Scheme)” together account for 96% of the UC caseload, with the remaining 4% being people with other types of immigration status. This is in line with the general principle that only people who are settled in the UK or protected by the EU Exit Withdrawal Agreement should be able to claim Universal Credit.”Hide quote

    “CTA – UK, Ireland, Right of Abode”, “EU Settlement Scheme”, and “Indefinite Leave to Remain (not EU Settlement Scheme)” together account for 96% of the UC caseload, with the remaining 4% being people with other types of immigration status. This is in line with the general principle that only people who are settled in the UK or protected by the EU Exit Withdrawal Agreement should be able to claim Universal Credit.

34. Universal Credit statistics, 29 April 2013 to 10 July 2025

    Department for Work and Pensions, 2025-12-08 · complicates

    “Overall, the employment rate on the UC caseload for June 2025 is 34%. This is broadly consistent with the employment rate for “CTA - UK, Ireland, Right of Abode” at 33%. Similarly, the employment rate for “Indefinite Leave to Remain (not EU Settlement Scheme)”, “Limited Leave to Remain (not EU Settlement Scheme) including family reunion”, and “Other” is 33%, 33%, and 34% respectively. “EU Settlement Scheme” has the highest rate in employment at 47%. “Refugee” has the lowest rate of employment at 23%.”Hide quote

    Overall, the employment rate on the UC caseload for June 2025 is 34%. This is broadly consistent with the employment rate for “CTA - UK, Ireland, Right of Abode” at 33%. Similarly, the employment rate for “Indefinite Leave to Remain (not EU Settlement Scheme)”, “Limited Leave to Remain (not EU Settlement Scheme) including family reunion”, and “Other” is 33%, 33%, and 34% respectively. “EU Settlement Scheme” has the highest rate in employment at 47%. “Refugee” has the lowest rate of employment at 23%.

35. Universal Credit statistics, 29 April 2013 to 10 July 2025

    Department for Work and Pensions, 2025-12-08 · complicates

    “The Immigration and Nationality section of these statistics is being released as statistics in development.”Hide quote

    The Immigration and Nationality section of these statistics is being released as statistics in development.

36. How many migrants in the UK have settlement?

    The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2025-11-10 · complicates

    “Our estimates of non-EU migrants with ILR cannot be compared to Department for Work and Pensions data on Universal Credit (UC) recipients by immigration status. In the UC dataset, immigration status is recorded when an individual makes an initial claim or when their circumstances change. However, the DWP is not usually notified if somebody with settlement acquires British citizenship. As a result, the UC figures for ILR will also include people with citizenship and thus will be higher than in reality.”Hide quote

    Our estimates of non-EU migrants with ILR cannot be compared to Department for Work and Pensions data on Universal Credit (UC) recipients by immigration status. In the UC dataset, immigration status is recorded when an individual makes an initial claim or when their circumstances change. However, the DWP is not usually notified if somebody with settlement acquires British citizenship. As a result, the UC figures for ILR will also include people with citizenship and thus will be higher than in reality.

37. A Fairer Pathway to Settlement: a statement and accompanying consultation on earned settlement (CP 1448)

    Home Office, 2025-11-20 · supports

    “Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) reported that 213,000 migrants with settlement were claiming Universal Credit.”Hide quote

    Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) reported that 213,000 migrants with settlement were claiming Universal Credit.

38. Social housing lettings in England, tenants: April 2024 to March 2025

    Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, 2025-11-13 · supports

    “Most lead tenants of households with a new social letting in 2024/25 were UK nationals (89%, or 233,000 lead tenants). European nationals comprised 4% of lead tenants (10,000) with the remaining 8% from nations outside the European Economic Area (EEA) (20,000).”Hide quote

    Most lead tenants of households with a new social letting in 2024/25 were UK nationals (89%, or 233,000 lead tenants). European nationals comprised 4% of lead tenants (10,000) with the remaining 8% from nations outside the European Economic Area (EEA) (20,000).

39. Social housing lettings in England, tenants: April 2024 to March 2025

    Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, 2025-11-13 · supports

    “Lead tenants with nationality from outside the EEA was broadly stable around 3-4% in 2008/09 to 2020/21, after which it rose to 9% in 2023/24, then fell slightly to 8% in 2024/25.”Hide quote

    Lead tenants with nationality from outside the EEA was broadly stable around 3-4% in 2008/09 to 2020/21, after which it rose to 9% in 2023/24, then fell slightly to 8% in 2024/25.

40. Social housing lettings in England, tenants: April 2024 to March 2025

    Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, 2025-11-13 · complicates

    “3% of households on a housing register had a lead tenant subject to immigration control. Equivalent information is not collected in CORE for new lets.”Hide quote

    3% of households on a housing register had a lead tenant subject to immigration control. Equivalent information is not collected in CORE for new lets.

41. Earned Settlement: Examining the Government's proposed reforms (Sixth Report of Session 2024–26)

    House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, 2026-03-13 · supports

    “Immigrants with temporary permission to be in the UK are usually subject to the No Recourse to Public Funds (NRPF) condition, which means they are not eligible for most benefits. Once an immigrant is granted Indefinite Leave to Remain, they become eligible for accessing benefits on the same terms as British citizens.”Hide quote

    Immigrants with temporary permission to be in the UK are usually subject to the No Recourse to Public Funds (NRPF) condition, which means they are not eligible for most benefits. Once an immigrant is granted Indefinite Leave to Remain, they become eligible for accessing benefits on the same terms as British citizens.

42. Skilled Worker visa

    GOV.UK (UK Visas and Immigration), 2026-10-29 · complicates

    “After 5 years, you may be able to apply to settle permanently in the UK (also known as ‘indefinite leave to remain’). This gives you the right to live, work and study here for as long as you like, and apply for benefits if you’re eligible.”Hide quote

    After 5 years, you may be able to apply to settle permanently in the UK (also known as ‘indefinite leave to remain’). This gives you the right to live, work and study here for as long as you like, and apply for benefits if you’re eligible.

43. Hong Kong British National (Overseas) Visa: policy statement

    Home Office, 2020-07-22 · supports

    “The United Kingdom will create a new bespoke immigration route for British Nationals (Overseas) (BN(O) citizens) from Hong Kong, reflecting the unique and unprecedented circumstances in Hong Kong and the UK’s historic and moral commitment to BN(O) citizens.”Hide quote

    The United Kingdom will create a new bespoke immigration route for British Nationals (Overseas) (BN(O) citizens) from Hong Kong, reflecting the unique and unprecedented circumstances in Hong Kong and the UK’s historic and moral commitment to BN(O) citizens.

44. Hong Kong British National (Overseas) Visa: policy statement

    Home Office, 2020-07-22 · supports

    “After 5 years in the UK and, provided they have stayed free of criminality, have supported themselves financially and otherwise complied with the terms of the visa, they will be able to apply for settled status; after a further year they may apply to naturalise as a British citizen.”Hide quote

    After 5 years in the UK and, provided they have stayed free of criminality, have supported themselves financially and otherwise complied with the terms of the visa, they will be able to apply for settled status; after a further year they may apply to naturalise as a British citizen.

45. Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, section 76: Revocation of leave to enter or remain

    legislation.gov.uk, 2002-11-07 · supports

    “(1)The Secretary of State may revoke a person’s indefinite leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom if the person— (a)is liable to deportation, but (b)cannot be deported for legal reasons. (2)The Secretary of State may revoke a person’s indefinite leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom if— (a)the leave was obtained by deception,”Hide quote

    (1)The Secretary of State may revoke a person’s indefinite leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom if the person— (a)is liable to deportation, but (b)cannot be deported for legal reasons. (2)The Secretary of State may revoke a person’s indefinite leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom if— (a)the leave was obtained by deception,

46. Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, section 76: Revocation of leave to enter or remain

    legislation.gov.uk, 2002-11-07 · supports

    “(3)The Secretary of State may revoke a person’s indefinite leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom if the person, or someone of whom he is a dependant, ceases to be a refugee as a result of—”Hide quote

    (3)The Secretary of State may revoke a person’s indefinite leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom if the person, or someone of whom he is a dependant, ceases to be a refugee as a result of—

47. R (HSMP Forum Ltd) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] EWHC 664 (Admin)

    High Court of Justice (The National Archives, Find Case Law), 2008-04-08 · supports

    “I find that the terms of the scheme, properly interpreted in context and read with the guidance and the rules, contain a clear representation, made by the defendant, that once a migrant had embarked on the scheme he would enjoy the benefits of the scheme according to the terms prevailing at the date he joined.”Hide quote

    I find that the terms of the scheme, properly interpreted in context and read with the guidance and the rules, contain a clear representation, made by the defendant, that once a migrant had embarked on the scheme he would enjoy the benefits of the scheme according to the terms prevailing at the date he joined.

48. R (HSMP Forum Ltd) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] EWHC 664 (Admin)

    High Court of Justice (The National Archives, Find Case Law), 2008-04-08 · supports

    “I am unable to see a sufficient public interest which outweighs the unfairness, which I am satisfied the changes visit upon those already admitted under the programme. In the circumstances, I am satisfied that the terms of the original scheme should be honoured and that there is no good reason why those already on the scheme shall not enjoy the benefits of it as originally offered to them. Good administration and straightforward dealing with the public require it. Not to restrain the impact of the changes would, in my judgment, give rise to conspicuous unfairness and an abuse of power.”Hide quote

    I am unable to see a sufficient public interest which outweighs the unfairness, which I am satisfied the changes visit upon those already admitted under the programme. In the circumstances, I am satisfied that the terms of the original scheme should be honoured and that there is no good reason why those already on the scheme shall not enjoy the benefits of it as originally offered to them. Good administration and straightforward dealing with the public require it. Not to restrain the impact of the changes would, in my judgment, give rise to conspicuous unfairness and an abuse of power.

49. R (HSMP Forum Ltd) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] EWHC 664 (Admin)

    High Court of Justice (The National Archives, Find Case Law), 2008-04-08 · complicates

    ““I do not accept that those who receive a grant of leave in a category have a legitimate expectation that the rules for further grants of leave within that category which existed at the time of their first grant of leave will apply to them for the rest of the time that they spend in the UK.”Hide quote

    “I do not accept that those who receive a grant of leave in a category have a legitimate expectation that the rules for further grants of leave within that category which existed at the time of their first grant of leave will apply to them for the rest of the time that they spend in the UK.

50. Earned Settlement: Examining the Government's proposed reforms (Sixth Report of Session 2024–26)

    House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, 2026-03-13 · complicates

    “It is common for the Home Office to apply transitional protections when making changes to the Immigration Rules—so that immigrants are covered by the rules that were in place at the time they received their visa, with regards to both settlement and other aspects of immigration policy189—but there is also precedent for changes to Immigration Rules being applied to people already in the UK.”Hide quote

    It is common for the Home Office to apply transitional protections when making changes to the Immigration Rules—so that immigrants are covered by the rules that were in place at the time they received their visa, with regards to both settlement and other aspects of immigration policy189—but there is also precedent for changes to Immigration Rules being applied to people already in the UK.

51. Earned Settlement: Examining the Government's proposed reforms (Sixth Report of Session 2024–26)

    House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, 2026-03-13 · complicates

    “It is not unprecedented to apply changes to people who are already in the immigration system.”Hide quote

    It is not unprecedented to apply changes to people who are already in the immigration system.

52. Migrant journey: 2025 report

    Home Office, 2026-05-21 · complicates

    “Changes introduced in 2012, which extended the qualifying period for settlement from 2 to 5 years, mean that individuals who arrived for Family reasons after this policy change typically take longer to reach settlement than those who arrived beforehand.”Hide quote

    Changes introduced in 2012, which extended the qualifying period for settlement from 2 to 5 years, mean that individuals who arrived for Family reasons after this policy change typically take longer to reach settlement than those who arrived beforehand.

53. A Fairer Pathway to Settlement: a statement and accompanying consultation on earned settlement (CP 1448)

    Home Office, 2025-11-20 · supports

    “Crucially, for these and every other group mentioned here, we propose to apply these changes to everyone in the country today who has not already received indefinite leave to remain. This would mean that those who are due to reach settlement in the coming months and years would be subject to the new requirements for earned settlement, as soon as our immigration rules have changed.”Hide quote

    Crucially, for these and every other group mentioned here, we propose to apply these changes to everyone in the country today who has not already received indefinite leave to remain. This would mean that those who are due to reach settlement in the coming months and years would be subject to the new requirements for earned settlement, as soon as our immigration rules have changed.

54. A Fairer Pathway to Settlement: a statement and accompanying consultation on earned settlement (CP 1448)

    Home Office, 2025-11-20 · supports

    “We will not, and would never, take away settled status from those who have already been granted it. These are people who have been in our country for years, even decades. They have families here. They have contributed to our society. Fairness is the most fundamental of British values. We made these people a promise when we gave them settlement.”Hide quote

    We will not, and would never, take away settled status from those who have already been granted it. These are people who have been in our country for years, even decades. They have families here. They have contributed to our society. Fairness is the most fundamental of British values. We made these people a promise when we gave them settlement.

55. A Fairer Pathway to Settlement: a statement and accompanying consultation on earned settlement (CP 1448)

    Home Office, 2025-11-20 · supports

    “In line with the UK’s obligations under the Withdrawal Agreement, settled status under the EU Settlement Scheme (EUSS) is out of scope for both this consultation and the planned reforms. Grants of settlement related to the Windrush Scheme are also out of scope for both this consultation and the planned reforms. There will be no changes implemented for either scheme in relation to the settlement reforms.”Hide quote

    In line with the UK’s obligations under the Withdrawal Agreement, settled status under the EU Settlement Scheme (EUSS) is out of scope for both this consultation and the planned reforms. Grants of settlement related to the Windrush Scheme are also out of scope for both this consultation and the planned reforms. There will be no changes implemented for either scheme in relation to the settlement reforms.

56. A Fairer Pathway to Settlement: a statement and accompanying consultation on earned settlement (CP 1448)

    Home Office, 2025-11-20 · supports

    “Specifically, it proposes that benefits should not be available to those who have settled status, and asks whether they should instead be reserved for those who have achieved British citizenship.”Hide quote

    Specifically, it proposes that benefits should not be available to those who have settled status, and asks whether they should instead be reserved for those who have achieved British citizenship.

57. Changes to settlement: what do they mean?

    The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-02-10 · supports

    “Second, the standard waiting period before a migrant becomes eligible for settlement would increase from five to ten years, with important exceptions. Family members of British citizens would continue to be eligible for settlement after five years, as would holders of BN(O) visas under the UK’s humanitarian route for Hong Kongers. Migrants with Innovator Founder or Global Talent visas would continue to be able to obtain settlement after three years. EU citizens and others holding status under the EU Settlement Scheme would also be unaffected by any changes (including those on minimum requirements). Other groups would face longer baseline waiting periods. Migrants on the Skilled Worker route in low or middle-skilled occupations (below RQF level 6) would have to wait fifteen years before applying for settlement. Refugees would face a baseline wait of twenty years, though shorter waits would be available for those who switch onto a separate work and study protection route, details of which remain unclear.”Hide quote

    Second, the standard waiting period before a migrant becomes eligible for settlement would increase from five to ten years, with important exceptions. Family members of British citizens would continue to be eligible for settlement after five years, as would holders of BN(O) visas under the UK’s humanitarian route for Hong Kongers. Migrants with Innovator Founder or Global Talent visas would continue to be able to obtain settlement after three years. EU citizens and others holding status under the EU Settlement Scheme would also be unaffected by any changes (including those on minimum requirements). Other groups would face longer baseline waiting periods. Migrants on the Skilled Worker route in low or middle-skilled occupations (below RQF level 6) would have to wait fifteen years before applying for settlement. Refugees would face a baseline wait of twenty years, though shorter waits would be available for those who switch onto a separate work and study protection route, details of which remain unclear.

58. Changes to settlement: what do they mean?

    The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-02-10 · supports

    “5 years less for migrants with taxable income of at least £50,270 a year 7 years less for migrants with taxable income of at least £125,140 a year 5 years less for migrants in specified public service occupations (such as those working in education or the NHS, though a list is to be confirmed) 3 to 5 years less for migrants working in their community, such as through volunteering (details remain unclear) The following factors would result in longer waiting periods would also apply (only the largest): 5 years longer if the applicant has received public funds for less than 12 months 10 years longer if the applicant has received public funds for more than 12 months Up to 20 years longer for people who entered the UK illegally, first arrived on a visitor visa, or overstayed a visa for more than 6 months (up to a maximum total of 30 years)”Hide quote

    5 years less for migrants with taxable income of at least £50,270 a year 7 years less for migrants with taxable income of at least £125,140 a year 5 years less for migrants in specified public service occupations (such as those working in education or the NHS, though a list is to be confirmed) 3 to 5 years less for migrants working in their community, such as through volunteering (details remain unclear) The following factors would result in longer waiting periods would also apply (only the largest): 5 years longer if the applicant has received public funds for less than 12 months 10 years longer if the applicant has received public funds for more than 12 months Up to 20 years longer for people who entered the UK illegally, first arrived on a visitor visa, or overstayed a visa for more than 6 months (up to a maximum total of 30 years)

59. Changes to settlement: what do they mean?

    The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-02-10 · supports

    “It would also require migrants to have made national insurance contributions for at least three years – in effect, to have been employed with earnings of at least £12,570 a year for this period. This is equivalent to a part-time job (19 hours per week) at the 2026-7 minimum wage.”Hide quote

    It would also require migrants to have made national insurance contributions for at least three years – in effect, to have been employed with earnings of at least £12,570 a year for this period. This is equivalent to a part-time job (19 hours per week) at the 2026-7 minimum wage.

60. Earned Settlement: Examining the Government's proposed reforms (Sixth Report of Session 2024–26)

    House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, 2026-03-13 · supports

    “The Home Office recently held a consultation on its proposed changes, which closed on 12 February.”Hide quote

    The Home Office recently held a consultation on its proposed changes, which closed on 12 February.

61. Earned Settlement: Examining the Government's proposed reforms (Sixth Report of Session 2024–26)

    House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, 2026-03-13 · complicates

    “It is not clear that applying these changes to people who arrived prior to introduction of new immigration rules in 2021—after the UK’s exit from the EU—is necessary for the Government to achieve its stated policy aims, and so it is difficult to see a justification for applying the changes to this cohort.”Hide quote

    It is not clear that applying these changes to people who arrived prior to introduction of new immigration rules in 2021—after the UK’s exit from the EU—is necessary for the Government to achieve its stated policy aims, and so it is difficult to see a justification for applying the changes to this cohort.

62. Earned Settlement: Examining the Government's proposed reforms (Sixth Report of Session 2024–26)

    House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, 2026-03-13 · supports

    “understand that extending routes to settlement for at least some people already in the UK is essential for the Government to be able to meet its objective of reducing the impact of the large number of immigrants who arrived to the UK in recent years.”Hide quote

    understand that extending routes to settlement for at least some people already in the UK is essential for the Government to be able to meet its objective of reducing the impact of the large number of immigrants who arrived to the UK in recent years.

63. Earned Settlement: Examining the Government's proposed reforms (Sixth Report of Session 2024–26)

    House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, 2026-03-13 · supports

    “Changes to English language requirements for settlement, which were not under consultation, were introduced through changes to the immigration rules on 5 March 2026 and will come into force on 26 March 2027.”Hide quote

    Changes to English language requirements for settlement, which were not under consultation, were introduced through changes to the immigration rules on 5 March 2026 and will come into force on 26 March 2027.

64. Home Secretary tells MPs that earned settlement policy will be set out later this year

    Electronic Immigration Network, 2026-09-24 · supports

    “"I am very aware that a large group of people who arrived in 2022, absent any change, would qualify in February 2027. We have to give certainty to the system. It remains the case that the rules that apply to you are the rules in force at the point of your application, not when you arrived in the country. That will continue to apply in the normal way. Later this year we will set out the new policy on settlement, taking into account all the consultation responses we have had, as well as any transitional arrangements we might decide to implement."”Hide quote

    "I am very aware that a large group of people who arrived in 2022, absent any change, would qualify in February 2027. We have to give certainty to the system. It remains the case that the rules that apply to you are the rules in force at the point of your application, not when you arrived in the country. That will continue to apply in the normal way. Later this year we will set out the new policy on settlement, taking into account all the consultation responses we have had, as well as any transitional arrangements we might decide to implement."

65. Home Secretary tells MPs that earned settlement policy will be set out later this year

    Electronic Immigration Network, 2026-09-24 · supports

    “It is everything from passporting certain cohorts through—so no change, and they still qualify at five years—to different options for what you might do with other cohorts over a longer period.”Hide quote

    It is everything from passporting certain cohorts through—so no change, and they still qualify at five years—to different options for what you might do with other cohorts over a longer period.

66. Immigration Rules: statement of changes

    UK Visas and Immigration, 2026-09-03 · supports

    “Added a link to the statement of changes to the Immigration Rules: HC 584, 3 September 2026.”Hide quote

    Added a link to the statement of changes to the Immigration Rules: HC 584, 3 September 2026.

67. Changes to settlement: what do they mean?

    The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-02-10 · complicates

    “Median earnings were £30,200 among employed Skilled Worker dependants in 2023/4, and £22,100 for Health & Care dependants. Most would thus be expected to face a ten-year route.”Hide quote

    Median earnings were £30,200 among employed Skilled Worker dependants in 2023/4, and £22,100 for Health & Care dependants. Most would thus be expected to face a ten-year route.

68. Earned Settlement: Examining the Government's proposed reforms (Sixth Report of Session 2024–26)

    House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, 2026-03-13 · supports

    “The changes will make the UK an outlier among most high-income countries, where the standard settlement period is usually five years for those who have a path to settlement, although Switzerland and Japan both have 10-year routes to settlement.”Hide quote

    The changes will make the UK an outlier among most high-income countries, where the standard settlement period is usually five years for those who have a path to settlement, although Switzerland and Japan both have 10-year routes to settlement.

69. Changes to settlement: what do they mean?

    The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-02-10 · supports

    “Several other European countries impose minimum employment requirements for migrants seeking to obtain permanent residence, including Denmark, Sweden, and Italy. In practice, this means some non-working migrants have no route to permanent status. For those who do have a path to permanent status, a ten-year standard route to settlement for most migrants would make the UK more restrictive than most other high-income countries, though comparable to Switzerland and Japan. Longer waiting periods of 15 to 30 years would be unusual among high-income countries.”Hide quote

    Several other European countries impose minimum employment requirements for migrants seeking to obtain permanent residence, including Denmark, Sweden, and Italy. In practice, this means some non-working migrants have no route to permanent status. For those who do have a path to permanent status, a ten-year standard route to settlement for most migrants would make the UK more restrictive than most other high-income countries, though comparable to Switzerland and Japan. Longer waiting periods of 15 to 30 years would be unusual among high-income countries.

70. Work Permit conditions

    Ministry of Manpower, Singapore, 2026-10-29 · complicates

    “Not marry a Singapore citizen or permanent resident in or outside Singapore without MOM's approval. This applies even after their Work Permits have expired, been cancelled or revoked. Not get pregnant or deliver a child in Singapore during the validity of their Work Permit unless they are already married to a Singapore citizen or permanent resident with MOM's approval.”Hide quote

    Not marry a Singapore citizen or permanent resident in or outside Singapore without MOM's approval. This applies even after their Work Permits have expired, been cancelled or revoked. Not get pregnant or deliver a child in Singapore during the validity of their Work Permit unless they are already married to a Singapore citizen or permanent resident with MOM's approval.

71. Changes to settlement: what do they mean?

    The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-02-10 · complicates

    “There is limited evidence on how more stringent requirements and a longer path to ILR may affect immigration and emigration. In theory, some people may be deterred from coming to the UK in the first place. A recent survey-based study found that the length of time for acquiring settlement at destination did not significantly affect prospective migrants’ decisions about whether to migrate, but the evidence is limited.”Hide quote

    There is limited evidence on how more stringent requirements and a longer path to ILR may affect immigration and emigration. In theory, some people may be deterred from coming to the UK in the first place. A recent survey-based study found that the length of time for acquiring settlement at destination did not significantly affect prospective migrants’ decisions about whether to migrate, but the evidence is limited.

72. Changes to settlement: what do they mean?

    The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-02-10 · complicates

    “Such incentives seem to work in some contexts – for example, a reform making permanent residence more accessible in Sweden led to more unemployment and lower incomes among those affected. However, other research found no connection between labour market integration and the type of status held by migrants. On the other hand, some studies suggest that longer periods of time without the rights that come with permanent status and citizenship can hinder social and economic integration. Migrants with permanent residence have more bargaining power than those on work visas who are tied to their employers, which can lead to better pay and conditions. Some studies of refugees found that having a permanent or more secure immigration status was associated with better labour market outcomes. In Denmark, one study suggests that imposing more stringent employment and language criteria for settlement led to a decrease rather than an increase in employment.”Hide quote

    Such incentives seem to work in some contexts – for example, a reform making permanent residence more accessible in Sweden led to more unemployment and lower incomes among those affected. However, other research found no connection between labour market integration and the type of status held by migrants. On the other hand, some studies suggest that longer periods of time without the rights that come with permanent status and citizenship can hinder social and economic integration. Migrants with permanent residence have more bargaining power than those on work visas who are tied to their employers, which can lead to better pay and conditions. Some studies of refugees found that having a permanent or more secure immigration status was associated with better labour market outcomes. In Denmark, one study suggests that imposing more stringent employment and language criteria for settlement led to a decrease rather than an increase in employment.

73. Fees and Unit Cost Table 08 October 2026 (visa fees transparency data)

    Home Office, 2026-10-20 · supports

    “Enabling Provision (Fees Order) | Method of Calculation | In-Country/Overseas | Fee Category | Current Fee | Fee from 08 October 2026 | % Change | Estimated Unit Cost | Maxima”Hide quote

    Enabling Provision (Fees Order) | Method of Calculation | In-Country/Overseas | Fee Category | Current Fee | Fee from 08 October 2026 | % Change | Estimated Unit Cost | Maxima

74. Fees and Unit Cost Table 08 October 2026 (visa fees transparency data)

    Home Office, 2026-10-20 · supports

    “In-Country | Indefinite leave to remain - main applicant and dependants | £3,226 | £3,226 | 0% | £310 | £3,635”Hide quote

    In-Country | Indefinite leave to remain - main applicant and dependants | £3,226 | £3,226 | 0% | £310 | £3,635

75. Fees and Unit Cost Table 08 October 2026 (visa fees transparency data)

    Home Office, 2026-10-20 · supports

    “Overseas | Skilled Worker, where a certificate of sponsorship has been issued or approval to sponsor under Sponsor a Worker has been given for over three years [Footnote 2] - main applicant and dependants | £1,618 | £1,618 | 0% | £153 | £2,000”Hide quote

    Overseas | Skilled Worker, where a certificate of sponsorship has been issued or approval to sponsor under Sponsor a Worker has been given for over three years [Footnote 2] - main applicant and dependants | £1,618 | £1,618 | 0% | £153 | £2,000

76. Fees and Unit Cost Table 08 October 2026 (visa fees transparency data)

    Home Office, 2026-10-20 · supports

    “Overseas | Skilled Worker - Health and Care Visa - where a certificate of sponsorship has been issued or approval to sponsor under Sponor a Worker has been given for three years or less  [Footnotes 2 and 3] - main applicant and dependants | £324 | £324 | 0% | £153 | £2,000”Hide quote

    Overseas | Skilled Worker - Health and Care Visa - where a certificate of sponsorship has been issued or approval to sponsor under Sponor a Worker has been given for three years or less  [Footnotes 2 and 3] - main applicant and dependants | £324 | £324 | 0% | £153 | £2,000

77. Fees and Unit Cost Table 08 October 2026 (visa fees transparency data)

    Home Office, 2026-10-20 · supports

    “Overseas | Student - main applicant and dependants | £558 | £558 | 0% | £176 | £600”Hide quote

    Overseas | Student - main applicant and dependants | £558 | £558 | 0% | £176 | £600

78. Fees and Unit Cost Table 08 October 2026 (visa fees transparency data)

    Home Office, 2026-10-20 · supports

    “In-Country | Graduate Route – main applicant and dependants | £937 | £937 | 0% | £110 | £2,000”Hide quote

    In-Country | Graduate Route – main applicant and dependants | £937 | £937 | 0% | £110 | £2,000

79. Fees and Unit Cost Table 08 October 2026 (visa fees transparency data)

    Home Office, 2026-10-20 · supports

    “Entry clearance or limited leave to remain for any purpose (excluding visits) not referred to in the preceding provisions of this table | Fixed Amount | Overseas | Route to Settlement | £2,064 | £2,064 | 0% | £639 | £3,600”Hide quote

    Entry clearance or limited leave to remain for any purpose (excluding visits) not referred to in the preceding provisions of this table | Fixed Amount | Overseas | Route to Settlement | £2,064 | £2,064 | 0% | £639 | £3,600

80. Fees and Unit Cost Table 08 October 2026 (visa fees transparency data)

    Home Office, 2026-10-20 · supports

    “Entry clearance as a Visitor for a period of six months or less. | Fixed Amount | Overseas | Visit visa – short up to 6 months | £135 | £135 | 0% | £159 | £140”Hide quote

    Entry clearance as a Visitor for a period of six months or less. | Fixed Amount | Overseas | Visit visa – short up to 6 months | £135 | £135 | 0% | £159 | £140

81. Fees and Unit Cost Table 08 October 2026 (visa fees transparency data)

    Home Office, 2026-10-20 · supports

    “Overseas | Global Talent - main applicant - where Approval Letter is required | £205 | £205 | 0% | £488 | £2,000”Hide quote

    Overseas | Global Talent - main applicant - where Approval Letter is required | £205 | £205 | 0% | £488 | £2,000

82. Fees and Unit Cost Table 08 October 2026 (visa fees transparency data)

    Home Office, 2026-10-20 · complicates

    “Naturalisation as a British citizen or a British overseas territories citizen. | Fixed Amount | In-Country | Naturalisation (British citizenship) [Footnote 5] | £1,709 | £1,709 | 0% | £1.23 | £1,709”Hide quote

    Naturalisation as a British citizen or a British overseas territories citizen. | Fixed Amount | In-Country | Naturalisation (British citizenship) [Footnote 5] | £1,709 | £1,709 | 0% | £1.23 | £1,709

83. Earned Settlement: Examining the Government's proposed reforms (Sixth Report of Session 2024–26)

    House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, 2026-03-13 · supports

    “In 2024/25 UK Visas and Immigration had an overall income of around £3 billion and a surplus of £1.8 billion once the cost of delivery is taken into account. The cost recovery rate for visa fees was 256%.”Hide quote

    In 2024/25 UK Visas and Immigration had an overall income of around £3 billion and a surplus of £1.8 billion once the cost of delivery is taken into account. The cost recovery rate for visa fees was 256%.

84. Pay for UK healthcare as part of your immigration application: how much you have to pay

    GOV.UK (UK Visas and Immigration), 2026-10-29 · supports

    “£1,035 per year for all other visa and immigration applications, for example £3,105 for a 3-year visa”Hide quote

    £1,035 per year for all other visa and immigration applications, for example £3,105 for a 3-year visa

85. 66% increase in Immigration Health Surcharge to be implemented on 6 February 2024

    Electronic Immigration Network, 2024-01-18 · complicates

    “As the equality impact assessment explains, the IHS is set at a fixed amount which takes no account of an individual's usage: "The charge is based on how much healthcare an 'average' Health Charge payer is expected to use and not directly linked to the healthcare usage of each individual payee."”Hide quote

    As the equality impact assessment explains, the IHS is set at a fixed amount which takes no account of an individual's usage: "The charge is based on how much healthcare an 'average' Health Charge payer is expected to use and not directly linked to the healthcare usage of each individual payee."

86. 66% increase in Immigration Health Surcharge to be implemented on 6 February 2024

    Electronic Immigration Network, 2024-01-18 · complicates

    “The Committee also found that the Home Office's calculations had overstated the current per capita cost for NHS spending when compared to all spending, which meant the IHS was set higher than it otherwise would be. While the difference was only minor (£1,013 instead of £1,036), the Committee called the calculations "unconvincing" and said it was "worrying that the Home Office should use such a questionable methodology and it may cast doubt on the accuracy of other underlying calculations that we have not scrutinised."”Hide quote

    The Committee also found that the Home Office's calculations had overstated the current per capita cost for NHS spending when compared to all spending, which meant the IHS was set higher than it otherwise would be. While the difference was only minor (£1,013 instead of £1,036), the Committee called the calculations "unconvincing" and said it was "worrying that the Home Office should use such a questionable methodology and it may cast doubt on the accuracy of other underlying calculations that we have not scrutinised."

87. Changes to settlement: what do they mean?

    The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-02-10 · supports

    “For example, a migrant with no dependants who comes to the UK on a three-year Skilled Worker visa currently pays a total of around £9,900 in fees before obtaining settlement in five years, not including the employer’s Immigration Skills Charge. If the same person instead waited for ten years, fees would increase to a total of £16,900, mostly because the Immigration Health Surcharge is paid for every year of residence.”Hide quote

    For example, a migrant with no dependants who comes to the UK on a three-year Skilled Worker visa currently pays a total of around £9,900 in fees before obtaining settlement in five years, not including the employer’s Immigration Skills Charge. If the same person instead waited for ten years, fees would increase to a total of £16,900, mostly because the Immigration Health Surcharge is paid for every year of residence.

88. UK immigration costs: an international comparison of skilled worker, researcher and student visas in 2025

    The Royal Society, 2025-10 · supports

    “The UK required the highest settlement fees skilled worker visas in other leading science nations. compared to other European nations in 2025 when controlling for PPP – without PPP adjustment, it ranked second to Switzerland, which topped the list at £3,871.”Hide quote

    The UK required the highest settlement fees skilled worker visas in other leading science nations. compared to other European nations in 2025 when controlling for PPP – without PPP adjustment, it ranked second to Switzerland, which topped the list at £3,871.

89. UK immigration costs: an international comparison of skilled worker, researcher and student visas in 2025

    The Royal Society, 2025-10 · supports

    “In 2025, visa holders incur 336% (404% when adjusting to rise in the UK increasing to £3,029 by 5% in 2024 – for PPP) higher costs to apply for settlement in the UK as 2025 and by 27% in 2021 – 2025, equivalent to 2% in compared to the average costs for permanent residence in real terms after adjusting for inflation. Figure 6 shows a other European countries, and 217% (248% when adjusting comparison of 2025 settlement costs between the UK for PPP) higher if the UK are included in the international”Hide quote

    In 2025, visa holders incur 336% (404% when adjusting to rise in the UK increasing to £3,029 by 5% in 2024 – for PPP) higher costs to apply for settlement in the UK as 2025 and by 27% in 2021 – 2025, equivalent to 2% in compared to the average costs for permanent residence in real terms after adjusting for inflation. Figure 6 shows a other European countries, and 217% (248% when adjusting comparison of 2025 settlement costs between the UK for PPP) higher if the UK are included in the international

90. UK immigration costs: an international comparison of skilled worker, researcher and student visas in 2025

    The Royal Society, 2025-10 · supports

    “Costs of settlement across leading European science nations, 2024 and 2025”Hide quote

    Costs of settlement across leading European science nations, 2024 and 2025

91. Earned Settlement: Examining the Government's proposed reforms (Sixth Report of Session 2024–26)

    House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, 2026-03-13 · supports

    “In 2024/25, the 91 local authorities that provided data to the NRPF Network spent £94 million on support to NRPF households.”Hide quote

    In 2024/25, the 91 local authorities that provided data to the NRPF Network spent £94 million on support to NRPF households.

92. Earned Settlement: Examining the Government's proposed reforms (Sixth Report of Session 2024–26)

    House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, 2026-03-13 · complicates

    “While there is considerable uncertainty about how the Government’s policy will apply to children, it appears likely that no matter how the policy is applied it will lead to more child poverty.”Hide quote

    While there is considerable uncertainty about how the Government’s policy will apply to children, it appears likely that no matter how the policy is applied it will lead to more child poverty.

93. Windrush Lessons Learned Review (HC 93)

    Home Office (independent review by Wendy Williams), 2020-03-19 · supports

    “However, despite the scandal taking the Home Office by surprise my report sets out that what happened to those affected by the Windrush scandal was foreseeable and avoidable.”Hide quote

    However, despite the scandal taking the Home Office by surprise my report sets out that what happened to those affected by the Windrush scandal was foreseeable and avoidable.

94. Windrush Lessons Learned Review (HC 93)

    Home Office (independent review by Wendy Williams), 2020-03-19 · supports

    “It removed and detained others. And through policies designed to combat illegal migration, it denied people access to work, housing and services, even though they were here lawfully and therefore lawfully entitled to access them. Some lost their jobs, their homes, and in many cases their sense of identity and wellbeing.”Hide quote

    It removed and detained others. And through policies designed to combat illegal migration, it denied people access to work, housing and services, even though they were here lawfully and therefore lawfully entitled to access them. Some lost their jobs, their homes, and in many cases their sense of identity and wellbeing.

95. Windrush Lessons Learned Review (HC 93)

    Home Office (independent review by Wendy Williams), 2020-03-19 · supports

    “It identified 164 people in the country before 1973 who’d either been detained or removed – or both – since 2002”Hide quote

    It identified 164 people in the country before 1973 who’d either been detained or removed – or both – since 2002

96. Windrush Compensation Scheme data: August 2026 (data tables)

    Home Office, 2026-10-29 · supports

    “Quarter/Month | Total intake | Total WIP | Total Final Decisions* | Of which | Value offers | No. of zero entitlement claims | Eligibility refused / withdrawn | Suspended | Total Cases Fully Closed** | Of which | Value offers (includes zero entitlement claims that have had a payment on review) | No. of zero entitlement claims | Eligibility refused / withdrawn || Total | 12,414 | 591 | 11,690 | 4,009 | 6,741 | 940 | 133 | 10,068 | 3,438 | 5,690 | 940”Hide quote

    Quarter/Month | Total intake | Total WIP | Total Final Decisions* | Of which | Value offers | No. of zero entitlement claims | Eligibility refused / withdrawn | Suspended | Total Cases Fully Closed** | Of which | Value offers (includes zero entitlement claims that have had a payment on review) | No. of zero entitlement claims | Eligibility refused / withdrawn || Total | 12,414 | 591 | 11,690 | 4,009 | 6,741 | 940 | 133 | 10,068 | 3,438 | 5,690 | 940

97. Windrush Compensation Scheme data: August 2026 (data tables)

    Home Office, 2026-10-29 · supports

    “Quarter/Month | Cumulative amount paid | Cumulative Number of Preliminary claims paid8 | Cumulative number of claims receiving payment* | Cumulative Number of Primary claims receiving payment | Cumulative Number of Estate claims receiving payment | Cumulative Number of Close Family claims receiving payment | Cumulative amount Offered | Cumulative Number of Preliminary offers made | Cumulative number claims receiving value offer | Cumulative No. of Primary claims receiving value offer | Cumulative No. of Estate claims receiving value offer | Cumulative No. of Close Family claims receiving value offer | Cumulative number claims receiving value offer or a zero entitlement | Cumulative No. of Primary claims receiving value offer or a zero entitlement | Cumulative No. of Estate claims receiving value offer or a zero entitlement | Cumulative No. of Close Family claims receiving value offer or a zero entitlement || Aug-2026 | £133,475,539.07 | 2,048 | 4,221 | 2,289 | 238 | 1,694 | £138,849,799.48 | 1,947 | 4,294 | 2,316 | 246 | 1,732 | 10,756 | 6,044 | 1,145 | 3,567”Hide quote

    Quarter/Month | Cumulative amount paid | Cumulative Number of Preliminary claims paid8 | Cumulative number of claims receiving payment* | Cumulative Number of Primary claims receiving payment | Cumulative Number of Estate claims receiving payment | Cumulative Number of Close Family claims receiving payment | Cumulative amount Offered | Cumulative Number of Preliminary offers made | Cumulative number claims receiving value offer | Cumulative No. of Primary claims receiving value offer | Cumulative No. of Estate claims receiving value offer | Cumulative No. of Close Family claims receiving value offer | Cumulative number claims receiving value offer or a zero entitlement | Cumulative No. of Primary claims receiving value offer or a zero entitlement | Cumulative No. of Estate claims receiving value offer or a zero entitlement | Cumulative No. of Close Family claims receiving value offer or a zero entitlement || Aug-2026 | £133,475,539.07 | 2,048 | 4,221 | 2,289 | 238 | 1,694 | £138,849,799.48 | 1,947 | 4,294 | 2,316 | 246 | 1,732 | 10,756 | 6,044 | 1,145 | 3,567

98. What do Britons really think about scrapping indefinite leave to remain?

    YouGov, 2025-09-27 · supports

    “a new YouGov survey finds that the prospect of ending the granting of ILR divides the public: 44% say they support doing so, while 43% are opposed.”Hide quote

    a new YouGov survey finds that the prospect of ending the granting of ILR divides the public: 44% say they support doing so, while 43% are opposed.

99. What do Britons really think about scrapping indefinite leave to remain?

    YouGov, 2025-09-27 · supports

    “If ending the granting of ILR is divisive, removing it from current holders is downright unpopular. Support for removing ILR from those who have already been given permission to reside permanently in the UK falls to 29% – even among those who support ending the granting of ILR, only a minority (41%) agree with stripping permanent residency rights from those already granted them.”Hide quote

    If ending the granting of ILR is divisive, removing it from current holders is downright unpopular. Support for removing ILR from those who have already been given permission to reside permanently in the UK falls to 29% – even among those who support ending the granting of ILR, only a minority (41%) agree with stripping permanent residency rights from those already granted them.

100. What do Britons really think about scrapping indefinite leave to remain?

     YouGov, 2025-09-27 · supports

     “The majority of Britons (58%) are opposed to removing indefinite leave to remain status from those who already hold it.”Hide quote

     The majority of Britons (58%) are opposed to removing indefinite leave to remain status from those who already hold it.

101. What do Britons really think about scrapping indefinite leave to remain?

     YouGov, 2025-09-27 · complicates

     “Two thirds (64%) support ending the granting of ILR, while 54% back removing it from those who already have it. While Conservative voters back no longer granting ILR (51%), they are divided on removing it from those who already hold it, with 44% in favour of doing so and 42% against.”Hide quote

     Two thirds (64%) support ending the granting of ILR, while 54% back removing it from those who already have it. While Conservative voters back no longer granting ILR (51%), they are divided on removing it from those who already hold it, with 44% in favour of doing so and 42% against.

102. What do Britons really think about scrapping indefinite leave to remain?

     YouGov, 2025-09-27 · complicates

     “When it comes to ending the granting of ILR, sizeable minorities of Labour (40%), Lib Dem (37%) and Green (35%) voters are also in favour – but in each case are outnumbered by those opposed (50-57%). However the large majority are opposed to removing the status from those who already have it (71-80%).”Hide quote

     When it comes to ending the granting of ILR, sizeable minorities of Labour (40%), Lib Dem (37%) and Green (35%) voters are also in favour – but in each case are outnumbered by those opposed (50-57%). However the large majority are opposed to removing the status from those who already have it (71-80%).

103. What do Britons really think about scrapping indefinite leave to remain?

     YouGov, 2025-09-27 · complicates

     “In a three-way choice on whether certain groups of current ILR recipients should a) continue to be allowed to stay permanently, b) have to apply for a temporary visa or c) be made to leave the UK, the majority of the public want to continue allowing permanent residency for: those who have lived in Britain for over 10 years; those in full time work and paying taxes; NHS workers; those married to a British citizen, or those with children who are citizens; and those who have set up businesses in the UK.”Hide quote

     In a three-way choice on whether certain groups of current ILR recipients should a) continue to be allowed to stay permanently, b) have to apply for a temporary visa or c) be made to leave the UK, the majority of the public want to continue allowing permanent residency for: those who have lived in Britain for over 10 years; those in full time work and paying taxes; NHS workers; those married to a British citizen, or those with children who are citizens; and those who have set up businesses in the UK.

104. Immigration system statistics, year ending June 2026: settlement summary tables (Se_02)

     Home Office, 2026-08-27 · supports

     “Se_02: Grants of settlement by category of grant, type of applicant and refusals, 2010 to the year ending June 2026 [Notes 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13, 15, 16, 17]”Hide quote

     Se_02: Grants of settlement by category of grant, type of applicant and refusals, 2010 to the year ending June 2026 [Notes 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13, 15, 16, 17]

105. Windrush Compensation Scheme data: August 2026 (data tables)

     Home Office, 2026-10-29 · supports

     “WCS_03: Value of Windrush Compensation Scheme payments made7-11”Hide quote

     WCS_03: Value of Windrush Compensation Scheme payments made7-11

Immigration, the Economy and the Public Finances

1. Gross domestic product (Average) per head, CVM market prices (reference year = 2023), series IHXW, dataset PN2 (rows 2007–2025)

   Office for National Statistics, 2026-08-13 · supports

   “"2007","37625" "2008","37300" "2009","35339" "2010","35850" "2011","35856" "2012","36160" "2013","36537" "2014","37411" "2015","37937" "2016","38467" "2017","39415" "2018","39831" "2019","40125" "2020","36033" "2021","38972" "2022","40554" "2023","40126" "2024","40153" "2025","40546"”Hide quote

   "2007","37625" "2008","37300" "2009","35339" "2010","35850" "2011","35856" "2012","36160" "2013","36537" "2014","37411" "2015","37937" "2016","38467" "2017","39415" "2018","39831" "2019","40125" "2020","36033" "2021","38972" "2022","40554" "2023","40126" "2024","40153" "2025","40546"

2. Gross Domestic Product: chained volume measures: Seasonally adjusted £m, series ABMI, dataset PN2 (rows 2019–2025)

   Office for National Statistics, 2026-08-13 · supports

   “"2019","2673465" "2020","2404838" "2021","2610286" "2022","2744708" "2023","2752164" "2024","2780853" "2025","2817414"”Hide quote

   "2019","2673465" "2020","2404838" "2021","2610286" "2022","2744708" "2023","2752164" "2024","2780853" "2025","2817414"

3. Economic and fiscal outlook – March 2024 (CP 1027), Box 2.3

   Office for Budget Responsibility, 2024-03-06 · supports

   “Based on these assumptions, GDP is 1.5 per cent higher in 2028-29, but GDP per person is largely unchanged.”Hide quote

   Based on these assumptions, GDP is 1.5 per cent higher in 2028-29, but GDP per person is largely unchanged.

4. Economic and fiscal outlook – March 2024 (CP 1027), Box 2.3

   Office for Budget Responsibility, 2024-03-06 · supports

   “The yellow triangles show what would happen if the capital stock did not adjust at all in response to higher migration, making less capital available per worker and reducing overall productivity. GDP in 2028-29 is still higher but by a smaller amount (1 per cent), but GDP per person is then 0.4 per cent below our central forecast.”Hide quote

   The yellow triangles show what would happen if the capital stock did not adjust at all in response to higher migration, making less capital available per worker and reducing overall productivity. GDP in 2028-29 is still higher but by a smaller amount (1 per cent), but GDP per person is then 0.4 per cent below our central forecast.

5. Economic and fiscal outlook – March 2024 (CP 1027), Box 2.3

   Office for Budget Responsibility, 2024-03-06 · supports

   “This boosts the impact on GDP to 2.2 per cent in 2028-29 and raises GDP per person 0.8 per cent above our forecast. The impacts in the lower migration scenario, in which net migration settles at 115,000 in 2028-29, are symmetric.”Hide quote

   This boosts the impact on GDP to 2.2 per cent in 2028-29 and raises GDP per person 0.8 per cent above our forecast. The impacts in the lower migration scenario, in which net migration settles at 115,000 in 2028-29, are symmetric.

6. Economic and fiscal outlook – March 2024 (CP 1027), Box 4.5

   Office for Budget Responsibility, 2024-03-06 · supports

   “Overall, borrowing is estimated to be £19.9 billion lower and debt 3.1 per cent of GDP lower in 2028-29. The lower migration scenario is symmetric to this, with lower receipts and spending, meaning that borrowing is £19.9 billion higher and debt 3.1 per cent of GDP higher in 2028-29.”Hide quote

   Overall, borrowing is estimated to be £19.9 billion lower and debt 3.1 per cent of GDP lower in 2028-29. The lower migration scenario is symmetric to this, with lower receipts and spending, meaning that borrowing is £19.9 billion higher and debt 3.1 per cent of GDP higher in 2028-29.

7. Economic and fiscal outlook – March 2024 (CP 1027), Box 4.5

   Office for Budget Responsibility, 2024-03-06 · complicates

   “Adjusting for this we estimate that providing equivalent service provision to the additional migrants in the high scenario would require an additional £6.1 billion in 2028-29. On this basis, in this scenario a portion of the higher receipts generated by the additional migrants is offset by higher spending, so that while migration still improves the public finances it does so by less than in the unadjusted DEL scenario, with borrowing £13.1 billion lower and debt 2.5 per cent of GDP lower by 2028-29. The lower migration scenario has the opposite effect with borrowing and debt £13.1 billion and 2.5 per cent of GDP higher.”Hide quote

   Adjusting for this we estimate that providing equivalent service provision to the additional migrants in the high scenario would require an additional £6.1 billion in 2028-29. On this basis, in this scenario a portion of the higher receipts generated by the additional migrants is offset by higher spending, so that while migration still improves the public finances it does so by less than in the unadjusted DEL scenario, with borrowing £13.1 billion lower and debt 2.5 per cent of GDP lower by 2028-29. The lower migration scenario has the opposite effect with borrowing and debt £13.1 billion and 2.5 per cent of GDP higher.

8. Economic and fiscal outlook – March 2026, Box 2.1

   Office for Budget Responsibility, 2026-03 · supports

   “While the level of net migration has a significant impact on the level of real GDP, the size and direction of the impact on real GDP per person, an indicator of living standards, is much more uncertain. Estimates in the economics literature tend to suggest that the impacts of different levels of net inward migration on real GDP per person are relatively small in either a positive or negative direction and depend on a number of uncertain factors.”Hide quote

   While the level of net migration has a significant impact on the level of real GDP, the size and direction of the impact on real GDP per person, an indicator of living standards, is much more uncertain. Estimates in the economics literature tend to suggest that the impacts of different levels of net inward migration on real GDP per person are relatively small in either a positive or negative direction and depend on a number of uncertain factors.

9. Economic and fiscal outlook – March 2026, paragraph 2.12

   Office for Budget Responsibility, 2026-03 · supports

   “Reflecting this revision, we have lowered our central forecast for overall net inward migration by around 60,000 people (50,000 adults) a year on average (Chart 2.6, right panel). This is driven entirely by a more negative assumption for net migration by British nationals. By 2030, this change reduces the adult population by around 200,000 relative to the November forecast.”Hide quote

   Reflecting this revision, we have lowered our central forecast for overall net inward migration by around 60,000 people (50,000 adults) a year on average (Chart 2.6, right panel). This is driven entirely by a more negative assumption for net migration by British nationals. By 2030, this change reduces the adult population by around 200,000 relative to the November forecast.

10. Economic and fiscal outlook – March 2026, paragraph 2.14

    Office for Budget Responsibility, 2026-03 · supports

    “The productivity and participation rate effects largely offset each other, so the change to the net migration forecast results in broadly unchanged potential output per person.”Hide quote

    The productivity and participation rate effects largely offset each other, so the change to the net migration forecast results in broadly unchanged potential output per person.

11. Economic and fiscal outlook – March 2026, Box 2.1

    Office for Budget Responsibility, 2026-03 · complicates

    “Overall, in the medium term, net inward migration is likely to boost participation given migrants’ younger age composition. But the impact on productivity is much more uncertain.”Hide quote

    Overall, in the medium term, net inward migration is likely to boost participation given migrants’ younger age composition. But the impact on productivity is much more uncertain.

12. The Fiscal Impact of Immigration in the UK

    The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-06-23 · complicates

    “Short-term forecasts like these are particularly likely to find a positive impact from migration, because they do not account for the costs that come later as migrants age.”Hide quote

    Short-term forecasts like these are particularly likely to find a positive impact from migration, because they do not account for the costs that come later as migrants age.

13. The Fiscal Impact of Immigration in the UK

    The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-06-23 · complicates

    “In 2023, for example, it projected that by 2072/73 the primary budget deficit (i.e. excluding interest payments on debt) would be 1.1% of GDP lower in a scenario where annual net migration was 245,000 rather than 129,000. It projected that higher net migration would reduce debt as a share of GDP by 30 percentage points by 2072/73, but would not prevent debt from rising from around 100 to 300 percent of GDP.”Hide quote

    In 2023, for example, it projected that by 2072/73 the primary budget deficit (i.e. excluding interest payments on debt) would be 1.1% of GDP lower in a scenario where annual net migration was 245,000 rather than 129,000. It projected that higher net migration would reduce debt as a share of GDP by 30 percentage points by 2072/73, but would not prevent debt from rising from around 100 to 300 percent of GDP.

14. The Fiscal Impact of Immigration in the UK

    The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-06-23 · complicates

    “It concluded that “higher migration could be seen as delaying some of the fiscal challenges of an ageing population rather than a way of resolving them permanently”.”Hide quote

    It concluded that “higher migration could be seen as delaying some of the fiscal challenges of an ageing population rather than a way of resolving them permanently”.

15. Lower immigration will hit UK growth and raise borrowing

    Oxford Economics, 2026-02-11 · supports

    “If the official forecast from the Office for Budget Responsibility moves into line with ours, that would cut its projection for the level of potential output in 2029-2030 by 1ppt. This implies that government borrowing would be £19bn (0.5% of GDP) higher, wiping out most of the Chancellor’s headroom.”Hide quote

    If the official forecast from the Office for Budget Responsibility moves into line with ours, that would cut its projection for the level of potential output in 2029-2030 by 1ppt. This implies that government borrowing would be £19bn (0.5% of GDP) higher, wiping out most of the Chancellor’s headroom.

16. The Fiscal Impact of Immigration: Static and Dynamic Estimates for the UK

    Migration Advisory Committee, 2025-12-11 · supports

    “Overall, the SW visa route is clearly fiscally positive for the UK. This is almost inevitable given that main applicants on the route must have a job offer paying above a set of salary thresholds.”Hide quote

    Overall, the SW visa route is clearly fiscally positive for the UK. This is almost inevitable given that main applicants on the route must have a job offer paying above a set of salary thresholds.

17. The Fiscal Impact of Immigration: Static and Dynamic Estimates for the UK

    Migration Advisory Committee, 2025-12-11 · supports

    “For the entire cohort of 329,200 arrivals, we estimate that they will contribute a net £47.1bn over their lifetime – or +£143,000”Hide quote

    For the entire cohort of 329,200 arrivals, we estimate that they will contribute a net £47.1bn over their lifetime – or +£143,000

18. The Fiscal Impact of Immigration: Static and Dynamic Estimates for the UK

    Migration Advisory Committee, 2025-12-11 · supports

    “For SW (excl. H&C) main applicants (Fig 16), the average lifetime contribution is a substantial +£689,000 in present value (the cumulative total of £47.7bn divided by 69,200 main applicants).”Hide quote

    For SW (excl. H&C) main applicants (Fig 16), the average lifetime contribution is a substantial +£689,000 in present value (the cumulative total of £47.7bn divided by 69,200 main applicants).

19. The Fiscal Impact of Immigration: Static and Dynamic Estimates for the UK

    Migration Advisory Committee, 2025-12-11 · supports

    “The lifetime net contribution of those who remain in the UK is +£931,000, whilst it is only +£174,000 for those who leave.”Hide quote

    The lifetime net contribution of those who remain in the UK is +£931,000, whilst it is only +£174,000 for those who leave.

20. The Fiscal Impact of Immigration: Static and Dynamic Estimates for the UK

    Migration Advisory Committee, 2025-12-11 · supports

    “For the H&C main applicants (Figure 17), the lifetime fiscal contribution is positive (£54,000) but much smaller than for SW (excl. H&C) main applicants.”Hide quote

    For the H&C main applicants (Figure 17), the lifetime fiscal contribution is positive (£54,000) but much smaller than for SW (excl. H&C) main applicants.

21. The Fiscal Impact of Immigration: Static and Dynamic Estimates for the UK

    Migration Advisory Committee, 2025-12-11 · supports

    “For care workers, the lifetime contribution is estimated to be -£36,000, whilst for the other occupations it is +£166,000. Care Workers are therefore fiscally negative over their lifetimes and broadly similar to the UK median for the age group.”Hide quote

    For care workers, the lifetime contribution is estimated to be -£36,000, whilst for the other occupations it is +£166,000. Care Workers are therefore fiscally negative over their lifetimes and broadly similar to the UK median for the age group.

22. The Fiscal Impact of Immigration: Static and Dynamic Estimates for the UK

    Migration Advisory Committee, 2025-12-11 · supports

    “There average lifetime contributions are +£3,000 and -£67,000 respectively. This is in spite of being younger than the average UK resident – the age-adjusted UK comparators are +£107,000 (median of -£55,000) and +£84,000 (median of -£71,000) respectively.”Hide quote

    There average lifetime contributions are +£3,000 and -£67,000 respectively. This is in spite of being younger than the average UK resident – the age-adjusted UK comparators are +£107,000 (median of -£55,000) and +£84,000 (median of -£71,000) respectively.

23. The Fiscal Impact of Immigration: Static and Dynamic Estimates for the UK

    Migration Advisory Committee, 2025-12-11 · complicates

    “Recall that the UK resident population has a mean of -£39,000 overall lifetime contribution and a median of -£145,000. We can adjust the UK comparator group to have the same age distribution as the SW (excl. H&C) main applicants. This in effect compares the contribution of a migrant from 2022/23 onwards to that of a native with the same starting age. For this UK comparator group, the mean lifetime contribution is +£117,000 and median of -£47,000.”Hide quote

    Recall that the UK resident population has a mean of -£39,000 overall lifetime contribution and a median of -£145,000. We can adjust the UK comparator group to have the same age distribution as the SW (excl. H&C) main applicants. This in effect compares the contribution of a migrant from 2022/23 onwards to that of a native with the same starting age. For this UK comparator group, the mean lifetime contribution is +£117,000 and median of -£47,000.

24. The Fiscal Impact of Immigration: Static and Dynamic Estimates for the UK

    Migration Advisory Committee, 2025-12-11 · supports

    “We estimate that the top 10% of earners in the SW (excl. H&C) cohort (with a minimum salary in 2022/23 of £131,000) make an average lifetime contribution of £2.7m and account for 39% of the total contribution of”Hide quote

    We estimate that the top 10% of earners in the SW (excl. H&C) cohort (with a minimum salary in 2022/23 of £131,000) make an average lifetime contribution of £2.7m and account for 39% of the total contribution of

25. The Fiscal Impact of Immigration: Static and Dynamic Estimates for the UK, footnote 5

    Migration Advisory Committee, 2025-12-11 · complicates

    “To understand the role of real discounting, note that if we did not discount (i.e. 𝑟 = 0), the future fiscal contribution of a 25-year-old would be -£186,000 rather than +£184,000.”Hide quote

    To understand the role of real discounting, note that if we did not discount (i.e. 𝑟 = 0), the future fiscal contribution of a 25-year-old would be -£186,000 rather than +£184,000.

26. The Fiscal Impact of Immigration: Static and Dynamic Estimates for the UK

    Migration Advisory Committee, 2025-12-11 · complicates

    “a 3.0% real discount rate which is broadly in line with HMT Green Book”Hide quote

    a 3.0% real discount rate which is broadly in line with HMT Green Book

27. The Fiscal Impact of Immigration: Static and Dynamic Estimates for the UK

    Migration Advisory Committee, 2025-12-11 · complicates

    “Among the lower-earning skilled worker groups, temporary migration will be more beneficial than permanent migration from a fiscal perspective. This is not true higher up the earnings distribution, where having migrants stay in the long-term adds to the fiscal benefit they provide.”Hide quote

    Among the lower-earning skilled worker groups, temporary migration will be more beneficial than permanent migration from a fiscal perspective. This is not true higher up the earnings distribution, where having migrants stay in the long-term adds to the fiscal benefit they provide.

28. Migration Advisory Committee (MAC) annual report, 2025 (accessible)

    Migration Advisory Committee, 2025-12-17 · supports

    “Under the current immigration rules, we estimate that the 2022/23 cohort of successful applicants to the Partner route, which consists of the partners of British citizens and settled residents, will incur a net lifetime fiscal deficit of -£5.6bn in present value terms – an average of -£109,000 per applicant.”Hide quote

    Under the current immigration rules, we estimate that the 2022/23 cohort of successful applicants to the Partner route, which consists of the partners of British citizens and settled residents, will incur a net lifetime fiscal deficit of -£5.6bn in present value terms – an average of -£109,000 per applicant.

29. The Fiscal Impact of Immigration in the UK

    The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-06-23 · supports

    “At the time of writing, the MAC has not yet evaluated the net lifetime fiscal impact of all migration routes. It has not assessed the impact of refugees, for example, a group that is likely to affect the public finances more negatively than the groups discussed above because they have lower employment rates and often require more support from the state.”Hide quote

    At the time of writing, the MAC has not yet evaluated the net lifetime fiscal impact of all migration routes. It has not assessed the impact of refugees, for example, a group that is likely to affect the public finances more negatively than the groups discussed above because they have lower employment rates and often require more support from the state.

30. Fiscal risks and sustainability – September 2024 (CP 1142, corrected 14 November 2024), paragraph 4.33

    Office for Budget Responsibility, 2024-09-12 · supports

    “An illustrative migrant worker arriving to the UK at this age and earning the average UK salary is a net fiscal contributor (green line) by their second year. By contrast, an average resident of the same age is still a net fiscal recipient and does not become a net fiscal contributor until their 40s. This is because, unlike the UK resident, the migrant has not previously consumed UK public services, particularly education and health in their childhood.”Hide quote

    An illustrative migrant worker arriving to the UK at this age and earning the average UK salary is a net fiscal contributor (green line) by their second year. By contrast, an average resident of the same age is still a net fiscal recipient and does not become a net fiscal contributor until their 40s. This is because, unlike the UK resident, the migrant has not previously consumed UK public services, particularly education and health in their childhood.

31. Fiscal risks and sustainability – September 2024 (CP 1142, corrected 14 November 2024), paragraph 4.33

    Office for Budget Responsibility, 2024-09-12 · supports

    “For example, a high-wage migrant earning 30 per cent more than the UK average would still be a net benefit to the public finances even if they lived to”Hide quote

    For example, a high-wage migrant earning 30 per cent more than the UK average would still be a net benefit to the public finances even if they lived to

32. Fiscal risks and sustainability – September 2024 (CP 1142, corrected 14 November 2024), paragraph 4.33

    Office for Budget Responsibility, 2024-09-12 · supports

    “However, an illustrative low wage migrant worker arriving at 25 and earning half the UK average becomes less fiscally beneficial (yellow line) than the average UK resident in their early 40s.”Hide quote

    However, an illustrative low wage migrant worker arriving at 25 and earning half the UK average becomes less fiscally beneficial (yellow line) than the average UK resident in their early 40s.

33. Fiscal risks and sustainability – September 2024 (CP 1142, corrected 14 November 2024), correction slip

    Office for Budget Responsibility, 2024-11-14 · complicates

    “Average-and high-wage representative migrants are more fiscally beneficial in their mid-life compared to the previous chart but broadly unchanged at older ages. The representative low-wage migrant is significantly less fiscally beneficial, and substantially so at older ages.”Hide quote

    Average-and high-wage representative migrants are more fiscally beneficial in their mid-life compared to the previous chart but broadly unchanged at older ages. The representative low-wage migrant is significantly less fiscally beneficial, and substantially so at older ages.

34. Fiscal risks and sustainability – September 2024 (CP 1142, corrected 14 November 2024), paragraph 4.34

    Office for Budget Responsibility, 2024-09-12 · complicates

    “Given the wide range of possible households we have opted to model a more typical migrant on a work visa and no dependants.”Hide quote

    Given the wide range of possible households we have opted to model a more typical migrant on a work visa and no dependants.

35. Fiscal risks and sustainability – September 2024 (CP 1142, corrected 14 November 2024), paragraph 1.29

    Office for Budget Responsibility, 2024-09-12 · complicates

    “In the shorter length of stay scenario, where half of migrants leave after three years, and so generate savings in areas such as welfare and state pensions, debt ends up about 23 per cent of GDP lower by 2073-74. In the higher earnings scenario, where migrants generate extra tax revenue relative to their consumption of government services and benefits, debt as a share of GDP ends up about 40 per cent of GDP lower. However, in both cases, debt is still projected to be on an unsustainable upward trajectory in the long run.”Hide quote

    In the shorter length of stay scenario, where half of migrants leave after three years, and so generate savings in areas such as welfare and state pensions, debt ends up about 23 per cent of GDP lower by 2073-74. In the higher earnings scenario, where migrants generate extra tax revenue relative to their consumption of government services and benefits, debt as a share of GDP ends up about 40 per cent of GDP lower. However, in both cases, debt is still projected to be on an unsustainable upward trajectory in the long run.

36. Fiscal risks and sustainability – September 2024 (CP 1142, corrected 14 November 2024), paragraph 4.42

    Office for Budget Responsibility, 2024-09-12 · complicates

    “The primary balance worsens by 2.9 per cent of GDP and net debt rises in every year to reach 351 per cent of GDP by the end of the forecast horizon, 76 per cent of GDP above the baseline.”Hide quote

    The primary balance worsens by 2.9 per cent of GDP and net debt rises in every year to reach 351 per cent of GDP by the end of the forecast horizon, 76 per cent of GDP above the baseline.

37. Fiscal risks and sustainability – September 2024: chapter 4 charts and tables, sheet C4.13

    Office for Budget Responsibility, 2024-11-14 · supports

    “Chart 4.13: Cumulative fiscal impact of representative migrants”Hide quote

    Chart 4.13: Cumulative fiscal impact of representative migrants

38. Sponsored work and family visa earnings, employment and Income Tax

    Home Office, 2025-05-12 · supports

    “In financial year 2023 to 2024, median annual adjusted earnings for main applicants granted entry clearance visas were £56,600 for Skilled Workers, £30,900 for Health and Care Workers, and £47,900 for Senior or Specialist Workers (Global Business Mobility). For dependants, median annual adjusted earnings were £30,200, £22,100, and £27,200 for the same visa routes, respectively.”Hide quote

    In financial year 2023 to 2024, median annual adjusted earnings for main applicants granted entry clearance visas were £56,600 for Skilled Workers, £30,900 for Health and Care Workers, and £47,900 for Senior or Specialist Workers (Global Business Mobility). For dependants, median annual adjusted earnings were £30,200, £22,100, and £27,200 for the same visa routes, respectively.

39. Sponsored work and family visa earnings, employment and Income Tax, Table 5

    Home Office, 2025-05-12 · supports

    “6145 Care Workers and Home Carers 32,000 £23,100 84% 6146 Senior Care Workers 16,800 £25,800 78%”Hide quote

    6145 Care Workers and Home Carers 32,000 £23,100 84% 6146 Senior Care Workers 16,800 £25,800 78%

40. Sponsored work and family visa earnings, employment and Income Tax

    Home Office, 2025-05-12 · supports

    “In financial year 2023 to 2024, median annual adjusted earnings were £20,200 for a granted Family-related entry clearance visa.”Hide quote

    In financial year 2023 to 2024, median annual adjusted earnings were £20,200 for a granted Family-related entry clearance visa.

41. Sponsored work and family visa earnings, employment and Income Tax

    Home Office, 2025-05-12 · complicates

    “In financial year 2023 to 2024, at least 75% of main applicants granted a Skilled Worker entry clearance visa had PAYE earnings. This was at least 81% for Health and Care Workers and at least 68% for Senior or Specialist Workers (Global Business Mobility). For dependants, proportions were at least 45%, 67%, and 25%, respectively.”Hide quote

    In financial year 2023 to 2024, at least 75% of main applicants granted a Skilled Worker entry clearance visa had PAYE earnings. This was at least 81% for Health and Care Workers and at least 68% for Senior or Specialist Workers (Global Business Mobility). For dependants, proportions were at least 45%, 67%, and 25%, respectively.

42. Sponsored work and family visa earnings, employment and Income Tax

    Home Office, 2025-05-12 · complicates

    “Caution is advised when comparing median annual adjusted earnings across different visa routes, as work eligibility and requirements vary.”Hide quote

    Caution is advised when comparing median annual adjusted earnings across different visa routes, as work eligibility and requirements vary.

43. Employee earnings in the UK: 2024

    Office for National Statistics, 2024-10-29 · complicates

    “Median gross annual earnings for full-time employees were £37,430 in April 2024, compared with £35,004 in April 2023”Hide quote

    Median gross annual earnings for full-time employees were £37,430 in April 2024, compared with £35,004 in April 2023

44. Upward mobility? Earnings trajectories for recent immigrants

    The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-05-29 · supports

    “For the most recent, very large cohorts, we see surprising stability: after one full year in the UK labour market, each cohort from 2021 to 2023 was earning around 95% of the UK average, broadly similar to the pre-Brexit cohorts. However, there was a significant fall for those who arrived in 2024, to 90%.”Hide quote

    For the most recent, very large cohorts, we see surprising stability: after one full year in the UK labour market, each cohort from 2021 to 2023 was earning around 95% of the UK average, broadly similar to the pre-Brexit cohorts. However, there was a significant fall for those who arrived in 2024, to 90%.

45. Upward mobility? Earnings trajectories for recent immigrants

    The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-05-29 · supports

    “For example, while 2015 non-EU entrants took around six years to reach the overall median wage, 2021 entrants had already exceeded it after two years. Indeed, even those who entered in 2023 exceeded overall median earnings after two years. This implies that either more recent non-EU arrivals were seeing strong earnings growth relative to the overall workforce, or that lower earners were disproportionately leaving the employee workforce within the first few years (for example, international students working part-time before leaving the country), or some combination of the two.”Hide quote

    For example, while 2015 non-EU entrants took around six years to reach the overall median wage, 2021 entrants had already exceeded it after two years. Indeed, even those who entered in 2023 exceeded overall median earnings after two years. This implies that either more recent non-EU arrivals were seeing strong earnings growth relative to the overall workforce, or that lower earners were disproportionately leaving the employee workforce within the first few years (for example, international students working part-time before leaving the country), or some combination of the two.

46. Upward mobility? Earnings trajectories for recent immigrants

    The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-05-29 · complicates

    “Entry-year earnings then settled at a lower level between 2020 and 2023, followed by a modest decline in 2024 and a much sharper fall in 2025.”Hide quote

    Entry-year earnings then settled at a lower level between 2020 and 2023, followed by a modest decline in 2024 and a much sharper fall in 2025.

47. Upward mobility? Earnings trajectories for recent immigrants

    The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-05-29 · complicates

    “It includes both full-time and part-time workers, and we cannot distinguish between the two because hours worked are not reported.”Hide quote

    It includes both full-time and part-time workers, and we cannot distinguish between the two because hours worked are not reported.

48. Upward mobility? Earnings trajectories for recent immigrants

    The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-05-29 · complicates

    “Of the EU-origin migrants who first appeared in 2015, 45% were still on payroll in 2025 (Figure 3). For non-EU origin migrants, the figure was 60%.”Hide quote

    Of the EU-origin migrants who first appeared in 2015, 45% were still on payroll in 2025 (Figure 3). For non-EU origin migrants, the figure was 60%.

49. The Fiscal Impact of Immigration in the UK

    The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-06-23 · supports

    “While there are no fiscal analyses covering the entire post-Brexit immigration system, several cover the entire pre-Brexit system.”Hide quote

    While there are no fiscal analyses covering the entire post-Brexit immigration system, several cover the entire pre-Brexit system.

50. The Fiscal Impact of Immigration in the UK

    The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-06-23 · supports

    “Despite differences in methods, some key points emerge consistently. First, in all cases, the impacts were found to be less than +1% or -1% of GDP. Second, recent migrants made a more positive impact than those who had been in the UK for longer.”Hide quote

    Despite differences in methods, some key points emerge consistently. First, in all cases, the impacts were found to be less than +1% or -1% of GDP. Second, recent migrants made a more positive impact than those who had been in the UK for longer.

51. The Fiscal Impact of Immigration in the UK, Table 1 (columns: EEA, non-EEA, UK born, then recent EEA and non-EEA migrants)

    The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-06-23 · supports

    “Oxford Economics (2018) FY 2016/17 (1 year) +£4.7b -£9.0b -£41.4b Migration Watch (2016) FY 2014/15 (1 year) -£1.1b -£15.6b -£87.8b £0.0 -£6.2b Dustmann and Frattini (2014) 1995-2011 (17 years) +£4.4b (+£259m pa) -£118b (-£6.9b pa) -£591b (-£34.8b pa)”Hide quote

    Oxford Economics (2018) FY 2016/17 (1 year) +£4.7b -£9.0b -£41.4b Migration Watch (2016) FY 2014/15 (1 year) -£1.1b -£15.6b -£87.8b £0.0 -£6.2b Dustmann and Frattini (2014) 1995-2011 (17 years) +£4.4b (+£259m pa) -£118b (-£6.9b pa) -£591b (-£34.8b pa)

52. The Fiscal Impact of Immigration in the UK, Table 1

    The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-06-23 · supports

    “Migration Watch (2014) 1995-2011 (17 years) -£13.6b (-£0.8b pa) -£134.9b (-£7.94b pa) -£565b (-£33.2b pa)”Hide quote

    Migration Watch (2014) 1995-2011 (17 years) -£13.6b (-£0.8b pa) -£134.9b (-£7.94b pa) -£565b (-£33.2b pa)

53. Here To Stay? Estimating the Scale and Cost of Long-Term Migration

    Centre for Policy Studies, 2025-02-09 · supports

    “In our central model, using the OBR’s extremely optimistic assumptions about migrant earnings, the lifetime net fiscal cost to the state would be £234 billion – equivalent to a bill of £8,200 for every UK household, albeit spread out over decades.”Hide quote

    In our central model, using the OBR’s extremely optimistic assumptions about migrant earnings, the lifetime net fiscal cost to the state would be £234 billion – equivalent to a bill of £8,200 for every UK household, albeit spread out over decades.

54. Here To Stay? Estimating the Scale and Cost of Long-Term Migration

    Centre for Policy Studies, 2025-02-09 · complicates

    “For example, as the graph below shows, an ‘average-wage’ migrant who arrives aged 25 will make a net lifetime contribution of around £405,000 if they live to the age of 82.”Hide quote

    For example, as the graph below shows, an ‘average-wage’ migrant who arrives aged 25 will make a net lifetime contribution of around £405,000 if they live to the age of 82.

55. Here To Stay? Estimating the Scale and Cost of Long-Term Migration (research page)

    Centre for Policy Studies, 2025-09-08 · contests

    “NOTE: The Office for Budget Responsibility fiscal data contained within this report is the subject of dispute, meaning that the overall cost estimates should no longer be used. We will be publishing an updated estimate in due course. This does not impact on the visa data or projections for the numbers likely to gain ILR on different visa routes.”Hide quote

    NOTE: The Office for Budget Responsibility fiscal data contained within this report is the subject of dispute, meaning that the overall cost estimates should no longer be used. We will be publishing an updated estimate in due course. This does not impact on the visa data or projections for the numbers likely to gain ILR on different visa routes.

56. Centre for Policy Studies issues clarification on Indefinite Leave to Remain statistics

    Centre for Policy Studies, 2025-09-22 · contests

    “After the CPS’ report was published, the Office for Budget Responsibility revised their definitions of some of the fiscal data contained within our report, meaning that the overall cost estimates should no longer be used.”Hide quote

    After the CPS’ report was published, the Office for Budget Responsibility revised their definitions of some of the fiscal data contained within our report, meaning that the overall cost estimates should no longer be used.

57. Daily Mail corrects report about Reform UK’s disputed immigration savings

    Full Fact, 2025-10-03 · contests

    “This is not what this figure refers to, and we’re grateful to the Daily Mail for correcting its article after we got in touch. The figure is actually Reform UK’s estimate of the overall net savings to taxpayers, not just on benefits—though the figure is disputed and based on a now-withdrawn think tank estimate.”Hide quote

    This is not what this figure refers to, and we’re grateful to the Daily Mail for correcting its article after we got in touch. The figure is actually Reform UK’s estimate of the overall net savings to taxpayers, not just on benefits—though the figure is disputed and based on a now-withdrawn think tank estimate.

58. The Cost of the Boriswave

    Reform UK, 2026-04 · supports

    “The total lifetime cost of the 2021-2025 migrants expected to receive ILR in the years from 2026 to 2030 is roughly £622.5 bn in real terms if undiscounted, and £154 bn if discounted at the 3.5% rate suggested by the HM Treasury Green Book. This total fiscal black hole represents a £20,000 liability for every household in the UK.”Hide quote

    The total lifetime cost of the 2021-2025 migrants expected to receive ILR in the years from 2026 to 2030 is roughly £622.5 bn in real terms if undiscounted, and £154 bn if discounted at the 3.5% rate suggested by the HM Treasury Green Book. This total fiscal black hole represents a £20,000 liability for every household in the UK.

59. The Cost of the Boriswave

    Reform UK, 2026-04 · complicates

    “Due to lack of microdata on migrant fiscal incidence, we map migrants to ONS income quintiles as a proxy. This likely understates heterogeneity within groups.”Hide quote

    Due to lack of microdata on migrant fiscal incidence, we map migrants to ONS income quintiles as a proxy. This likely understates heterogeneity within groups.

60. The Cost of the Boriswave

    Reform UK, 2026-04 · complicates

    “The primary source of difference is the lack of additional discounting that the Migration Advisory Committee and the Government generally applies when considering fiscal impact.”Hide quote

    The primary source of difference is the lack of additional discounting that the Migration Advisory Committee and the Government generally applies when considering fiscal impact.

61. Economists Slam Reform UK's 'Fantasy' Claims That 'Boriswave' Migrants Will Cost Households £20,000

    Byline Times, 2026-04-16 · contests

    ““The main reason the headline figures are so high in the Reform estimate is that it does not adopt the standard practice of discounting, i.e. valuing costs and benefits now as more important than costs and benefits in the future,” she said. “This has a big impact on the numbers because many of the costs of migration come decades down the line, while benefits come sooner.””Hide quote

    “The main reason the headline figures are so high in the Reform estimate is that it does not adopt the standard practice of discounting, i.e. valuing costs and benefits now as more important than costs and benefits in the future,” she said. “This has a big impact on the numbers because many of the costs of migration come decades down the line, while benefits come sooner.”

62. Economists Slam Reform UK's 'Fantasy' Claims That 'Boriswave' Migrants Will Cost Households £20,000

    Byline Times, 2026-04-16 · supports

    ““There is not yet a high-quality estimate for the total fiscal impact of migration under the post-Brexit immigration system,” Sumption said.”Hide quote

    “There is not yet a high-quality estimate for the total fiscal impact of migration under the post-Brexit immigration system,” Sumption said.

63. Economists Slam Reform UK's 'Fantasy' Claims That 'Boriswave' Migrants Will Cost Households £20,000

    Byline Times, 2026-04-16 · contests

    ““Reform have simply invented their own numbers for migrant earnings, ignoring the analysis of the independent Migration Advisory Committee (MAC) which used actual data from HMRC,” he said.”Hide quote

    “Reform have simply invented their own numbers for migrant earnings, ignoring the analysis of the independent Migration Advisory Committee (MAC) which used actual data from HMRC,” he said.

64. Economists Slam Reform UK's 'Fantasy' Claims That 'Boriswave' Migrants Will Cost Households £20,000

    Byline Times, 2026-04-16 · supports

    “A Reform UK spokesperson denied the criticisms and said their assumptions and methodology are “entirely defensible”.”Hide quote

    A Reform UK spokesperson denied the criticisms and said their assumptions and methodology are “entirely defensible”.

65. EEA migration in the UK: final report

    Migration Advisory Committee, 2018-09 · supports

    “In terms of wages the existing evidence and the analysis we present in the report suggests that migration is not a major determinate of the wages of UK-born workers. We found some evidence suggesting that lower-skilled workers face a negative impact while higher-skilled workers benefit, however the magnitude of the impacts are generally small.”Hide quote

    In terms of wages the existing evidence and the analysis we present in the report suggests that migration is not a major determinate of the wages of UK-born workers. We found some evidence suggesting that lower-skilled workers face a negative impact while higher-skilled workers benefit, however the magnitude of the impacts are generally small.

66. EEA migration in the UK: final report, paragraph 1.39

    Migration Advisory Committee, 2018-09 · supports

    “Given the 6.7 percentage point increase in the EU-born working age population ratio between 1993 and 2017 the implied total effect on UK-born nominal wages of EU immigration is of the order of a 5.2 per cent reduction to the 5th percentile a 4.9 per cent reduction at the 10th percentile, a 1.6 per cent reduction to the 25th percentile, a 1.6 per cent increase at the median, a 2.2 per cent increase at the 75th percentile and a 4.4 and 3.1 per cent increase at the 90th and 95th percentiles respectively. As previously stated this type exercise should be interpreted with caution as the model only estimates the short-run response to migration.”Hide quote

    Given the 6.7 percentage point increase in the EU-born working age population ratio between 1993 and 2017 the implied total effect on UK-born nominal wages of EU immigration is of the order of a 5.2 per cent reduction to the 5th percentile a 4.9 per cent reduction at the 10th percentile, a 1.6 per cent reduction to the 25th percentile, a 1.6 per cent increase at the median, a 2.2 per cent increase at the 75th percentile and a 4.4 and 3.1 per cent increase at the 90th and 95th percentiles respectively. As previously stated this type exercise should be interpreted with caution as the model only estimates the short-run response to migration.

67. EEA migration in the UK: final report, paragraph 1.33

    Migration Advisory Committee, 2018-09 · supports

    “The 2015 paper estimated that a 10 percentage point rise in the proportion of migrants in this occupation group leads to a 1.9 per cent reduction in pay, compared to the earlier estimate of a 5.2 per cent fall.”Hide quote

    The 2015 paper estimated that a 10 percentage point rise in the proportion of migrants in this occupation group leads to a 1.9 per cent reduction in pay, compared to the earlier estimate of a 5.2 per cent fall.

68. The labour market effects of immigration

    The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-02-24 · supports

    “reduced the hourly wage of UK-born wage earners at the 5 th percentile (i.e. the lowest earners in the labour market) by around half of one pence per year. The gains for top earners were also small: 1.7p per year for people at the 90 th percentile of wage earners.”Hide quote

    reduced the hourly wage of UK-born wage earners at the 5 th percentile (i.e. the lowest earners in the labour market) by around half of one pence per year. The gains for top earners were also small: 1.7p per year for people at the 90 th percentile of wage earners.

69. The labour market effects of immigration

    The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-02-24 · supports

    “in low-wage service sector jobs, a 1 percentage point rise in the share of migrants reduced average wages in that occupation by about 0.2%.”Hide quote

    in low-wage service sector jobs, a 1 percentage point rise in the share of migrants reduced average wages in that occupation by about 0.2%.

70. The labour market effects of immigration

    The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-02-24 · complicates

    “To our knowledge, there are not yet any similar studies on the impacts of post-Brexit migration.”Hide quote

    To our knowledge, there are not yet any similar studies on the impacts of post-Brexit migration.

71. The labour market effects of immigration

    The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-02-24 · complicates

    “one study concludes that the main impact of increased immigration from 1975 to 2005 was on the wages of migrants already in the UK.”Hide quote

    one study concludes that the main impact of increased immigration from 1975 to 2005 was on the wages of migrants already in the UK.

72. OfS warns against persistent over-optimism as analysis finds institutions under continued financial pressure

    Office for Students, 2026-05-14 · supports

    “Data published today shows that more than a third (35.8 per cent) of institutions reported a deficit for 2024-25. While this is lower than expected, this figure is forecast to rise to four in ten institutions (42.7 per cent) for 2025-26.”Hide quote

    Data published today shows that more than a third (35.8 per cent) of institutions reported a deficit for 2024-25. While this is lower than expected, this figure is forecast to rise to four in ten institutions (42.7 per cent) for 2025-26.

73. OfS warns against persistent over-optimism as analysis finds institutions under continued financial pressure

    Office for Students, 2026-05-14 · complicates

    “As well as general recruitment challenges, the report identifies other risks that have persisted for a number of years, such as an overreliance on fee income from international students.”Hide quote

    As well as general recruitment challenges, the report identifies other risks that have persisted for a number of years, such as an overreliance on fee income from international students.

74. DT031 Table 6 – Tuition fees and education contracts analysed by HE provider, domicile, mode, level, source, 2024/25 (Total row; £000s; columns: Home, Rest of UK, Total UK, EU, UK and EU, Non-EU, Total Non-UK, Total HE course fees, …)

    HESA / Office for Students, 2026 · supports

    “"","Total","","784,383","638,072","14,364,460","106,136","1,528,591","1,664,067","10,626,703","26,761,366","433,859","942,152","143,485","28,280,862","438,145"”Hide quote

    "","Total","","784,383","638,072","14,364,460","106,136","1,528,591","1,664,067","10,626,703","26,761,366","433,859","942,152","143,485","28,280,862","438,145"

75. Job Creators 2025

    The Entrepreneurs Network, 2025 · supports

    “Our latest analysis reveals that 54 of the UK’s 100 fastest-growing companies have a foreign-born founder or co-founder.”Hide quote

    Our latest analysis reveals that 54 of the UK’s 100 fastest-growing companies have a foreign-born founder or co-founder.

76. Job Creators 2025

    The Entrepreneurs Network, 2025 · supports

    “Among the 219 founders and co-founders behind this year’s companies, 91 – or 42% – were born overseas.”Hide quote

    Among the 219 founders and co-founders behind this year’s companies, 91 – or 42% – were born overseas.

77. Job Creators 2025

    The Entrepreneurs Network, 2025 · complicates

    “Nevertheless, Migration Observatory analysis of the latest census and Annual Population Survey data shows that the foreign-born population of the United Kingdom stood at around 16% in 2023.”Hide quote

    Nevertheless, Migration Observatory analysis of the latest census and Annual Population Survey data shows that the foreign-born population of the United Kingdom stood at around 16% in 2023.

78. Job Creators 2025

    The Entrepreneurs Network, 2025 · complicates

    “we established a list of the 100 companies which had experienced the greatest growth in reaching a valuation observed between June 2024 and the end of May 2025.”Hide quote

    we established a list of the 100 companies which had experienced the greatest growth in reaching a valuation observed between June 2024 and the end of May 2025.

79. Gross domestic product (Average) per head, CVM market prices (reference year = 2023), series IHXW, dataset PN2

    Office for National Statistics, 2026-08-13 · supports

    “"Title","Gross domestic product (Average) per head, CVM market prices (reference year = 2023) £: SA"”Hide quote

    "Title","Gross domestic product (Average) per head, CVM market prices (reference year = 2023) £: SA"

80. Gross Domestic Product: chained volume measures: Seasonally adjusted £m, series ABMI, dataset PN2

    Office for National Statistics, 2026-08-13 · supports

    “"Title","Gross Domestic Product: chained volume measures: Seasonally adjusted £m"”Hide quote

    "Title","Gross Domestic Product: chained volume measures: Seasonally adjusted £m"

81. World Development Indicators: GDP per capita (constant 2015 US$), NY.GDP.PCAP.KD, G7 countries

    World Bank, 2026-10-08 · supports

    “GDP per capita (constant 2015 US$)”Hide quote

    GDP per capita (constant 2015 US$)