Immigration, the Economy and the Public Finances
GDP per head has barely grown since 2019, and migration's effect on the public finances depends on who comes: skilled workers are a large gain, care workers a cost. [1][6][8][17][21][22][62][55][57]
GDP per head
Real gross domestic product divided by the UK population, at 2023 prices, for every year the ONS series publishes. It is output per person, not income per person or how that output is shared.
£ per person, 2023 prices, by year
Real gross domestic product divided by the UK population, at 2023 prices, for every year the ONS series publishes. It is output per person, not income per person or how that output is shared. Read as GDP per head: £ per person, 2023 prices. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- UK GDP per head
Source: Office for National Statistics [79]
Observations 2
GDP per head has barely grown since 2019
In pounds per person at 2023 prices, UK GDP per head was 40,125 in 2019 and 40,546 in 2025. It fell to 36,033 in 2020, recovered to 40,554 in 2022, then slipped to 40,126 in 2023 and 40,153 in 2024. Between 2007 and 2019 it had risen from 37,625 to 40,125, with the 2009 recession in between. 1
The series shows timing, not cause
The 2019–2025 window contains the 2020 pandemic fall in output as well as other shocks. A series of GDP per head cannot by itself say how much of the stall, if any, is due to migration; that needs a model, and the OBR's scenarios are further down. No study attributing the stall among its causes was found. 1 8
About this data
Full published range: 1955–2025. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – The ONS annual series IHXW starts in 1955 (earlier cells are blank or zero) and ends in 2025; quarterly values run to 2026 Q2. Values are from the release of 13 August 2026, the latest the ONS series page returned on 29 October 2026.
Total GDP
Real gross domestic product for the whole economy at 2023 prices, in £ billion. Shown beside GDP per head because a larger population raises total output even when output per person does not change.
£ billion, 2023 prices, by year
Real gross domestic product for the whole economy at 2023 prices, in £ billion. Shown beside GDP per head because a larger population raises total output even when output per person does not change. Read as total GDP: £ billion, 2023 prices. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- UK GDP
Source: Office for National Statistics [80]
Observations 1
Total GDP kept growing while GDP per head stalled
About this data
Full published range: 1948–2025. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – ONS series ABMI, chained volume measure, published in £ million and shown here divided by 1,000. The annual series starts in 1948. Release of 13 August 2026.
GDP per head, G7
Real GDP per person in each G7 country, in US dollars at 2015 prices and market exchange rates, from the World Bank. All seven G7 members are shown; the UK is the subject.
US$ per person, 2015 prices, by year
Real GDP per person in each G7 country, in US dollars at 2015 prices and market exchange rates, from the World Bank. All seven G7 members are shown; the UK is the subject. Read as GDP per head, G7: US$ per person, 2015 prices. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- United Kingdom
- United States
- Germany
- France
- Italy
- Japan
- Canada
Source: World Bank [81]
Observations 1
Read changes within each country, not levels across them
The World Bank series uses market exchange rates, so the gaps between countries' levels move with currencies. The ranking of growth since 2019 is in the bar chart below. 81
About this data
Full published range: 1960–2025. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – World Bank World Development Indicators, NY.GDP.PCAP.KD, last updated 8 October 2026. The series starts in 1960 for all seven countries. Market exchange rates, not purchasing-power parities, so levels across countries are only roughly comparable; changes within a country are the more reliable reading.
Change in GDP per head, 2019 to 2025, G7
Cumulative change in real GDP per person between 2019 and 2025, all seven G7 countries, ranked. The UK is highlighted.
% change in GDP per head, 2019–2025
- United States11.3%
- Italy7.9%
- Japan4.8%
- France3.1%
- United Kingdom1.2%
- Canada0.7%
- Germany−0.2%
Source: World Bank [81]
Observations 1
The UK was fifth of the seven G7 countries for growth in GDP per head after 2019
On the World Bank series, GDP per head rose more between 2019 and 2025 in the United States, Italy, Japan and France than in the UK; Canada grew less and Germany shrank slightly. The UK's stall was shared by other large economies, so on its own it is not evidence about migration. Net migration per head for these countries over the same years is not shown here (see Data still needed). 81
About this data
Derived from the World Bank series charted above: 2025 value divided by 2019 value, minus one. Not published as a growth rate by the World Bank. Net migration per head over the same years is not shown here.
OBR: GDP per person if net migration were 200,000 a year higher
Difference from the OBR central forecast in 2028-29, March 2024 scenarios. The lower-migration scenario is the mirror image.
GDP per person, % difference from central forecast
- Migrants work like residents; nearly all adults on work visas (about 90% participation)0.8%
- Migrants as productive as residents; capital keeps pace0%
- Capital stock does not adjust−0.4%
Source: Office for Budget Responsibility [3]; Office for Budget Responsibility [4]; Office for Budget Responsibility [5]
Observations 2
The OBR finds the per-head effect small and of uncertain sign
In the OBR's March 2024 scenarios, 200,000 more net migrants a year leave GDP per person "largely unchanged" if they are as productive as residents, 0.4 per cent lower if the capital stock does not adjust, and 0.8 per cent higher if nearly all adults arrive on work visas. The lower-migration scenario is the mirror image. 3 4 5
In March 2026 the OBR summarised the literature: the effects on real GDP per person "are relatively small in either a positive or negative direction". It adds that migration is likely to raise participation, because migrants are younger, but that the effect on productivity "is much more uncertain". 8 11
March 2026: a lower migration forecast left output per person unchanged
After the ONS revised up emigration by British nationals, the OBR cut its net migration forecast by around 60,000 people a year, lowering the adult population in 2030 by around 200,000. Because the extra emigrants were assumed to be younger and lower-paid, the change left potential output per person "broadly unchanged". 9 10
About this data
The OBR describes the first case as "largely unchanged" and gives no number; it is plotted at zero. All three cases assume net migration 200,000 a year higher, settling at 515,000 in 2028-29.
OBR: total GDP if net migration were 200,000 a year higher
Difference from the OBR central forecast in 2028-29, same three cases, March 2024.
Total GDP, % difference from central forecast
- Nearly all adults on work visas (about 90% participation)2.2%
- Migrants as productive as residents; capital keeps pace1.5%
- Capital stock does not adjust1%
Source: Office for Budget Responsibility [3]; Office for Budget Responsibility [4]; Office for Budget Responsibility [5]
OBR: borrowing in 2028-29 under higher or lower net migration
Change in public sector net borrowing against the central forecast, March 2024 scenarios with net migration 200,000 a year higher or lower. Negative means less borrowing.
Change in borrowing in 2028-29
- Lower migration, spending left as planned£19,900,000,000
- Lower migration, spending per person held£13,100,000,000
- Higher migration, spending per person held−£13,100,000,000
- Higher migration, spending left as planned−£19,900,000,000
Source: Office for Budget Responsibility [6]; Office for Budget Responsibility [7]
Observations 3
Lower migration raises borrowing in the OBR's five-year scenarios
With departmental spending left as planned, 200,000 more net migrants a year cut borrowing in 2028-29 by £19.9 billion, and 200,000 fewer raise it by the same amount. If spending is raised to keep services per person unchanged — about £6.1 billion extra in the higher scenario — the effect is £13.1 billion either way. 6 7
The five-year window leaves out later costs
The Migration Observatory notes that short-term forecasts "are particularly likely to find a positive impact from migration, because they do not account for the costs that come later as migrants age". Over fifty years the OBR's 2023 projection had higher net migration lowering the primary deficit by 1.1% of GDP by 2072/73, without stopping debt rising towards 300 percent of GDP. In 2013 the OBR described higher migration as "delaying some of the fiscal challenges of an ageing population rather than a way of resolving them permanently". 12 13 14
In its 2024 long-run scenarios, a shorter average stay lowered debt by about 23 per cent of GDP by 2073-74 and higher migrant earnings by about 40 per cent of GDP; in neither case did debt stop rising. Migrants earning half the average instead raised debt to 351 per cent of GDP, 76 per cent of GDP above the baseline. 35 36
An independent forecaster puts a similar figure on lower migration
Oxford Economics, expecting net migration to stay low, estimated in February 2026 that if the OBR followed its forecast, borrowing would be £19bn (0.5% of GDP) higher. That is a private forecast, not an OBR figure. 15
About this data
Two spending assumptions: departmental spending left as planned, or raised to keep spending per person unchanged (about £6.1 billion extra in the higher scenario). Five-year horizon only; later pension and health costs of an ageing cohort fall outside it.
Modelled lifetime net fiscal contribution, by visa route and against UK residents
Present value of taxes paid minus public spending received over the rest of each person's life, from 2022/23. Migrant groups are the 2022/23 Skilled Worker and Partner-route cohorts; UK resident rows are the MAC's comparators.
Mean lifetime net contribution per person (present value)
- Skilled Worker main applicants (outside health and care)£689,000
- Other health and care occupations (mainly nurses and doctors)£166,000
- Age-matched UK resident (comparator, mean)£117,000
- Health and Care main applicants (all)£54,000
- Skilled Worker adult dependants£3,000
- Care workers (Health and Care visa)−£36,000
- All UK residents (comparator, mean)−£39,000
- Health and Care adult dependants−£67,000
- Partner route (2022/23 cohort)−£109,000
- All UK residents (comparator, median)−£145,000
Source: Migration Advisory Committee [18]; Migration Advisory Committee [21]; Migration Advisory Committee [20]; Migration Advisory Committee [22]; Migration Advisory Committee [23]; Migration Advisory Committee [28]
Observations 5
Skilled Workers are a large net gain; care workers and Health and Care dependants are net costs
The Migration Advisory Committee models the 329,200 people who arrived on the Skilled Worker route in 2022/23, including Health and Care visas and dependants, at a net £47.1bn over their lifetimes, or +£143,000 each. Main applicants outside health and care average +£689,000; Health and Care main applicants +£54,000, split between care workers at −£36,000 and other health and care occupations at +£166,000. Adult dependants average +£3,000 on the Skilled Worker route and −£67,000 on the Health and Care route. 17 18 20 21 22
The MAC calls the route "clearly fiscally positive", which it says is "almost inevitable" given the salary thresholds. 16
The average UK resident is a lifetime net cost too
On the same method the whole UK resident population has a mean lifetime contribution of −£39,000 and a median of −£145,000. Residents with the same starting ages as Skilled Worker main applicants average +£117,000 (median −£47,000). Care workers are "broadly similar to the UK median for the age group". Health and Care dependants fall short of their own age-matched comparator of +£84,000. 23 21 22
Partners of British citizens and settled residents arriving on the Partner route in 2022/23 are modelled at −£109,000 each. 28
Most of the gain comes from top earners and from those who stay
The top 10% of earners outside health and care (salary at least £131,000) account for 39% of that group's contribution. Main applicants who stay are modelled at +£931,000 and those who leave at +£174,000. The MAC concludes that for lower earners temporary migration is fiscally better than permanent, and for higher earners the reverse. 24 19 27
Discounting can change the sign
The MAC uses a 3.0% real discount rate, "broadly in line with HMT Green Book". Without discounting, the future contribution of a 25-year-old UK resident would be −£186,000 rather than +£184,000, because old-age costs fall late in life. Any lifetime figure has to state its discount rate to be compared with another. 26 25
Most routes have not been modelled
The MAC has not estimated lifetime effects for refugees, students or other routes; the Migration Observatory expects refugees to be more negative because of lower employment and greater need for support. 29
About this data
MAC baseline: 3.0% real discount rate and 1.8% real growth in taxes and spending. "Age-matched UK resident" has the same starting-age mix as Skilled Worker main applicants outside health and care. The Partner route (partners of British citizens and settled residents) comes from the MAC annual report. Students, Graduate route, refugees and other family routes have not been modelled. All values are means except the UK resident median, shown because most residents are below the mean.
OBR: cumulative fiscal impact by age 66
Stylised OBR profiles: a migrant worker arriving at 25 on three wage levels, and a representative UK resident counted from birth, cumulative to age 66. Not discounted.
Cumulative taxes minus spending to age 66
- High-wage migrant (30% above average pay)£1,247,000
- Average-wage migrant£722,000
- Representative UK resident£309,000
- Low-wage migrant (half of average pay)−£198,000
Source: Office for Budget Responsibility [37]; Office for Budget Responsibility [30]; Office for Budget Responsibility [33]
Observations 1
Earnings and age at arrival decide the result
In the OBR's stylised profiles, a migrant arriving at 25 on average pay is a net contributor "by their second year", while a resident of the same age becomes one only in their 40s, because the migrant's childhood education and health were paid for elsewhere. A migrant earning 30 per cent above average stays a net benefit even living to 100; one on half the average falls behind the average resident in their early 40s. 30 31 32
About this data
Read from the OBR's published chart data (sheet C4.13, as corrected on 14 November 2024), in £ thousand and rounded here to the nearest £1,000. Cumulative tax paid minus public spending received, from birth for the resident and from arrival at 25 for the migrants. The migrant lines include visa fees and the health surcharge, no welfare for five years, and £20,000 of public investment per arrival; they exclude dependants. The OBR presents this as a stylised illustration, not a forecast for any real cohort.
OBR: cumulative fiscal impact by age 82
Stylised OBR profiles: a migrant worker arriving at 25 on three wage levels, and a representative UK resident counted from birth, cumulative to age 82. Not discounted.
Cumulative taxes minus spending to age 82
- High-wage migrant (30% above average pay)£1,010,000
- Average-wage migrant£405,000
- Representative UK resident−£7,000
- Low-wage migrant (half of average pay)−£653,000
Source: Office for Budget Responsibility [37]; Office for Budget Responsibility [30]; Office for Budget Responsibility [33]
About this data
Read from the OBR's published chart data (sheet C4.13, as corrected on 14 November 2024), in £ thousand and rounded here to the nearest £1,000. Cumulative tax paid minus public spending received, from birth for the resident and from arrival at 25 for the migrants. The migrant lines include visa fees and the health surcharge, no welfare for five years, and £20,000 of public investment per arrival; they exclude dependants. The OBR presents this as a stylised illustration, not a forecast for any real cohort.
OBR: cumulative fiscal impact by age 100
Stylised OBR profiles: a migrant worker arriving at 25 on three wage levels, and a representative UK resident counted from birth, cumulative to age 100. Not discounted.
Cumulative taxes minus spending to age 100
- High-wage migrant (30% above average pay)£252,000
- Average-wage migrant−£405,000
- Representative UK resident−£818,000
- Low-wage migrant (half of average pay)−£1,555,000
Source: Office for Budget Responsibility [37]; Office for Budget Responsibility [30]; Office for Budget Responsibility [33]
Observations 1
Old age reverses most of the gains
Every line falls after state pension age as health, care and pension costs mount. The correction of November 2024 made the low-wage migrant "significantly less fiscally beneficial, and substantially so at older ages". The OBR's representative migrant has no dependants; the OBR says it chose "a more typical migrant on a work visa and no dependants". 33 34 37
About this data
Read from the OBR's published chart data (sheet C4.13, as corrected on 14 November 2024), in £ thousand and rounded here to the nearest £1,000. Cumulative tax paid minus public spending received, from birth for the resident and from arrival at 25 for the migrants. The migrant lines include visa fees and the health surcharge, no welfare for five years, and £20,000 of public investment per arrival; they exclude dependants. The OBR presents this as a stylised illustration, not a forecast for any real cohort.
Median earnings by visa route, 2023/24
Median annual adjusted PAYE earnings in financial year 2023/24 of people granted entry clearance visas from April 2019 to March 2023, aged 18–65, with the UK full-time median beside them for reference.
Median annual earnings
- Skilled Worker main applicants£56,600
- Senior or Specialist Worker main applicants£47,900
- UK full-time employees (ASHE, reference)£37,430
- Health and Care main applicants£30,900
- Skilled Worker dependants£30,200
- Senior care workers£25,800
- Care workers and home carers£23,100
- Health and Care dependants£22,100
- Family-route visa holders£20,200
Source: Home Office [38]; Home Office [39]; Home Office [40]; Office for National Statistics [43]
Observations 2
Earnings differ widely by route
In 2023/24 median annual earnings were £56,600 for Skilled Worker main applicants, £47,900 for Senior or Specialist Workers and £30,900 for Health and Care main applicants; care workers and home carers earned £23,100. Dependants earned £30,200 (Skilled Worker) and £22,100 (Health and Care); family-route visa holders £20,200. The ONS median for full-time employees was £37,430 in April 2024, a different measure shown only for reference. 38 39 40 43
At least 75% of Skilled Worker main applicants and at least 45% of their dependants had PAYE earnings; the Home Office counts these as minimums because self-employment is not included. It also advises caution in comparing routes, because work eligibility differs. 41 42
Recent non-EU cohorts caught up quickly; the 2024 and 2025 cohorts started lower
HMRC payroll data show each non-EU cohort from 2021 to 2023 earning around 95% of the UK median after one full year, falling to 90% for the 2024 cohort. The 2021 and 2023 entrants passed the overall median within two years; 2015 entrants took about six. Entry-year pay fell sharply in 2025. The Migration Observatory says faster catch-up may reflect lower earners leaving the payroll, and the data mix full-time and part-time work. 44 45 46 47
Of non-EU migrants first on payroll in 2015, 60% were still there in 2025; of EU migrants, 45%. These data are by nationality, not by visa route. 48
About this data
Home Office–HMRC linked data, 93% of records matched. "Adjusted" scales part-year earnings to a full year; part-time work is included, and self-employment is not. The UK figure is the ONS ASHE median for full-time employees in April 2024, a different measure, shown only as a reference point. Care workers and senior care workers are occupations within the Health and Care route.
Implied effect of EU immigration on UK-born wages, 1993–2017, by wage level
MAC update of Dustmann, Frattini and Preston: the total effect implied by the 6.7-point rise in the EU-born share of the working-age population, at each point of the UK-born wage distribution. Ordered from lowest to highest paid.
% change in UK-born nominal wages
- 5th percentile (lowest paid)−5.2%
- 10th percentile−4.9%
- 25th percentile−1.6%
- Median1.6%
- 75th percentile2.2%
- 90th percentile4.4%
- 95th percentile (highest paid)3.1%
Source: Migration Advisory Committee [66]
Observations 2
Average wage effects are small; slightly negative at the bottom, positive further up
The MAC found migration "is not a major determinate of the wages of UK-born workers", with some evidence of a negative effect on lower-skilled and a positive one on higher-skilled workers. Its update implies EU immigration over 1993–2017 lowered UK-born wages by 5.2 per cent at the 5th percentile and raised them by 1.6 per cent at the median and by 4.4 and 3.1 per cent at the 90th and 95th percentiles, as short-run estimates. 65 66
Expressed per year, a 2022 study found immigration over 1994–2016 cut the hourly wage at the 5th percentile by about half a penny a year and raised it by 1.7p a year at the 90th. In low-wage service jobs, a one-point rise in the migrant share lowered average occupational wages by about 0.2%. An earlier estimate for semi- and unskilled services, a 1.9 per cent fall per 10-point rise, revised down an even earlier 5.2 per cent. 68 69 67
About this data
The MAC says this kind of exercise "should be interpreted with caution as the model only estimates the short-run response to migration". It covers EU free movement before 2018, not the post-Brexit system. Spread over 24 years, the effects are small per year.
Who pays UK universities' course fees, 2024/25
Higher-education course fees received by UK providers in 2024/25, by where the student is domiciled.
Course fee income, 2024/25
- Students domiciled in the UK£14,364,460,000 · 53.7%
- Students domiciled outside the UK£12,396,906,000 · 46.3%
Source: HESA / Office for Students [74]
Observations 2
A third of English universities are in deficit
About this data
HESA DT031 Table 6, total row, in £000s. Non-UK is the sum of the "Total Non-UK fees" column (providers that report only a UK/non-UK split) and the EU and non-EU columns (providers that report them separately); together with UK fees it equals the published total of HE course fees exactly. Excludes research training grants, non-credit-bearing courses and further education. Fees are not total income, so this is not a share of university income.
This collection covers what is measured about immigration's effect on output, on the public finances and on wages: GDP and GDP per head over time and across the G7, the OBR's migration scenarios, modelled lifetime fiscal contributions by visa route, earnings by route, the record of headline cost estimates, wage effects by pay level, universities' reliance on international fees, and founders of fast-growing firms. Fiscal figures are model estimates resting on stated assumptions; the assumptions are given beside each one.
Observations
The £234bn was withdrawn by its author
The Centre for Policy Studies' February 2025 report put "the lifetime net fiscal cost to the state" of settling recent migrants at £234 billion, or £8,200 per household. Its research page now says "the overall cost estimates should no longer be used" because the OBR fiscal data it relied on are disputed; its projections of how many will settle stand. 53 55 56
Full Fact found the figure was a net lifetime cost, not a benefits bill, and that the Daily Mail corrected an article describing it as benefits. 57
The CPS says the OBR revised its data after the report was published; the OBR's correction slip to its migrant profiles is dated 14 November 2024, before the report. Which revision the CPS means is not stated. 56 33
Reform UK's £622.5bn is undiscounted; its own discounted figure is £154bn
Reform UK's April 2026 report puts the lifetime cost of 2021–2025 arrivals expected to settle in 2026–2030 at £622.5 bn undiscounted and £154 bn discounted at 3.5%; the £20,000-per-household figure goes with the undiscounted total. It maps migrants onto ONS income quintiles as "a proxy", which it says "likely understates heterogeneity within groups". 58 59
Reform argues that discounting understates long-run costs. Madeleine Sumption (Migration Observatory) said the absence of discounting is "the main reason the headline figures are so high"; Jonathan Portes said Reform "invented their own numbers for migrant earnings" instead of using the MAC's HMRC data. Reform called its assumptions "entirely defensible". 60 61 63 64
There is no estimate for the whole post-Brexit system
The record of estimates, side by side
| Estimate | Covers | Figure | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| Centre for Policy Studies (2025) | Lifetime cost of settling recent migrants, from OBR profiles | £234 billion cost (£8,200 per household) | Withdrawn by the CPS |
| Reform UK (2026) | 2021–2025 arrivals settling in 2026–2030, to old age | £622.5 bn undiscounted; £154 bn discounted | Reform's own figures; method disputed |
| MAC (2025) | 2022/23 Skilled Worker cohort, lifetime, discounted | +£47.1bn | Current |
| MAC (2025) | 2022/23 Partner-route cohort, lifetime, discounted | −£109,000 per applicant | Current |
| Oxford Economics (2018) | One year, 2016/17: EEA, non-EEA, UK-born | +£4.7b, −£9.0b, −£41.4b | Static, pre-Brexit |
| Dustmann and Frattini (2014) | 1995–2011: EEA, non-EEA, UK-born | +£4.4b, −£118b, −£591b | Static, pre-Brexit |
| Migration Watch (2014) | 1995–2011: EEA, non-EEA, UK-born | −£13.6b, −£134.9b, −£565b | Static, pre-Brexit |
Static estimates count one period's taxes and spending; lifetime estimates project and discount. The two kinds are not comparable. 53 58 17 28 51 52
Observations
Foreign-born founders are over-represented among the fastest-growing firms
The Entrepreneurs Network found that 54 of the UK's 100 fastest-growing companies had a foreign-born founder or co-founder, and 91 of 219 founders (42%) were born overseas, against a foreign-born population of around 16%. The sample is 100 companies selected on valuation growth between June 2024 and May 2025; it says nothing about migrants on most visa routes. No UK measure of foreign-born inventors was found. 75 76 77 78
Related Data
Work and Study Visas and the Care Workforce
Work visas more than tripled to a 2023 peak and have since fallen most of the way back, driven above all by care workers. [1][2][3][5][14][21]
By route
Entry clearance visas issued for work, each calendar year, main applicants and dependants together, split into route families that add up to the total. Health and Care Worker is the route that took care workers from February 2022 until it closed to new overseas recruits in July 2025.
Work visas issued in the year, by year
Entry clearance visas issued for work, each calendar year, main applicants and dependants together, split into route families that add up to the total. Health and Care Worker is the route that took care workers from February 2022 until it closed to new overseas recruits in July 2025. Read as by route: Work visas issued in the year. Dashed segments cross 2 definitional breaks in the source, explained in Method Changes below this graph. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- All work visas
- Health and Care Worker
- Other sponsored work
- Temporary work
- Talent, innovator and entrepreneur
- Other work routes
Vertical dashed lines mark measurement changes. See method changes.
Source: Home Office [55]
Observations 3
Work visas more than doubled in two years and have fallen back most of the way
For the eleven years to mid-2021 there were fewer than 200,000 work visas a year, partly because EU nationals needed no visa while free movement lasted. Health and Care Worker and Skilled Worker visas drove the rise to 613,627 in 2023, and together made up 76% of work visas that year. 2 The total was 234,841 in the year to June 2026: 158,722 main applicants and 76,119 dependants. 1
The skill threshold was lowered in 2020 and raised again in July 2025
The post-Brexit system cut the skill threshold for a work visa from degree level (RQF 6) to A-level equivalent (RQF 3), opening sponsored visas to mid-skilled occupations; care workers were added to the Health and Care Worker route separately, in February 2022. 8 2 On 22 July 2025 the threshold went back to RQF 6, which the Migration Advisory Committee describes as ending the 2020 relaxation. 9
Talent, innovator and entrepreneur routes are a small slice and have not grown since 2023
These routes (Global Talent, High Potential Individual, Innovator Founder, Scale-up and their predecessors) were under one in twenty-five work visas in every year shown, and their number in 2025 was below 2023's. The chart counts visas applied for abroad only, so it misses people who switch onto these routes from inside the UK.
Method Changes
2008: Points-based system tiers begin
Home Office: "Prior to the Q3 2019 publication, each PBS visa type (Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 4 and Tier 5) included 'pre-PBS equivalent' visa types, which relate to non-PBS visas that were in place before the PBS was introduced. From Q3 2019, the non-PBS equivalent visas have been recategorised, and in the latest published data all Work non-PBS visas are included in the 'Other work visas and exemptions' visa type". Before the points-based tiers, every work visa therefore sits in "Other work routes". [55]
2021: EU nationals start needing work visas
Home Office: "During this time the UK was a member of the European Union (EU) and, as such, EU nationals did not require a visa to work in the UK due to freedom of movement." Free movement ended on 1 January 2021, so from 2021 the count covers EU workers too. [55]
Main applicants and dependants
Work visas issued in the year, by year
Entry clearance visas issued for work, each calendar year, main applicants and dependants together, split into route families that add up to the total. Health and Care Worker is the route that took care workers from February 2022 until it closed to new overseas recruits in July 2025. Read as main applicants and dependants: Work visas issued in the year. Dashed segments cross 2 definitional breaks in the source, explained in Method Changes below this graph. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- Main applicants
- Dependants
Vertical dashed lines mark measurement changes. See method changes.
Source: Home Office [55]
Observations 1
Dependants were close to half of work visas at the peak
The Migration Advisory Committee found that Health and Care Worker visa holders brought 1.21 dependants each between October 2022 and September 2023, against 0.77 for other Skilled Worker occupations: 173,900 dependants on that route in a year. 10 The dependant line fell after care workers lost the right to bring family in spring 2024, but more slowly than main applicants, because people recruited before the change could still bring family from abroad. In the year to June 2026, 79% of Health and Care Worker visas went to dependants. 4 13
Method Changes
2008: Points-based system tiers begin
Home Office: "Prior to the Q3 2019 publication, each PBS visa type (Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 4 and Tier 5) included 'pre-PBS equivalent' visa types, which relate to non-PBS visas that were in place before the PBS was introduced. From Q3 2019, the non-PBS equivalent visas have been recategorised, and in the latest published data all Work non-PBS visas are included in the 'Other work visas and exemptions' visa type". Before the points-based tiers, every work visa therefore sits in "Other work routes". [55]
2021: EU nationals start needing work visas
Home Office: "During this time the UK was a member of the European Union (EU) and, as such, EU nationals did not require a visa to work in the UK due to freedom of movement." Free movement ended on 1 January 2021, so from 2021 the count covers EU workers too. [55]
About this data
Full published range: 2005–2025. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – The Home Office detailed dataset runs from 2005 to the second quarter of 2026; the chart stops at the last complete calendar year. It counts visas applied for outside the UK only, so it leaves out in-country grants and switches between routes, including the Graduate route and most extensions. Route families are our grouping of the dataset’s visa types: "Talent, innovator and entrepreneur" is Global Talent, Tier 1 Exceptional Talent, High Potential Individual, Innovator Founder, Start-up, Tier 1 Entrepreneur, Tier 1 Graduate Entrepreneur and Scale-up; "Other sponsored work" is every other visa in the Worker category (Skilled Worker and Tier 2, intra-company transfers, Global Business Mobility, sportspeople and ministers of religion, including Tier 2 dependants); "Temporary work" is the Temporary Worker category (seasonal workers, youth mobility, creative and exchange schemes); "Other work routes" is everything else, including Tier 1 General and Post-Study Work, investors, UK Ancestry, overseas domestic workers and all pre-2008 work permits. The five families sum exactly to the total in every year.
By route
Health and Care Worker visas are zero before 2020 because the route opened in August 2020; health workers sponsored before then are in "Other sponsored work". Main applicants and dependants are counted together because the dataset assigns dependants on points-based routes to their main applicant’s route.
Main applicants and dependants
Health and Care Worker visas issued to people applying from abroad each quarter, main applicants and the dependants who came with or joined them. Care workers became eligible in February 2022; restrictions announced in December 2023, including a bar on care workers bringing dependants, took effect in spring 2024; the route closed to new overseas care recruits in July 2025.
Visas issued in the quarter, by quarter ending
Health and Care Worker visas issued to people applying from abroad each quarter, main applicants and the dependants who came with or joined them. Care workers became eligible in February 2022; restrictions announced in December 2023, including a bar on care workers bringing dependants, took effect in spring 2024; the route closed to new overseas care recruits in July 2025. Read as main applicants and dependants: Visas issued in the quarter. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- Main applicants
- Dependants
Source: Home Office [56]
Observations 1
Main applicants fell first; dependants followed after the spring 2024 rules
Main applicants on the route peaked in the third quarter of 2023 and dropped by four-fifths within two quarters. Dependants stayed high into early 2024, then fell by about two-thirds in the quarter after care workers lost the right to bring them. 13 The government's technical annex puts the 2023-to-2024 fall in the whole route at 68%, to 110,800, and attributes it to Home Office scrutiny of employers, compliance action and the spring 2024 dependant rule. 11
About this data
Full published range: 2020-12–2026-06. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – The route opened in August 2020 and its first grants fall in the last quarter of 2020; the dataset runs to the second quarter of 2026. Figures from the first quarter of 2026 are provisional.
By occupation
Entry clearance grants to sponsored work main applicants each quarter, for the three health and care occupation groups, with every sponsored occupation shown for scale. Dependants are not included, because the dataset records occupation only for the person sponsored.
Main applicants granted visas in the quarter, by quarter ending
Entry clearance grants to sponsored work main applicants each quarter, for the three health and care occupation groups, with every sponsored occupation shown for scale. Dependants are not included, because the dataset records occupation only for the person sponsored. Read as by occupation: Main applicants granted visas in the quarter. Dashed segments cross 1 definitional break in the source, explained in Method Changes below this graph. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- All sponsored occupations
- Care workers and senior care workers
- Nurses
- Doctors
Vertical dashed lines mark measurement changes. See method changes.
Source: Home Office [57]
Observations 2
Care-worker visas collapsed in late 2023 and early 2024, long before the 2025 closure
Grants to sponsored care workers fell by about nine-tenths between the third quarter of 2023 and the first quarter of 2024. The Home Office attributes the start of the fall to closer scrutiny of health and social care sponsors and compliance action against employers, before the 2024 rule changes took effect. 3 By the time the route closed to new overseas care recruits in July 2025, grants were already about a thousand a quarter; the government's own impact estimate for the closure was about 7,000 main applicants a year. 12 The Home Office summary nonetheless describes the fall from 107,772 to 344 as following "the end to overseas recruitment of care workers in July 2025". 5
Nurse recruitment from abroad fell almost as steeply
Health and Care Worker visas for nursing professionals fell 95%, from 22,858 to 1,125, between 2023 and the year to June 2026; the Department of Health and Social Care links this to the end of its centrally supported international recruitment programme and lower demand. Doctors fell less, and were 59% of the route's visas in the latest year. 6
Method Changes
2024-12: Recorded SOC 2020 codes replace modelled estimates
Home Office: "Data between Q1 2021 and Q3 2024 are modelled estimates, based on converting occupations under the Office for National Statistics' (ONS) Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) 2010 framework for classifying occupations, and converting these to occupations under the SOC 2020 framework." [57]
About this data
Full published range: 2021-03–2026-06. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – The occupation dataset starts in the first quarter of 2021 and runs to the second quarter of 2026; figures from 2026 are provisional. It covers only applications matched to a certificate of sponsorship, so totals are slightly below the visa dataset. "Care workers and senior care workers" is the SOC 2020 minor group 613, Caring Personal Services.
Vacancy rate
Three views of the adult social care workforce in England, each financial year: the vacancy rate, the nationality of the people filling posts, and how far care workers’ average pay sits above the legal minimum wage.
Vacant posts as a percentage of all posts, by financial year ending March
Three views of the adult social care workforce in England, each financial year: the vacancy rate, the nationality of the people filling posts, and how far care workers’ average pay sits above the legal minimum wage. Read as vacancy rate: Vacant posts as a percentage of all posts. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- All job roles
- Care workers and support workers
Source: Skills for Care [58]
Observations 3
Care vacancies fell from their 2021/22 peak to the lowest rate in the series
Skills for Care puts the 2021/22 vacancy rate at 10.4%, the highest since its records began in 2012/13, and the 2025/26 rate at 6.1%, one point below 2018/19. 14 It credits international recruitment with part of the fall, and changes in economic inactivity and fewer vacancies elsewhere in the economy with another part; it does not say how much each contributed. 16 17
Vacancies did not rise as overseas recruitment ran down
About 105,000 people arrived from abroad and started direct care jobs in 2023/24, 50,000 in 2024/25 and 30,000 in 2025/26. 13 19 Around 2,000 were recruited between April and June 2026, and the monthly vacancy rate stayed between 6.4% and 6.1% from March to August 2026. 18 15 That is under a year of data after the route closed, so the effect of the closure on vacancies is not yet known.
Employers that recruited abroad saw the largest fall in vacancies
The vacancy rate among employers with internationally recruited care staff fell from 9.9% in March 2022 to 5.6% in March 2026. 20
Nationality of the workforce
Percentage of filled posts, by financial year ending March
Three views of the adult social care workforce in England, each financial year: the vacancy rate, the nationality of the people filling posts, and how far care workers’ average pay sits above the legal minimum wage. Read as nationality of the workforce: Percentage of filled posts. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- British
- EU (non-British)
- Non-EU
Source: Skills for Care [59]
Observations 2
British-held care posts fell by about 130,000
Posts filled by British nationals fell from 85% of the workforce in 2020/21 to 67% in 2025/26, about 130,000 fewer posts, 40,000 of them in the last year. 21 Elsewhere in the same report, measured from 2021/22 across local authority and independent employers only, the fall is 83% to 65%, or about 107,000 posts. 22 Skills for Care attributes the decline to fewer British people starting care jobs, not to more of them leaving. 23 About 150,000 posts were held by people on Health and Care Worker visas in March 2026. 19
About this data
Full published range: 2017–2026. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – Each point is a financial year from April to March, labelled by the year it ends: 2026 is 2025/26. The statistical appendix publishes these trend tables from 2016/17 on the method revised in October 2026; earlier editions ran back to 2012/13 on the old method and are not joined on. Figures cover England only.
Vacancy rate
All sectors, from appendix table 3.12.2. The appendix was revised in October 2026 and gives a 2021/22 peak of 10.1% for all job roles; the main report’s text still quotes 10.4% for that year and 6.2% for 2025/26 in places. The chart uses the revised appendix.
Nationality of the workforce
All sectors and job roles, from appendix table 4.8.1, which publishes shares rounded to whole percentages. The three groups sum to 100% in every year.
Care worker pay above the minimum wage
Derived by us from appendix table 5.4.1: the independent-sector mean hourly rate for care workers and support workers, minus the National Minimum Wage or National Living Wage in force during the year, divided by that wage. The inputs run from £7.77 against £7.20 in 2016/17 to £12.84 against £12.21 in 2025/26. A mean, not the median the report quotes in its text.
Licences revoked
Licences to sponsor overseas workers or students that the Home Office revoked each calendar year, by route. A revoked sponsor can no longer employ or recruit people on that route.
Licences revoked in the year, by year
Licences to sponsor overseas workers or students that the Home Office revoked each calendar year, by route. A revoked sponsor can no longer employ or recruit people on that route. Read as licences revoked: Licences revoked in the year. Dashed segments cross 1 definitional break in the source, explained in Method Changes below this graph. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- Skilled Worker
- Temporary Worker
- Student
Vertical dashed lines mark measurement changes. See method changes.
Source: UK Visas and Immigration [61]
Observations 1
Revocations of sponsor licences are at a record number
The Home Office revoked 1,948 worker sponsor licences between July 2024 and June 2025, against 937 the year before and 261 and 247 in the two years before that. It names adult social care among the sectors with the most abuse, and gives underpayment, helping people get round the rules and failing to provide promised work as reasons. 27 28 The series records licences, not the workers employed, and has no sector or reason breakdown.
Method Changes
2016: Administrative revocations counted
Home Office: "Following a review of the definitions used in producing this data, there has been a change in the way this data is reported from Q2 2016. Figures now include administrative revocations and the suspension of a licence when an immediate revocation is completed. This means that these figures are not directly comparable to those published previously." [61]
About this data
Full published range: 2012–2025. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – The transparency table runs from the first quarter of 2012 to the second quarter of 2026; the chart sums complete calendar years. Licences covering several routes are counted under each. The table has no breakdown by sector, by reason, or by the number of workers each sponsor employed.
Registered sponsors
Organisations licensed to sponsor overseas workers or students at the end of each year, and Skilled Worker revocations in the year as a share of Skilled Worker sponsors.
Sponsors registered at the end of the year, by year
Organisations licensed to sponsor overseas workers or students at the end of each year, and Skilled Worker revocations in the year as a share of Skilled Worker sponsors. Read as registered sponsors: Sponsors registered at the end of the year. Dashed segments cross 1 definitional break in the source, explained in Method Changes below this graph. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- Skilled Worker
- Temporary Worker
- Student
Vertical dashed lines mark measurement changes. See method changes.
Source: UK Visas and Immigration [62]
Method Changes
2016: Administrative revocations counted
Home Office: "Following a review of the definitions used in producing this data, there has been a change in the way this data is reported from Q2 2016. Figures now include administrative revocations and the suspension of a licence when an immediate revocation is completed." [62]
Skilled Worker revocation rate
Licences revoked as % of registered sponsors, by year
Organisations licensed to sponsor overseas workers or students at the end of each year, and Skilled Worker revocations in the year as a share of Skilled Worker sponsors. Read as skilled Worker revocation rate: Licences revoked as % of registered sponsors. Dashed segments cross 1 definitional break in the source, explained in Method Changes below this graph. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- Skilled Worker
Vertical dashed lines mark measurement changes. See method changes.
Source: UK Visas and Immigration [62]
Observations 1
As a share of sponsors, revocations are back to their mid-2010s level, not a record
Registered Skilled Worker sponsors roughly quadrupled between 2019 and 2025. Measured against that larger base, revocations in 2025 were about the same share of sponsors as in 2014 to 2017, after very low rates during 2021 to 2023 while sponsor numbers were climbing fastest.
Method Changes
2016: Administrative revocations counted
Home Office: "Following a review of the definitions used in producing this data, there has been a change in the way this data is reported from Q2 2016. Figures now include administrative revocations and the suspension of a licence when an immediate revocation is completed." [62]
About this data
Full published range: 2014–2025. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – The sponsor register table starts in the first quarter of 2014; each point is the count at the end of the year. The revocation rate is derived by us: Skilled Worker licences revoked in the calendar year (table SC_01) divided by Skilled Worker sponsors registered at the end of that year (table SP_01).
New joiners by place of education
People joining the Nursing and Midwifery Council register for the first time each year to March, by whether they were educated in the UK or abroad.
People joining the register for the first time, by year ending March
People joining the Nursing and Midwifery Council register for the first time each year to March, by whether they were educated in the UK or abroad. Read as new joiners by place of education: People joining the register for the first time. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- Educated in the UK
- Educated abroad
Source: Nursing and Midwifery Council [64]
Observations 3
UK-trained nurses joining rose while overseas recruitment peaked
UK-educated joiners to the nursing register rose 11.9% in 2023-24 and 5.9% in 2024-25, while internationally educated joiners reached their 2023-24 peak and stayed high; internationally educated professionals were 49.4% of new joiners in 2023-24 and 26.4% in 2025-26. 29 30 The two counts moved together, which does not by itself show whether one affects the other.
Then both fell
In 2025-26, 10,961 internationally educated professionals joined, against 20,669 the year before, and UK-educated joiners fell 4.9% to 30,581. 30 Acceptances onto nursing degrees at English universities in 2025 were 18% below their 2021 peak. 32 Two of the three largest sources of international joiners, Nigeria and Ghana, are on the list of countries where active recruitment is barred under ethical codes. 31
Research on training predates the sponsored system
The Migration Advisory Committee's 2018 review found "no evidence that migration has had a negative impact on the training of the UK-born workforce" under EU free movement. 33 The 2025 white paper reads the recent period the other way, from the two trends moving in opposite directions rather than from a study. 34 The 2018 research covered EU free movement, before sponsorship and salary thresholds applied; see Immigration and Domestic Workforce Training.
About this data
Full published range: 2021–2026. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – The data tables publish six-month counts from the half-year to September 2020; each point sums the two halves of a year from April to March, so 2026 is April 2025 to March 2026. The sums reproduce the report’s own figures for the last two years.
About this data
Full published range: 2010-09–2025-06. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – The House of Commons Library tables give eight dates from September 2010 to June 2025, unevenly spaced; NHS Digital’s monthly series behind them could not be downloaded. Each value is 100 minus the Library’s "UK as % of known". Excludes GPs and social care. The share of staff with unknown nationality fell from about one in six in 2010 to about one in eighty in 2025, so early figures are less certain.
All claims by entry route
Everyone who claimed asylum each year, split by how they last came to be in the UK: an illegal entry route, a visa or other leave, or neither; and, for visa holders, which visa.
People claiming asylum in the year, by year
Everyone who claimed asylum each year, split by how they last came to be in the UK: an illegal entry route, a visa or other leave, or neither; and, for visa holders, which visa. Read as all claims by entry route: People claiming asylum in the year. Dashed segments cross 1 definitional break in the source, explained in Method Changes below this graph. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- Illegal entry routes
- Held a visa or other leave
- Other or unmatched
Vertical dashed lines mark measurement changes. See method changes.
Source: Home Office [66]
Observations 1
Two in five people claiming asylum had held a visa
Of 85,891 people who claimed asylum in the year to June 2026, 41% (34,999) had held a visa or other leave, slightly more than the 40% (33,949) who arrived by small boat. 50 51 52 The Home Office notes that the rise coincided with the rise in visa grants up to 2023, and that a claim can come long after the visa was granted, during or after the period of leave. 53
Method Changes
2020: Exact counts and work sub-routes begin
Home Office: "Figures for 2018 and 2019 have been rounded to the nearest 100, or nearest 10 for values under 100." Health and Care Worker and Graduate show zero before 2020 and 2021 because those routes did not yet exist. [66]
Claims by visa held
People claiming asylum in the year, by year
Everyone who claimed asylum each year, split by how they last came to be in the UK: an illegal entry route, a visa or other leave, or neither; and, for visa holders, which visa. Read as claims by visa held: People claiming asylum in the year. Dashed segments cross 1 definitional break in the source, explained in Method Changes below this graph. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- Study
- Visitor
- Health and Care Worker
- Graduate
- Other work
- Other leave
Vertical dashed lines mark measurement changes. See method changes.
Source: Home Office [66]
Observations 1
Graduate visa claims doubled as study-visa claims fell
In the year to June 2026, claims from people who last held a study visa fell 35% and claims from work-visa holders rose 16%; Graduate visa holders' claims more than doubled to 5,130 while claims from other work visas fell 9% to 9,021. 54 Each route's claims are a small fraction of the visas it issued; rough ratios are in About this data. The dataset records the last leave held, not how the person first entered.
Method Changes
2020: Exact counts and work sub-routes begin
Home Office: "Figures for 2018 and 2019 have been rounded to the nearest 100, or nearest 10 for values under 100." Health and Care Worker and Graduate show zero before 2020 and 2021 because those routes did not yet exist. [66]
About this data
Full published range: 2018–2025. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – The dataset runs from the first quarter of 2018 to the second quarter of 2026; the chart shows complete calendar years. It records the most recent leave held before the claim, so a student who switched to a work visa is counted under work. "Other work" is Skilled Worker, Seasonal Worker and every other work visa except Health and Care and Graduate; for 2018 and 2019 the Home Office gives only a work total. "Other leave" includes family visas and Electronic Travel Authorisations. Rough scale: claims from Health and Care Worker visa holders in 2024 were about 1% of the Health and Care visas issued in 2022 and 2023 together (first chart), and study-visa claims in 2024 were about 3% of the sponsored study visas issued in 2023; these are cross-year ratios of our own, not published rates.
Foreign-trained doctors across the OECD
Share of doctors who obtained their first medical degree abroad, 2023 or the latest year shown in brackets, every country the OECD reports. The UK is highlighted.
% of doctors trained abroad
- Israel58.5%
- Norway44%
- Ireland43.4%
- New Zealand42.4%
- Switzerland40.3%
- United Kingdom (England and Wales)38.3%
- Australia31.4%
- Sweden (2022)28.4%
- United States (2016)25%
- Chile24.9%
- Canada24.6%
- Greece22%
- OECD average (28 countries)19.6%
- Slovenia15.4%
- Germany15%
- Finland (2022)14.1%
- Belgium14%
- Denmark11.7%
- France11%
- Hungary8.3%
- Czechia8.2%
- Austria7.5%
- Latvia6.7%
- Colombia5.1%
- Estonia4.5%
- Netherlands3.8%
- Poland (2022)3.8%
- Italy1%
- Lithuania0.8%
Source: OECD [38]
Observations 1
The UK relies on foreign-trained doctors more than most OECD countries
The UK (England and Wales) has the sixth-highest share of foreign-trained doctors among the 28 countries the OECD reports, about twice the OECD average of 20%. 38 It admitted more foreign-trained doctors in 2023 than in any earlier year on record. 39 Across the OECD, domestically trained doctors still made up most of the growth in physician numbers between 2010 and 2023. 40
About this data
OECD Health Statistics 2025, Figure 8.23 workbook (stat.link/cuf5an). UK data cover England and Wales only. Germany counts foreign nationals rather than foreign-trained doctors, and some registries include licensed doctors who are not working, which the OECD names as the main comparability limit. The OECD average is the unweighted mean of the 28 countries with data in both years.
Foreign-trained nurses across the OECD
Share of nurses who obtained their first nursing degree abroad, 2023 or the latest year shown in brackets, every country the OECD reports. The UK is highlighted.
% of nurses trained abroad
- Ireland51.8%
- New Zealand33.1%
- Switzerland26.6%
- United Kingdom22.7%
- Australia17.9%
- Austria13.7%
- Israel11.4%
- Germany10.1%
- Canada10%
- OECD average (28 countries)8.8%
- United States (2024)6.8%
- Norway6.5%
- Italy5.2%
- Belgium4.6%
- Sweden (2022)3.7%
- Czechia3.5%
- France (2021)3.1%
- Latvia2.9%
- Denmark2.8%
- Slovenia2.1%
- Hungary1.9%
- Chile1.8%
- Netherlands1.5%
- Finland (2022)0.9%
- Greece0.9%
- Colombia0.6%
- Lithuania0.5%
- Poland (2022)0.4%
- Estonia0.2%
Source: OECD [41]
Observations 1
For nurses the UK is fourth, and foreign-trained nurses made up most of its growth
The OECD average share of foreign-trained nurses was 8.8% in 2023; the UK ranks fourth. 41 Foreign-trained nurses accounted for 83% of the increase in UK nurse numbers from 2010 to 2023. 42 Registries differ in whether they count only practising nurses, and Germany counts nationality instead of place of training. 43
About this data
OECD Health Statistics 2025, Figure 8.26 workbook (stat.link/op6rgz). Germany counts foreign nationals rather than foreign-trained nurses. The OECD average is the unweighted mean of 28 countries.
First-year earnings of Graduate route visa holders and UK graduates
Median annual earnings of people in work: Graduate route holders over their first year on the visa and in its last three months, against UK-domiciled first-degree graduates about 15 months after graduating.
Median annual earnings
- Graduate route, first year£21,000
- Graduate route, last three months of first year£24,240
- UK graduates, 15 months after graduating£26,000
Source: Migration Advisory Committee [44]; Migration Advisory Committee [45]
Observations 1
Graduate route holders earned less than UK graduates in their first year
The median Graduate visa holder in work earned £1,750 a month in the first year (£21,000 a year), rising to £2,020 a month (£24,240) in the last three months; UK graduates earned a median £26,000 about 15 months after graduating. 44 45 The MAC expected some gap because international graduates have less experience of the UK labour market. 45 19% earned at least £2,500 in their first full month, and 38% by the twelfth month. 46 These are first-year figures only; nothing published follows the same people further.
About this data
Migration Advisory Committee, from HMRC PAYE records for Graduate visa holders who started before April 2022, and the Graduate Outcomes survey for UK graduates of 2020/21. Annual figures are the MAC’s conversions of monthly medians. No later year has been published.
Jobs taken by people switching into sponsored work
Share in managerial, professional or associate professional and technical occupations: people switching to a sponsored work visa from the Graduate route, people switching straight from a student visa, and UK graduates.
% in graduate-level occupations
- UK graduates75%
- Switched from the Graduate route69%
- Switched straight from a student visa42%
Source: Migration Advisory Committee [47]
Observations 1
Graduate route switchers took graduate-level jobs at nearly the UK graduate rate; students who switched directly did not
69% of people who switched from the Graduate route to a sponsored work visa went into managerial, professional or associate professional jobs, against 75% of UK graduates and 42% of people who switched straight from a student visa. 47 49% of direct student switchers became care workers or senior care workers, against 20% of Graduate route switchers and 6% of UK graduates in the whole caring, leisure and other service group. 48 Students are also staying longer than they used to: 41% of the 2020 study cohort still held leave five years later, against 17% to 18% for the 2012 to 2016 cohorts; see Student Migration and Subsequent Residence. 49
About this data
Migration Advisory Committee, from corrected Home Office management information on switches made between July 2021 and December 2023.
Work visas issued to people coming from abroad rose to 613,627 in 2023 and fell to 234,841 in the year to June 2026, 62% below the peak. 2 1 Care workers account for most of both the rise and the fall: visas for caring occupations fell from 107,772 in 2023 to 344, and the fall began at the end of 2023, more than eighteen months before the route closed to new overseas recruits in July 2025. 5 3 In England's adult social care, the share of posts held by British nationals fell from 85% to 67% between 2020/21 and 2025/26, and the vacancy rate came down from its 2021/22 peak to 6.1%. 21 14
The report then follows the same workers into the NHS and nursing register, sets UK reliance on foreign-trained staff against every OECD country that reports it, and covers two questions about study and work routes: what Graduate route holders earn, and how many visa holders later claim asylum.
Subtleties
Fewer arrivals is not fewer visa holders
Every visa chart here counts people applying from abroad. Health and Care Worker extensions granted inside the UK rose 19% to 336,215 in the year to June 2026, as people who arrived in 2022 and 2023 renewed their leave. 7 The number of people holding these visas has therefore not fallen in step with new grants.
The care route's own data cannot measure exploitation
The Migration Advisory Committee reported exploitation on the route and tied it to low pay and visas linked to one employer, but this report found no official series that counts exploited workers by visa route, and licence revocations count employers rather than victims. 26 27 See Data still needed.
Immigration, Housing and Public Services
Migration drives about half of projected household growth but only a small part of rising house prices, and UK public investment has long lagged other rich countries. [1][3][8][26][29][32][39][43][46][48][40][41]
Net additional dwellings
The net change in England's housing stock each financial year (April to March): new homes, conversions and changes of use, minus demolitions. Each point is labelled by the year in which the financial year ends.
Net additional dwellings in the financial year, by financial year ending March
The net change in England's housing stock each financial year (April to March): new homes, conversions and changes of use, minus demolitions. Each point is labelled by the year in which the financial year ends. Read as net additional dwellings: Net additional dwellings in the financial year. Dashed segments cross 2 definitional breaks in the source, explained in Method Changes below this graph. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- Net additional dwellings
Vertical dashed lines mark measurement changes. See method changes.
Source: Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government [47]
Observations 2
Building has run below projected household growth
England added 208,600 net dwellings in 2024-25. The ONS projects an average of 242,000 additional households a year over 2022–2032, up from 158,000 a year in its 2018-based projections for the same period. 6 2 A household is not a dwelling — some homes stand empty or are second homes — so the two numbers are not an exact measure of shortfall, and the ONS says its projections are not a forecast of how many homes should be built. 5
Building peaked before migration did
Method Changes
2001: Local authority returns replace stock-estimate differences
MHCLG: "From 2000-01 all local authorities submitted data to the Department through the Housing Flows Reconciliation form. Figures from 1990-91 to 1999-2000 are annual differences from the Department’s Dwelling Stock Estimates Live Table 104." Earlier figures are also rounded to the nearest thousand. [47]
2012: Figures recalibrated to the 2021 Census
MHCLG: "Figures for 2011-12 to 2020-21 have been previously revised, as scheduled, to calibrate to the Census 2021 dwelling count." [47]
About this data
Full published range: 1992–2025. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – This is the whole of MHCLG's Table 1, which starts at 1991-92. The 2025-26 figure is due in November 2026. The chart shows homes, not households: for comparison, the ONS projects household growth of an average 242,000 a year in England over 2022–2032 (see the variant chart below). There is no annual series of past household growth on the same basis to draw beside it, so the projection is given as a number rather than as a line.
Annual change in average private rent
Annual change in the average private rent paid in the UK, covering new and existing tenancies, each month. Net migration peaked at 944,000 in the year to March 2023 and fell to 171,000 in 2025; that series is in the UK Immigration Trends data.
Change on the same month a year earlier, by month
Annual change in the average private rent paid in the UK, covering new and existing tenancies, each month. Net migration peaked at 944,000 in the year to March 2023 and fell to 171,000 in 2025; that series is in the UK Immigration Trends data. Read as annual change in average private rent: Change on the same month a year earlier. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- United Kingdom
Source: Office for National Statistics [48]
Observations 2
Rent growth fell from its 2024 peak as migration fell
Annual private rent growth peaked in March 2024 and stayed near that level through 2024, then fell through 2025 to 3.8% in the year to September 2026 — less than half its peak. Over roughly the same period net migration fell from 944,000 in the year to March 2023 to 171,000 in 2025. 26 28 Rent growth turned about a year after net migration did.
Subtleties
The timing does not isolate migration's effect
The two series moving together fits migration having pushed rents up, but the data do not separate it from other influences on rents over the same years. The Migration Observatory says research provides "limited insight into the magnitude" of migration's effect on private rents. 21
About this data
Full published range: 2016-01–2026-09. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – The Price Index of Private Rents starts in January 2015, so its annual change starts in January 2016. ONS publishes a chain-linked historical series back to 2005 but advises caution across the January 2015 method change, so it is not joined on. August and September 2026 are provisional. Values are rounded here to one decimal place.
Pupils by phase
Headcount of pupils at each January school census, by phase. Independent schools are not included.
Pupils on the January census, by January school census
Headcount of pupils at each January school census, by phase. Independent schools are not included. Read as pupils by phase: Pupils on the January census. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- All state-funded schools
- Primary
- Secondary
- Nursery, special and alternative provision
Source: Department for Education [49]
Observations 3
Pupil numbers are falling nationally
There were 112,200 fewer pupils in England's schools in January 2026 than a year earlier. DfE attributes the fall to fewer births since a 2012 peak and projects primary and secondary numbers to keep falling to 2030. 29 30 In the state-funded chart, primary numbers peaked in 2019 and the total in 2024.
GP numbers are rising
Patients per GP over time was not obtained
The number of GPs rising does not show that GPs kept pace with patients. Patients per GP varies by area, from 2,566 in North East London to 1,798 in Bristol, North Somerset and South Gloucestershire after adjusting for need. 34 The national trend in patients per GP is listed under data still needed.
Subtleties
English as an additional language is not a migration measure
21.6% of pupils have a first language other than English, but DfE says this is "not a measure of English language proficiency or a good proxy for recent immigration". 31
National totals can hide local pressure
A falling national roll does not rule out pressure in areas where migrants settle; no local figures were gathered. The MAC's 2018 review found no evidence that migration had reduced parental choice of school or UK-born children's attainment. 25
About this data
Full published range: 2016–2026. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – The data set published with the 2025/26 release covers 2015/16 to 2025/26 (census years 2016 to 2026). "Nursery, special and alternative provision" is the published state-funded total minus primary and secondary, and covers state-funded nursery, special and alternative provision schools and non-maintained special schools. The 112,200 fall quoted by DfE includes independent schools.
Completions by tenure
Gross new affordable homes (new build and acquisitions) each financial year, and the social rent homes among them. Losses through Right to Buy and demolition are not subtracted. Labelled by the year in which the financial year ends.
Homes completed or acquired in the financial year, by financial year ending March
Gross new affordable homes (new build and acquisitions) each financial year, and the social rent homes among them. Losses through Right to Buy and demolition are not subtracted. Labelled by the year in which the financial year ends. Read as completions by tenure: Homes completed or acquired in the financial year. Dashed segments cross 1 definitional break in the source, explained in Method Changes below this graph. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- All affordable homes
- Social rent
Vertical dashed lines mark measurement changes. See method changes.
Source: Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government [50]
Observations 2
Method Changes
2012: Affordable rent introduced
MHCLG: "Up to 2011-12, social rent was the most common affordable housing tenure for new supply, but affordable rent has become the most common since 2023-14, following its introduction in 2011-12." [50]
About this data
Full published range: 1992–2025. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – Live Table 1000 as revised on 25 June 2026, which starts at 1991-92. The revision raised 2024-25 social rent completions from the 12,198 in the November 2025 release to 12,267. From 2020-21, some London Affordable Rent homes that cannot be separated are counted as social rent. Affordable rent, a tenure at up to about 80% of market rent, was introduced in 2011-12 and is in the total but has no line of its own here because it has no earlier values.
Real funding per pupil, change since 2010-11
Revenue funding for 5–16 year olds in state-funded schools per pupil, after inflation (GDP deflator, 2025-26 prices), shown as the change since 2010-11. Labelled by the year in which the financial year ends.
Cumulative change since 2010-11, 2025-26 prices, by financial year ending March
Revenue funding for 5–16 year olds in state-funded schools per pupil, after inflation (GDP deflator, 2025-26 prices), shown as the change since 2010-11. Labelled by the year in which the financial year ends. Read as real funding per pupil, change since 2010-11: Cumulative change since 2010-11, 2025-26 prices. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- Funding per pupil
Source: Department for Education [51]
Observations 2
Day-to-day spending per head is above its 2010 level, after a dip in schools
Real school funding per pupil was flat at around £7,700 from 2010-11 to 2015-16, fell 3.6% to 2018-19, then rose, to £8,390 in 2026-27 in 2025-26 prices. 46 Real health spending per person was almost £3,500 in 2022, almost double its level at the turn of the century, though still below the average of 19 advanced economies. 43
Lower migration raises spending per person
The OBR projects real day-to-day departmental spending per person to reach its highest level in two decades outside the pandemic, around £7,800 in 2028-29. It attributes the rise from about £7,700 in the June 2025 Spending Review plans to a lower population forecast, "largely due to lower projected net migration". 44
About this data
Full published range: 2011–2027. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – The whole DfE time series, which starts at 2010-11. 2026-27 is based on allocations and the 2025 Spending Review rather than outturn, and excludes SEND reform funding not yet announced. This is funding allocated, not money spent. 2010-11 is the base year, so its value is zero by definition.
Government investment, % of GDP
General government gross fixed capital formation as a percentage of GDP, for the UK and for the median OECD member with data that year.
General government investment as a share of GDP, by year
General government gross fixed capital formation as a percentage of GDP, for the UK and for the median OECD member with data that year. Read as government investment, % of GDP: General government investment as a share of GDP. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- United Kingdom
- OECD median
Source: OECD [52]
Observations 3
Public investment has been low by OECD standards
UK government investment as a share of GDP was below the OECD median in every year from 1995 to 2024. In the decade to 2017, the OBR ranked the UK between 23rd and 27th of 30 OECD countries. 40 41 39 UK investment has been higher as a share of GDP since 2020 than in most of the 2010s, but the OECD median rose too.
Health capital spending is below the OECD average
In 2021–2024 the UK invested 0.4–0.5% of GDP a year in health capital, below the OECD average, after a clear decline through the mid-2010s and a rise since. 42
Investment does not adjust quickly to population
The OBR notes that much public investment is fixed in cash terms for each Spending Review period, so it "does not respond immediately to changes in the size of the population"; whether it catches up later is uncertain. 45
About this data
Full published range: 1995–2024. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – Calculated here from OECD national accounts: general government gross fixed capital formation (Table 0200) divided by GDP (Table 0102), both at current prices in national currency. Before 1995 only a handful of countries report; 2025 is missing for nine members, so the chart stops at 2024. The median covers the OECD members with data each year: 31 in 1995, 36 or 37 from 2005. Chile and Türkiye have no general government investment series in 2024. This is the internationally comparable general government measure, not the UK's own public sector net investment.
Projected household growth in England by migration assumption
Projected increase in households in England between mid-2022 and mid-2032 under each of the ONS's 2022-based variant projections, ranked. The ONS recommends the migration category variant as its main projection.
Additional households, 2022 to 2032
- High international migration3,104,773
- Five-year migration2,692,232
- Ten-year migration2,692,232
- Migration category variant (ONS main projection)2,417,584
- Low international migration2,203,892
- Household formation rates projected throughout2,018,723
- Zero net migration1,129,832
Source: Office for National Statistics [3]; Office for National Statistics [4]
Observations 2
The projections follow past trends, not a target
About this data
Each bar is the variant's mid-2032 household total from ONS Table 430a minus the mid-2022 base of 23,540,824 households, which every variant shares. The full set of seven published variants is shown. The difference between the zero net migration variant and the main projection, 1,287,752 households, is published by the ONS; as a share of the main projection's 2,417,584 rise it is 53%, calculated here. The household formation rates variant changes how many households a given population forms, not migration.
How much house prices and rents rise per point of immigrant share
Median estimated percentage rise in house prices or rents for a one-percentage-point rise in the immigrant share of the population, from the MAC-commissioned review of international studies, by study group.
Median effect of a 1-point rise in immigrant share
- House prices: less comparable countries1.42%
- Rents: UK-like countries0.81%
- House prices: UK-like countries0.65%
- Rents: all studies0.64%
- Rents: less comparable countries0.42%
- House prices: all causal studies0.36%
Source: Migration Advisory Committee [11]; Migration Advisory Committee [12]; Migration Advisory Committee [13]
Observations 5
Immigration explains about 4–6% of the real house-price rise
In housing markets most like the UK's, the median study finds a one-point rise in the immigrant share raises house prices by 0.65%. Applied to the UK's foreign-born share, the review says this "can explain approximately 4-6%" of the three-decade rise in real house prices. It calls immigration "unlikely to be a dominant driver" of UK housing costs, while finding the effect positive. 8 13 9
Rent effects per person are at least as large as price effects
Effects are larger where building is constrained, and UK local studies find falls
Prices respond more where planning limits construction. Studies of small areas find weaker or negative effects because existing residents move away; in the UK, Sá (2015) finds a 1.7% fall in local house prices per point of immigrant share. 10 14 Migration also supplies the building workforce in London, where migrants are around 46% of construction employment. 15
Recent migrants rent privately; settled migrants own homes at UK-born rates
About this data
Every median the review reports. "All causal studies" for house prices is 45 estimates from 22 studies using modern causal methods; "all studies" for rents is 33 estimates from 17 studies. The UK-like and less comparable groups regroup estimates across methods by how similar each country's housing market is to the UK's. UK studies alone are not shown because the review gives no median for them; it says they "tend to be negative" at local level.
Government investment across the OECD in 2024
General government gross fixed capital formation as a percentage of GDP, 2024, for every OECD member with data. The UK is highlighted.
Government investment as a share of GDP
- Estonia6.15%
- Latvia5.78%
- Sweden5.48%
- Norway5.25%
- Slovenia5.18%
- Israel5.13%
- New Zealand4.85%
- Poland4.81%
- Czechia4.71%
- Luxembourg4.61%
- Korea4.59%
- Lithuania4.51%
- Finland4.47%
- France4.34%
- Hungary4.33%
- Greece4.24%
- Iceland4.02%
- Australia3.99%
- Canada3.94%
- Austria3.89%
- Japan3.79%
- Italy3.61%
- Slovak Republic3.5%
- United States3.36%
- Netherlands3.29%
- Germany3.18%
- United Kingdom3.17%
- Denmark3.13%
- Switzerland3.13%
- Belgium3.13%
- Spain2.71%
- Portugal2.68%
- Ireland2.61%
- Colombia2.37%
- Mexico1.85%
- Costa Rica1.59%
About this data
Calculated here from OECD national accounts (Table 0200 gross fixed capital formation of general government, divided by Table 0102 GDP, both at current prices in national currency). 36 of the 38 OECD members have 2024 data; Chile and Türkiye do not. The UK ranks 27th. Ireland's GDP is inflated by multinational accounting, which lowers its ratio.
Building in England has run below the number of new households the ONS projects. With zero net migration, the ONS projects 1,287,752 fewer households in England by 2032 than in its main projection — 5.0% of the projected total, and just over half of the 2.4 million projected increase. 1 3 Prices, however, have risen far more than migration explains: a review commissioned by the Migration Advisory Committee puts immigration at roughly 4–6% of the rise in real UK house prices over three decades. 8
On public services, the national figures cut against a simple population-pressure story. Pupil numbers in England are falling, GP numbers are rising, real school funding per pupil is above its 2010-11 level and real health spending per person roughly doubled between 2000 and 2022. 29 32 46 43 Investment tells a different story: social rent building collapsed after 2010-11 and UK government investment has been below the OECD median in every year since 1995. 36 39
Observations
Migrants staff health services as well as use them
The MAC's 2018 review of EEA migration found that EEA migrants contributed more to the health service and social care, in money and work, than they used, and found no evidence that migration had reduced the quality of healthcare. It covered EEA migration before 2018, not the post-2021 arrivals. 24
Non-UK citizens head about a fifth of homeless households
Of households in England assessed as homeless or at risk in 2024/25, 22% (71,580) were headed by a non-UK citizen, including 7% by EEA citizens and 6% by people granted refugee status. People subject to the no recourse to public funds condition are not eligible and are not counted. 22
Data still needed
- A lifetime fiscal estimate covering every post-Brexit route — students, Graduate route, family, refugees and humanitarian schemes — on one methodThe only route-level estimates cover Skilled Worker and Partner cohorts; a total for the post-2021 inflow, which the cost claims are about, does not exist.
- Earnings and employment by visa route over years since arrival, including after settlementHMRC cohort data are split only by EU and non-EU nationality, and the Home Office route snapshot is a single year, so whether low-paid routes catch up is not measured.
- Net migration per head for the G7 over 2019–2025 on a common definitionNeeded beside the GDP-per-head comparison to see whether the countries that stalled were the high-migration ones.
- Any study attributing the 2019–2025 stall in UK GDP per head among migration, the pandemic, the energy shock and other causesThe chart shows timing only; the OBR scenarios are forward-looking models, not an attribution of what happened.
- Migrants' actual use of public services (health, schools, social care) by routeEvery fiscal model reviewed assumes migrants use services like residents of the same age, because the data do not exist.
- The borrowing effect of the OBR's March 2026 net migration revisionThe OBR reports the revision's effect on population and potential output, but no borrowing figure for it was found.
- Total university income by source, so international fees can be expressed as a share of incomeThe HESA table used here covers fee income only.
- The share of UK patents or inventors who were born abroadNo UK birthplace-based measure was found; the founders figure covers only the 100 fastest-growing companies.
Sources
Immigration, the Economy and the Public Finances
- Gross domestic product (Average) per head, CVM market prices (reference year = 2023), series IHXW, dataset PN2 (rows 2007–2025)
Office for National Statistics, 2026-08-13 · supports
“"2007","37625" "2008","37300" "2009","35339" "2010","35850" "2011","35856" "2012","36160" "2013","36537" "2014","37411" "2015","37937" "2016","38467" "2017","39415" "2018","39831" "2019","40125" "2020","36033" "2021","38972" "2022","40554" "2023","40126" "2024","40153" "2025","40546"”
"2007","37625" "2008","37300" "2009","35339" "2010","35850" "2011","35856" "2012","36160" "2013","36537" "2014","37411" "2015","37937" "2016","38467" "2017","39415" "2018","39831" "2019","40125" "2020","36033" "2021","38972" "2022","40554" "2023","40126" "2024","40153" "2025","40546"
- Gross Domestic Product: chained volume measures: Seasonally adjusted £m, series ABMI, dataset PN2 (rows 2019–2025)
Office for National Statistics, 2026-08-13 · supports
“"2019","2673465" "2020","2404838" "2021","2610286" "2022","2744708" "2023","2752164" "2024","2780853" "2025","2817414"”
"2019","2673465" "2020","2404838" "2021","2610286" "2022","2744708" "2023","2752164" "2024","2780853" "2025","2817414"
- Economic and fiscal outlook – March 2024 (CP 1027), Box 2.3
Office for Budget Responsibility, 2024-03-06 · supports
“Based on these assumptions, GDP is 1.5 per cent higher in 2028-29, but GDP per person is largely unchanged.”
Based on these assumptions, GDP is 1.5 per cent higher in 2028-29, but GDP per person is largely unchanged.
- Economic and fiscal outlook – March 2024 (CP 1027), Box 2.3
Office for Budget Responsibility, 2024-03-06 · supports
“The yellow triangles show what would happen if the capital stock did not adjust at all in response to higher migration, making less capital available per worker and reducing overall productivity. GDP in 2028-29 is still higher but by a smaller amount (1 per cent), but GDP per person is then 0.4 per cent below our central forecast.”
The yellow triangles show what would happen if the capital stock did not adjust at all in response to higher migration, making less capital available per worker and reducing overall productivity. GDP in 2028-29 is still higher but by a smaller amount (1 per cent), but GDP per person is then 0.4 per cent below our central forecast.
- Economic and fiscal outlook – March 2024 (CP 1027), Box 2.3
Office for Budget Responsibility, 2024-03-06 · supports
“This boosts the impact on GDP to 2.2 per cent in 2028-29 and raises GDP per person 0.8 per cent above our forecast. The impacts in the lower migration scenario, in which net migration settles at 115,000 in 2028-29, are symmetric.”
This boosts the impact on GDP to 2.2 per cent in 2028-29 and raises GDP per person 0.8 per cent above our forecast. The impacts in the lower migration scenario, in which net migration settles at 115,000 in 2028-29, are symmetric.
- Economic and fiscal outlook – March 2024 (CP 1027), Box 4.5
Office for Budget Responsibility, 2024-03-06 · supports
“Overall, borrowing is estimated to be £19.9 billion lower and debt 3.1 per cent of GDP lower in 2028-29. The lower migration scenario is symmetric to this, with lower receipts and spending, meaning that borrowing is £19.9 billion higher and debt 3.1 per cent of GDP higher in 2028-29.”
Overall, borrowing is estimated to be £19.9 billion lower and debt 3.1 per cent of GDP lower in 2028-29. The lower migration scenario is symmetric to this, with lower receipts and spending, meaning that borrowing is £19.9 billion higher and debt 3.1 per cent of GDP higher in 2028-29.
- Economic and fiscal outlook – March 2024 (CP 1027), Box 4.5
Office for Budget Responsibility, 2024-03-06 · complicates
“Adjusting for this we estimate that providing equivalent service provision to the additional migrants in the high scenario would require an additional £6.1 billion in 2028-29. On this basis, in this scenario a portion of the higher receipts generated by the additional migrants is offset by higher spending, so that while migration still improves the public finances it does so by less than in the unadjusted DEL scenario, with borrowing £13.1 billion lower and debt 2.5 per cent of GDP lower by 2028-29. The lower migration scenario has the opposite effect with borrowing and debt £13.1 billion and 2.5 per cent of GDP higher.”
Adjusting for this we estimate that providing equivalent service provision to the additional migrants in the high scenario would require an additional £6.1 billion in 2028-29. On this basis, in this scenario a portion of the higher receipts generated by the additional migrants is offset by higher spending, so that while migration still improves the public finances it does so by less than in the unadjusted DEL scenario, with borrowing £13.1 billion lower and debt 2.5 per cent of GDP lower by 2028-29. The lower migration scenario has the opposite effect with borrowing and debt £13.1 billion and 2.5 per cent of GDP higher.
- Economic and fiscal outlook – March 2026, Box 2.1
Office for Budget Responsibility, 2026-03 · supports
“While the level of net migration has a significant impact on the level of real GDP, the size and direction of the impact on real GDP per person, an indicator of living standards, is much more uncertain. Estimates in the economics literature tend to suggest that the impacts of different levels of net inward migration on real GDP per person are relatively small in either a positive or negative direction and depend on a number of uncertain factors.”
While the level of net migration has a significant impact on the level of real GDP, the size and direction of the impact on real GDP per person, an indicator of living standards, is much more uncertain. Estimates in the economics literature tend to suggest that the impacts of different levels of net inward migration on real GDP per person are relatively small in either a positive or negative direction and depend on a number of uncertain factors.
- Economic and fiscal outlook – March 2026, paragraph 2.12
Office for Budget Responsibility, 2026-03 · supports
“Reflecting this revision, we have lowered our central forecast for overall net inward migration by around 60,000 people (50,000 adults) a year on average (Chart 2.6, right panel). This is driven entirely by a more negative assumption for net migration by British nationals. By 2030, this change reduces the adult population by around 200,000 relative to the November forecast.”
Reflecting this revision, we have lowered our central forecast for overall net inward migration by around 60,000 people (50,000 adults) a year on average (Chart 2.6, right panel). This is driven entirely by a more negative assumption for net migration by British nationals. By 2030, this change reduces the adult population by around 200,000 relative to the November forecast.
- Economic and fiscal outlook – March 2026, paragraph 2.14
Office for Budget Responsibility, 2026-03 · supports
“The productivity and participation rate effects largely offset each other, so the change to the net migration forecast results in broadly unchanged potential output per person.”
The productivity and participation rate effects largely offset each other, so the change to the net migration forecast results in broadly unchanged potential output per person.
- Economic and fiscal outlook – March 2026, Box 2.1
Office for Budget Responsibility, 2026-03 · complicates
“Overall, in the medium term, net inward migration is likely to boost participation given migrants’ younger age composition. But the impact on productivity is much more uncertain.”
Overall, in the medium term, net inward migration is likely to boost participation given migrants’ younger age composition. But the impact on productivity is much more uncertain.
- The Fiscal Impact of Immigration in the UK
The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-06-23 · complicates
“Short-term forecasts like these are particularly likely to find a positive impact from migration, because they do not account for the costs that come later as migrants age.”
Short-term forecasts like these are particularly likely to find a positive impact from migration, because they do not account for the costs that come later as migrants age.
- The Fiscal Impact of Immigration in the UK
The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-06-23 · complicates
“In 2023, for example, it projected that by 2072/73 the primary budget deficit (i.e. excluding interest payments on debt) would be 1.1% of GDP lower in a scenario where annual net migration was 245,000 rather than 129,000. It projected that higher net migration would reduce debt as a share of GDP by 30 percentage points by 2072/73, but would not prevent debt from rising from around 100 to 300 percent of GDP.”
In 2023, for example, it projected that by 2072/73 the primary budget deficit (i.e. excluding interest payments on debt) would be 1.1% of GDP lower in a scenario where annual net migration was 245,000 rather than 129,000. It projected that higher net migration would reduce debt as a share of GDP by 30 percentage points by 2072/73, but would not prevent debt from rising from around 100 to 300 percent of GDP.
- The Fiscal Impact of Immigration in the UK
The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-06-23 · complicates
“It concluded that “higher migration could be seen as delaying some of the fiscal challenges of an ageing population rather than a way of resolving them permanently”.”
It concluded that “higher migration could be seen as delaying some of the fiscal challenges of an ageing population rather than a way of resolving them permanently”.
- Lower immigration will hit UK growth and raise borrowing
Oxford Economics, 2026-02-11 · supports
“If the official forecast from the Office for Budget Responsibility moves into line with ours, that would cut its projection for the level of potential output in 2029-2030 by 1ppt. This implies that government borrowing would be £19bn (0.5% of GDP) higher, wiping out most of the Chancellor’s headroom.”
If the official forecast from the Office for Budget Responsibility moves into line with ours, that would cut its projection for the level of potential output in 2029-2030 by 1ppt. This implies that government borrowing would be £19bn (0.5% of GDP) higher, wiping out most of the Chancellor’s headroom.
- The Fiscal Impact of Immigration: Static and Dynamic Estimates for the UK
Migration Advisory Committee, 2025-12-11 · supports
“Overall, the SW visa route is clearly fiscally positive for the UK. This is almost inevitable given that main applicants on the route must have a job offer paying above a set of salary thresholds.”
Overall, the SW visa route is clearly fiscally positive for the UK. This is almost inevitable given that main applicants on the route must have a job offer paying above a set of salary thresholds.
- The Fiscal Impact of Immigration: Static and Dynamic Estimates for the UK
Migration Advisory Committee, 2025-12-11 · supports
“For the entire cohort of 329,200 arrivals, we estimate that they will contribute a net £47.1bn over their lifetime – or +£143,000”
For the entire cohort of 329,200 arrivals, we estimate that they will contribute a net £47.1bn over their lifetime – or +£143,000
- The Fiscal Impact of Immigration: Static and Dynamic Estimates for the UK
Migration Advisory Committee, 2025-12-11 · supports
“For SW (excl. H&C) main applicants (Fig 16), the average lifetime contribution is a substantial +£689,000 in present value (the cumulative total of £47.7bn divided by 69,200 main applicants).”
For SW (excl. H&C) main applicants (Fig 16), the average lifetime contribution is a substantial +£689,000 in present value (the cumulative total of £47.7bn divided by 69,200 main applicants).
- The Fiscal Impact of Immigration: Static and Dynamic Estimates for the UK
Migration Advisory Committee, 2025-12-11 · supports
“The lifetime net contribution of those who remain in the UK is +£931,000, whilst it is only +£174,000 for those who leave.”
The lifetime net contribution of those who remain in the UK is +£931,000, whilst it is only +£174,000 for those who leave.
- The Fiscal Impact of Immigration: Static and Dynamic Estimates for the UK
Migration Advisory Committee, 2025-12-11 · supports
“For the H&C main applicants (Figure 17), the lifetime fiscal contribution is positive (£54,000) but much smaller than for SW (excl. H&C) main applicants.”
For the H&C main applicants (Figure 17), the lifetime fiscal contribution is positive (£54,000) but much smaller than for SW (excl. H&C) main applicants.
- The Fiscal Impact of Immigration: Static and Dynamic Estimates for the UK
Migration Advisory Committee, 2025-12-11 · supports
“For care workers, the lifetime contribution is estimated to be -£36,000, whilst for the other occupations it is +£166,000. Care Workers are therefore fiscally negative over their lifetimes and broadly similar to the UK median for the age group.”
For care workers, the lifetime contribution is estimated to be -£36,000, whilst for the other occupations it is +£166,000. Care Workers are therefore fiscally negative over their lifetimes and broadly similar to the UK median for the age group.
- The Fiscal Impact of Immigration: Static and Dynamic Estimates for the UK
Migration Advisory Committee, 2025-12-11 · supports
“There average lifetime contributions are +£3,000 and -£67,000 respectively. This is in spite of being younger than the average UK resident – the age-adjusted UK comparators are +£107,000 (median of -£55,000) and +£84,000 (median of -£71,000) respectively.”
There average lifetime contributions are +£3,000 and -£67,000 respectively. This is in spite of being younger than the average UK resident – the age-adjusted UK comparators are +£107,000 (median of -£55,000) and +£84,000 (median of -£71,000) respectively.
- The Fiscal Impact of Immigration: Static and Dynamic Estimates for the UK
Migration Advisory Committee, 2025-12-11 · complicates
“Recall that the UK resident population has a mean of -£39,000 overall lifetime contribution and a median of -£145,000. We can adjust the UK comparator group to have the same age distribution as the SW (excl. H&C) main applicants. This in effect compares the contribution of a migrant from 2022/23 onwards to that of a native with the same starting age. For this UK comparator group, the mean lifetime contribution is +£117,000 and median of -£47,000.”
Recall that the UK resident population has a mean of -£39,000 overall lifetime contribution and a median of -£145,000. We can adjust the UK comparator group to have the same age distribution as the SW (excl. H&C) main applicants. This in effect compares the contribution of a migrant from 2022/23 onwards to that of a native with the same starting age. For this UK comparator group, the mean lifetime contribution is +£117,000 and median of -£47,000.
- The Fiscal Impact of Immigration: Static and Dynamic Estimates for the UK
Migration Advisory Committee, 2025-12-11 · supports
“We estimate that the top 10% of earners in the SW (excl. H&C) cohort (with a minimum salary in 2022/23 of £131,000) make an average lifetime contribution of £2.7m and account for 39% of the total contribution of”
We estimate that the top 10% of earners in the SW (excl. H&C) cohort (with a minimum salary in 2022/23 of £131,000) make an average lifetime contribution of £2.7m and account for 39% of the total contribution of
- The Fiscal Impact of Immigration: Static and Dynamic Estimates for the UK, footnote 5
Migration Advisory Committee, 2025-12-11 · complicates
“To understand the role of real discounting, note that if we did not discount (i.e. 𝑟 = 0), the future fiscal contribution of a 25-year-old would be -£186,000 rather than +£184,000.”
To understand the role of real discounting, note that if we did not discount (i.e. 𝑟 = 0), the future fiscal contribution of a 25-year-old would be -£186,000 rather than +£184,000.
- The Fiscal Impact of Immigration: Static and Dynamic Estimates for the UK
Migration Advisory Committee, 2025-12-11 · complicates
“a 3.0% real discount rate which is broadly in line with HMT Green Book”
a 3.0% real discount rate which is broadly in line with HMT Green Book
- The Fiscal Impact of Immigration: Static and Dynamic Estimates for the UK
Migration Advisory Committee, 2025-12-11 · complicates
“Among the lower-earning skilled worker groups, temporary migration will be more beneficial than permanent migration from a fiscal perspective. This is not true higher up the earnings distribution, where having migrants stay in the long-term adds to the fiscal benefit they provide.”
Among the lower-earning skilled worker groups, temporary migration will be more beneficial than permanent migration from a fiscal perspective. This is not true higher up the earnings distribution, where having migrants stay in the long-term adds to the fiscal benefit they provide.
- Migration Advisory Committee (MAC) annual report, 2025 (accessible)
Migration Advisory Committee, 2025-12-17 · supports
“Under the current immigration rules, we estimate that the 2022/23 cohort of successful applicants to the Partner route, which consists of the partners of British citizens and settled residents, will incur a net lifetime fiscal deficit of -£5.6bn in present value terms – an average of -£109,000 per applicant.”
Under the current immigration rules, we estimate that the 2022/23 cohort of successful applicants to the Partner route, which consists of the partners of British citizens and settled residents, will incur a net lifetime fiscal deficit of -£5.6bn in present value terms – an average of -£109,000 per applicant.
- The Fiscal Impact of Immigration in the UK
The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-06-23 · supports
“At the time of writing, the MAC has not yet evaluated the net lifetime fiscal impact of all migration routes. It has not assessed the impact of refugees, for example, a group that is likely to affect the public finances more negatively than the groups discussed above because they have lower employment rates and often require more support from the state.”
At the time of writing, the MAC has not yet evaluated the net lifetime fiscal impact of all migration routes. It has not assessed the impact of refugees, for example, a group that is likely to affect the public finances more negatively than the groups discussed above because they have lower employment rates and often require more support from the state.
- Fiscal risks and sustainability – September 2024 (CP 1142, corrected 14 November 2024), paragraph 4.33
Office for Budget Responsibility, 2024-09-12 · supports
“An illustrative migrant worker arriving to the UK at this age and earning the average UK salary is a net fiscal contributor (green line) by their second year. By contrast, an average resident of the same age is still a net fiscal recipient and does not become a net fiscal contributor until their 40s. This is because, unlike the UK resident, the migrant has not previously consumed UK public services, particularly education and health in their childhood.”
An illustrative migrant worker arriving to the UK at this age and earning the average UK salary is a net fiscal contributor (green line) by their second year. By contrast, an average resident of the same age is still a net fiscal recipient and does not become a net fiscal contributor until their 40s. This is because, unlike the UK resident, the migrant has not previously consumed UK public services, particularly education and health in their childhood.
- Fiscal risks and sustainability – September 2024 (CP 1142, corrected 14 November 2024), paragraph 4.33
Office for Budget Responsibility, 2024-09-12 · supports
“For example, a high-wage migrant earning 30 per cent more than the UK average would still be a net benefit to the public finances even if they lived to”
For example, a high-wage migrant earning 30 per cent more than the UK average would still be a net benefit to the public finances even if they lived to
- Fiscal risks and sustainability – September 2024 (CP 1142, corrected 14 November 2024), paragraph 4.33
Office for Budget Responsibility, 2024-09-12 · supports
“However, an illustrative low wage migrant worker arriving at 25 and earning half the UK average becomes less fiscally beneficial (yellow line) than the average UK resident in their early 40s.”
However, an illustrative low wage migrant worker arriving at 25 and earning half the UK average becomes less fiscally beneficial (yellow line) than the average UK resident in their early 40s.
- Fiscal risks and sustainability – September 2024 (CP 1142, corrected 14 November 2024), correction slip
Office for Budget Responsibility, 2024-11-14 · complicates
“Average-and high-wage representative migrants are more fiscally beneficial in their mid-life compared to the previous chart but broadly unchanged at older ages. The representative low-wage migrant is significantly less fiscally beneficial, and substantially so at older ages.”
Average-and high-wage representative migrants are more fiscally beneficial in their mid-life compared to the previous chart but broadly unchanged at older ages. The representative low-wage migrant is significantly less fiscally beneficial, and substantially so at older ages.
- Fiscal risks and sustainability – September 2024 (CP 1142, corrected 14 November 2024), paragraph 4.34
Office for Budget Responsibility, 2024-09-12 · complicates
“Given the wide range of possible households we have opted to model a more typical migrant on a work visa and no dependants.”
Given the wide range of possible households we have opted to model a more typical migrant on a work visa and no dependants.
- Fiscal risks and sustainability – September 2024 (CP 1142, corrected 14 November 2024), paragraph 1.29
Office for Budget Responsibility, 2024-09-12 · complicates
“In the shorter length of stay scenario, where half of migrants leave after three years, and so generate savings in areas such as welfare and state pensions, debt ends up about 23 per cent of GDP lower by 2073-74. In the higher earnings scenario, where migrants generate extra tax revenue relative to their consumption of government services and benefits, debt as a share of GDP ends up about 40 per cent of GDP lower. However, in both cases, debt is still projected to be on an unsustainable upward trajectory in the long run.”
In the shorter length of stay scenario, where half of migrants leave after three years, and so generate savings in areas such as welfare and state pensions, debt ends up about 23 per cent of GDP lower by 2073-74. In the higher earnings scenario, where migrants generate extra tax revenue relative to their consumption of government services and benefits, debt as a share of GDP ends up about 40 per cent of GDP lower. However, in both cases, debt is still projected to be on an unsustainable upward trajectory in the long run.
- Fiscal risks and sustainability – September 2024 (CP 1142, corrected 14 November 2024), paragraph 4.42
Office for Budget Responsibility, 2024-09-12 · complicates
“The primary balance worsens by 2.9 per cent of GDP and net debt rises in every year to reach 351 per cent of GDP by the end of the forecast horizon, 76 per cent of GDP above the baseline.”
The primary balance worsens by 2.9 per cent of GDP and net debt rises in every year to reach 351 per cent of GDP by the end of the forecast horizon, 76 per cent of GDP above the baseline.
- Fiscal risks and sustainability – September 2024: chapter 4 charts and tables, sheet C4.13
Office for Budget Responsibility, 2024-11-14 · supports
“Chart 4.13: Cumulative fiscal impact of representative migrants”
Chart 4.13: Cumulative fiscal impact of representative migrants
- Sponsored work and family visa earnings, employment and Income Tax
Home Office, 2025-05-12 · supports
“In financial year 2023 to 2024, median annual adjusted earnings for main applicants granted entry clearance visas were £56,600 for Skilled Workers, £30,900 for Health and Care Workers, and £47,900 for Senior or Specialist Workers (Global Business Mobility). For dependants, median annual adjusted earnings were £30,200, £22,100, and £27,200 for the same visa routes, respectively.”
In financial year 2023 to 2024, median annual adjusted earnings for main applicants granted entry clearance visas were £56,600 for Skilled Workers, £30,900 for Health and Care Workers, and £47,900 for Senior or Specialist Workers (Global Business Mobility). For dependants, median annual adjusted earnings were £30,200, £22,100, and £27,200 for the same visa routes, respectively.
- Sponsored work and family visa earnings, employment and Income Tax, Table 5
Home Office, 2025-05-12 · supports
“6145 Care Workers and Home Carers 32,000 £23,100 84% 6146 Senior Care Workers 16,800 £25,800 78%”
6145 Care Workers and Home Carers 32,000 £23,100 84% 6146 Senior Care Workers 16,800 £25,800 78%
- Sponsored work and family visa earnings, employment and Income Tax
Home Office, 2025-05-12 · supports
“In financial year 2023 to 2024, median annual adjusted earnings were £20,200 for a granted Family-related entry clearance visa.”
In financial year 2023 to 2024, median annual adjusted earnings were £20,200 for a granted Family-related entry clearance visa.
- Sponsored work and family visa earnings, employment and Income Tax
Home Office, 2025-05-12 · complicates
“In financial year 2023 to 2024, at least 75% of main applicants granted a Skilled Worker entry clearance visa had PAYE earnings. This was at least 81% for Health and Care Workers and at least 68% for Senior or Specialist Workers (Global Business Mobility). For dependants, proportions were at least 45%, 67%, and 25%, respectively.”
In financial year 2023 to 2024, at least 75% of main applicants granted a Skilled Worker entry clearance visa had PAYE earnings. This was at least 81% for Health and Care Workers and at least 68% for Senior or Specialist Workers (Global Business Mobility). For dependants, proportions were at least 45%, 67%, and 25%, respectively.
- Sponsored work and family visa earnings, employment and Income Tax
Home Office, 2025-05-12 · complicates
“Caution is advised when comparing median annual adjusted earnings across different visa routes, as work eligibility and requirements vary.”
Caution is advised when comparing median annual adjusted earnings across different visa routes, as work eligibility and requirements vary.
- Employee earnings in the UK: 2024
Office for National Statistics, 2024-10-29 · complicates
“Median gross annual earnings for full-time employees were £37,430 in April 2024, compared with £35,004 in April 2023”
Median gross annual earnings for full-time employees were £37,430 in April 2024, compared with £35,004 in April 2023
- Upward mobility? Earnings trajectories for recent immigrants
The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-05-29 · supports
“For the most recent, very large cohorts, we see surprising stability: after one full year in the UK labour market, each cohort from 2021 to 2023 was earning around 95% of the UK average, broadly similar to the pre-Brexit cohorts. However, there was a significant fall for those who arrived in 2024, to 90%.”
For the most recent, very large cohorts, we see surprising stability: after one full year in the UK labour market, each cohort from 2021 to 2023 was earning around 95% of the UK average, broadly similar to the pre-Brexit cohorts. However, there was a significant fall for those who arrived in 2024, to 90%.
- Upward mobility? Earnings trajectories for recent immigrants
The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-05-29 · supports
“For example, while 2015 non-EU entrants took around six years to reach the overall median wage, 2021 entrants had already exceeded it after two years. Indeed, even those who entered in 2023 exceeded overall median earnings after two years. This implies that either more recent non-EU arrivals were seeing strong earnings growth relative to the overall workforce, or that lower earners were disproportionately leaving the employee workforce within the first few years (for example, international students working part-time before leaving the country), or some combination of the two.”
For example, while 2015 non-EU entrants took around six years to reach the overall median wage, 2021 entrants had already exceeded it after two years. Indeed, even those who entered in 2023 exceeded overall median earnings after two years. This implies that either more recent non-EU arrivals were seeing strong earnings growth relative to the overall workforce, or that lower earners were disproportionately leaving the employee workforce within the first few years (for example, international students working part-time before leaving the country), or some combination of the two.
- Upward mobility? Earnings trajectories for recent immigrants
The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-05-29 · complicates
“Entry-year earnings then settled at a lower level between 2020 and 2023, followed by a modest decline in 2024 and a much sharper fall in 2025.”
Entry-year earnings then settled at a lower level between 2020 and 2023, followed by a modest decline in 2024 and a much sharper fall in 2025.
- Upward mobility? Earnings trajectories for recent immigrants
The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-05-29 · complicates
“It includes both full-time and part-time workers, and we cannot distinguish between the two because hours worked are not reported.”
It includes both full-time and part-time workers, and we cannot distinguish between the two because hours worked are not reported.
- Upward mobility? Earnings trajectories for recent immigrants
The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-05-29 · complicates
“Of the EU-origin migrants who first appeared in 2015, 45% were still on payroll in 2025 (Figure 3). For non-EU origin migrants, the figure was 60%.”
Of the EU-origin migrants who first appeared in 2015, 45% were still on payroll in 2025 (Figure 3). For non-EU origin migrants, the figure was 60%.
- The Fiscal Impact of Immigration in the UK
The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-06-23 · supports
“While there are no fiscal analyses covering the entire post-Brexit immigration system, several cover the entire pre-Brexit system.”
While there are no fiscal analyses covering the entire post-Brexit immigration system, several cover the entire pre-Brexit system.
- The Fiscal Impact of Immigration in the UK
The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-06-23 · supports
“Despite differences in methods, some key points emerge consistently. First, in all cases, the impacts were found to be less than +1% or -1% of GDP. Second, recent migrants made a more positive impact than those who had been in the UK for longer.”
Despite differences in methods, some key points emerge consistently. First, in all cases, the impacts were found to be less than +1% or -1% of GDP. Second, recent migrants made a more positive impact than those who had been in the UK for longer.
- The Fiscal Impact of Immigration in the UK, Table 1 (columns: EEA, non-EEA, UK born, then recent EEA and non-EEA migrants)
The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-06-23 · supports
“Oxford Economics (2018) FY 2016/17 (1 year) +£4.7b -£9.0b -£41.4b Migration Watch (2016) FY 2014/15 (1 year) -£1.1b -£15.6b -£87.8b £0.0 -£6.2b Dustmann and Frattini (2014) 1995-2011 (17 years) +£4.4b (+£259m pa) -£118b (-£6.9b pa) -£591b (-£34.8b pa)”
Oxford Economics (2018) FY 2016/17 (1 year) +£4.7b -£9.0b -£41.4b Migration Watch (2016) FY 2014/15 (1 year) -£1.1b -£15.6b -£87.8b £0.0 -£6.2b Dustmann and Frattini (2014) 1995-2011 (17 years) +£4.4b (+£259m pa) -£118b (-£6.9b pa) -£591b (-£34.8b pa)
- The Fiscal Impact of Immigration in the UK, Table 1
The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-06-23 · supports
“Migration Watch (2014) 1995-2011 (17 years) -£13.6b (-£0.8b pa) -£134.9b (-£7.94b pa) -£565b (-£33.2b pa)”
Migration Watch (2014) 1995-2011 (17 years) -£13.6b (-£0.8b pa) -£134.9b (-£7.94b pa) -£565b (-£33.2b pa)
- Here To Stay? Estimating the Scale and Cost of Long-Term Migration
Centre for Policy Studies, 2025-02-09 · supports
“In our central model, using the OBR’s extremely optimistic assumptions about migrant earnings, the lifetime net fiscal cost to the state would be £234 billion – equivalent to a bill of £8,200 for every UK household, albeit spread out over decades.”
In our central model, using the OBR’s extremely optimistic assumptions about migrant earnings, the lifetime net fiscal cost to the state would be £234 billion – equivalent to a bill of £8,200 for every UK household, albeit spread out over decades.
- Here To Stay? Estimating the Scale and Cost of Long-Term Migration
Centre for Policy Studies, 2025-02-09 · complicates
“For example, as the graph below shows, an ‘average-wage’ migrant who arrives aged 25 will make a net lifetime contribution of around £405,000 if they live to the age of 82.”
For example, as the graph below shows, an ‘average-wage’ migrant who arrives aged 25 will make a net lifetime contribution of around £405,000 if they live to the age of 82.
- Here To Stay? Estimating the Scale and Cost of Long-Term Migration (research page)
Centre for Policy Studies, 2025-09-08 · contests
“NOTE: The Office for Budget Responsibility fiscal data contained within this report is the subject of dispute, meaning that the overall cost estimates should no longer be used. We will be publishing an updated estimate in due course. This does not impact on the visa data or projections for the numbers likely to gain ILR on different visa routes.”
NOTE: The Office for Budget Responsibility fiscal data contained within this report is the subject of dispute, meaning that the overall cost estimates should no longer be used. We will be publishing an updated estimate in due course. This does not impact on the visa data or projections for the numbers likely to gain ILR on different visa routes.
- Centre for Policy Studies issues clarification on Indefinite Leave to Remain statistics
Centre for Policy Studies, 2025-09-22 · contests
“After the CPS’ report was published, the Office for Budget Responsibility revised their definitions of some of the fiscal data contained within our report, meaning that the overall cost estimates should no longer be used.”
After the CPS’ report was published, the Office for Budget Responsibility revised their definitions of some of the fiscal data contained within our report, meaning that the overall cost estimates should no longer be used.
- Daily Mail corrects report about Reform UK’s disputed immigration savings
Full Fact, 2025-10-03 · contests
“This is not what this figure refers to, and we’re grateful to the Daily Mail for correcting its article after we got in touch. The figure is actually Reform UK’s estimate of the overall net savings to taxpayers, not just on benefits—though the figure is disputed and based on a now-withdrawn think tank estimate.”
This is not what this figure refers to, and we’re grateful to the Daily Mail for correcting its article after we got in touch. The figure is actually Reform UK’s estimate of the overall net savings to taxpayers, not just on benefits—though the figure is disputed and based on a now-withdrawn think tank estimate.
- The Cost of the Boriswave
Reform UK, 2026-04 · supports
“The total lifetime cost of the 2021-2025 migrants expected to receive ILR in the years from 2026 to 2030 is roughly £622.5 bn in real terms if undiscounted, and £154 bn if discounted at the 3.5% rate suggested by the HM Treasury Green Book. This total fiscal black hole represents a £20,000 liability for every household in the UK.”
The total lifetime cost of the 2021-2025 migrants expected to receive ILR in the years from 2026 to 2030 is roughly £622.5 bn in real terms if undiscounted, and £154 bn if discounted at the 3.5% rate suggested by the HM Treasury Green Book. This total fiscal black hole represents a £20,000 liability for every household in the UK.
- The Cost of the Boriswave
Reform UK, 2026-04 · complicates
“Due to lack of microdata on migrant fiscal incidence, we map migrants to ONS income quintiles as a proxy. This likely understates heterogeneity within groups.”
Due to lack of microdata on migrant fiscal incidence, we map migrants to ONS income quintiles as a proxy. This likely understates heterogeneity within groups.
- The Cost of the Boriswave
Reform UK, 2026-04 · complicates
“The primary source of difference is the lack of additional discounting that the Migration Advisory Committee and the Government generally applies when considering fiscal impact.”
The primary source of difference is the lack of additional discounting that the Migration Advisory Committee and the Government generally applies when considering fiscal impact.
- Economists Slam Reform UK's 'Fantasy' Claims That 'Boriswave' Migrants Will Cost Households £20,000
Byline Times, 2026-04-16 · contests
““The main reason the headline figures are so high in the Reform estimate is that it does not adopt the standard practice of discounting, i.e. valuing costs and benefits now as more important than costs and benefits in the future,” she said. “This has a big impact on the numbers because many of the costs of migration come decades down the line, while benefits come sooner.””
“The main reason the headline figures are so high in the Reform estimate is that it does not adopt the standard practice of discounting, i.e. valuing costs and benefits now as more important than costs and benefits in the future,” she said. “This has a big impact on the numbers because many of the costs of migration come decades down the line, while benefits come sooner.”
- Economists Slam Reform UK's 'Fantasy' Claims That 'Boriswave' Migrants Will Cost Households £20,000
Byline Times, 2026-04-16 · supports
““There is not yet a high-quality estimate for the total fiscal impact of migration under the post-Brexit immigration system,” Sumption said.”
“There is not yet a high-quality estimate for the total fiscal impact of migration under the post-Brexit immigration system,” Sumption said.
- Economists Slam Reform UK's 'Fantasy' Claims That 'Boriswave' Migrants Will Cost Households £20,000
Byline Times, 2026-04-16 · contests
““Reform have simply invented their own numbers for migrant earnings, ignoring the analysis of the independent Migration Advisory Committee (MAC) which used actual data from HMRC,” he said.”
“Reform have simply invented their own numbers for migrant earnings, ignoring the analysis of the independent Migration Advisory Committee (MAC) which used actual data from HMRC,” he said.
- Economists Slam Reform UK's 'Fantasy' Claims That 'Boriswave' Migrants Will Cost Households £20,000
Byline Times, 2026-04-16 · supports
“A Reform UK spokesperson denied the criticisms and said their assumptions and methodology are “entirely defensible”.”
A Reform UK spokesperson denied the criticisms and said their assumptions and methodology are “entirely defensible”.
- EEA migration in the UK: final report
Migration Advisory Committee, 2018-09 · supports
“In terms of wages the existing evidence and the analysis we present in the report suggests that migration is not a major determinate of the wages of UK-born workers. We found some evidence suggesting that lower-skilled workers face a negative impact while higher-skilled workers benefit, however the magnitude of the impacts are generally small.”
In terms of wages the existing evidence and the analysis we present in the report suggests that migration is not a major determinate of the wages of UK-born workers. We found some evidence suggesting that lower-skilled workers face a negative impact while higher-skilled workers benefit, however the magnitude of the impacts are generally small.
- EEA migration in the UK: final report, paragraph 1.39
Migration Advisory Committee, 2018-09 · supports
“Given the 6.7 percentage point increase in the EU-born working age population ratio between 1993 and 2017 the implied total effect on UK-born nominal wages of EU immigration is of the order of a 5.2 per cent reduction to the 5th percentile a 4.9 per cent reduction at the 10th percentile, a 1.6 per cent reduction to the 25th percentile, a 1.6 per cent increase at the median, a 2.2 per cent increase at the 75th percentile and a 4.4 and 3.1 per cent increase at the 90th and 95th percentiles respectively. As previously stated this type exercise should be interpreted with caution as the model only estimates the short-run response to migration.”
Given the 6.7 percentage point increase in the EU-born working age population ratio between 1993 and 2017 the implied total effect on UK-born nominal wages of EU immigration is of the order of a 5.2 per cent reduction to the 5th percentile a 4.9 per cent reduction at the 10th percentile, a 1.6 per cent reduction to the 25th percentile, a 1.6 per cent increase at the median, a 2.2 per cent increase at the 75th percentile and a 4.4 and 3.1 per cent increase at the 90th and 95th percentiles respectively. As previously stated this type exercise should be interpreted with caution as the model only estimates the short-run response to migration.
- EEA migration in the UK: final report, paragraph 1.33
Migration Advisory Committee, 2018-09 · supports
“The 2015 paper estimated that a 10 percentage point rise in the proportion of migrants in this occupation group leads to a 1.9 per cent reduction in pay, compared to the earlier estimate of a 5.2 per cent fall.”
The 2015 paper estimated that a 10 percentage point rise in the proportion of migrants in this occupation group leads to a 1.9 per cent reduction in pay, compared to the earlier estimate of a 5.2 per cent fall.
- The labour market effects of immigration
The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-02-24 · supports
“reduced the hourly wage of UK-born wage earners at the 5 th percentile (i.e. the lowest earners in the labour market) by around half of one pence per year. The gains for top earners were also small: 1.7p per year for people at the 90 th percentile of wage earners.”
reduced the hourly wage of UK-born wage earners at the 5 th percentile (i.e. the lowest earners in the labour market) by around half of one pence per year. The gains for top earners were also small: 1.7p per year for people at the 90 th percentile of wage earners.
- The labour market effects of immigration
The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-02-24 · supports
“in low-wage service sector jobs, a 1 percentage point rise in the share of migrants reduced average wages in that occupation by about 0.2%.”
in low-wage service sector jobs, a 1 percentage point rise in the share of migrants reduced average wages in that occupation by about 0.2%.
- The labour market effects of immigration
The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-02-24 · complicates
“To our knowledge, there are not yet any similar studies on the impacts of post-Brexit migration.”
To our knowledge, there are not yet any similar studies on the impacts of post-Brexit migration.
- The labour market effects of immigration
The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-02-24 · complicates
“one study concludes that the main impact of increased immigration from 1975 to 2005 was on the wages of migrants already in the UK.”
one study concludes that the main impact of increased immigration from 1975 to 2005 was on the wages of migrants already in the UK.
- OfS warns against persistent over-optimism as analysis finds institutions under continued financial pressure
Office for Students, 2026-05-14 · supports
“Data published today shows that more than a third (35.8 per cent) of institutions reported a deficit for 2024-25. While this is lower than expected, this figure is forecast to rise to four in ten institutions (42.7 per cent) for 2025-26.”
Data published today shows that more than a third (35.8 per cent) of institutions reported a deficit for 2024-25. While this is lower than expected, this figure is forecast to rise to four in ten institutions (42.7 per cent) for 2025-26.
- OfS warns against persistent over-optimism as analysis finds institutions under continued financial pressure
Office for Students, 2026-05-14 · complicates
“As well as general recruitment challenges, the report identifies other risks that have persisted for a number of years, such as an overreliance on fee income from international students.”
As well as general recruitment challenges, the report identifies other risks that have persisted for a number of years, such as an overreliance on fee income from international students.
- DT031 Table 6 – Tuition fees and education contracts analysed by HE provider, domicile, mode, level, source, 2024/25 (Total row; £000s; columns: Home, Rest of UK, Total UK, EU, UK and EU, Non-EU, Total Non-UK, Total HE course fees, …)
HESA / Office for Students, 2026 · supports
“"","Total","","784,383","638,072","14,364,460","106,136","1,528,591","1,664,067","10,626,703","26,761,366","433,859","942,152","143,485","28,280,862","438,145"”
"","Total","","784,383","638,072","14,364,460","106,136","1,528,591","1,664,067","10,626,703","26,761,366","433,859","942,152","143,485","28,280,862","438,145"
- Job Creators 2025
The Entrepreneurs Network, 2025 · supports
“Our latest analysis reveals that 54 of the UK’s 100 fastest-growing companies have a foreign-born founder or co-founder.”
Our latest analysis reveals that 54 of the UK’s 100 fastest-growing companies have a foreign-born founder or co-founder.
- Job Creators 2025
The Entrepreneurs Network, 2025 · supports
“Among the 219 founders and co-founders behind this year’s companies, 91 – or 42% – were born overseas.”
Among the 219 founders and co-founders behind this year’s companies, 91 – or 42% – were born overseas.
- Job Creators 2025
The Entrepreneurs Network, 2025 · complicates
“Nevertheless, Migration Observatory analysis of the latest census and Annual Population Survey data shows that the foreign-born population of the United Kingdom stood at around 16% in 2023.”
Nevertheless, Migration Observatory analysis of the latest census and Annual Population Survey data shows that the foreign-born population of the United Kingdom stood at around 16% in 2023.
- Job Creators 2025
The Entrepreneurs Network, 2025 · complicates
“we established a list of the 100 companies which had experienced the greatest growth in reaching a valuation observed between June 2024 and the end of May 2025.”
we established a list of the 100 companies which had experienced the greatest growth in reaching a valuation observed between June 2024 and the end of May 2025.
- Gross domestic product (Average) per head, CVM market prices (reference year = 2023), series IHXW, dataset PN2
Office for National Statistics, 2026-08-13 · supports
“"Title","Gross domestic product (Average) per head, CVM market prices (reference year = 2023) £: SA"”
"Title","Gross domestic product (Average) per head, CVM market prices (reference year = 2023) £: SA"
- Gross Domestic Product: chained volume measures: Seasonally adjusted £m, series ABMI, dataset PN2
Office for National Statistics, 2026-08-13 · supports
“"Title","Gross Domestic Product: chained volume measures: Seasonally adjusted £m"”
"Title","Gross Domestic Product: chained volume measures: Seasonally adjusted £m"
- World Development Indicators: GDP per capita (constant 2015 US$), NY.GDP.PCAP.KD, G7 countries
World Bank, 2026-10-08 · supports
“GDP per capita (constant 2015 US$)”
GDP per capita (constant 2015 US$)
Work and Study Visas and the Care Workforce
- Why do people come to the UK? Work
Home Office, 2026-08-27 · supports
“There were 234,841 visas issued (including dependants) in all work categories in the YE June 2026, of which 158,722 were to main applicants and 76,119 were to dependants. This represents a fall of 18% compared to the previous year and 62% fewer than the YE December 2023 when the number of work visas peaked.”
There were 234,841 visas issued (including dependants) in all work categories in the YE June 2026, of which 158,722 were to main applicants and 76,119 were to dependants. This represents a fall of 18% compared to the previous year and 62% fewer than the YE December 2023 when the number of work visas peaked.
- Why do people come to the UK? Work
Home Office, 2026-08-27 · supports
“Figure 1 shows between the YE June 2010 and YE June 2021 there were less than 200,000 work visas issued each year, of which over two-thirds were to main applicants. During this time the UK was a member of the European Union (EU) and, as such, EU nationals did not require a visa to work in the UK due to freedom of movement. Between 2021 and 2023, there was an increase in the number of work visas granted. Visas on the Health and Care Worker route, in particular, grew sharply following the expansion of the route in February 2022 to boost the social care workforce and was accompanied by a large increase in the number of dependants. Skilled Worker visas also contributed to the increase over this period. The growth in these routes caused work visas to peak in the YE December 2023 at 613,627. Combined Skilled Worker and Health and Care Worker accounted for 76% of all work visas in the same period.”
Figure 1 shows between the YE June 2010 and YE June 2021 there were less than 200,000 work visas issued each year, of which over two-thirds were to main applicants. During this time the UK was a member of the European Union (EU) and, as such, EU nationals did not require a visa to work in the UK due to freedom of movement. Between 2021 and 2023, there was an increase in the number of work visas granted. Visas on the Health and Care Worker route, in particular, grew sharply following the expansion of the route in February 2022 to boost the social care workforce and was accompanied by a large increase in the number of dependants. Skilled Worker visas also contributed to the increase over this period. The growth in these routes caused work visas to peak in the YE December 2023 at 613,627. Combined Skilled Worker and Health and Care Worker accounted for 76% of all work visas in the same period.
- Why do people come to the UK? Work
Home Office, 2026-08-27 · supports
“The number of work visas issued began to fall towards the end of 2023, driven by a decrease in Health and Care Worker visas, due to more scrutiny applied by the Home Office to employers in the health and social care sector, and compliance activity taken against employers who did not fulfil their obligations as employers of migrant workers.”
The number of work visas issued began to fall towards the end of 2023, driven by a decrease in Health and Care Worker visas, due to more scrutiny applied by the Home Office to employers in the health and social care sector, and compliance activity taken against employers who did not fulfil their obligations as employers of migrant workers.
- Why do people come to the UK? Work
Home Office, 2026-08-27 · supports
“Dependants accounted for 79% of Health and Care Worker visas issued in the YE June 2026. The higher number of dependants compared to main applicants may be partly due to migrants already in the UK, many of whom will have been sponsored prior to the changes in July 2025 restricting dependents for medium skilled occupations, continuing to be eligible to bring family members from abroad.”
Dependants accounted for 79% of Health and Care Worker visas issued in the YE June 2026. The higher number of dependants compared to main applicants may be partly due to migrants already in the UK, many of whom will have been sponsored prior to the changes in July 2025 restricting dependents for medium skilled occupations, continuing to be eligible to bring family members from abroad.
- Why do people come to the UK? Work
Home Office, 2026-08-27 · supports
“Visas issued to Health and Care Worker main applicants increased from 31,800 in the YE December 2021 to a peak of 145,823 in the YE December 2023. The rise was primarily due to an increase in South Asian (Indian, Pakistani, and Bangladeshi) and Sub-Saharan African (Zimbabwean, Ghanaian, and Nigerian) nationals coming to work as care workers. The number of Health and Care Worker visas issued to migrant workers in a Caring Personal Service occupation fell by over 99% (107,772 to 344) in YE June 2026 when compared with the YE December 2023, following the end to overseas recruitment of care workers in July 2025.”
Visas issued to Health and Care Worker main applicants increased from 31,800 in the YE December 2021 to a peak of 145,823 in the YE December 2023. The rise was primarily due to an increase in South Asian (Indian, Pakistani, and Bangladeshi) and Sub-Saharan African (Zimbabwean, Ghanaian, and Nigerian) nationals coming to work as care workers. The number of Health and Care Worker visas issued to migrant workers in a Caring Personal Service occupation fell by over 99% (107,772 to 344) in YE June 2026 when compared with the YE December 2023, following the end to overseas recruitment of care workers in July 2025.
- Why do people come to the UK? Work
Home Office, 2026-08-27 · supports
“The number of Health and Care Worker visas issued to nursing professionals fell by 95% (22,858 to 1,125) in the YE June 2026, when compared with the YE December 2023. This may be attributable to, according to the Department for Health and Social Care, the end of the centrally supported nurse international recruitment programme and changes in demand for international staff. Medical practitioners account for the majority (59%) of Health and Care Worker visas issued in the YE June 2026, though numbers have decreased by 42% in the latest year.”
The number of Health and Care Worker visas issued to nursing professionals fell by 95% (22,858 to 1,125) in the YE June 2026, when compared with the YE December 2023. This may be attributable to, according to the Department for Health and Social Care, the end of the centrally supported nurse international recruitment programme and changes in demand for international staff. Medical practitioners account for the majority (59%) of Health and Care Worker visas issued in the YE June 2026, though numbers have decreased by 42% in the latest year.
- Why do people come to the UK? Work
Home Office, 2026-08-27 · complicates
“In contrast to the Graduate route, Health and Care Worker extension grants rose by 19% in the YE June 2026, reaching 336,215. Skilled Worker extension grants also increased over the same period, by 11% to 196,097. These increases reflect the high numbers of entry clearance grants issued in 2022 and 2023, with many individuals who arrived during that period now seeking to extend their stay and continue working in the UK.”
In contrast to the Graduate route, Health and Care Worker extension grants rose by 19% in the YE June 2026, reaching 336,215. Skilled Worker extension grants also increased over the same period, by 11% to 196,097. These increases reflect the high numbers of entry clearance grants issued in 2022 and 2023, with many individuals who arrived during that period now seeking to extend their stay and continue working in the UK.
- Restoring control over the immigration system (accessible)
Home Office, 2025-05-12 · supports
“The recent significant increases followed the introduction of new immigration policies in 2020, following the UK’s departure from the EU – a system which made a number of key changes… including reducing the overall skills threshold for migration from degree-level (Regulated Qualifications Framework Level 6 or RQF 6) to A-Level-equivalent (RQF 3), and setting a new basic salary threshold for all countries at £25,600.”
The recent significant increases followed the introduction of new immigration policies in 2020, following the UK’s departure from the EU – a system which made a number of key changes… including reducing the overall skills threshold for migration from degree-level (Regulated Qualifications Framework Level 6 or RQF 6) to A-Level-equivalent (RQF 3), and setting a new basic salary threshold for all countries at £25,600.
- Review of salary requirements (accessible)
Migration Advisory Committee, 2025-12-17 · supports
“On 22 July 2025, the government raised the skill threshold to occupations that are Regulated Qualifications Framework (RQF) Level 6+ (equivalent to an undergraduate degree) to address the growth in visa numbers and concerns about exploitation of overseas recruits in occupations below RQF 6. This ends the changes introduced in 2020 that had relaxed the skills threshold to RQF 3+, allowing companies to make up for a shortfall of workers following the end of free movement.”
On 22 July 2025, the government raised the skill threshold to occupations that are Regulated Qualifications Framework (RQF) Level 6+ (equivalent to an undergraduate degree) to address the growth in visa numbers and concerns about exploitation of overseas recruits in occupations below RQF 6. This ends the changes introduced in 2020 that had relaxed the skills threshold to RQF 3+, allowing companies to make up for a shortfall of workers following the end of free movement.
- Migration Advisory Committee (MAC) annual report, 2023 (accessible)
Migration Advisory Committee, 2023-12-13 · supports
“Between October 2022 to September 2023 (the latest available data point), there have been 173,900 dependants on the H&CW visa. Over this period, the dependant ratio for those on the H&CW visa was 1.21 compared to 0.77 for other occupations on the SW visa (see Table 2.4).”
Between October 2022 to September 2023 (the latest available data point), there have been 173,900 dependants on the H&CW visa. Over this period, the dependant ratio for those on the H&CW visa was 1.21 compared to 0.77 for other occupations on the SW visa (see Table 2.4).
- Restoring control over the immigration system: technical annex
Home Office, 2025-05-12 · supports
“After expanding the Health and Care route to boost the social care workforce in 2022, total visas issued for main applicants and dependants fell by 68% to 110,800 from 2023 to 2024 due to more Home Office scrutiny on employers in the Health and Social Care sector, compliance activity taken against employers of migrant workers and the Spring 2024 policy measures no longer permitting Care Workers to bring dependants.”
After expanding the Health and Care route to boost the social care workforce in 2022, total visas issued for main applicants and dependants fell by 68% to 110,800 from 2023 to 2024 due to more Home Office scrutiny on employers in the Health and Social Care sector, compliance activity taken against employers of migrant workers and the Spring 2024 policy measures no longer permitting Care Workers to bring dependants.
- Restoring control over the immigration system: technical annex
Home Office, 2025-05-12 · supports
“The impact on the volume of Health and Care visas granted, due to Care and Senior Care worker occupations being removed, is estimated to be an annual reduction of approximately 7,000 main applicants (with a range of 6,000 to 8,000 main applicants).”
The impact on the volume of Health and Care visas granted, due to Care and Senior Care worker occupations being removed, is estimated to be an annual reduction of approximately 7,000 main applicants (with a range of 6,000 to 8,000 main applicants).
- The state of the adult social care sector and workforce in England, 2026
Skills for Care, 2026-10-14 · supports
“In March/April 2024, the SOL was replaced by the Immigration Salary List. In addition, restrictions were added that allowed only employers regulated by the CQC to sponsor care workers and senior care workers, the salary threshold was increased for newly sponsored Health and Care Worker visa holders, and dependants were no longer able to accompany or join care workers or senior care workers. Following these changes, the estimated number of people starting direct care providing roles in the independent sector, after having arrived in the UK, showed a large decrease from 105,000 in 2023/24, to 30,000 in 2025/26.”
In March/April 2024, the SOL was replaced by the Immigration Salary List. In addition, restrictions were added that allowed only employers regulated by the CQC to sponsor care workers and senior care workers, the salary threshold was increased for newly sponsored Health and Care Worker visa holders, and dependants were no longer able to accompany or join care workers or senior care workers. Following these changes, the estimated number of people starting direct care providing roles in the independent sector, after having arrived in the UK, showed a large decrease from 105,000 in 2023/24, to 30,000 in 2025/26.
- The state of the adult social care sector and workforce in England, 2026
Skills for Care, 2026-10-14 · supports
“The vacancy rate reached a peak of 10.4% in 2021/22, the highest rate since records began in 2012/13. Since then, the rate has steadily decreased to 6.1% in 2025/26, one percentage point lower than in 2018/19.”
The vacancy rate reached a peak of 10.4% in 2021/22, the highest rate since records began in 2012/13. Since then, the rate has steadily decreased to 6.1% in 2025/26, one percentage point lower than in 2018/19.
- The state of the adult social care sector and workforce in England, 2026
Skills for Care, 2026-10-14 · supports
“From March to August 2026, the vacancy rate has stayed consistently between 6.4% and 6.1%.”
From March to August 2026, the vacancy rate has stayed consistently between 6.4% and 6.1%.
- The state of the adult social care sector and workforce in England, 2026
Skills for Care, 2026-10-14 · supports
“Between 2022/23 and 2025/26, there were substantially more people recruited internationally compared to 2021/22 or earlier, which has played a part in the increase in filled posts and the reduction in vacant posts seen over the period. Between 2024/25 and 2025/26, the number of filled posts increased by around 22,000 and the number of vacant posts decreased by around 11,500. During the same period, 30,000 staff arrived from outside the UK to work in the sector.”
Between 2022/23 and 2025/26, there were substantially more people recruited internationally compared to 2021/22 or earlier, which has played a part in the increase in filled posts and the reduction in vacant posts seen over the period. Between 2024/25 and 2025/26, the number of filled posts increased by around 22,000 and the number of vacant posts decreased by around 11,500. During the same period, 30,000 staff arrived from outside the UK to work in the sector.
- The state of the adult social care sector and workforce in England, 2026
Skills for Care, 2026-10-14 · complicates
“In recent years, changes in economic inactivity and job-seeking behaviour may have affected the number of people available to work in the sector. At the same time, vacancies across the wider economy fell, which may have reduced competition for workers from other sectors. Together, these factors may have supported recruitment activity and contributed to improvements in adult social care vacancy rates.”
In recent years, changes in economic inactivity and job-seeking behaviour may have affected the number of people available to work in the sector. At the same time, vacancies across the wider economy fell, which may have reduced competition for workers from other sectors. Together, these factors may have supported recruitment activity and contributed to improvements in adult social care vacancy rates.
- The state of the adult social care sector and workforce in England, 2026
Skills for Care, 2026-10-14 · supports
“Between April 2026 and June 2026, there were around 2,000 people recruited internationally.”
Between April 2026 and June 2026, there were around 2,000 people recruited internationally.
- The state of the adult social care sector and workforce in England, 2026
Skills for Care, 2026-10-14 · supports
“The estimated number of internationally recruited workers in 2025/26 was 30,000 – a decrease from 50,000 the previous year. This in part was due to the closure of the Health and Care Worker visa route to new overseas applicants from July 2025. ▪ An estimated 150,000 posts were filled by people employed on the Health and Care Worker visa as at March 2026, working in direct care roles at establishments regulated by the Care Quality Commission (CQC) in the independent sector.”
The estimated number of internationally recruited workers in 2025/26 was 30,000 – a decrease from 50,000 the previous year. This in part was due to the closure of the Health and Care Worker visa route to new overseas applicants from July 2025. ▪ An estimated 150,000 posts were filled by people employed on the Health and Care Worker visa as at March 2026, working in direct care roles at establishments regulated by the Care Quality Commission (CQC) in the independent sector.
- The state of the adult social care sector and workforce in England, 2026
Skills for Care, 2026-10-14 · supports
“The vacancy rate for employers with direct care workers recruited internationally decreased by 4.3 percentage points between March 2022 and March 2026, from 9.9% to 5.6%.”
The vacancy rate for employers with direct care workers recruited internationally decreased by 4.3 percentage points between March 2022 and March 2026, from 9.9% to 5.6%.
- The state of the adult social care sector and workforce in England, 2026
Skills for Care, 2026-10-14 · supports
“Domestic recruitment remains challenging for the sector. The overall number of posts filled by British workers across all job roles decreased from 85% of the workforce in 2020/21, to 67% in 2025/26. This is a decrease of 130,000 posts over the period, including 40,000 over the last year.”
Domestic recruitment remains challenging for the sector. The overall number of posts filled by British workers across all job roles decreased from 85% of the workforce in 2020/21, to 67% in 2025/26. This is a decrease of 130,000 posts over the period, including 40,000 over the last year.
- The state of the adult social care sector and workforce in England, 2026
Skills for Care, 2026-10-14 · complicates
“The proportion of workers with a British nationality in the local authority and independent sectors has decreased from 83% in 2021/22 to 65% in 2025/26. This equates to around 107,000 fewer posts filled by people with a British nationality.”
The proportion of workers with a British nationality in the local authority and independent sectors has decreased from 83% in 2021/22 to 65% in 2025/26. This equates to around 107,000 fewer posts filled by people with a British nationality.
- The state of the adult social care sector and workforce in England, 2026
Skills for Care, 2026-10-14 · supports
“These figures indicate that the decreasing number of direct care workers with a British nationality in the workforce is related to fewer people with a British nationality starting in these roles over time, rather than an increase in the number of British workers leaving these roles.”
These figures indicate that the decreasing number of direct care workers with a British nationality in the workforce is related to fewer people with a British nationality starting in these roles over time, rather than an increase in the number of British workers leaving these roles.
- The state of the adult social care sector and workforce in England, 2026
Skills for Care, 2026-10-14 · supports
“The median hourly rate for care workers and support workers in March 2026 was £12.60, which was 39p higher than the National Living Wage (NLW) (£12.21). ▪ The median care worker and support worker hourly rate has nominally increased by 60p (5.0%) since March 2025; however, taking inflation into account, it has increased in real terms by 20p (1.6%). ▪ Care workers and support workers had lower hourly rates (median - £12.60) compared to Band 3 NHS Healthcare Assistants (HCAs) who were new in role (£12.75); however, they were paid more than those in Band 2 who were new in role (£12.51). ▪ Care workers and support workers with five or more years’ experience were, on average, earning around 12p more per hour than those with less than one year’s experience. This is considerably lower than in March 2016, when the gap was 33p per hour.”
The median hourly rate for care workers and support workers in March 2026 was £12.60, which was 39p higher than the National Living Wage (NLW) (£12.21). ▪ The median care worker and support worker hourly rate has nominally increased by 60p (5.0%) since March 2025; however, taking inflation into account, it has increased in real terms by 20p (1.6%). ▪ Care workers and support workers had lower hourly rates (median - £12.60) compared to Band 3 NHS Healthcare Assistants (HCAs) who were new in role (£12.75); however, they were paid more than those in Band 2 who were new in role (£12.51). ▪ Care workers and support workers with five or more years’ experience were, on average, earning around 12p more per hour than those with less than one year’s experience. This is considerably lower than in March 2016, when the gap was 33p per hour.
- Migration Advisory Committee (MAC) annual report, 2023 (accessible)
Migration Advisory Committee, 2023-12-13 · complicates
“However, as we stated at the time, the underlying cause of these workforce difficulties is the underfunding of the social care sector. We recommended the addition of care workers to the H&CW visa as part of a package of 19 other recommendations. We were clear that immigration could not solve these workforce issues alone. Our main recommendation was to introduce a minimum rate of pay, initially at £1 per hour above the National Living Wage (NLW), for care workers in England where care was being provided by public funds, to help tackle the workforce issues faced by the sector in the medium to longer term. To date, the government has not responded to or implemented any of these other recommendations as part of a social care package.”
However, as we stated at the time, the underlying cause of these workforce difficulties is the underfunding of the social care sector. We recommended the addition of care workers to the H&CW visa as part of a package of 19 other recommendations. We were clear that immigration could not solve these workforce issues alone. Our main recommendation was to introduce a minimum rate of pay, initially at £1 per hour above the National Living Wage (NLW), for care workers in England where care was being provided by public funds, to help tackle the workforce issues faced by the sector in the medium to longer term. To date, the government has not responded to or implemented any of these other recommendations as part of a social care package.
- Migration Advisory Committee (MAC) annual report, 2023 (accessible)
Migration Advisory Committee, 2023-12-13 · supports
“Underfunding and consequential low pay contributes to the exploitation of workers in the social care sector. Migrants in the sector on the H&CW visa are even more susceptible to exploitation as their right to reside in the UK is directly linked to their employer, creating a power imbalance.”
Underfunding and consequential low pay contributes to the exploitation of workers in the social care sector. Migrants in the sector on the H&CW visa are even more susceptible to exploitation as their right to reside in the UK is directly linked to their employer, creating a power imbalance.
- Record numbers of visa sponsor licences revoked for rule breaking
Home Office, 2025-09-11 · supports
“Between July 2024 and June 2025, 1,948 licences allowing companies to bring in migrant workers were revoked – more than double the number in the previous 12 months (937). Many of the employers had been using work visas to help migrants circumvent immigration rules, as well as undercutting domestic workers by underpaying and exploiting migrant staff reliant on their jobs to stay in the country. Adult social care, hospitality, retail and construction are among the sectors with the highest levels of abuse, data shows. Based on current trends, sponsor revocations for this year are expected to exceed the record high once again. This surge in compliance activity follows just 261 and 247 licences being revoked in the same period in 2021 to 2022 and 2022 to 2023 respectively.”
Between July 2024 and June 2025, 1,948 licences allowing companies to bring in migrant workers were revoked – more than double the number in the previous 12 months (937). Many of the employers had been using work visas to help migrants circumvent immigration rules, as well as undercutting domestic workers by underpaying and exploiting migrant staff reliant on their jobs to stay in the country. Adult social care, hospitality, retail and construction are among the sectors with the highest levels of abuse, data shows. Based on current trends, sponsor revocations for this year are expected to exceed the record high once again. This surge in compliance activity follows just 261 and 247 licences being revoked in the same period in 2021 to 2022 and 2022 to 2023 respectively.
- Record numbers of visa sponsor licences revoked for rule breaking
Home Office, 2025-09-11 · supports
“Licences have been revoked from companies for a wide range of rule breaking, which includes: underpayment of workers facilitating the entry of individuals to circumvent the immigration rules failing to provide promised work”
Licences have been revoked from companies for a wide range of rule breaking, which includes: underpayment of workers facilitating the entry of individuals to circumvent the immigration rules failing to provide promised work
- The NMC Register: 1 April 2025 – 31 March 2026
Nursing and Midwifery Council, 2026-07 · supports
“This is mainly due to fewer internationally educated professionals joining the Register. In 2025-26, 26.4% of new joiners to the Register were internationally educated, compared to 39.1% the year before and a high of 49.4% in 2023-24.”
This is mainly due to fewer internationally educated professionals joining the Register. In 2025-26, 26.4% of new joiners to the Register were internationally educated, compared to 39.1% the year before and a high of 49.4% in 2023-24.
- The NMC Register: 1 April 2025 – 31 March 2026
Nursing and Midwifery Council, 2026-07 · supports
“Over the past year, 10,961 professionals who were educated outside the UK joined the NMC Register for the first time. That’s 9,708 (47%) fewer than the previous year (20,669 in March 2025). In the same period, 30,581 UK-educated professionals joined the Register – this is 4.9% fewer than the 32,164 who joined the previous year. This fall follows the slowdown seen in 2024-25 where the number of UK-educated new joiners increased by only 5.9%, compared to 11.9% during 2023-24.”
Over the past year, 10,961 professionals who were educated outside the UK joined the NMC Register for the first time. That’s 9,708 (47%) fewer than the previous year (20,669 in March 2025). In the same period, 30,581 UK-educated professionals joined the Register – this is 4.9% fewer than the 32,164 who joined the previous year. This fall follows the slowdown seen in 2024-25 where the number of UK-educated new joiners increased by only 5.9%, compared to 11.9% during 2023-24.
- The NMC Register: 1 April 2025 – 31 March 2026
Nursing and Midwifery Council, 2026-07 · supports
“This means that two of the biggest sources of international joiners – Nigeria and Ghana – are ‘red list’ countries. Active recruitment from these countries is prohibited by the relevant codes of practice which uphold ethical standards on recruitment and support global health equity.”
This means that two of the biggest sources of international joiners – Nigeria and Ghana – are ‘red list’ countries. Active recruitment from these countries is prohibited by the relevant codes of practice which uphold ethical standards on recruitment and support global health equity.
- NHS staffing tracker: training
Nuffield Trust, 2026 · supports
“The number of people actually accepting a nurse training place in 2025 has increased by 140 (or 0.7%) compared to a year prior, but has fallen by 4,755 (18%) since the peak in 2021.”
The number of people actually accepting a nurse training place in 2025 has increased by 140 (or 0.7%) compared to a year prior, but has fallen by 4,755 (18%) since the peak in 2021.
- EEA migration in the UK: final report
Migration Advisory Committee, 2018-09 · complicates
“The research we commissioned showed that overall there is no evidence that migration has had a negative impact on the training of the UK-born workforce. Moreover, there is some evidence to suggest that skilled migrants have a positive impact on the quantity of training available to the UK-born workforce.”
The research we commissioned showed that overall there is no evidence that migration has had a negative impact on the training of the UK-born workforce. Moreover, there is some evidence to suggest that skilled migrants have a positive impact on the quantity of training available to the UK-born workforce.
- Restoring control over the immigration system
HM Government, 2025-05-12 · complicates
“Economic migration shot up while training of the domestic workforce has fallen, and lower skilled migration soared while the proportion of UK residents in work fell.”
Economic migration shot up while training of the domestic workforce has fallen, and lower skilled migration soared while the proportion of UK residents in work fell.
- NHS staff from overseas: statistics
House of Commons Library, 2025-11 · supports
“Overall, 21.3% of staff report a nationality other than British. For doctors this figure is 36.3%, and for nurses it is 30.0%.”
Overall, 21.3% of staff report a nationality other than British. For doctors this figure is 36.3%, and for nurses it is 30.0%.
- NHS staff from overseas: statistics
House of Commons Library, 2025-11 · supports
“In the early 2010s there was a rise in the proportion of staff reporting EU nationality. After the EU referendum this increase stopped and the proportion has fallen slightly. In recent years there has been a sharp increase in the proportion of NHS staff reporting an Asian or African nationality.”
In the early 2010s there was a rise in the proportion of staff reporting EU nationality. After the EU referendum this increase stopped and the proportion has fallen slightly. In recent years there has been a sharp increase in the proportion of NHS staff reporting an Asian or African nationality.
- Migrants in the UK labour market: an overview
The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-05-15 · supports
“In December 2025, a quarter of the jobs held by employees with non-EU nationalities when they registered for a national insurance number (‘adult migrants’) were in the health and care sector (Figure 7). This share stood at 22% in February 2022 but rose sharply after care workers were made eligible for Skilled Worker visas—161,000 Skilled Worker visas had been granted to non-EU care workers by the end of 2025.”
In December 2025, a quarter of the jobs held by employees with non-EU nationalities when they registered for a national insurance number (‘adult migrants’) were in the health and care sector (Figure 7). This share stood at 22% in February 2022 but rose sharply after care workers were made eligible for Skilled Worker visas—161,000 Skilled Worker visas had been granted to non-EU care workers by the end of 2025.
- Health at a Glance 2025: OECD Indicators
OECD, 2025-11-13 · supports
“Foreign-trained doctors represented, on average, 20% of the medical workforce across OECD countries in 2023, up from 16% in 2010 (Figure 8.23). Their numbers rose faster than those of domestically trained physicians in almost every member country, pushing their share upwards. The proportion varied considerably in 2023, from 1% or lower in Lithuania and Italy to more than 40% in Switzerland, New Zealand, Ireland and Norway, and 59% in Israel.”
Foreign-trained doctors represented, on average, 20% of the medical workforce across OECD countries in 2023, up from 16% in 2010 (Figure 8.23). Their numbers rose faster than those of domestically trained physicians in almost every member country, pushing their share upwards. The proportion varied considerably in 2023, from 1% or lower in Lithuania and Italy to more than 40% in Switzerland, New Zealand, Ireland and Norway, and 59% in Israel.
- Health at a Glance 2025: OECD Indicators
OECD, 2025-11-13 · supports
“The United Kingdom admitted more than 18 000 foreign-trained doctors in 2023, its highest annual intake on record and a three-fold increase from 2010.”
The United Kingdom admitted more than 18 000 foreign-trained doctors in 2023, its highest annual intake on record and a three-fold increase from 2010.
- Health at a Glance 2025: OECD Indicators
OECD, 2025-11-13 · complicates
“Growing reliance on foreign-trained physicians has taken place alongside an expansion of domestic training capacity. Between 2010 and 2023, domestically trained doctors still made up most of the growth in physician numbers in most OECD Members (Figure 8.24). Yet in five countries foreign-trained doctors drove more than half of the increase – notably in Switzerland (86%), Norway (70%) and Ireland (57%). Across OECD countries, foreign-trained doctors accounted for roughly one-third of the total growth in physicians’ numbers.”
Growing reliance on foreign-trained physicians has taken place alongside an expansion of domestic training capacity. Between 2010 and 2023, domestically trained doctors still made up most of the growth in physician numbers in most OECD Members (Figure 8.24). Yet in five countries foreign-trained doctors drove more than half of the increase – notably in Switzerland (86%), Norway (70%) and Ireland (57%). Across OECD countries, foreign-trained doctors accounted for roughly one-third of the total growth in physicians’ numbers.
- Health at a Glance 2025: OECD Indicators
OECD, 2025-11-13 · supports
“OECD countries tend to rely less on foreign-trained nurses than doctors. In 2023, 8.8% of nurses were trained abroad (Figure 8.26), far below the 19.6% average for physicians”
OECD countries tend to rely less on foreign-trained nurses than doctors. In 2023, 8.8% of nurses were trained abroad (Figure 8.26), far below the 19.6% average for physicians
- Health at a Glance 2025: OECD Indicators
OECD, 2025-11-13 · supports
“Their contribution was especially marked in the United Kingdom, where foreign-trained nurses represented 83% of the increase in the total number of nurses (increasing from 70 000 to 170 000 in absolute terms).”
Their contribution was especially marked in the United Kingdom, where foreign-trained nurses represented 83% of the increase in the total number of nurses (increasing from 70 000 to 170 000 in absolute terms).
- Health at a Glance 2025: OECD Indicators
OECD, 2025-11-13 · complicates
“The main comparability limitation relates to differences in the activity status of nurses. Some registries are updated regularly, making it possible to distinguish nurses who are actively working in health systems, while others include all nurses licensed to practise, regardless of whether they are still active. Data for Germany are based on nationality, not on place of training.”
The main comparability limitation relates to differences in the activity status of nurses. Some registries are updated regularly, making it possible to distinguish nurses who are actively working in health systems, while others include all nurses licensed to practise, regardless of whether they are still active. Data for Germany are based on nationality, not on place of training.
- Rapid Review of the Graduate Route
Migration Advisory Committee, 2024-05-14 · supports
“The median monthly income of the matched cohort who are in work is £1,750 (equivalent to £21,000 annually). The median monthly income, when looking at only the last 3 months of the first year on the Graduate route, is £2,020 (equivalent to £24,240 annually).”
The median monthly income of the matched cohort who are in work is £1,750 (equivalent to £21,000 annually). The median monthly income, when looking at only the last 3 months of the first year on the Graduate route, is £2,020 (equivalent to £24,240 annually).
- Rapid Review of the Graduate Route
Migration Advisory Committee, 2024-05-14 · complicates
“For domestic graduates it is estimated at £26,000 15 months after graduation, from the Graduate Outcomes Survey (UK domicile 1st degree in 2020/21). Despite a greater proportion of Graduate visa holders being postgraduates compared to domestic graduates, the difference between the 2 median income figures can be expected given that international students are likely to have less experience in the UK labour market.”
For domestic graduates it is estimated at £26,000 15 months after graduation, from the Graduate Outcomes Survey (UK domicile 1st degree in 2020/21). Despite a greater proportion of Graduate visa holders being postgraduates compared to domestic graduates, the difference between the 2 median income figures can be expected given that international students are likely to have less experience in the UK labour market.
- Rapid Review of the Graduate Route
Migration Advisory Committee, 2024-05-14 · supports
“It is interesting to note, in this context, that 19% of Graduate visa holders earn at least £2,500 in their first full month after obtaining the visa. This increases to 38% by the 12th month.”
It is interesting to note, in this context, that 19% of Graduate visa holders earn at least £2,500 in their first full month after obtaining the visa. This increases to 38% by the 12th month.
- Rapid Review of the Graduate Route
Migration Advisory Committee, 2024-05-14 · supports
“Amongst those switching from the Graduate route to a sponsored working visa, 69% were switching into occupations that are classified as: Managers, directors, and senior officials; Professional occupations; or Associate professional and technical occupations. This compares to 75% of domestic graduates who are in these roles. In contrast, only 42% of those switching directly from the Student route to a sponsored working route are in these roles. Crucially, Graduate route switchers are moving into graduate level jobs at the end of their visa in roughly the same proportions as we observe domestic graduates.”
Amongst those switching from the Graduate route to a sponsored working visa, 69% were switching into occupations that are classified as: Managers, directors, and senior officials; Professional occupations; or Associate professional and technical occupations. This compares to 75% of domestic graduates who are in these roles. In contrast, only 42% of those switching directly from the Student route to a sponsored working route are in these roles. Crucially, Graduate route switchers are moving into graduate level jobs at the end of their visa in roughly the same proportions as we observe domestic graduates.
- Rapid Review of the Graduate Route
Migration Advisory Committee, 2024-05-14 · supports
“Almost half of student switchers work as Senior care workers or Care workers (49%), whilst in comparison many fewer Graduate route switchers work in these occupations (20%). However, this is still significantly higher than the domestic graduate population, where only 6% work in the entire ‘Caring, leisure and other service’ occupations.”
Almost half of student switchers work as Senior care workers or Care workers (49%), whilst in comparison many fewer Graduate route switchers work in these occupations (20%). However, this is still significantly higher than the domestic graduate population, where only 6% work in the entire ‘Caring, leisure and other service’ occupations.
- Migrant journey: 2025 report
Home Office, 2026-05-21 · supports
“Within the Study route, and across the time-series covered in this report (from 2008 onwards), the 2020 Study cohort recorded the highest proportion of individuals still holding leave to remain 5 years after arrival. Following the 2012 Immigration Rules changes, outcomes for Study migrants were relatively stable for several years, with around 17% to 18% of those arriving between 2012 and 2016 retaining leave after 5 years. This rose to 25% for the 2019 cohort, before increasing to 41% for the 2020 Study cohorts.”
Within the Study route, and across the time-series covered in this report (from 2008 onwards), the 2020 Study cohort recorded the highest proportion of individuals still holding leave to remain 5 years after arrival. Following the 2012 Immigration Rules changes, outcomes for Study migrants were relatively stable for several years, with around 17% to 18% of those arriving between 2012 and 2016 retaining leave after 5 years. This rose to 25% for the 2019 cohort, before increasing to 41% for the 2020 Study cohorts.
- How many people claim asylum in the UK?
Home Office, 2026-08-27 · supports
“In the YE June 2026, 85,891 people claimed asylum in the UK, 21% fewer than in the previous year.”
In the YE June 2026, 85,891 people claimed asylum in the UK, 21% fewer than in the previous year.
- How many people claim asylum in the UK?
Home Office, 2026-08-27 · supports
“41% (34,999) of asylum seekers held a visa or other leave prior to claiming, including those who held an Electronic Travel Authorization (ETA)”
41% (34,999) of asylum seekers held a visa or other leave prior to claiming, including those who held an Electronic Travel Authorization (ETA)
- How many people claim asylum in the UK?
Home Office, 2026-08-27 · supports
“40% (33,949) of asylum seekers arrived on small boats”
40% (33,949) of asylum seekers arrived on small boats
- How many people claim asylum in the UK?
Home Office, 2026-08-27 · supports
“The increase in claims from people who had previously held a visa or other leave coincides with a rise in visa grants up until 2023. However, there may be a delay between a person being granted a visa and subsequently claiming asylum, as some claim shortly after arrival while others claim later during their period of leave or after their leave has expired.”
The increase in claims from people who had previously held a visa or other leave coincides with a rise in visa grants up until 2023. However, there may be a delay between a person being granted a visa and subsequently claiming asylum, as some claim shortly after arrival while others claim later during their period of leave or after their leave has expired.
- How many people claim asylum in the UK?
Home Office, 2026-08-27 · supports
“The number of people who held a study visa prior to claiming asylum has decreased by over a third (35%) in the latest year. This decline mirrors the fall in the number of study visas issued after restrictions on dependants came into effect on 1 January 2024. In contrast, the number of people who held a work visa prior to claiming asylum increased by 16%, making work visas the most common type of visa held prior to claiming. Most of this increase was driven by claims from Graduate visas, which more than doubled to 5,130 while claims from all other work visas fell 9% to 9,021.”
The number of people who held a study visa prior to claiming asylum has decreased by over a third (35%) in the latest year. This decline mirrors the fall in the number of study visas issued after restrictions on dependants came into effect on 1 January 2024. In contrast, the number of people who held a work visa prior to claiming asylum increased by 16%, making work visas the most common type of visa held prior to claiming. Most of this increase was driven by claims from Graduate visas, which more than doubled to 5,130 while claims from all other work visas fell 9% to 9,021.
- Entry clearance visa applications and outcomes detailed datasets, year ending June 2026 (Data_Vis_D02)
Home Office, 2026-08-27 · supports
“Outcomes of applications for entry clearance visas, 2005 to 2026 Q2 - dataset”
Outcomes of applications for entry clearance visas, 2005 to 2026 Q2 - dataset
- Entry clearance visa applications and outcomes detailed datasets, year ending June 2026 (Data_Vis_D02)
Home Office, 2026-08-27 · supports
“Outcomes of applications for entry clearance visas, 2005 to 2026 Q2 - dataset”
Outcomes of applications for entry clearance visas, 2005 to 2026 Q2 - dataset
- Sponsored work visas by occupation and industry (SOC 2020) detailed datasets, year ending June 2026 (Data_Occ_D02)
Home Office, 2026-08-27 · supports
“Grants of entry clearance visas, by occupation and industry, 2021 to 2026 Q2 - Dataset”
Grants of entry clearance visas, by occupation and industry, 2021 to 2026 Q2 - Dataset
- Adult social care workforce statistical appendix 2026
Skills for Care, 2026-10-14 · supports
“Table 3.12.2. Vacancy rate trend by job role”
Table 3.12.2. Vacancy rate trend by job role
- Adult social care workforce statistical appendix 2026
Skills for Care, 2026-10-14 · supports
“Table 4.8.1. Nationality trends by sector”
Table 4.8.1. Nationality trends by sector
- Adult social care workforce statistical appendix 2026
Skills for Care, 2026-10-14 · supports
“Table 5.4.1. Mean hourly pay trends by sector and job role”
Table 5.4.1. Mean hourly pay trends by sector and job role
- Sponsorship transparency data, April to June 2026 (SC_01)
UK Visas and Immigration, 2026-08-27 · supports
“SC_01: Action taken against Sponsors”
SC_01: Action taken against Sponsors
- Sponsorship transparency data, April to June 2026 (SP_01)
UK Visas and Immigration, 2026-08-27 · supports
“SP_01: Number of sponsoring organisations registered to sponsor an overseas national in Skilled Worker, Temporary Worker and Student routes”
SP_01: Number of sponsoring organisations registered to sponsor an overseas national in Skilled Worker, Temporary Worker and Student routes
- The NMC register: March 2026 UK data tables
Nursing and Midwifery Council, 2026-07 · supports
“Total number of people trained in the UK joining the register for the first time by declared ethnicity”
Total number of people trained in the UK joining the register for the first time by declared ethnicity
- The NMC register: March 2026 UK data tables
Nursing and Midwifery Council, 2026-07 · supports
“Total number of people trained internationally joining the register for the first time by declared ethnicity”
Total number of people trained internationally joining the register for the first time by declared ethnicity
- NHS staff from overseas: statistics
House of Commons Library, 2025-11 · supports
“As of June 2025, 78.7% of NHS staff in England are British. 9.9% report an Asian nationality, 5.2% are EU nationals and 4.2% are African.”
As of June 2025, 78.7% of NHS staff in England are British. 9.9% report an Asian nationality, 5.2% are EU nationals and 4.2% are African.
- Asylum claims and initial decisions detailed datasets, year ending June 2026 (Data_Asy_D01a)
Home Office, 2026-08-27 · supports
“Asy_D01a: People claiming asylum by prior route, 2018 Q1 to 2026 Q2 - dataset”
Asy_D01a: People claiming asylum by prior route, 2018 Q1 to 2026 Q2 - dataset
Immigration, Housing and Public Services
- Household projections for England: 2022-based
Office for National Statistics, 2025-10-28 · supports
“Over the 10 years to mid-2032, the number of households in England is projected to increase by 2.4 million (10.3%), from 23.5 million in 2022 to 25.9 million in 2032.”
Over the 10 years to mid-2032, the number of households in England is projected to increase by 2.4 million (10.3%), from 23.5 million in 2022 to 25.9 million in 2032.
- Household projections for England: 2022-based
Office for National Statistics, 2025-10-28 · supports
“The projected increase of 10.3% equates to an average of 242,000 additional households per year. For the same period (2022 to 2032) in the 2018-based projections, we projected an average of 158,000 additional households per year.”
The projected increase of 10.3% equates to an average of 242,000 additional households per year. For the same period (2022 to 2032) in the 2018-based projections, we projected an average of 158,000 additional households per year.
- 2022-based household projections: variant comparison
Office for National Statistics, 2025-10-28 · supports
“Table 430a: Household projection variants and difference between principal projection and each variant, local authorities and higher administrative areas, mid-2032 ... E92000001 ENGLAND 25958408 26233056 26233056 26645597 25744716 25559547 24670656 274648 274648 687189 -213691 -398861 -1287752”
Table 430a: Household projection variants and difference between principal projection and each variant, local authorities and higher administrative areas, mid-2032 ... E92000001 ENGLAND 25958408 26233056 26233056 26645597 25744716 25559547 24670656 274648 274648 687189 -213691 -398861 -1287752
- 2022-based household projections (migration category variant) - detailed data: Stage 1 projected households
Office for National Statistics, 2025-10-28 · supports
“E92000001 ENGLAND All Ages Persons 23540823.735300701”
E92000001 ENGLAND All Ages Persons 23540823.735300701
- Household projections for England: 2022-based
Office for National Statistics, 2025-10-28 · complicates
“Household projections are not a prediction or forecast of how many houses should be built in the future. Instead, they show how many additional households would form if assumptions based on previous demographic trends in population growth and household formation were to be realised. At the local level, household change is influenced by economic development and housing policies, factors that are not included in these projections.”
Household projections are not a prediction or forecast of how many houses should be built in the future. Instead, they show how many additional households would form if assumptions based on previous demographic trends in population growth and household formation were to be realised. At the local level, household change is influenced by economic development and housing policies, factors that are not included in these projections.
- Housing supply: net additional dwellings, England: 2024 to 2025
Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, 2025-11-20 · supports
“Annual housing supply in England amounted to 208,600 net additional dwellings in 2024-25, a 6% decrease on 2023-24.”
Annual housing supply in England amounted to 208,600 net additional dwellings in 2024-25, a 6% decrease on 2023-24.
- Housing supply: net additional dwellings, England: 2024 to 2025
Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, 2025-11-20 · supports
“As can be seen from Figure 1 and Table 1 below, net additional dwellings reached a previous peak of 223,530 in 2007-08 and then decreased to 130,610 in 2012-13 with the economic downturn. Net additions then increased to a peak of 248,590 in 2019-20, before falling to 217,750 in 2020-21, the lowest level for 5 years.”
As can be seen from Figure 1 and Table 1 below, net additional dwellings reached a previous peak of 223,530 in 2007-08 and then decreased to 130,610 in 2012-13 with the economic downturn. Net additions then increased to a peak of 248,590 in 2019-20, before falling to 217,750 in 2020-21, the lowest level for 5 years.
- Migration and housing costs: what does international evidence imply for the UK?
Migration Advisory Committee, 2026-06-19 · supports
“The median and mean estimates suggest that a one-percentage-point increase in the immigrant share raises house prices by 0.65% and 1%, respectively. Taken at face value, this implies that immigration can explain approximately 4-6% of the total increase in UK house prices over the last three decades.”
The median and mean estimates suggest that a one-percentage-point increase in the immigrant share raises house prices by 0.65% and 1%, respectively. Taken at face value, this implies that immigration can explain approximately 4-6% of the total increase in UK house prices over the last three decades.
- Migration and housing costs: what does international evidence imply for the UK?
Migration Advisory Committee, 2026-06-19 · complicates
“Overall, the evidence does not point to a single precise estimate of the impact of immigration on housing costs. However, the literature generally suggests positive but relatively small effects. Immigration, therefore, appears unlikely to be a dominant driver of rising housing costs in the UK.”
Overall, the evidence does not point to a single precise estimate of the impact of immigration on housing costs. However, the literature generally suggests positive but relatively small effects. Immigration, therefore, appears unlikely to be a dominant driver of rising housing costs in the UK.
- Migration and housing costs: what does international evidence imply for the UK?
Migration Advisory Committee, 2026-06-19 · complicates
“Housing supply responsiveness plays a key role: in dense areas or where planning constraints limit construction, immigration-driven demand shocks are more likely to raise prices. Immigrant composition also matters, with higher-income immigrants exerting stronger demand pressures than lower-income immigrants. Methodologically, studies using credible causal identification strategies tend to find positive but small effects, whereas less rigorous approaches produce more dispersed estimates. Studies using smaller geographic units (such as neighbourhoods or districts rather than larger regions) often find weaker or even negative effects, partly reflecting out-migration of native residents and the spatial redistribution of housing demand.”
Housing supply responsiveness plays a key role: in dense areas or where planning constraints limit construction, immigration-driven demand shocks are more likely to raise prices. Immigrant composition also matters, with higher-income immigrants exerting stronger demand pressures than lower-income immigrants. Methodologically, studies using credible causal identification strategies tend to find positive but small effects, whereas less rigorous approaches produce more dispersed estimates. Studies using smaller geographic units (such as neighbourhoods or districts rather than larger regions) often find weaker or even negative effects, partly reflecting out-migration of native residents and the spatial redistribution of housing demand.
- Migration and housing costs: what does international evidence imply for the UK?
Migration Advisory Committee, 2026-06-19 · supports
“Figure 1 summarises 45 comparable baseline semi-elasticity estimates from 22 studies that use modern causal inference techniques to estimate house price effects. Most estimates fall within a positive range, with the median effect at 0.36% and the mean at 0.8%.”
Figure 1 summarises 45 comparable baseline semi-elasticity estimates from 22 studies that use modern causal inference techniques to estimate house price effects. Most estimates fall within a positive range, with the median effect at 0.36% and the mean at 0.8%.
- Migration and housing costs: what does international evidence imply for the UK?
Migration Advisory Committee, 2026-06-19 · supports
“Figure 2 summarises 33 semi-elasticity estimates on the effect of immigration on rents from 17 studies. As with house prices, estimated rent effects are generally positive but modest, with a mean estimate of 0.87% and the median estimate at 0.64%.”
Figure 2 summarises 33 semi-elasticity estimates on the effect of immigration on rents from 17 studies. As with house prices, estimated rent effects are generally positive but modest, with a mean estimate of 0.87% and the median estimate at 0.64%.
- Migration and housing costs: what does international evidence imply for the UK?
Migration Advisory Committee, 2026-06-19 · supports
“UK-based estimates of the impact of migration on house prices tend to be negative. When we look at countries most similar to the UK in terms of housing market indicators, the estimated effects show a modest increase, with a median house-price effect of 0.65% (mean: 0.97%). By contrast, estimates in less comparable countries are slightly more positive, with a median estimate at 1.42% (mean: 1.63%). This pattern suggests that less positive house price effects are plausible in the UK. For rents, effect sizes are similar across both country groups. In UK-like countries, the median estimate is 0.81% (mean: 0.89%), whereas in less similar countries, the median estimate is lower at 0.42%, although the mean is comparable at 0.96%.”
UK-based estimates of the impact of migration on house prices tend to be negative. When we look at countries most similar to the UK in terms of housing market indicators, the estimated effects show a modest increase, with a median house-price effect of 0.65% (mean: 0.97%). By contrast, estimates in less comparable countries are slightly more positive, with a median estimate at 1.42% (mean: 1.63%). This pattern suggests that less positive house price effects are plausible in the UK. For rents, effect sizes are similar across both country groups. In UK-like countries, the median estimate is 0.81% (mean: 0.89%), whereas in less similar countries, the median estimate is lower at 0.42%, although the mean is comparable at 0.96%.
- Migration and housing costs: what does international evidence imply for the UK?
Migration Advisory Committee, 2026-06-19 · complicates
“For example, in the UK, Sá (2015) finds that a 1-percentage-point increase in the immigrant share of the local population is associated with a 0.05 percentage-point increase in out-migration from the area (and a 1.7% decline in house prices).”
For example, in the UK, Sá (2015) finds that a 1-percentage-point increase in the immigrant share of the local population is associated with a 0.05 percentage-point increase in out-migration from the area (and a 1.7% decline in house prices).
- Migration and housing costs: what does international evidence imply for the UK?
Migration Advisory Committee, 2026-06-19 · complicates
“However, there is substantial regional variation. Migrants make up around 46% of construction employment in London (compared with 42% of total employment), followed by 16% in the East of England and 12% in the South East. This suggests that immigration trends may be an important determinant of housing supply in the capital compared to other regions.”
However, there is substantial regional variation. Migrants make up around 46% of construction employment in London (compared with 42% of total employment), followed by 16% in the East of England and 12% in the South East. This suggests that immigration trends may be an important determinant of housing supply in the capital compared to other regions.
- Migrants and Housing in the UK
The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2024-12-04 · supports
“Around a third of people living in privately rented households in England and Wales were non-UK born, compared to around 10% of people living in owner-occupier housing and 15% living in social housing (Figure 2).”
Around a third of people living in privately rented households in England and Wales were non-UK born, compared to around 10% of people living in owner-occupier housing and 15% living in social housing (Figure 2).
- Migrants and Housing in the UK
The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2024-12-04 · complicates
“In 2021, only 17% of foreign-born people who had moved to England or Wales in the previous five years owned their own home. Those who had moved over 20 years earlier, by contrast, had a homeownership rate of 68%, marginally higher than the UK-born (67%) (Figure 3).”
In 2021, only 17% of foreign-born people who had moved to England or Wales in the previous five years owned their own home. Those who had moved over 20 years earlier, by contrast, had a homeownership rate of 68%, marginally higher than the UK-born (67%) (Figure 3).
- Migrants and Housing in the UK
The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2024-12-04 · supports
“The share of new social housing lettings in England to lead tenants with a non-UK nationality increased from 6% to 10% between the 2007/08 and 2022/23 financial years, most likely due to the rising share of non-UK citizens in the population (Figure 3).”
The share of new social housing lettings in England to lead tenants with a non-UK nationality increased from 6% to 10% between the 2007/08 and 2022/23 financial years, most likely due to the rising share of non-UK citizens in the population (Figure 3).
- Migrants and Housing in the UK
The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2024-12-04 · complicates
“In general, migrants living in the UK with temporary immigration statuses – such as a work, study or family visa – are not eligible for social housing. This is because they are subject to the “No Recourse to Public Funds” (NRPF) condition, which prevents access to state-funded welfare.”
In general, migrants living in the UK with temporary immigration statuses – such as a work, study or family visa – are not eligible for social housing. This is because they are subject to the “No Recourse to Public Funds” (NRPF) condition, which prevents access to state-funded welfare.
- Migrants and Housing in the UK
The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2024-12-04 · complicates
“While some non-UK passport holders may be more likely to have the characteristics required to gain priority for social housing, on average, they were slightly underrepresented among social renters at the time of the 2021 Census of England and Wales. At that point, 7% of people living in social housing had a non-UK passport, compared to 10% of non-UK passport holders in the population of England and Wales (excluding people living in communal establishments, such as care homes).”
While some non-UK passport holders may be more likely to have the characteristics required to gain priority for social housing, on average, they were slightly underrepresented among social renters at the time of the 2021 Census of England and Wales. At that point, 7% of people living in social housing had a non-UK passport, compared to 10% of non-UK passport holders in the population of England and Wales (excluding people living in communal establishments, such as care homes).
- Migrants and Housing in the UK
The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2024-12-04 · complicates
“Note, however, that recent migrants are particularly likely to be in private rented housing (see Figure 2). As a result, migration may have a larger impact on prices in the private rental market since this is where demand will be affected most. In practice, the research to date provides limited insight into the magnitude of any effect, in part because of data limitations.”
Note, however, that recent migrants are particularly likely to be in private rented housing (see Figure 2). As a result, migration may have a larger impact on prices in the private rental market since this is where demand will be affected most. In practice, the research to date provides limited insight into the magnitude of any effect, in part because of data limitations.
- Migrants and Housing in the UK
The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2024-12-04 · supports
“Of these, 22% (or 71,580) had a non-UK citizen as the head of the household. Note that these figures do not include all migrants—people with temporary immigration statuses subject to NRPF (see Understanding the Policy, above) are not eligible for homelessness support, although they may receive other types of housing assistance if they are destitute and would otherwise be homeless. Looking in more detail, EEA citizens were the head of 7% of households, while people granted refugee status accounted for 6%.”
Of these, 22% (or 71,580) had a non-UK citizen as the head of the household. Note that these figures do not include all migrants—people with temporary immigration statuses subject to NRPF (see Understanding the Policy, above) are not eligible for homelessness support, although they may receive other types of housing assistance if they are destitute and would otherwise be homeless. Looking in more detail, EEA citizens were the head of 7% of households, while people granted refugee status accounted for 6%.
- EEA migration in the UK: Final report
Migration Advisory Committee, 2018-09 · supports
“Migrants are a small fraction of people in social housing but a rising fraction of new tenants. The share of new tenancies going to migrants from the NMS in particular is rising. Given there is little building of new social housing this is inevitably at the expense of other potential tenants.”
Migrants are a small fraction of people in social housing but a rising fraction of new tenants. The share of new tenancies going to migrants from the NMS in particular is rising. Given there is little building of new social housing this is inevitably at the expense of other potential tenants.
- EEA migration in the UK: Final report
Migration Advisory Committee, 2018-09 · complicates
“EEA migrants contribute much more to the health service and the provision of social care in financial resources and through work than they consume in services. EEA workers are an increasing share of the health and social care workforces though these sectors employ greater numbers of non-EEA migrants. There is no evidence that migration has reduced the quality of healthcare.”
EEA migrants contribute much more to the health service and the provision of social care in financial resources and through work than they consume in services. EEA workers are an increasing share of the health and social care workforces though these sectors employ greater numbers of non-EEA migrants. There is no evidence that migration has reduced the quality of healthcare.
- EEA migration in the UK: Final report
Migration Advisory Committee, 2018-09 · complicates
“In education, migrant children and the children of migrants are a higher fraction of the school population than migrants are of the school workforce. However, we find no evidence that migration has reduced parental choice in schools or the educational attainment of UK-born children.”
In education, migrant children and the children of migrants are a higher fraction of the school population than migrants are of the school workforce. However, we find no evidence that migration has reduced parental choice in schools or the educational attainment of UK-born children.
- Private rent and house prices, UK: October 2026
Office for National Statistics, 2026-10-21 · supports
“Average UK monthly private rent increased by 3.8%, to £1,406, in the 12 months to September 2026 (provisional estimate); this annual growth rate is unchanged from the 12 months to August 2026.”
Average UK monthly private rent increased by 3.8%, to £1,406, in the 12 months to September 2026 (provisional estimate); this annual growth rate is unchanged from the 12 months to August 2026.
- Private rent and house prices, UK: October 2026
Office for National Statistics, 2026-10-21 · supports
“In England, private rent annual inflation was highest in the North West (5.7%), and lowest in London and the South East (both 3.5%), in the 12 months to September 2026.”
In England, private rent annual inflation was highest in the North West (5.7%), and lowest in London and the South East (both 3.5%), in the 12 months to September 2026.
- Long-term international migration, provisional: year ending December 2025
Office for National Statistics, 2026-05-21 · supports
“Net migration in YE December 2025 was 171,000. This was down from the peak of 944,000 in YE March 2023.”
Net migration in YE December 2025 was 171,000. This was down from the peak of 944,000 in YE March 2023.
- Schools, pupils and their characteristics: academic year 2025/26
Department for Education, 2026-06-04 · supports
“There has been a decrease of 112,200 (1.2%) pupils across all school types from the previous year, with a total of over 8.9 million pupils. This includes all state-funded and independent schools.”
There has been a decrease of 112,200 (1.2%) pupils across all school types from the previous year, with a total of over 8.9 million pupils. This includes all state-funded and independent schools.
- Schools, pupils and their characteristics: academic year 2025/26
Department for Education, 2026-06-04 · supports
“There are fewer pupils in primary, secondary and independent schools this year compared to last year. This is primarily driven by demographic changes, following a peak of births in 2012, as children move through secondary school age and lower numbers of pupils are moving into primary school age. The primary and secondary populations are projected to continue decreasing to the end of the projection period in 2030 (see the department's pupil projections release).”
There are fewer pupils in primary, secondary and independent schools this year compared to last year. This is primarily driven by demographic changes, following a peak of births in 2012, as children move through secondary school age and lower numbers of pupils are moving into primary school age. The primary and secondary populations are projected to continue decreasing to the end of the projection period in 2030 (see the department's pupil projections release).
- Schools, pupils and their characteristics: academic year 2025/26
Department for Education, 2026-06-04 · complicates
“A pupil is recorded to have English as an additional language if they are exposed to a language at home that is known or believed to be other than English. This measure is not a measure of English language proficiency or a good proxy for recent immigration. 21.6% of pupils were recorded as having a first language known or believed to be other than English.”
A pupil is recorded to have English as an additional language if they are exposed to a language at home that is known or believed to be other than English. This measure is not a measure of English language proficiency or a good proxy for recent immigration. 21.6% of pupils were recorded as having a first language known or believed to be other than English.
- NHS staffing tracker: General practice
Nuffield Trust, 2026-10-20 · supports
“Despite remaining below previous targets, the number of GPs continues to steadily increase, with 1,381 further GPs joining the workforce in the year to June 2026. The number of GPs employed directly by PCNs is also increasing. As of June 2026, 1,175 were employed by PCNs, an increase of 121% compared to the previous year. This brought the total number of fully qualified GPs in England to 30,183.”
Despite remaining below previous targets, the number of GPs continues to steadily increase, with 1,381 further GPs joining the workforce in the year to June 2026. The number of GPs employed directly by PCNs is also increasing. As of June 2026, 1,175 were employed by PCNs, an increase of 121% compared to the previous year. This brought the total number of fully qualified GPs in England to 30,183.
- NHS staffing tracker: General practice
Nuffield Trust, 2026-10-20 · supports
“GPs themselves make up only a minority (around one in six) of the general practice workforce. The number of doctors training to become GPs (GP registrars) has increased by 3,309 compared to pre-pandemic levels, and the number of GPs have increased by 2,382 over the same period.”
GPs themselves make up only a minority (around one in six) of the general practice workforce. The number of doctors training to become GPs (GP registrars) has increased by 3,309 compared to pre-pandemic levels, and the number of GPs have increased by 2,382 over the same period.
- NHS staffing tracker: General practice
Nuffield Trust, 2026-10-20 · complicates
“When taking account of the relative needs of a ICB’s patient population, the number of patients per one GP as of June 2026 varied from 2,566 patients in North East London ICB to 1,798 patients in Bristol, North Somerset and South Gloucestershire ICB.”
When taking account of the relative needs of a ICB’s patient population, the number of patients per one GP as of June 2026 varied from 2,566 patients in North East London ICB to 1,798 patients in Bristol, North Somerset and South Gloucestershire ICB.
- General Practice Workforce (series page)
NHS England Digital, 2026-10-22 · complicates
“The publication includes an Excel Bulletin file containing full-time equivalent (FTE) and headcount figures by gender and role, age band and work commitment at England-level, along with patient counts. ... As a result, the main time series in these statistics begins in September 2015 and the earlier figures that were calculated from the previous data source are not comparable although the publications are listed below for reference.”
The publication includes an Excel Bulletin file containing full-time equivalent (FTE) and headcount figures by gender and role, age band and work commitment at England-level, along with patient counts. ... As a result, the main time series in these statistics begins in September 2015 and the earlier figures that were calculated from the previous data source are not comparable although the publications are listed below for reference.
- Live Table 1000: Additional affordable homes provided by tenure and provider, England, Completions
Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, 2026-06-25 · supports
“Social Rent [note 4] 25,705 57,023 48,941 52,190 56,949 42,465 35,780 33,579 28,794 27,087 26,810 23,955 22,661 21,674 23,633 24,683 29,643 31,122 33,491 39,562 37,677 17,580 10,924 9,331 6,803 5,827 7,049 6,363 6,766 6,051 7,661 9,458 10,325 12,267”
Social Rent [note 4] 25,705 57,023 48,941 52,190 56,949 42,465 35,780 33,579 28,794 27,087 26,810 23,955 22,661 21,674 23,633 24,683 29,643 31,122 33,491 39,562 37,677 17,580 10,924 9,331 6,803 5,827 7,049 6,363 6,766 6,051 7,661 9,458 10,325 12,267
- Affordable housing supply in England: 2024 to 2025
Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, 2025-11-20 · complicates
“10,480 or 16% of all new affordable housing completions were delivered by local authorities, the highest recorded value in the available period (since 1991-92)”
10,480 or 16% of all new affordable housing completions were delivered by local authorities, the highest recorded value in the available period (since 1991-92)
- Affordable housing supply in England: 2024 to 2025
Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, 2025-11-20 · complicates
“There were 12,198 new social rent homes delivered in 2024-25, the highest number since 2012-13. Additionally, there were 5,019 London affordable rent homes that the Greater London Authority funds at a similar rent level to social rent.”
There were 12,198 new social rent homes delivered in 2024-25, the highest number since 2012-13. Additionally, there were 5,019 London affordable rent homes that the Greater London Authority funds at a similar rent level to social rent.
- International comparisons of government investment (Box 3.3, Economic and fiscal outlook – March 2020)
Office for Budget Responsibility, 2020-03 · supports
“Chart B shows the UK’s relative position among 30 OECD countries over the decade to 2017. Across the whole period, the UK was consistently positioned within the bottom quarter in terms of government investment as a share of GDP – more specifically, it was ranked between 23rd and 27th out of 30 countries in every year. UK government investment was a little higher as a share of GDP in 2017 than in 2007, having first risen during the crisis then fallen back. The large increase over the next five years will take it to around the present OECD median.”
Chart B shows the UK’s relative position among 30 OECD countries over the decade to 2017. Across the whole period, the UK was consistently positioned within the bottom quarter in terms of government investment as a share of GDP – more specifically, it was ranked between 23rd and 27th out of 30 countries in every year. UK government investment was a little higher as a share of GDP in 2017 than in 2007, having first risen during the crisis then fallen back. The large increase over the next five years will take it to around the present OECD median.
- OECD Data Explorer: Annual government non-financial accounts and key indicators (Table 0200)
OECD, 2026 · supports
“Annual government non-financial accounts and key indicators (for 'Developer API') ... S13 General government ... P51G Gross fixed capital formation ... XDC National currency ... V Current prices”
Annual government non-financial accounts and key indicators (for 'Developer API') ... S13 General government ... P51G Gross fixed capital formation ... XDC National currency ... V Current prices
- OECD Data Explorer: Annual GDP and components - expenditure approach (Table 0102)
OECD, 2026 · supports
“Annual GDP and components - expenditure approach ... B1GQ ... XDC ... V ... T0102”
Annual GDP and components - expenditure approach ... B1GQ ... XDC ... V ... T0102
- Health at a Glance 2025: OECD Indicators (Capital expenditure in the health sector)
OECD, 2025 · supports
“Between 2021 and 2024, average annual capital expenditure on health across OECD countries remained at around 0.6% of GDP ... Of the G7 countries, Japan at 0.9% and the United States at 0.8% remained above the OECD average, while France, Italy and the United Kingdom all invested below the average at 0.4-0.5% of GDP. ... On the other hand, after the United Kingdom experienced a clear decline in investment through the mid-2010s, there has been a notable increase in recent years – even if the level remains below the OECD average.”
Between 2021 and 2024, average annual capital expenditure on health across OECD countries remained at around 0.6% of GDP ... Of the G7 countries, Japan at 0.9% and the United States at 0.8% remained above the OECD average, while France, Italy and the United Kingdom all invested below the average at 0.4-0.5% of GDP. ... On the other hand, after the United Kingdom experienced a clear decline in investment through the mid-2010s, there has been a notable increase in recent years – even if the level remains below the OECD average.
- Fiscal risks and sustainability – September 2024
Office for Budget Responsibility, 2024-09 · complicates
“The steep rises in health spending described above mean the UK spent almost £3,500 per person (in 2015 real-terms prices) on health in 2022 – almost double real per-person spending at the turn of the century. Across the 19 advanced economies analysed in Chart 3.9, the UK still ranked below the average per-person total health spend of £3,880 in 2022 (the UK was fifth from bottom in 2000 and the same position in 2022), even after seeing one of the larger pandemic-related spikes.”
The steep rises in health spending described above mean the UK spent almost £3,500 per person (in 2015 real-terms prices) on health in 2022 – almost double real per-person spending at the turn of the century. Across the 19 advanced economies analysed in Chart 3.9, the UK still ranked below the average per-person total health spend of £3,880 in 2022 (the UK was fifth from bottom in 2000 and the same position in 2022), even after seeing one of the larger pandemic-related spikes.
- Economic and fiscal outlook – March 2026
Office for Budget Responsibility, 2026-03 · complicates
“As shown in Chart 4.3, the real per-person value of RDEL spending is projected to rise to the highest level for the past two decades, excluding the pandemic peak. It is around £100 a year higher than when the Treasury set the SR envelopes alongside the March 2025 forecast. The initial June 2025 Spending Review plans implied real per-person resource spending of approximately £7,700 by 2028-29. Since then, a lower population growth forecast, largely due to lower projected net migration, has increased projected real spending per person to around £7,800 in 2028-29.”
As shown in Chart 4.3, the real per-person value of RDEL spending is projected to rise to the highest level for the past two decades, excluding the pandemic peak. It is around £100 a year higher than when the Treasury set the SR envelopes alongside the March 2025 forecast. The initial June 2025 Spending Review plans implied real per-person resource spending of approximately £7,700 by 2028-29. Since then, a lower population growth forecast, largely due to lower projected net migration, has increased projected real spending per person to around £7,800 in 2028-29.
- Economic and fiscal outlook – March 2026 (Box 2.1, Net migration and GDP per person)
Office for Budget Responsibility, 2026-03 · supports
“In addition, a significant proportion of public investment is fixed in nominal terms up to the end of a Spending Review period, so does not respond immediately to changes in the size of the population. Therefore, higher inward migration could initially make less capital available per worker and reduce productivity. Over the longer term, private and public investment flows may rise to offset the dilution of capital per person, but there is limited evidence on the extent to which this happens, or if it does at all.”
In addition, a significant proportion of public investment is fixed in nominal terms up to the end of a Spending Review period, so does not respond immediately to changes in the size of the population. Therefore, higher inward migration could initially make less capital available per worker and reduce productivity. Over the longer term, private and public investment flows may rise to offset the dilution of capital per person, but there is limited evidence on the extent to which this happens, or if it does at all.
- School funding statistics: financial year 2025-26
Department for Education, 2026-01-29 · complicates
“After adjusting for inflation, funding per pupil was broadly flat between 2010-11 and 2015-16 at around £7,700 in 2025-26 prices. It then fell by 3.6% over the period 2016-17 to 2018-19, but subsequently increased by 4.6% over the years 2019-20, 2020-21 and 2021-22. Since then, funding has increased by a further 7.1% (after adjusting for inflation), including small falls of 0.2% in 2022-23 and 0.1% in 2026-27, and stands at £8,390 in 2026-27 (in 2025-26 prices).”
After adjusting for inflation, funding per pupil was broadly flat between 2010-11 and 2015-16 at around £7,700 in 2025-26 prices. It then fell by 3.6% over the period 2016-17 to 2018-19, but subsequently increased by 4.6% over the years 2019-20, 2020-21 and 2021-22. Since then, funding has increased by a further 7.1% (after adjusting for inflation), including small falls of 0.2% in 2022-23 and 0.1% in 2026-27, and stands at £8,390 in 2026-27 (in 2025-26 prices).
- Housing supply: net additional dwellings, England: 2024 to 2025
Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, 2025-11-20 · supports
“Table 1. Net additional dwellings, England, 1991-92 to 2024-25”
Table 1. Net additional dwellings, England, 1991-92 to 2024-25
- Price Index of Private Rents, UK: monthly price statistics
Office for National Statistics, 2026-10-21 · supports
“This spreadsheet includes Price Index of Private Rents (PIPR) data from January 2015 to present.”
This spreadsheet includes Price Index of Private Rents (PIPR) data from January 2015 to present.
- Schools, pupils and their characteristics: academic year 2025/26 (data set)
Department for Education, 2026-06-04 · supports
“Pupil characteristics - number of pupils by fsm eligibility ... Pupils in state-funded nursery, primary, secondary and special schools, non-maintained special schools, pupil referral units and independent schools.”
Pupil characteristics - number of pupils by fsm eligibility ... Pupils in state-funded nursery, primary, secondary and special schools, non-maintained special schools, pupil referral units and independent schools.
- Live Table 1000: Additional affordable homes provided by tenure and provider, England
Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, 2026-06-25 · supports
“Live Table 1000: Additional affordable homes provided by tenure and provider, England, Completions”
Live Table 1000: Additional affordable homes provided by tenure and provider, England, Completions
- School funding statistics: financial year 2025-26 (Tab1 data file)
Department for Education, 2026-01-29 · supports
“School revenue funding for 5-16 year olds for 2010-11 to 2026-27”
School revenue funding for 5-16 year olds for 2010-11 to 2026-27
- OECD Data Explorer: general government gross fixed capital formation and GDP
OECD, 2026 · supports
“Annual government non-financial accounts and key indicators (for 'Developer API') ... P51G Gross fixed capital formation”
Annual government non-financial accounts and key indicators (for 'Developer API') ... P51G Gross fixed capital formation