Immigration, Housing and Public Services

Immigration, Housing and Public Services

1. Household projections for England: 2022-based

   Office for National Statistics, 2025-10-28 · supports

   “Over the 10 years to mid-2032, the number of households in England is projected to increase by 2.4 million (10.3%), from 23.5 million in 2022 to 25.9 million in 2032.”Hide quote

   Over the 10 years to mid-2032, the number of households in England is projected to increase by 2.4 million (10.3%), from 23.5 million in 2022 to 25.9 million in 2032.

2. Household projections for England: 2022-based

   Office for National Statistics, 2025-10-28 · supports

   “The projected increase of 10.3% equates to an average of 242,000 additional households per year. For the same period (2022 to 2032) in the 2018-based projections, we projected an average of 158,000 additional households per year.”Hide quote

   The projected increase of 10.3% equates to an average of 242,000 additional households per year. For the same period (2022 to 2032) in the 2018-based projections, we projected an average of 158,000 additional households per year.

3. 2022-based household projections: variant comparison

   Office for National Statistics, 2025-10-28 · supports

   “Table 430a: Household projection variants and difference between principal projection and each variant, local authorities and higher administrative areas, mid-2032 ... E92000001 ENGLAND 25958408 26233056 26233056 26645597 25744716 25559547 24670656 274648 274648 687189 -213691 -398861 -1287752”Hide quote

   Table 430a: Household projection variants and difference between principal projection and each variant, local authorities and higher administrative areas, mid-2032 ... E92000001 ENGLAND 25958408 26233056 26233056 26645597 25744716 25559547 24670656 274648 274648 687189 -213691 -398861 -1287752

4. 2022-based household projections (migration category variant) - detailed data: Stage 1 projected households

   Office for National Statistics, 2025-10-28 · supports

   “E92000001 ENGLAND All Ages Persons 23540823.735300701”Hide quote

   E92000001 ENGLAND All Ages Persons 23540823.735300701

5. Household projections for England: 2022-based

   Office for National Statistics, 2025-10-28 · complicates

   “Household projections are not a prediction or forecast of how many houses should be built in the future. Instead, they show how many additional households would form if assumptions based on previous demographic trends in population growth and household formation were to be realised. At the local level, household change is influenced by economic development and housing policies, factors that are not included in these projections.”Hide quote

   Household projections are not a prediction or forecast of how many houses should be built in the future. Instead, they show how many additional households would form if assumptions based on previous demographic trends in population growth and household formation were to be realised. At the local level, household change is influenced by economic development and housing policies, factors that are not included in these projections.

6. Housing supply: net additional dwellings, England: 2024 to 2025

   Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, 2025-11-20 · supports

   “Annual housing supply in England amounted to 208,600 net additional dwellings in 2024-25, a 6% decrease on 2023-24.”Hide quote

   Annual housing supply in England amounted to 208,600 net additional dwellings in 2024-25, a 6% decrease on 2023-24.

7. Housing supply: net additional dwellings, England: 2024 to 2025

   Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, 2025-11-20 · supports

   “As can be seen from Figure 1 and Table 1 below, net additional dwellings reached a previous peak of 223,530 in 2007-08 and then decreased to 130,610 in 2012-13 with the economic downturn. Net additions then increased to a peak of 248,590 in 2019-20, before falling to 217,750 in 2020-21, the lowest level for 5 years.”Hide quote

   As can be seen from Figure 1 and Table 1 below, net additional dwellings reached a previous peak of 223,530 in 2007-08 and then decreased to 130,610 in 2012-13 with the economic downturn. Net additions then increased to a peak of 248,590 in 2019-20, before falling to 217,750 in 2020-21, the lowest level for 5 years.

8. Migration and housing costs: what does international evidence imply for the UK?

   Migration Advisory Committee, 2026-06-19 · supports

   “The median and mean estimates suggest that a one-percentage-point increase in the immigrant share raises house prices by 0.65% and 1%, respectively. Taken at face value, this implies that immigration can explain approximately 4-6% of the total increase in UK house prices over the last three decades.”Hide quote

   The median and mean estimates suggest that a one-percentage-point increase in the immigrant share raises house prices by 0.65% and 1%, respectively. Taken at face value, this implies that immigration can explain approximately 4-6% of the total increase in UK house prices over the last three decades.

9. Migration and housing costs: what does international evidence imply for the UK?

   Migration Advisory Committee, 2026-06-19 · complicates

   “Overall, the evidence does not point to a single precise estimate of the impact of immigration on housing costs. However, the literature generally suggests positive but relatively small effects. Immigration, therefore, appears unlikely to be a dominant driver of rising housing costs in the UK.”Hide quote

   Overall, the evidence does not point to a single precise estimate of the impact of immigration on housing costs. However, the literature generally suggests positive but relatively small effects. Immigration, therefore, appears unlikely to be a dominant driver of rising housing costs in the UK.

10. Migration and housing costs: what does international evidence imply for the UK?

    Migration Advisory Committee, 2026-06-19 · complicates

    “Housing supply responsiveness plays a key role: in dense areas or where planning constraints limit construction, immigration-driven demand shocks are more likely to raise prices. Immigrant composition also matters, with higher-income immigrants exerting stronger demand pressures than lower-income immigrants. Methodologically, studies using credible causal identification strategies tend to find positive but small effects, whereas less rigorous approaches produce more dispersed estimates. Studies using smaller geographic units (such as neighbourhoods or districts rather than larger regions) often find weaker or even negative effects, partly reflecting out-migration of native residents and the spatial redistribution of housing demand.”Hide quote

    Housing supply responsiveness plays a key role: in dense areas or where planning constraints limit construction, immigration-driven demand shocks are more likely to raise prices. Immigrant composition also matters, with higher-income immigrants exerting stronger demand pressures than lower-income immigrants. Methodologically, studies using credible causal identification strategies tend to find positive but small effects, whereas less rigorous approaches produce more dispersed estimates. Studies using smaller geographic units (such as neighbourhoods or districts rather than larger regions) often find weaker or even negative effects, partly reflecting out-migration of native residents and the spatial redistribution of housing demand.

11. Migration and housing costs: what does international evidence imply for the UK?

    Migration Advisory Committee, 2026-06-19 · supports

    “Figure 1 summarises 45 comparable baseline semi-elasticity estimates from 22 studies that use modern causal inference techniques to estimate house price effects. Most estimates fall within a positive range, with the median effect at 0.36% and the mean at 0.8%.”Hide quote

    Figure 1 summarises 45 comparable baseline semi-elasticity estimates from 22 studies that use modern causal inference techniques to estimate house price effects. Most estimates fall within a positive range, with the median effect at 0.36% and the mean at 0.8%.

12. Migration and housing costs: what does international evidence imply for the UK?

    Migration Advisory Committee, 2026-06-19 · supports

    “Figure 2 summarises 33 semi-elasticity estimates on the effect of immigration on rents from 17 studies. As with house prices, estimated rent effects are generally positive but modest, with a mean estimate of 0.87% and the median estimate at 0.64%.”Hide quote

    Figure 2 summarises 33 semi-elasticity estimates on the effect of immigration on rents from 17 studies. As with house prices, estimated rent effects are generally positive but modest, with a mean estimate of 0.87% and the median estimate at 0.64%.

13. Migration and housing costs: what does international evidence imply for the UK?

    Migration Advisory Committee, 2026-06-19 · supports

    “UK-based estimates of the impact of migration on house prices tend to be negative. When we look at countries most similar to the UK in terms of housing market indicators, the estimated effects show a modest increase, with a median house-price effect of 0.65% (mean: 0.97%). By contrast, estimates in less comparable countries are slightly more positive, with a median estimate at 1.42% (mean: 1.63%). This pattern suggests that less positive house price effects are plausible in the UK. For rents, effect sizes are similar across both country groups. In UK-like countries, the median estimate is 0.81% (mean: 0.89%), whereas in less similar countries, the median estimate is lower at 0.42%, although the mean is comparable at 0.96%.”Hide quote

    UK-based estimates of the impact of migration on house prices tend to be negative. When we look at countries most similar to the UK in terms of housing market indicators, the estimated effects show a modest increase, with a median house-price effect of 0.65% (mean: 0.97%). By contrast, estimates in less comparable countries are slightly more positive, with a median estimate at 1.42% (mean: 1.63%). This pattern suggests that less positive house price effects are plausible in the UK. For rents, effect sizes are similar across both country groups. In UK-like countries, the median estimate is 0.81% (mean: 0.89%), whereas in less similar countries, the median estimate is lower at 0.42%, although the mean is comparable at 0.96%.

14. Migration and housing costs: what does international evidence imply for the UK?

    Migration Advisory Committee, 2026-06-19 · complicates

    “For example, in the UK, Sá (2015) finds that a 1-percentage-point increase in the immigrant share of the local population is associated with a 0.05 percentage-point increase in out-migration from the area (and a 1.7% decline in house prices).”Hide quote

    For example, in the UK, Sá (2015) finds that a 1-percentage-point increase in the immigrant share of the local population is associated with a 0.05 percentage-point increase in out-migration from the area (and a 1.7% decline in house prices).

15. Migration and housing costs: what does international evidence imply for the UK?

    Migration Advisory Committee, 2026-06-19 · complicates

    “However, there is substantial regional variation. Migrants make up around 46% of construction employment in London (compared with 42% of total employment), followed by 16% in the East of England and 12% in the South East. This suggests that immigration trends may be an important determinant of housing supply in the capital compared to other regions.”Hide quote

    However, there is substantial regional variation. Migrants make up around 46% of construction employment in London (compared with 42% of total employment), followed by 16% in the East of England and 12% in the South East. This suggests that immigration trends may be an important determinant of housing supply in the capital compared to other regions.

16. Migrants and Housing in the UK

    The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2024-12-04 · supports

    “Around a third of people living in privately rented households in England and Wales were non-UK born, compared to around 10% of people living in owner-occupier housing and 15% living in social housing (Figure 2).”Hide quote

    Around a third of people living in privately rented households in England and Wales were non-UK born, compared to around 10% of people living in owner-occupier housing and 15% living in social housing (Figure 2).

17. Migrants and Housing in the UK

    The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2024-12-04 · complicates

    “In 2021, only 17% of foreign-born people who had moved to England or Wales in the previous five years owned their own home. Those who had moved over 20 years earlier, by contrast, had a homeownership rate of 68%, marginally higher than the UK-born (67%) (Figure 3).”Hide quote

    In 2021, only 17% of foreign-born people who had moved to England or Wales in the previous five years owned their own home. Those who had moved over 20 years earlier, by contrast, had a homeownership rate of 68%, marginally higher than the UK-born (67%) (Figure 3).

18. Migrants and Housing in the UK

    The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2024-12-04 · supports

    “The share of new social housing lettings in England to lead tenants with a non-UK nationality increased from 6% to 10% between the 2007/08 and 2022/23 financial years, most likely due to the rising share of non-UK citizens in the population (Figure 3).”Hide quote

    The share of new social housing lettings in England to lead tenants with a non-UK nationality increased from 6% to 10% between the 2007/08 and 2022/23 financial years, most likely due to the rising share of non-UK citizens in the population (Figure 3).

19. Migrants and Housing in the UK

    The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2024-12-04 · complicates

    “In general, migrants living in the UK with temporary immigration statuses – such as a work, study or family visa – are not eligible for social housing. This is because they are subject to the “No Recourse to Public Funds” (NRPF) condition, which prevents access to state-funded welfare.”Hide quote

    In general, migrants living in the UK with temporary immigration statuses – such as a work, study or family visa – are not eligible for social housing. This is because they are subject to the “No Recourse to Public Funds” (NRPF) condition, which prevents access to state-funded welfare.

20. Migrants and Housing in the UK

    The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2024-12-04 · complicates

    “While some non-UK passport holders may be more likely to have the characteristics required to gain priority for social housing, on average, they were slightly underrepresented among social renters at the time of the 2021 Census of England and Wales. At that point, 7% of people living in social housing had a non-UK passport, compared to 10% of non-UK passport holders in the population of England and Wales (excluding people living in communal establishments, such as care homes).”Hide quote

    While some non-UK passport holders may be more likely to have the characteristics required to gain priority for social housing, on average, they were slightly underrepresented among social renters at the time of the 2021 Census of England and Wales. At that point, 7% of people living in social housing had a non-UK passport, compared to 10% of non-UK passport holders in the population of England and Wales (excluding people living in communal establishments, such as care homes).

21. Migrants and Housing in the UK

    The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2024-12-04 · complicates

    “Note, however, that recent migrants are particularly likely to be in private rented housing (see Figure 2). As a result, migration may have a larger impact on prices in the private rental market since this is where demand will be affected most. In practice, the research to date provides limited insight into the magnitude of any effect, in part because of data limitations.”Hide quote

    Note, however, that recent migrants are particularly likely to be in private rented housing (see Figure 2). As a result, migration may have a larger impact on prices in the private rental market since this is where demand will be affected most. In practice, the research to date provides limited insight into the magnitude of any effect, in part because of data limitations.

22. Migrants and Housing in the UK

    The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2024-12-04 · supports

    “Of these, 22% (or 71,580) had a non-UK citizen as the head of the household. Note that these figures do not include all migrants—people with temporary immigration statuses subject to NRPF (see Understanding the Policy, above) are not eligible for homelessness support, although they may receive other types of housing assistance if they are destitute and would otherwise be homeless. Looking in more detail, EEA citizens were the head of 7% of households, while people granted refugee status accounted for 6%.”Hide quote

    Of these, 22% (or 71,580) had a non-UK citizen as the head of the household. Note that these figures do not include all migrants—people with temporary immigration statuses subject to NRPF (see Understanding the Policy, above) are not eligible for homelessness support, although they may receive other types of housing assistance if they are destitute and would otherwise be homeless. Looking in more detail, EEA citizens were the head of 7% of households, while people granted refugee status accounted for 6%.

23. EEA migration in the UK: Final report

    Migration Advisory Committee, 2018-09 · supports

    “Migrants are a small fraction of people in social housing but a rising fraction of new tenants. The share of new tenancies going to migrants from the NMS in particular is rising. Given there is little building of new social housing this is inevitably at the expense of other potential tenants.”Hide quote

    Migrants are a small fraction of people in social housing but a rising fraction of new tenants. The share of new tenancies going to migrants from the NMS in particular is rising. Given there is little building of new social housing this is inevitably at the expense of other potential tenants.

24. EEA migration in the UK: Final report

    Migration Advisory Committee, 2018-09 · complicates

    “EEA migrants contribute much more to the health service and the provision of social care in financial resources and through work than they consume in services. EEA workers are an increasing share of the health and social care workforces though these sectors employ greater numbers of non-EEA migrants. There is no evidence that migration has reduced the quality of healthcare.”Hide quote

    EEA migrants contribute much more to the health service and the provision of social care in financial resources and through work than they consume in services. EEA workers are an increasing share of the health and social care workforces though these sectors employ greater numbers of non-EEA migrants. There is no evidence that migration has reduced the quality of healthcare.

25. EEA migration in the UK: Final report

    Migration Advisory Committee, 2018-09 · complicates

    “In education, migrant children and the children of migrants are a higher fraction of the school population than migrants are of the school workforce. However, we find no evidence that migration has reduced parental choice in schools or the educational attainment of UK-born children.”Hide quote

    In education, migrant children and the children of migrants are a higher fraction of the school population than migrants are of the school workforce. However, we find no evidence that migration has reduced parental choice in schools or the educational attainment of UK-born children.

26. Private rent and house prices, UK: October 2026

    Office for National Statistics, 2026-10-21 · supports

    “Average UK monthly private rent increased by 3.8%, to £1,406, in the 12 months to September 2026 (provisional estimate); this annual growth rate is unchanged from the 12 months to August 2026.”Hide quote

    Average UK monthly private rent increased by 3.8%, to £1,406, in the 12 months to September 2026 (provisional estimate); this annual growth rate is unchanged from the 12 months to August 2026.

27. Private rent and house prices, UK: October 2026

    Office for National Statistics, 2026-10-21 · supports

    “In England, private rent annual inflation was highest in the North West (5.7%), and lowest in London and the South East (both 3.5%), in the 12 months to September 2026.”Hide quote

    In England, private rent annual inflation was highest in the North West (5.7%), and lowest in London and the South East (both 3.5%), in the 12 months to September 2026.

28. Long-term international migration, provisional: year ending December 2025

    Office for National Statistics, 2026-05-21 · supports

    “Net migration in YE December 2025 was 171,000. This was down from the peak of 944,000 in YE March 2023.”Hide quote

    Net migration in YE December 2025 was 171,000. This was down from the peak of 944,000 in YE March 2023.

29. Schools, pupils and their characteristics: academic year 2025/26

    Department for Education, 2026-06-04 · supports

    “There has been a decrease of 112,200 (1.2%) pupils across all school types from the previous year, with a total of over 8.9 million pupils. This includes all state-funded and independent schools.”Hide quote

    There has been a decrease of 112,200 (1.2%) pupils across all school types from the previous year, with a total of over 8.9 million pupils. This includes all state-funded and independent schools.

30. Schools, pupils and their characteristics: academic year 2025/26

    Department for Education, 2026-06-04 · supports

    “There are fewer pupils in primary, secondary and independent schools this year compared to last year. This is primarily driven by demographic changes, following a peak of births in 2012, as children move through secondary school age and lower numbers of pupils are moving into primary school age. The primary and secondary populations are projected to continue decreasing to the end of the projection period in 2030 (see the department's pupil projections release).”Hide quote

    There are fewer pupils in primary, secondary and independent schools this year compared to last year. This is primarily driven by demographic changes, following a peak of births in 2012, as children move through secondary school age and lower numbers of pupils are moving into primary school age. The primary and secondary populations are projected to continue decreasing to the end of the projection period in 2030 (see the department's pupil projections release).

31. Schools, pupils and their characteristics: academic year 2025/26

    Department for Education, 2026-06-04 · complicates

    “A pupil is recorded to have English as an additional language if they are exposed to a language at home that is known or believed to be other than English. This measure is not a measure of English language proficiency or a good proxy for recent immigration. 21.6% of pupils were recorded as having a first language known or believed to be other than English.”Hide quote

    A pupil is recorded to have English as an additional language if they are exposed to a language at home that is known or believed to be other than English. This measure is not a measure of English language proficiency or a good proxy for recent immigration. 21.6% of pupils were recorded as having a first language known or believed to be other than English.

32. NHS staffing tracker: General practice

    Nuffield Trust, 2026-10-20 · supports

    “Despite remaining below previous targets, the number of GPs continues to steadily increase, with 1,381 further GPs joining the workforce in the year to June 2026. The number of GPs employed directly by PCNs is also increasing. As of June 2026, 1,175 were employed by PCNs, an increase of 121% compared to the previous year. This brought the total number of fully qualified GPs in England to 30,183.”Hide quote

    Despite remaining below previous targets, the number of GPs continues to steadily increase, with 1,381 further GPs joining the workforce in the year to June 2026. The number of GPs employed directly by PCNs is also increasing. As of June 2026, 1,175 were employed by PCNs, an increase of 121% compared to the previous year. This brought the total number of fully qualified GPs in England to 30,183.

33. NHS staffing tracker: General practice

    Nuffield Trust, 2026-10-20 · supports

    “GPs themselves make up only a minority (around one in six) of the general practice workforce. The number of doctors training to become GPs (GP registrars) has increased by 3,309 compared to pre-pandemic levels, and the number of GPs have increased by 2,382 over the same period.”Hide quote

    GPs themselves make up only a minority (around one in six) of the general practice workforce. The number of doctors training to become GPs (GP registrars) has increased by 3,309 compared to pre-pandemic levels, and the number of GPs have increased by 2,382 over the same period.

34. NHS staffing tracker: General practice

    Nuffield Trust, 2026-10-20 · complicates

    “When taking account of the relative needs of a ICB’s patient population, the number of patients per one GP as of June 2026 varied from 2,566 patients in North East London ICB to 1,798 patients in Bristol, North Somerset and South Gloucestershire ICB.”Hide quote

    When taking account of the relative needs of a ICB’s patient population, the number of patients per one GP as of June 2026 varied from 2,566 patients in North East London ICB to 1,798 patients in Bristol, North Somerset and South Gloucestershire ICB.

35. General Practice Workforce (series page)

    NHS England Digital, 2026-10-22 · complicates

    “The publication includes an Excel Bulletin file containing full-time equivalent (FTE) and headcount figures by gender and role, age band and work commitment at England-level, along with patient counts. ... As a result, the main time series in these statistics begins in September 2015 and the earlier figures that were calculated from the previous data source are not comparable although the publications are listed below for reference.”Hide quote

    The publication includes an Excel Bulletin file containing full-time equivalent (FTE) and headcount figures by gender and role, age band and work commitment at England-level, along with patient counts. ... As a result, the main time series in these statistics begins in September 2015 and the earlier figures that were calculated from the previous data source are not comparable although the publications are listed below for reference.

36. Live Table 1000: Additional affordable homes provided by tenure and provider, England, Completions

    Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, 2026-06-25 · supports

    “Social Rent [note 4] 25,705 57,023 48,941 52,190 56,949 42,465 35,780 33,579 28,794 27,087 26,810 23,955 22,661 21,674 23,633 24,683 29,643 31,122 33,491 39,562 37,677 17,580 10,924 9,331 6,803 5,827 7,049 6,363 6,766 6,051 7,661 9,458 10,325 12,267”Hide quote

    Social Rent [note 4] 25,705 57,023 48,941 52,190 56,949 42,465 35,780 33,579 28,794 27,087 26,810 23,955 22,661 21,674 23,633 24,683 29,643 31,122 33,491 39,562 37,677 17,580 10,924 9,331 6,803 5,827 7,049 6,363 6,766 6,051 7,661 9,458 10,325 12,267

37. Affordable housing supply in England: 2024 to 2025

    Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, 2025-11-20 · complicates

    “10,480 or 16% of all new affordable housing completions were delivered by local authorities, the highest recorded value in the available period (since 1991-92)”Hide quote

    10,480 or 16% of all new affordable housing completions were delivered by local authorities, the highest recorded value in the available period (since 1991-92)

38. Affordable housing supply in England: 2024 to 2025

    Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, 2025-11-20 · complicates

    “There were 12,198 new social rent homes delivered in 2024-25, the highest number since 2012-13. Additionally, there were 5,019 London affordable rent homes that the Greater London Authority funds at a similar rent level to social rent.”Hide quote

    There were 12,198 new social rent homes delivered in 2024-25, the highest number since 2012-13. Additionally, there were 5,019 London affordable rent homes that the Greater London Authority funds at a similar rent level to social rent.

39. International comparisons of government investment (Box 3.3, Economic and fiscal outlook – March 2020)

    Office for Budget Responsibility, 2020-03 · supports

    “Chart B shows the UK’s relative position among 30 OECD countries over the decade to 2017. Across the whole period, the UK was consistently positioned within the bottom quarter in terms of government investment as a share of GDP – more specifically, it was ranked between 23rd and 27th out of 30 countries in every year. UK government investment was a little higher as a share of GDP in 2017 than in 2007, having first risen during the crisis then fallen back. The large increase over the next five years will take it to around the present OECD median.”Hide quote

    Chart B shows the UK’s relative position among 30 OECD countries over the decade to 2017. Across the whole period, the UK was consistently positioned within the bottom quarter in terms of government investment as a share of GDP – more specifically, it was ranked between 23rd and 27th out of 30 countries in every year. UK government investment was a little higher as a share of GDP in 2017 than in 2007, having first risen during the crisis then fallen back. The large increase over the next five years will take it to around the present OECD median.

40. OECD Data Explorer: Annual government non-financial accounts and key indicators (Table 0200)

    OECD, 2026 · supports

    “Annual government non-financial accounts and key indicators (for 'Developer API') ... S13 General government ... P51G Gross fixed capital formation ... XDC National currency ... V Current prices”Hide quote

    Annual government non-financial accounts and key indicators (for 'Developer API') ... S13 General government ... P51G Gross fixed capital formation ... XDC National currency ... V Current prices

41. OECD Data Explorer: Annual GDP and components - expenditure approach (Table 0102)

    OECD, 2026 · supports

    “Annual GDP and components - expenditure approach ... B1GQ ... XDC ... V ... T0102”Hide quote

    Annual GDP and components - expenditure approach ... B1GQ ... XDC ... V ... T0102

42. Health at a Glance 2025: OECD Indicators (Capital expenditure in the health sector)

    OECD, 2025 · supports

    “Between 2021 and 2024, average annual capital expenditure on health across OECD countries remained at around 0.6% of GDP ... Of the G7 countries, Japan at 0.9% and the United States at 0.8% remained above the OECD average, while France, Italy and the United Kingdom all invested below the average at 0.4-0.5% of GDP. ... On the other hand, after the United Kingdom experienced a clear decline in investment through the mid-2010s, there has been a notable increase in recent years – even if the level remains below the OECD average.”Hide quote

    Between 2021 and 2024, average annual capital expenditure on health across OECD countries remained at around 0.6% of GDP ... Of the G7 countries, Japan at 0.9% and the United States at 0.8% remained above the OECD average, while France, Italy and the United Kingdom all invested below the average at 0.4-0.5% of GDP. ... On the other hand, after the United Kingdom experienced a clear decline in investment through the mid-2010s, there has been a notable increase in recent years – even if the level remains below the OECD average.

43. Fiscal risks and sustainability – September 2024

    Office for Budget Responsibility, 2024-09 · complicates

    “The steep rises in health spending described above mean the UK spent almost £3,500 per person (in 2015 real-terms prices) on health in 2022 – almost double real per-person spending at the turn of the century. Across the 19 advanced economies analysed in Chart 3.9, the UK still ranked below the average per-person total health spend of £3,880 in 2022 (the UK was fifth from bottom in 2000 and the same position in 2022), even after seeing one of the larger pandemic-related spikes.”Hide quote

    The steep rises in health spending described above mean the UK spent almost £3,500 per person (in 2015 real-terms prices) on health in 2022 – almost double real per-person spending at the turn of the century. Across the 19 advanced economies analysed in Chart 3.9, the UK still ranked below the average per-person total health spend of £3,880 in 2022 (the UK was fifth from bottom in 2000 and the same position in 2022), even after seeing one of the larger pandemic-related spikes.

44. Economic and fiscal outlook – March 2026

    Office for Budget Responsibility, 2026-03 · complicates

    “As shown in Chart 4.3, the real per-person value of RDEL spending is projected to rise to the highest level for the past two decades, excluding the pandemic peak. It is around £100 a year higher than when the Treasury set the SR envelopes alongside the March 2025 forecast. The initial June 2025 Spending Review plans implied real per-person resource spending of approximately £7,700 by 2028-29. Since then, a lower population growth forecast, largely due to lower projected net migration, has increased projected real spending per person to around £7,800 in 2028-29.”Hide quote

    As shown in Chart 4.3, the real per-person value of RDEL spending is projected to rise to the highest level for the past two decades, excluding the pandemic peak. It is around £100 a year higher than when the Treasury set the SR envelopes alongside the March 2025 forecast. The initial June 2025 Spending Review plans implied real per-person resource spending of approximately £7,700 by 2028-29. Since then, a lower population growth forecast, largely due to lower projected net migration, has increased projected real spending per person to around £7,800 in 2028-29.

45. Economic and fiscal outlook – March 2026 (Box 2.1, Net migration and GDP per person)

    Office for Budget Responsibility, 2026-03 · supports

    “In addition, a significant proportion of public investment is fixed in nominal terms up to the end of a Spending Review period, so does not respond immediately to changes in the size of the population. Therefore, higher inward migration could initially make less capital available per worker and reduce productivity. Over the longer term, private and public investment flows may rise to offset the dilution of capital per person, but there is limited evidence on the extent to which this happens, or if it does at all.”Hide quote

    In addition, a significant proportion of public investment is fixed in nominal terms up to the end of a Spending Review period, so does not respond immediately to changes in the size of the population. Therefore, higher inward migration could initially make less capital available per worker and reduce productivity. Over the longer term, private and public investment flows may rise to offset the dilution of capital per person, but there is limited evidence on the extent to which this happens, or if it does at all.

46. School funding statistics: financial year 2025-26

    Department for Education, 2026-01-29 · complicates

    “After adjusting for inflation, funding per pupil was broadly flat between 2010-11 and 2015-16 at around £7,700 in 2025-26 prices. It then fell by 3.6% over the period 2016-17 to 2018-19, but subsequently increased by 4.6% over the years 2019-20, 2020-21 and 2021-22. Since then, funding has increased by a further 7.1% (after adjusting for inflation), including small falls of 0.2% in 2022-23 and 0.1% in 2026-27, and stands at £8,390 in 2026-27 (in 2025-26 prices).”Hide quote

    After adjusting for inflation, funding per pupil was broadly flat between 2010-11 and 2015-16 at around £7,700 in 2025-26 prices. It then fell by 3.6% over the period 2016-17 to 2018-19, but subsequently increased by 4.6% over the years 2019-20, 2020-21 and 2021-22. Since then, funding has increased by a further 7.1% (after adjusting for inflation), including small falls of 0.2% in 2022-23 and 0.1% in 2026-27, and stands at £8,390 in 2026-27 (in 2025-26 prices).

47. Housing supply: net additional dwellings, England: 2024 to 2025

    Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, 2025-11-20 · supports

    “Table 1. Net additional dwellings, England, 1991-92 to 2024-25”Hide quote

    Table 1. Net additional dwellings, England, 1991-92 to 2024-25

48. Price Index of Private Rents, UK: monthly price statistics

    Office for National Statistics, 2026-10-21 · supports

    “This spreadsheet includes Price Index of Private Rents (PIPR) data from January 2015 to present.”Hide quote

    This spreadsheet includes Price Index of Private Rents (PIPR) data from January 2015 to present.

49. Schools, pupils and their characteristics: academic year 2025/26 (data set)

    Department for Education, 2026-06-04 · supports

    “Pupil characteristics - number of pupils by fsm eligibility ... Pupils in state-funded nursery, primary, secondary and special schools, non-maintained special schools, pupil referral units and independent schools.”Hide quote

    Pupil characteristics - number of pupils by fsm eligibility ... Pupils in state-funded nursery, primary, secondary and special schools, non-maintained special schools, pupil referral units and independent schools.

50. Live Table 1000: Additional affordable homes provided by tenure and provider, England

    Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, 2026-06-25 · supports

    “Live Table 1000: Additional affordable homes provided by tenure and provider, England, Completions”Hide quote

    Live Table 1000: Additional affordable homes provided by tenure and provider, England, Completions

51. School funding statistics: financial year 2025-26 (Tab1 data file)

    Department for Education, 2026-01-29 · supports

    “School revenue funding for 5-16 year olds for 2010-11 to 2026-27”Hide quote

    School revenue funding for 5-16 year olds for 2010-11 to 2026-27

52. OECD Data Explorer: general government gross fixed capital formation and GDP

    OECD, 2026 · supports

    “Annual government non-financial accounts and key indicators (for 'Developer API') ... P51G Gross fixed capital formation”Hide quote

    Annual government non-financial accounts and key indicators (for 'Developer API') ... P51G Gross fixed capital formation

UK Migration and Population Over the Long Run

1. Long-term international migration, provisional: year ending December 2025

   Office for National Statistics, 2026-05-21 · supports

   “A provisionally estimated 813,000 people made a long-term move to the UK in year ending (YE) December 2025. Immigration dropped compared with our updated estimate for YE December 2024, when it was 1,012,000, continuing a downward trend from the peak of 1,469,000 in March 2023. … Net migration in YE December 2025 was 171,000. This was down from the peak of 944,000 in YE March 2023.”Hide quote

   A provisionally estimated 813,000 people made a long-term move to the UK in year ending (YE) December 2025. Immigration dropped compared with our updated estimate for YE December 2024, when it was 1,012,000, continuing a downward trend from the peak of 1,469,000 in March 2023. … Net migration in YE December 2025 was 171,000. This was down from the peak of 944,000 in YE March 2023.

2. What is international migration and how do we estimate it?

   Office for National Statistics, 2025-11-18 · supports

   “We have been measuring long-term international migration in and out of the UK for over 60 years.”Hide quote

   We have been measuring long-term international migration in and out of the UK for over 60 years.

3. What is international migration and how do we estimate it?

   Office for National Statistics, 2025-11-18 · supports

   “From the late 1960s to the early 1980s, net migration was consistently negative, meaning in most years, more people moved out of the country than moved into it.”Hide quote

   From the late 1960s to the early 1980s, net migration was consistently negative, meaning in most years, more people moved out of the country than moved into it.

4. What is international migration and how do we estimate it?

   Office for National Statistics, 2025-11-18 · supports

   “In the late 1990s, this trend reversed, and net migration began to rise.”Hide quote

   In the late 1990s, this trend reversed, and net migration began to rise.

5. Immigration, emigration and net migration into the UK, 1964 - 2025 (data download)

   Office for National Statistics, 2026-05-21 · complicates

   “Due to changes in methodology, comparisons between pre-June 2021 and post-June 2021 estimates should be treated with caution.”Hide quote

   Due to changes in methodology, comparisons between pre-June 2021 and post-June 2021 estimates should be treated with caution.

6. Net migration to the UK

   The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-05-27 · complicates

   “Net migration was 171,000 in 2025, lower than the levels seen during the 2010s and a sharp decline from the unusually high levels in 2022 and 2023. In 2025, 67% of non-EU immigration was for work and study purposes. … it reintroduced a post-study work route – which likely made the UK more attractive to international students – opened new humanitarian visa routes for Ukrainians and Hong Kongers, and made care and senior care workers eligible for work visas. … UK universities recruited students overseas more actively as their financial situation deteriorated, and social care providers hired migrant workers to fill vacancies caused by low pay and poor working conditions in a sector with limited funding. … These included visa restrictions on the family members of care workers and most international students. … The current government introduced further restrictions on work visas and refugee family reunion in the second half of 2025, but these are not yet fully visible in the 2025 statistics.”Hide quote

   Net migration was 171,000 in 2025, lower than the levels seen during the 2010s and a sharp decline from the unusually high levels in 2022 and 2023. In 2025, 67% of non-EU immigration was for work and study purposes. … it reintroduced a post-study work route – which likely made the UK more attractive to international students – opened new humanitarian visa routes for Ukrainians and Hong Kongers, and made care and senior care workers eligible for work visas. … UK universities recruited students overseas more actively as their financial situation deteriorated, and social care providers hired migrant workers to fill vacancies caused by low pay and poor working conditions in a sector with limited funding. … These included visa restrictions on the family members of care workers and most international students. … The current government introduced further restrictions on work visas and refugee family reunion in the second half of 2025, but these are not yet fully visible in the 2025 statistics.

7. Why do people come to the UK? Work

   Home Office, 2026-07-16 · supports

   “Health and Care Worker visas had fallen prior to the changes”Hide quote

   Health and Care Worker visas had fallen prior to the changes

8. Immigration in Europe, 2024: migr_imm8 and demo_pjan

   Eurostat, 2026-02-27 · complicates

   “Poland and Slovakia did not include refugees from Ukraine who benefit from temporary protection”Hide quote

   Poland and Slovakia did not include refugees from Ukraine who benefit from temporary protection

9. International migration: a recent history

   Office for National Statistics, 2015-01-15 · supports

   “Net migration of non-EU citizens increased after 1997 and peaked in 2004.”Hide quote

   Net migration of non-EU citizens increased after 1997 and peaked in 2004.

10. Determinants of Migration to the UK

    The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2017-10-11 · supports

    “Economic growth and a structural demand for migrant labour”Hide quote

    Economic growth and a structural demand for migrant labour

11. Immigration by citizenship, 2024 (migr_imm1ctz)

    Eurostat, 2026-09-11 · complicates

    “Immigration by age group, sex and citizenship”Hide quote

    Immigration by age group, sex and citizenship

12. Long-term international migration, provisional: year ending December 2025

    Office for National Statistics, 2026-05-21 · supports

    “Net migration for EU+ nationals in YE December 2025 was negative 42,000, it has been negative since YE June 2022.”Hide quote

    Net migration for EU+ nationals in YE December 2025 was negative 42,000, it has been negative since YE June 2022.

13. Long-term international migration, provisional: year ending December 2025

    Office for National Statistics, 2026-05-21 · supports

    “Most people immigrating into the UK in YE December 2025 were non-EU+ nationals, provisionally estimated at 627,000, a decline from 780,000 in YE December 2024.”Hide quote

    Most people immigrating into the UK in YE December 2025 were non-EU+ nationals, provisionally estimated at 627,000, a decline from 780,000 in YE December 2024.

14. Long-term international migration, provisional: year ending December 2025

    Office for National Statistics, 2026-05-21 · supports

    “Freedom of movement between the EU+ countries and the UK ended in January 2021.”Hide quote

    Freedom of movement between the EU+ countries and the UK ended in January 2021.

15. Net migration to the UK

    The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-05-27 · supports

    “EU net migration subsequently turned negative in 2022, as the post-Brexit immigration system greatly reduced opportunities for EU citizens to move to the UK.”Hide quote

    EU net migration subsequently turned negative in 2022, as the post-Brexit immigration system greatly reduced opportunities for EU citizens to move to the UK.

16. International migration, England and Wales: Census 2021

    Office for National Statistics, 2022-11-02 · supports

    “Those born in the European Union (EU) made up 3.6 million (36.4% of all non-UK born usual residents) of the population, an increase from 2.5 million (32.7%) in 2011”Hide quote

    Those born in the European Union (EU) made up 3.6 million (36.4% of all non-UK born usual residents) of the population, an increase from 2.5 million (32.7%) in 2011

17. Net migration to the UK

    The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-05-27 · complicates

    “Although policy towards EU citizens did not change until January 2021, EU net migration began to fall immediately after the referendum.”Hide quote

    Although policy towards EU citizens did not change until January 2021, EU net migration began to fall immediately after the referendum.

18. Net migration to the UK

    The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-05-27 · complicates

    “This is because EU emigration is driven by people who arrived before Brexit, when EU immigration was higher.”Hide quote

    This is because EU emigration is driven by people who arrived before Brexit, when EU immigration was higher.

19. Long-term international migration, provisional: year ending December 2025 (Table 1 data download)

    Office for National Statistics, 2026-05-21 · complicates

    “For estimates up to YE March 2021 this category includes nationals of the countries of the European Union (EU) for each given time period (excluding British nationals).”Hide quote

    For estimates up to YE March 2021 this category includes nationals of the countries of the European Union (EU) for each given time period (excluding British nationals).

20. Long-term international migration, provisional: year ending December 2025

    Office for National Statistics, 2026-05-21 · complicates

    “The number of non-EU+ nationals arriving for work-related reasons fell by 47% in 2025”Hide quote

    The number of non-EU+ nationals arriving for work-related reasons fell by 47% in 2025

21. Long-term international migration, provisional: year ending December 2025

    Office for National Statistics, 2026-05-21 · supports

    “At 171,000, long-term international net migration for year ending (YE) December 2025 has nearly halved from YE December 2024 (updated to 331,000); this level was last seen when the new immigration system was introduced in early 2021, and the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic travel restrictions were still in place. … The provisional estimate for total long-term emigration in the most recent period is 642,000.”Hide quote

    At 171,000, long-term international net migration for year ending (YE) December 2025 has nearly halved from YE December 2024 (updated to 331,000); this level was last seen when the new immigration system was introduced in early 2021, and the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic travel restrictions were still in place. … The provisional estimate for total long-term emigration in the most recent period is 642,000.

22. Long-term international migration, provisional: year ending December 2025

    Office for National Statistics, 2026-05-21 · supports

    “Provisional net migration was 350,000 for non-EU+ nationals in YE December 2025, down from 511,000 a year earlier. … The provisional net migration of British nationals remained broadly stable, estimated at negative 136,000. … The immigration of EU+ and British nationals in the YE December 2025 was 76,000 and 110,000, falling slightly from 91,000 and 140,000, respectively, in the previous year. … In YE December 2025, 246,000 British nationals left the UK, a slight decline of 4% from the updated YE December 2024 estimates of 257,000.”Hide quote

    Provisional net migration was 350,000 for non-EU+ nationals in YE December 2025, down from 511,000 a year earlier. … The provisional net migration of British nationals remained broadly stable, estimated at negative 136,000. … The immigration of EU+ and British nationals in the YE December 2025 was 76,000 and 110,000, falling slightly from 91,000 and 140,000, respectively, in the previous year. … In YE December 2025, 246,000 British nationals left the UK, a slight decline of 4% from the updated YE December 2024 estimates of 257,000.

23. Long-term international migration, provisional: year ending December 2025

    Office for National Statistics, 2026-05-21 · supports

    “When looking at the reasons for immigration of non-EU+ nationals in YE December 2025, 47% came for study-related reasons, 23% for work-related reasons, 14% were asylum applicants, and 7% and 6% were for family- and humanitarian-related reasons, respectively.”Hide quote

    When looking at the reasons for immigration of non-EU+ nationals in YE December 2025, 47% came for study-related reasons, 23% for work-related reasons, 14% were asylum applicants, and 7% and 6% were for family- and humanitarian-related reasons, respectively.

24. Long-term international migration, provisional: year ending December 2025

    Office for National Statistics, 2026-05-21 · supports

    “In YE December 2025, 159,000 non-EU+ nationals who originally arrived on a study-related visa emigrated long-term. This accounts for 57% of all long-term emigration for non-EU+ nationals. This is likely because the large number of students who came to the UK after the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic have completed their studies and departed.”Hide quote

    In YE December 2025, 159,000 non-EU+ nationals who originally arrived on a study-related visa emigrated long-term. This accounts for 57% of all long-term emigration for non-EU+ nationals. This is likely because the large number of students who came to the UK after the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic have completed their studies and departed.

25. Long-term international migration, provisional: year ending December 2025

    Office for National Statistics, 2026-05-21 · complicates

    “the number of people immigrating for asylum was broadly stable, with a small increase to 88,000 in the year ending December 2025, from 87,000 the previous year; these estimates include people who claimed asylum after arriving via a regular route and by illegal entry routes, such as small boats”Hide quote

    the number of people immigrating for asylum was broadly stable, with a small increase to 88,000 in the year ending December 2025, from 87,000 the previous year; these estimates include people who claimed asylum after arriving via a regular route and by illegal entry routes, such as small boats

26. Net migration to the UK

    The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-05-27 · complicates

    “Asylum accounted for a further 14% of non-EU immigration—however, unlike other types of migrant, relatively few asylum migrants left the UK, so their impact on population growth will be larger than this.”Hide quote

    Asylum accounted for a further 14% of non-EU immigration—however, unlike other types of migrant, relatively few asylum migrants left the UK, so their impact on population growth will be larger than this.

27. Net migration to the UK

    The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-05-27 · complicates

    “ONS estimates dating back to 1964 indicate that British net migration has been negative in all but one year (1985). In 2025, net emigration of British citizens was estimated at 136,000 (Figure 6), using an experimental new methodology that makes the figures particularly uncertain. According to the ONS, emigration of British citizens has been stable over time—the change in the data in Figure 6 results from a change of methodology, not a change in the underlying trend (see Understanding the evidence for more information). However, net emigration of British citizens has increased since 2022, because of fewer British people moving (back) to the UK.”Hide quote

    ONS estimates dating back to 1964 indicate that British net migration has been negative in all but one year (1985). In 2025, net emigration of British citizens was estimated at 136,000 (Figure 6), using an experimental new methodology that makes the figures particularly uncertain. According to the ONS, emigration of British citizens has been stable over time—the change in the data in Figure 6 results from a change of methodology, not a change in the underlying trend (see Understanding the evidence for more information). However, net emigration of British citizens has increased since 2022, because of fewer British people moving (back) to the UK.

28. Net migration to the UK

    The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-05-27 · complicates

    “The May 2026 publication made further revisions, primarily because the method used to estimate EU and British migration was changed. Net migration for 2024 was revised down by 100,000 (or 23%) compared to the initial estimate in the May 2025 publication”Hide quote

    The May 2026 publication made further revisions, primarily because the method used to estimate EU and British migration was changed. Net migration for 2024 was revised down by 100,000 (or 23%) compared to the initial estimate in the May 2025 publication

29. Population estimates for the UK, England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland: mid-2025

    Office for National Statistics, 2026-10-01 · supports

    “The population of the UK continued to grow in the year to mid-2025, reaching an estimated 69.5 million people. The size of the population is estimated to have increased by 227,700 (0.3%) from mid-2024, the lowest rate of increase since mid-2020. … net international migration to the UK was 222,900 (down from 651,700 in the year to mid-2024) … natural change, the difference between births and deaths, contributed an increase in population of 4,900; this increase was lower than in the previous year, but above the negative change in the year to mid-2023”Hide quote

    The population of the UK continued to grow in the year to mid-2025, reaching an estimated 69.5 million people. The size of the population is estimated to have increased by 227,700 (0.3%) from mid-2024, the lowest rate of increase since mid-2020. … net international migration to the UK was 222,900 (down from 651,700 in the year to mid-2024) … natural change, the difference between births and deaths, contributed an increase in population of 4,900; this increase was lower than in the previous year, but above the negative change in the year to mid-2023

30. Population estimates for the UK, England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland: mid-2025

    Office for National Statistics, 2026-10-01 · supports

    “Figure 3: Net migration has contributed most to population growth from mid-1999 except for mid-2012”Hide quote

    Figure 3: Net migration has contributed most to population growth from mid-1999 except for mid-2012

31. The Impact of Migration on UK Population Growth

    The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-05-13 · supports

    “Population estimates show that net migration was a major component of population growth over the past two decades, making up 68% of UK population growth from 2005 to 2024 (Figure 1). Natural change—i.e., the difference between the number of births and deaths—has declined since 2011, and fell into negative territory in 2023. As a result, net migration has accounted for 99% of population growth since 2020.”Hide quote

    Population estimates show that net migration was a major component of population growth over the past two decades, making up 68% of UK population growth from 2005 to 2024 (Figure 1). Natural change—i.e., the difference between the number of births and deaths—has declined since 2011, and fell into negative territory in 2023. As a result, net migration has accounted for 99% of population growth since 2020.

32. The Impact of Migration on UK Population Growth

    The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-05-13 · complicates

    “This retrospective analysis does not account for the contribution of past migration to natural change, mainly to births. … ONS figures show that in 2024, 34% of births in England and Wales were to non-UK-born mothers.”Hide quote

    This retrospective analysis does not account for the contribution of past migration to natural change, mainly to births. … ONS figures show that in 2024, 34% of births in England and Wales were to non-UK-born mothers.

33. National population projections: 2024-based

    Office for National Statistics, 2026-04-28 · supports

    “Net migration is projected to be the only source of population growth in the UK over the next 25 years, as deaths are expected to exceed births by 2.5 million. … Deaths are projected to exceed births in the UK from mid-2026, with mid-2025 being the last year in which births are slightly higher. … After peaking at 72.5 million in mid-2054, the UK population is projected to decrease.”Hide quote

    Net migration is projected to be the only source of population growth in the UK over the next 25 years, as deaths are expected to exceed births by 2.5 million. … Deaths are projected to exceed births in the UK from mid-2026, with mid-2025 being the last year in which births are slightly higher. … After peaking at 72.5 million in mid-2054, the UK population is projected to decrease.

34. National population projections: 2024-based

    Office for National Statistics, 2026-04-28 · supports

    “The 2024-based NPPs long-term average annual net international migration assumption is 230,000, down by 110,000 from 340,000 in the 2022-based projections. This reflects the sharp decrease in net migration since it peaked in 2023, as well as expert advice.”Hide quote

    The 2024-based NPPs long-term average annual net international migration assumption is 230,000, down by 110,000 from 340,000 in the 2022-based projections. This reflects the sharp decrease in net migration since it peaked in 2023, as well as expert advice.

35. National population projections: 2024-based

    Office for National Statistics, 2026-04-28 · supports

    “A common measure is the old-age-dependency ratio (OADR), which is the number of people of pensionable age for every 1,000 people of working age. It is projected that OADR will increase from 280 in mid-2024 to 310 in mid-2034, and reach 329 by mid-2049.”Hide quote

    A common measure is the old-age-dependency ratio (OADR), which is the number of people of pensionable age for every 1,000 people of working age. It is projected that OADR will increase from 280 in mid-2024 to 310 in mid-2034, and reach 329 by mid-2049.

36. National population projections: 2024-based

    Office for National Statistics, 2026-04-28 · complicates

    “Demographic behaviour is inherently uncertain, so it is not possible to predict future migration trends. The long-term assumption should not be viewed as a forecast, but as a scenario where long-term net migration averages at a certain level with year-to-year variation.”Hide quote

    Demographic behaviour is inherently uncertain, so it is not possible to predict future migration trends. The long-term assumption should not be viewed as a forecast, but as a scenario where long-term net migration averages at a certain level with year-to-year variation.

37. National population projections: variant projections, 2024-based

    Office for National Statistics, 2026-04-28 · supports

    “Migration (year ending … mid-2027 onwards) … 105,000 … 230,000 … 455,000 … Principal … 72.4 … High migration … 78.9 … Low migration … 68.8 … Zero net migration … 65.5 … Migration assumption: zero (zero cross-border migration and zero international net migration)”Hide quote

    Migration (year ending … mid-2027 onwards) … 105,000 … 230,000 … 455,000 … Principal … 72.4 … High migration … 78.9 … Low migration … 68.8 … Zero net migration … 65.5 … Migration assumption: zero (zero cross-border migration and zero international net migration)

38. Clash of the manifestos: the net migration target

    Full Fact, 2015-04-28 · supports

    “In the 2010 Conservative manifesto it was stated that "we will take steps to take net migration back to the levels of the 1990s—tens of thousands a year, not hundreds of thousands". … "We will keep our ambition of delivering annual net migration in the tens of thousands, not the hundreds of thousands"—Conservative manifesto … Net migration stood at 298,000 in the year to September 2014—three times the 100,000 maximum implied by the 'tens of thousands' claim.”Hide quote

    In the 2010 Conservative manifesto it was stated that "we will take steps to take net migration back to the levels of the 1990s—tens of thousands a year, not hundreds of thousands". … "We will keep our ambition of delivering annual net migration in the tens of thousands, not the hundreds of thousands"—Conservative manifesto … Net migration stood at 298,000 in the year to September 2014—three times the 100,000 maximum implied by the 'tens of thousands' claim.

39. Conservative manifesto keeps 'objective' to reduce net migration to the tens of thousands

    Electronic Immigration Network, 2017-05-18 · supports

    “The manifesto states: "It is our objective to reduce immigration to sustainable levels, by which we mean annual net migration in the tens of thousands, rather than the hundreds of thousands we have seen over the last two decades."”Hide quote

    The manifesto states: "It is our objective to reduce immigration to sustainable levels, by which we mean annual net migration in the tens of thousands, rather than the hundreds of thousands we have seen over the last two decades."

40. Get Brexit Done: Unleash Britain's Potential — The Conservative and Unionist Party Manifesto 2019

    Conservative Party, 2019-11-24 · supports

    “There will be fewer lower-skilled migrants and overall numbers will come down.”Hide quote

    There will be fewer lower-skilled migrants and overall numbers will come down.

41. UK election 2024: comparing the manifestos

    The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2024-06-28 · supports

    “The Conservative and Labour parties both say they want to reduce legal migration from its historically high levels. … The Conservatives want to introduce an annual cap on work and family visa grants … At the other end, Reform UK has said that net migration should be zero. … it is unclear how the MAC’s view on an ‘optimal’ level would be reconciled with the commitment to year-on-year reductions”Hide quote

    The Conservative and Labour parties both say they want to reduce legal migration from its historically high levels. … The Conservatives want to introduce an annual cap on work and family visa grants … At the other end, Reform UK has said that net migration should be zero. … it is unclear how the MAC’s view on an ‘optimal’ level would be reconciled with the commitment to year-on-year reductions

42. Net migration likely to fall close to pre-Brexit levels but public still expects immigration to increase

    Ipsos, 2025-11-27 · supports

    “Four in ten people (41%) want immigration numbers reduced ‘a lot’, with a further 16% wanting more modest reductions. Just over a third of people (35%) want numbers to stay the same (21%) or increase (15%).”Hide quote

    Four in ten people (41%) want immigration numbers reduced ‘a lot’, with a further 16% wanting more modest reductions. Just over a third of people (35%) want numbers to stay the same (21%) or increase (15%).

43. Public opinion towards immigration in the UK

    The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-09-08 · complicates

    “From around 2013, opposition to immigrants and immigration fell. The share of the public agreeing there were ‘too many’ immigrants, wanting immigration numbers reduced, or opposing migrants of a different race or ethnicity fell substantially between the early 2010s and the early 2020s. More recently, this trend has started to reverse, with surveys conducted since 2022 showing an uptick in opposition. However, despite this increase, attitudes were less negative in 2025 than they were up until the early 2010s. … In 1994, the starting point of this data series, fewer than 5% of respondents thought of immigration as a concern … peaking at 56% in September 2015. … with the share mentioning immigration reaching 51% in September 2025.”Hide quote

    From around 2013, opposition to immigrants and immigration fell. The share of the public agreeing there were ‘too many’ immigrants, wanting immigration numbers reduced, or opposing migrants of a different race or ethnicity fell substantially between the early 2010s and the early 2020s. More recently, this trend has started to reverse, with surveys conducted since 2022 showing an uptick in opposition. However, despite this increase, attitudes were less negative in 2025 than they were up until the early 2010s. … In 1994, the starting point of this data series, fewer than 5% of respondents thought of immigration as a concern … peaking at 56% in September 2015. … with the share mentioning immigration reaching 51% in September 2025.

44. International Migration Outlook 2025

    OECD, 2025-11-03 · supports

    “The sharpest declines were observed in New Zealand (-56%) and the United Kingdom (-41%), both of which had experienced unusually high levels of permanent labour migration in 2022-2023. … In some large OECD countries (United Kingdom, the United States) the inflows per population remain modest despite the recent increase in inflows in absolute terms.”Hide quote

    The sharpest declines were observed in New Zealand (-56%) and the United Kingdom (-41%), both of which had experienced unusually high levels of permanent labour migration in 2022-2023. … In some large OECD countries (United Kingdom, the United States) the inflows per population remain modest despite the recent increase in inflows in absolute terms.

45. International Migration Outlook 2025: Figure 1.2 data (StatLink)

    OECD, 2025-11-03 · supports

    “Figure 1.2. Permanent migration to OECD countries relative to total population, 2024 … Note: Light blue columns are unstandardised data.”Hide quote

    Figure 1.2. Permanent migration to OECD countries relative to total population, 2024 … Note: Light blue columns are unstandardised data.

46. Immigration, emigration and net migration into the UK, 1964 - 2025 (data download)

    Office for National Statistics, 2026-05-21 · complicates

    “Due to changes in methodology, comparisons between pre-June 2021 and post-June 2021 estimates should be treated with caution.”Hide quote

    Due to changes in methodology, comparisons between pre-June 2021 and post-June 2021 estimates should be treated with caution.

47. United Kingdom population mid-year estimate (series UKPOP)

    Office for National Statistics, 2026-10-01 · complicates

    “Mid-year population estimates relate to the usually resident population. They account for long-term international migrants (people who change their country of usual residence for a period of 12 months or more) but do not account for short-term migrants (people who come to or leave the country for a period of less than 12 months).”Hide quote

    Mid-year population estimates relate to the usually resident population. They account for long-term international migrants (people who change their country of usual residence for a period of 12 months or more) but do not account for short-term migrants (people who come to or leave the country for a period of less than 12 months).

48. Long-term international migration, December 2025: Table 4b

    Office for National Statistics, 2026-05-21 · supports

    “Table 4b: Long-term international immigration, emigration and net migration of non-EU+ nationals by reason,”Hide quote

    Table 4b: Long-term international immigration, emigration and net migration of non-EU+ nationals by reason,

49. Long-term international migration, December 2025: Table 1

    Office for National Statistics, 2026-05-21 · supports

    “Table 1: Long-term international migration into and out of the United Kingdom by nationality,”Hide quote

    Table 1: Long-term international migration into and out of the United Kingdom by nationality,

50. Long-term international migration, provisional: year ending December 2025 (Table 1 data download)

    Office for National Statistics, 2026-05-21 · complicates

    “Comparisons between estimates before and after June 2021 should be treated with caution because of changes in methodology.”Hide quote

    Comparisons between estimates before and after June 2021 should be treated with caution because of changes in methodology.

51. Population estimates, mid-2025: Figure 3 data

    Office for National Statistics, 2026-10-01 · supports

    “Components of population change, UK, mid-1982 to mid-2025 … Note: “Net-migration and other” includes international migration, changes in armed forces personnel and dependants, and unattributable population change.”Hide quote

    Components of population change, UK, mid-1982 to mid-2025 … Note: “Net-migration and other” includes international migration, changes in armed forces personnel and dependants, and unattributable population change.

52. National population projections, 2024-based: Z1 machine-readable files (uk_ppp, uk_pph, uk_ppl, uk_ppz)

    Office for National Statistics, 2026-04-28 · supports

    “Population numbers at mid year by age last birthday - Males and Females - Ages 0 to 104, 105-109, 110+”Hide quote

    Population numbers at mid year by age last birthday - Males and Females - Ages 0 to 104, 105-109, 110+