UK Migration and Population Over the Long Run
Immigration is still far above its historical level after falling since 2023, and migration now supplies almost all UK population growth. [1][46][29]
UK Migration Over Time
Annual long-term arrivals, departures and their difference, from 1964 to 2025. A long-term move means a stay of at least a year.
People moving to or from the UK for a year or more, by year
Annual long-term arrivals, departures and their difference, from 1964 to 2025. A long-term move means a stay of at least a year. Read as UK Migration Over Time: People moving to or from the UK for a year or more. Dashed segments cross 3 definitional breaks in the source, explained in Method Changes below this graph. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- Emigration
Vertical dashed lines mark measurement changes. See method changes.
Source: Office for National Statistics [46]
Observations 10
Gross immigration is far above any historical norm, even after two years of falling
Net migration has fallen by about four-fifths from its peak
Net migration fell from its peak of 944,000 in the year to March 2023 to 171,000 in 2025: 171,000 is 18.1% of 944,000. The Migration Observatory puts the 2025 level below the levels of the 2010s, while gross arrivals remained high. The peak is a rolling year ending in March; the annual chart shows calendar years, so its highest point is lower. 1 6
Over four years, about 4.8 million arrived and net migration was about 2.5 million
Adding the chart's calendar-year values for 2021 to 2024 gives about 4.8 million long-term arrivals and about 2.5 million net migration; for 2022 to 2025 the totals are about 4.7 million and 2.2 million. The two measures answer different questions. Gross arrivals count every person who came, including British nationals returning and students who later left. Net migration counts what was added to the population once departures are subtracted. 46 22
The years of negative net migration came from emigration, at much lower levels of arrivals
Net migration was negative in every year from 1964 to 1978, in 1980 to 1982, and in 1988, 1992 and 1993. In each of those years immigration was below a third of its 2025 level, and more people left than arrived. British nationals have had negative net migration in every year since 1964 except 1985, so those years mainly reflect British emigration outweighing a smaller inflow. 3 27 46
Late 1990s: non-EU migration rose as labour demand strengthened
The sustained rise is clearer after 1997 than at 1990. ONS identifies an increase in non-EU net migration after 1997. The Migration Observatory links the wider rise to a growing economy and low unemployment from the late 1990s, followed by a more open non-EU work-permit system and efforts to attract international students in the early 2000s. These changes developed over several years; the graph cannot attribute the turn to a single election or policy. The dashed line near 1991 instead marks a measurement change. 9 10
2004: EU enlargement added a further increase
The earlier rise began before eastern European countries joined the EU. In 2004 the UK, unlike most existing members, opened its labour market immediately to workers from the new accession countries. This helped produce the subsequent increase in migration from eastern Europe. It explains a later step, not the beginning of the late-1990s rise. 9 10
2020: the pandemic interrupted migration
The dip in net migration in 2020 reflects the disruption caused by COVID-19. It is an exceptional baseline for judging the subsequent rise. 21
2021–2023: more students, care workers and humanitarian arrivals
The surge was driven by non-EU arrivals. The government restored a post-study work route, opened routes for people from Ukraine and Hong Kong, and made care workers eligible for work visas. Universities recruited overseas as their finances deteriorated, while care employers recruited to fill vacancies. The route chart below shows how much each contributed. 6
Late 2023–2024: recruitment slowed and visa rules tightened
Work visas began falling in late 2023, especially in care. The Home Office says closer scrutiny of sponsoring employers and enforcement against non-compliance likely contributed to the initial decline. The decline began before the 2024 rule changes, so those changes cannot explain its start. 7
Restrictions on bringing family members for care workers and most international students then helped reduce arrivals. Further restrictions introduced in the second half of 2025 are not yet fully reflected in this chart. 6
2025: fewer work arrivals drove the latest fall
Non-EU+ work-related arrivals fell by 47% in 2025, the main reason net migration continued falling. Overall emigration fell slightly that year, so the latest fall came from fewer arrivals rather than more departures. Departures had risen between 2022 and 2024, so the explanation differs across the decline. 20
Subtleties
Recent years have been revised, and the latest are provisional
ONS changed how it estimates EU and British migration in 2025 and 2026. The May 2026 release cut net migration for 2024 by 100,000 (23%) compared with the first estimate a year earlier, and the 2024 figure now stands at 331,000. The last four rolling years in the chart are provisional and will be revised again. 28 21
Method Changes
1991: LTIM replaces IPS-alone estimates
ONS: "Annual LTIM estimates from 1991 onwards can be directly compared with one another. However, annual estimates before 1991 use a different methodology and cannot be directly compared with more recent figures." [46]
2012: Administrative data replaces the survey, backdated to here
ONS: "These official statistics in development based on administrative data provide a more accurate picture of international migration over this period than our previously published estimates based on the International Passenger Survey (IPS), which underestimated migration of some groups." [46]
2021-06: Administrative data replaces the IPS outright
ONS: "Due to changes in methodology, comparisons between pre-June 2021 and post-June 2021 estimates should be treated with caution." [46]
About this data
Full published range: 1964–2025. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – 1964 is where the series starts because it is where the ONS method starts — before it there is no continuous annual series to show.
As a Share of the UK Population
Derived, not published: ONS publishes no share-of-population migration series, so each year's flow here is divided by the ONS mid-year UK population estimate for the same year. Denominators for 1971–2025 are the UKPOP series in its October 2026 vintage, which revised mid-2022 to mid-2024; those for 1964–1970 come from an older ONS vintage that predates the Census 2021 rebasing, and differ from the current one by a few thousand where the two overlap. The denominator is not innocent either: the UK population grew from 54.0 million to 69.5 million across this series and immigration is part of why, so dividing by a population that immigration inflated understates the change slightly. Emigration has no share line because the derivation covers immigration and net migration.
Net migration by route and nationality
Net long-term migration in each rolling year, split into non-EU+ nationals by their original reason for coming, EU+ nationals and British nationals. The parts add to the total, apart from rounding.
Net long-term migration (arrivals minus departures), by year ending
Net long-term migration in each rolling year, split into non-EU+ nationals by their original reason for coming, EU+ nationals and British nationals. The parts add to the total, apart from rounding. Read as net migration by route and nationality: Net long-term migration (arrivals minus departures). Dashed segments cross 1 definitional break in the source, explained in Method Changes below this graph. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- Work
- Study
- Family
- Ukraine scheme
- BN(O) route
- Asylum
- Other non-EU+
- EU+ nationals
- British nationals
- Total net migration
Vertical dashed lines mark measurement changes. See method changes.
Source: Office for National Statistics [49]
Observations 5
The 2022–2023 peak combined work, study and two humanitarian routes
At the peak, work, study, the Ukraine scheme and the BN(O) route for Hong Kongers all added large numbers at once, while EU+ net migration had already turned negative. The Ukraine scheme line jumps in 2022 and has fallen back to around zero since; the BN(O) line is smaller and steadier. A policy aimed only at work or study would not have touched the two humanitarian routes. 48 6
Ukraine contributed a sharp spike in 2022, but not the whole surge
Study adds far less to net migration once students leave
Asylum is now one of the largest net contributors
British and EU+ nationals both leave on net
In 2025 net migration was 350,000 for non-EU+ nationals, negative 136,000 for British nationals and negative 42,000 for EU+ nationals. The British figure grew after 2022 mainly because fewer Britons returned; ONS says British emigration itself has been stable, and the British estimates are particularly uncertain. 22 12 27
Method Changes
2021-06: "EU" becomes "EU+", and the method changes
ONS: "Comparisons between estimates before and after June 2021 should be treated with caution because of changes in methodology." British estimates before this date rest on the International Passenger Survey, which ONS says undercounted British emigration. [48]
About this data
Full published range: 2019-06–2025-12. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – The whole of ONS Table 4b, which splits non-EU+ net migration by reason only from the year ending June 2019, on rolling quarterly years. Earlier years have no reason-for-moving split on this basis.
Net migration by route and nationality
Non-EU+ lines come from Table 4b, by the reason a person originally came, so a student who leaves counts against Study. "Ukraine scheme" and "BN(O) route" are Table 4b's humanitarian sub-columns; "Other non-EU+" combines its resettlement and "other" columns. EU+ and British lines and the total come from Table 1. All values are rounded to the nearest thousand by ONS, so the parts can differ from the total by up to 2,000. Figures for the last four periods are provisional.
Arrivals: EU+, Non-EU+ and British
EU+, non-EU+ and British nationals, shown separately. EU+ includes the EU and EFTA from mid-2021; the earlier definition covers the EU only. Nationality is not ethnicity or the country someone last lived in.
People moving to the UK for a year or more, by year ending
EU+, non-EU+ and British nationals, shown separately. EU+ includes the EU and EFTA from mid-2021; the earlier definition covers the EU only. Nationality is not ethnicity or the country someone last lived in. Read as arrivals: EU+, Non-EU+ and British: People moving to the UK for a year or more. Dashed segments cross 1 definitional break in the source, explained in Method Changes below this graph. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- Non-EU+ nationals
- EU+ nationals
- British nationals
Vertical dashed lines mark measurement changes. See method changes.
Source: Office for National Statistics [50]
Observations 3
2021–2023: Visa Changes, Recruitment and Humanitarian Routes Drove the Surge
Several changes increased non-EU arrivals together: the government restored a post-study work route, care workers became eligible for work visas in early 2022, and new routes admitted people from Hong Kong and Ukraine. Demand reinforced those policy changes: universities recruited more overseas students as their finances deteriorated, while social care employers recruited abroad to fill vacancies linked to low pay and poor working conditions. 6
Immigration Has Shifted from EU to Non-EU Nationals
627,000 of the 813,000 people who moved to the UK long-term in 2025 were non-EU+ nationals, down from 780,000 the year before but still the great majority. 13
EU+ arrivals remain positive, but more EU+ nationals are leaving than arriving: net migration was -42,000 in 2025 and has been negative in every rolling-year estimate since June 2022. Arrivals and net migration measure different things. 12
Method Changes
2021-06: "EU" becomes "EU+", and the method changes
ONS: "For estimates up to YE March 2021 this category includes nationals of the countries of the European Union (EU) for each given time period (excluding British nationals)." From year ending June 2021 the same category also includes Norwegian, Icelandic, Liechtenstein and Swiss nationals, and ONS adds: "Comparisons between estimates before and after June 2021 should be treated with caution because of changes in methodology." [50]
About this data
Full published range: 2012-06–2025-12. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – This is the whole of the ONS series that splits migration by nationality group on the administrative-data method: it begins at year ending June 2012 and runs to year ending December 2025. An older survey-based series carries an EU/non-EU split back to 1975, but it uses a different method and a different definition of the group, so it is not joined on here.
Components of population change
Each year's change in the UK population, split into natural change (births minus deaths) and net migration. Years run to the end of June.
Change in UK population over the year to mid-year, by year to mid-year
Each year's change in the UK population, split into natural change (births minus deaths) and net migration. Years run to the end of June. Read as components of population change: Change in UK population over the year to mid-year. Dashed segments cross 1 definitional break in the source, explained in Method Changes below this graph. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- Net migration and other
- Natural change
- Total change
Vertical dashed lines mark measurement changes. See method changes.
Source: Office for National Statistics [51]
Observations 2
Migration is almost all of recent population growth
In the year to mid-2025 the UK population grew by 227,700. Net international migration was 222,900 and natural change only 4,900, so migration supplied 98% of the growth (222,900 divided by 227,700). The Migration Observatory puts migration's share at 68% of growth from 2005 to 2024 and 99% since 2020. 29 31
Subtleties
The direct share understates migration's effect on population
These components count migrants only when they arrive or leave. Children later born to migrants count as natural change: in 2024, 34% of births in England and Wales were to mothers born outside the UK. 32
Method Changes
2022: Administrative migration data, still being revised
ONS: "Population estimates for mid-2022 onwards for the UK are subject to regular revision as the methods and data used to estimate international and internal migration continue to be developed." Mid-2022 to mid-2024 were revised in October 2026. [51]
About this data
Full published range: 1982–2025. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – The full span ONS publishes with the mid-2025 estimates (Figure 3 of the bulletin).
Components of population change
ONS publishes these in thousands to one decimal place; they are shown here in people. "Net migration and other" is ONS's own category: international migration plus changes in armed forces personnel and their dependants and unattributable change. ONS rounds each component separately, so natural change plus net migration can differ from the total by a few hundred people (by 500 in mid-2001).
Projected population
ONS 2024-based national population projections. Each line holds fertility and mortality at the principal assumptions and varies only long-term net migration. Projections are scenarios, not forecasts.
UK population at mid-year, by mid-year
ONS 2024-based national population projections. Each line holds fertility and mortality at the principal assumptions and varies only long-term net migration. Projections are scenarios, not forecasts. Read as projected population: UK population at mid-year. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- Zero net migration
- Low migration (105,000 a year)
- Principal (230,000 a year)
- High migration (455,000 a year)
Source: Office for National Statistics [52]
Observations 2
On ONS's central assumption, migration is the only source of growth
ONS now assumes long-term net migration of 230,000 a year, down from 340,000 in its previous projections. On that basis deaths exceed births from mid-2026, and net migration is the only source of population growth over the next 25 years. The population peaks in the mid-2050s and then declines. 34 33 52
Zero net migration gives a smaller population from now on
People aged 65+ per 1,000 aged 16–64
People aged 65 and over per 1,000 people aged 16 to 64, by mid-year
ONS 2024-based national population projections. Each line holds fertility and mortality at the principal assumptions and varies only long-term net migration. Projections are scenarios, not forecasts. Read as people aged 65+ per 1,000 aged 16–64: People aged 65 and over per 1,000 people aged 16 to 64. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- Zero net migration
- Low migration (105,000 a year)
- Principal (230,000 a year)
- High migration (455,000 a year)
Source: Office for National Statistics [52]
Observations 2
Every assumption ages the population; migration changes how fast
On this chart's fixed-age measure there were about 302 people aged 65 and over per 1,000 aged 16 to 64 in 2024. By 2074 the ratio reaches about 457 with high migration, 525 on the principal assumption, 580 with low migration and 641 with zero net migration. Higher migration slows the rise but does not stop it, and it does so by making the population larger. On ONS's own pension-age measure, the principal projection goes from 280 in mid-2024 to 329 by mid-2049. 52 35
Projections are scenarios, not forecasts
ONS says its long-term migration assumption "should not be viewed as a forecast". Each line shows what a migration level implies if it is sustained, not how likely it is. 36
About this data
Full published range: 2024–2124. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – The full 100-year horizon ONS publishes for the 2024-based projections. The further from 2024, the more the lines show the arithmetic of the assumptions rather than a likely future.
Projected population
Sum of every single-year age and both sexes in each file's Population sheet. The zero variant also sets migration between the four UK nations to zero; at UK level this makes no difference.
People aged 65+ per 1,000 aged 16–64
Derived, not published: people aged 65 and over divided by people aged 16 to 64, times 1,000, from the same files. This fixed-age ratio is not the ONS old-age-dependency ratio, which uses the legislated State Pension age (rising to 67 and then 68) and so starts lower, at 280 in mid-2024. A fixed age is used here so that every year and every variant is measured against the same line.
Permanent-type migration per head, OECD countries, 2024
New permanent-type migrants of foreign nationality in 2024 as a share of each country's population. All 37 countries in the OECD's chart; Türkiye is not included. The UK is 21st of 37.
New permanent-type migrants as % of population, 2024
- Luxembourg3.94%
- Iceland3.79%
- Switzerland1.52%
- Ireland1.38%
- Portugal1.32%
- Slovenia1.25%
- Canada1.22%
- Austria1.12%
- New Zealand1.02%
- Netherlands1.01%
- Poland0.96%
- Denmark0.91%
- Belgium0.91%
- Australia0.9%
- Spain0.77%
- Sweden0.71%
- Germany0.69%
- Estonia0.65%
- Norway0.64%
- Greece0.64%
- United Kingdom0.63%
- Finland0.62%
- Chile0.57%
- Hungary0.51%
- France0.45%
- Israel0.43%
- United States0.41%
- Slovak Republic0.38%
- Czechia0.37%
- Italy0.28%
- Costa Rica0.23%
- Lithuania0.2%
- Korea0.15%
- Japan0.14%
- Latvia0.14%
- Colombia0.12%
- Mexico0.06%
Observations 3
Per head, the UK sits in the middle of the OECD
In 2024 the UK received the fourth-largest number of new permanent-type migrants in the OECD, but per head of population it ranked 21st of the 37 countries shown, next to Norway, Greece and Finland. Luxembourg, Iceland, Switzerland and Ireland took the most relative to their size; Japan and Mexico the least. The OECD notes that UK inflows per head "remain modest despite the recent increase in inflows in absolute terms". 45 44
The UK's 2024 fall was one of the sharpest
UK permanent-type migration fell by 41% between 2023 and 2024, the second-sharpest fall after New Zealand; the OECD links both to unusually high permanent labour migration in 2022–2023. 44
This is an inflow measure, not net migration
The OECD counts foreign nationals granted permanent-type status and does not subtract anyone leaving, so a country with heavy emigration can rank high here and low on net migration. No comparable cross-country net migration series was found: the UN and World Bank figures disagree with ONS by about half for the UK. Temporary migrants such as students are excluded. 45
About this data
OECD International Migration Outlook 2025, Figure 1.2 data (StatLink f9aut5): the "share" column, which is inflows divided by the OECD's own population figure. 29 countries are on the OECD's standardised permanent-type basis; Iceland, Poland, Greece, Chile, Hungary, Costa Rica, Latvia and Colombia use unstandardised national data, which the OECD marks separately. Permanent-type means people granted a status that can lead to long-term residence, including people switching from temporary status and free-movement migrants; it counts foreign nationals only and excludes temporary workers, students and Ukrainians under temporary protection. It is an inflow, not net migration: emigration is not subtracted.
Permanent-type migration in people, OECD countries, 2024
The same 2024 inflows as the chart above, in people rather than per head. The UK had the fourth-largest number, after the United States, Germany and Canada.
New permanent-type migrants, 2024
- United States1,425,060
- Germany586,208
- Canada483,585
- United Kingdom435,650
- Poland373,303
- Spain367,986
- France298,115
- Australia239,343
- Netherlands183,377
- Japan177,133
- Italy168,868
- Portugal137,571
- Switzerland135,570
- Chile112,184
- Belgium106,178
- Austria102,604
- Sweden75,599
- Korea75,582
- Mexico72,486
- Ireland71,921
- Greece64,697
- Colombia61,811
- Denmark54,387
- New Zealand52,958
- Hungary49,300
- Czechia40,242
- Israel39,728
- Norway35,706
- Finland34,681
- Slovenia26,391
- Luxembourg26,352
- Slovak Republic20,874
- Iceland14,796
- Costa Rica11,629
- Estonia8,907
- Lithuania5,685
- Latvia2,661
About this data
Same source, coverage and definitions as the per-head chart: the "value" column of the Figure 1.2 data, rounded to whole people.
International Comparison by Nationality, 2024
EU+ and non-EU+ bars count foreign nationals; each country’s own nationals are separate. EU+ means EU and EFTA; other foreign nationals are non-EU+. Poland and Slovakia exclude Ukrainians under temporary protection.
Non-EU+ nationals · Annual arrivals as % of resident population
- Malta4.29%
- Cyprus3.11%
- Spain1.97%
- Liechtenstein1.66%
- Luxembourg1.53%
- Ireland1.38%
- Croatia1.35%
- Slovenia1.2%
- United Kingdom1.13%
- Lithuania1.1%
- Czechia0.99%
- Finland0.92%
- Germany0.91%
- Iceland0.77%
- Denmark0.74%
- Estonia0.74%
- Switzerland0.74%
- Netherlands0.73%
- Belgium0.71%
- Greece0.69%
- Norway0.69%
- Sweden0.67%
- Austria0.66%
- Italy0.6%
- Poland0.49%
- Romania0.48%
- Bulgaria0.42%
- Hungary0.41%
- France0.36%
- Latvia0.29%
- Slovakia0.04%
Show all breakdowns
| Country | Non-EU+ nationals | EU+ nationals | Own-country nationals | Other / rounding | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Malta | 4.29% | 1.31% | 0.44% | 0% | 6.04% |
| Cyprus | 3.11% | 0.83% | 0.24% | 0% | 4.19% |
| Spain | 1.97% | 0.38% | 0.3% | <0.01% | 2.65% |
| Liechtenstein | 1.66% | 1.09% | 0.48% | 0.02% | 3.25% |
| Luxembourg | 1.53% | 2.02% | 0.27% | <0.01% | 3.83% |
| Ireland | 1.38% | 0.36% | 0.63% | <0.01% | 2.39% |
| Croatia | 1.35% | 0.13% | 0.34% | <0.01% | 1.82% |
| Slovenia | 1.2% | 0.13% | 0.22% | 0% | 1.55% |
| United Kingdom | 1.13% | 0.13% | 0.2% | <0.01% | 1.46% |
| Lithuania | 1.1% | 0.04% | 0.65% | <0.01% | 1.8% |
| Czechia | 0.99% | 0.12% | 0.03% | <0.01% | 1.14% |
| Finland | 0.92% | 0.1% | 0.12% | <0.01% | 1.14% |
| Germany | 0.91% | 0.29% | 0.09% | <0.01% | 1.29% |
| Iceland | 0.77% | 1.35% | 0.47% | <0.01% | 2.59% |
| Denmark | 0.74% | 0.65% | 0.31% | <0.01% | 1.71% |
| Estonia | 0.74% | 0.23% | 0.38% | <0.01% | 1.36% |
| Switzerland | 0.74% | 1.38% | 0.25% | <0.01% | 2.37% |
| Netherlands | 0.73% | 0.48% | 0.21% | 0.01% | 1.44% |
| Belgium | 0.71% | 0.53% | 0.14% | <0.01% | 1.38% |
| Greece | 0.69% | 0.08% | 0.5% | 0% | 1.27% |
| Norway | 0.69% | 0.37% | 0.13% | <0.01% | 1.19% |
| Sweden | 0.67% | 0.25% | 0.18% | <0.01% | 1.1% |
| Austria | 0.66% | 0.65% | 0.1% | <0.01% | 1.41% |
| Italy | 0.6% | 0.07% | 0.1% | <0.01% | 0.77% |
| Poland | 0.49% | 0.09% | 0.24% | <0.01% | 0.82% |
| Romania | 0.48% | 0.06% | 0.97% | <0.01% | 1.5% |
| Bulgaria | 0.42% | 0.11% | 0.28% | <0.01% | 0.81% |
| Hungary | 0.41% | 0.1% | 0.41% | <0.01% | 0.92% |
| France | 0.36% | 0.1% | 0.18% | 0% | 0.64% |
| Latvia | 0.29% | 0.02% | 0.47% | <0.01% | 0.78% |
| Slovakia | 0.04% | 0.02% | 0.07% | 0% | 0.13% |
Source: Eurostat [11]; Office for National Statistics [22]; Office for National Statistics [47]
Observations 3
Separate the non-EU+ comparison from the overall total
The comparison starts with non-EU+ foreign nationals. Switching to EU+ or all arrivals changes the ranking: these are different questions, so a high total does not by itself establish a high non-EU+ inflow. 11 This is Gross ArrivalsThe number of people moving into a country, before subtracting anyone leaving. In these UK charts, this means people moving to the UK for at least 12 months, including returning British citizens. It is the immigration line, not net migration.: countries with substantial outward migration can have high arrivals without equally high Net MigrationImmigration minus emigration: the number moving in, less the number moving out. Net migration can fall because fewer people arrive, more people leave, or both. It does not count births or deaths.. 8 46
High small-country totals conceal different nationality mixes
A modest number of arrivals is a larger share of a small country's population. The nationality breakdown also differs sharply: EU+ nationals form a much larger share of arrivals in Luxembourg than in Malta. Nationality and previous residence are different measures, so this chart uses citizenship consistently. 11
Some low rates reflect who gets counted
Poland and Slovakia exclude Ukrainians under temporary protection from these migration statistics. Their low bars therefore cannot be read as evidence that they received very few people fleeing Ukraine. Differing coverage is one reason the chart is an approximate comparison rather than a precise league table. 8
About this data
Eurostat migr_imm1ctz, 2024, age TOTAL, sex T, unit NR, age definition REACH; divided by demo_pjan population on 1 January 2024. EU+ foreign nationals = EU27_2020_FOR + EFTA_FOR. Non-EU+ foreign nationals = NEU27_2020_FOR − EFTA_FOR. Own-country nationals = NAT. Unknown/stateless = STLS + UNK. Eurostat components sum to TOTAL before rounding. Other / rounding comprises unknown citizenship and stateless arrivals in Eurostat, and the 1,000-person gap between independently rounded UK groups and the rounded UK total; the UK gap is a rounding adjustment, not another measured nationality group. All 30 available EU/EFTA countries are shown; Portugal has no 2024 data. UK: ONS December 2024 nationality estimates (780,000 non-EU+, 91,000 EU+, 140,000 British) divided by the ONS mid-2024 UK population estimate in its October 2026 vintage (series UKPOP); the UK population reference date differs from Eurostat’s start-year denominator. Nationality is not previous residence, birthplace or ethnicity. British citizens are own-country nationals in the UK and non-EU+ foreigners in EU/EFTA countries. Refugee coverage and registration methods vary. Downloaded 11 September 2026: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/api/dissemination/statistics/1.0/data/migr_imm1ctz?time=2024&age=TOTAL&sex=T&unit=NR .
813,000 people moved to the UK for a year or more in 2025 and 642,000 left, so net migration was 171,000, down from a peak of 944,000 in the year to March 2023. 1 21 The charts below set that against the whole ONS series back to 1964, the routes behind the recent rise and fall, what migration does to population growth now and under official projections, other OECD countries, and what governments promised.
Pledges, outcomes and public preferences
What governing parties promised about the level of net migration, set against the ONS series in the first chart:
| Election | Pledge (source wording) | What happened to net migration |
|---|---|---|
| 2010, Conservative | "take net migration back to the levels of the 1990s—tens of thousands a year, not hundreds of thousands" 38 | Above 100,000 in every year of the 2010s |
| 2015, Conservative | "keep our ambition of delivering annual net migration in the tens of thousands" 38 | Above 100,000 every year to 2019 |
| 2017, Conservative | "annual net migration in the tens of thousands" 39 | Above 100,000 every year to 2019 |
| 2019, Conservative | "overall numbers will come down" (no number) 40 | Rose to the 944,000 peak in the year to March 2023 |
| 2024, Conservative | annual cap on work and family visas, with "year-on-year reductions" 41 | Not elected |
| 2024, Labour | reduce legal migration, no number 41 | 171,000 in 2025, down from 331,000 in 2024 |
| 2024, Reform UK | net migration "should be zero" 41 | Not in government |
Public preferences, latest reading: in the Ipsos and British Future tracker (fieldwork June to July 2025), 41% wanted immigration reduced "a lot", 16% reduced a little, 21% kept the same and 15% increased. 42 Immigration's salience as an issue was below 5% in 1994, peaked at 56% in September 2015, fell to around 5% in 2020 and reached 51% in September 2025. 43
Observations
"Tens of thousands" was met only during Covid
Pledges since 2019 have named a direction, not a number
A majority want lower immigration, but views softened while numbers were high
57% wanted immigration reduced in 2025 (41% "a lot" plus 16% "a little"), against 35% who wanted it kept the same or increased. Opposition to immigration fell from the early 2010s to the early 2020s, while net migration stayed above 100,000, and has risen again since 2022; attitudes in 2025 were still less negative than before the early 2010s. 42 43
Related Data
Work and Study Visas and the Care Workforce
Work visas more than tripled to a 2023 peak and have since fallen most of the way back, driven above all by care workers. [1][2][3][5][14][21]
By route
Entry clearance visas issued for work, each calendar year, main applicants and dependants together, split into route families that add up to the total. Health and Care Worker is the route that took care workers from February 2022 until it closed to new overseas recruits in July 2025.
Work visas issued in the year, by year
Entry clearance visas issued for work, each calendar year, main applicants and dependants together, split into route families that add up to the total. Health and Care Worker is the route that took care workers from February 2022 until it closed to new overseas recruits in July 2025. Read as by route: Work visas issued in the year. Dashed segments cross 2 definitional breaks in the source, explained in Method Changes below this graph. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- All work visas
- Health and Care Worker
- Other sponsored work
- Temporary work
- Talent, innovator and entrepreneur
- Other work routes
Vertical dashed lines mark measurement changes. See method changes.
Source: Home Office [55]
Observations 3
Work visas more than doubled in two years and have fallen back most of the way
For the eleven years to mid-2021 there were fewer than 200,000 work visas a year, partly because EU nationals needed no visa while free movement lasted. Health and Care Worker and Skilled Worker visas drove the rise to 613,627 in 2023, and together made up 76% of work visas that year. 2 The total was 234,841 in the year to June 2026: 158,722 main applicants and 76,119 dependants. 1
The skill threshold was lowered in 2020 and raised again in July 2025
The post-Brexit system cut the skill threshold for a work visa from degree level (RQF 6) to A-level equivalent (RQF 3), opening sponsored visas to mid-skilled occupations; care workers were added to the Health and Care Worker route separately, in February 2022. 8 2 On 22 July 2025 the threshold went back to RQF 6, which the Migration Advisory Committee describes as ending the 2020 relaxation. 9
Talent, innovator and entrepreneur routes are a small slice and have not grown since 2023
These routes (Global Talent, High Potential Individual, Innovator Founder, Scale-up and their predecessors) were under one in twenty-five work visas in every year shown, and their number in 2025 was below 2023's. The chart counts visas applied for abroad only, so it misses people who switch onto these routes from inside the UK.
Method Changes
2008: Points-based system tiers begin
Home Office: "Prior to the Q3 2019 publication, each PBS visa type (Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 4 and Tier 5) included 'pre-PBS equivalent' visa types, which relate to non-PBS visas that were in place before the PBS was introduced. From Q3 2019, the non-PBS equivalent visas have been recategorised, and in the latest published data all Work non-PBS visas are included in the 'Other work visas and exemptions' visa type". Before the points-based tiers, every work visa therefore sits in "Other work routes". [55]
2021: EU nationals start needing work visas
Home Office: "During this time the UK was a member of the European Union (EU) and, as such, EU nationals did not require a visa to work in the UK due to freedom of movement." Free movement ended on 1 January 2021, so from 2021 the count covers EU workers too. [55]
Main applicants and dependants
Work visas issued in the year, by year
Entry clearance visas issued for work, each calendar year, main applicants and dependants together, split into route families that add up to the total. Health and Care Worker is the route that took care workers from February 2022 until it closed to new overseas recruits in July 2025. Read as main applicants and dependants: Work visas issued in the year. Dashed segments cross 2 definitional breaks in the source, explained in Method Changes below this graph. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- Main applicants
- Dependants
Vertical dashed lines mark measurement changes. See method changes.
Source: Home Office [55]
Observations 1
Dependants were close to half of work visas at the peak
The Migration Advisory Committee found that Health and Care Worker visa holders brought 1.21 dependants each between October 2022 and September 2023, against 0.77 for other Skilled Worker occupations: 173,900 dependants on that route in a year. 10 The dependant line fell after care workers lost the right to bring family in spring 2024, but more slowly than main applicants, because people recruited before the change could still bring family from abroad. In the year to June 2026, 79% of Health and Care Worker visas went to dependants. 4 13
Method Changes
2008: Points-based system tiers begin
Home Office: "Prior to the Q3 2019 publication, each PBS visa type (Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 4 and Tier 5) included 'pre-PBS equivalent' visa types, which relate to non-PBS visas that were in place before the PBS was introduced. From Q3 2019, the non-PBS equivalent visas have been recategorised, and in the latest published data all Work non-PBS visas are included in the 'Other work visas and exemptions' visa type". Before the points-based tiers, every work visa therefore sits in "Other work routes". [55]
2021: EU nationals start needing work visas
Home Office: "During this time the UK was a member of the European Union (EU) and, as such, EU nationals did not require a visa to work in the UK due to freedom of movement." Free movement ended on 1 January 2021, so from 2021 the count covers EU workers too. [55]
About this data
Full published range: 2005–2025. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – The Home Office detailed dataset runs from 2005 to the second quarter of 2026; the chart stops at the last complete calendar year. It counts visas applied for outside the UK only, so it leaves out in-country grants and switches between routes, including the Graduate route and most extensions. Route families are our grouping of the dataset’s visa types: "Talent, innovator and entrepreneur" is Global Talent, Tier 1 Exceptional Talent, High Potential Individual, Innovator Founder, Start-up, Tier 1 Entrepreneur, Tier 1 Graduate Entrepreneur and Scale-up; "Other sponsored work" is every other visa in the Worker category (Skilled Worker and Tier 2, intra-company transfers, Global Business Mobility, sportspeople and ministers of religion, including Tier 2 dependants); "Temporary work" is the Temporary Worker category (seasonal workers, youth mobility, creative and exchange schemes); "Other work routes" is everything else, including Tier 1 General and Post-Study Work, investors, UK Ancestry, overseas domestic workers and all pre-2008 work permits. The five families sum exactly to the total in every year.
By route
Health and Care Worker visas are zero before 2020 because the route opened in August 2020; health workers sponsored before then are in "Other sponsored work". Main applicants and dependants are counted together because the dataset assigns dependants on points-based routes to their main applicant’s route.
Main applicants and dependants
Health and Care Worker visas issued to people applying from abroad each quarter, main applicants and the dependants who came with or joined them. Care workers became eligible in February 2022; restrictions announced in December 2023, including a bar on care workers bringing dependants, took effect in spring 2024; the route closed to new overseas care recruits in July 2025.
Visas issued in the quarter, by quarter ending
Health and Care Worker visas issued to people applying from abroad each quarter, main applicants and the dependants who came with or joined them. Care workers became eligible in February 2022; restrictions announced in December 2023, including a bar on care workers bringing dependants, took effect in spring 2024; the route closed to new overseas care recruits in July 2025. Read as main applicants and dependants: Visas issued in the quarter. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- Main applicants
- Dependants
Source: Home Office [56]
Observations 1
Main applicants fell first; dependants followed after the spring 2024 rules
Main applicants on the route peaked in the third quarter of 2023 and dropped by four-fifths within two quarters. Dependants stayed high into early 2024, then fell by about two-thirds in the quarter after care workers lost the right to bring them. 13 The government's technical annex puts the 2023-to-2024 fall in the whole route at 68%, to 110,800, and attributes it to Home Office scrutiny of employers, compliance action and the spring 2024 dependant rule. 11
About this data
Full published range: 2020-12–2026-06. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – The route opened in August 2020 and its first grants fall in the last quarter of 2020; the dataset runs to the second quarter of 2026. Figures from the first quarter of 2026 are provisional.
By occupation
Entry clearance grants to sponsored work main applicants each quarter, for the three health and care occupation groups, with every sponsored occupation shown for scale. Dependants are not included, because the dataset records occupation only for the person sponsored.
Main applicants granted visas in the quarter, by quarter ending
Entry clearance grants to sponsored work main applicants each quarter, for the three health and care occupation groups, with every sponsored occupation shown for scale. Dependants are not included, because the dataset records occupation only for the person sponsored. Read as by occupation: Main applicants granted visas in the quarter. Dashed segments cross 1 definitional break in the source, explained in Method Changes below this graph. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- All sponsored occupations
- Care workers and senior care workers
- Nurses
- Doctors
Vertical dashed lines mark measurement changes. See method changes.
Source: Home Office [57]
Observations 2
Care-worker visas collapsed in late 2023 and early 2024, long before the 2025 closure
Grants to sponsored care workers fell by about nine-tenths between the third quarter of 2023 and the first quarter of 2024. The Home Office attributes the start of the fall to closer scrutiny of health and social care sponsors and compliance action against employers, before the 2024 rule changes took effect. 3 By the time the route closed to new overseas care recruits in July 2025, grants were already about a thousand a quarter; the government's own impact estimate for the closure was about 7,000 main applicants a year. 12 The Home Office summary nonetheless describes the fall from 107,772 to 344 as following "the end to overseas recruitment of care workers in July 2025". 5
Nurse recruitment from abroad fell almost as steeply
Health and Care Worker visas for nursing professionals fell 95%, from 22,858 to 1,125, between 2023 and the year to June 2026; the Department of Health and Social Care links this to the end of its centrally supported international recruitment programme and lower demand. Doctors fell less, and were 59% of the route's visas in the latest year. 6
Method Changes
2024-12: Recorded SOC 2020 codes replace modelled estimates
Home Office: "Data between Q1 2021 and Q3 2024 are modelled estimates, based on converting occupations under the Office for National Statistics' (ONS) Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) 2010 framework for classifying occupations, and converting these to occupations under the SOC 2020 framework." [57]
About this data
Full published range: 2021-03–2026-06. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – The occupation dataset starts in the first quarter of 2021 and runs to the second quarter of 2026; figures from 2026 are provisional. It covers only applications matched to a certificate of sponsorship, so totals are slightly below the visa dataset. "Care workers and senior care workers" is the SOC 2020 minor group 613, Caring Personal Services.
Vacancy rate
Three views of the adult social care workforce in England, each financial year: the vacancy rate, the nationality of the people filling posts, and how far care workers’ average pay sits above the legal minimum wage.
Vacant posts as a percentage of all posts, by financial year ending March
Three views of the adult social care workforce in England, each financial year: the vacancy rate, the nationality of the people filling posts, and how far care workers’ average pay sits above the legal minimum wage. Read as vacancy rate: Vacant posts as a percentage of all posts. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- All job roles
- Care workers and support workers
Source: Skills for Care [58]
Observations 3
Care vacancies fell from their 2021/22 peak to the lowest rate in the series
Skills for Care puts the 2021/22 vacancy rate at 10.4%, the highest since its records began in 2012/13, and the 2025/26 rate at 6.1%, one point below 2018/19. 14 It credits international recruitment with part of the fall, and changes in economic inactivity and fewer vacancies elsewhere in the economy with another part; it does not say how much each contributed. 16 17
Vacancies did not rise as overseas recruitment ran down
About 105,000 people arrived from abroad and started direct care jobs in 2023/24, 50,000 in 2024/25 and 30,000 in 2025/26. 13 19 Around 2,000 were recruited between April and June 2026, and the monthly vacancy rate stayed between 6.4% and 6.1% from March to August 2026. 18 15 That is under a year of data after the route closed, so the effect of the closure on vacancies is not yet known.
Employers that recruited abroad saw the largest fall in vacancies
The vacancy rate among employers with internationally recruited care staff fell from 9.9% in March 2022 to 5.6% in March 2026. 20
Nationality of the workforce
Percentage of filled posts, by financial year ending March
Three views of the adult social care workforce in England, each financial year: the vacancy rate, the nationality of the people filling posts, and how far care workers’ average pay sits above the legal minimum wage. Read as nationality of the workforce: Percentage of filled posts. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- British
- EU (non-British)
- Non-EU
Source: Skills for Care [59]
Observations 2
British-held care posts fell by about 130,000
Posts filled by British nationals fell from 85% of the workforce in 2020/21 to 67% in 2025/26, about 130,000 fewer posts, 40,000 of them in the last year. 21 Elsewhere in the same report, measured from 2021/22 across local authority and independent employers only, the fall is 83% to 65%, or about 107,000 posts. 22 Skills for Care attributes the decline to fewer British people starting care jobs, not to more of them leaving. 23 About 150,000 posts were held by people on Health and Care Worker visas in March 2026. 19
About this data
Full published range: 2017–2026. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – Each point is a financial year from April to March, labelled by the year it ends: 2026 is 2025/26. The statistical appendix publishes these trend tables from 2016/17 on the method revised in October 2026; earlier editions ran back to 2012/13 on the old method and are not joined on. Figures cover England only.
Vacancy rate
All sectors, from appendix table 3.12.2. The appendix was revised in October 2026 and gives a 2021/22 peak of 10.1% for all job roles; the main report’s text still quotes 10.4% for that year and 6.2% for 2025/26 in places. The chart uses the revised appendix.
Nationality of the workforce
All sectors and job roles, from appendix table 4.8.1, which publishes shares rounded to whole percentages. The three groups sum to 100% in every year.
Care worker pay above the minimum wage
Derived by us from appendix table 5.4.1: the independent-sector mean hourly rate for care workers and support workers, minus the National Minimum Wage or National Living Wage in force during the year, divided by that wage. The inputs run from £7.77 against £7.20 in 2016/17 to £12.84 against £12.21 in 2025/26. A mean, not the median the report quotes in its text.
Licences revoked
Licences to sponsor overseas workers or students that the Home Office revoked each calendar year, by route. A revoked sponsor can no longer employ or recruit people on that route.
Licences revoked in the year, by year
Licences to sponsor overseas workers or students that the Home Office revoked each calendar year, by route. A revoked sponsor can no longer employ or recruit people on that route. Read as licences revoked: Licences revoked in the year. Dashed segments cross 1 definitional break in the source, explained in Method Changes below this graph. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- Skilled Worker
- Temporary Worker
- Student
Vertical dashed lines mark measurement changes. See method changes.
Source: UK Visas and Immigration [61]
Observations 1
Revocations of sponsor licences are at a record number
The Home Office revoked 1,948 worker sponsor licences between July 2024 and June 2025, against 937 the year before and 261 and 247 in the two years before that. It names adult social care among the sectors with the most abuse, and gives underpayment, helping people get round the rules and failing to provide promised work as reasons. 27 28 The series records licences, not the workers employed, and has no sector or reason breakdown.
Method Changes
2016: Administrative revocations counted
Home Office: "Following a review of the definitions used in producing this data, there has been a change in the way this data is reported from Q2 2016. Figures now include administrative revocations and the suspension of a licence when an immediate revocation is completed. This means that these figures are not directly comparable to those published previously." [61]
About this data
Full published range: 2012–2025. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – The transparency table runs from the first quarter of 2012 to the second quarter of 2026; the chart sums complete calendar years. Licences covering several routes are counted under each. The table has no breakdown by sector, by reason, or by the number of workers each sponsor employed.
Registered sponsors
Organisations licensed to sponsor overseas workers or students at the end of each year, and Skilled Worker revocations in the year as a share of Skilled Worker sponsors.
Sponsors registered at the end of the year, by year
Organisations licensed to sponsor overseas workers or students at the end of each year, and Skilled Worker revocations in the year as a share of Skilled Worker sponsors. Read as registered sponsors: Sponsors registered at the end of the year. Dashed segments cross 1 definitional break in the source, explained in Method Changes below this graph. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- Skilled Worker
- Temporary Worker
- Student
Vertical dashed lines mark measurement changes. See method changes.
Source: UK Visas and Immigration [62]
Method Changes
2016: Administrative revocations counted
Home Office: "Following a review of the definitions used in producing this data, there has been a change in the way this data is reported from Q2 2016. Figures now include administrative revocations and the suspension of a licence when an immediate revocation is completed." [62]
Skilled Worker revocation rate
Licences revoked as % of registered sponsors, by year
Organisations licensed to sponsor overseas workers or students at the end of each year, and Skilled Worker revocations in the year as a share of Skilled Worker sponsors. Read as skilled Worker revocation rate: Licences revoked as % of registered sponsors. Dashed segments cross 1 definitional break in the source, explained in Method Changes below this graph. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- Skilled Worker
Vertical dashed lines mark measurement changes. See method changes.
Source: UK Visas and Immigration [62]
Observations 1
As a share of sponsors, revocations are back to their mid-2010s level, not a record
Registered Skilled Worker sponsors roughly quadrupled between 2019 and 2025. Measured against that larger base, revocations in 2025 were about the same share of sponsors as in 2014 to 2017, after very low rates during 2021 to 2023 while sponsor numbers were climbing fastest.
Method Changes
2016: Administrative revocations counted
Home Office: "Following a review of the definitions used in producing this data, there has been a change in the way this data is reported from Q2 2016. Figures now include administrative revocations and the suspension of a licence when an immediate revocation is completed." [62]
About this data
Full published range: 2014–2025. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – The sponsor register table starts in the first quarter of 2014; each point is the count at the end of the year. The revocation rate is derived by us: Skilled Worker licences revoked in the calendar year (table SC_01) divided by Skilled Worker sponsors registered at the end of that year (table SP_01).
New joiners by place of education
People joining the Nursing and Midwifery Council register for the first time each year to March, by whether they were educated in the UK or abroad.
People joining the register for the first time, by year ending March
People joining the Nursing and Midwifery Council register for the first time each year to March, by whether they were educated in the UK or abroad. Read as new joiners by place of education: People joining the register for the first time. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- Educated in the UK
- Educated abroad
Source: Nursing and Midwifery Council [64]
Observations 3
UK-trained nurses joining rose while overseas recruitment peaked
UK-educated joiners to the nursing register rose 11.9% in 2023-24 and 5.9% in 2024-25, while internationally educated joiners reached their 2023-24 peak and stayed high; internationally educated professionals were 49.4% of new joiners in 2023-24 and 26.4% in 2025-26. 29 30 The two counts moved together, which does not by itself show whether one affects the other.
Then both fell
In 2025-26, 10,961 internationally educated professionals joined, against 20,669 the year before, and UK-educated joiners fell 4.9% to 30,581. 30 Acceptances onto nursing degrees at English universities in 2025 were 18% below their 2021 peak. 32 Two of the three largest sources of international joiners, Nigeria and Ghana, are on the list of countries where active recruitment is barred under ethical codes. 31
Research on training predates the sponsored system
The Migration Advisory Committee's 2018 review found "no evidence that migration has had a negative impact on the training of the UK-born workforce" under EU free movement. 33 The 2025 white paper reads the recent period the other way, from the two trends moving in opposite directions rather than from a study. 34 The 2018 research covered EU free movement, before sponsorship and salary thresholds applied; see Immigration and Domestic Workforce Training.
About this data
Full published range: 2021–2026. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – The data tables publish six-month counts from the half-year to September 2020; each point sums the two halves of a year from April to March, so 2026 is April 2025 to March 2026. The sums reproduce the report’s own figures for the last two years.
About this data
Full published range: 2010-09–2025-06. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – The House of Commons Library tables give eight dates from September 2010 to June 2025, unevenly spaced; NHS Digital’s monthly series behind them could not be downloaded. Each value is 100 minus the Library’s "UK as % of known". Excludes GPs and social care. The share of staff with unknown nationality fell from about one in six in 2010 to about one in eighty in 2025, so early figures are less certain.
All claims by entry route
Everyone who claimed asylum each year, split by how they last came to be in the UK: an illegal entry route, a visa or other leave, or neither; and, for visa holders, which visa.
People claiming asylum in the year, by year
Everyone who claimed asylum each year, split by how they last came to be in the UK: an illegal entry route, a visa or other leave, or neither; and, for visa holders, which visa. Read as all claims by entry route: People claiming asylum in the year. Dashed segments cross 1 definitional break in the source, explained in Method Changes below this graph. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- Illegal entry routes
- Held a visa or other leave
- Other or unmatched
Vertical dashed lines mark measurement changes. See method changes.
Source: Home Office [66]
Observations 1
Two in five people claiming asylum had held a visa
Of 85,891 people who claimed asylum in the year to June 2026, 41% (34,999) had held a visa or other leave, slightly more than the 40% (33,949) who arrived by small boat. 50 51 52 The Home Office notes that the rise coincided with the rise in visa grants up to 2023, and that a claim can come long after the visa was granted, during or after the period of leave. 53
Method Changes
2020: Exact counts and work sub-routes begin
Home Office: "Figures for 2018 and 2019 have been rounded to the nearest 100, or nearest 10 for values under 100." Health and Care Worker and Graduate show zero before 2020 and 2021 because those routes did not yet exist. [66]
Claims by visa held
People claiming asylum in the year, by year
Everyone who claimed asylum each year, split by how they last came to be in the UK: an illegal entry route, a visa or other leave, or neither; and, for visa holders, which visa. Read as claims by visa held: People claiming asylum in the year. Dashed segments cross 1 definitional break in the source, explained in Method Changes below this graph. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- Study
- Visitor
- Health and Care Worker
- Graduate
- Other work
- Other leave
Vertical dashed lines mark measurement changes. See method changes.
Source: Home Office [66]
Observations 1
Graduate visa claims doubled as study-visa claims fell
In the year to June 2026, claims from people who last held a study visa fell 35% and claims from work-visa holders rose 16%; Graduate visa holders' claims more than doubled to 5,130 while claims from other work visas fell 9% to 9,021. 54 Each route's claims are a small fraction of the visas it issued; rough ratios are in About this data. The dataset records the last leave held, not how the person first entered.
Method Changes
2020: Exact counts and work sub-routes begin
Home Office: "Figures for 2018 and 2019 have been rounded to the nearest 100, or nearest 10 for values under 100." Health and Care Worker and Graduate show zero before 2020 and 2021 because those routes did not yet exist. [66]
About this data
Full published range: 2018–2025. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – The dataset runs from the first quarter of 2018 to the second quarter of 2026; the chart shows complete calendar years. It records the most recent leave held before the claim, so a student who switched to a work visa is counted under work. "Other work" is Skilled Worker, Seasonal Worker and every other work visa except Health and Care and Graduate; for 2018 and 2019 the Home Office gives only a work total. "Other leave" includes family visas and Electronic Travel Authorisations. Rough scale: claims from Health and Care Worker visa holders in 2024 were about 1% of the Health and Care visas issued in 2022 and 2023 together (first chart), and study-visa claims in 2024 were about 3% of the sponsored study visas issued in 2023; these are cross-year ratios of our own, not published rates.
Foreign-trained doctors across the OECD
Share of doctors who obtained their first medical degree abroad, 2023 or the latest year shown in brackets, every country the OECD reports. The UK is highlighted.
% of doctors trained abroad
- Israel58.5%
- Norway44%
- Ireland43.4%
- New Zealand42.4%
- Switzerland40.3%
- United Kingdom (England and Wales)38.3%
- Australia31.4%
- Sweden (2022)28.4%
- United States (2016)25%
- Chile24.9%
- Canada24.6%
- Greece22%
- OECD average (28 countries)19.6%
- Slovenia15.4%
- Germany15%
- Finland (2022)14.1%
- Belgium14%
- Denmark11.7%
- France11%
- Hungary8.3%
- Czechia8.2%
- Austria7.5%
- Latvia6.7%
- Colombia5.1%
- Estonia4.5%
- Netherlands3.8%
- Poland (2022)3.8%
- Italy1%
- Lithuania0.8%
Source: OECD [38]
Observations 1
The UK relies on foreign-trained doctors more than most OECD countries
The UK (England and Wales) has the sixth-highest share of foreign-trained doctors among the 28 countries the OECD reports, about twice the OECD average of 20%. 38 It admitted more foreign-trained doctors in 2023 than in any earlier year on record. 39 Across the OECD, domestically trained doctors still made up most of the growth in physician numbers between 2010 and 2023. 40
About this data
OECD Health Statistics 2025, Figure 8.23 workbook (stat.link/cuf5an). UK data cover England and Wales only. Germany counts foreign nationals rather than foreign-trained doctors, and some registries include licensed doctors who are not working, which the OECD names as the main comparability limit. The OECD average is the unweighted mean of the 28 countries with data in both years.
Foreign-trained nurses across the OECD
Share of nurses who obtained their first nursing degree abroad, 2023 or the latest year shown in brackets, every country the OECD reports. The UK is highlighted.
% of nurses trained abroad
- Ireland51.8%
- New Zealand33.1%
- Switzerland26.6%
- United Kingdom22.7%
- Australia17.9%
- Austria13.7%
- Israel11.4%
- Germany10.1%
- Canada10%
- OECD average (28 countries)8.8%
- United States (2024)6.8%
- Norway6.5%
- Italy5.2%
- Belgium4.6%
- Sweden (2022)3.7%
- Czechia3.5%
- France (2021)3.1%
- Latvia2.9%
- Denmark2.8%
- Slovenia2.1%
- Hungary1.9%
- Chile1.8%
- Netherlands1.5%
- Finland (2022)0.9%
- Greece0.9%
- Colombia0.6%
- Lithuania0.5%
- Poland (2022)0.4%
- Estonia0.2%
Source: OECD [41]
Observations 1
For nurses the UK is fourth, and foreign-trained nurses made up most of its growth
The OECD average share of foreign-trained nurses was 8.8% in 2023; the UK ranks fourth. 41 Foreign-trained nurses accounted for 83% of the increase in UK nurse numbers from 2010 to 2023. 42 Registries differ in whether they count only practising nurses, and Germany counts nationality instead of place of training. 43
About this data
OECD Health Statistics 2025, Figure 8.26 workbook (stat.link/op6rgz). Germany counts foreign nationals rather than foreign-trained nurses. The OECD average is the unweighted mean of 28 countries.
First-year earnings of Graduate route visa holders and UK graduates
Median annual earnings of people in work: Graduate route holders over their first year on the visa and in its last three months, against UK-domiciled first-degree graduates about 15 months after graduating.
Median annual earnings
- Graduate route, first year£21,000
- Graduate route, last three months of first year£24,240
- UK graduates, 15 months after graduating£26,000
Source: Migration Advisory Committee [44]; Migration Advisory Committee [45]
Observations 1
Graduate route holders earned less than UK graduates in their first year
The median Graduate visa holder in work earned £1,750 a month in the first year (£21,000 a year), rising to £2,020 a month (£24,240) in the last three months; UK graduates earned a median £26,000 about 15 months after graduating. 44 45 The MAC expected some gap because international graduates have less experience of the UK labour market. 45 19% earned at least £2,500 in their first full month, and 38% by the twelfth month. 46 These are first-year figures only; nothing published follows the same people further.
About this data
Migration Advisory Committee, from HMRC PAYE records for Graduate visa holders who started before April 2022, and the Graduate Outcomes survey for UK graduates of 2020/21. Annual figures are the MAC’s conversions of monthly medians. No later year has been published.
Jobs taken by people switching into sponsored work
Share in managerial, professional or associate professional and technical occupations: people switching to a sponsored work visa from the Graduate route, people switching straight from a student visa, and UK graduates.
% in graduate-level occupations
- UK graduates75%
- Switched from the Graduate route69%
- Switched straight from a student visa42%
Source: Migration Advisory Committee [47]
Observations 1
Graduate route switchers took graduate-level jobs at nearly the UK graduate rate; students who switched directly did not
69% of people who switched from the Graduate route to a sponsored work visa went into managerial, professional or associate professional jobs, against 75% of UK graduates and 42% of people who switched straight from a student visa. 47 49% of direct student switchers became care workers or senior care workers, against 20% of Graduate route switchers and 6% of UK graduates in the whole caring, leisure and other service group. 48 Students are also staying longer than they used to: 41% of the 2020 study cohort still held leave five years later, against 17% to 18% for the 2012 to 2016 cohorts; see Student Migration and Subsequent Residence. 49
About this data
Migration Advisory Committee, from corrected Home Office management information on switches made between July 2021 and December 2023.
Work visas issued to people coming from abroad rose to 613,627 in 2023 and fell to 234,841 in the year to June 2026, 62% below the peak. 2 1 Care workers account for most of both the rise and the fall: visas for caring occupations fell from 107,772 in 2023 to 344, and the fall began at the end of 2023, more than eighteen months before the route closed to new overseas recruits in July 2025. 5 3 In England's adult social care, the share of posts held by British nationals fell from 85% to 67% between 2020/21 and 2025/26, and the vacancy rate came down from its 2021/22 peak to 6.1%. 21 14
The report then follows the same workers into the NHS and nursing register, sets UK reliance on foreign-trained staff against every OECD country that reports it, and covers two questions about study and work routes: what Graduate route holders earn, and how many visa holders later claim asylum.
Subtleties
Fewer arrivals is not fewer visa holders
Every visa chart here counts people applying from abroad. Health and Care Worker extensions granted inside the UK rose 19% to 336,215 in the year to June 2026, as people who arrived in 2022 and 2023 renewed their leave. 7 The number of people holding these visas has therefore not fallen in step with new grants.
The care route's own data cannot measure exploitation
The Migration Advisory Committee reported exploitation on the route and tied it to low pay and visas linked to one employer, but this report found no official series that counts exploited workers by visa route, and licence revocations count employers rather than victims. 26 27 See Data still needed.
Integration Outcomes in the UK
The share of residents born abroad has roughly quadrupled since 1951, and outcomes vary widely by group, mostly improving with time and across generations. [2][1][6][11][13][36][41][20]
About this data
Full published range: 1951–2021. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – The ONS states the 1951, 2001 and 2011 shares in its 2013 Census analysis and the 2011 and 2021 shares in its 2021 Census bulletin. The 1961, 1971, 1981 and 1991 Census shares appear only in an ONS chart image, with no published table, so those years are left out rather than read off a picture. 2011 uses the 13.4% stated in the 2021 bulletin; the 2013 article rounds it to 13 per cent.
Employment rate
The share of 16- to 64-year-olds in work in each year, for every ethnic group the Annual Population Survey series publishes, with the overall rate for comparison. Ethnicity is not migrant status: most people in several of these groups were born in the UK.
Share of 16- to 64-year-olds in work, by year
The share of 16- to 64-year-olds in work in each year, for every ethnic group the Annual Population Survey series publishes, with the overall rate for comparison. Ethnicity is not migrant status: most people in several of these groups were born in the UK. Read as employment rate: Share of 16- to 64-year-olds in work. Dashed segments cross 1 definitional break in the source, explained in Method Changes below this graph. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- All
- White British
- White other
- Indian
- Pakistani and Bangladeshi
- Asian other
- Black
- Mixed
- Other
Vertical dashed lines mark measurement changes. See method changes.
Source: Department for Work and Pensions (Ethnicity facts and figures) [65]
Observations 2
Employment gaps by ethnicity are large but narrowing
Rising employment across all groups partly reflects the wider labour market
The overall rate also rose over the period, so part of each group's rise is the general recovery after 2010 rather than anything specific to that group. 11
Method Changes
2012: New ethnicity question
DWP: "The Annual Population Survey updated its ethnicity questions in 2011. Estimates from before and after 2011 may not be consistent, and data for individual ethnic groups in 2011 is not available." [65]
About this data
Full published range: 2004–2022. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – The full range of the published series. Rates for individual ethnic groups are not available for 2011, when the survey changed its ethnicity question, so each group's line has no 2011 point; the overall rate is published for every year.
Net contribution per person
Taxes paid minus transfers and public services used, per person per year, for people of Danish origin and for immigrants and their Danish-born descendants by region of origin. Below zero is a net cost. These are single-year accounts, not lifetime ones.
DKK thousand per person per year, 2019 prices, by year
Taxes paid minus transfers and public services used, per person per year, for people of Danish origin and for immigrants and their Danish-born descendants by region of origin. Below zero is a net cost. These are single-year accounts, not lifetime ones. Read as net contribution per person: DKK thousand per person per year, 2019 prices. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- Danish origin
- Immigrants from Western countries
- Immigrants from MENAPT countries
- Immigrants from other non-Western countries
- Descendants, Western origin
- Descendants, MENAPT origin
- Descendants, other non-Western origin
Source: Finansministeriet (Danish Ministry of Finance) [66]
Observations 4
Denmark: immigrants from MENAPT countries are net costs; Western immigrants are net contributors
In 2019, immigrants from the Middle East, North Africa, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Turkey (the ministry's "MENAPT" group) cost Danish public finances DKK 79 thousand each on average, while immigrants from Western countries contributed DKK 52 thousand each, and people of Danish origin DKK 22 thousand. Immigrants and descendants together cost DKK 16 billion, about DKK 21 thousand per person. 19 20 25
The cost fell sharply as employment rose
The average net cost of MENAPT immigrants fell by about DKK 37 thousand a person between 2014 and 2019. The ministry attributes about half the fall for non-Western immigrants to stronger attachment to the labour market, during years when employment was rising for everyone. Had MENAPT immigrants aged 25 to 64 worked at the Danish-origin rate, their 2019 contribution would have been about DKK 12 billion higher. 24 26
Reason for migrating explains part of the gap, not all of it
Immigrants who came as refugees cost about DKK 95 thousand each in 2019, while those who came to work contributed about DKK 120 thousand. MENAPT immigrants came mainly as refugees or family members, Western immigrants mainly to work or study. With the Western mix of reasons for migrating, MENAPT immigrants' average would have been about DKK 55 thousand higher, still negative. 21 22
Descendants' figures mostly reflect their age
Descendants of every origin, including Western, show net costs because most are children in school. At the Danish-origin age profile, descendants' total contribution would be about DKK 13 billion higher and immigrants' about DKK 28 billion lower. 23
Subtleties
One year, not a lifetime
These are annual accounts for each year, not lifetime ones, and are not adjusted for the business cycle, which is why the Danish-origin line swings from year to year. They allocate shared spending such as defence across everyone. Denmark's MENAPT intake was mainly refugees and their families, so the figures say more about humanitarian routes than about work routes such as the UK's. 25 21
About this data
Full published range: 2014–2019. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – The full range of the Ministry of Finance's register-based series in its latest edition (May 2023). Earlier years are uprated to 2019 prices with nominal GDP. A 2020–2021 update had not been found published. Read from the Internet Archive copy, because fm.dk refused automated fetching.
Net contribution per person
MENAPT is the ministry's grouping of Middle Eastern and North African countries plus Pakistan, Afghanistan and Turkey. Descendants are people born in Denmark to immigrant parents; most are children.
Entry rate at 18
The share of 18-year-olds from English state schools accepted onto a full-time undergraduate course through UCAS, for each ethnic group the series publishes.
Share of state-school 18-year-olds accepted to higher education, by year
The share of 18-year-olds from English state schools accepted onto a full-time undergraduate course through UCAS, for each ethnic group the series publishes. Read as entry rate at 18: Share of state-school 18-year-olds accepted to higher education. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- Chinese
- Asian
- Black
- Other
- Mixed
- White
Source: Department for Education (Ethnicity facts and figures) [67]
Observations 1
Minority pupils enter university at higher rates, and White pupils at the lowest
In 2024, 66.1% of Chinese state-school pupils went to university at 18, and 29.8% of White pupils, the lowest rate. Every group's entry rate rose between 2006 and 2024. Research cited by the publisher finds almost all minority groups more likely to go to university by 19 than White British pupils, even after allowing for prior attainment and family background. 38 39
About this data
Full published range: 2006–2024. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – The full range of the published series. Students whose ethnicity is not known are excluded, and students who do not match across school and UCAS records are dropped, which the publisher says makes the estimates likely to be lower than the real value.
Share of adults agreeing
The share of adults who say many people in their neighbourhood can be trusted, and the share who agree their local area is a place where people from different backgrounds get on well together. Each point is a survey year from October to March, plotted at the year it starts.
Share of adults in England, by survey year (plotted at its starting year)
The share of adults who say many people in their neighbourhood can be trusted, and the share who agree their local area is a place where people from different backgrounds get on well together. Each point is a survey year from October to March, plotted at the year it starts. Read as share of adults agreeing: Share of adults in England. Use the Table switch to see every value.
- People from different backgrounds get on well together
- Many people in the neighbourhood can be trusted
Source: Department for Culture, Media and Sport [68]
Observations 4
Cohesion has stayed high
81% of adults in England agree their local area is a place where people from different backgrounds get on well together, in a narrow range since 2018/19; the 2024/25 figure is a small but statistically significant fall from 81.4% to 80.6%. 47
Neighbourhood trust is lower than in 2013/14
40% say many people in their neighbourhood can be trusted, within a 40% to 42% band since 2016/17 but down from 48% in 2013/14, the first year of the current survey method. 46
Trust tracks deprivation closely
Research finds a small negative association between diversity and trust, weaker or absent once deprivation is allowed for
Most studies find more diverse communities report less trust, and a 2005 British survey linked rising diversity to lower neighbourhood trust. Other British studies find no strong erosion once deprivation is taken into account, and a London study found diversity linked to higher perceived cohesion, with segregation within neighbourhoods linked to lower cohesion. 50 51 52
Subtleties
The research measures diversity, not immigration or its pace
Almost all of the trust research relates trust to an area's ethnic mix, not to immigration or to how fast an area changed, and the national survey does not link trust to local migration. A national trend cannot show whether places that changed fastest lost the most trust. 53
About this data
Full published range: 2018–2024. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – The full range of the time-series table in the 2024/25 release. There is no 2022/23 survey year in the table. The survey began its push-to-web method in 2013/14, when 48% said many neighbours could be trusted; those earlier years are in earlier releases and are not plotted here. The survey covers England only and replaced the face-to-face Citizenship Survey, which is not comparable.
Where the foreign-born share rose most, 2011 to 2021
The 20 local authorities in England and Wales with the largest rise in the share of residents born outside the UK between the 2011 and 2021 Censuses, with England and Wales as a whole, split into residents born in the EU and those born elsewhere outside the UK.
Both · Rise in the foreign-born share, percentage points
- City of London12.9
- Barking and Dagenham10.39
- Watford9.25
- Havering9.13
- Thurrock9.02
- Reading8.68
- Cambridge8.58
- Boston8.5
- Hillingdon8.49
- Dartford8.4
- Sutton7.9
- Sandwell7.65
- Peterborough7.59
- Swindon7.53
- Luton7.5
- Leicester7.49
- Salford7.27
- Milton Keynes7.19
- Bexley6.93
- Pendle6.8
- England and Wales3.43
Show all breakdowns
| Category | Born in the EU | Born elsewhere outside the UK | Total |
|---|---|---|---|
| City of London | 6.09 | 6.81 | 12.9 |
| Barking and Dagenham | 5.59 | 4.8 | 10.39 |
| Watford | 4.74 | 4.51 | 9.25 |
| Havering | 3.56 | 5.57 | 9.13 |
| Thurrock | 5.02 | 4 | 9.02 |
| Reading | 3.86 | 4.82 | 8.68 |
| Cambridge | 4.26 | 4.32 | 8.58 |
| Boston | 7.56 | 0.94 | 8.5 |
| Hillingdon | 2.54 | 5.95 | 8.49 |
| Dartford | 2.17 | 6.23 | 8.4 |
| Sutton | 2.67 | 5.23 | 7.9 |
| Sandwell | 2.11 | 5.54 | 7.65 |
| Peterborough | 4.8 | 2.79 | 7.59 |
| Swindon | 1.65 | 5.88 | 7.53 |
| Luton | 4.11 | 3.39 | 7.5 |
| Leicester | 3.23 | 4.26 | 7.49 |
| Salford | 2.51 | 4.76 | 7.27 |
| Milton Keynes | 3.4 | 3.79 | 7.19 |
| Bexley | 2.47 | 4.46 | 6.93 |
| Pendle | 3.23 | 3.57 | 6.8 |
| England and Wales | 1.76 | 1.67 | 3.43 |
Source: Office for National Statistics (Nomis) [4]; Office for National Statistics (Nomis) [5]
Observations 3
The fastest-changing places are mostly outer London and towns near it
The detailed origins of the non-EU rise vary by place
The same Census tables split the non-EU-born by continent. In Hillingdon, Swindon, Sandwell and Leicester most of the non-EU rise was in people born in the Middle East and Asia; in Dartford and Salford a large part was in people born in Africa. The Census groups do not separate Muslim-majority countries, so these figures cannot say how much of the change was from any particular culture or religion. 4 5
About this data
Own calculation from the Census country-of-birth tables for local authority districts (2011 QS203EW, 2021 TS004, both via Nomis). Each share is that group's residents divided by all usual residents in that Census; a bar is the 2021 share minus the 2011 share. "Born in the EU" is Ireland plus the other EU countries as each Census defined them, so Croatia counts as EU only in 2021. "Born elsewhere" is everyone else born outside the UK, including the rest of Europe. 323 of the 331 2021 districts kept their codes from 2011 and are ranked; the eight formed by later mergers (such as Buckinghamshire and Dorset) are left out. The City of London has about four thousand residents. England and Wales totals sum all districts and reproduce the ONS figures of 13.4% and 16.8%. Ranked by total rise; the full ranking is in the extraction script, not shown.
English proficiency of residents born abroad, by when they arrived
Census 2021, England and Wales, everyone born outside the UK aged 3 and over, by period of arrival. One Census, so this compares people who arrived at different times, not the same people over time.
Cannot speak English well · Share of residents born abroad who arrived in the period
- Arrived 2011 to 202110.8%
- Arrived 1971 to 19807.6%
- Arrived 1981 to 19907.5%
- Arrived 1991 to 20006.9%
- Arrived 2001 to 20106.8%
- Arrived before 19714.3%
Show all breakdowns
| Category | English is a main language | Speaks English well or very well | Cannot speak English well | Cannot speak English | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Arrived before 1971 | 84.4% | 10.6% | 4.3% | 0.7% | 100% |
| Arrived 1971 to 1980 | 72.2% | 18.8% | 7.6% | 1.4% | 100% |
| Arrived 1981 to 1990 | 71.8% | 19.1% | 7.5% | 1.5% | 99.9% |
| Arrived 1991 to 2000 | 64.6% | 27.4% | 6.9% | 1.1% | 100% |
| Arrived 2001 to 2010 | 51.6% | 40.7% | 6.8% | 0.9% | 100% |
| Arrived 2011 to 2021 | 37.4% | 49.7% | 10.8% | 2% | 99.9% |
Source: Office for National Statistics [10]
Observations 3
Recent arrivals are the most likely to struggle with English
English as a main language rises with time in the UK
84% of residents who arrived before 1971 had English as their main language, against 37% of 2011–21 arrivals; most recent arrivals who do not have English as a main language say they speak it well or very well. The share who cannot speak English at all is around 1 to 2% in every arrival period. 7
British identity follows the same pattern
94% of non-EU-born residents who arrived before 1951 described their national identity as UK-only, against 81% of 1981–90 arrivals and 20% of 2011–21 arrivals. 8
Subtleties
One snapshot, not people followed over time
These are different groups of people measured once, in 2021. Earlier arrivals came from different countries, and those who stayed may differ from those who left, so the gap between periods is not only the effect of time spent in the UK. The Census does not record parents' birthplace, so the children of immigrants cannot be separated out. 7
About this data
Percentages computed from the counts in the ONS Figure 9 data file, rounded to one decimal place, so some rows total 99.9. Proficiency is self-reported and asked only of people whose main language is not English. Earlier arrivals still living in England and Wales in 2021 are survivors who stayed; people who left or died are not counted.
Employment rate of women by ethnic group, 2022
Women aged 16 to 64 in work, Great Britain, 2022, every ethnic group in the published breakdown.
Share of women aged 16 to 64 in work
- White other79%
- White British74%
- All women72%
- Mixed71%
- Indian70%
- Asian other68%
- Black66%
- Other60%
- Pakistani and Bangladeshi46%
Source: Department for Work and Pensions (Ethnicity facts and figures) [18]
Observations 1
The remaining gap is mainly among women
In 2022, 75% of Pakistani and Bangladeshi men were in work and 46% of women. The publisher notes that the Commission on Race and Ethnic Disparities cited cultural and religious reasons for this difference. 13
About this data
Annual Population Survey, 2022. Men's rates in the same table: All 79, White British 79, White other 86, Indian 84, Pakistani and Bangladeshi 75, Asian other 75, Black 74, Mixed 67, Other 75.
Employment rate by religion, Census 2021
People aged 16 to 64 in work (employees and self-employed), England and Wales, March 2021, for every religion the Census tick-box lists.
Share of 16- to 64-year-olds in work
- Christian73%
- No religion72.7%
- Jewish72.6%
- Hindu72.4%
- England and Wales70.9%
- Sikh70%
- Buddhist66.6%
- Other religion64.2%
- Muslim51.4%
Source: Office for National Statistics [17]
Observations 2
Muslims have the lowest employment rate of any religious group
Qualifications are polarised rather than uniformly low
25.3% of Muslims had no qualifications, against 18.2% of the population, but 32.3% had a degree-level qualification, close to the 33.8% overall. 16
About this data
Sum of the "employee" and "self-employed" shares in the ONS Figure 8 data file. Not adjusted for age: the Muslim group is the youngest, and students and people looking after home or family count as not in work. People who did not state a religion are not shown. The ONS notes that Census 2021 took place during the pandemic, when some furloughed people may have described themselves as inactive.
Lifetime net fiscal contribution by reason for migrating, Netherlands
Average net contribution per immigrant over the rest of their life, including the cost of the second generation, by the reason recorded on arrival. Independent study, not a government estimate.
Euro thousands per immigrant (below zero is a net cost)
- Labour migration125
- Study migration−75
- Family migration−275
- Asylum migration−475
Source: Jan van de Beek, Hans Roodenburg, Joop Hartog and Gerrit Kreffer (demo-demo uitgever) [27]
Observations 1
Netherlands: labour migrants are lifetime net contributors; asylum and family migrants are large net costs
An independent study estimates that, over a lifetime and including the second generation, labour migrants contribute €125,000 each on average, while study migrants cost €75,000, family migrants €275,000 and asylum migrants €475,000. 27
About this data
From the English summary (Table 0.2) of van de Beek, Roodenburg, Hartog and Kreffer (2021), rounded by the authors to multiples of €10,000. Generational accounting on Statistics Netherlands microdata for 2016, discounted to the time of arrival.
Lifetime net fiscal contribution by region of origin, Netherlands
Average net contribution per immigrant over the rest of their life, including the cost of the second generation, for the regions in the study's English summary table. Independent study, not a government estimate.
Euro thousands per immigrant (below zero is a net cost)
- Japan, North America, Oceania, British Isles, Scandinavia, Switzerland200
- Southern Africa150
- Other EU countries50
- Israel50
- Central and Eastern EU countries−50
- Former Yugoslavia and former Soviet Union−150
- Morocco−550
- Horn of Africa and Sudan−600
Source: Jan van de Beek, Hans Roodenburg, Joop Hartog and Gerrit Kreffer (demo-demo uitgever) [28]
Observations 1
Region of origin produces gaps as large as reason for migrating
Western immigrants contribute €25,000 on average and non-Western immigrants cost nearly €275,000; Morocco, the Horn of Africa and Sudan sit at a net cost of "€550,000 to €600.000" per immigrant, in the study's own words. The authors find that where the first generation is a large net cost, the second generation is usually also negative or at best budget-neutral. 28 29
Subtleties
An independent study, not the CPB
The study is by Jan van de Beek, Hans Roodenburg, Joop Hartog and Gerrit Kreffer, published by van de Beek's own imprint in 2021 and part-funded by the Renaissance Instituut. It describes itself as an update of a 2003 report by the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (CPB), which is why it is sometimes attributed to the CPB; the CPB did not produce it. Its lifetime figures are projections of future earnings and spending, not observed totals. 30 31
About this data
From Table 0.2 of the English summary, which lists these regions and two averages: Western +€25,000 and non-Western −€275,000. The summary text puts the Caribbean, West Asia, Turkey and North, Central and West Africa at −€200,000 to −€400,000 without single figures, so they are not plotted; the full regional breakdown is in the Dutch chapters and is not reproduced here.
Modelled net fiscal effect of extra immigrants, Norway
Statistics Norway model: present value, 2015 to 2100, of the change in net public finances per additional immigrant arriving in 2015, including their descendants, by country group. Above zero is a net gain.
NOK million per additional immigrant, 2012 values
- R1 (Western Europe, North America, Australia, New Zealand)0.8
- R2 (Eastern European EU countries)−0.8
- R3 (rest of the world)−4.1
Source: Statistics Norway (SSB) [32]
Observations 1
Norway's model finds a net cost only for immigrants from outside Europe and the West
Statistics Norway modelled a one-off increase in immigration in 2015. Over 2015–2100 each extra immigrant from the rest of the world (R3) adds NOK 4.1 million of net public spending, while Western immigrants (R1) reduce it by NOK 0.8 million and Eastern EU immigrants (R2) add 0.8 million. 32
Subtleties
A broad group and generous assumptions
R3 is everything outside Western Europe, North America, Oceania and the Eastern EU, and includes most refugees. The model assumes immigrants' children behave like non-immigrants and gives everyone of a given age and sex the same use of public services, which SSB says probably underestimates spending on refugees. It rests on 2006 behaviour. 33 34
About this data
Signs reversed from SSB's "net public spending" so that, as in the other fiscal charts, below zero is a net cost: SSB gives net spending of NOK 4.1 million for R3, 0.8 million for R2 and −0.8 million for R1. 4% discount rate. R1 is Western Europe, North America, Australia and New Zealand; R2 the Eastern European EU countries; R3 the rest of the world, including most refugees. Children are assumed to behave like non-immigrants. Built on 2006 behaviour; published in Norwegian in 2013.
GCSE results by ethnic group, England, 2022/23
Average Attainment 8 score (out of 90) for pupils at the end of Key Stage 4 in state-funded schools, every detailed ethnic group. White British pupils are highlighted as the reference group.
Average Attainment 8 score (out of 90)
- Chinese65.5
- Indian59.4
- Asian other54.3
- Bangladeshi51.9
- Mixed White and Asian51.7
- White Irish50.7
- Mixed other48.8
- Black African48.7
- White other48.4
- Pakistani47
- Other47
- Mixed White and Black African46.4
- All pupils46.3
- White British44.9
- Black other44.3
- Black Caribbean40
- Mixed White and Black Caribbean39.1
- Irish traveller26.8
- Gypsy, Roma20.3
Source: Department for Education (Ethnicity facts and figures) [35]
Observations 1
Most minority groups outscore White British pupils at GCSE
In 2022/23 Chinese (65.5) and Indian (59.4) pupils had the highest average Attainment 8 scores, and Bangladeshi, Black African and Pakistani pupils also scored above White British pupils (44.9). Gypsy and Roma pupils (20.3), Irish traveller pupils (26.8) and Mixed White and Black Caribbean pupils (39.1) had the lowest, with Black Caribbean pupils also below White British. The Education Policy Institute found most ethnic groups achieved higher GCSE grades than White British pupils in 2023. 35 36
Subtleties
Ethnicity is not generation
About this data
Department for Education, 2022/23, via Ethnicity facts and figures. Pupils of unknown ethnicity (score 42.1) are not shown. Ethnicity, not migrant generation or country of birth. Later years (2023/24 and 2024/25) are published in the DfE performance tables and were not collected for this report; grading changes during the pandemic make scores before 2022/23 hard to compare.
GCSE results of pupils eligible for free school meals, by ethnic group, England, 2022/23
Average Attainment 8 score (out of 90) for pupils eligible for free school meals, a measure of low family income, every detailed ethnic group. White British pupils are highlighted.
Average Attainment 8 score (out of 90), free-school-meal pupils
- Chinese60.3
- Indian48.6
- Bangladeshi47.7
- Black African44.7
- Asian other44.5
- Pakistani42.2
- Other41.1
- Mixed other38.9
- Black other38.8
- Mixed White and Asian38.8
- Mixed White and Black African38.8
- White other38.7
- Black Caribbean35.3
- All free-school-meal pupils34.8
- Mixed White and Black Caribbean32.2
- White Irish31.9
- White British30.9
- Irish traveller21.2
- Gypsy, Roma16.1
Source: Department for Education (Ethnicity facts and figures) [37]
Observations 1
The gap is widest among poorer pupils
Among pupils eligible for free school meals, White British pupils scored lower than every group except Gypsy, Roma and Irish traveller pupils. Every group scores lower when eligible for free school meals. 37
About this data
Department for Education, 2022/23. Pupils of unknown ethnicity (35.0) are not shown. Some groups are small: 227 Chinese and 126 Irish traveller pupils were eligible.
Saying it would be undesirable to outlaw homosexuality, 2024
British Muslims and the general public, one 2024 online poll by J.L. Partners commissioned by the Henry Jackson Society.
Share saying outlawing homosexuality would be undesirable
- General public62%
- British Muslims28%
Source: Henry Jackson Society [59]
Observations 3
British Muslims are markedly more conservative than the public on homosexuality
In a 2024 poll, 28% of British Muslims said it would be undesirable to outlaw homosexuality, against 62% of the public. In a 2015 poll in areas where at least a fifth of residents were Muslim, 52% of Muslims disagreed that homosexuality should be legal and 18% agreed; 39% agreed that wives should always obey their husbands. 59 55 56
The same polls find belonging to Britain as high as the public's
In the 2015 poll, 86% of Muslims felt a strong sense of belonging to Britain, against 83% of the national control sample. 57
The evidence on generations is thin and mixed
The one academic study comparing generations, from 2009, found young Muslims more liberal than their elders on gay marriage, with 74 percent supporting same-sex marriage or civil unions, but the most conservative of any group on the morality of homosexuality. No repeated survey tracks these attitudes across generations. 61 62
Subtleties
Each survey has a limitation that matters
- ICM for Channel 4, 2015: 1,081 Muslims interviewed face to face, only in areas at least 20% Muslim, which over-represents concentrated communities; the control sample of 1,008 was by telephone, a different method. 54
- J.L. Partners for the Henry Jackson Society, 2024: 1,000 Muslims and 2,013 members of the public from an online panel, weighted by country of birth among other things; the commissioner is a think tank with a position on the subject. 58
- Faith Matters survey, 2009 (Kashyap and Lewis): 480 interviews in areas at least 10% Muslim, with 79 percent non-response; old and small. 60
No British Social Attitudes or European Social Survey series of these attitudes by religion and generation was found.
About this data
Online panel, 1,000 British Muslims (14 February to 12 March 2024) and 2,013 adults in the general public (4 to 6 March 2024), each weighted to its own population. Commissioned by a think tank rather than run by an academic or official body. A different poll in 2015 (ICM for Channel 4) asked whether homosexuality should be legal and is described beneath the chart rather than plotted, because the question and method differ.
Who arrives and how they fare afterwards are measured by different statistics, and most of the UK's are by ethnicity or religion rather than by country of birth or generation. Read together, they show wide differences between groups, with most gaps narrowing over time: language improves with years in the country, employment gaps have shrunk, the children of most minority groups outperform White British pupils at school, and residential segregation has fallen. No UK fiscal estimate by origin was found; the three countries that do find large differences by origin and by reason for migrating. 1 6 11 36 41 20
Observations
Residential segregation fell for every ethnic group, 1991–2021
On the standard measure, the index of dissimilarity across neighbourhoods, segregation declined steadily for every ethnic group, White and minority, across the four censuses from 1991 to 2021. The largest fall was for the Black African group; Bangladeshi, Black Caribbean and Indian segregation also fell sharply. White British segregation was 0.55 in 2001 and 2011 and 0.53 in 2021. 41 43
The standard measure is of evenness, not of who lives next to whom
The index compares how evenly each group is spread across neighbourhoods relative to everyone else. A growing group can become more evenly spread while more of its members' neighbours belong to the same group; the study does not report that second measure, called isolation or exposure, and none was found for 2021. 42
Between schools, segregation was highest in non-Christian faith schools
A 2017 analysis of 2011–16 school census data counted a school as segregated when its share of White British pupils differed from its ten nearest schools' by more than 15 percentage points. By that test 84% of primary and 93% of secondary non-Christian faith schools were segregated. No later measure was found. 44 45
Subtleties
What this report does not measure
Almost no UK statistic follows immigrants and their children by country of origin. Employment and school results are by ethnicity; the Census measures language and identity by year of arrival, not generation; and fiscal contribution by origin was found only for other countries. Comparisons with Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway carry over the differences in who those countries admitted, which were more often refugees and family members than the UK's recent work and study arrivals. 21 34 53
Data still needed
- Net migration per head on a common definition for the UK and other high-income countries, for the same yearsThe OECD publishes comparable permanent-type inflows, not net migration. The UN and World Bank series does publish net migration, but it puts the UK at about half the ONS figure for 2023, so it cannot be set beside ONS data without reconciliation.
- Annual net migration by nationality and by reason before mid-2019 on the administrative-data methodONS splits net migration by reason only from the year ending June 2019, so the route mix of earlier rises (such as the 2000s) cannot be shown on the same basis.
- A long-run series of the share of the public wanting immigration reduced, on one question wordingThe Ipsos tracker gives preferred levels only since 2015; longer series use different questions, so the report can give the latest reading and the direction of change but not a consistent line set against migration levels.
- Projected old-age ratios for other ageing countries under their own migration variantsWithout them the report cannot say whether the UK's ageing under each migration assumption is typical.
Sources
UK Migration and Population Over the Long Run
- Long-term international migration, provisional: year ending December 2025
Office for National Statistics, 2026-05-21 · supports
“A provisionally estimated 813,000 people made a long-term move to the UK in year ending (YE) December 2025. Immigration dropped compared with our updated estimate for YE December 2024, when it was 1,012,000, continuing a downward trend from the peak of 1,469,000 in March 2023. … Net migration in YE December 2025 was 171,000. This was down from the peak of 944,000 in YE March 2023.”
A provisionally estimated 813,000 people made a long-term move to the UK in year ending (YE) December 2025. Immigration dropped compared with our updated estimate for YE December 2024, when it was 1,012,000, continuing a downward trend from the peak of 1,469,000 in March 2023. … Net migration in YE December 2025 was 171,000. This was down from the peak of 944,000 in YE March 2023.
- What is international migration and how do we estimate it?
Office for National Statistics, 2025-11-18 · supports
“We have been measuring long-term international migration in and out of the UK for over 60 years.”
We have been measuring long-term international migration in and out of the UK for over 60 years.
- What is international migration and how do we estimate it?
Office for National Statistics, 2025-11-18 · supports
“From the late 1960s to the early 1980s, net migration was consistently negative, meaning in most years, more people moved out of the country than moved into it.”
From the late 1960s to the early 1980s, net migration was consistently negative, meaning in most years, more people moved out of the country than moved into it.
- What is international migration and how do we estimate it?
Office for National Statistics, 2025-11-18 · supports
“In the late 1990s, this trend reversed, and net migration began to rise.”
In the late 1990s, this trend reversed, and net migration began to rise.
- Immigration, emigration and net migration into the UK, 1964 - 2025 (data download)
Office for National Statistics, 2026-05-21 · complicates
“Due to changes in methodology, comparisons between pre-June 2021 and post-June 2021 estimates should be treated with caution.”
Due to changes in methodology, comparisons between pre-June 2021 and post-June 2021 estimates should be treated with caution.
- Net migration to the UK
The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-05-27 · complicates
“Net migration was 171,000 in 2025, lower than the levels seen during the 2010s and a sharp decline from the unusually high levels in 2022 and 2023. In 2025, 67% of non-EU immigration was for work and study purposes. … it reintroduced a post-study work route – which likely made the UK more attractive to international students – opened new humanitarian visa routes for Ukrainians and Hong Kongers, and made care and senior care workers eligible for work visas. … UK universities recruited students overseas more actively as their financial situation deteriorated, and social care providers hired migrant workers to fill vacancies caused by low pay and poor working conditions in a sector with limited funding. … These included visa restrictions on the family members of care workers and most international students. … The current government introduced further restrictions on work visas and refugee family reunion in the second half of 2025, but these are not yet fully visible in the 2025 statistics.”
Net migration was 171,000 in 2025, lower than the levels seen during the 2010s and a sharp decline from the unusually high levels in 2022 and 2023. In 2025, 67% of non-EU immigration was for work and study purposes. … it reintroduced a post-study work route – which likely made the UK more attractive to international students – opened new humanitarian visa routes for Ukrainians and Hong Kongers, and made care and senior care workers eligible for work visas. … UK universities recruited students overseas more actively as their financial situation deteriorated, and social care providers hired migrant workers to fill vacancies caused by low pay and poor working conditions in a sector with limited funding. … These included visa restrictions on the family members of care workers and most international students. … The current government introduced further restrictions on work visas and refugee family reunion in the second half of 2025, but these are not yet fully visible in the 2025 statistics.
- Why do people come to the UK? Work
Home Office, 2026-07-16 · supports
“Health and Care Worker visas had fallen prior to the changes”
Health and Care Worker visas had fallen prior to the changes
- Immigration in Europe, 2024: migr_imm8 and demo_pjan
Eurostat, 2026-02-27 · complicates
“Poland and Slovakia did not include refugees from Ukraine who benefit from temporary protection”
Poland and Slovakia did not include refugees from Ukraine who benefit from temporary protection
- International migration: a recent history
Office for National Statistics, 2015-01-15 · supports
“Net migration of non-EU citizens increased after 1997 and peaked in 2004.”
Net migration of non-EU citizens increased after 1997 and peaked in 2004.
- Determinants of Migration to the UK
The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2017-10-11 · supports
“Economic growth and a structural demand for migrant labour”
Economic growth and a structural demand for migrant labour
- Immigration by citizenship, 2024 (migr_imm1ctz)
Eurostat, 2026-09-11 · complicates
“Immigration by age group, sex and citizenship”
Immigration by age group, sex and citizenship
- Long-term international migration, provisional: year ending December 2025
Office for National Statistics, 2026-05-21 · supports
“Net migration for EU+ nationals in YE December 2025 was negative 42,000, it has been negative since YE June 2022.”
Net migration for EU+ nationals in YE December 2025 was negative 42,000, it has been negative since YE June 2022.
- Long-term international migration, provisional: year ending December 2025
Office for National Statistics, 2026-05-21 · supports
“Most people immigrating into the UK in YE December 2025 were non-EU+ nationals, provisionally estimated at 627,000, a decline from 780,000 in YE December 2024.”
Most people immigrating into the UK in YE December 2025 were non-EU+ nationals, provisionally estimated at 627,000, a decline from 780,000 in YE December 2024.
- Long-term international migration, provisional: year ending December 2025
Office for National Statistics, 2026-05-21 · supports
“Freedom of movement between the EU+ countries and the UK ended in January 2021.”
Freedom of movement between the EU+ countries and the UK ended in January 2021.
- Net migration to the UK
The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-05-27 · supports
“EU net migration subsequently turned negative in 2022, as the post-Brexit immigration system greatly reduced opportunities for EU citizens to move to the UK.”
EU net migration subsequently turned negative in 2022, as the post-Brexit immigration system greatly reduced opportunities for EU citizens to move to the UK.
- International migration, England and Wales: Census 2021
Office for National Statistics, 2022-11-02 · supports
“Those born in the European Union (EU) made up 3.6 million (36.4% of all non-UK born usual residents) of the population, an increase from 2.5 million (32.7%) in 2011”
Those born in the European Union (EU) made up 3.6 million (36.4% of all non-UK born usual residents) of the population, an increase from 2.5 million (32.7%) in 2011
- Net migration to the UK
The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-05-27 · complicates
“Although policy towards EU citizens did not change until January 2021, EU net migration began to fall immediately after the referendum.”
Although policy towards EU citizens did not change until January 2021, EU net migration began to fall immediately after the referendum.
- Net migration to the UK
The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-05-27 · complicates
“This is because EU emigration is driven by people who arrived before Brexit, when EU immigration was higher.”
This is because EU emigration is driven by people who arrived before Brexit, when EU immigration was higher.
- Long-term international migration, provisional: year ending December 2025 (Table 1 data download)
Office for National Statistics, 2026-05-21 · complicates
“For estimates up to YE March 2021 this category includes nationals of the countries of the European Union (EU) for each given time period (excluding British nationals).”
For estimates up to YE March 2021 this category includes nationals of the countries of the European Union (EU) for each given time period (excluding British nationals).
- Long-term international migration, provisional: year ending December 2025
Office for National Statistics, 2026-05-21 · complicates
“The number of non-EU+ nationals arriving for work-related reasons fell by 47% in 2025”
The number of non-EU+ nationals arriving for work-related reasons fell by 47% in 2025
- Long-term international migration, provisional: year ending December 2025
Office for National Statistics, 2026-05-21 · supports
“At 171,000, long-term international net migration for year ending (YE) December 2025 has nearly halved from YE December 2024 (updated to 331,000); this level was last seen when the new immigration system was introduced in early 2021, and the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic travel restrictions were still in place. … The provisional estimate for total long-term emigration in the most recent period is 642,000.”
At 171,000, long-term international net migration for year ending (YE) December 2025 has nearly halved from YE December 2024 (updated to 331,000); this level was last seen when the new immigration system was introduced in early 2021, and the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic travel restrictions were still in place. … The provisional estimate for total long-term emigration in the most recent period is 642,000.
- Long-term international migration, provisional: year ending December 2025
Office for National Statistics, 2026-05-21 · supports
“Provisional net migration was 350,000 for non-EU+ nationals in YE December 2025, down from 511,000 a year earlier. … The provisional net migration of British nationals remained broadly stable, estimated at negative 136,000. … The immigration of EU+ and British nationals in the YE December 2025 was 76,000 and 110,000, falling slightly from 91,000 and 140,000, respectively, in the previous year. … In YE December 2025, 246,000 British nationals left the UK, a slight decline of 4% from the updated YE December 2024 estimates of 257,000.”
Provisional net migration was 350,000 for non-EU+ nationals in YE December 2025, down from 511,000 a year earlier. … The provisional net migration of British nationals remained broadly stable, estimated at negative 136,000. … The immigration of EU+ and British nationals in the YE December 2025 was 76,000 and 110,000, falling slightly from 91,000 and 140,000, respectively, in the previous year. … In YE December 2025, 246,000 British nationals left the UK, a slight decline of 4% from the updated YE December 2024 estimates of 257,000.
- Long-term international migration, provisional: year ending December 2025
Office for National Statistics, 2026-05-21 · supports
“When looking at the reasons for immigration of non-EU+ nationals in YE December 2025, 47% came for study-related reasons, 23% for work-related reasons, 14% were asylum applicants, and 7% and 6% were for family- and humanitarian-related reasons, respectively.”
When looking at the reasons for immigration of non-EU+ nationals in YE December 2025, 47% came for study-related reasons, 23% for work-related reasons, 14% were asylum applicants, and 7% and 6% were for family- and humanitarian-related reasons, respectively.
- Long-term international migration, provisional: year ending December 2025
Office for National Statistics, 2026-05-21 · supports
“In YE December 2025, 159,000 non-EU+ nationals who originally arrived on a study-related visa emigrated long-term. This accounts for 57% of all long-term emigration for non-EU+ nationals. This is likely because the large number of students who came to the UK after the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic have completed their studies and departed.”
In YE December 2025, 159,000 non-EU+ nationals who originally arrived on a study-related visa emigrated long-term. This accounts for 57% of all long-term emigration for non-EU+ nationals. This is likely because the large number of students who came to the UK after the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic have completed their studies and departed.
- Long-term international migration, provisional: year ending December 2025
Office for National Statistics, 2026-05-21 · complicates
“the number of people immigrating for asylum was broadly stable, with a small increase to 88,000 in the year ending December 2025, from 87,000 the previous year; these estimates include people who claimed asylum after arriving via a regular route and by illegal entry routes, such as small boats”
the number of people immigrating for asylum was broadly stable, with a small increase to 88,000 in the year ending December 2025, from 87,000 the previous year; these estimates include people who claimed asylum after arriving via a regular route and by illegal entry routes, such as small boats
- Net migration to the UK
The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-05-27 · complicates
“Asylum accounted for a further 14% of non-EU immigration—however, unlike other types of migrant, relatively few asylum migrants left the UK, so their impact on population growth will be larger than this.”
Asylum accounted for a further 14% of non-EU immigration—however, unlike other types of migrant, relatively few asylum migrants left the UK, so their impact on population growth will be larger than this.
- Net migration to the UK
The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-05-27 · complicates
“ONS estimates dating back to 1964 indicate that British net migration has been negative in all but one year (1985). In 2025, net emigration of British citizens was estimated at 136,000 (Figure 6), using an experimental new methodology that makes the figures particularly uncertain. According to the ONS, emigration of British citizens has been stable over time—the change in the data in Figure 6 results from a change of methodology, not a change in the underlying trend (see Understanding the evidence for more information). However, net emigration of British citizens has increased since 2022, because of fewer British people moving (back) to the UK.”
ONS estimates dating back to 1964 indicate that British net migration has been negative in all but one year (1985). In 2025, net emigration of British citizens was estimated at 136,000 (Figure 6), using an experimental new methodology that makes the figures particularly uncertain. According to the ONS, emigration of British citizens has been stable over time—the change in the data in Figure 6 results from a change of methodology, not a change in the underlying trend (see Understanding the evidence for more information). However, net emigration of British citizens has increased since 2022, because of fewer British people moving (back) to the UK.
- Net migration to the UK
The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-05-27 · complicates
“The May 2026 publication made further revisions, primarily because the method used to estimate EU and British migration was changed. Net migration for 2024 was revised down by 100,000 (or 23%) compared to the initial estimate in the May 2025 publication”
The May 2026 publication made further revisions, primarily because the method used to estimate EU and British migration was changed. Net migration for 2024 was revised down by 100,000 (or 23%) compared to the initial estimate in the May 2025 publication
- Population estimates for the UK, England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland: mid-2025
Office for National Statistics, 2026-10-01 · supports
“The population of the UK continued to grow in the year to mid-2025, reaching an estimated 69.5 million people. The size of the population is estimated to have increased by 227,700 (0.3%) from mid-2024, the lowest rate of increase since mid-2020. … net international migration to the UK was 222,900 (down from 651,700 in the year to mid-2024) … natural change, the difference between births and deaths, contributed an increase in population of 4,900; this increase was lower than in the previous year, but above the negative change in the year to mid-2023”
The population of the UK continued to grow in the year to mid-2025, reaching an estimated 69.5 million people. The size of the population is estimated to have increased by 227,700 (0.3%) from mid-2024, the lowest rate of increase since mid-2020. … net international migration to the UK was 222,900 (down from 651,700 in the year to mid-2024) … natural change, the difference between births and deaths, contributed an increase in population of 4,900; this increase was lower than in the previous year, but above the negative change in the year to mid-2023
- Population estimates for the UK, England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland: mid-2025
Office for National Statistics, 2026-10-01 · supports
“Figure 3: Net migration has contributed most to population growth from mid-1999 except for mid-2012”
Figure 3: Net migration has contributed most to population growth from mid-1999 except for mid-2012
- The Impact of Migration on UK Population Growth
The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-05-13 · supports
“Population estimates show that net migration was a major component of population growth over the past two decades, making up 68% of UK population growth from 2005 to 2024 (Figure 1). Natural change—i.e., the difference between the number of births and deaths—has declined since 2011, and fell into negative territory in 2023. As a result, net migration has accounted for 99% of population growth since 2020.”
Population estimates show that net migration was a major component of population growth over the past two decades, making up 68% of UK population growth from 2005 to 2024 (Figure 1). Natural change—i.e., the difference between the number of births and deaths—has declined since 2011, and fell into negative territory in 2023. As a result, net migration has accounted for 99% of population growth since 2020.
- The Impact of Migration on UK Population Growth
The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-05-13 · complicates
“This retrospective analysis does not account for the contribution of past migration to natural change, mainly to births. … ONS figures show that in 2024, 34% of births in England and Wales were to non-UK-born mothers.”
This retrospective analysis does not account for the contribution of past migration to natural change, mainly to births. … ONS figures show that in 2024, 34% of births in England and Wales were to non-UK-born mothers.
- National population projections: 2024-based
Office for National Statistics, 2026-04-28 · supports
“Net migration is projected to be the only source of population growth in the UK over the next 25 years, as deaths are expected to exceed births by 2.5 million. … Deaths are projected to exceed births in the UK from mid-2026, with mid-2025 being the last year in which births are slightly higher. … After peaking at 72.5 million in mid-2054, the UK population is projected to decrease.”
Net migration is projected to be the only source of population growth in the UK over the next 25 years, as deaths are expected to exceed births by 2.5 million. … Deaths are projected to exceed births in the UK from mid-2026, with mid-2025 being the last year in which births are slightly higher. … After peaking at 72.5 million in mid-2054, the UK population is projected to decrease.
- National population projections: 2024-based
Office for National Statistics, 2026-04-28 · supports
“The 2024-based NPPs long-term average annual net international migration assumption is 230,000, down by 110,000 from 340,000 in the 2022-based projections. This reflects the sharp decrease in net migration since it peaked in 2023, as well as expert advice.”
The 2024-based NPPs long-term average annual net international migration assumption is 230,000, down by 110,000 from 340,000 in the 2022-based projections. This reflects the sharp decrease in net migration since it peaked in 2023, as well as expert advice.
- National population projections: 2024-based
Office for National Statistics, 2026-04-28 · supports
“A common measure is the old-age-dependency ratio (OADR), which is the number of people of pensionable age for every 1,000 people of working age. It is projected that OADR will increase from 280 in mid-2024 to 310 in mid-2034, and reach 329 by mid-2049.”
A common measure is the old-age-dependency ratio (OADR), which is the number of people of pensionable age for every 1,000 people of working age. It is projected that OADR will increase from 280 in mid-2024 to 310 in mid-2034, and reach 329 by mid-2049.
- National population projections: 2024-based
Office for National Statistics, 2026-04-28 · complicates
“Demographic behaviour is inherently uncertain, so it is not possible to predict future migration trends. The long-term assumption should not be viewed as a forecast, but as a scenario where long-term net migration averages at a certain level with year-to-year variation.”
Demographic behaviour is inherently uncertain, so it is not possible to predict future migration trends. The long-term assumption should not be viewed as a forecast, but as a scenario where long-term net migration averages at a certain level with year-to-year variation.
- National population projections: variant projections, 2024-based
Office for National Statistics, 2026-04-28 · supports
“Migration (year ending … mid-2027 onwards) … 105,000 … 230,000 … 455,000 … Principal … 72.4 … High migration … 78.9 … Low migration … 68.8 … Zero net migration … 65.5 … Migration assumption: zero (zero cross-border migration and zero international net migration)”
Migration (year ending … mid-2027 onwards) … 105,000 … 230,000 … 455,000 … Principal … 72.4 … High migration … 78.9 … Low migration … 68.8 … Zero net migration … 65.5 … Migration assumption: zero (zero cross-border migration and zero international net migration)
- Clash of the manifestos: the net migration target
Full Fact, 2015-04-28 · supports
“In the 2010 Conservative manifesto it was stated that "we will take steps to take net migration back to the levels of the 1990s—tens of thousands a year, not hundreds of thousands". … "We will keep our ambition of delivering annual net migration in the tens of thousands, not the hundreds of thousands"—Conservative manifesto … Net migration stood at 298,000 in the year to September 2014—three times the 100,000 maximum implied by the 'tens of thousands' claim.”
In the 2010 Conservative manifesto it was stated that "we will take steps to take net migration back to the levels of the 1990s—tens of thousands a year, not hundreds of thousands". … "We will keep our ambition of delivering annual net migration in the tens of thousands, not the hundreds of thousands"—Conservative manifesto … Net migration stood at 298,000 in the year to September 2014—three times the 100,000 maximum implied by the 'tens of thousands' claim.
- Conservative manifesto keeps 'objective' to reduce net migration to the tens of thousands
Electronic Immigration Network, 2017-05-18 · supports
“The manifesto states: "It is our objective to reduce immigration to sustainable levels, by which we mean annual net migration in the tens of thousands, rather than the hundreds of thousands we have seen over the last two decades."”
The manifesto states: "It is our objective to reduce immigration to sustainable levels, by which we mean annual net migration in the tens of thousands, rather than the hundreds of thousands we have seen over the last two decades."
- Get Brexit Done: Unleash Britain's Potential — The Conservative and Unionist Party Manifesto 2019
Conservative Party, 2019-11-24 · supports
“There will be fewer lower-skilled migrants and overall numbers will come down.”
There will be fewer lower-skilled migrants and overall numbers will come down.
- UK election 2024: comparing the manifestos
The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2024-06-28 · supports
“The Conservative and Labour parties both say they want to reduce legal migration from its historically high levels. … The Conservatives want to introduce an annual cap on work and family visa grants … At the other end, Reform UK has said that net migration should be zero. … it is unclear how the MAC’s view on an ‘optimal’ level would be reconciled with the commitment to year-on-year reductions”
The Conservative and Labour parties both say they want to reduce legal migration from its historically high levels. … The Conservatives want to introduce an annual cap on work and family visa grants … At the other end, Reform UK has said that net migration should be zero. … it is unclear how the MAC’s view on an ‘optimal’ level would be reconciled with the commitment to year-on-year reductions
- Net migration likely to fall close to pre-Brexit levels but public still expects immigration to increase
Ipsos, 2025-11-27 · supports
“Four in ten people (41%) want immigration numbers reduced ‘a lot’, with a further 16% wanting more modest reductions. Just over a third of people (35%) want numbers to stay the same (21%) or increase (15%).”
Four in ten people (41%) want immigration numbers reduced ‘a lot’, with a further 16% wanting more modest reductions. Just over a third of people (35%) want numbers to stay the same (21%) or increase (15%).
- Public opinion towards immigration in the UK
The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-09-08 · complicates
“From around 2013, opposition to immigrants and immigration fell. The share of the public agreeing there were ‘too many’ immigrants, wanting immigration numbers reduced, or opposing migrants of a different race or ethnicity fell substantially between the early 2010s and the early 2020s. More recently, this trend has started to reverse, with surveys conducted since 2022 showing an uptick in opposition. However, despite this increase, attitudes were less negative in 2025 than they were up until the early 2010s. … In 1994, the starting point of this data series, fewer than 5% of respondents thought of immigration as a concern … peaking at 56% in September 2015. … with the share mentioning immigration reaching 51% in September 2025.”
From around 2013, opposition to immigrants and immigration fell. The share of the public agreeing there were ‘too many’ immigrants, wanting immigration numbers reduced, or opposing migrants of a different race or ethnicity fell substantially between the early 2010s and the early 2020s. More recently, this trend has started to reverse, with surveys conducted since 2022 showing an uptick in opposition. However, despite this increase, attitudes were less negative in 2025 than they were up until the early 2010s. … In 1994, the starting point of this data series, fewer than 5% of respondents thought of immigration as a concern … peaking at 56% in September 2015. … with the share mentioning immigration reaching 51% in September 2025.
- International Migration Outlook 2025
OECD, 2025-11-03 · supports
“The sharpest declines were observed in New Zealand (-56%) and the United Kingdom (-41%), both of which had experienced unusually high levels of permanent labour migration in 2022-2023. … In some large OECD countries (United Kingdom, the United States) the inflows per population remain modest despite the recent increase in inflows in absolute terms.”
The sharpest declines were observed in New Zealand (-56%) and the United Kingdom (-41%), both of which had experienced unusually high levels of permanent labour migration in 2022-2023. … In some large OECD countries (United Kingdom, the United States) the inflows per population remain modest despite the recent increase in inflows in absolute terms.
- International Migration Outlook 2025: Figure 1.2 data (StatLink)
OECD, 2025-11-03 · supports
“Figure 1.2. Permanent migration to OECD countries relative to total population, 2024 … Note: Light blue columns are unstandardised data.”
Figure 1.2. Permanent migration to OECD countries relative to total population, 2024 … Note: Light blue columns are unstandardised data.
- Immigration, emigration and net migration into the UK, 1964 - 2025 (data download)
Office for National Statistics, 2026-05-21 · complicates
“Due to changes in methodology, comparisons between pre-June 2021 and post-June 2021 estimates should be treated with caution.”
Due to changes in methodology, comparisons between pre-June 2021 and post-June 2021 estimates should be treated with caution.
- United Kingdom population mid-year estimate (series UKPOP)
Office for National Statistics, 2026-10-01 · complicates
“Mid-year population estimates relate to the usually resident population. They account for long-term international migrants (people who change their country of usual residence for a period of 12 months or more) but do not account for short-term migrants (people who come to or leave the country for a period of less than 12 months).”
Mid-year population estimates relate to the usually resident population. They account for long-term international migrants (people who change their country of usual residence for a period of 12 months or more) but do not account for short-term migrants (people who come to or leave the country for a period of less than 12 months).
- Long-term international migration, December 2025: Table 4b
Office for National Statistics, 2026-05-21 · supports
“Table 4b: Long-term international immigration, emigration and net migration of non-EU+ nationals by reason,”
Table 4b: Long-term international immigration, emigration and net migration of non-EU+ nationals by reason,
- Long-term international migration, December 2025: Table 1
Office for National Statistics, 2026-05-21 · supports
“Table 1: Long-term international migration into and out of the United Kingdom by nationality,”
Table 1: Long-term international migration into and out of the United Kingdom by nationality,
- Long-term international migration, provisional: year ending December 2025 (Table 1 data download)
Office for National Statistics, 2026-05-21 · complicates
“Comparisons between estimates before and after June 2021 should be treated with caution because of changes in methodology.”
Comparisons between estimates before and after June 2021 should be treated with caution because of changes in methodology.
- Population estimates, mid-2025: Figure 3 data
Office for National Statistics, 2026-10-01 · supports
“Components of population change, UK, mid-1982 to mid-2025 … Note: “Net-migration and other” includes international migration, changes in armed forces personnel and dependants, and unattributable population change.”
Components of population change, UK, mid-1982 to mid-2025 … Note: “Net-migration and other” includes international migration, changes in armed forces personnel and dependants, and unattributable population change.
- National population projections, 2024-based: Z1 machine-readable files (uk_ppp, uk_pph, uk_ppl, uk_ppz)
Office for National Statistics, 2026-04-28 · supports
“Population numbers at mid year by age last birthday - Males and Females - Ages 0 to 104, 105-109, 110+”
Population numbers at mid year by age last birthday - Males and Females - Ages 0 to 104, 105-109, 110+
Work and Study Visas and the Care Workforce
- Why do people come to the UK? Work
Home Office, 2026-08-27 · supports
“There were 234,841 visas issued (including dependants) in all work categories in the YE June 2026, of which 158,722 were to main applicants and 76,119 were to dependants. This represents a fall of 18% compared to the previous year and 62% fewer than the YE December 2023 when the number of work visas peaked.”
There were 234,841 visas issued (including dependants) in all work categories in the YE June 2026, of which 158,722 were to main applicants and 76,119 were to dependants. This represents a fall of 18% compared to the previous year and 62% fewer than the YE December 2023 when the number of work visas peaked.
- Why do people come to the UK? Work
Home Office, 2026-08-27 · supports
“Figure 1 shows between the YE June 2010 and YE June 2021 there were less than 200,000 work visas issued each year, of which over two-thirds were to main applicants. During this time the UK was a member of the European Union (EU) and, as such, EU nationals did not require a visa to work in the UK due to freedom of movement. Between 2021 and 2023, there was an increase in the number of work visas granted. Visas on the Health and Care Worker route, in particular, grew sharply following the expansion of the route in February 2022 to boost the social care workforce and was accompanied by a large increase in the number of dependants. Skilled Worker visas also contributed to the increase over this period. The growth in these routes caused work visas to peak in the YE December 2023 at 613,627. Combined Skilled Worker and Health and Care Worker accounted for 76% of all work visas in the same period.”
Figure 1 shows between the YE June 2010 and YE June 2021 there were less than 200,000 work visas issued each year, of which over two-thirds were to main applicants. During this time the UK was a member of the European Union (EU) and, as such, EU nationals did not require a visa to work in the UK due to freedom of movement. Between 2021 and 2023, there was an increase in the number of work visas granted. Visas on the Health and Care Worker route, in particular, grew sharply following the expansion of the route in February 2022 to boost the social care workforce and was accompanied by a large increase in the number of dependants. Skilled Worker visas also contributed to the increase over this period. The growth in these routes caused work visas to peak in the YE December 2023 at 613,627. Combined Skilled Worker and Health and Care Worker accounted for 76% of all work visas in the same period.
- Why do people come to the UK? Work
Home Office, 2026-08-27 · supports
“The number of work visas issued began to fall towards the end of 2023, driven by a decrease in Health and Care Worker visas, due to more scrutiny applied by the Home Office to employers in the health and social care sector, and compliance activity taken against employers who did not fulfil their obligations as employers of migrant workers.”
The number of work visas issued began to fall towards the end of 2023, driven by a decrease in Health and Care Worker visas, due to more scrutiny applied by the Home Office to employers in the health and social care sector, and compliance activity taken against employers who did not fulfil their obligations as employers of migrant workers.
- Why do people come to the UK? Work
Home Office, 2026-08-27 · supports
“Dependants accounted for 79% of Health and Care Worker visas issued in the YE June 2026. The higher number of dependants compared to main applicants may be partly due to migrants already in the UK, many of whom will have been sponsored prior to the changes in July 2025 restricting dependents for medium skilled occupations, continuing to be eligible to bring family members from abroad.”
Dependants accounted for 79% of Health and Care Worker visas issued in the YE June 2026. The higher number of dependants compared to main applicants may be partly due to migrants already in the UK, many of whom will have been sponsored prior to the changes in July 2025 restricting dependents for medium skilled occupations, continuing to be eligible to bring family members from abroad.
- Why do people come to the UK? Work
Home Office, 2026-08-27 · supports
“Visas issued to Health and Care Worker main applicants increased from 31,800 in the YE December 2021 to a peak of 145,823 in the YE December 2023. The rise was primarily due to an increase in South Asian (Indian, Pakistani, and Bangladeshi) and Sub-Saharan African (Zimbabwean, Ghanaian, and Nigerian) nationals coming to work as care workers. The number of Health and Care Worker visas issued to migrant workers in a Caring Personal Service occupation fell by over 99% (107,772 to 344) in YE June 2026 when compared with the YE December 2023, following the end to overseas recruitment of care workers in July 2025.”
Visas issued to Health and Care Worker main applicants increased from 31,800 in the YE December 2021 to a peak of 145,823 in the YE December 2023. The rise was primarily due to an increase in South Asian (Indian, Pakistani, and Bangladeshi) and Sub-Saharan African (Zimbabwean, Ghanaian, and Nigerian) nationals coming to work as care workers. The number of Health and Care Worker visas issued to migrant workers in a Caring Personal Service occupation fell by over 99% (107,772 to 344) in YE June 2026 when compared with the YE December 2023, following the end to overseas recruitment of care workers in July 2025.
- Why do people come to the UK? Work
Home Office, 2026-08-27 · supports
“The number of Health and Care Worker visas issued to nursing professionals fell by 95% (22,858 to 1,125) in the YE June 2026, when compared with the YE December 2023. This may be attributable to, according to the Department for Health and Social Care, the end of the centrally supported nurse international recruitment programme and changes in demand for international staff. Medical practitioners account for the majority (59%) of Health and Care Worker visas issued in the YE June 2026, though numbers have decreased by 42% in the latest year.”
The number of Health and Care Worker visas issued to nursing professionals fell by 95% (22,858 to 1,125) in the YE June 2026, when compared with the YE December 2023. This may be attributable to, according to the Department for Health and Social Care, the end of the centrally supported nurse international recruitment programme and changes in demand for international staff. Medical practitioners account for the majority (59%) of Health and Care Worker visas issued in the YE June 2026, though numbers have decreased by 42% in the latest year.
- Why do people come to the UK? Work
Home Office, 2026-08-27 · complicates
“In contrast to the Graduate route, Health and Care Worker extension grants rose by 19% in the YE June 2026, reaching 336,215. Skilled Worker extension grants also increased over the same period, by 11% to 196,097. These increases reflect the high numbers of entry clearance grants issued in 2022 and 2023, with many individuals who arrived during that period now seeking to extend their stay and continue working in the UK.”
In contrast to the Graduate route, Health and Care Worker extension grants rose by 19% in the YE June 2026, reaching 336,215. Skilled Worker extension grants also increased over the same period, by 11% to 196,097. These increases reflect the high numbers of entry clearance grants issued in 2022 and 2023, with many individuals who arrived during that period now seeking to extend their stay and continue working in the UK.
- Restoring control over the immigration system (accessible)
Home Office, 2025-05-12 · supports
“The recent significant increases followed the introduction of new immigration policies in 2020, following the UK’s departure from the EU – a system which made a number of key changes… including reducing the overall skills threshold for migration from degree-level (Regulated Qualifications Framework Level 6 or RQF 6) to A-Level-equivalent (RQF 3), and setting a new basic salary threshold for all countries at £25,600.”
The recent significant increases followed the introduction of new immigration policies in 2020, following the UK’s departure from the EU – a system which made a number of key changes… including reducing the overall skills threshold for migration from degree-level (Regulated Qualifications Framework Level 6 or RQF 6) to A-Level-equivalent (RQF 3), and setting a new basic salary threshold for all countries at £25,600.
- Review of salary requirements (accessible)
Migration Advisory Committee, 2025-12-17 · supports
“On 22 July 2025, the government raised the skill threshold to occupations that are Regulated Qualifications Framework (RQF) Level 6+ (equivalent to an undergraduate degree) to address the growth in visa numbers and concerns about exploitation of overseas recruits in occupations below RQF 6. This ends the changes introduced in 2020 that had relaxed the skills threshold to RQF 3+, allowing companies to make up for a shortfall of workers following the end of free movement.”
On 22 July 2025, the government raised the skill threshold to occupations that are Regulated Qualifications Framework (RQF) Level 6+ (equivalent to an undergraduate degree) to address the growth in visa numbers and concerns about exploitation of overseas recruits in occupations below RQF 6. This ends the changes introduced in 2020 that had relaxed the skills threshold to RQF 3+, allowing companies to make up for a shortfall of workers following the end of free movement.
- Migration Advisory Committee (MAC) annual report, 2023 (accessible)
Migration Advisory Committee, 2023-12-13 · supports
“Between October 2022 to September 2023 (the latest available data point), there have been 173,900 dependants on the H&CW visa. Over this period, the dependant ratio for those on the H&CW visa was 1.21 compared to 0.77 for other occupations on the SW visa (see Table 2.4).”
Between October 2022 to September 2023 (the latest available data point), there have been 173,900 dependants on the H&CW visa. Over this period, the dependant ratio for those on the H&CW visa was 1.21 compared to 0.77 for other occupations on the SW visa (see Table 2.4).
- Restoring control over the immigration system: technical annex
Home Office, 2025-05-12 · supports
“After expanding the Health and Care route to boost the social care workforce in 2022, total visas issued for main applicants and dependants fell by 68% to 110,800 from 2023 to 2024 due to more Home Office scrutiny on employers in the Health and Social Care sector, compliance activity taken against employers of migrant workers and the Spring 2024 policy measures no longer permitting Care Workers to bring dependants.”
After expanding the Health and Care route to boost the social care workforce in 2022, total visas issued for main applicants and dependants fell by 68% to 110,800 from 2023 to 2024 due to more Home Office scrutiny on employers in the Health and Social Care sector, compliance activity taken against employers of migrant workers and the Spring 2024 policy measures no longer permitting Care Workers to bring dependants.
- Restoring control over the immigration system: technical annex
Home Office, 2025-05-12 · supports
“The impact on the volume of Health and Care visas granted, due to Care and Senior Care worker occupations being removed, is estimated to be an annual reduction of approximately 7,000 main applicants (with a range of 6,000 to 8,000 main applicants).”
The impact on the volume of Health and Care visas granted, due to Care and Senior Care worker occupations being removed, is estimated to be an annual reduction of approximately 7,000 main applicants (with a range of 6,000 to 8,000 main applicants).
- The state of the adult social care sector and workforce in England, 2026
Skills for Care, 2026-10-14 · supports
“In March/April 2024, the SOL was replaced by the Immigration Salary List. In addition, restrictions were added that allowed only employers regulated by the CQC to sponsor care workers and senior care workers, the salary threshold was increased for newly sponsored Health and Care Worker visa holders, and dependants were no longer able to accompany or join care workers or senior care workers. Following these changes, the estimated number of people starting direct care providing roles in the independent sector, after having arrived in the UK, showed a large decrease from 105,000 in 2023/24, to 30,000 in 2025/26.”
In March/April 2024, the SOL was replaced by the Immigration Salary List. In addition, restrictions were added that allowed only employers regulated by the CQC to sponsor care workers and senior care workers, the salary threshold was increased for newly sponsored Health and Care Worker visa holders, and dependants were no longer able to accompany or join care workers or senior care workers. Following these changes, the estimated number of people starting direct care providing roles in the independent sector, after having arrived in the UK, showed a large decrease from 105,000 in 2023/24, to 30,000 in 2025/26.
- The state of the adult social care sector and workforce in England, 2026
Skills for Care, 2026-10-14 · supports
“The vacancy rate reached a peak of 10.4% in 2021/22, the highest rate since records began in 2012/13. Since then, the rate has steadily decreased to 6.1% in 2025/26, one percentage point lower than in 2018/19.”
The vacancy rate reached a peak of 10.4% in 2021/22, the highest rate since records began in 2012/13. Since then, the rate has steadily decreased to 6.1% in 2025/26, one percentage point lower than in 2018/19.
- The state of the adult social care sector and workforce in England, 2026
Skills for Care, 2026-10-14 · supports
“From March to August 2026, the vacancy rate has stayed consistently between 6.4% and 6.1%.”
From March to August 2026, the vacancy rate has stayed consistently between 6.4% and 6.1%.
- The state of the adult social care sector and workforce in England, 2026
Skills for Care, 2026-10-14 · supports
“Between 2022/23 and 2025/26, there were substantially more people recruited internationally compared to 2021/22 or earlier, which has played a part in the increase in filled posts and the reduction in vacant posts seen over the period. Between 2024/25 and 2025/26, the number of filled posts increased by around 22,000 and the number of vacant posts decreased by around 11,500. During the same period, 30,000 staff arrived from outside the UK to work in the sector.”
Between 2022/23 and 2025/26, there were substantially more people recruited internationally compared to 2021/22 or earlier, which has played a part in the increase in filled posts and the reduction in vacant posts seen over the period. Between 2024/25 and 2025/26, the number of filled posts increased by around 22,000 and the number of vacant posts decreased by around 11,500. During the same period, 30,000 staff arrived from outside the UK to work in the sector.
- The state of the adult social care sector and workforce in England, 2026
Skills for Care, 2026-10-14 · complicates
“In recent years, changes in economic inactivity and job-seeking behaviour may have affected the number of people available to work in the sector. At the same time, vacancies across the wider economy fell, which may have reduced competition for workers from other sectors. Together, these factors may have supported recruitment activity and contributed to improvements in adult social care vacancy rates.”
In recent years, changes in economic inactivity and job-seeking behaviour may have affected the number of people available to work in the sector. At the same time, vacancies across the wider economy fell, which may have reduced competition for workers from other sectors. Together, these factors may have supported recruitment activity and contributed to improvements in adult social care vacancy rates.
- The state of the adult social care sector and workforce in England, 2026
Skills for Care, 2026-10-14 · supports
“Between April 2026 and June 2026, there were around 2,000 people recruited internationally.”
Between April 2026 and June 2026, there were around 2,000 people recruited internationally.
- The state of the adult social care sector and workforce in England, 2026
Skills for Care, 2026-10-14 · supports
“The estimated number of internationally recruited workers in 2025/26 was 30,000 – a decrease from 50,000 the previous year. This in part was due to the closure of the Health and Care Worker visa route to new overseas applicants from July 2025. ▪ An estimated 150,000 posts were filled by people employed on the Health and Care Worker visa as at March 2026, working in direct care roles at establishments regulated by the Care Quality Commission (CQC) in the independent sector.”
The estimated number of internationally recruited workers in 2025/26 was 30,000 – a decrease from 50,000 the previous year. This in part was due to the closure of the Health and Care Worker visa route to new overseas applicants from July 2025. ▪ An estimated 150,000 posts were filled by people employed on the Health and Care Worker visa as at March 2026, working in direct care roles at establishments regulated by the Care Quality Commission (CQC) in the independent sector.
- The state of the adult social care sector and workforce in England, 2026
Skills for Care, 2026-10-14 · supports
“The vacancy rate for employers with direct care workers recruited internationally decreased by 4.3 percentage points between March 2022 and March 2026, from 9.9% to 5.6%.”
The vacancy rate for employers with direct care workers recruited internationally decreased by 4.3 percentage points between March 2022 and March 2026, from 9.9% to 5.6%.
- The state of the adult social care sector and workforce in England, 2026
Skills for Care, 2026-10-14 · supports
“Domestic recruitment remains challenging for the sector. The overall number of posts filled by British workers across all job roles decreased from 85% of the workforce in 2020/21, to 67% in 2025/26. This is a decrease of 130,000 posts over the period, including 40,000 over the last year.”
Domestic recruitment remains challenging for the sector. The overall number of posts filled by British workers across all job roles decreased from 85% of the workforce in 2020/21, to 67% in 2025/26. This is a decrease of 130,000 posts over the period, including 40,000 over the last year.
- The state of the adult social care sector and workforce in England, 2026
Skills for Care, 2026-10-14 · complicates
“The proportion of workers with a British nationality in the local authority and independent sectors has decreased from 83% in 2021/22 to 65% in 2025/26. This equates to around 107,000 fewer posts filled by people with a British nationality.”
The proportion of workers with a British nationality in the local authority and independent sectors has decreased from 83% in 2021/22 to 65% in 2025/26. This equates to around 107,000 fewer posts filled by people with a British nationality.
- The state of the adult social care sector and workforce in England, 2026
Skills for Care, 2026-10-14 · supports
“These figures indicate that the decreasing number of direct care workers with a British nationality in the workforce is related to fewer people with a British nationality starting in these roles over time, rather than an increase in the number of British workers leaving these roles.”
These figures indicate that the decreasing number of direct care workers with a British nationality in the workforce is related to fewer people with a British nationality starting in these roles over time, rather than an increase in the number of British workers leaving these roles.
- The state of the adult social care sector and workforce in England, 2026
Skills for Care, 2026-10-14 · supports
“The median hourly rate for care workers and support workers in March 2026 was £12.60, which was 39p higher than the National Living Wage (NLW) (£12.21). ▪ The median care worker and support worker hourly rate has nominally increased by 60p (5.0%) since March 2025; however, taking inflation into account, it has increased in real terms by 20p (1.6%). ▪ Care workers and support workers had lower hourly rates (median - £12.60) compared to Band 3 NHS Healthcare Assistants (HCAs) who were new in role (£12.75); however, they were paid more than those in Band 2 who were new in role (£12.51). ▪ Care workers and support workers with five or more years’ experience were, on average, earning around 12p more per hour than those with less than one year’s experience. This is considerably lower than in March 2016, when the gap was 33p per hour.”
The median hourly rate for care workers and support workers in March 2026 was £12.60, which was 39p higher than the National Living Wage (NLW) (£12.21). ▪ The median care worker and support worker hourly rate has nominally increased by 60p (5.0%) since March 2025; however, taking inflation into account, it has increased in real terms by 20p (1.6%). ▪ Care workers and support workers had lower hourly rates (median - £12.60) compared to Band 3 NHS Healthcare Assistants (HCAs) who were new in role (£12.75); however, they were paid more than those in Band 2 who were new in role (£12.51). ▪ Care workers and support workers with five or more years’ experience were, on average, earning around 12p more per hour than those with less than one year’s experience. This is considerably lower than in March 2016, when the gap was 33p per hour.
- Migration Advisory Committee (MAC) annual report, 2023 (accessible)
Migration Advisory Committee, 2023-12-13 · complicates
“However, as we stated at the time, the underlying cause of these workforce difficulties is the underfunding of the social care sector. We recommended the addition of care workers to the H&CW visa as part of a package of 19 other recommendations. We were clear that immigration could not solve these workforce issues alone. Our main recommendation was to introduce a minimum rate of pay, initially at £1 per hour above the National Living Wage (NLW), for care workers in England where care was being provided by public funds, to help tackle the workforce issues faced by the sector in the medium to longer term. To date, the government has not responded to or implemented any of these other recommendations as part of a social care package.”
However, as we stated at the time, the underlying cause of these workforce difficulties is the underfunding of the social care sector. We recommended the addition of care workers to the H&CW visa as part of a package of 19 other recommendations. We were clear that immigration could not solve these workforce issues alone. Our main recommendation was to introduce a minimum rate of pay, initially at £1 per hour above the National Living Wage (NLW), for care workers in England where care was being provided by public funds, to help tackle the workforce issues faced by the sector in the medium to longer term. To date, the government has not responded to or implemented any of these other recommendations as part of a social care package.
- Migration Advisory Committee (MAC) annual report, 2023 (accessible)
Migration Advisory Committee, 2023-12-13 · supports
“Underfunding and consequential low pay contributes to the exploitation of workers in the social care sector. Migrants in the sector on the H&CW visa are even more susceptible to exploitation as their right to reside in the UK is directly linked to their employer, creating a power imbalance.”
Underfunding and consequential low pay contributes to the exploitation of workers in the social care sector. Migrants in the sector on the H&CW visa are even more susceptible to exploitation as their right to reside in the UK is directly linked to their employer, creating a power imbalance.
- Record numbers of visa sponsor licences revoked for rule breaking
Home Office, 2025-09-11 · supports
“Between July 2024 and June 2025, 1,948 licences allowing companies to bring in migrant workers were revoked – more than double the number in the previous 12 months (937). Many of the employers had been using work visas to help migrants circumvent immigration rules, as well as undercutting domestic workers by underpaying and exploiting migrant staff reliant on their jobs to stay in the country. Adult social care, hospitality, retail and construction are among the sectors with the highest levels of abuse, data shows. Based on current trends, sponsor revocations for this year are expected to exceed the record high once again. This surge in compliance activity follows just 261 and 247 licences being revoked in the same period in 2021 to 2022 and 2022 to 2023 respectively.”
Between July 2024 and June 2025, 1,948 licences allowing companies to bring in migrant workers were revoked – more than double the number in the previous 12 months (937). Many of the employers had been using work visas to help migrants circumvent immigration rules, as well as undercutting domestic workers by underpaying and exploiting migrant staff reliant on their jobs to stay in the country. Adult social care, hospitality, retail and construction are among the sectors with the highest levels of abuse, data shows. Based on current trends, sponsor revocations for this year are expected to exceed the record high once again. This surge in compliance activity follows just 261 and 247 licences being revoked in the same period in 2021 to 2022 and 2022 to 2023 respectively.
- Record numbers of visa sponsor licences revoked for rule breaking
Home Office, 2025-09-11 · supports
“Licences have been revoked from companies for a wide range of rule breaking, which includes: underpayment of workers facilitating the entry of individuals to circumvent the immigration rules failing to provide promised work”
Licences have been revoked from companies for a wide range of rule breaking, which includes: underpayment of workers facilitating the entry of individuals to circumvent the immigration rules failing to provide promised work
- The NMC Register: 1 April 2025 – 31 March 2026
Nursing and Midwifery Council, 2026-07 · supports
“This is mainly due to fewer internationally educated professionals joining the Register. In 2025-26, 26.4% of new joiners to the Register were internationally educated, compared to 39.1% the year before and a high of 49.4% in 2023-24.”
This is mainly due to fewer internationally educated professionals joining the Register. In 2025-26, 26.4% of new joiners to the Register were internationally educated, compared to 39.1% the year before and a high of 49.4% in 2023-24.
- The NMC Register: 1 April 2025 – 31 March 2026
Nursing and Midwifery Council, 2026-07 · supports
“Over the past year, 10,961 professionals who were educated outside the UK joined the NMC Register for the first time. That’s 9,708 (47%) fewer than the previous year (20,669 in March 2025). In the same period, 30,581 UK-educated professionals joined the Register – this is 4.9% fewer than the 32,164 who joined the previous year. This fall follows the slowdown seen in 2024-25 where the number of UK-educated new joiners increased by only 5.9%, compared to 11.9% during 2023-24.”
Over the past year, 10,961 professionals who were educated outside the UK joined the NMC Register for the first time. That’s 9,708 (47%) fewer than the previous year (20,669 in March 2025). In the same period, 30,581 UK-educated professionals joined the Register – this is 4.9% fewer than the 32,164 who joined the previous year. This fall follows the slowdown seen in 2024-25 where the number of UK-educated new joiners increased by only 5.9%, compared to 11.9% during 2023-24.
- The NMC Register: 1 April 2025 – 31 March 2026
Nursing and Midwifery Council, 2026-07 · supports
“This means that two of the biggest sources of international joiners – Nigeria and Ghana – are ‘red list’ countries. Active recruitment from these countries is prohibited by the relevant codes of practice which uphold ethical standards on recruitment and support global health equity.”
This means that two of the biggest sources of international joiners – Nigeria and Ghana – are ‘red list’ countries. Active recruitment from these countries is prohibited by the relevant codes of practice which uphold ethical standards on recruitment and support global health equity.
- NHS staffing tracker: training
Nuffield Trust, 2026 · supports
“The number of people actually accepting a nurse training place in 2025 has increased by 140 (or 0.7%) compared to a year prior, but has fallen by 4,755 (18%) since the peak in 2021.”
The number of people actually accepting a nurse training place in 2025 has increased by 140 (or 0.7%) compared to a year prior, but has fallen by 4,755 (18%) since the peak in 2021.
- EEA migration in the UK: final report
Migration Advisory Committee, 2018-09 · complicates
“The research we commissioned showed that overall there is no evidence that migration has had a negative impact on the training of the UK-born workforce. Moreover, there is some evidence to suggest that skilled migrants have a positive impact on the quantity of training available to the UK-born workforce.”
The research we commissioned showed that overall there is no evidence that migration has had a negative impact on the training of the UK-born workforce. Moreover, there is some evidence to suggest that skilled migrants have a positive impact on the quantity of training available to the UK-born workforce.
- Restoring control over the immigration system
HM Government, 2025-05-12 · complicates
“Economic migration shot up while training of the domestic workforce has fallen, and lower skilled migration soared while the proportion of UK residents in work fell.”
Economic migration shot up while training of the domestic workforce has fallen, and lower skilled migration soared while the proportion of UK residents in work fell.
- NHS staff from overseas: statistics
House of Commons Library, 2025-11 · supports
“Overall, 21.3% of staff report a nationality other than British. For doctors this figure is 36.3%, and for nurses it is 30.0%.”
Overall, 21.3% of staff report a nationality other than British. For doctors this figure is 36.3%, and for nurses it is 30.0%.
- NHS staff from overseas: statistics
House of Commons Library, 2025-11 · supports
“In the early 2010s there was a rise in the proportion of staff reporting EU nationality. After the EU referendum this increase stopped and the proportion has fallen slightly. In recent years there has been a sharp increase in the proportion of NHS staff reporting an Asian or African nationality.”
In the early 2010s there was a rise in the proportion of staff reporting EU nationality. After the EU referendum this increase stopped and the proportion has fallen slightly. In recent years there has been a sharp increase in the proportion of NHS staff reporting an Asian or African nationality.
- Migrants in the UK labour market: an overview
The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-05-15 · supports
“In December 2025, a quarter of the jobs held by employees with non-EU nationalities when they registered for a national insurance number (‘adult migrants’) were in the health and care sector (Figure 7). This share stood at 22% in February 2022 but rose sharply after care workers were made eligible for Skilled Worker visas—161,000 Skilled Worker visas had been granted to non-EU care workers by the end of 2025.”
In December 2025, a quarter of the jobs held by employees with non-EU nationalities when they registered for a national insurance number (‘adult migrants’) were in the health and care sector (Figure 7). This share stood at 22% in February 2022 but rose sharply after care workers were made eligible for Skilled Worker visas—161,000 Skilled Worker visas had been granted to non-EU care workers by the end of 2025.
- Health at a Glance 2025: OECD Indicators
OECD, 2025-11-13 · supports
“Foreign-trained doctors represented, on average, 20% of the medical workforce across OECD countries in 2023, up from 16% in 2010 (Figure 8.23). Their numbers rose faster than those of domestically trained physicians in almost every member country, pushing their share upwards. The proportion varied considerably in 2023, from 1% or lower in Lithuania and Italy to more than 40% in Switzerland, New Zealand, Ireland and Norway, and 59% in Israel.”
Foreign-trained doctors represented, on average, 20% of the medical workforce across OECD countries in 2023, up from 16% in 2010 (Figure 8.23). Their numbers rose faster than those of domestically trained physicians in almost every member country, pushing their share upwards. The proportion varied considerably in 2023, from 1% or lower in Lithuania and Italy to more than 40% in Switzerland, New Zealand, Ireland and Norway, and 59% in Israel.
- Health at a Glance 2025: OECD Indicators
OECD, 2025-11-13 · supports
“The United Kingdom admitted more than 18 000 foreign-trained doctors in 2023, its highest annual intake on record and a three-fold increase from 2010.”
The United Kingdom admitted more than 18 000 foreign-trained doctors in 2023, its highest annual intake on record and a three-fold increase from 2010.
- Health at a Glance 2025: OECD Indicators
OECD, 2025-11-13 · complicates
“Growing reliance on foreign-trained physicians has taken place alongside an expansion of domestic training capacity. Between 2010 and 2023, domestically trained doctors still made up most of the growth in physician numbers in most OECD Members (Figure 8.24). Yet in five countries foreign-trained doctors drove more than half of the increase – notably in Switzerland (86%), Norway (70%) and Ireland (57%). Across OECD countries, foreign-trained doctors accounted for roughly one-third of the total growth in physicians’ numbers.”
Growing reliance on foreign-trained physicians has taken place alongside an expansion of domestic training capacity. Between 2010 and 2023, domestically trained doctors still made up most of the growth in physician numbers in most OECD Members (Figure 8.24). Yet in five countries foreign-trained doctors drove more than half of the increase – notably in Switzerland (86%), Norway (70%) and Ireland (57%). Across OECD countries, foreign-trained doctors accounted for roughly one-third of the total growth in physicians’ numbers.
- Health at a Glance 2025: OECD Indicators
OECD, 2025-11-13 · supports
“OECD countries tend to rely less on foreign-trained nurses than doctors. In 2023, 8.8% of nurses were trained abroad (Figure 8.26), far below the 19.6% average for physicians”
OECD countries tend to rely less on foreign-trained nurses than doctors. In 2023, 8.8% of nurses were trained abroad (Figure 8.26), far below the 19.6% average for physicians
- Health at a Glance 2025: OECD Indicators
OECD, 2025-11-13 · supports
“Their contribution was especially marked in the United Kingdom, where foreign-trained nurses represented 83% of the increase in the total number of nurses (increasing from 70 000 to 170 000 in absolute terms).”
Their contribution was especially marked in the United Kingdom, where foreign-trained nurses represented 83% of the increase in the total number of nurses (increasing from 70 000 to 170 000 in absolute terms).
- Health at a Glance 2025: OECD Indicators
OECD, 2025-11-13 · complicates
“The main comparability limitation relates to differences in the activity status of nurses. Some registries are updated regularly, making it possible to distinguish nurses who are actively working in health systems, while others include all nurses licensed to practise, regardless of whether they are still active. Data for Germany are based on nationality, not on place of training.”
The main comparability limitation relates to differences in the activity status of nurses. Some registries are updated regularly, making it possible to distinguish nurses who are actively working in health systems, while others include all nurses licensed to practise, regardless of whether they are still active. Data for Germany are based on nationality, not on place of training.
- Rapid Review of the Graduate Route
Migration Advisory Committee, 2024-05-14 · supports
“The median monthly income of the matched cohort who are in work is £1,750 (equivalent to £21,000 annually). The median monthly income, when looking at only the last 3 months of the first year on the Graduate route, is £2,020 (equivalent to £24,240 annually).”
The median monthly income of the matched cohort who are in work is £1,750 (equivalent to £21,000 annually). The median monthly income, when looking at only the last 3 months of the first year on the Graduate route, is £2,020 (equivalent to £24,240 annually).
- Rapid Review of the Graduate Route
Migration Advisory Committee, 2024-05-14 · complicates
“For domestic graduates it is estimated at £26,000 15 months after graduation, from the Graduate Outcomes Survey (UK domicile 1st degree in 2020/21). Despite a greater proportion of Graduate visa holders being postgraduates compared to domestic graduates, the difference between the 2 median income figures can be expected given that international students are likely to have less experience in the UK labour market.”
For domestic graduates it is estimated at £26,000 15 months after graduation, from the Graduate Outcomes Survey (UK domicile 1st degree in 2020/21). Despite a greater proportion of Graduate visa holders being postgraduates compared to domestic graduates, the difference between the 2 median income figures can be expected given that international students are likely to have less experience in the UK labour market.
- Rapid Review of the Graduate Route
Migration Advisory Committee, 2024-05-14 · supports
“It is interesting to note, in this context, that 19% of Graduate visa holders earn at least £2,500 in their first full month after obtaining the visa. This increases to 38% by the 12th month.”
It is interesting to note, in this context, that 19% of Graduate visa holders earn at least £2,500 in their first full month after obtaining the visa. This increases to 38% by the 12th month.
- Rapid Review of the Graduate Route
Migration Advisory Committee, 2024-05-14 · supports
“Amongst those switching from the Graduate route to a sponsored working visa, 69% were switching into occupations that are classified as: Managers, directors, and senior officials; Professional occupations; or Associate professional and technical occupations. This compares to 75% of domestic graduates who are in these roles. In contrast, only 42% of those switching directly from the Student route to a sponsored working route are in these roles. Crucially, Graduate route switchers are moving into graduate level jobs at the end of their visa in roughly the same proportions as we observe domestic graduates.”
Amongst those switching from the Graduate route to a sponsored working visa, 69% were switching into occupations that are classified as: Managers, directors, and senior officials; Professional occupations; or Associate professional and technical occupations. This compares to 75% of domestic graduates who are in these roles. In contrast, only 42% of those switching directly from the Student route to a sponsored working route are in these roles. Crucially, Graduate route switchers are moving into graduate level jobs at the end of their visa in roughly the same proportions as we observe domestic graduates.
- Rapid Review of the Graduate Route
Migration Advisory Committee, 2024-05-14 · supports
“Almost half of student switchers work as Senior care workers or Care workers (49%), whilst in comparison many fewer Graduate route switchers work in these occupations (20%). However, this is still significantly higher than the domestic graduate population, where only 6% work in the entire ‘Caring, leisure and other service’ occupations.”
Almost half of student switchers work as Senior care workers or Care workers (49%), whilst in comparison many fewer Graduate route switchers work in these occupations (20%). However, this is still significantly higher than the domestic graduate population, where only 6% work in the entire ‘Caring, leisure and other service’ occupations.
- Migrant journey: 2025 report
Home Office, 2026-05-21 · supports
“Within the Study route, and across the time-series covered in this report (from 2008 onwards), the 2020 Study cohort recorded the highest proportion of individuals still holding leave to remain 5 years after arrival. Following the 2012 Immigration Rules changes, outcomes for Study migrants were relatively stable for several years, with around 17% to 18% of those arriving between 2012 and 2016 retaining leave after 5 years. This rose to 25% for the 2019 cohort, before increasing to 41% for the 2020 Study cohorts.”
Within the Study route, and across the time-series covered in this report (from 2008 onwards), the 2020 Study cohort recorded the highest proportion of individuals still holding leave to remain 5 years after arrival. Following the 2012 Immigration Rules changes, outcomes for Study migrants were relatively stable for several years, with around 17% to 18% of those arriving between 2012 and 2016 retaining leave after 5 years. This rose to 25% for the 2019 cohort, before increasing to 41% for the 2020 Study cohorts.
- How many people claim asylum in the UK?
Home Office, 2026-08-27 · supports
“In the YE June 2026, 85,891 people claimed asylum in the UK, 21% fewer than in the previous year.”
In the YE June 2026, 85,891 people claimed asylum in the UK, 21% fewer than in the previous year.
- How many people claim asylum in the UK?
Home Office, 2026-08-27 · supports
“41% (34,999) of asylum seekers held a visa or other leave prior to claiming, including those who held an Electronic Travel Authorization (ETA)”
41% (34,999) of asylum seekers held a visa or other leave prior to claiming, including those who held an Electronic Travel Authorization (ETA)
- How many people claim asylum in the UK?
Home Office, 2026-08-27 · supports
“40% (33,949) of asylum seekers arrived on small boats”
40% (33,949) of asylum seekers arrived on small boats
- How many people claim asylum in the UK?
Home Office, 2026-08-27 · supports
“The increase in claims from people who had previously held a visa or other leave coincides with a rise in visa grants up until 2023. However, there may be a delay between a person being granted a visa and subsequently claiming asylum, as some claim shortly after arrival while others claim later during their period of leave or after their leave has expired.”
The increase in claims from people who had previously held a visa or other leave coincides with a rise in visa grants up until 2023. However, there may be a delay between a person being granted a visa and subsequently claiming asylum, as some claim shortly after arrival while others claim later during their period of leave or after their leave has expired.
- How many people claim asylum in the UK?
Home Office, 2026-08-27 · supports
“The number of people who held a study visa prior to claiming asylum has decreased by over a third (35%) in the latest year. This decline mirrors the fall in the number of study visas issued after restrictions on dependants came into effect on 1 January 2024. In contrast, the number of people who held a work visa prior to claiming asylum increased by 16%, making work visas the most common type of visa held prior to claiming. Most of this increase was driven by claims from Graduate visas, which more than doubled to 5,130 while claims from all other work visas fell 9% to 9,021.”
The number of people who held a study visa prior to claiming asylum has decreased by over a third (35%) in the latest year. This decline mirrors the fall in the number of study visas issued after restrictions on dependants came into effect on 1 January 2024. In contrast, the number of people who held a work visa prior to claiming asylum increased by 16%, making work visas the most common type of visa held prior to claiming. Most of this increase was driven by claims from Graduate visas, which more than doubled to 5,130 while claims from all other work visas fell 9% to 9,021.
- Entry clearance visa applications and outcomes detailed datasets, year ending June 2026 (Data_Vis_D02)
Home Office, 2026-08-27 · supports
“Outcomes of applications for entry clearance visas, 2005 to 2026 Q2 - dataset”
Outcomes of applications for entry clearance visas, 2005 to 2026 Q2 - dataset
- Entry clearance visa applications and outcomes detailed datasets, year ending June 2026 (Data_Vis_D02)
Home Office, 2026-08-27 · supports
“Outcomes of applications for entry clearance visas, 2005 to 2026 Q2 - dataset”
Outcomes of applications for entry clearance visas, 2005 to 2026 Q2 - dataset
- Sponsored work visas by occupation and industry (SOC 2020) detailed datasets, year ending June 2026 (Data_Occ_D02)
Home Office, 2026-08-27 · supports
“Grants of entry clearance visas, by occupation and industry, 2021 to 2026 Q2 - Dataset”
Grants of entry clearance visas, by occupation and industry, 2021 to 2026 Q2 - Dataset
- Adult social care workforce statistical appendix 2026
Skills for Care, 2026-10-14 · supports
“Table 3.12.2. Vacancy rate trend by job role”
Table 3.12.2. Vacancy rate trend by job role
- Adult social care workforce statistical appendix 2026
Skills for Care, 2026-10-14 · supports
“Table 4.8.1. Nationality trends by sector”
Table 4.8.1. Nationality trends by sector
- Adult social care workforce statistical appendix 2026
Skills for Care, 2026-10-14 · supports
“Table 5.4.1. Mean hourly pay trends by sector and job role”
Table 5.4.1. Mean hourly pay trends by sector and job role
- Sponsorship transparency data, April to June 2026 (SC_01)
UK Visas and Immigration, 2026-08-27 · supports
“SC_01: Action taken against Sponsors”
SC_01: Action taken against Sponsors
- Sponsorship transparency data, April to June 2026 (SP_01)
UK Visas and Immigration, 2026-08-27 · supports
“SP_01: Number of sponsoring organisations registered to sponsor an overseas national in Skilled Worker, Temporary Worker and Student routes”
SP_01: Number of sponsoring organisations registered to sponsor an overseas national in Skilled Worker, Temporary Worker and Student routes
- The NMC register: March 2026 UK data tables
Nursing and Midwifery Council, 2026-07 · supports
“Total number of people trained in the UK joining the register for the first time by declared ethnicity”
Total number of people trained in the UK joining the register for the first time by declared ethnicity
- The NMC register: March 2026 UK data tables
Nursing and Midwifery Council, 2026-07 · supports
“Total number of people trained internationally joining the register for the first time by declared ethnicity”
Total number of people trained internationally joining the register for the first time by declared ethnicity
- NHS staff from overseas: statistics
House of Commons Library, 2025-11 · supports
“As of June 2025, 78.7% of NHS staff in England are British. 9.9% report an Asian nationality, 5.2% are EU nationals and 4.2% are African.”
As of June 2025, 78.7% of NHS staff in England are British. 9.9% report an Asian nationality, 5.2% are EU nationals and 4.2% are African.
- Asylum claims and initial decisions detailed datasets, year ending June 2026 (Data_Asy_D01a)
Home Office, 2026-08-27 · supports
“Asy_D01a: People claiming asylum by prior route, 2018 Q1 to 2026 Q2 - dataset”
Asy_D01a: People claiming asylum by prior route, 2018 Q1 to 2026 Q2 - dataset
Integration Outcomes in the UK
- International migration, England and Wales: Census 2021
Office for National Statistics, 2022-11-02 · supports
“Out of the 59.6 million usual residents in England and Wales in 2021, 49.6 million (83.2%) were born in the UK and 10.0 million (16.8%) were born outside the UK. This means that about one in six people in England and Wales were born outside the UK. The size of the non-UK born population has risen since 2011, when it was 7.5 million (13.4%).”
Out of the 59.6 million usual residents in England and Wales in 2021, 49.6 million (83.2%) were born in the UK and 10.0 million (16.8%) were born outside the UK. This means that about one in six people in England and Wales were born outside the UK. The size of the non-UK born population has risen since 2011, when it was 7.5 million (13.4%).
- 2011 Census analysis: Immigration Patterns of Non-UK Born Populations in England and Wales in 2011
Office for National Statistics, 2013-12-17 · supports
“Migration is an important driver of population change, currently accounting for around half of the population growth in England and Wales (natural change, that is the difference between births and deaths, accounting for the remainder). This is reflected in the increase in the proportion of the usually resident population1 born abroad2 from 4.3 per cent (1.9 million) recorded in the 1951 Census to 13 per cent (7.5 million) in the 2011 Census (see figure 1). While the total resident population of England and Wales increased by 28 per cent (from 43.7 million to 56.1 million) between 1951 and 2011, the non-UK born population3 almost quadrupled. There was a particularly marked increase in the latest inter-censal period, from 8.9 per cent (4.6 million)4 in 2001.”
Migration is an important driver of population change, currently accounting for around half of the population growth in England and Wales (natural change, that is the difference between births and deaths, accounting for the remainder). This is reflected in the increase in the proportion of the usually resident population1 born abroad2 from 4.3 per cent (1.9 million) recorded in the 1951 Census to 13 per cent (7.5 million) in the 2011 Census (see figure 1). While the total resident population of England and Wales increased by 28 per cent (from 43.7 million to 56.1 million) between 1951 and 2011, the non-UK born population3 almost quadrupled. There was a particularly marked increase in the latest inter-censal period, from 8.9 per cent (4.6 million)4 in 2001.
- International migration, England and Wales: Census 2021
Office for National Statistics, 2022-11-02 · complicates
“Those who listed Romania as their country of birth increased to 539,000 in 2021, from 80,000 in 2011, an increase between censuses of 459,000 (576%), making Romania the fourth most common non-UK country of birth. This increase was the highest out of any country and is driven by working restrictions for Romanian citizens being lifted in 2014.”
Those who listed Romania as their country of birth increased to 539,000 in 2021, from 80,000 in 2011, an increase between censuses of 459,000 (576%), making Romania the fourth most common non-UK country of birth. This increase was the highest out of any country and is driven by working restrictions for Romanian citizens being lifted in 2014.
- TS004 - Country of birth (Census 2021), local authority districts
Office for National Statistics (Nomis), 2022-11-02 · supports
“This dataset provides Census 2021 estimates that classify usual residents in England and Wales by their country of birth. The estimates are as at Census Day, 21 March 2021.”
This dataset provides Census 2021 estimates that classify usual residents in England and Wales by their country of birth. The estimates are as at Census Day, 21 March 2021.
- QS203EW - Country of birth (detailed) (2011 Census), local authority districts
Office for National Statistics (Nomis), 2013-01-30 · supports
“This dataset provides 2011 estimates that classify usual residents in England and Wales by country of birth. The estimates are as at census day, 27 March 2011.”
This dataset provides 2011 estimates that classify usual residents in England and Wales by country of birth. The estimates are as at census day, 27 March 2011.
- Analysis of social characteristics of international migrants living in England and Wales: Census 2021
Office for National Statistics, 2023-09-18 · supports
“A high proportion of migrants had English as a main language or speak it well or very well; this can be seen by most recent year of arrival in Figure 9. Arrivals between 2011 and 2021 contained the highest percentage of residents who reported not speaking English well (11%) compared with 4% of arrivals before 1971 who reported not speaking English well.”
A high proportion of migrants had English as a main language or speak it well or very well; this can be seen by most recent year of arrival in Figure 9. Arrivals between 2011 and 2021 contained the highest percentage of residents who reported not speaking English well (11%) compared with 4% of arrivals before 1971 who reported not speaking English well.
- Analysis of social characteristics of international migrants living in England and Wales: Census 2021
Office for National Statistics, 2023-09-18 · supports
“As of Census 2021, the residents who arrived earliest were more likely to have English as a main language, with 84% of arrivals before 1971 reporting this compared with 37% of arrivals between 2011 and 2021. Recent arrivals tended to speak English well or very well, with 50% of arrivals between 2011 and 2021 reporting this. As of Census 2021, a very small proportion of non-UK-born residents reported not speaking English at all, around 1 to 2% in each arrival group.”
As of Census 2021, the residents who arrived earliest were more likely to have English as a main language, with 84% of arrivals before 1971 reporting this compared with 37% of arrivals between 2011 and 2021. Recent arrivals tended to speak English well or very well, with 50% of arrivals between 2011 and 2021 reporting this. As of Census 2021, a very small proportion of non-UK-born residents reported not speaking English at all, around 1 to 2% in each arrival group.
- Analysis of social characteristics of international migrants living in England and Wales: Census 2021
Office for National Statistics, 2023-09-18 · supports
“For both EU-born and non-EU-born residents, those who arrived in the UK earlier were more likely to describe their national identity as being one from the UK only (Figure 18). For example, 94% of non-EU-born residents who arrived before 1951 reported an identity from the UK only, compared with 81% for arrivals between 1981 and 1990, and 20% who arrived between 2011 and 2021.”
For both EU-born and non-EU-born residents, those who arrived in the UK earlier were more likely to describe their national identity as being one from the UK only (Figure 18). For example, 94% of non-EU-born residents who arrived before 1951 reported an identity from the UK only, compared with 81% for arrivals between 1981 and 1990, and 20% who arrived between 2011 and 2021.
- Language, England and Wales: Census 2021
Office for National Statistics, 2022-11-29 · supports
“In 2021, a further 7.1% (4.1 million) of the overall population were proficient in English, so they spoke English either "well" or "very well" (English or Welsh in Wales), but did not speak it as their main language. Additionally, 1.5% (880,000) could not speak English well, and a small percentage (0.3%, 161,000) of the overall population could not speak English at all.”
In 2021, a further 7.1% (4.1 million) of the overall population were proficient in English, so they spoke English either "well" or "very well" (English or Welsh in Wales), but did not speak it as their main language. Additionally, 1.5% (880,000) could not speak English well, and a small percentage (0.3%, 161,000) of the overall population could not speak English at all.
- Figure 9 data: English proficiency of non-UK-born residents by year of arrival
Office for National Statistics, 2023-09-18 · supports
“English proficiency of non-UK-born residents by year of arrival, usual residents, 2021, England and Wales”
English proficiency of non-UK-born residents by year of arrival, usual residents, 2021, England and Wales
- Employment (Ethnicity facts and figures)
Department for Work and Pensions (Ethnicity facts and figures), 2023-11-28 · supports
“from 2004 to 2022, the biggest increases in employment rates were in the combined Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnic group (from 44% to 61%), and the ‘other’ ethnic group (from 55% to 68%)”
from 2004 to 2022, the biggest increases in employment rates were in the combined Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnic group (from 44% to 61%), and the ‘other’ ethnic group (from 55% to 68%)
- Employment (Ethnicity facts and figures)
Department for Work and Pensions (Ethnicity facts and figures), 2023-11-28 · supports
“61% of people from the combined Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnic group were employed – the lowest percentage out of all ethnic groups”
61% of people from the combined Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnic group were employed – the lowest percentage out of all ethnic groups
- Employment (Ethnicity facts and figures)
Department for Work and Pensions (Ethnicity facts and figures), 2023-11-28 · complicates
“The report cites cultural religious reasons for the differences between men and women in employment rates in the combined Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnic group – 75% for men compared, with 46% for women in 2022.”
The report cites cultural religious reasons for the differences between men and women in employment rates in the combined Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnic group – 75% for men compared, with 46% for women in 2022.
- Religion by housing, health, employment, and education, England and Wales: Census 2021
Office for National Statistics, 2023-03-24 · supports
“In 2021, people who identified as "Muslim" had the lowest percentage of people aged 16 to 64 years in employment (51.4% compared with 70.9% of the overall population); this resulted from the high percentages of people who were students or looking after home or family in this group. [...] For example, people who said they were "Muslim" had the youngest age profile (median age 27 years) and the highest percentage of overcrowding. [...] It is possible that some people on furlough may have identified as economically inactive, instead of temporarily away from work.”
In 2021, people who identified as "Muslim" had the lowest percentage of people aged 16 to 64 years in employment (51.4% compared with 70.9% of the overall population); this resulted from the high percentages of people who were students or looking after home or family in this group. [...] For example, people who said they were "Muslim" had the youngest age profile (median age 27 years) and the highest percentage of overcrowding. [...] It is possible that some people on furlough may have identified as economically inactive, instead of temporarily away from work.
- Religion by housing, health, employment, and education, England and Wales: Census 2021
Office for National Statistics, 2023-03-24 · supports
“Females were more likely than males to be looking after home or family among the overall population (9.7% and 1.9%, respectively). This difference was consistent across religious groups but was largest among people who identified as "Muslim" (28.7% females and 3.9% males).”
Females were more likely than males to be looking after home or family among the overall population (9.7% and 1.9%, respectively). This difference was consistent across religious groups but was largest among people who identified as "Muslim" (28.7% females and 3.9% males).
- Religion by housing, health, employment, and education, England and Wales: Census 2021
Office for National Statistics, 2023-03-24 · complicates
“Among people who identified as "Muslim", 25.3% had no qualifications, 7.1 percentage points higher than the overall population (18.2%). A similar percentage of this group had a "Level 4 or above" qualification (32.3%) to the overall population (33.8%).”
Among people who identified as "Muslim", 25.3% had no qualifications, 7.1 percentage points higher than the overall population (18.2%). A similar percentage of this group had a "Level 4 or above" qualification (32.3%) to the overall population (33.8%).
- Figure 8 data: Religion by economic activity, England and Wales, 2021
Office for National Statistics, 2023-03-24 · supports
“Religion by economic activity, England and Wales, 2021. 1. Percentages have been calculated out of the overall population of each religious group for those aged 16 to 64 years using rounded data, as such totals may not add to 100%.”
Religion by economic activity, England and Wales, 2021. 1. Percentages have been calculated out of the overall population of each religious group for those aged 16 to 64 years using rounded data, as such totals may not add to 100%.
- Employment (Ethnicity facts and figures): by ethnicity and gender
Department for Work and Pensions (Ethnicity facts and figures), 2023-11-28 · supports
“Percentages are worked out using the total working age population (people aged 16 to 64 years).”
Percentages are worked out using the total working age population (people aged 16 to 64 years).
- Økonomisk Analyse: Indvandreres nettobidrag til de offentlige finanser i 2019
Finansministeriet (Danish Ministry of Finance), 2023-05 · supports
“Når man ser på gruppens nettobidrag til offentlige finanser i 2019, var gruppen forbundet med en offentlig nettoudgift på ca. 16 mia. kr., svarende til en gennemsnitlig nettoudgift på ca. 21.000 kr. pr. person.”
Når man ser på gruppens nettobidrag til offentlige finanser i 2019, var gruppen forbundet med en offentlig nettoudgift på ca. 16 mia. kr., svarende til en gennemsnitlig nettoudgift på ca. 21.000 kr. pr. person.
- Økonomisk Analyse: Indvandreres nettobidrag til de offentlige finanser i 2019
Finansministeriet (Danish Ministry of Finance), 2023-05 · supports
“Tabel 2.1 Nettobidrag til de offentlige finanser efter herkomst, 2019. Gennemsnitlig nettobidrag (1.000 kr. pr. person): Dansk oprindelse 22; Alle indvandrere 5; - Heraf vestlige lande 52; - Heraf MENAPT-lande -79; - Heraf øvrige ikke-vestlige lande 11; Alle efterkommere -102”
Tabel 2.1 Nettobidrag til de offentlige finanser efter herkomst, 2019. Gennemsnitlig nettobidrag (1.000 kr. pr. person): Dansk oprindelse 22; Alle indvandrere 5; - Heraf vestlige lande 52; - Heraf MENAPT-lande -79; - Heraf øvrige ikke-vestlige lande 11; Alle efterkommere -102
- Økonomisk Analyse: Indvandreres nettobidrag til de offentlige finanser i 2019
Finansministeriet (Danish Ministry of Finance), 2023-05 · complicates
“Indvandrere med asyl som opholdsgrundlag var i gennemsnit forbundet med en nettoudgift på ca. 95.000 kr. pr. person i 2019, mens personer med fx erhverv som opholdsgrundlag i gennemsnit var forbundet med et positivt nettobidrag på ca. 120.000 kr. pr. person, jf. figur 2.9. Det er samtidig særligt indvandrere fra MENAPT- og øvrige ikke-vestlige lande, der er kommet til Danmark med asyl eller familiesammenføring som opholdsgrundlag, hvorimod vestlige indvandrere altovervejende er kommet til landet for at arbejde eller studere, jf. figur 2.10.”
Indvandrere med asyl som opholdsgrundlag var i gennemsnit forbundet med en nettoudgift på ca. 95.000 kr. pr. person i 2019, mens personer med fx erhverv som opholdsgrundlag i gennemsnit var forbundet med et positivt nettobidrag på ca. 120.000 kr. pr. person, jf. figur 2.9. Det er samtidig særligt indvandrere fra MENAPT- og øvrige ikke-vestlige lande, der er kommet til Danmark med asyl eller familiesammenføring som opholdsgrundlag, hvorimod vestlige indvandrere altovervejende er kommet til landet for at arbejde eller studere, jf. figur 2.10.
- Økonomisk Analyse: Indvandreres nettobidrag til de offentlige finanser i 2019
Finansministeriet (Danish Ministry of Finance), 2023-05 · complicates
“Beregningerne viser, at det gennemsnitlige nettobidrag for indvandrere fra MENAPT-lande i 2019 ville være ca. 55.000 kr. højere pr. person i det hypotetiske scenarie med samme fordeling efter opholdsgrundlag som vestlige indvandrere, om end de fortsat ville være forbundet med et negativt nettobidrag i gennemsnit.”
Beregningerne viser, at det gennemsnitlige nettobidrag for indvandrere fra MENAPT-lande i 2019 ville være ca. 55.000 kr. højere pr. person i det hypotetiske scenarie med samme fordeling efter opholdsgrundlag som vestlige indvandrere, om end de fortsat ville være forbundet med et negativt nettobidrag i gennemsnit.
- Økonomisk Analyse: Indvandreres nettobidrag til de offentlige finanser i 2019
Finansministeriet (Danish Ministry of Finance), 2023-05 · complicates
“Opgjort med samme aldersfordeling som personer med dansk oprindelse ville nettobidraget for efterkommere i 2019 i sig selv være ca. 13 mia. kr. højere, mens det ville være ca. 28 mia. kr. lavere for gruppen af indvandrere, jf. kapitel 2 om nettobidraget i 2019.”
Opgjort med samme aldersfordeling som personer med dansk oprindelse ville nettobidraget for efterkommere i 2019 i sig selv være ca. 13 mia. kr. højere, mens det ville være ca. 28 mia. kr. lavere for gruppen af indvandrere, jf. kapitel 2 om nettobidraget i 2019.
- Økonomisk Analyse: Indvandreres nettobidrag til de offentlige finanser i 2019
Finansministeriet (Danish Ministry of Finance), 2023-05 · complicates
“Fra 2014 til 2019 er den gennemsnitlige nettoudgift forbundet med indvandrere fra fx MENAPT-lande faldet med ca. 37.000 kr. pr. person, hvilket blandt andet skal ses i sammenhæng med højere beskæftigelsesfrekvens. Regneeksempler peger på, at en stærkere tilknytning til arbejdsmarkedet kan forklare ca. halvdelen af faldet i den gennemsnitlige nettoudgift forbundet med indvandrere fra ikke-vestlige lande fra 2014 til 2019”
Fra 2014 til 2019 er den gennemsnitlige nettoudgift forbundet med indvandrere fra fx MENAPT-lande faldet med ca. 37.000 kr. pr. person, hvilket blandt andet skal ses i sammenhæng med højere beskæftigelsesfrekvens. Regneeksempler peger på, at en stærkere tilknytning til arbejdsmarkedet kan forklare ca. halvdelen af faldet i den gennemsnitlige nettoudgift forbundet med indvandrere fra ikke-vestlige lande fra 2014 til 2019
- Økonomisk Analyse: Indvandreres nettobidrag til de offentlige finanser i 2019
Finansministeriet (Danish Ministry of Finance), 2023-05 · complicates
“Opgørelsen er i udgangspunktet ikke renset for konjunkturer eller andre midlertidige udsving i skatteprovenu mv. [...] MENAPT-lande omfatter igennem hele analysen følgende lande: Syrien, Kuwait, Libyen, Saudi-Arabien, Libanon, Somalia, Irak, Qatar, Sudan, Bahrain, Djibouti, Jordan, Algeriet, Forenede Arabiske Emirater, Tunesien, Egypten, Marokko, Iran, Yemen, Mauretanien, Oman, Afghanistan, Pakistan og Tyrkiet.”
Opgørelsen er i udgangspunktet ikke renset for konjunkturer eller andre midlertidige udsving i skatteprovenu mv. [...] MENAPT-lande omfatter igennem hele analysen følgende lande: Syrien, Kuwait, Libyen, Saudi-Arabien, Libanon, Somalia, Irak, Qatar, Sudan, Bahrain, Djibouti, Jordan, Algeriet, Forenede Arabiske Emirater, Tunesien, Egypten, Marokko, Iran, Yemen, Mauretanien, Oman, Afghanistan, Pakistan og Tyrkiet.
- Økonomisk Analyse: Indvandreres nettobidrag til de offentlige finanser i 2019
Finansministeriet (Danish Ministry of Finance), 2023-05 · complicates
“Et regneeksempel viser fx, at nettobidraget i 2019 for 25-64-årige indvandrere fra MENAPT-lande ville være ca. 12 mia. kr. højere, hvis gruppen havde samme beskæftigelsesfrekvens som gruppen af 25-64-årige med dansk oprindelse”
Et regneeksempel viser fx, at nettobidraget i 2019 for 25-64-årige indvandrere fra MENAPT-lande ville være ca. 12 mia. kr. højere, hvis gruppen havde samme beskæftigelsesfrekvens som gruppen af 25-64-årige med dansk oprindelse
- Borderless Welfare State: The Consequences of Immigration for Public Finances (English summary of Grenzeloze verzorgingsstaat)
Jan van de Beek, Hans Roodenburg, Joop Hartog and Gerrit Kreffer (demo-demo uitgever), 2021-03 · supports
“Only labour migration generates a positive net contribution of, on average, €125,000 per immigrant. Study migration shows, on average, a negative net contribution of €75,000. Family migration shows, on average, a negative net contribution of about €275,000 per immigrant. Asylum migration shows a negative figure as well, amounting to an average of €475,000 per immigrant.”
Only labour migration generates a positive net contribution of, on average, €125,000 per immigrant. Study migration shows, on average, a negative net contribution of €75,000. Family migration shows, on average, a negative net contribution of about €275,000 per immigrant. Asylum migration shows a negative figure as well, amounting to an average of €475,000 per immigrant.
- Borderless Welfare State: The Consequences of Immigration for Public Finances (English summary of Grenzeloze verzorgingsstaat)
Jan van de Beek, Hans Roodenburg, Joop Hartog and Gerrit Kreffer (demo-demo uitgever), 2021-03 · supports
“There are also considerable differences by region of origin. On average, Western immigrants make a positive contribution of €25,000, while non-western immigrants cost nearly €275,000. Within the categories Western and non-Western there is, however, much variation. [...] Immigration from non-Western regions is usually unfavourable for public finances. This applies especially to the areas of origin Caribbean, West-Asia, Turkey and North, Central and West Africa with net costs around ranging from €200,000 to €400,000 per immigrant, and Morocco, the Horn of Africa and Sudan with net cost of €550,000 to €600.000 per immigrant.”
There are also considerable differences by region of origin. On average, Western immigrants make a positive contribution of €25,000, while non-western immigrants cost nearly €275,000. Within the categories Western and non-Western there is, however, much variation. [...] Immigration from non-Western regions is usually unfavourable for public finances. This applies especially to the areas of origin Caribbean, West-Asia, Turkey and North, Central and West Africa with net costs around ranging from €200,000 to €400,000 per immigrant, and Morocco, the Horn of Africa and Sudan with net cost of €550,000 to €600.000 per immigrant.
- Borderless Welfare State: The Consequences of Immigration for Public Finances (English summary of Grenzeloze verzorgingsstaat)
Jan van de Beek, Hans Roodenburg, Joop Hartog and Gerrit Kreffer (demo-demo uitgever), 2021-03 · supports
“Migrant groups of which the first generation has a considerable negative net contribution, usually continue into a second generation that also has a negative or, at best, approximately budget-neutral contribution. For those groups, the net present value of the net contribution of future generations will not offset the costs for the first generation.”
Migrant groups of which the first generation has a considerable negative net contribution, usually continue into a second generation that also has a negative or, at best, approximately budget-neutral contribution. For those groups, the net present value of the net contribution of future generations will not offset the costs for the first generation.
- Borderless Welfare State: The Consequences of Immigration for Public Finances (English summary of Grenzeloze verzorgingsstaat)
Jan van de Beek, Hans Roodenburg, Joop Hartog and Gerrit Kreffer (demo-demo uitgever), 2021-03 · complicates
“The current report is an update of the Public Sector chapter of the report Immigration and the Dutch Economy (2003) by the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis. Both reports deploy the method of generational accounting to calculate the net contribution – revenues minus expenses – of immigrants to public finances, measured from the moment of their immigration to the time of repatriation or death.”
The current report is an update of the Public Sector chapter of the report Immigration and the Dutch Economy (2003) by the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis. Both reports deploy the method of generational accounting to calculate the net contribution – revenues minus expenses – of immigrants to public finances, measured from the moment of their immigration to the time of repatriation or death.
- Grenzeloze verzorgingsstaat: de gevolgen van immigratie voor de overheidsfinanciën
Jan van de Beek, Hans Roodenburg, Joop Hartog and Gerrit Kreffer (demo-demo uitgever), 2021-03 · complicates
“Dr. Jan van de Beek is zelfstandig onderzoeker, voor dit project gedetacheerd bij Amsterdam School of Economics; dr. Joop Hartog is emeritus hoogleraar economie aan de Faculteit Economie en Bedrijfskunde van de Universiteit van Amsterdam [...] Het onderzoek werd mede mogelijk gemaakt door een subsidie van het Renaissance Instituut. [...] © 2021, Zeist: demo-demo uitgever”
Dr. Jan van de Beek is zelfstandig onderzoeker, voor dit project gedetacheerd bij Amsterdam School of Economics; dr. Joop Hartog is emeritus hoogleraar economie aan de Faculteit Economie en Bedrijfskunde van de Universiteit van Amsterdam [...] Het onderzoek werd mede mogelijk gemaakt door een subsidie van het Renaissance Instituut. [...] © 2021, Zeist: demo-demo uitgever
- The effects of more immigrants on public finances
Statistics Norway (SSB), 2014-12-19 · supports
“This present value of increased net public spending is NOK 4.1 million when expressed in 2012 values. Correspondingly, present values of net spending increases for R1 and R2 immigration are NOK -0.8 and 0.8 million respectively in 2012 values.”
This present value of increased net public spending is NOK 4.1 million when expressed in 2012 values. Correspondingly, present values of net spending increases for R1 and R2 immigration are NOK -0.8 and 0.8 million respectively in 2012 values.
- The effects of more immigrants on public finances
Statistics Norway (SSB), 2014-12-19 · complicates
“In the calculations that are commented on below, the immigrants’ children are assumed to have the same economic behaviour as the non-immigrants. [...] This means that persons of the same age and gender on average use all public services to the same extent regardless of reason for residence or country of origin. This assumption on its own probably entails an underestimation of public spending on refugees.”
In the calculations that are commented on below, the immigrants’ children are assumed to have the same economic behaviour as the non-immigrants. [...] This means that persons of the same age and gender on average use all public services to the same extent regardless of reason for residence or country of origin. This assumption on its own probably entails an underestimation of public spending on refugees.
- The effects of more immigrants on public finances
Statistics Norway (SSB), 2014-12-19 · complicates
“The immigrants are from the country groups: R1 (Western Europe, North America, Australia and New Zealand), R2 (Eastern European EU countries) and R3 (rest of the world). The groups from R1 and R2 include large numbers of labour immigrants and family immigrants. Group R3 is very heterogeneous, partly because it includes most of the refugees.”
The immigrants are from the country groups: R1 (Western Europe, North America, Australia and New Zealand), R2 (Eastern European EU countries) and R3 (rest of the world). The groups from R1 and R2 include large numbers of labour immigrants and family immigrants. Group R3 is very heterogeneous, partly because it includes most of the refugees.
- GCSE results (Attainment 8) (Ethnicity facts and figures)
Department for Education (Ethnicity facts and figures), 2024-11-07 · supports
“pupils from the Chinese ethnic group had the highest average score out of all ethnic groups (65.5), followed by pupils from the Indian ethnic group (59.4) [...] white Gypsy or Roma pupils had had the lowest average score (20.3), followed by traveller of Irish heritage pupils (26.8) and mixed white and black Caribbean pupils (39.1)”
pupils from the Chinese ethnic group had the highest average score out of all ethnic groups (65.5), followed by pupils from the Indian ethnic group (59.4) [...] white Gypsy or Roma pupils had had the lowest average score (20.3), followed by traveller of Irish heritage pupils (26.8) and mixed white and black Caribbean pupils (39.1)
- GCSE results (Attainment 8) (Ethnicity facts and figures)
Department for Education (Ethnicity facts and figures), 2024-11-07 · supports
“A 2024 report from the Education Policy Institute compared white British pupils’ attainment against other ethnic groups across education, from early years foundation stage to 16-19 education. They found that by the end of secondary school, most ethnic groups achieved higher GCSE grades than white British pupils in 2023.”
A 2024 report from the Education Policy Institute compared white British pupils’ attainment against other ethnic groups across education, from early years foundation stage to 16-19 education. They found that by the end of secondary school, most ethnic groups achieved higher GCSE grades than white British pupils in 2023.
- GCSE results (Attainment 8) (Ethnicity facts and figures)
Department for Education (Ethnicity facts and figures), 2024-11-07 · supports
“in every ethnic group, pupils eligible for free school meals had a lower average score than those not eligible”
in every ethnic group, pupils eligible for free school meals had a lower average score than those not eligible
- Entry rates into higher education (Ethnicity facts and figures)
Department for Education (Ethnicity facts and figures), 2025-07-09 · supports
“in 2024, students from the Chinese ethnic group had the highest entry rate into higher education (66.1%) and White students had the lowest (29.8%)”
in 2024, students from the Chinese ethnic group had the highest entry rate into higher education (66.1%) and White students had the lowest (29.8%)
- Entry rates into higher education (Ethnicity facts and figures)
Department for Education (Ethnicity facts and figures), 2025-07-09 · supports
“Recent research shows that young people from almost all ethnic minority backgrounds were more likely to go to university by age 19 than White British pupils. This was the case even when accounting for prior attainment or socio-economic background.”
Recent research shows that young people from almost all ethnic minority backgrounds were more likely to go to university by age 19 than White British pupils. This was the case even when accounting for prior attainment or socio-economic background.
- Entry rates into higher education (Ethnicity facts and figures)
Department for Education (Ethnicity facts and figures), 2025-07-09 · complicates
“The data includes students from state schools in England – those funded directly by the government or their local authority. It only counts students who applied to full time undergraduate courses through UCAS (the Universities and Colleges Admissions Service).”
The data includes students from state schools in England – those funded directly by the government or their local authority. It only counts students who applied to full time undergraduate courses through UCAS (the Universities and Colleges Admissions Service).
- Ethnic diversification and neighbourhood mixing: A rapid response analysis of the 2021 Census of England and Wales
Catney, Lloyd, Ellis, Wright, Finney, Jivraj and Manley, The Geographical Journal 189(1), 2023 · supports
“Looking across all four time points, we see steady declines in segregation for all ethnic groups: White and minority. The largest proportional decline in residential segregation between 1991 and 2021 was for the Black African group, with a decrease of 0.17. The Bangladeshi, Black Caribbean and Indian ethnic groups also experienced large decreases in neighbourhood residential segregation between 1991 and 2021.”
Looking across all four time points, we see steady declines in segregation for all ethnic groups: White and minority. The largest proportional decline in residential segregation between 1991 and 2021 was for the Black African group, with a decrease of 0.17. The Bangladeshi, Black Caribbean and Indian ethnic groups also experienced large decreases in neighbourhood residential segregation between 1991 and 2021.
- Ethnic diversification and neighbourhood mixing: A rapid response analysis of the 2021 Census of England and Wales
Catney, Lloyd, Ellis, Wright, Finney, Jivraj and Manley, The Geographical Journal 189(1), 2023 · complicates
“The Index of Dissimilarity (D), which captures the evenness of the spatial distribution of two groups, is one of the most commonly used measures of segregation (Massey & Denton, 1988). Here, each named group is compared with all others (for example, people in the Pakistani ethnic group compared with all people other than Pakistani).”
The Index of Dissimilarity (D), which captures the evenness of the spatial distribution of two groups, is one of the most commonly used measures of segregation (Massey & Denton, 1988). Here, each named group is compared with all others (for example, people in the Pakistani ethnic group compared with all people other than Pakistani).
- Ethnic diversification and neighbourhood mixing: A rapid response analysis of the 2021 Census of England and Wales
Catney, Lloyd, Ellis, Wright, Finney, Jivraj and Manley, The Geographical Journal 189(1), 2023 · supports
“White British segregation (not shown) remained the same between 2001 and 2011 (0.55), and decreased between 2011 and 2021 (to 0.53).”
White British segregation (not shown) remained the same between 2001 and 2011 (0.55), and decreased between 2011 and 2021 (to 0.53).
- Segregation in education (SchoolDash blog, March 2017), analysis for the iCoCo Foundation, SchoolDash and The Challenge study Understanding School Segregation in England 2011 to 2016
SchoolDash, 2017-03-22 · complicates
“A school is deemed 'segregated' if the proportion of White British pupils is more than 15 percentage points higher or lower than that in other nearby schools.”
A school is deemed 'segregated' if the proportion of White British pupils is more than 15 percentage points higher or lower than that in other nearby schools.
- Segregation in education (SchoolDash blog, March 2017), analysis for the iCoCo Foundation, SchoolDash and The Challenge study Understanding School Segregation in England 2011 to 2016
SchoolDash, 2017-03-22 · complicates
“Perhaps unsurprisingly, the highest levels of ethnic segregation are seen in non-Christian faith schools (which include Jewish, Muslim, Hindu, Sikh and Buddhist establishments). Though their numbers are small, fully 84% of primary schools and 93% of secondary schools in this group show ethnic segregation relative to their local areas.”
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the highest levels of ethnic segregation are seen in non-Christian faith schools (which include Jewish, Muslim, Hindu, Sikh and Buddhist establishments). Though their numbers are small, fully 84% of primary schools and 93% of secondary schools in this group show ethnic segregation relative to their local areas.
- Community Life Survey 2024/25: headline findings
Department for Culture, Media and Sport, 2026-07-31 · complicates
“40% of adults agreed that many of the people in their neighbourhood can be trusted, no significant change from 2023/24 (41%). Levels of trust have remained broadly consistent since 2016/17 (40% to 42%) but have decreased from rates in 2013/14 (48%) when push-to-web data collection commenced.”
40% of adults agreed that many of the people in their neighbourhood can be trusted, no significant change from 2023/24 (41%). Levels of trust have remained broadly consistent since 2016/17 (40% to 42%) but have decreased from rates in 2013/14 (48%) when push-to-web data collection commenced.
- Community Life Survey 2024/25: headline findings
Department for Culture, Media and Sport, 2026-07-31 · supports
“81% of adults agreed that their local area is a place where people from different backgrounds get along well together, a small, but significant, decrease from 2023/24 (from 81.4% in 2023/24 to 80.6% in 2024/25).”
81% of adults agreed that their local area is a place where people from different backgrounds get along well together, a small, but significant, decrease from 2023/24 (from 81.4% in 2023/24 to 80.6% in 2024/25).
- Community Life Survey 2024/25: neighbourhood and community
Department for Culture, Media and Sport, 2026-07-31 · complicates
“Adults living in the least deprived areas (10th decile, 63%) were more likely to report that many people in their neighbourhood can be trusted than adults living in the most deprived areas (1st decile, 18%).”
Adults living in the least deprived areas (10th decile, 63%) were more likely to report that many people in their neighbourhood can be trusted than adults living in the most deprived areas (1st decile, 18%).
- Community Life Survey 2024/25: neighbourhood and community
Department for Culture, Media and Sport, 2026-07-31 · complicates
“Compared with the average for adults in England (40%), Jewish (52%) and Christian (45%) adults were more likely to report that many people in their neighbourhood can be trusted. Adults from the No religion classification (39%), adults from the Any other religion classification (34%), and Buddhist (33%), Hindu (31%), Muslim (25%), and Sikh (24%) adults were less likely to report that many of the people in their neighbourhood can be trusted compared with the average for adults in England (40%).”
Compared with the average for adults in England (40%), Jewish (52%) and Christian (45%) adults were more likely to report that many people in their neighbourhood can be trusted. Adults from the No religion classification (39%), adults from the Any other religion classification (34%), and Buddhist (33%), Hindu (31%), Muslim (25%), and Sikh (24%) adults were less likely to report that many of the people in their neighbourhood can be trusted compared with the average for adults in England (40%).
- Immigration, diversity and social cohesion
The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2019-12-13 · supports
“Most of the empirical literature on this subject finds that the relationship between diversity and trust is negative – the more diverse a community is, the less likely individuals in it are to be trusting.”
Most of the empirical literature on this subject finds that the relationship between diversity and trust is negative – the more diverse a community is, the less likely individuals in it are to be trusting.
- Immigration, diversity and social cohesion
The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2019-12-13 · complicates
“Laurence and Heath (2008) and Letki (2008), looking at different predictors of social cohesion in the 2005 and 2001 Citizenship Surveys, argue that there is no strong evidence for an eroding effect of diversity once the association between diversity and economic deprivation is taken into account. Still, with British data based on the Citizenship Survey 2005, Laurence (2009) argued that rising diversity is associated with lower levels of neighbourhood trust.”
Laurence and Heath (2008) and Letki (2008), looking at different predictors of social cohesion in the 2005 and 2001 Citizenship Surveys, argue that there is no strong evidence for an eroding effect of diversity once the association between diversity and economic deprivation is taken into account. Still, with British data based on the Citizenship Survey 2005, Laurence (2009) argued that rising diversity is associated with lower levels of neighbourhood trust.
- Immigration, diversity and social cohesion
The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2019-12-13 · complicates
“Most recently, Sturgis et al. (2013) establish that neighbourhood ethnic diversity in London is positively related to the perceived social cohesion of neighbourhood residents with control for economic deprivation. Moreover, it is ethnic segregation within neighbourhoods that is associated with lower levels of perceived social cohesion.”
Most recently, Sturgis et al. (2013) establish that neighbourhood ethnic diversity in London is positively related to the perceived social cohesion of neighbourhood residents with control for economic deprivation. Moreover, it is ethnic segregation within neighbourhoods that is associated with lower levels of perceived social cohesion.
- Immigration, diversity and social cohesion
The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2019-12-13 · complicates
“However, most research analyses the relationship between diversity (typically measured in terms of racial and ethnic composition of the population) and social cohesion, not between immigration (typically measured based on place of birth and/or nationality) and social cohesion.”
However, most research analyses the relationship between diversity (typically measured in terms of racial and ethnic composition of the population) and social cohesion, not between immigration (typically measured based on place of birth and/or nationality) and social cohesion.
- C4 survey and documentary reveals What British Muslims Really Think
Channel 4, 2016-04-11 · complicates
“ICM Unlimited interviewed a random sample of 1,081 adults aged 18+ who self-identified themselves as belonging to the Muslim faith. Interviews were carried out face-to-face, in-home, in geographical areas in which minimum Muslims incidence was confirmed by Census to be a minimum of 20%. Interviews took place between 25th April and 31st May 2015 and the data has been weighted to representative of all Muslims by age, gender, work status and region. A nationally representative control sample of 1,008 adults aged 18+ was also conducted, by telephone, between 5th-7th June 2015.”
ICM Unlimited interviewed a random sample of 1,081 adults aged 18+ who self-identified themselves as belonging to the Muslim faith. Interviews were carried out face-to-face, in-home, in geographical areas in which minimum Muslims incidence was confirmed by Census to be a minimum of 20%. Interviews took place between 25th April and 31st May 2015 and the data has been weighted to representative of all Muslims by age, gender, work status and region. A nationally representative control sample of 1,008 adults aged 18+ was also conducted, by telephone, between 5th-7th June 2015.
- C4 survey and documentary reveals What British Muslims Really Think
Channel 4, 2016-04-11 · supports
“52% do not believe that homosexuality should be legal in Britain Q: To what extent you agree or disagree with each one: homosexuality should be legal in Britain? Net agree 18% (strongly agree 8%, tend to agree 10%) Net disagree: 52% (strongly disagree: 38%, tend to disagree: 14%)”
52% do not believe that homosexuality should be legal in Britain Q: To what extent you agree or disagree with each one: homosexuality should be legal in Britain? Net agree 18% (strongly agree 8%, tend to agree 10%) Net disagree: 52% (strongly disagree: 38%, tend to disagree: 14%)
- C4 survey and documentary reveals What British Muslims Really Think
Channel 4, 2016-04-11 · supports
“39% agree that “wives should always obey their husbands”.”
39% agree that “wives should always obey their husbands”.
- C4 survey and documentary reveals What British Muslims Really Think
Channel 4, 2016-04-11 · complicates
“A large majority of British Muslims feel a strong sense of belonging to Britain (86%). This is higher than the national average (83%)”
A large majority of British Muslims feel a strong sense of belonging to Britain (86%). This is higher than the national average (83%)
- British Muslims poll: methodology and summary of findings (J.L. Partners for the Henry Jackson Society)
Henry Jackson Society, 2024-04 · complicates
“J.L. Partners polled two audiences in conjunction with Number Cruncher: a nationally representative sample of British Muslims and a nationally representative sample of the general public. Fieldwork dates of 14th February – 12th March 2024 for British Muslims, 4th – 6th March 2024 for General Public [...] Sample of 1,000 for British Muslims, 2,013 for General Public [...] Sample collected using online panel”
J.L. Partners polled two audiences in conjunction with Number Cruncher: a nationally representative sample of British Muslims and a nationally representative sample of the general public. Fieldwork dates of 14th February – 12th March 2024 for British Muslims, 4th – 6th March 2024 for General Public [...] Sample of 1,000 for British Muslims, 2,013 for General Public [...] Sample collected using online panel
- British Muslims poll: methodology and summary of findings (J.L. Partners for the Henry Jackson Society)
Henry Jackson Society, 2024-04 · supports
“Only 28% say it would be undesirable to outlaw homosexuality in the UK (compared to 62% of the public as a whole)”
Only 28% say it would be undesirable to outlaw homosexuality in the UK (compared to 62% of the public as a whole)
- British Muslim youth and religious fundamentalism: a quantitative investigation (accepted manuscript)
Kashyap and Lewis, Ethnic and Racial Studies 36(12), 2012-04-26 · complicates
“From the 2001 Census, Super Output Areas (OAs) containing 10% or more Muslim residents were identified. Overall, the sampled areas contain 67.5% of the Muslim population of Great Britain as reported in the 2001 Census. Between January and May 2009, face-to-face interviews were conducted. [...] A total of 480 interviews were completed. The survey had an overall high rate of non-response at 79 percent.”
From the 2001 Census, Super Output Areas (OAs) containing 10% or more Muslim residents were identified. Overall, the sampled areas contain 67.5% of the Muslim population of Great Britain as reported in the 2001 Census. Between January and May 2009, face-to-face interviews were conducted. [...] A total of 480 interviews were completed. The survey had an overall high rate of non-response at 79 percent.
- British Muslim youth and religious fundamentalism: a quantitative investigation (accepted manuscript)
Kashyap and Lewis, Ethnic and Racial Studies 36(12), 2012-04-26 · complicates
“Like other youth, Muslim youth show liberalizing social attitudes across generations on gay marriage and legal abortion.”
Like other youth, Muslim youth show liberalizing social attitudes across generations on gay marriage and legal abortion.
- British Muslim youth and religious fundamentalism: a quantitative investigation (accepted manuscript)
Kashyap and Lewis, Ethnic and Racial Studies 36(12), 2012-04-26 · supports
“Notably, Muslim youth are the most conservative when it comes to the morality of homosexuality, falling even slightly more conservative than their elders. However, when it comes to the public policy question of gay marriage, a majority (74 percent) support legalizing either same-sex marriage or same-sex civil unions.”
Notably, Muslim youth are the most conservative when it comes to the morality of homosexuality, falling even slightly more conservative than their elders. However, when it comes to the public policy question of gay marriage, a majority (74 percent) support legalizing either same-sex marriage or same-sex civil unions.
- 2011 Census analysis: Immigration Patterns of Non-UK Born Populations in England and Wales in 2011
Office for National Statistics, 2013-12-17 · supports
“This is reflected in the increase in the proportion of the usually resident population1 born abroad2 from 4.3 per cent (1.9 million) recorded in the 1951 Census to 13 per cent (7.5 million) in the 2011 Census (see figure 1). [...] There was a particularly marked increase in the latest inter-censal period, from 8.9 per cent (4.6 million)4 in 2001.”
This is reflected in the increase in the proportion of the usually resident population1 born abroad2 from 4.3 per cent (1.9 million) recorded in the 1951 Census to 13 per cent (7.5 million) in the 2011 Census (see figure 1). [...] There was a particularly marked increase in the latest inter-censal period, from 8.9 per cent (4.6 million)4 in 2001.
- International migration, England and Wales: Census 2021
Office for National Statistics, 2022-11-02 · supports
“One in six usual residents of England and Wales were born outside the UK, an increase of 2.5 million since 2011, from 7.5 million (13.4%) to 10 million (16.8%).”
One in six usual residents of England and Wales were born outside the UK, an increase of 2.5 million since 2011, from 7.5 million (13.4%) to 10 million (16.8%).
- Employment (Ethnicity facts and figures): by ethnicity over time
Department for Work and Pensions (Ethnicity facts and figures), 2023-11-28 · supports
“Percentage of 16 to 64 year olds who were employed, by ethnicity over time”
Percentage of 16 to 64 year olds who were employed, by ethnicity over time
- Økonomisk Analyse: Indvandreres nettobidrag til de offentlige finanser i 2019
Finansministeriet (Danish Ministry of Finance), 2023-05 · supports
“Tabel 3.2 Nettobidrag til de offentlige finanser opdelt på herkomst, 2014-2019 [...] Gennemsnit, 1.000 kr. pr. person (2019-niveau) [...] Anm.: Tallene er opregnet til 2019-niveau med udviklingen i nominelt BNP.”
Tabel 3.2 Nettobidrag til de offentlige finanser opdelt på herkomst, 2014-2019 [...] Gennemsnit, 1.000 kr. pr. person (2019-niveau) [...] Anm.: Tallene er opregnet til 2019-niveau med udviklingen i nominelt BNP.
- Entry rates into higher education (Ethnicity facts and figures): by ethnicity over time
Department for Education (Ethnicity facts and figures), 2025-07-09 · supports
“Percentages and number of state school pupils aged 18 years who were accepted to higher education in the UK, by ethnicity over time”
Percentages and number of state school pupils aged 18 years who were accepted to higher education in the UK, by ethnicity over time
- Community Life Survey 2024/25: annual data tables (Timeseries sheet)
Department for Culture, Media and Sport, 2026-07-31 · supports
“Time series for headline indicators, people aged 16 and over, England, October 2018 to March 2025”
Time series for headline indicators, people aged 16 and over, England, October 2018 to March 2025