Steelview

Integration Outcomes in the UK

The share of residents born abroad has roughly quadrupled since 1951, and outcomes vary widely by group, mostly improving with time and across generations. [2][1][6][11][13][36][41][20]

Foreign-born share of the resident population, England and Wales, Census 1951–2021

Born outside the UK

The share of usual residents born outside the UK at each Census for which the ONS states the figure in text. This is a resident stock, not a count of arrivals in the year shown.

Share of usual residents born outside the UK, by census year

The share of usual residents born outside the UK at each Census for which the ONS states the figure in text. This is a resident stock, not a count of arrivals in the year shown. Read as born outside the UK: Share of usual residents born outside the UK. Use the Table switch to see every value.

  • Born outside the UK
4%8%12%16%195119601980200020214%6%8%10%12%14%16%18%19511960197019801990200020102021

Source: Office for National Statistics [64]

Observations 2
The foreign-born share has roughly quadrupled since 1951

In England and Wales, 4.3% of residents were born abroad in 1951, 8.9% in 2001, 13.4% in 2011 and 16.8% in 2021, about one person in six. The largest single increase between the last two censuses was in people born in Romania, after work restrictions on Romanian citizens were lifted in 2014. 2 1 3

This is a count of residents, not of recent arrivals

The share includes people who arrived decades ago, many now British citizens, and it falls when people born abroad leave or die. It says nothing about how long people have been here, which is what the language and identity figures below are about. 1

About this data

Full published range: 1951–2021. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – The ONS states the 1951, 2001 and 2011 shares in its 2013 Census analysis and the 2011 and 2021 shares in its 2021 Census bulletin. The 1961, 1971, 1981 and 1991 Census shares appear only in an ONS chart image, with no published table, so those years are left out rather than read off a picture. 2011 uses the 13.4% stated in the 2021 bulletin; the 2013 article rounds it to 13 per cent.

Employment rate by ethnic group, ages 16 to 64, Great Britain, 2004–2022

Employment rate

The share of 16- to 64-year-olds in work in each year, for every ethnic group the Annual Population Survey series publishes, with the overall rate for comparison. Ethnicity is not migrant status: most people in several of these groups were born in the UK.

Share of 16- to 64-year-olds in work, by year

The share of 16- to 64-year-olds in work in each year, for every ethnic group the Annual Population Survey series publishes, with the overall rate for comparison. Ethnicity is not migrant status: most people in several of these groups were born in the UK. Read as employment rate: Share of 16- to 64-year-olds in work. Dashed segments cross 1 definitional break in the source, explained in Method Changes below this graph. Use the Table switch to see every value.

  • All
  • White British
  • White other
  • Indian
  • Pakistani and Bangladeshi
  • Asian other
  • Black
  • Mixed
  • Other
40%60%80%20042020202240%50%60%70%80%90%2004201020202022

Vertical dashed lines mark measurement changes. See method changes.

Source: Department for Work and Pensions (Ethnicity facts and figures) [65]

Observations 2
Employment gaps by ethnicity are large but narrowing

From 2004 to 2022 the employment rate of the combined Pakistani and Bangladeshi group rose from 44% to 61%, the largest increase of any group, but it remained the lowest. The Indian rate overtook the White British rate over the same period. 11 12

Rising employment across all groups partly reflects the wider labour market

The overall rate also rose over the period, so part of each group's rise is the general recovery after 2010 rather than anything specific to that group. 11

Method Changes
2012: New ethnicity question

DWP: "The Annual Population Survey updated its ethnicity questions in 2011. Estimates from before and after 2011 may not be consistent, and data for individual ethnic groups in 2011 is not available." [65]

About this data

Full published range: 2004–2022. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – The full range of the published series. Rates for individual ethnic groups are not available for 2011, when the survey changed its ethnicity question, so each group's line has no 2011 point; the overall rate is published for every year.

Average annual net contribution to public finances by origin, Denmark, 2014–2019

Net contribution per person

Taxes paid minus transfers and public services used, per person per year, for people of Danish origin and for immigrants and their Danish-born descendants by region of origin. Below zero is a net cost. These are single-year accounts, not lifetime ones.

DKK thousand per person per year, 2019 prices, by year

Taxes paid minus transfers and public services used, per person per year, for people of Danish origin and for immigrants and their Danish-born descendants by region of origin. Below zero is a net cost. These are single-year accounts, not lifetime ones. Read as net contribution per person: DKK thousand per person per year, 2019 prices. Use the Table switch to see every value.

  • Danish origin
  • Immigrants from Western countries
  • Immigrants from MENAPT countries
  • Immigrants from other non-Western countries
  • Descendants, Western origin
  • Descendants, MENAPT origin
  • Descendants, other non-Western origin
−200−1000100201420152016201720182019−200−150−100−50050100201420152016201720182019

Source: Finansministeriet (Danish Ministry of Finance) [66]

Observations 4
Denmark: immigrants from MENAPT countries are net costs; Western immigrants are net contributors

In 2019, immigrants from the Middle East, North Africa, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Turkey (the ministry's "MENAPT" group) cost Danish public finances DKK 79 thousand each on average, while immigrants from Western countries contributed DKK 52 thousand each, and people of Danish origin DKK 22 thousand. Immigrants and descendants together cost DKK 16 billion, about DKK 21 thousand per person. 19 20 25

The cost fell sharply as employment rose

The average net cost of MENAPT immigrants fell by about DKK 37 thousand a person between 2014 and 2019. The ministry attributes about half the fall for non-Western immigrants to stronger attachment to the labour market, during years when employment was rising for everyone. Had MENAPT immigrants aged 25 to 64 worked at the Danish-origin rate, their 2019 contribution would have been about DKK 12 billion higher. 24 26

Reason for migrating explains part of the gap, not all of it

Immigrants who came as refugees cost about DKK 95 thousand each in 2019, while those who came to work contributed about DKK 120 thousand. MENAPT immigrants came mainly as refugees or family members, Western immigrants mainly to work or study. With the Western mix of reasons for migrating, MENAPT immigrants' average would have been about DKK 55 thousand higher, still negative. 21 22

Descendants' figures mostly reflect their age

Descendants of every origin, including Western, show net costs because most are children in school. At the Danish-origin age profile, descendants' total contribution would be about DKK 13 billion higher and immigrants' about DKK 28 billion lower. 23

Subtleties
One year, not a lifetime

These are annual accounts for each year, not lifetime ones, and are not adjusted for the business cycle, which is why the Danish-origin line swings from year to year. They allocate shared spending such as defence across everyone. Denmark's MENAPT intake was mainly refugees and their families, so the figures say more about humanitarian routes than about work routes such as the UK's. 25 21

About this data

Full published range: 2014–2019. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – The full range of the Ministry of Finance's register-based series in its latest edition (May 2023). Earlier years are uprated to 2019 prices with nominal GDP. A 2020–2021 update had not been found published. Read from the Internet Archive copy, because fm.dk refused automated fetching.

Net contribution per person

MENAPT is the ministry's grouping of Middle Eastern and North African countries plus Pakistan, Afghanistan and Turkey. Descendants are people born in Denmark to immigrant parents; most are children.

Entry rate into higher education at 18 by ethnic group, England, 2006–2024

Entry rate at 18

The share of 18-year-olds from English state schools accepted onto a full-time undergraduate course through UCAS, for each ethnic group the series publishes.

Share of state-school 18-year-olds accepted to higher education, by year

The share of 18-year-olds from English state schools accepted onto a full-time undergraduate course through UCAS, for each ethnic group the series publishes. Read as entry rate at 18: Share of state-school 18-year-olds accepted to higher education. Use the Table switch to see every value.

  • Chinese
  • Asian
  • Black
  • Other
  • Mixed
  • White
20%40%60%80%20062020202420%30%40%50%60%70%80%2006201020202024

Source: Department for Education (Ethnicity facts and figures) [67]

Observations 1
Minority pupils enter university at higher rates, and White pupils at the lowest

In 2024, 66.1% of Chinese state-school pupils went to university at 18, and 29.8% of White pupils, the lowest rate. Every group's entry rate rose between 2006 and 2024. Research cited by the publisher finds almost all minority groups more likely to go to university by 19 than White British pupils, even after allowing for prior attainment and family background. 38 39

About this data

Full published range: 2006–2024. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – The full range of the published series. Students whose ethnicity is not known are excluded, and students who do not match across school and UCAS records are dropped, which the publisher says makes the estimates likely to be lower than the real value.

Neighbourhood trust and cohesion, England, 2018/19–2024/25

Share of adults agreeing

The share of adults who say many people in their neighbourhood can be trusted, and the share who agree their local area is a place where people from different backgrounds get on well together. Each point is a survey year from October to March, plotted at the year it starts.

Share of adults in England, by survey year (plotted at its starting year)

The share of adults who say many people in their neighbourhood can be trusted, and the share who agree their local area is a place where people from different backgrounds get on well together. Each point is a survey year from October to March, plotted at the year it starts. Read as share of adults agreeing: Share of adults in England. Use the Table switch to see every value.

  • People from different backgrounds get on well together
  • Many people in the neighbourhood can be trusted
30%50%70%90%201820192020202120222023202430%40%50%60%70%80%90%2018201920202021202220232024

Source: Department for Culture, Media and Sport [68]

Observations 4
Cohesion has stayed high

81% of adults in England agree their local area is a place where people from different backgrounds get on well together, in a narrow range since 2018/19; the 2024/25 figure is a small but statistically significant fall from 81.4% to 80.6%. 47

Neighbourhood trust is lower than in 2013/14

40% say many people in their neighbourhood can be trusted, within a 40% to 42% band since 2016/17 but down from 48% in 2013/14, the first year of the current survey method. 46

Trust tracks deprivation closely

63% of adults in the least deprived tenth of areas say many neighbours can be trusted, against 18% in the most deprived tenth. Trust is also lower among most minority religious groups, including 25% of Muslims. 48 49

Research finds a small negative association between diversity and trust, weaker or absent once deprivation is allowed for

Most studies find more diverse communities report less trust, and a 2005 British survey linked rising diversity to lower neighbourhood trust. Other British studies find no strong erosion once deprivation is taken into account, and a London study found diversity linked to higher perceived cohesion, with segregation within neighbourhoods linked to lower cohesion. 50 51 52

Subtleties
The research measures diversity, not immigration or its pace

Almost all of the trust research relates trust to an area's ethnic mix, not to immigration or to how fast an area changed, and the national survey does not link trust to local migration. A national trend cannot show whether places that changed fastest lost the most trust. 53

About this data

Full published range: 2018–2024. Every plotted line runs the whole of it – The full range of the time-series table in the 2024/25 release. There is no 2022/23 survey year in the table. The survey began its push-to-web method in 2013/14, when 48% said many neighbours could be trusted; those earlier years are in earlier releases and are not plotted here. The survey covers England only and replaced the face-to-face Citizenship Survey, which is not comparable.

Where the foreign-born share rose most, 2011 to 2021

The 20 local authorities in England and Wales with the largest rise in the share of residents born outside the UK between the 2011 and 2021 Censuses, with England and Wales as a whole, split into residents born in the EU and those born elsewhere outside the UK.

Compare by country of birth

Both · Rise in the foreign-born share, percentage points

  1. City of London12.9
  2. Barking and Dagenham10.39
  3. Watford9.25
  4. Havering9.13
  5. Thurrock9.02
  6. Reading8.68
  7. Cambridge8.58
  8. Boston8.5
  9. Hillingdon8.49
  10. Dartford8.4
  11. Sutton7.9
  12. Sandwell7.65
  13. Peterborough7.59
  14. Swindon7.53
  15. Luton7.5
  16. Leicester7.49
  17. Salford7.27
  18. Milton Keynes7.19
  19. Bexley6.93
  20. Pendle6.8
  21. England and Wales3.43
Born in the EUBorn elsewhere outside the UK
Show all breakdowns
Where the foreign-born share rose most, 2011 to 2021, by country of birth
CategoryBorn in the EUBorn elsewhere outside the UKTotal
City of London6.096.8112.9
Barking and Dagenham5.594.810.39
Watford4.744.519.25
Havering3.565.579.13
Thurrock5.0249.02
Reading3.864.828.68
Cambridge4.264.328.58
Boston7.560.948.5
Hillingdon2.545.958.49
Dartford2.176.238.4
Sutton2.675.237.9
Sandwell2.115.547.65
Peterborough4.82.797.59
Swindon1.655.887.53
Luton4.113.397.5
Leicester3.234.267.49
Salford2.514.767.27
Milton Keynes3.43.797.19
Bexley2.474.466.93
Pendle3.233.576.8
England and Wales1.761.673.43

Source: Office for National Statistics (Nomis) [4]; Office for National Statistics (Nomis) [5]

Observations 3
The fastest-changing places are mostly outer London and towns near it

Between 2011 and 2021 the foreign-born share rose by about 10 percentage points in Barking and Dagenham and about 9 in Watford, Havering and Thurrock, against 3.4 points for England and Wales as a whole. Inner London boroughs that were already the most foreign-born changed little. 4 5

EU-born residents drove the change in some towns, not in most

EU-born residents accounted for more than half of the rise in 6 of the 20 places: Boston, where they were almost all of it, Peterborough, Thurrock, Luton, Barking and Dagenham, and Watford. In the other 14, including Hillingdon, Dartford, Swindon, Sandwell and Sutton, people born outside the EU accounted for half or more. Across England and Wales the two contributed about equally. 4 5

The detailed origins of the non-EU rise vary by place

The same Census tables split the non-EU-born by continent. In Hillingdon, Swindon, Sandwell and Leicester most of the non-EU rise was in people born in the Middle East and Asia; in Dartford and Salford a large part was in people born in Africa. The Census groups do not separate Muslim-majority countries, so these figures cannot say how much of the change was from any particular culture or religion. 4 5

About this data

Own calculation from the Census country-of-birth tables for local authority districts (2011 QS203EW, 2021 TS004, both via Nomis). Each share is that group's residents divided by all usual residents in that Census; a bar is the 2021 share minus the 2011 share. "Born in the EU" is Ireland plus the other EU countries as each Census defined them, so Croatia counts as EU only in 2021. "Born elsewhere" is everyone else born outside the UK, including the rest of Europe. 323 of the 331 2021 districts kept their codes from 2011 and are ranked; the eight formed by later mergers (such as Buckinghamshire and Dorset) are left out. The City of London has about four thousand residents. England and Wales totals sum all districts and reproduce the ONS figures of 13.4% and 16.8%. Ranked by total rise; the full ranking is in the extraction script, not shown.

English proficiency of residents born abroad, by when they arrived

Census 2021, England and Wales, everyone born outside the UK aged 3 and over, by period of arrival. One Census, so this compares people who arrived at different times, not the same people over time.

Compare by English proficiency

Cannot speak English well · Share of residents born abroad who arrived in the period

  1. Arrived 2011 to 202110.8%
  2. Arrived 1971 to 19807.6%
  3. Arrived 1981 to 19907.5%
  4. Arrived 1991 to 20006.9%
  5. Arrived 2001 to 20106.8%
  6. Arrived before 19714.3%
Show all breakdowns
English proficiency of residents born abroad, by when they arrived, by English proficiency
CategoryEnglish is a main languageSpeaks English well or very wellCannot speak English wellCannot speak EnglishTotal
Arrived before 197184.4%10.6%4.3%0.7%100%
Arrived 1971 to 198072.2%18.8%7.6%1.4%100%
Arrived 1981 to 199071.8%19.1%7.5%1.5%99.9%
Arrived 1991 to 200064.6%27.4%6.9%1.1%100%
Arrived 2001 to 201051.6%40.7%6.8%0.9%100%
Arrived 2011 to 202137.4%49.7%10.8%2%99.9%

Source: Office for National Statistics [10]

Observations 3
Recent arrivals are the most likely to struggle with English

11% of people who arrived between 2011 and 2021 said they could not speak English well, against 4% of those who arrived before 1971. Across the whole population, 1.5% (880,000) could not speak English well and 0.3% (161,000) could not speak it at all. 6 9

English as a main language rises with time in the UK

84% of residents who arrived before 1971 had English as their main language, against 37% of 2011–21 arrivals; most recent arrivals who do not have English as a main language say they speak it well or very well. The share who cannot speak English at all is around 1 to 2% in every arrival period. 7

British identity follows the same pattern

94% of non-EU-born residents who arrived before 1951 described their national identity as UK-only, against 81% of 1981–90 arrivals and 20% of 2011–21 arrivals. 8

Subtleties
One snapshot, not people followed over time

These are different groups of people measured once, in 2021. Earlier arrivals came from different countries, and those who stayed may differ from those who left, so the gap between periods is not only the effect of time spent in the UK. The Census does not record parents' birthplace, so the children of immigrants cannot be separated out. 7

About this data

Percentages computed from the counts in the ONS Figure 9 data file, rounded to one decimal place, so some rows total 99.9. Proficiency is self-reported and asked only of people whose main language is not English. Earlier arrivals still living in England and Wales in 2021 are survivors who stayed; people who left or died are not counted.

Employment rate of women by ethnic group, 2022

Women aged 16 to 64 in work, Great Britain, 2022, every ethnic group in the published breakdown.

Share of women aged 16 to 64 in work

  1. White other79%
  2. White British74%
  3. All women72%
  4. Mixed71%
  5. Indian70%
  6. Asian other68%
  7. Black66%
  8. Other60%
  9. Pakistani and Bangladeshi46%

Source: Department for Work and Pensions (Ethnicity facts and figures) [18]

Observations 1
The remaining gap is mainly among women

In 2022, 75% of Pakistani and Bangladeshi men were in work and 46% of women. The publisher notes that the Commission on Race and Ethnic Disparities cited cultural and religious reasons for this difference. 13

About this data

Annual Population Survey, 2022. Men's rates in the same table: All 79, White British 79, White other 86, Indian 84, Pakistani and Bangladeshi 75, Asian other 75, Black 74, Mixed 67, Other 75.

Employment rate by religion, Census 2021

People aged 16 to 64 in work (employees and self-employed), England and Wales, March 2021, for every religion the Census tick-box lists.

Share of 16- to 64-year-olds in work

  1. Christian73%
  2. No religion72.7%
  3. Jewish72.6%
  4. Hindu72.4%
  5. England and Wales70.9%
  6. Sikh70%
  7. Buddhist66.6%
  8. Other religion64.2%
  9. Muslim51.4%

Source: Office for National Statistics [17]

Observations 2
Muslims have the lowest employment rate of any religious group

At the 2021 Census, 51.4% of Muslims aged 16 to 64 were in work against 70.9% of the population. The ONS attributes the gap to high shares of students and of people looking after home or family. 28.7% of Muslim women were looking after home or family, against 3.9% of Muslim men. 14 15

Qualifications are polarised rather than uniformly low

25.3% of Muslims had no qualifications, against 18.2% of the population, but 32.3% had a degree-level qualification, close to the 33.8% overall. 16

Subtleties
Not adjusted for age

The ONS figures are not age-standardised, and the Muslim group is the youngest in the Census, so more of its working-age members are students. That explains part of the employment gap; it does not explain the gap among women. 14 15

About this data

Sum of the "employee" and "self-employed" shares in the ONS Figure 8 data file. Not adjusted for age: the Muslim group is the youngest, and students and people looking after home or family count as not in work. People who did not state a religion are not shown. The ONS notes that Census 2021 took place during the pandemic, when some furloughed people may have described themselves as inactive.

Lifetime net fiscal contribution by reason for migrating, Netherlands

Average net contribution per immigrant over the rest of their life, including the cost of the second generation, by the reason recorded on arrival. Independent study, not a government estimate.

Euro thousands per immigrant (below zero is a net cost)

  1. Labour migration125
  2. Study migration−75
  3. Family migration−275
  4. Asylum migration−475

Source: Jan van de Beek, Hans Roodenburg, Joop Hartog and Gerrit Kreffer (demo-demo uitgever) [27]

Observations 1
Netherlands: labour migrants are lifetime net contributors; asylum and family migrants are large net costs

An independent study estimates that, over a lifetime and including the second generation, labour migrants contribute €125,000 each on average, while study migrants cost €75,000, family migrants €275,000 and asylum migrants €475,000. 27

About this data

From the English summary (Table 0.2) of van de Beek, Roodenburg, Hartog and Kreffer (2021), rounded by the authors to multiples of €10,000. Generational accounting on Statistics Netherlands microdata for 2016, discounted to the time of arrival.

Lifetime net fiscal contribution by region of origin, Netherlands

Average net contribution per immigrant over the rest of their life, including the cost of the second generation, for the regions in the study's English summary table. Independent study, not a government estimate.

Euro thousands per immigrant (below zero is a net cost)

  1. Japan, North America, Oceania, British Isles, Scandinavia, Switzerland200
  2. Southern Africa150
  3. Other EU countries50
  4. Israel50
  5. Central and Eastern EU countries−50
  6. Former Yugoslavia and former Soviet Union−150
  7. Morocco−550
  8. Horn of Africa and Sudan−600

Source: Jan van de Beek, Hans Roodenburg, Joop Hartog and Gerrit Kreffer (demo-demo uitgever) [28]

Observations 1
Region of origin produces gaps as large as reason for migrating

Western immigrants contribute €25,000 on average and non-Western immigrants cost nearly €275,000; Morocco, the Horn of Africa and Sudan sit at a net cost of "€550,000 to €600.000" per immigrant, in the study's own words. The authors find that where the first generation is a large net cost, the second generation is usually also negative or at best budget-neutral. 28 29

Subtleties
An independent study, not the CPB

The study is by Jan van de Beek, Hans Roodenburg, Joop Hartog and Gerrit Kreffer, published by van de Beek's own imprint in 2021 and part-funded by the Renaissance Instituut. It describes itself as an update of a 2003 report by the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (CPB), which is why it is sometimes attributed to the CPB; the CPB did not produce it. Its lifetime figures are projections of future earnings and spending, not observed totals. 30 31

About this data

From Table 0.2 of the English summary, which lists these regions and two averages: Western +€25,000 and non-Western −€275,000. The summary text puts the Caribbean, West Asia, Turkey and North, Central and West Africa at −€200,000 to −€400,000 without single figures, so they are not plotted; the full regional breakdown is in the Dutch chapters and is not reproduced here.

Modelled net fiscal effect of extra immigrants, Norway

Statistics Norway model: present value, 2015 to 2100, of the change in net public finances per additional immigrant arriving in 2015, including their descendants, by country group. Above zero is a net gain.

NOK million per additional immigrant, 2012 values

  1. R1 (Western Europe, North America, Australia, New Zealand)0.8
  2. R2 (Eastern European EU countries)−0.8
  3. R3 (rest of the world)−4.1

Source: Statistics Norway (SSB) [32]

Observations 1
Norway's model finds a net cost only for immigrants from outside Europe and the West

Statistics Norway modelled a one-off increase in immigration in 2015. Over 2015–2100 each extra immigrant from the rest of the world (R3) adds NOK 4.1 million of net public spending, while Western immigrants (R1) reduce it by NOK 0.8 million and Eastern EU immigrants (R2) add 0.8 million. 32

Subtleties
A broad group and generous assumptions

R3 is everything outside Western Europe, North America, Oceania and the Eastern EU, and includes most refugees. The model assumes immigrants' children behave like non-immigrants and gives everyone of a given age and sex the same use of public services, which SSB says probably underestimates spending on refugees. It rests on 2006 behaviour. 33 34

About this data

Signs reversed from SSB's "net public spending" so that, as in the other fiscal charts, below zero is a net cost: SSB gives net spending of NOK 4.1 million for R3, 0.8 million for R2 and −0.8 million for R1. 4% discount rate. R1 is Western Europe, North America, Australia and New Zealand; R2 the Eastern European EU countries; R3 the rest of the world, including most refugees. Children are assumed to behave like non-immigrants. Built on 2006 behaviour; published in Norwegian in 2013.

GCSE results by ethnic group, England, 2022/23

Average Attainment 8 score (out of 90) for pupils at the end of Key Stage 4 in state-funded schools, every detailed ethnic group. White British pupils are highlighted as the reference group.

Average Attainment 8 score (out of 90)

  1. Chinese65.5
  2. Indian59.4
  3. Asian other54.3
  4. Bangladeshi51.9
  5. Mixed White and Asian51.7
  6. White Irish50.7
  7. Mixed other48.8
  8. Black African48.7
  9. White other48.4
  10. Pakistani47
  11. Other47
  12. Mixed White and Black African46.4
  13. All pupils46.3
  14. White British44.9
  15. Black other44.3
  16. Black Caribbean40
  17. Mixed White and Black Caribbean39.1
  18. Irish traveller26.8
  19. Gypsy, Roma20.3

Source: Department for Education (Ethnicity facts and figures) [35]

Observations 1
Most minority groups outscore White British pupils at GCSE

In 2022/23 Chinese (65.5) and Indian (59.4) pupils had the highest average Attainment 8 scores, and Bangladeshi, Black African and Pakistani pupils also scored above White British pupils (44.9). Gypsy and Roma pupils (20.3), Irish traveller pupils (26.8) and Mixed White and Black Caribbean pupils (39.1) had the lowest, with Black Caribbean pupils also below White British. The Education Policy Institute found most ethnic groups achieved higher GCSE grades than White British pupils in 2023. 35 36

Subtleties
Ethnicity is not generation

These are ethnic groups, most of whose pupils were born in the UK. The school figures show how the children and grandchildren of earlier migrants are doing, not how recent arrivals or the children of recent arrivals are doing, and they cover state-school pupils in England only. 38 40

About this data

Department for Education, 2022/23, via Ethnicity facts and figures. Pupils of unknown ethnicity (score 42.1) are not shown. Ethnicity, not migrant generation or country of birth. Later years (2023/24 and 2024/25) are published in the DfE performance tables and were not collected for this report; grading changes during the pandemic make scores before 2022/23 hard to compare.

GCSE results of pupils eligible for free school meals, by ethnic group, England, 2022/23

Average Attainment 8 score (out of 90) for pupils eligible for free school meals, a measure of low family income, every detailed ethnic group. White British pupils are highlighted.

Average Attainment 8 score (out of 90), free-school-meal pupils

  1. Chinese60.3
  2. Indian48.6
  3. Bangladeshi47.7
  4. Black African44.7
  5. Asian other44.5
  6. Pakistani42.2
  7. Other41.1
  8. Mixed other38.9
  9. Black other38.8
  10. Mixed White and Asian38.8
  11. Mixed White and Black African38.8
  12. White other38.7
  13. Black Caribbean35.3
  14. All free-school-meal pupils34.8
  15. Mixed White and Black Caribbean32.2
  16. White Irish31.9
  17. White British30.9
  18. Irish traveller21.2
  19. Gypsy, Roma16.1

Source: Department for Education (Ethnicity facts and figures) [37]

Observations 1
The gap is widest among poorer pupils

Among pupils eligible for free school meals, White British pupils scored lower than every group except Gypsy, Roma and Irish traveller pupils. Every group scores lower when eligible for free school meals. 37

About this data

Department for Education, 2022/23. Pupils of unknown ethnicity (35.0) are not shown. Some groups are small: 227 Chinese and 126 Irish traveller pupils were eligible.

Saying it would be undesirable to outlaw homosexuality, 2024

British Muslims and the general public, one 2024 online poll by J.L. Partners commissioned by the Henry Jackson Society.

Share saying outlawing homosexuality would be undesirable

  1. General public62%
  2. British Muslims28%

Source: Henry Jackson Society [59]

Observations 3
British Muslims are markedly more conservative than the public on homosexuality

In a 2024 poll, 28% of British Muslims said it would be undesirable to outlaw homosexuality, against 62% of the public. In a 2015 poll in areas where at least a fifth of residents were Muslim, 52% of Muslims disagreed that homosexuality should be legal and 18% agreed; 39% agreed that wives should always obey their husbands. 59 55 56

The same polls find belonging to Britain as high as the public's

In the 2015 poll, 86% of Muslims felt a strong sense of belonging to Britain, against 83% of the national control sample. 57

The evidence on generations is thin and mixed

The one academic study comparing generations, from 2009, found young Muslims more liberal than their elders on gay marriage, with 74 percent supporting same-sex marriage or civil unions, but the most conservative of any group on the morality of homosexuality. No repeated survey tracks these attitudes across generations. 61 62

Subtleties
Each survey has a limitation that matters
  • ICM for Channel 4, 2015: 1,081 Muslims interviewed face to face, only in areas at least 20% Muslim, which over-represents concentrated communities; the control sample of 1,008 was by telephone, a different method. 54
  • J.L. Partners for the Henry Jackson Society, 2024: 1,000 Muslims and 2,013 members of the public from an online panel, weighted by country of birth among other things; the commissioner is a think tank with a position on the subject. 58
  • Faith Matters survey, 2009 (Kashyap and Lewis): 480 interviews in areas at least 10% Muslim, with 79 percent non-response; old and small. 60

No British Social Attitudes or European Social Survey series of these attitudes by religion and generation was found.

About this data

Online panel, 1,000 British Muslims (14 February to 12 March 2024) and 2,013 adults in the general public (4 to 6 March 2024), each weighted to its own population. Commissioned by a think tank rather than run by an academic or official body. A different poll in 2015 (ICM for Channel 4) asked whether homosexuality should be legal and is described beneath the chart rather than plotted, because the question and method differ.

Who arrives and how they fare afterwards are measured by different statistics, and most of the UK's are by ethnicity or religion rather than by country of birth or generation. Read together, they show wide differences between groups, with most gaps narrowing over time: language improves with years in the country, employment gaps have shrunk, the children of most minority groups outperform White British pupils at school, and residential segregation has fallen. No UK fiscal estimate by origin was found; the three countries that do find large differences by origin and by reason for migrating. 1 6 11 36 41 20

Observations

Residential segregation fell for every ethnic group, 1991–2021

On the standard measure, the index of dissimilarity across neighbourhoods, segregation declined steadily for every ethnic group, White and minority, across the four censuses from 1991 to 2021. The largest fall was for the Black African group; Bangladeshi, Black Caribbean and Indian segregation also fell sharply. White British segregation was 0.55 in 2001 and 2011 and 0.53 in 2021. 41 43

The standard measure is of evenness, not of who lives next to whom

The index compares how evenly each group is spread across neighbourhoods relative to everyone else. A growing group can become more evenly spread while more of its members' neighbours belong to the same group; the study does not report that second measure, called isolation or exposure, and none was found for 2021. 42

Between schools, segregation was highest in non-Christian faith schools

A 2017 analysis of 2011–16 school census data counted a school as segregated when its share of White British pupils differed from its ten nearest schools' by more than 15 percentage points. By that test 84% of primary and 93% of secondary non-Christian faith schools were segregated. No later measure was found. 44 45

Subtleties

What this report does not measure

Almost no UK statistic follows immigrants and their children by country of origin. Employment and school results are by ethnicity; the Census measures language and identity by year of arrival, not generation; and fiscal contribution by origin was found only for other countries. Comparisons with Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway carry over the differences in who those countries admitted, which were more often refugees and family members than the UK's recent work and study arrivals. 21 34 53

Data still needed

  • Net fiscal contribution by country of birth and by generation, UKNo UK body publishes the annual or lifetime net fiscal contribution of immigrants and their children by country or region of origin, so the Danish, Dutch and Norwegian figures are the only ones available and come from countries whose immigrant intakes differ from the UK's.
  • Employment, earnings and school results by migrant generation, UKThe Census does not record parents' country of birth, and the official employment and GCSE series are by ethnicity, which mixes immigrants with UK-born people whose families arrived generations ago. Whether gaps close between the first and second generation cannot be read from them.
  • Published Index of Dissimilarity values and an isolation (exposure) index by ethnic group, 1991–2021Catney and colleagues publish their segregation values only as a chart image, and the dissimilarity index measures evenness, not how many of a group's neighbours belong to the same group. An isolation index for the Pakistani and Bangladeshi groups would show whether neighbourhood exposure moved differently from evenness as those groups grew.
  • A current measure of ethnic segregation between schoolsThe only school-level measure found covers 2011 to 2016.
  • A repeated survey of social attitudes by religion and migrant generation, UKThe attitude evidence by religion is two one-off polls and one small 2009 academic survey. No British Social Attitudes or European Social Survey series by religion and generation was found, so whether attitudes change between generations cannot be tracked.
  • Local trust and cohesion measured against the local pace of immigrationThe research reviewed relates trust to the level of ethnic diversity, not to how fast an area's population changed through immigration.
  • Denmark's net-contribution analysis for 2020 onwardsThe latest edition found covers 2019; a combined 2020–2021 update was announced but not found published.
  • Foreign-born share of England and Wales for 1961–1991 in a published tableThe ONS publishes the 1961, 1971, 1981 and 1991 Census shares only as a chart image, so the series here shows only the years the ONS states in text.
Sources
  1. International migration, England and Wales: Census 2021

    Office for National Statistics, 2022-11-02 · supports

    “Out of the 59.6 million usual residents in England and Wales in 2021, 49.6 million (83.2%) were born in the UK and 10.0 million (16.8%) were born outside the UK. This means that about one in six people in England and Wales were born outside the UK. The size of the non-UK born population has risen since 2011, when it was 7.5 million (13.4%).”Hide quote
    Out of the 59.6 million usual residents in England and Wales in 2021, 49.6 million (83.2%) were born in the UK and 10.0 million (16.8%) were born outside the UK. This means that about one in six people in England and Wales were born outside the UK. The size of the non-UK born population has risen since 2011, when it was 7.5 million (13.4%).
  2. 2011 Census analysis: Immigration Patterns of Non-UK Born Populations in England and Wales in 2011

    Office for National Statistics, 2013-12-17 · supports

    “Migration is an important driver of population change, currently accounting for around half of the population growth in England and Wales (natural change, that is the difference between births and deaths, accounting for the remainder). This is reflected in the increase in the proportion of the usually resident population1 born abroad2 from 4.3 per cent (1.9 million) recorded in the 1951 Census to 13 per cent (7.5 million) in the 2011 Census (see figure 1). While the total resident population of England and Wales increased by 28 per cent (from 43.7 million to 56.1 million) between 1951 and 2011, the non-UK born population3 almost quadrupled. There was a particularly marked increase in the latest inter-censal period, from 8.9 per cent (4.6 million)4 in 2001.”Hide quote
    Migration is an important driver of population change, currently accounting for around half of the population growth in England and Wales (natural change, that is the difference between births and deaths, accounting for the remainder). This is reflected in the increase in the proportion of the usually resident population1 born abroad2 from 4.3 per cent (1.9 million) recorded in the 1951 Census to 13 per cent (7.5 million) in the 2011 Census (see figure 1). While the total resident population of England and Wales increased by 28 per cent (from 43.7 million to 56.1 million) between 1951 and 2011, the non-UK born population3 almost quadrupled. There was a particularly marked increase in the latest inter-censal period, from 8.9 per cent (4.6 million)4 in 2001.
  3. International migration, England and Wales: Census 2021

    Office for National Statistics, 2022-11-02 · complicates

    “Those who listed Romania as their country of birth increased to 539,000 in 2021, from 80,000 in 2011, an increase between censuses of 459,000 (576%), making Romania the fourth most common non-UK country of birth. This increase was the highest out of any country and is driven by working restrictions for Romanian citizens being lifted in 2014.”Hide quote
    Those who listed Romania as their country of birth increased to 539,000 in 2021, from 80,000 in 2011, an increase between censuses of 459,000 (576%), making Romania the fourth most common non-UK country of birth. This increase was the highest out of any country and is driven by working restrictions for Romanian citizens being lifted in 2014.
  4. TS004 - Country of birth (Census 2021), local authority districts

    Office for National Statistics (Nomis), 2022-11-02 · supports

    “This dataset provides Census 2021 estimates that classify usual residents in England and Wales by their country of birth. The estimates are as at Census Day, 21 March 2021.”Hide quote
    This dataset provides Census 2021 estimates that classify usual residents in England and Wales by their country of birth. The estimates are as at Census Day, 21 March 2021.
  5. QS203EW - Country of birth (detailed) (2011 Census), local authority districts

    Office for National Statistics (Nomis), 2013-01-30 · supports

    “This dataset provides 2011 estimates that classify usual residents in England and Wales by country of birth. The estimates are as at census day, 27 March 2011.”Hide quote
    This dataset provides 2011 estimates that classify usual residents in England and Wales by country of birth. The estimates are as at census day, 27 March 2011.
  6. Analysis of social characteristics of international migrants living in England and Wales: Census 2021

    Office for National Statistics, 2023-09-18 · supports

    “A high proportion of migrants had English as a main language or speak it well or very well; this can be seen by most recent year of arrival in Figure 9. Arrivals between 2011 and 2021 contained the highest percentage of residents who reported not speaking English well (11%) compared with 4% of arrivals before 1971 who reported not speaking English well.”Hide quote
    A high proportion of migrants had English as a main language or speak it well or very well; this can be seen by most recent year of arrival in Figure 9. Arrivals between 2011 and 2021 contained the highest percentage of residents who reported not speaking English well (11%) compared with 4% of arrivals before 1971 who reported not speaking English well.
  7. Analysis of social characteristics of international migrants living in England and Wales: Census 2021

    Office for National Statistics, 2023-09-18 · supports

    “As of Census 2021, the residents who arrived earliest were more likely to have English as a main language, with 84% of arrivals before 1971 reporting this compared with 37% of arrivals between 2011 and 2021. Recent arrivals tended to speak English well or very well, with 50% of arrivals between 2011 and 2021 reporting this. As of Census 2021, a very small proportion of non-UK-born residents reported not speaking English at all, around 1 to 2% in each arrival group.”Hide quote
    As of Census 2021, the residents who arrived earliest were more likely to have English as a main language, with 84% of arrivals before 1971 reporting this compared with 37% of arrivals between 2011 and 2021. Recent arrivals tended to speak English well or very well, with 50% of arrivals between 2011 and 2021 reporting this. As of Census 2021, a very small proportion of non-UK-born residents reported not speaking English at all, around 1 to 2% in each arrival group.
  8. Analysis of social characteristics of international migrants living in England and Wales: Census 2021

    Office for National Statistics, 2023-09-18 · supports

    “For both EU-born and non-EU-born residents, those who arrived in the UK earlier were more likely to describe their national identity as being one from the UK only (Figure 18). For example, 94% of non-EU-born residents who arrived before 1951 reported an identity from the UK only, compared with 81% for arrivals between 1981 and 1990, and 20% who arrived between 2011 and 2021.”Hide quote
    For both EU-born and non-EU-born residents, those who arrived in the UK earlier were more likely to describe their national identity as being one from the UK only (Figure 18). For example, 94% of non-EU-born residents who arrived before 1951 reported an identity from the UK only, compared with 81% for arrivals between 1981 and 1990, and 20% who arrived between 2011 and 2021.
  9. Language, England and Wales: Census 2021

    Office for National Statistics, 2022-11-29 · supports

    “In 2021, a further 7.1% (4.1 million) of the overall population were proficient in English, so they spoke English either "well" or "very well" (English or Welsh in Wales), but did not speak it as their main language. Additionally, 1.5% (880,000) could not speak English well, and a small percentage (0.3%, 161,000) of the overall population could not speak English at all.”Hide quote
    In 2021, a further 7.1% (4.1 million) of the overall population were proficient in English, so they spoke English either "well" or "very well" (English or Welsh in Wales), but did not speak it as their main language. Additionally, 1.5% (880,000) could not speak English well, and a small percentage (0.3%, 161,000) of the overall population could not speak English at all.
  10. Figure 9 data: English proficiency of non-UK-born residents by year of arrival

    Office for National Statistics, 2023-09-18 · supports

    “English proficiency of non-UK-born residents by year of arrival, usual residents, 2021, England and Wales”Hide quote
    English proficiency of non-UK-born residents by year of arrival, usual residents, 2021, England and Wales
  11. Employment (Ethnicity facts and figures)

    Department for Work and Pensions (Ethnicity facts and figures), 2023-11-28 · supports

    “from 2004 to 2022, the biggest increases in employment rates were in the combined Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnic group (from 44% to 61%), and the ‘other’ ethnic group (from 55% to 68%)”Hide quote
    from 2004 to 2022, the biggest increases in employment rates were in the combined Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnic group (from 44% to 61%), and the ‘other’ ethnic group (from 55% to 68%)
  12. Employment (Ethnicity facts and figures)

    Department for Work and Pensions (Ethnicity facts and figures), 2023-11-28 · supports

    “61% of people from the combined Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnic group were employed – the lowest percentage out of all ethnic groups”Hide quote
    61% of people from the combined Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnic group were employed – the lowest percentage out of all ethnic groups
  13. Employment (Ethnicity facts and figures)

    Department for Work and Pensions (Ethnicity facts and figures), 2023-11-28 · complicates

    “The report cites cultural religious reasons for the differences between men and women in employment rates in the combined Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnic group – 75% for men compared, with 46% for women in 2022.”Hide quote
    The report cites cultural religious reasons for the differences between men and women in employment rates in the combined Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnic group – 75% for men compared, with 46% for women in 2022.
  14. Religion by housing, health, employment, and education, England and Wales: Census 2021

    Office for National Statistics, 2023-03-24 · supports

    “In 2021, people who identified as "Muslim" had the lowest percentage of people aged 16 to 64 years in employment (51.4% compared with 70.9% of the overall population); this resulted from the high percentages of people who were students or looking after home or family in this group. [...] For example, people who said they were "Muslim" had the youngest age profile (median age 27 years) and the highest percentage of overcrowding. [...] It is possible that some people on furlough may have identified as economically inactive, instead of temporarily away from work.”Hide quote
    In 2021, people who identified as "Muslim" had the lowest percentage of people aged 16 to 64 years in employment (51.4% compared with 70.9% of the overall population); this resulted from the high percentages of people who were students or looking after home or family in this group. [...] For example, people who said they were "Muslim" had the youngest age profile (median age 27 years) and the highest percentage of overcrowding. [...] It is possible that some people on furlough may have identified as economically inactive, instead of temporarily away from work.
  15. Religion by housing, health, employment, and education, England and Wales: Census 2021

    Office for National Statistics, 2023-03-24 · supports

    “Females were more likely than males to be looking after home or family among the overall population (9.7% and 1.9%, respectively). This difference was consistent across religious groups but was largest among people who identified as "Muslim" (28.7% females and 3.9% males).”Hide quote
    Females were more likely than males to be looking after home or family among the overall population (9.7% and 1.9%, respectively). This difference was consistent across religious groups but was largest among people who identified as "Muslim" (28.7% females and 3.9% males).
  16. Religion by housing, health, employment, and education, England and Wales: Census 2021

    Office for National Statistics, 2023-03-24 · complicates

    “Among people who identified as "Muslim", 25.3% had no qualifications, 7.1 percentage points higher than the overall population (18.2%). A similar percentage of this group had a "Level 4 or above" qualification (32.3%) to the overall population (33.8%).”Hide quote
    Among people who identified as "Muslim", 25.3% had no qualifications, 7.1 percentage points higher than the overall population (18.2%). A similar percentage of this group had a "Level 4 or above" qualification (32.3%) to the overall population (33.8%).
  17. Figure 8 data: Religion by economic activity, England and Wales, 2021

    Office for National Statistics, 2023-03-24 · supports

    “Religion by economic activity, England and Wales, 2021. 1. Percentages have been calculated out of the overall population of each religious group for those aged 16 to 64 years using rounded data, as such totals may not add to 100%.”Hide quote
    Religion by economic activity, England and Wales, 2021. 1. Percentages have been calculated out of the overall population of each religious group for those aged 16 to 64 years using rounded data, as such totals may not add to 100%.
  18. Employment (Ethnicity facts and figures): by ethnicity and gender

    Department for Work and Pensions (Ethnicity facts and figures), 2023-11-28 · supports

    “Percentages are worked out using the total working age population (people aged 16 to 64 years).”Hide quote
    Percentages are worked out using the total working age population (people aged 16 to 64 years).
  19. Økonomisk Analyse: Indvandreres nettobidrag til de offentlige finanser i 2019

    Finansministeriet (Danish Ministry of Finance), 2023-05 · supports

    “Når man ser på gruppens nettobidrag til offentlige finanser i 2019, var gruppen forbundet med en offentlig nettoudgift på ca. 16 mia. kr., svarende til en gennemsnitlig nettoudgift på ca. 21.000 kr. pr. person.”Hide quote
    Når man ser på gruppens nettobidrag til offentlige finanser i 2019, var gruppen forbundet med en offentlig nettoudgift på ca. 16 mia. kr., svarende til en gennemsnitlig nettoudgift på ca. 21.000 kr. pr. person.
  20. Økonomisk Analyse: Indvandreres nettobidrag til de offentlige finanser i 2019

    Finansministeriet (Danish Ministry of Finance), 2023-05 · supports

    “Tabel 2.1 Nettobidrag til de offentlige finanser efter herkomst, 2019. Gennemsnitlig nettobidrag (1.000 kr. pr. person): Dansk oprindelse 22; Alle indvandrere 5; - Heraf vestlige lande 52; - Heraf MENAPT-lande -79; - Heraf øvrige ikke-vestlige lande 11; Alle efterkommere -102”Hide quote
    Tabel 2.1 Nettobidrag til de offentlige finanser efter herkomst, 2019. Gennemsnitlig nettobidrag (1.000 kr. pr. person): Dansk oprindelse 22; Alle indvandrere 5; - Heraf vestlige lande 52; - Heraf MENAPT-lande -79; - Heraf øvrige ikke-vestlige lande 11; Alle efterkommere -102
  21. Økonomisk Analyse: Indvandreres nettobidrag til de offentlige finanser i 2019

    Finansministeriet (Danish Ministry of Finance), 2023-05 · complicates

    “Indvandrere med asyl som opholdsgrundlag var i gennemsnit forbundet med en nettoudgift på ca. 95.000 kr. pr. person i 2019, mens personer med fx erhverv som opholdsgrundlag i gennemsnit var forbundet med et positivt nettobidrag på ca. 120.000 kr. pr. person, jf. figur 2.9. Det er samtidig særligt indvandrere fra MENAPT- og øvrige ikke-vestlige lande, der er kommet til Danmark med asyl eller familiesammenføring som opholdsgrundlag, hvorimod vestlige indvandrere altovervejende er kommet til landet for at arbejde eller studere, jf. figur 2.10.”Hide quote
    Indvandrere med asyl som opholdsgrundlag var i gennemsnit forbundet med en nettoudgift på ca. 95.000 kr. pr. person i 2019, mens personer med fx erhverv som opholdsgrundlag i gennemsnit var forbundet med et positivt nettobidrag på ca. 120.000 kr. pr. person, jf. figur 2.9. Det er samtidig særligt indvandrere fra MENAPT- og øvrige ikke-vestlige lande, der er kommet til Danmark med asyl eller familiesammenføring som opholdsgrundlag, hvorimod vestlige indvandrere altovervejende er kommet til landet for at arbejde eller studere, jf. figur 2.10.
  22. Økonomisk Analyse: Indvandreres nettobidrag til de offentlige finanser i 2019

    Finansministeriet (Danish Ministry of Finance), 2023-05 · complicates

    “Beregningerne viser, at det gennemsnitlige nettobidrag for indvandrere fra MENAPT-lande i 2019 ville være ca. 55.000 kr. højere pr. person i det hypotetiske scenarie med samme fordeling efter opholdsgrundlag som vestlige indvandrere, om end de fortsat ville være forbundet med et negativt nettobidrag i gennemsnit.”Hide quote
    Beregningerne viser, at det gennemsnitlige nettobidrag for indvandrere fra MENAPT-lande i 2019 ville være ca. 55.000 kr. højere pr. person i det hypotetiske scenarie med samme fordeling efter opholdsgrundlag som vestlige indvandrere, om end de fortsat ville være forbundet med et negativt nettobidrag i gennemsnit.
  23. Økonomisk Analyse: Indvandreres nettobidrag til de offentlige finanser i 2019

    Finansministeriet (Danish Ministry of Finance), 2023-05 · complicates

    “Opgjort med samme aldersfordeling som personer med dansk oprindelse ville nettobidraget for efterkommere i 2019 i sig selv være ca. 13 mia. kr. højere, mens det ville være ca. 28 mia. kr. lavere for gruppen af indvandrere, jf. kapitel 2 om nettobidraget i 2019.”Hide quote
    Opgjort med samme aldersfordeling som personer med dansk oprindelse ville nettobidraget for efterkommere i 2019 i sig selv være ca. 13 mia. kr. højere, mens det ville være ca. 28 mia. kr. lavere for gruppen af indvandrere, jf. kapitel 2 om nettobidraget i 2019.
  24. Økonomisk Analyse: Indvandreres nettobidrag til de offentlige finanser i 2019

    Finansministeriet (Danish Ministry of Finance), 2023-05 · complicates

    “Fra 2014 til 2019 er den gennemsnitlige nettoudgift forbundet med indvandrere fra fx MENAPT-lande faldet med ca. 37.000 kr. pr. person, hvilket blandt andet skal ses i sammenhæng med højere beskæftigelsesfrekvens. Regneeksempler peger på, at en stærkere tilknytning til arbejdsmarkedet kan forklare ca. halvdelen af faldet i den gennemsnitlige nettoudgift forbundet med indvandrere fra ikke-vestlige lande fra 2014 til 2019”Hide quote
    Fra 2014 til 2019 er den gennemsnitlige nettoudgift forbundet med indvandrere fra fx MENAPT-lande faldet med ca. 37.000 kr. pr. person, hvilket blandt andet skal ses i sammenhæng med højere beskæftigelsesfrekvens. Regneeksempler peger på, at en stærkere tilknytning til arbejdsmarkedet kan forklare ca. halvdelen af faldet i den gennemsnitlige nettoudgift forbundet med indvandrere fra ikke-vestlige lande fra 2014 til 2019
  25. Økonomisk Analyse: Indvandreres nettobidrag til de offentlige finanser i 2019

    Finansministeriet (Danish Ministry of Finance), 2023-05 · complicates

    “Opgørelsen er i udgangspunktet ikke renset for konjunkturer eller andre midlertidige udsving i skatteprovenu mv. [...] MENAPT-lande omfatter igennem hele analysen følgende lande: Syrien, Kuwait, Libyen, Saudi-Arabien, Libanon, Somalia, Irak, Qatar, Sudan, Bahrain, Djibouti, Jordan, Algeriet, Forenede Arabiske Emirater, Tunesien, Egypten, Marokko, Iran, Yemen, Mauretanien, Oman, Afghanistan, Pakistan og Tyrkiet.”Hide quote
    Opgørelsen er i udgangspunktet ikke renset for konjunkturer eller andre midlertidige udsving i skatteprovenu mv. [...] MENAPT-lande omfatter igennem hele analysen følgende lande: Syrien, Kuwait, Libyen, Saudi-Arabien, Libanon, Somalia, Irak, Qatar, Sudan, Bahrain, Djibouti, Jordan, Algeriet, Forenede Arabiske Emirater, Tunesien, Egypten, Marokko, Iran, Yemen, Mauretanien, Oman, Afghanistan, Pakistan og Tyrkiet.
  26. Økonomisk Analyse: Indvandreres nettobidrag til de offentlige finanser i 2019

    Finansministeriet (Danish Ministry of Finance), 2023-05 · complicates

    “Et regneeksempel viser fx, at nettobidraget i 2019 for 25-64-årige indvandrere fra MENAPT-lande ville være ca. 12 mia. kr. højere, hvis gruppen havde samme beskæftigelsesfrekvens som gruppen af 25-64-årige med dansk oprindelse”Hide quote
    Et regneeksempel viser fx, at nettobidraget i 2019 for 25-64-årige indvandrere fra MENAPT-lande ville være ca. 12 mia. kr. højere, hvis gruppen havde samme beskæftigelsesfrekvens som gruppen af 25-64-årige med dansk oprindelse
  27. Borderless Welfare State: The Consequences of Immigration for Public Finances (English summary of Grenzeloze verzorgingsstaat)

    Jan van de Beek, Hans Roodenburg, Joop Hartog and Gerrit Kreffer (demo-demo uitgever), 2021-03 · supports

    “Only labour migration generates a positive net contribution of, on average, €125,000 per immigrant. Study migration shows, on average, a negative net contribution of €75,000. Family migration shows, on average, a negative net contribution of about €275,000 per immigrant. Asylum migration shows a negative figure as well, amounting to an average of €475,000 per immigrant.”Hide quote
    Only labour migration generates a positive net contribution of, on average, €125,000 per immigrant. Study migration shows, on average, a negative net contribution of €75,000. Family migration shows, on average, a negative net contribution of about €275,000 per immigrant. Asylum migration shows a negative figure as well, amounting to an average of €475,000 per immigrant.
  28. Borderless Welfare State: The Consequences of Immigration for Public Finances (English summary of Grenzeloze verzorgingsstaat)

    Jan van de Beek, Hans Roodenburg, Joop Hartog and Gerrit Kreffer (demo-demo uitgever), 2021-03 · supports

    “There are also considerable differences by region of origin. On average, Western immigrants make a positive contribution of €25,000, while non-western immigrants cost nearly €275,000. Within the categories Western and non-Western there is, however, much variation. [...] Immigration from non-Western regions is usually unfavourable for public finances. This applies especially to the areas of origin Caribbean, West-Asia, Turkey and North, Central and West Africa with net costs around ranging from €200,000 to €400,000 per immigrant, and Morocco, the Horn of Africa and Sudan with net cost of €550,000 to €600.000 per immigrant.”Hide quote
    There are also considerable differences by region of origin. On average, Western immigrants make a positive contribution of €25,000, while non-western immigrants cost nearly €275,000. Within the categories Western and non-Western there is, however, much variation. [...] Immigration from non-Western regions is usually unfavourable for public finances. This applies especially to the areas of origin Caribbean, West-Asia, Turkey and North, Central and West Africa with net costs around ranging from €200,000 to €400,000 per immigrant, and Morocco, the Horn of Africa and Sudan with net cost of €550,000 to €600.000 per immigrant.
  29. Borderless Welfare State: The Consequences of Immigration for Public Finances (English summary of Grenzeloze verzorgingsstaat)

    Jan van de Beek, Hans Roodenburg, Joop Hartog and Gerrit Kreffer (demo-demo uitgever), 2021-03 · supports

    “Migrant groups of which the first generation has a considerable negative net contribution, usually continue into a second generation that also has a negative or, at best, approximately budget-neutral contribution. For those groups, the net present value of the net contribution of future generations will not offset the costs for the first generation.”Hide quote
    Migrant groups of which the first generation has a considerable negative net contribution, usually continue into a second generation that also has a negative or, at best, approximately budget-neutral contribution. For those groups, the net present value of the net contribution of future generations will not offset the costs for the first generation.
  30. Borderless Welfare State: The Consequences of Immigration for Public Finances (English summary of Grenzeloze verzorgingsstaat)

    Jan van de Beek, Hans Roodenburg, Joop Hartog and Gerrit Kreffer (demo-demo uitgever), 2021-03 · complicates

    “The current report is an update of the Public Sector chapter of the report Immigration and the Dutch Economy (2003) by the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis. Both reports deploy the method of generational accounting to calculate the net contribution – revenues minus expenses – of immigrants to public finances, measured from the moment of their immigration to the time of repatriation or death.”Hide quote
    The current report is an update of the Public Sector chapter of the report Immigration and the Dutch Economy (2003) by the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis. Both reports deploy the method of generational accounting to calculate the net contribution – revenues minus expenses – of immigrants to public finances, measured from the moment of their immigration to the time of repatriation or death.
  31. Grenzeloze verzorgingsstaat: de gevolgen van immigratie voor de overheidsfinanciën

    Jan van de Beek, Hans Roodenburg, Joop Hartog and Gerrit Kreffer (demo-demo uitgever), 2021-03 · complicates

    “Dr. Jan van de Beek is zelfstandig onderzoeker, voor dit project gedetacheerd bij Amsterdam School of Economics; dr. Joop Hartog is emeritus hoogleraar economie aan de Faculteit Economie en Bedrijfskunde van de Universiteit van Amsterdam [...] Het onderzoek werd mede mogelijk gemaakt door een subsidie van het Renaissance Instituut. [...] © 2021, Zeist: demo-demo uitgever”Hide quote
    Dr. Jan van de Beek is zelfstandig onderzoeker, voor dit project gedetacheerd bij Amsterdam School of Economics; dr. Joop Hartog is emeritus hoogleraar economie aan de Faculteit Economie en Bedrijfskunde van de Universiteit van Amsterdam [...] Het onderzoek werd mede mogelijk gemaakt door een subsidie van het Renaissance Instituut. [...] © 2021, Zeist: demo-demo uitgever
  32. The effects of more immigrants on public finances

    Statistics Norway (SSB), 2014-12-19 · supports

    “This present value of increased net public spending is NOK 4.1 million when expressed in 2012 values. Correspondingly, present values of net spending increases for R1 and R2 immigration are NOK -0.8 and 0.8 million respectively in 2012 values.”Hide quote
    This present value of increased net public spending is NOK 4.1 million when expressed in 2012 values. Correspondingly, present values of net spending increases for R1 and R2 immigration are NOK -0.8 and 0.8 million respectively in 2012 values.
  33. The effects of more immigrants on public finances

    Statistics Norway (SSB), 2014-12-19 · complicates

    “In the calculations that are commented on below, the immigrants’ children are assumed to have the same economic behaviour as the non-immigrants. [...] This means that persons of the same age and gender on average use all public services to the same extent regardless of reason for residence or country of origin. This assumption on its own probably entails an underestimation of public spending on refugees.”Hide quote
    In the calculations that are commented on below, the immigrants’ children are assumed to have the same economic behaviour as the non-immigrants. [...] This means that persons of the same age and gender on average use all public services to the same extent regardless of reason for residence or country of origin. This assumption on its own probably entails an underestimation of public spending on refugees.
  34. The effects of more immigrants on public finances

    Statistics Norway (SSB), 2014-12-19 · complicates

    “The immigrants are from the country groups: R1 (Western Europe, North America, Australia and New Zealand), R2 (Eastern European EU countries) and R3 (rest of the world). The groups from R1 and R2 include large numbers of labour immigrants and family immigrants. Group R3 is very heterogeneous, partly because it includes most of the refugees.”Hide quote
    The immigrants are from the country groups: R1 (Western Europe, North America, Australia and New Zealand), R2 (Eastern European EU countries) and R3 (rest of the world). The groups from R1 and R2 include large numbers of labour immigrants and family immigrants. Group R3 is very heterogeneous, partly because it includes most of the refugees.
  35. GCSE results (Attainment 8) (Ethnicity facts and figures)

    Department for Education (Ethnicity facts and figures), 2024-11-07 · supports

    “pupils from the Chinese ethnic group had the highest average score out of all ethnic groups (65.5), followed by pupils from the Indian ethnic group (59.4) [...] white Gypsy or Roma pupils had had the lowest average score (20.3), followed by traveller of Irish heritage pupils (26.8) and mixed white and black Caribbean pupils (39.1)”Hide quote
    pupils from the Chinese ethnic group had the highest average score out of all ethnic groups (65.5), followed by pupils from the Indian ethnic group (59.4) [...] white Gypsy or Roma pupils had had the lowest average score (20.3), followed by traveller of Irish heritage pupils (26.8) and mixed white and black Caribbean pupils (39.1)
  36. GCSE results (Attainment 8) (Ethnicity facts and figures)

    Department for Education (Ethnicity facts and figures), 2024-11-07 · supports

    “A 2024 report from the Education Policy Institute compared white British pupils’ attainment against other ethnic groups across education, from early years foundation stage to 16-19 education. They found that by the end of secondary school, most ethnic groups achieved higher GCSE grades than white British pupils in 2023.”Hide quote
    A 2024 report from the Education Policy Institute compared white British pupils’ attainment against other ethnic groups across education, from early years foundation stage to 16-19 education. They found that by the end of secondary school, most ethnic groups achieved higher GCSE grades than white British pupils in 2023.
  37. GCSE results (Attainment 8) (Ethnicity facts and figures)

    Department for Education (Ethnicity facts and figures), 2024-11-07 · supports

    “in every ethnic group, pupils eligible for free school meals had a lower average score than those not eligible”Hide quote
    in every ethnic group, pupils eligible for free school meals had a lower average score than those not eligible
  38. Entry rates into higher education (Ethnicity facts and figures)

    Department for Education (Ethnicity facts and figures), 2025-07-09 · supports

    “in 2024, students from the Chinese ethnic group had the highest entry rate into higher education (66.1%) and White students had the lowest (29.8%)”Hide quote
    in 2024, students from the Chinese ethnic group had the highest entry rate into higher education (66.1%) and White students had the lowest (29.8%)
  39. Entry rates into higher education (Ethnicity facts and figures)

    Department for Education (Ethnicity facts and figures), 2025-07-09 · supports

    “Recent research shows that young people from almost all ethnic minority backgrounds were more likely to go to university by age 19 than White British pupils. This was the case even when accounting for prior attainment or socio-economic background.”Hide quote
    Recent research shows that young people from almost all ethnic minority backgrounds were more likely to go to university by age 19 than White British pupils. This was the case even when accounting for prior attainment or socio-economic background.
  40. Entry rates into higher education (Ethnicity facts and figures)

    Department for Education (Ethnicity facts and figures), 2025-07-09 · complicates

    “The data includes students from state schools in England – those funded directly by the government or their local authority. It only counts students who applied to full time undergraduate courses through UCAS (the Universities and Colleges Admissions Service).”Hide quote
    The data includes students from state schools in England – those funded directly by the government or their local authority. It only counts students who applied to full time undergraduate courses through UCAS (the Universities and Colleges Admissions Service).
  41. Ethnic diversification and neighbourhood mixing: A rapid response analysis of the 2021 Census of England and Wales

    Catney, Lloyd, Ellis, Wright, Finney, Jivraj and Manley, The Geographical Journal 189(1), 2023 · supports

    “Looking across all four time points, we see steady declines in segregation for all ethnic groups: White and minority. The largest proportional decline in residential segregation between 1991 and 2021 was for the Black African group, with a decrease of 0.17. The Bangladeshi, Black Caribbean and Indian ethnic groups also experienced large decreases in neighbourhood residential segregation between 1991 and 2021.”Hide quote
    Looking across all four time points, we see steady declines in segregation for all ethnic groups: White and minority. The largest proportional decline in residential segregation between 1991 and 2021 was for the Black African group, with a decrease of 0.17. The Bangladeshi, Black Caribbean and Indian ethnic groups also experienced large decreases in neighbourhood residential segregation between 1991 and 2021.
  42. Ethnic diversification and neighbourhood mixing: A rapid response analysis of the 2021 Census of England and Wales

    Catney, Lloyd, Ellis, Wright, Finney, Jivraj and Manley, The Geographical Journal 189(1), 2023 · complicates

    “The Index of Dissimilarity (D), which captures the evenness of the spatial distribution of two groups, is one of the most commonly used measures of segregation (Massey & Denton, 1988). Here, each named group is compared with all others (for example, people in the Pakistani ethnic group compared with all people other than Pakistani).”Hide quote
    The Index of Dissimilarity (D), which captures the evenness of the spatial distribution of two groups, is one of the most commonly used measures of segregation (Massey & Denton, 1988). Here, each named group is compared with all others (for example, people in the Pakistani ethnic group compared with all people other than Pakistani).
  43. Ethnic diversification and neighbourhood mixing: A rapid response analysis of the 2021 Census of England and Wales

    Catney, Lloyd, Ellis, Wright, Finney, Jivraj and Manley, The Geographical Journal 189(1), 2023 · supports

    “White British segregation (not shown) remained the same between 2001 and 2011 (0.55), and decreased between 2011 and 2021 (to 0.53).”Hide quote
    White British segregation (not shown) remained the same between 2001 and 2011 (0.55), and decreased between 2011 and 2021 (to 0.53).
  44. Segregation in education (SchoolDash blog, March 2017), analysis for the iCoCo Foundation, SchoolDash and The Challenge study Understanding School Segregation in England 2011 to 2016

    SchoolDash, 2017-03-22 · complicates

    “A school is deemed 'segregated' if the proportion of White British pupils is more than 15 percentage points higher or lower than that in other nearby schools.”Hide quote
    A school is deemed 'segregated' if the proportion of White British pupils is more than 15 percentage points higher or lower than that in other nearby schools.
  45. Segregation in education (SchoolDash blog, March 2017), analysis for the iCoCo Foundation, SchoolDash and The Challenge study Understanding School Segregation in England 2011 to 2016

    SchoolDash, 2017-03-22 · complicates

    “Perhaps unsurprisingly, the highest levels of ethnic segregation are seen in non-Christian faith schools (which include Jewish, Muslim, Hindu, Sikh and Buddhist establishments). Though their numbers are small, fully 84% of primary schools and 93% of secondary schools in this group show ethnic segregation relative to their local areas.”Hide quote
    Perhaps unsurprisingly, the highest levels of ethnic segregation are seen in non-Christian faith schools (which include Jewish, Muslim, Hindu, Sikh and Buddhist establishments). Though their numbers are small, fully 84% of primary schools and 93% of secondary schools in this group show ethnic segregation relative to their local areas.
  46. Community Life Survey 2024/25: headline findings

    Department for Culture, Media and Sport, 2026-07-31 · complicates

    “40% of adults agreed that many of the people in their neighbourhood can be trusted, no significant change from 2023/24 (41%). Levels of trust have remained broadly consistent since 2016/17 (40% to 42%) but have decreased from rates in 2013/14 (48%) when push-to-web data collection commenced.”Hide quote
    40% of adults agreed that many of the people in their neighbourhood can be trusted, no significant change from 2023/24 (41%). Levels of trust have remained broadly consistent since 2016/17 (40% to 42%) but have decreased from rates in 2013/14 (48%) when push-to-web data collection commenced.
  47. Community Life Survey 2024/25: headline findings

    Department for Culture, Media and Sport, 2026-07-31 · supports

    “81% of adults agreed that their local area is a place where people from different backgrounds get along well together, a small, but significant, decrease from 2023/24 (from 81.4% in 2023/24 to 80.6% in 2024/25).”Hide quote
    81% of adults agreed that their local area is a place where people from different backgrounds get along well together, a small, but significant, decrease from 2023/24 (from 81.4% in 2023/24 to 80.6% in 2024/25).
  48. Community Life Survey 2024/25: neighbourhood and community

    Department for Culture, Media and Sport, 2026-07-31 · complicates

    “Adults living in the least deprived areas (10th decile, 63%) were more likely to report that many people in their neighbourhood can be trusted than adults living in the most deprived areas (1st decile, 18%).”Hide quote
    Adults living in the least deprived areas (10th decile, 63%) were more likely to report that many people in their neighbourhood can be trusted than adults living in the most deprived areas (1st decile, 18%).
  49. Community Life Survey 2024/25: neighbourhood and community

    Department for Culture, Media and Sport, 2026-07-31 · complicates

    “Compared with the average for adults in England (40%), Jewish (52%) and Christian (45%) adults were more likely to report that many people in their neighbourhood can be trusted. Adults from the No religion classification (39%), adults from the Any other religion classification (34%), and Buddhist (33%), Hindu (31%), Muslim (25%), and Sikh (24%) adults were less likely to report that many of the people in their neighbourhood can be trusted compared with the average for adults in England (40%).”Hide quote
    Compared with the average for adults in England (40%), Jewish (52%) and Christian (45%) adults were more likely to report that many people in their neighbourhood can be trusted. Adults from the No religion classification (39%), adults from the Any other religion classification (34%), and Buddhist (33%), Hindu (31%), Muslim (25%), and Sikh (24%) adults were less likely to report that many of the people in their neighbourhood can be trusted compared with the average for adults in England (40%).
  50. Immigration, diversity and social cohesion

    The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2019-12-13 · supports

    “Most of the empirical literature on this subject finds that the relationship between diversity and trust is negative – the more diverse a community is, the less likely individuals in it are to be trusting.”Hide quote
    Most of the empirical literature on this subject finds that the relationship between diversity and trust is negative – the more diverse a community is, the less likely individuals in it are to be trusting.
  51. Immigration, diversity and social cohesion

    The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2019-12-13 · complicates

    “Laurence and Heath (2008) and Letki (2008), looking at different predictors of social cohesion in the 2005 and 2001 Citizenship Surveys, argue that there is no strong evidence for an eroding effect of diversity once the association between diversity and economic deprivation is taken into account. Still, with British data based on the Citizenship Survey 2005, Laurence (2009) argued that rising diversity is associated with lower levels of neighbourhood trust.”Hide quote
    Laurence and Heath (2008) and Letki (2008), looking at different predictors of social cohesion in the 2005 and 2001 Citizenship Surveys, argue that there is no strong evidence for an eroding effect of diversity once the association between diversity and economic deprivation is taken into account. Still, with British data based on the Citizenship Survey 2005, Laurence (2009) argued that rising diversity is associated with lower levels of neighbourhood trust.
  52. Immigration, diversity and social cohesion

    The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2019-12-13 · complicates

    “Most recently, Sturgis et al. (2013) establish that neighbourhood ethnic diversity in London is positively related to the perceived social cohesion of neighbourhood residents with control for economic deprivation. Moreover, it is ethnic segregation within neighbourhoods that is associated with lower levels of perceived social cohesion.”Hide quote
    Most recently, Sturgis et al. (2013) establish that neighbourhood ethnic diversity in London is positively related to the perceived social cohesion of neighbourhood residents with control for economic deprivation. Moreover, it is ethnic segregation within neighbourhoods that is associated with lower levels of perceived social cohesion.
  53. Immigration, diversity and social cohesion

    The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2019-12-13 · complicates

    “However, most research analyses the relationship between diversity (typically measured in terms of racial and ethnic composition of the population) and social cohesion, not between immigration (typically measured based on place of birth and/or nationality) and social cohesion.”Hide quote
    However, most research analyses the relationship between diversity (typically measured in terms of racial and ethnic composition of the population) and social cohesion, not between immigration (typically measured based on place of birth and/or nationality) and social cohesion.
  54. C4 survey and documentary reveals What British Muslims Really Think

    Channel 4, 2016-04-11 · complicates

    “ICM Unlimited interviewed a random sample of 1,081 adults aged 18+ who self-identified themselves as belonging to the Muslim faith. Interviews were carried out face-to-face, in-home, in geographical areas in which minimum Muslims incidence was confirmed by Census to be a minimum of 20%. Interviews took place between 25th April and 31st May 2015 and the data has been weighted to representative of all Muslims by age, gender, work status and region. A nationally representative control sample of 1,008 adults aged 18+ was also conducted, by telephone, between 5th-7th June 2015.”Hide quote
    ICM Unlimited interviewed a random sample of 1,081 adults aged 18+ who self-identified themselves as belonging to the Muslim faith. Interviews were carried out face-to-face, in-home, in geographical areas in which minimum Muslims incidence was confirmed by Census to be a minimum of 20%. Interviews took place between 25th April and 31st May 2015 and the data has been weighted to representative of all Muslims by age, gender, work status and region. A nationally representative control sample of 1,008 adults aged 18+ was also conducted, by telephone, between 5th-7th June 2015.
  55. C4 survey and documentary reveals What British Muslims Really Think

    Channel 4, 2016-04-11 · supports

    “52% do not believe that homosexuality should be legal in Britain Q: To what extent you agree or disagree with each one: homosexuality should be legal in Britain? Net agree 18% (strongly agree 8%, tend to agree 10%) Net disagree: 52% (strongly disagree: 38%, tend to disagree: 14%)”Hide quote
    52% do not believe that homosexuality should be legal in Britain Q: To what extent you agree or disagree with each one: homosexuality should be legal in Britain? Net agree 18% (strongly agree 8%, tend to agree 10%) Net disagree: 52% (strongly disagree: 38%, tend to disagree: 14%)
  56. C4 survey and documentary reveals What British Muslims Really Think

    Channel 4, 2016-04-11 · supports

    “39% agree that “wives should always obey their husbands”.”Hide quote
    39% agree that “wives should always obey their husbands”.
  57. C4 survey and documentary reveals What British Muslims Really Think

    Channel 4, 2016-04-11 · complicates

    “A large majority of British Muslims feel a strong sense of belonging to Britain (86%). This is higher than the national average (83%)”Hide quote
    A large majority of British Muslims feel a strong sense of belonging to Britain (86%). This is higher than the national average (83%)
  58. British Muslims poll: methodology and summary of findings (J.L. Partners for the Henry Jackson Society)

    Henry Jackson Society, 2024-04 · complicates

    “J.L. Partners polled two audiences in conjunction with Number Cruncher: a nationally representative sample of British Muslims and a nationally representative sample of the general public. Fieldwork dates of 14th February – 12th March 2024 for British Muslims, 4th – 6th March 2024 for General Public [...] Sample of 1,000 for British Muslims, 2,013 for General Public [...] Sample collected using online panel”Hide quote
    J.L. Partners polled two audiences in conjunction with Number Cruncher: a nationally representative sample of British Muslims and a nationally representative sample of the general public. Fieldwork dates of 14th February – 12th March 2024 for British Muslims, 4th – 6th March 2024 for General Public [...] Sample of 1,000 for British Muslims, 2,013 for General Public [...] Sample collected using online panel
  59. British Muslims poll: methodology and summary of findings (J.L. Partners for the Henry Jackson Society)

    Henry Jackson Society, 2024-04 · supports

    “Only 28% say it would be undesirable to outlaw homosexuality in the UK (compared to 62% of the public as a whole)”Hide quote
    Only 28% say it would be undesirable to outlaw homosexuality in the UK (compared to 62% of the public as a whole)
  60. British Muslim youth and religious fundamentalism: a quantitative investigation (accepted manuscript)

    Kashyap and Lewis, Ethnic and Racial Studies 36(12), 2012-04-26 · complicates

    “From the 2001 Census, Super Output Areas (OAs) containing 10% or more Muslim residents were identified. Overall, the sampled areas contain 67.5% of the Muslim population of Great Britain as reported in the 2001 Census. Between January and May 2009, face-to-face interviews were conducted. [...] A total of 480 interviews were completed. The survey had an overall high rate of non-response at 79 percent.”Hide quote
    From the 2001 Census, Super Output Areas (OAs) containing 10% or more Muslim residents were identified. Overall, the sampled areas contain 67.5% of the Muslim population of Great Britain as reported in the 2001 Census. Between January and May 2009, face-to-face interviews were conducted. [...] A total of 480 interviews were completed. The survey had an overall high rate of non-response at 79 percent.
  61. British Muslim youth and religious fundamentalism: a quantitative investigation (accepted manuscript)

    Kashyap and Lewis, Ethnic and Racial Studies 36(12), 2012-04-26 · complicates

    “Like other youth, Muslim youth show liberalizing social attitudes across generations on gay marriage and legal abortion.”Hide quote
    Like other youth, Muslim youth show liberalizing social attitudes across generations on gay marriage and legal abortion.
  62. British Muslim youth and religious fundamentalism: a quantitative investigation (accepted manuscript)

    Kashyap and Lewis, Ethnic and Racial Studies 36(12), 2012-04-26 · supports

    “Notably, Muslim youth are the most conservative when it comes to the morality of homosexuality, falling even slightly more conservative than their elders. However, when it comes to the public policy question of gay marriage, a majority (74 percent) support legalizing either same-sex marriage or same-sex civil unions.”Hide quote
    Notably, Muslim youth are the most conservative when it comes to the morality of homosexuality, falling even slightly more conservative than their elders. However, when it comes to the public policy question of gay marriage, a majority (74 percent) support legalizing either same-sex marriage or same-sex civil unions.
  63. 2011 Census analysis: Immigration Patterns of Non-UK Born Populations in England and Wales in 2011

    Office for National Statistics, 2013-12-17 · supports

    “This is reflected in the increase in the proportion of the usually resident population1 born abroad2 from 4.3 per cent (1.9 million) recorded in the 1951 Census to 13 per cent (7.5 million) in the 2011 Census (see figure 1). [...] There was a particularly marked increase in the latest inter-censal period, from 8.9 per cent (4.6 million)4 in 2001.”Hide quote
    This is reflected in the increase in the proportion of the usually resident population1 born abroad2 from 4.3 per cent (1.9 million) recorded in the 1951 Census to 13 per cent (7.5 million) in the 2011 Census (see figure 1). [...] There was a particularly marked increase in the latest inter-censal period, from 8.9 per cent (4.6 million)4 in 2001.
  64. International migration, England and Wales: Census 2021

    Office for National Statistics, 2022-11-02 · supports

    “One in six usual residents of England and Wales were born outside the UK, an increase of 2.5 million since 2011, from 7.5 million (13.4%) to 10 million (16.8%).”Hide quote
    One in six usual residents of England and Wales were born outside the UK, an increase of 2.5 million since 2011, from 7.5 million (13.4%) to 10 million (16.8%).
  65. Employment (Ethnicity facts and figures): by ethnicity over time

    Department for Work and Pensions (Ethnicity facts and figures), 2023-11-28 · supports

    “Percentage of 16 to 64 year olds who were employed, by ethnicity over time”Hide quote
    Percentage of 16 to 64 year olds who were employed, by ethnicity over time
  66. Økonomisk Analyse: Indvandreres nettobidrag til de offentlige finanser i 2019

    Finansministeriet (Danish Ministry of Finance), 2023-05 · supports

    “Tabel 3.2 Nettobidrag til de offentlige finanser opdelt på herkomst, 2014-2019 [...] Gennemsnit, 1.000 kr. pr. person (2019-niveau) [...] Anm.: Tallene er opregnet til 2019-niveau med udviklingen i nominelt BNP.”Hide quote
    Tabel 3.2 Nettobidrag til de offentlige finanser opdelt på herkomst, 2014-2019 [...] Gennemsnit, 1.000 kr. pr. person (2019-niveau) [...] Anm.: Tallene er opregnet til 2019-niveau med udviklingen i nominelt BNP.
  67. Entry rates into higher education (Ethnicity facts and figures): by ethnicity over time

    Department for Education (Ethnicity facts and figures), 2025-07-09 · supports

    “Percentages and number of state school pupils aged 18 years who were accepted to higher education in the UK, by ethnicity over time”Hide quote
    Percentages and number of state school pupils aged 18 years who were accepted to higher education in the UK, by ethnicity over time
  68. Community Life Survey 2024/25: annual data tables (Timeseries sheet)

    Department for Culture, Media and Sport, 2026-07-31 · supports

    “Time series for headline indicators, people aged 16 and over, England, October 2018 to March 2025”Hide quote
    Time series for headline indicators, people aged 16 and over, England, October 2018 to March 2025
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