Crime, Terrorism and Group-Based Child Sexual Exploitation

Crime, Terrorism and Group-Based Child Sexual Exploitation

1. National Audit on Group-based Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse

   Home Office (Baroness Louise Casey), 2025-06-16 · supports

   “We found that the ethnicity of perpetrators is shied away from and is still not recorded for two-thirds of perpetrators, so we are unable to provide any accurate assessment from the nationally collected data.”Hide quote

   We found that the ethnicity of perpetrators is shied away from and is still not recorded for two-thirds of perpetrators, so we are unable to provide any accurate assessment from the nationally collected data.

2. National Audit on Group-based Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse

   Home Office (Baroness Louise Casey), 2025-06-16 · supports

   “Despite the lack of a full picture in the national data sets, there is enough evidence available in local police data in three police force areas which we examined which show disproportionate numbers of men from Asian ethnic backgrounds amongst suspects for group-based child sexual exploitation, as well as in the significant number of perpetrators of Asian ethnicity identified in local reviews and high-profile child sexual exploitation prosecutions across the country, to at least warrant further examination.”Hide quote

   Despite the lack of a full picture in the national data sets, there is enough evidence available in local police data in three police force areas which we examined which show disproportionate numbers of men from Asian ethnic backgrounds amongst suspects for group-based child sexual exploitation, as well as in the significant number of perpetrators of Asian ethnicity identified in local reviews and high-profile child sexual exploitation prosecutions across the country, to at least warrant further examination.

3. National Audit on Group-based Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse

   Home Office (Baroness Louise Casey), 2025-06-16 · supports

   “These data show that child sexual exploitation suspects in Greater Manchester are more than twice as likely to be of Asian ethnicity compared to the proportion of the Asian population in the area (52% to 54% in GMP suspect data compared to 20.9% in Census 2021 data for Greater Manchester). … Notably, in relation to comparison with the COCAD data, the Greater Manchester data has recorded ethnicity for all suspects, compared with 34% for COCAD 2023 data.”Hide quote

   These data show that child sexual exploitation suspects in Greater Manchester are more than twice as likely to be of Asian ethnicity compared to the proportion of the Asian population in the area (52% to 54% in GMP suspect data compared to 20.9% in Census 2021 data for Greater Manchester). … Notably, in relation to comparison with the COCAD data, the Greater Manchester data has recorded ethnicity for all suspects, compared with 34% for COCAD 2023 data.

4. National Audit on Group-based Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse

   Home Office (Baroness Louise Casey), 2025-06-16 · complicates

   “This suggests that, in Greater Manchester at least, there is an over-representation of suspects of Asian ethnicity in cases of group-based child sexual exploitation, whereas when you look more broadly across all child sex abuse offences, the ethnicity profile is much closer to that of the local population. [Table:] White - British, Irish, Gypsy or Irish Traveller, Roma, Other 396 44% / Unknown ethnicity 298 32% / Asian - British, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Chinese, Other 143 16%”Hide quote

   This suggests that, in Greater Manchester at least, there is an over-representation of suspects of Asian ethnicity in cases of group-based child sexual exploitation, whereas when you look more broadly across all child sex abuse offences, the ethnicity profile is much closer to that of the local population. [Table:] White - British, Irish, Gypsy or Irish Traveller, Roma, Other 396 44% / Unknown ethnicity 298 32% / Asian - British, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Chinese, Other 143 16%

5. National Audit on Group-based Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse

   Home Office (Baroness Louise Casey), 2025-06-16 · supports

   “This data reflects operational decision making. … The percentage of suspects of Asian ethnicity (35%) and White ethnicity (34%) compares with an ethnicity profile for West Yorkshire … of 16% Asian and 77% White, suggesting a disproportionate over-representation of people of Asian ethnic background (roughly double) and disproportionately under-representation of people of White ethnicity (roughly half) amongst child sexual exploitation suspects in West Yorkshire over the period examined. [Table:] Blank entry/ not stated 281 24%”Hide quote

   This data reflects operational decision making. … The percentage of suspects of Asian ethnicity (35%) and White ethnicity (34%) compares with an ethnicity profile for West Yorkshire … of 16% Asian and 77% White, suggesting a disproportionate over-representation of people of Asian ethnic background (roughly double) and disproportionately under-representation of people of White ethnicity (roughly half) amongst child sexual exploitation suspects in West Yorkshire over the period examined. [Table:] Blank entry/ not stated 281 24%

6. National Audit on Group-based Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse

   Home Office (Baroness Louise Casey), 2025-06-16 · supports

   “The first pie chart below shows the ethnic breakdown for a total of 323 designated CSAE suspects in Operation Stovewood, with nearly two-thirds recorded as coming from a Pakistani ethnic background, significantly higher than the proportion of South Yorkshire’s or Rotherham’s Pakistani ethnic population (2.4% … and 4% … respectively) … The second pie chart, below, shows the ethnic breakdown for a total of 42 individuals convicted for CSAE offences under Operation Stovewood, again with nearly two- thirds recorded as coming from a Pakistani ethnic background”Hide quote

   The first pie chart below shows the ethnic breakdown for a total of 323 designated CSAE suspects in Operation Stovewood, with nearly two-thirds recorded as coming from a Pakistani ethnic background, significantly higher than the proportion of South Yorkshire’s or Rotherham’s Pakistani ethnic population (2.4% … and 4% … respectively) … The second pie chart, below, shows the ethnic breakdown for a total of 42 individuals convicted for CSAE offences under Operation Stovewood, again with nearly two- thirds recorded as coming from a Pakistani ethnic background

7. National Audit on Group-based Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse

   Home Office (Baroness Louise Casey), 2025-06-16 · supports

   “The National Crime Agency (NCA) established Operation Stovewood in 2014 to prosecute the perpetrators of the abuse. To date, 1,100 victims have been identified and 42 people have been convicted on charges including rape, sexual assault and trafficking of children”Hide quote

   The National Crime Agency (NCA) established Operation Stovewood in 2014 to prosecute the perpetrators of the abuse. To date, 1,100 victims have been identified and 42 people have been convicted on charges including rape, sexual assault and trafficking of children

8. National Audit on Group-based Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse

   Home Office (Baroness Louise Casey), 2025-06-16 · supports

   “This audit took the same published data set and reconfigured it. If perpetrators for whom ethnicity was not known or declared are included in the data and percentage breakdowns, the figures look very different, with 28% of perpetrators identifying as White: [Table:] White 1,884 28% / Asian 165 2% / Black 110 2% / Mixed 60 <1% / Other 47 <1% / Not declared 4,404 66% / Totals 6,670 100% … Presenting the data without the ‘unknowns’ where the identification of ethnicity is at such a low level is misleading.”Hide quote

   This audit took the same published data set and reconfigured it. If perpetrators for whom ethnicity was not known or declared are included in the data and percentage breakdowns, the figures look very different, with 28% of perpetrators identifying as White: [Table:] White 1,884 28% / Asian 165 2% / Black 110 2% / Mixed 60 <1% / Other 47 <1% / Not declared 4,404 66% / Totals 6,670 100% … Presenting the data without the ‘unknowns’ where the identification of ethnicity is at such a low level is misleading.

9. National Audit on Group-based Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse

   Home Office (Baroness Louise Casey), 2025-06-16 · complicates

   “The VKPP Report for 2023 … notes that ethnicity was recorded for only 31% of perpetrators, but goes on to record the ethnicity breakdown (88% ‘White’, 5% as ‘Asian’, 3% as ‘Black’, 2% as ‘Mixed’ and 1% as ‘Chinese or other’) … It also outlined an ethnicity profile for suspects that aligns fairly closely with 2021 Census data for the general population in England and Wales … (88% White, 7% Asian, 5% Black, 3% Mixed and 2% Other), with a caveat noted in the report that self-defined ethnicity was only recorded for 34% of suspects.”Hide quote

   The VKPP Report for 2023 … notes that ethnicity was recorded for only 31% of perpetrators, but goes on to record the ethnicity breakdown (88% ‘White’, 5% as ‘Asian’, 3% as ‘Black’, 2% as ‘Mixed’ and 1% as ‘Chinese or other’) … It also outlined an ethnicity profile for suspects that aligns fairly closely with 2021 Census data for the general population in England and Wales … (88% White, 7% Asian, 5% Black, 3% Mixed and 2% Other), with a caveat noted in the report that self-defined ethnicity was only recorded for 34% of suspects.

10. National Audit on Group-based Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse

    Home Office (Baroness Louise Casey), 2025-06-16 · supports

    “Given this, we also find it hard to understand how the Home Office reached the conclusion in their paper that the ethnicity of group-based child sexual exploitation offenders is likely to be in line with child sexual abuse more generally and with the general population i.e. “with the majority of offenders being White”.”Hide quote

    Given this, we also find it hard to understand how the Home Office reached the conclusion in their paper that the ethnicity of group-based child sexual exploitation offenders is likely to be in line with child sexual abuse more generally and with the general population i.e. “with the majority of offenders being White”.

11. National Audit on Group-based Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse

    Home Office (Baroness Louise Casey), 2025-06-16 · supports

    “Instead of examining whether there is disproportionality in ethnicity or cultural factors at play in certain types of offending, we found many examples of organisations avoiding the topic altogether for fear of appearing racist, raising community tensions or causing community cohesion problems.”Hide quote

    Instead of examining whether there is disproportionality in ethnicity or cultural factors at play in certain types of offending, we found many examples of organisations avoiding the topic altogether for fear of appearing racist, raising community tensions or causing community cohesion problems.

12. National Audit on Group-based Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse

    Home Office (Baroness Louise Casey), 2025-06-16 · supports

    “On top of the avoidance of ethnicity issues, we also retain an ambivalent attitude to adolescent girls both in society and in the culture of many organisations. We too often judge them as adults (so-called ‘adultification’) especially those in local authority care, who too often are fast-tracked into ‘growing up’ before their time.”Hide quote

    On top of the avoidance of ethnicity issues, we also retain an ambivalent attitude to adolescent girls both in society and in the culture of many organisations. We too often judge them as adults (so-called ‘adultification’) especially those in local authority care, who too often are fast-tracked into ‘growing up’ before their time.

13. National Audit on Group-based Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse

    Home Office (Baroness Louise Casey), 2025-06-16 · complicates

    “Around 500,000 children a year are likely to experience child sexual abuse (of any kind). However, for the vast majority, their abuse is not identified, and it is not reported to the police either at the time or later. Police recorded crime data shows just over 100,000 offences of child sexual abuse and exploitation recorded in 2024, with around 60% of these being contact offences (and the remainder online offences). Of these contact offences, an estimated 17,100 are ‘flagged’ by police as child sexual exploitation in police recorded crime data. The only figure on group-based child sexual exploitation comes from a new police dataset (called the Complex and Organised Child Abuse Dataset - COCAD) which, while suffering a number of limitations, has identified around 700 recorded offences of group-based child sexual exploitation in 2023.”Hide quote

    Around 500,000 children a year are likely to experience child sexual abuse (of any kind). However, for the vast majority, their abuse is not identified, and it is not reported to the police either at the time or later. Police recorded crime data shows just over 100,000 offences of child sexual abuse and exploitation recorded in 2024, with around 60% of these being contact offences (and the remainder online offences). Of these contact offences, an estimated 17,100 are ‘flagged’ by police as child sexual exploitation in police recorded crime data. The only figure on group-based child sexual exploitation comes from a new police dataset (called the Complex and Organised Child Abuse Dataset - COCAD) which, while suffering a number of limitations, has identified around 700 recorded offences of group-based child sexual exploitation in 2023.

14. National Audit on Group-based Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse

    Home Office (Baroness Louise Casey), 2025-06-16 · complicates

    “Therefore, there were 102,878 child sexual abuse offences in total recorded in England and Wales in 2024”Hide quote

    Therefore, there were 102,878 child sexual abuse offences in total recorded in England and Wales in 2024

15. National Audit on Group-based Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse

    Home Office (Baroness Louise Casey), 2025-06-16 · supports

    “The ethnicity of perpetrators could be identified in fifteen cases, either by the review itself, or open-source research. … ten involved perpetrators of predominantly Asian or Pakistani ethnicity … While not representative of a national picture, it was notable that the majority of these involved perpetrators from Asian and Pakistani ethnic backgrounds.”Hide quote

    The ethnicity of perpetrators could be identified in fifteen cases, either by the review itself, or open-source research. … ten involved perpetrators of predominantly Asian or Pakistani ethnicity … While not representative of a national picture, it was notable that the majority of these involved perpetrators from Asian and Pakistani ethnic backgrounds.

16. National Audit on Group-based Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse

    Home Office (Baroness Louise Casey), 2025-06-16 · complicates

    “this audit noted that a significant proportion of these cases appear to involve suspects who are non-UK nationals and/or who are claiming asylum in the UK. … We cannot and should not draw any conclusions from individual nationalities or cultures alone.”Hide quote

    this audit noted that a significant proportion of these cases appear to involve suspects who are non-UK nationals and/or who are claiming asylum in the UK. … We cannot and should not draw any conclusions from individual nationalities or cultures alone.

17. National Audit on Group-based Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse

    Home Office (Baroness Louise Casey), 2025-06-16 · supports

    “In July 2022 the Telford Independent Inquiry … found up to 1,000 children may have been sexually exploited between 1989 to 2017, with a high proportion of offenders identified as coming from Asian or Pakistani ethnic backgrounds. … However, in the positive progress report published two years later, there was still a high proportion of missing data on the ethnicity of perpetrators.”Hide quote

    In July 2022 the Telford Independent Inquiry … found up to 1,000 children may have been sexually exploited between 1989 to 2017, with a high proportion of offenders identified as coming from Asian or Pakistani ethnic backgrounds. … However, in the positive progress report published two years later, there was still a high proportion of missing data on the ethnicity of perpetrators.

18. Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Exploitation in Rotherham 1997–2013

    Alexis Jay, for Rotherham Metropolitan Borough Council, 2014-08 · supports

    “No one knows the true scale of child sexual exploitation (CSE) in Rotherham over the years. Our conservative estimate is that approximately 1400 children were sexually exploited over the full Inquiry period, from 1997 to 2013.”Hide quote

    No one knows the true scale of child sexual exploitation (CSE) in Rotherham over the years. Our conservative estimate is that approximately 1400 children were sexually exploited over the full Inquiry period, from 1997 to 2013.

19. Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Exploitation in Rotherham 1997–2013

    Alexis Jay, for Rotherham Metropolitan Borough Council, 2014-08 · supports

    “By far the majority of perpetrators were described as 'Asian' by victims, yet throughout the entire period, councillors did not engage directly with the Pakistani-heritage community to discuss how best they could jointly address the issue. Some councillors seemed to think it was a one-off problem, which they hoped would go away. Several staff described their nervousness about identifying the ethnic origins of perpetrators for fear of being thought racist; others remembered clear direction from their managers not to do so.”Hide quote

    By far the majority of perpetrators were described as 'Asian' by victims, yet throughout the entire period, councillors did not engage directly with the Pakistani-heritage community to discuss how best they could jointly address the issue. Some councillors seemed to think it was a one-off problem, which they hoped would go away. Several staff described their nervousness about identifying the ethnic origins of perpetrators for fear of being thought racist; others remembered clear direction from their managers not to do so.

20. Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Exploitation in Rotherham 1997–2013

    Alexis Jay, for Rotherham Metropolitan Borough Council, 2014-08 · supports

    “Within social care, the scale and seriousness of the problem was underplayed by senior managers. At an operational level, the Police gave no priority to CSE, regarding many child victims with contempt and failing to act on their abuse as a crime.”Hide quote

    Within social care, the scale and seriousness of the problem was underplayed by senior managers. At an operational level, the Police gave no priority to CSE, regarding many child victims with contempt and failing to act on their abuse as a crime.

21. Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Exploitation in Rotherham 1997–2013

    Alexis Jay, for Rotherham Metropolitan Borough Council, 2014-08 · supports

    “Census information from 2011 showed that Rotherham had nearly 8000 people with Pakistani or Kashmiri ethnicity, or 3.1% of the Borough population, an increase from 2% in the previous census. … In Rotherham, the majority of known perpetrators were of Pakistani heritage including the five men convicted in 2010.”Hide quote

    Census information from 2011 showed that Rotherham had nearly 8000 people with Pakistani or Kashmiri ethnicity, or 3.1% of the Borough population, an increase from 2% in the previous census. … In Rotherham, the majority of known perpetrators were of Pakistani heritage including the five men convicted in 2010.

22. Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Exploitation in Rotherham 1997–2013

    Alexis Jay, for Rotherham Metropolitan Borough Council, 2014-08 · complicates

    “As has been stated many times before, there is no simple link between race and child sexual exploitation, and across the UK the greatest numbers of perpetrators of CSE are white men. … The Inquiry team was confident that ethnic issues did not influence professional decision-making in individual cases.”Hide quote

    As has been stated many times before, there is no simple link between race and child sexual exploitation, and across the UK the greatest numbers of perpetrators of CSE are white men. … The Inquiry team was confident that ethnic issues did not influence professional decision-making in individual cases.

23. Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Exploitation in Rotherham 1997–2013

    Alexis Jay, for Rotherham Metropolitan Borough Council, 2014-08 · supports

    “Several councillors interviewed believed that by opening up these issues they could be 'giving oxygen' to racist perspectives that might in turn attract extremist political groups and threaten community cohesion.”Hide quote

    Several councillors interviewed believed that by opening up these issues they could be 'giving oxygen' to racist perspectives that might in turn attract extremist political groups and threaten community cohesion.

24. Independent Inquiry Telford Child Sexual Exploitation, Volume One

    Tom Crowther QC, for Telford & Wrekin Council, 2022-07-12 · supports

    “When asked about the estimated ‘1,000’ figure published in the press, a number of witnesses considered that, whilst there was no hard evidence proving there to be as many as 1,000 confirmed victims of CSE in Telford, looking at the number of victims identified during Chalice – and since – and when considering that some allegations dated back to the 1990s, the estimate of victim/survivor numbers reaching 1,000 was considered conservative, or in the words of one witness “tame”.”Hide quote

    When asked about the estimated ‘1,000’ figure published in the press, a number of witnesses considered that, whilst there was no hard evidence proving there to be as many as 1,000 confirmed victims of CSE in Telford, looking at the number of victims identified during Chalice – and since – and when considering that some allegations dated back to the 1990s, the estimate of victim/survivor numbers reaching 1,000 was considered conservative, or in the words of one witness “tame”.

25. Independent Inquiry Telford Child Sexual Exploitation, Volume One

    Tom Crowther QC, for Telford & Wrekin Council, 2022-07-12 · supports

    “In considering the evidence, and in particular the disclosed material, I have been cautious not to infer too much from names, which may indicate wider geographical background and indeed religious heritage, but are wholly unreliable indicators of national background and (in particular) religious belief. Even bearing that in mind, however, the evidence plainly shows that the majority of CSE suspects in Telford during my Terms of Reference were men of southern Asian heritage, including all the men convicted in Chalice, and Operations Delta and Epsilon.”Hide quote

    In considering the evidence, and in particular the disclosed material, I have been cautious not to infer too much from names, which may indicate wider geographical background and indeed religious heritage, but are wholly unreliable indicators of national background and (in particular) religious belief. Even bearing that in mind, however, the evidence plainly shows that the majority of CSE suspects in Telford during my Terms of Reference were men of southern Asian heritage, including all the men convicted in Chalice, and Operations Delta and Epsilon.

26. Independent Inquiry Telford Child Sexual Exploitation, Volume One

    Tom Crowther QC, for Telford & Wrekin Council, 2022-07-12 · complicates

    “It would in my judgment be wholly wrong, and undoubtedly racist, to equate membership of a particular racial group with propensity to commit CSE”Hide quote

    It would in my judgment be wholly wrong, and undoubtedly racist, to equate membership of a particular racial group with propensity to commit CSE

27. Independent Inquiry Telford Child Sexual Exploitation, Volume One

    Tom Crowther QC, for Telford & Wrekin Council, 2022-07-12 · supports

    “As to failure to take proper action, I am quite satisfied on the evidence that in the 1990s and early 2000s - and even beyond - WMP allowed a nervousness about race to become prevalent among officers, and that this led to a reluctance to police parts of Wellington, in particular. … Second, I heard evidence that during the 1990s teachers and parents were reluctant to address potential CSE issues for concerns that they would be labelled racist”Hide quote

    As to failure to take proper action, I am quite satisfied on the evidence that in the 1990s and early 2000s - and even beyond - WMP allowed a nervousness about race to become prevalent among officers, and that this led to a reluctance to police parts of Wellington, in particular. … Second, I heard evidence that during the 1990s teachers and parents were reluctant to address potential CSE issues for concerns that they would be labelled racist

28. Independent assurance review of the effectiveness of multi-agency responses to child sexual exploitation in Greater Manchester, Part Three: The review into Operation Span and the investigation of non-recent child sexual exploitation in Rochdale

    Malcolm Newsam and Gary Ridgway, for the Greater Manchester Combined Authority, 2024-01 · supports

    “We also considered an additional 52 children mentioned in the GMP and Rochdale Council files we reviewed, bringing the total number of children to 111. We believe there was a significant probability that 74 of the children we considered were being sexually exploited. Of these 74, we found that we could only provide assurance that three of them were appropriately protected by the protective agencies. There were serious failures to protect the children in 48 cases.”Hide quote

    We also considered an additional 52 children mentioned in the GMP and Rochdale Council files we reviewed, bringing the total number of children to 111. We believe there was a significant probability that 74 of the children we considered were being sexually exploited. Of these 74, we found that we could only provide assurance that three of them were appropriately protected by the protective agencies. There were serious failures to protect the children in 48 cases.

29. Independent assurance review of the effectiveness of multi-agency responses to child sexual exploitation in Greater Manchester, Part Three: The review into Operation Span and the investigation of non-recent child sexual exploitation in Rochdale

    Malcolm Newsam and Gary Ridgway, for the Greater Manchester Combined Authority, 2024-01 · supports

    “In summary, this information demonstrated that in total 30 men had been convicted and most had received lengthy prison sentences. … In our research we have identified at least 96 individuals who potentially pose a risk to children.”Hide quote

    In summary, this information demonstrated that in total 30 men had been convicted and most had received lengthy prison sentences. … In our research we have identified at least 96 individuals who potentially pose a risk to children.

30. Independent assurance review of the effectiveness of multi-agency responses to child sexual exploitation in Greater Manchester, Part Three: The review into Operation Span and the investigation of non-recent child sexual exploitation in Rochdale

    Malcolm Newsam and Gary Ridgway, for the Greater Manchester Combined Authority, 2024-01 · supports

    “We have throughout much of this report used the term ‘Asian’ as this was how the ethnic origin of the suspected perpetrators was most commonly described in the contemporaneous records we have considered. Where the ethnic origin has been more accurately described we use the specific description.”Hide quote

    We have throughout much of this report used the term ‘Asian’ as this was how the ethnic origin of the suspected perpetrators was most commonly described in the contemporaneous records we have considered. Where the ethnic origin has been more accurately described we use the specific description.

31. Independent assurance review of the effectiveness of multi-agency responses to child sexual exploitation in Greater Manchester, Part Three: The review into Operation Span and the investigation of non-recent child sexual exploitation in Rochdale

    Malcolm Newsam and Gary Ridgway, for the Greater Manchester Combined Authority, 2024-01 · supports

    “The reality was that GMP had put insufficient resources into the investigation and closed it down prematurely. As a result, many perpetrators were left to continue to abuse children and many more children were left vulnerable to exploitation during the following months and years.”Hide quote

    The reality was that GMP had put insufficient resources into the investigation and closed it down prematurely. As a result, many perpetrators were left to continue to abuse children and many more children were left vulnerable to exploitation during the following months and years.

32. Independent assurance review of the effectiveness of multi-agency responses to child sexual exploitation in Greater Manchester, Part Two: The review into historic safeguarding practices in the borough of Oldham

    Malcolm Newsam and Gary Ridgway, for the Greater Manchester Combined Authority, 2022-06 · complicates

    “We have concluded that we have been provided with no evidence, either through our interviews or documentary review, to suggest that senior managers or councillors sought to cover up either the existence of child sexual exploitation in Oldham or the complexity involved in tackling the perpetrators.”Hide quote

    We have concluded that we have been provided with no evidence, either through our interviews or documentary review, to suggest that senior managers or councillors sought to cover up either the existence of child sexual exploitation in Oldham or the complexity involved in tackling the perpetrators.

33. Independent assurance review of the effectiveness of multi-agency responses to child sexual exploitation in Greater Manchester, Part Two: The review into historic safeguarding practices in the borough of Oldham

    Malcolm Newsam and Gary Ridgway, for the Greater Manchester Combined Authority, 2022-06 · supports

    “It stated that the majority of offenders were British Asian men, but Eastern European, Middle Eastern and White British men also featured.”Hide quote

    It stated that the majority of offenders were British Asian men, but Eastern European, Middle Eastern and White British men also featured.

34. Independent assurance review of the effectiveness of multi-agency responses to child sexual exploitation in Greater Manchester, Part Two: The review into historic safeguarding practices in the borough of Oldham

    Malcolm Newsam and Gary Ridgway, for the Greater Manchester Combined Authority, 2022-06 · complicates

    “There were also, throughout this period, legitimate concerns by both the council and the police that the high-profile convictions of predominantly Pakistani offenders across the country could be capitalised on by a far-right agenda and lead to the victimisation of the Pakistani community. However, it is clear from all the evidence we have seen that the council and its partners in no way avoided addressing this … The quality of casework by both the police and social care was generally very poor”Hide quote

    There were also, throughout this period, legitimate concerns by both the council and the police that the high-profile convictions of predominantly Pakistani offenders across the country could be capitalised on by a far-right agenda and lead to the victimisation of the Pakistani community. However, it is clear from all the evidence we have seen that the council and its partners in no way avoided addressing this … The quality of casework by both the police and social care was generally very poor

35. Child sexual exploitation by organised networks: Investigation Report

    Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse, 2022-02 · supports

    “None of the areas examined kept data on the ethnicity of victims and alleged perpetrators. … Many of the high-profile child sexual exploitation prosecutions have involved groups of men from minority ethnic communities. This has led to polarised debate about whether there is any link between ethnicity and child sexual exploitation networks. Poor or non-existent data collection makes it impossible to know whether any particular ethnic group is over‑represented as perpetrators of child sexual exploitation by networks.”Hide quote

    None of the areas examined kept data on the ethnicity of victims and alleged perpetrators. … Many of the high-profile child sexual exploitation prosecutions have involved groups of men from minority ethnic communities. This has led to polarised debate about whether there is any link between ethnicity and child sexual exploitation networks. Poor or non-existent data collection makes it impossible to know whether any particular ethnic group is over‑represented as perpetrators of child sexual exploitation by networks.

36. Child sexual exploitation by organised networks: Investigation Report

    Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse, 2022-02 · supports

    “It is unclear whether a misplaced sense of political correctness or the sheer complexity of the problem have inhibited good-quality data collection generally and on ethnicity more specifically.”Hide quote

    It is unclear whether a misplaced sense of political correctness or the sheer complexity of the problem have inhibited good-quality data collection generally and on ethnicity more specifically.

37. Child sexual exploitation by organised networks: Investigation Report

    Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse, 2022-02 · supports

    “in Durham, data provided for 2018/19 showed that ethnicity was not recorded for suspects in 35 percent of 1,900 cases of child sexual abuse and exploitation … in the Warwickshire 2019 profile, the ethnicity of over 40 percent of 137 perpetrators and over 50 percent of 162 victims of child sexual exploitation was unknown … in St Helens, Merseyside Police noted that, between April 2017 and March 2019, 41 percent of 435 victims and 28 percent of 217 alleged perpetrators of child sexual abuse and exploitation did not provide their ethnicity … in the Tower Hamlets 2019 profile, ethnicity was not recorded for 86 percent of offenders involved in 147 reports of child sexual exploitation … in Bristol, the ethnicity of 28 percent of 137 suspects and 19 percent of 474 children at risk of child sexual exploitation was unknown or unrecorded.”Hide quote

    in Durham, data provided for 2018/19 showed that ethnicity was not recorded for suspects in 35 percent of 1,900 cases of child sexual abuse and exploitation … in the Warwickshire 2019 profile, the ethnicity of over 40 percent of 137 perpetrators and over 50 percent of 162 victims of child sexual exploitation was unknown … in St Helens, Merseyside Police noted that, between April 2017 and March 2019, 41 percent of 435 victims and 28 percent of 217 alleged perpetrators of child sexual abuse and exploitation did not provide their ethnicity … in the Tower Hamlets 2019 profile, ethnicity was not recorded for 86 percent of offenders involved in 147 reports of child sexual exploitation … in Bristol, the ethnicity of 28 percent of 137 suspects and 19 percent of 474 children at risk of child sexual exploitation was unknown or unrecorded.

38. Child sexual exploitation by organised networks: Investigation Report

    Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse, 2022-02 · supports

    “They gave examples of institutions treating victims as complicit in their abuse and seeing victims as having made a lifestyle choice – concluding that the examples of victim-blaming in the case study areas reflected a cultural failure of management.”Hide quote

    They gave examples of institutions treating victims as complicit in their abuse and seeing victims as having made a lifestyle choice – concluding that the examples of victim-blaming in the case study areas reflected a cultural failure of management.

39. Group-based Child Sexual Exploitation: Characteristics of Offending

    Home Office, 2020-12-15 · complicates

    “While some of the research set out above suggests that there are high numbers of offenders of Asian or Black ethnicities committing group-based CSE offences, it is not possible to say whether these groups are over-represented in this type of offending. As set out in paragraph 75, research to date has relied on poor-quality data with a number of weaknesses. … Based on the existing evidence, and our understanding of the flaws in the existing data, it seems most likely that the ethnicity of group-based CSE offenders is in line with CSA more generally and with the general population, with the majority of offenders being White.”Hide quote

    While some of the research set out above suggests that there are high numbers of offenders of Asian or Black ethnicities committing group-based CSE offences, it is not possible to say whether these groups are over-represented in this type of offending. As set out in paragraph 75, research to date has relied on poor-quality data with a number of weaknesses. … Based on the existing evidence, and our understanding of the flaws in the existing data, it seems most likely that the ethnicity of group-based CSE offenders is in line with CSA more generally and with the general population, with the majority of offenders being White.

40. Child sexual abuse in England and Wales: year ending March 2019

    Office for National Statistics, 2020-01-14 · complicates

    “The Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW) estimated that 7.5% of adults aged 18 to 74 years experienced sexual abuse before the age of 16 years (3.1 million people); this includes both adult and child perpetrators. The abuse was most likely to have been perpetrated by a friend or acquaintance (37%); around a third (30%) were sexually abused by a stranger.”Hide quote

    The Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW) estimated that 7.5% of adults aged 18 to 74 years experienced sexual abuse before the age of 16 years (3.1 million people); this includes both adult and child perpetrators. The abuse was most likely to have been perpetrated by a friend or acquaintance (37%); around a third (30%) were sexually abused by a stranger.

41. Child sexual abuse in England and Wales: year ending March 2019

    Office for National Statistics, 2020-01-14 · complicates

    “women were around five times as likely as men to have experienced sexual abuse by a step-father, at 7.5% compared with 1.4% … women were more likely than men to have experienced sexual abuse by a family member that was not a parent or step-parent, at 24% compared with 15% … Reporting rates to the police were lower for rape or assault by penetration, including attempts (7%), and other contact sexual abuse (6%)”Hide quote

    women were around five times as likely as men to have experienced sexual abuse by a step-father, at 7.5% compared with 1.4% … women were more likely than men to have experienced sexual abuse by a family member that was not a parent or step-parent, at 24% compared with 15% … Reporting rates to the police were lower for rape or assault by penetration, including attempts (7%), and other contact sexual abuse (6%)

42. Census 2021, TS021 Ethnic group (local authorities), via Nomis

    Office for National Statistics, 2022-11 · supports

    “"Telford and Wrekin","Total: All usual residents","Value",185543; "Telford and Wrekin","Asian, Asian British or Asian Welsh","Value",10067; "Telford and Wrekin","Asian, Asian British or Asian Welsh: Pakistani","Value",3368”Hide quote

    "Telford and Wrekin","Total: All usual residents","Value",185543; "Telford and Wrekin","Asian, Asian British or Asian Welsh","Value",10067; "Telford and Wrekin","Asian, Asian British or Asian Welsh: Pakistani","Value",3368

43. Census 2021, TS021 Ethnic group (local authorities), via Nomis

    Office for National Statistics, 2022-11 · supports

    “"Rochdale","Total: All usual residents","Value",223771; "Rochdale","Asian, Asian British or Asian Welsh","Value",41406; "Rochdale","Asian, Asian British or Asian Welsh: Pakistani","Value",30525”Hide quote

    "Rochdale","Total: All usual residents","Value",223771; "Rochdale","Asian, Asian British or Asian Welsh","Value",41406; "Rochdale","Asian, Asian British or Asian Welsh: Pakistani","Value",30525

44. Census 2021, TS021 Ethnic group (local authorities), via Nomis

    Office for National Statistics, 2022-11 · supports

    “"Oldham","Total: All usual residents","Value",242087; "Oldham","Asian, Asian British or Asian Welsh","Value",59565; "Oldham","Asian, Asian British or Asian Welsh: Pakistani","Value",32802”Hide quote

    "Oldham","Total: All usual residents","Value",242087; "Oldham","Asian, Asian British or Asian Welsh","Value",59565; "Oldham","Asian, Asian British or Asian Welsh: Pakistani","Value",32802

45. Census 2021, TS021 Ethnic group (England and Wales), via Nomis

    Office for National Statistics, 2022-11 · supports

    “"England and Wales","Asian, Asian British or Asian Welsh","Percent",9.3; "England and Wales","Asian, Asian British or Asian Welsh: Pakistani","Percent",2.7”Hide quote

    "England and Wales","Asian, Asian British or Asian Welsh","Percent",9.3; "England and Wales","Asian, Asian British or Asian Welsh: Pakistani","Percent",2.7

46. Independent Inquiry into Grooming Gangs: terms of reference

    Home Office, 2026-03-31 · supports

    “The Inquiry must examine the factors that allowed or caused exploitation and abuse to happen and go unaddressed at a local and national level - including the role of ethnicity, religion and culture of perpetrators and victims. … The Inquiry must examine issues arising between 1 January 1996 and 31 March 2029. … The Inquiry will operate for no more than three years, within a budget of £65 million.”Hide quote

    The Inquiry must examine the factors that allowed or caused exploitation and abuse to happen and go unaddressed at a local and national level - including the role of ethnicity, religion and culture of perpetrators and victims. … The Inquiry must examine issues arising between 1 January 1996 and 31 March 2029. … The Inquiry will operate for no more than three years, within a budget of £65 million.

47. Oldham, London, and Bradford and Keighley announced as first places to be investigated in Grooming Gangs Inquiry

    Local Government Lawyer, 2026-06-25 · supports

    “The Statutory Independent Inquiry into Grooming Gangs has announced the first areas for its specific local investigations as Oldham, Bradford and Keighley, and London. Chaired by Baroness Anne Longfield CBE, the Inquiry will hold its first national public accountability hearings by the end of the year”Hide quote

    The Statutory Independent Inquiry into Grooming Gangs has announced the first areas for its specific local investigations as Oldham, Bradford and Keighley, and London. Chaired by Baroness Anne Longfield CBE, the Inquiry will hold its first national public accountability hearings by the end of the year

48. Migrants and crime in the UK

    The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-08-18 · supports

    “Most offences never lead to a conviction, so actual rates of offending among different groups in the population are unknown. However, non-UK citizens made up 13.1% of people given cautions or convictions in 2024, and 12.1% of the prison population in June 2025. This was roughly similar to their share of the adult population. The share of non-citizens among people convicted or incarcerated is lower when taking age into account. This is because non-citizens tend to be younger, and criminal offending takes place primarily among young men.”Hide quote

    Most offences never lead to a conviction, so actual rates of offending among different groups in the population are unknown. However, non-UK citizens made up 13.1% of people given cautions or convictions in 2024, and 12.1% of the prison population in June 2025. This was roughly similar to their share of the adult population. The share of non-citizens among people convicted or incarcerated is lower when taking age into account. This is because non-citizens tend to be younger, and criminal offending takes place primarily among young men.

49. Migrants and crime in the UK

    The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-08-18 · supports

    “There is currently no official estimate of non-citizens’ share of the adult population. However, Migration Observatory calculations suggest that by 2025, roughly 13.5% of the adult population were non-citizens.”Hide quote

    There is currently no official estimate of non-citizens’ share of the adult population. However, Migration Observatory calculations suggest that by 2025, roughly 13.5% of the adult population were non-citizens.

50. Migrants and crime in the UK

    The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-08-18 · complicates

    “Foreign nationals made up 18.7% of entries into prisons in 2025, higher than their share of either convictions or the prison population. This is driven by the fact that non-citizens are less likely than British citizens to be granted bail while awaiting trial.”Hide quote

    Foreign nationals made up 18.7% of entries into prisons in 2025, higher than their share of either convictions or the prison population. This is driven by the fact that non-citizens are less likely than British citizens to be granted bail while awaiting trial.

51. Migrants and crime in the UK

    The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-08-18 · complicates

    “Among the 50 largest individual nationalities, some were underrepresented in the convictions data, including Indians, Pakistanis, French, and Chinese. Others were overrepresented, such as Albanians, Iraqis, and Afghans.”Hide quote

    Among the 50 largest individual nationalities, some were underrepresented in the convictions data, including Indians, Pakistanis, French, and Chinese. Others were overrepresented, such as Albanians, Iraqis, and Afghans.

52. Migrants and crime in the UK

    The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2026-08-18 · complicates

    “Note that naturalised citizens (i.e., people who migrated to the UK and later acquired British citizenship) are recorded as British in these statistics. Government crime statistics do not include any information on country of birth.”Hide quote

    Note that naturalised citizens (i.e., people who migrated to the UK and later acquired British citizenship) are recorded as British in these statistics. Government crime statistics do not include any information on country of birth.

53. Kriminalitet og herkomst 2023

    Justitsministeriets Forskningsenhed (Danish Ministry of Justice research unit), 2025-04 · supports

    “Figur 3: Alderskorrigeret kriminalitetsindeks, straffeloven, for 15-79årige, fordelt efter køn og herkomst, 2023 … Figur 3 viser: Mandlige efterkommere af ikke-vestlig oprindelse har et alderskorrigeret kriminalitetsindeks for straffelovsovertrædelser på 262. Gruppen har således ca. 2,6 gange så mange personer – svarende til 162 pct. overrepræsentation – dømt for straffelovsovertrædelser, som det kunne forventes på baggrund af gruppens størrelse og alderssammensætning.”Hide quote

    Figur 3: Alderskorrigeret kriminalitetsindeks, straffeloven, for 15-79årige, fordelt efter køn og herkomst, 2023 … Figur 3 viser: Mandlige efterkommere af ikke-vestlig oprindelse har et alderskorrigeret kriminalitetsindeks for straffelovsovertrædelser på 262. Gruppen har således ca. 2,6 gange så mange personer – svarende til 162 pct. overrepræsentation – dømt for straffelovsovertrædelser, som det kunne forventes på baggrund af gruppens størrelse og alderssammensætning.

54. Kriminalitet og herkomst 2023

    Justitsministeriets Forskningsenhed (Danish Ministry of Justice research unit), 2025-04 · complicates

    “Det fremgår af præsentationen, at særligt efterkommere fra ikke-vestlige lande er overrepræsenterede i kriminalitetsstatistikkerne set i forhold til befolkningsgruppens størrelse. Det er i den forbindelse væsentligt at bemærke, at denne gruppe er markant mindre kriminelt belastet i dag end tidligere i den forstand, at der er sket et fald i andelen, der bliver dømt for overtrædelse af straffeloven.”Hide quote

    Det fremgår af præsentationen, at særligt efterkommere fra ikke-vestlige lande er overrepræsenterede i kriminalitetsstatistikkerne set i forhold til befolkningsgruppens størrelse. Det er i den forbindelse væsentligt at bemærke, at denne gruppe er markant mindre kriminelt belastet i dag end tidligere i den forstand, at der er sket et fald i andelen, der bliver dømt for overtrædelse af straffeloven.

55. Kriminalitet og herkomst 2023

    Justitsministeriets Forskningsenhed (Danish Ministry of Justice research unit), 2025-04 · complicates

    “Det er særligt de mandlige efterkommere fra ikke-vestlige lande, der er overrepræsenterede i kriminalitetsstatistikkerne set i forhold til befolkningsgruppens størrelse, men betragtes antallet af mænd dømt for overtrædelse af straffeloven er flest af dansk oprindelse.”Hide quote

    Det er særligt de mandlige efterkommere fra ikke-vestlige lande, der er overrepræsenterede i kriminalitetsstatistikkerne set i forhold til befolkningsgruppens størrelse, men betragtes antallet af mænd dømt for overtrædelse af straffeloven er flest af dansk oprindelse.

56. Operation of police powers under the Terrorism Act 2000 and subsequent legislation: Arrests, outcomes, and stop and search, Great Britain, to June 2026

    Home Office, 2026-10-08 · supports

    “of those in custody, the majority (57%) were categorised as holding Islamist-extremist views; a further 29% were categorised as holding extreme right-wing ideologies and 14% were categorised as holding other ideologies … the proportion categorised as holding extreme right-wing and other ideologies increasing gradually from 22% to 29% and 8% to 14%, respectively, since comparable records began in the year ending June 2021, while the proportion categorised as holding Islamist-extremist views decreased from 70% to 57% over the same period.”Hide quote

    of those in custody, the majority (57%) were categorised as holding Islamist-extremist views; a further 29% were categorised as holding extreme right-wing ideologies and 14% were categorised as holding other ideologies … the proportion categorised as holding extreme right-wing and other ideologies increasing gradually from 22% to 29% and 8% to 14%, respectively, since comparable records began in the year ending June 2021, while the proportion categorised as holding Islamist-extremist views decreased from 70% to 57% over the same period.

57. Operation of police powers under the Terrorism Act 2000 and subsequent legislation: Arrests, outcomes, and stop and search, Great Britain, to June 2026

    Home Office, 2026-10-08 · complicates

    “As at 30 June 2026, the majority of persons in custody for terrorism and terrorism-connected offences in Great Britain have the United Kingdom as their self-declared nationality (226 out of 275, 82%). … Of the 275 persons in custody for terrorism and terrorism-connected offences in Great Britain with a self-declared religion, 164 were Muslim (60%) … Overall, since 11 September 2001 (when the data collection began), 73% of those arrested considered themselves to be of British or British dual nationality.”Hide quote

    As at 30 June 2026, the majority of persons in custody for terrorism and terrorism-connected offences in Great Britain have the United Kingdom as their self-declared nationality (226 out of 275, 82%). … Of the 275 persons in custody for terrorism and terrorism-connected offences in Great Britain with a self-declared religion, 164 were Muslim (60%) … Overall, since 11 September 2001 (when the data collection began), 73% of those arrested considered themselves to be of British or British dual nationality.

58. Operation of police powers under the Terrorism Act 2000 and subsequent legislation: Arrests, outcomes, and stop and search, Great Britain, to June 2026

    Home Office, 2026-10-08 · supports

    “of these arrests, 3,630 (94%) were linked to supporting Palestine Action, following its proscription on 5 July 2025 … The total number of arrests remained stable over the 10-year period up to year ending June 2025 with a median of 238 arrests. … Of the cases not linked to supporting Palestine action, where the ethnic appearance was known, arrests for those of White ethnic appearance accounted for 56% of arrests (121 out of 218), compared to 52% for year ending June 2025 (113 out of 217). Arrests for those of Asian ethnic appearance accounted for 27% of arrests (59 out of 218)”Hide quote

    of these arrests, 3,630 (94%) were linked to supporting Palestine Action, following its proscription on 5 July 2025 … The total number of arrests remained stable over the 10-year period up to year ending June 2025 with a median of 238 arrests. … Of the cases not linked to supporting Palestine action, where the ethnic appearance was known, arrests for those of White ethnic appearance accounted for 56% of arrests (121 out of 218), compared to 52% for year ending June 2025 (113 out of 217). Arrests for those of Asian ethnic appearance accounted for 27% of arrests (59 out of 218)

59. Individuals referred to and supported through the Prevent Programme, April 2024 to March 2025

    Home Office, 2025-11-06 · supports

    “‘Extreme Right-Wing’ concerns accounted for 21% (1,798) of referrals, higher than those related to ‘Islamist Extremism’ (10%; 870) … the majority of referrals that went on to be adopted as a Channel case were for ‘Extreme Right-Wing concerns’ (612 out of 1464 (total specified); 42%); while 226 (15%) were for concerns related to ‘Islamist Extremism’”Hide quote

    ‘Extreme Right-Wing’ concerns accounted for 21% (1,798) of referrals, higher than those related to ‘Islamist Extremism’ (10%; 870) … the majority of referrals that went on to be adopted as a Channel case were for ‘Extreme Right-Wing concerns’ (612 out of 1464 (total specified); 42%); while 226 (15%) were for concerns related to ‘Islamist Extremism’

60. Individuals referred to and supported through the Prevent Programme, April 2024 to March 2025

    Home Office, 2025-11-06 · complicates

    “In the year ending 31 March 2025, of the 8,769 referrals to Prevent where the type of concern is specified, 56% (4,917) were for individuals with no identified ideology … The new type of concern categories do not exactly match onto previous years’ categories, therefore, there is a break in the time series and trends by type of concern should be interpreted carefully.”Hide quote

    In the year ending 31 March 2025, of the 8,769 referrals to Prevent where the type of concern is specified, 56% (4,917) were for individuals with no identified ideology … The new type of concern categories do not exactly match onto previous years’ categories, therefore, there is a break in the time series and trends by type of concern should be interpreted carefully.

61. Individuals referred to and supported through the Prevent Programme, April 2024 to March 2025: data tables

    Home Office, 2025-11-06 · supports

    “Table 6: Type of Concern of those referred, discussed at a Channel panel and adopted as a Channel case, 2024/25 … Prevent Referrals, *Total, 8778 … Extreme Right Wing, 1798 … Islamist Extremism, 870 … Left Wing Extremism, 21 … Anarchist Extremism, 13 … Northern Ireland Related – Dissident Republican Extremism, 16 … InCel, 66 … Fascination with extreme violence or mass casualty attacks (where no other ideology), 469 … Multiple ideologies (with no dominant ideology), 424 … No ideology – other susceptibility to radicalisation identified, 1908 … No ideology identified, 3009 … Other, 175 … Unspecified, 9”Hide quote

    Table 6: Type of Concern of those referred, discussed at a Channel panel and adopted as a Channel case, 2024/25 … Prevent Referrals, *Total, 8778 … Extreme Right Wing, 1798 … Islamist Extremism, 870 … Left Wing Extremism, 21 … Anarchist Extremism, 13 … Northern Ireland Related – Dissident Republican Extremism, 16 … InCel, 66 … Fascination with extreme violence or mass casualty attacks (where no other ideology), 469 … Multiple ideologies (with no dominant ideology), 424 … No ideology – other susceptibility to radicalisation identified, 1908 … No ideology identified, 3009 … Other, 175 … Unspecified, 9

62. MI5 Director General gives latest threat update (secondary summary)

    techUK, 2024-10-09 · supports

    “The headline split of MI5's counter terrorist work remains roughly 75% Islamist extremist, 25% extreme right-wing terrorism, however these straightforward labels do not fully reflect the dizzying range of beliefs and ideologies that present a threat to the UK.”Hide quote

    The headline split of MI5's counter terrorist work remains roughly 75% Islamist extremist, 25% extreme right-wing terrorism, however these straightforward labels do not fully reflect the dizzying range of beliefs and ideologies that present a threat to the UK.

63. Hate crime, England and Wales, year ending March 2026

    Home Office, 2026-10-08 · supports

    “These ‘spikes’ coincided with certain events. In the last year, there were elevated levels of these aggravated offences from May to October 2025, which coincided with an increased number of protests and incidents of public disorder. There was also a spike in March 2026, following the beginning of the USA-Iran conflict on the 28 February. The largest spike was seen in August 2024, following the Southport murders on the 29 July and the subsequent disorder and related protests in certain towns and cities across England. There were 10,158 racially or religiously aggravated offences recorded in August 2024, the highest monthly total ever recorded. Previous spikes in racially or religiously aggravated offences were also observed: following the start of the Israel-Hamas conflict in October 2023 … July 2017, following the terrorist attacks seen that year … around the time of the EU Referendum”Hide quote

    These ‘spikes’ coincided with certain events. In the last year, there were elevated levels of these aggravated offences from May to October 2025, which coincided with an increased number of protests and incidents of public disorder. There was also a spike in March 2026, following the beginning of the USA-Iran conflict on the 28 February. The largest spike was seen in August 2024, following the Southport murders on the 29 July and the subsequent disorder and related protests in certain towns and cities across England. There were 10,158 racially or religiously aggravated offences recorded in August 2024, the highest monthly total ever recorded. Previous spikes in racially or religiously aggravated offences were also observed: following the start of the Israel-Hamas conflict in October 2023 … July 2017, following the terrorist attacks seen that year … around the time of the EU Referendum

64. Hate crime, England and Wales, year ending March 2026

    Home Office, 2026-10-08 · complicates

    “However, as mentioned above it is known that police recorded crime data has been heavily affected by improvements in crime recording by the police over recent years, so data from the police is limited in assessing longer-term trends in hate crime.”Hide quote

    However, as mentioned above it is known that police recorded crime data has been heavily affected by improvements in crime recording by the police over recent years, so data from the police is limited in assessing longer-term trends in hate crime.

65. Population of England and Wales

    Cabinet Office, Ethnicity facts and figures, 2022-12-22 · supports

    “5.5 million people (9.3%) were from Asian ethnic groups – 1.9 million of those identified with the Indian ethnic group (3.1%), and 1.6 million with the Pakistani ethnic group (2.7%)”Hide quote

    5.5 million people (9.3%) were from Asian ethnic groups – 1.9 million of those identified with the Indian ethnic group (3.1%), and 1.6 million with the Pakistani ethnic group (2.7%)

66. Religion, England and Wales: Census 2021

    Office for National Statistics, 2022-11-29 · supports

    “There were increases in the number of people who described themselves as “Muslim” (3.9 million, 6.5% in 2021, up from 2.7 million, 4.9% in 2011)”Hide quote

    There were increases in the number of people who described themselves as “Muslim” (3.9 million, 6.5% in 2021, up from 2.7 million, 4.9% in 2011)

67. Operation of police powers under the Terrorism Act 2000, to June 2026: annual data tables (table P.01)

    Home Office, 2026-10-08 · supports

    “P.01a: Number of persons in custody for terrorism and terrorism-connected offences, by ideology, in Great Britain … Islamist Extremist … 157 … Extreme Right-Wing … 80 … Total … 275”Hide quote

    P.01a: Number of persons in custody for terrorism and terrorism-connected offences, by ideology, in Great Britain … Islamist Extremist … 157 … Extreme Right-Wing … 80 … Total … 275

68. Operation of police powers under the Terrorism Act 2000, to June 2026: annual data tables (table A.01)

    Home Office, 2026-10-08 · supports

    “A.01b: Number and percentage change of persons, linked to supporting Palestine Action, arrested for terrorism-related activity … Total … 3630 … A.01c: Number and percentage change of persons, not linked to supporting Palestine Action, arrested for terrorism-related activity … Total … 237”Hide quote

    A.01b: Number and percentage change of persons, linked to supporting Palestine Action, arrested for terrorism-related activity … Total … 3630 … A.01c: Number and percentage change of persons, not linked to supporting Palestine Action, arrested for terrorism-related activity … Total … 237

69. Hate crime, England and Wales, 2025 to 2026: appendix tables (table 6)

    Home Office, 2026-10-08 · supports

    “Appendix Table 6: Number of racially or religiously aggravated offences recorded by the police, by month, England and Wales, April 2015 to March 2026 … August … 10158”Hide quote

    Appendix Table 6: Number of racially or religiously aggravated offences recorded by the police, by month, England and Wales, April 2015 to March 2026 … August … 10158

Integration Outcomes in the UK

1. International migration, England and Wales: Census 2021

   Office for National Statistics, 2022-11-02 · supports

   “Out of the 59.6 million usual residents in England and Wales in 2021, 49.6 million (83.2%) were born in the UK and 10.0 million (16.8%) were born outside the UK. This means that about one in six people in England and Wales were born outside the UK. The size of the non-UK born population has risen since 2011, when it was 7.5 million (13.4%).”Hide quote

   Out of the 59.6 million usual residents in England and Wales in 2021, 49.6 million (83.2%) were born in the UK and 10.0 million (16.8%) were born outside the UK. This means that about one in six people in England and Wales were born outside the UK. The size of the non-UK born population has risen since 2011, when it was 7.5 million (13.4%).

2. 2011 Census analysis: Immigration Patterns of Non-UK Born Populations in England and Wales in 2011

   Office for National Statistics, 2013-12-17 · supports

   “Migration is an important driver of population change, currently accounting for around half of the population growth in England and Wales (natural change, that is the difference between births and deaths, accounting for the remainder). This is reflected in the increase in the proportion of the usually resident population1 born abroad2 from 4.3 per cent (1.9 million) recorded in the 1951 Census to 13 per cent (7.5 million) in the 2011 Census (see figure 1). While the total resident population of England and Wales increased by 28 per cent (from 43.7 million to 56.1 million) between 1951 and 2011, the non-UK born population3 almost quadrupled. There was a particularly marked increase in the latest inter-censal period, from 8.9 per cent (4.6 million)4 in 2001.”Hide quote

   Migration is an important driver of population change, currently accounting for around half of the population growth in England and Wales (natural change, that is the difference between births and deaths, accounting for the remainder). This is reflected in the increase in the proportion of the usually resident population1 born abroad2 from 4.3 per cent (1.9 million) recorded in the 1951 Census to 13 per cent (7.5 million) in the 2011 Census (see figure 1). While the total resident population of England and Wales increased by 28 per cent (from 43.7 million to 56.1 million) between 1951 and 2011, the non-UK born population3 almost quadrupled. There was a particularly marked increase in the latest inter-censal period, from 8.9 per cent (4.6 million)4 in 2001.

3. International migration, England and Wales: Census 2021

   Office for National Statistics, 2022-11-02 · complicates

   “Those who listed Romania as their country of birth increased to 539,000 in 2021, from 80,000 in 2011, an increase between censuses of 459,000 (576%), making Romania the fourth most common non-UK country of birth. This increase was the highest out of any country and is driven by working restrictions for Romanian citizens being lifted in 2014.”Hide quote

   Those who listed Romania as their country of birth increased to 539,000 in 2021, from 80,000 in 2011, an increase between censuses of 459,000 (576%), making Romania the fourth most common non-UK country of birth. This increase was the highest out of any country and is driven by working restrictions for Romanian citizens being lifted in 2014.

4. TS004 - Country of birth (Census 2021), local authority districts

   Office for National Statistics (Nomis), 2022-11-02 · supports

   “This dataset provides Census 2021 estimates that classify usual residents in England and Wales by their country of birth. The estimates are as at Census Day, 21 March 2021.”Hide quote

   This dataset provides Census 2021 estimates that classify usual residents in England and Wales by their country of birth. The estimates are as at Census Day, 21 March 2021.

5. QS203EW - Country of birth (detailed) (2011 Census), local authority districts

   Office for National Statistics (Nomis), 2013-01-30 · supports

   “This dataset provides 2011 estimates that classify usual residents in England and Wales by country of birth. The estimates are as at census day, 27 March 2011.”Hide quote

   This dataset provides 2011 estimates that classify usual residents in England and Wales by country of birth. The estimates are as at census day, 27 March 2011.

6. Analysis of social characteristics of international migrants living in England and Wales: Census 2021

   Office for National Statistics, 2023-09-18 · supports

   “A high proportion of migrants had English as a main language or speak it well or very well; this can be seen by most recent year of arrival in Figure 9. Arrivals between 2011 and 2021 contained the highest percentage of residents who reported not speaking English well (11%) compared with 4% of arrivals before 1971 who reported not speaking English well.”Hide quote

   A high proportion of migrants had English as a main language or speak it well or very well; this can be seen by most recent year of arrival in Figure 9. Arrivals between 2011 and 2021 contained the highest percentage of residents who reported not speaking English well (11%) compared with 4% of arrivals before 1971 who reported not speaking English well.

7. Analysis of social characteristics of international migrants living in England and Wales: Census 2021

   Office for National Statistics, 2023-09-18 · supports

   “As of Census 2021, the residents who arrived earliest were more likely to have English as a main language, with 84% of arrivals before 1971 reporting this compared with 37% of arrivals between 2011 and 2021. Recent arrivals tended to speak English well or very well, with 50% of arrivals between 2011 and 2021 reporting this. As of Census 2021, a very small proportion of non-UK-born residents reported not speaking English at all, around 1 to 2% in each arrival group.”Hide quote

   As of Census 2021, the residents who arrived earliest were more likely to have English as a main language, with 84% of arrivals before 1971 reporting this compared with 37% of arrivals between 2011 and 2021. Recent arrivals tended to speak English well or very well, with 50% of arrivals between 2011 and 2021 reporting this. As of Census 2021, a very small proportion of non-UK-born residents reported not speaking English at all, around 1 to 2% in each arrival group.

8. Analysis of social characteristics of international migrants living in England and Wales: Census 2021

   Office for National Statistics, 2023-09-18 · supports

   “For both EU-born and non-EU-born residents, those who arrived in the UK earlier were more likely to describe their national identity as being one from the UK only (Figure 18). For example, 94% of non-EU-born residents who arrived before 1951 reported an identity from the UK only, compared with 81% for arrivals between 1981 and 1990, and 20% who arrived between 2011 and 2021.”Hide quote

   For both EU-born and non-EU-born residents, those who arrived in the UK earlier were more likely to describe their national identity as being one from the UK only (Figure 18). For example, 94% of non-EU-born residents who arrived before 1951 reported an identity from the UK only, compared with 81% for arrivals between 1981 and 1990, and 20% who arrived between 2011 and 2021.

9. Language, England and Wales: Census 2021

   Office for National Statistics, 2022-11-29 · supports

   “In 2021, a further 7.1% (4.1 million) of the overall population were proficient in English, so they spoke English either "well" or "very well" (English or Welsh in Wales), but did not speak it as their main language. Additionally, 1.5% (880,000) could not speak English well, and a small percentage (0.3%, 161,000) of the overall population could not speak English at all.”Hide quote

   In 2021, a further 7.1% (4.1 million) of the overall population were proficient in English, so they spoke English either "well" or "very well" (English or Welsh in Wales), but did not speak it as their main language. Additionally, 1.5% (880,000) could not speak English well, and a small percentage (0.3%, 161,000) of the overall population could not speak English at all.

10. Figure 9 data: English proficiency of non-UK-born residents by year of arrival

    Office for National Statistics, 2023-09-18 · supports

    “English proficiency of non-UK-born residents by year of arrival, usual residents, 2021, England and Wales”Hide quote

    English proficiency of non-UK-born residents by year of arrival, usual residents, 2021, England and Wales

11. Employment (Ethnicity facts and figures)

    Department for Work and Pensions (Ethnicity facts and figures), 2023-11-28 · supports

    “from 2004 to 2022, the biggest increases in employment rates were in the combined Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnic group (from 44% to 61%), and the ‘other’ ethnic group (from 55% to 68%)”Hide quote

    from 2004 to 2022, the biggest increases in employment rates were in the combined Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnic group (from 44% to 61%), and the ‘other’ ethnic group (from 55% to 68%)

12. Employment (Ethnicity facts and figures)

    Department for Work and Pensions (Ethnicity facts and figures), 2023-11-28 · supports

    “61% of people from the combined Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnic group were employed – the lowest percentage out of all ethnic groups”Hide quote

    61% of people from the combined Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnic group were employed – the lowest percentage out of all ethnic groups

13. Employment (Ethnicity facts and figures)

    Department for Work and Pensions (Ethnicity facts and figures), 2023-11-28 · complicates

    “The report cites cultural religious reasons for the differences between men and women in employment rates in the combined Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnic group – 75% for men compared, with 46% for women in 2022.”Hide quote

    The report cites cultural religious reasons for the differences between men and women in employment rates in the combined Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnic group – 75% for men compared, with 46% for women in 2022.

14. Religion by housing, health, employment, and education, England and Wales: Census 2021

    Office for National Statistics, 2023-03-24 · supports

    “In 2021, people who identified as "Muslim" had the lowest percentage of people aged 16 to 64 years in employment (51.4% compared with 70.9% of the overall population); this resulted from the high percentages of people who were students or looking after home or family in this group. [...] For example, people who said they were "Muslim" had the youngest age profile (median age 27 years) and the highest percentage of overcrowding. [...] It is possible that some people on furlough may have identified as economically inactive, instead of temporarily away from work.”Hide quote

    In 2021, people who identified as "Muslim" had the lowest percentage of people aged 16 to 64 years in employment (51.4% compared with 70.9% of the overall population); this resulted from the high percentages of people who were students or looking after home or family in this group. [...] For example, people who said they were "Muslim" had the youngest age profile (median age 27 years) and the highest percentage of overcrowding. [...] It is possible that some people on furlough may have identified as economically inactive, instead of temporarily away from work.

15. Religion by housing, health, employment, and education, England and Wales: Census 2021

    Office for National Statistics, 2023-03-24 · supports

    “Females were more likely than males to be looking after home or family among the overall population (9.7% and 1.9%, respectively). This difference was consistent across religious groups but was largest among people who identified as "Muslim" (28.7% females and 3.9% males).”Hide quote

    Females were more likely than males to be looking after home or family among the overall population (9.7% and 1.9%, respectively). This difference was consistent across religious groups but was largest among people who identified as "Muslim" (28.7% females and 3.9% males).

16. Religion by housing, health, employment, and education, England and Wales: Census 2021

    Office for National Statistics, 2023-03-24 · complicates

    “Among people who identified as "Muslim", 25.3% had no qualifications, 7.1 percentage points higher than the overall population (18.2%). A similar percentage of this group had a "Level 4 or above" qualification (32.3%) to the overall population (33.8%).”Hide quote

    Among people who identified as "Muslim", 25.3% had no qualifications, 7.1 percentage points higher than the overall population (18.2%). A similar percentage of this group had a "Level 4 or above" qualification (32.3%) to the overall population (33.8%).

17. Figure 8 data: Religion by economic activity, England and Wales, 2021

    Office for National Statistics, 2023-03-24 · supports

    “Religion by economic activity, England and Wales, 2021. 1. Percentages have been calculated out of the overall population of each religious group for those aged 16 to 64 years using rounded data, as such totals may not add to 100%.”Hide quote

    Religion by economic activity, England and Wales, 2021. 1. Percentages have been calculated out of the overall population of each religious group for those aged 16 to 64 years using rounded data, as such totals may not add to 100%.

18. Employment (Ethnicity facts and figures): by ethnicity and gender

    Department for Work and Pensions (Ethnicity facts and figures), 2023-11-28 · supports

    “Percentages are worked out using the total working age population (people aged 16 to 64 years).”Hide quote

    Percentages are worked out using the total working age population (people aged 16 to 64 years).

19. Økonomisk Analyse: Indvandreres nettobidrag til de offentlige finanser i 2019

    Finansministeriet (Danish Ministry of Finance), 2023-05 · supports

    “Når man ser på gruppens nettobidrag til offentlige finanser i 2019, var gruppen forbundet med en offentlig nettoudgift på ca. 16 mia. kr., svarende til en gennemsnitlig nettoudgift på ca. 21.000 kr. pr. person.”Hide quote

    Når man ser på gruppens nettobidrag til offentlige finanser i 2019, var gruppen forbundet med en offentlig nettoudgift på ca. 16 mia. kr., svarende til en gennemsnitlig nettoudgift på ca. 21.000 kr. pr. person.

20. Økonomisk Analyse: Indvandreres nettobidrag til de offentlige finanser i 2019

    Finansministeriet (Danish Ministry of Finance), 2023-05 · supports

    “Tabel 2.1 Nettobidrag til de offentlige finanser efter herkomst, 2019. Gennemsnitlig nettobidrag (1.000 kr. pr. person): Dansk oprindelse 22; Alle indvandrere 5; - Heraf vestlige lande 52; - Heraf MENAPT-lande -79; - Heraf øvrige ikke-vestlige lande 11; Alle efterkommere -102”Hide quote

    Tabel 2.1 Nettobidrag til de offentlige finanser efter herkomst, 2019. Gennemsnitlig nettobidrag (1.000 kr. pr. person): Dansk oprindelse 22; Alle indvandrere 5; - Heraf vestlige lande 52; - Heraf MENAPT-lande -79; - Heraf øvrige ikke-vestlige lande 11; Alle efterkommere -102

21. Økonomisk Analyse: Indvandreres nettobidrag til de offentlige finanser i 2019

    Finansministeriet (Danish Ministry of Finance), 2023-05 · complicates

    “Indvandrere med asyl som opholdsgrundlag var i gennemsnit forbundet med en nettoudgift på ca. 95.000 kr. pr. person i 2019, mens personer med fx erhverv som opholdsgrundlag i gennemsnit var forbundet med et positivt nettobidrag på ca. 120.000 kr. pr. person, jf. figur 2.9. Det er samtidig særligt indvandrere fra MENAPT- og øvrige ikke-vestlige lande, der er kommet til Danmark med asyl eller familiesammenføring som opholdsgrundlag, hvorimod vestlige indvandrere altovervejende er kommet til landet for at arbejde eller studere, jf. figur 2.10.”Hide quote

    Indvandrere med asyl som opholdsgrundlag var i gennemsnit forbundet med en nettoudgift på ca. 95.000 kr. pr. person i 2019, mens personer med fx erhverv som opholdsgrundlag i gennemsnit var forbundet med et positivt nettobidrag på ca. 120.000 kr. pr. person, jf. figur 2.9. Det er samtidig særligt indvandrere fra MENAPT- og øvrige ikke-vestlige lande, der er kommet til Danmark med asyl eller familiesammenføring som opholdsgrundlag, hvorimod vestlige indvandrere altovervejende er kommet til landet for at arbejde eller studere, jf. figur 2.10.

22. Økonomisk Analyse: Indvandreres nettobidrag til de offentlige finanser i 2019

    Finansministeriet (Danish Ministry of Finance), 2023-05 · complicates

    “Beregningerne viser, at det gennemsnitlige nettobidrag for indvandrere fra MENAPT-lande i 2019 ville være ca. 55.000 kr. højere pr. person i det hypotetiske scenarie med samme fordeling efter opholdsgrundlag som vestlige indvandrere, om end de fortsat ville være forbundet med et negativt nettobidrag i gennemsnit.”Hide quote

    Beregningerne viser, at det gennemsnitlige nettobidrag for indvandrere fra MENAPT-lande i 2019 ville være ca. 55.000 kr. højere pr. person i det hypotetiske scenarie med samme fordeling efter opholdsgrundlag som vestlige indvandrere, om end de fortsat ville være forbundet med et negativt nettobidrag i gennemsnit.

23. Økonomisk Analyse: Indvandreres nettobidrag til de offentlige finanser i 2019

    Finansministeriet (Danish Ministry of Finance), 2023-05 · complicates

    “Opgjort med samme aldersfordeling som personer med dansk oprindelse ville nettobidraget for efterkommere i 2019 i sig selv være ca. 13 mia. kr. højere, mens det ville være ca. 28 mia. kr. lavere for gruppen af indvandrere, jf. kapitel 2 om nettobidraget i 2019.”Hide quote

    Opgjort med samme aldersfordeling som personer med dansk oprindelse ville nettobidraget for efterkommere i 2019 i sig selv være ca. 13 mia. kr. højere, mens det ville være ca. 28 mia. kr. lavere for gruppen af indvandrere, jf. kapitel 2 om nettobidraget i 2019.

24. Økonomisk Analyse: Indvandreres nettobidrag til de offentlige finanser i 2019

    Finansministeriet (Danish Ministry of Finance), 2023-05 · complicates

    “Fra 2014 til 2019 er den gennemsnitlige nettoudgift forbundet med indvandrere fra fx MENAPT-lande faldet med ca. 37.000 kr. pr. person, hvilket blandt andet skal ses i sammenhæng med højere beskæftigelsesfrekvens. Regneeksempler peger på, at en stærkere tilknytning til arbejdsmarkedet kan forklare ca. halvdelen af faldet i den gennemsnitlige nettoudgift forbundet med indvandrere fra ikke-vestlige lande fra 2014 til 2019”Hide quote

    Fra 2014 til 2019 er den gennemsnitlige nettoudgift forbundet med indvandrere fra fx MENAPT-lande faldet med ca. 37.000 kr. pr. person, hvilket blandt andet skal ses i sammenhæng med højere beskæftigelsesfrekvens. Regneeksempler peger på, at en stærkere tilknytning til arbejdsmarkedet kan forklare ca. halvdelen af faldet i den gennemsnitlige nettoudgift forbundet med indvandrere fra ikke-vestlige lande fra 2014 til 2019

25. Økonomisk Analyse: Indvandreres nettobidrag til de offentlige finanser i 2019

    Finansministeriet (Danish Ministry of Finance), 2023-05 · complicates

    “Opgørelsen er i udgangspunktet ikke renset for konjunkturer eller andre midlertidige udsving i skatteprovenu mv. [...] MENAPT-lande omfatter igennem hele analysen følgende lande: Syrien, Kuwait, Libyen, Saudi-Arabien, Libanon, Somalia, Irak, Qatar, Sudan, Bahrain, Djibouti, Jordan, Algeriet, Forenede Arabiske Emirater, Tunesien, Egypten, Marokko, Iran, Yemen, Mauretanien, Oman, Afghanistan, Pakistan og Tyrkiet.”Hide quote

    Opgørelsen er i udgangspunktet ikke renset for konjunkturer eller andre midlertidige udsving i skatteprovenu mv. [...] MENAPT-lande omfatter igennem hele analysen følgende lande: Syrien, Kuwait, Libyen, Saudi-Arabien, Libanon, Somalia, Irak, Qatar, Sudan, Bahrain, Djibouti, Jordan, Algeriet, Forenede Arabiske Emirater, Tunesien, Egypten, Marokko, Iran, Yemen, Mauretanien, Oman, Afghanistan, Pakistan og Tyrkiet.

26. Økonomisk Analyse: Indvandreres nettobidrag til de offentlige finanser i 2019

    Finansministeriet (Danish Ministry of Finance), 2023-05 · complicates

    “Et regneeksempel viser fx, at nettobidraget i 2019 for 25-64-årige indvandrere fra MENAPT-lande ville være ca. 12 mia. kr. højere, hvis gruppen havde samme beskæftigelsesfrekvens som gruppen af 25-64-årige med dansk oprindelse”Hide quote

    Et regneeksempel viser fx, at nettobidraget i 2019 for 25-64-årige indvandrere fra MENAPT-lande ville være ca. 12 mia. kr. højere, hvis gruppen havde samme beskæftigelsesfrekvens som gruppen af 25-64-årige med dansk oprindelse

27. Borderless Welfare State: The Consequences of Immigration for Public Finances (English summary of Grenzeloze verzorgingsstaat)

    Jan van de Beek, Hans Roodenburg, Joop Hartog and Gerrit Kreffer (demo-demo uitgever), 2021-03 · supports

    “Only labour migration generates a positive net contribution of, on average, €125,000 per immigrant. Study migration shows, on average, a negative net contribution of €75,000. Family migration shows, on average, a negative net contribution of about €275,000 per immigrant. Asylum migration shows a negative figure as well, amounting to an average of €475,000 per immigrant.”Hide quote

    Only labour migration generates a positive net contribution of, on average, €125,000 per immigrant. Study migration shows, on average, a negative net contribution of €75,000. Family migration shows, on average, a negative net contribution of about €275,000 per immigrant. Asylum migration shows a negative figure as well, amounting to an average of €475,000 per immigrant.

28. Borderless Welfare State: The Consequences of Immigration for Public Finances (English summary of Grenzeloze verzorgingsstaat)

    Jan van de Beek, Hans Roodenburg, Joop Hartog and Gerrit Kreffer (demo-demo uitgever), 2021-03 · supports

    “There are also considerable differences by region of origin. On average, Western immigrants make a positive contribution of €25,000, while non-western immigrants cost nearly €275,000. Within the categories Western and non-Western there is, however, much variation. [...] Immigration from non-Western regions is usually unfavourable for public finances. This applies especially to the areas of origin Caribbean, West-Asia, Turkey and North, Central and West Africa with net costs around ranging from €200,000 to €400,000 per immigrant, and Morocco, the Horn of Africa and Sudan with net cost of €550,000 to €600.000 per immigrant.”Hide quote

    There are also considerable differences by region of origin. On average, Western immigrants make a positive contribution of €25,000, while non-western immigrants cost nearly €275,000. Within the categories Western and non-Western there is, however, much variation. [...] Immigration from non-Western regions is usually unfavourable for public finances. This applies especially to the areas of origin Caribbean, West-Asia, Turkey and North, Central and West Africa with net costs around ranging from €200,000 to €400,000 per immigrant, and Morocco, the Horn of Africa and Sudan with net cost of €550,000 to €600.000 per immigrant.

29. Borderless Welfare State: The Consequences of Immigration for Public Finances (English summary of Grenzeloze verzorgingsstaat)

    Jan van de Beek, Hans Roodenburg, Joop Hartog and Gerrit Kreffer (demo-demo uitgever), 2021-03 · supports

    “Migrant groups of which the first generation has a considerable negative net contribution, usually continue into a second generation that also has a negative or, at best, approximately budget-neutral contribution. For those groups, the net present value of the net contribution of future generations will not offset the costs for the first generation.”Hide quote

    Migrant groups of which the first generation has a considerable negative net contribution, usually continue into a second generation that also has a negative or, at best, approximately budget-neutral contribution. For those groups, the net present value of the net contribution of future generations will not offset the costs for the first generation.

30. Borderless Welfare State: The Consequences of Immigration for Public Finances (English summary of Grenzeloze verzorgingsstaat)

    Jan van de Beek, Hans Roodenburg, Joop Hartog and Gerrit Kreffer (demo-demo uitgever), 2021-03 · complicates

    “The current report is an update of the Public Sector chapter of the report Immigration and the Dutch Economy (2003) by the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis. Both reports deploy the method of generational accounting to calculate the net contribution – revenues minus expenses – of immigrants to public finances, measured from the moment of their immigration to the time of repatriation or death.”Hide quote

    The current report is an update of the Public Sector chapter of the report Immigration and the Dutch Economy (2003) by the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis. Both reports deploy the method of generational accounting to calculate the net contribution – revenues minus expenses – of immigrants to public finances, measured from the moment of their immigration to the time of repatriation or death.

31. Grenzeloze verzorgingsstaat: de gevolgen van immigratie voor de overheidsfinanciën

    Jan van de Beek, Hans Roodenburg, Joop Hartog and Gerrit Kreffer (demo-demo uitgever), 2021-03 · complicates

    “Dr. Jan van de Beek is zelfstandig onderzoeker, voor dit project gedetacheerd bij Amsterdam School of Economics; dr. Joop Hartog is emeritus hoogleraar economie aan de Faculteit Economie en Bedrijfskunde van de Universiteit van Amsterdam [...] Het onderzoek werd mede mogelijk gemaakt door een subsidie van het Renaissance Instituut. [...] © 2021, Zeist: demo-demo uitgever”Hide quote

    Dr. Jan van de Beek is zelfstandig onderzoeker, voor dit project gedetacheerd bij Amsterdam School of Economics; dr. Joop Hartog is emeritus hoogleraar economie aan de Faculteit Economie en Bedrijfskunde van de Universiteit van Amsterdam [...] Het onderzoek werd mede mogelijk gemaakt door een subsidie van het Renaissance Instituut. [...] © 2021, Zeist: demo-demo uitgever

32. The effects of more immigrants on public finances

    Statistics Norway (SSB), 2014-12-19 · supports

    “This present value of increased net public spending is NOK 4.1 million when expressed in 2012 values. Correspondingly, present values of net spending increases for R1 and R2 immigration are NOK -0.8 and 0.8 million respectively in 2012 values.”Hide quote

    This present value of increased net public spending is NOK 4.1 million when expressed in 2012 values. Correspondingly, present values of net spending increases for R1 and R2 immigration are NOK -0.8 and 0.8 million respectively in 2012 values.

33. The effects of more immigrants on public finances

    Statistics Norway (SSB), 2014-12-19 · complicates

    “In the calculations that are commented on below, the immigrants’ children are assumed to have the same economic behaviour as the non-immigrants. [...] This means that persons of the same age and gender on average use all public services to the same extent regardless of reason for residence or country of origin. This assumption on its own probably entails an underestimation of public spending on refugees.”Hide quote

    In the calculations that are commented on below, the immigrants’ children are assumed to have the same economic behaviour as the non-immigrants. [...] This means that persons of the same age and gender on average use all public services to the same extent regardless of reason for residence or country of origin. This assumption on its own probably entails an underestimation of public spending on refugees.

34. The effects of more immigrants on public finances

    Statistics Norway (SSB), 2014-12-19 · complicates

    “The immigrants are from the country groups: R1 (Western Europe, North America, Australia and New Zealand), R2 (Eastern European EU countries) and R3 (rest of the world). The groups from R1 and R2 include large numbers of labour immigrants and family immigrants. Group R3 is very heterogeneous, partly because it includes most of the refugees.”Hide quote

    The immigrants are from the country groups: R1 (Western Europe, North America, Australia and New Zealand), R2 (Eastern European EU countries) and R3 (rest of the world). The groups from R1 and R2 include large numbers of labour immigrants and family immigrants. Group R3 is very heterogeneous, partly because it includes most of the refugees.

35. GCSE results (Attainment 8) (Ethnicity facts and figures)

    Department for Education (Ethnicity facts and figures), 2024-11-07 · supports

    “pupils from the Chinese ethnic group had the highest average score out of all ethnic groups (65.5), followed by pupils from the Indian ethnic group (59.4) [...] white Gypsy or Roma pupils had had the lowest average score (20.3), followed by traveller of Irish heritage pupils (26.8) and mixed white and black Caribbean pupils (39.1)”Hide quote

    pupils from the Chinese ethnic group had the highest average score out of all ethnic groups (65.5), followed by pupils from the Indian ethnic group (59.4) [...] white Gypsy or Roma pupils had had the lowest average score (20.3), followed by traveller of Irish heritage pupils (26.8) and mixed white and black Caribbean pupils (39.1)

36. GCSE results (Attainment 8) (Ethnicity facts and figures)

    Department for Education (Ethnicity facts and figures), 2024-11-07 · supports

    “A 2024 report from the Education Policy Institute compared white British pupils’ attainment against other ethnic groups across education, from early years foundation stage to 16-19 education. They found that by the end of secondary school, most ethnic groups achieved higher GCSE grades than white British pupils in 2023.”Hide quote

    A 2024 report from the Education Policy Institute compared white British pupils’ attainment against other ethnic groups across education, from early years foundation stage to 16-19 education. They found that by the end of secondary school, most ethnic groups achieved higher GCSE grades than white British pupils in 2023.

37. GCSE results (Attainment 8) (Ethnicity facts and figures)

    Department for Education (Ethnicity facts and figures), 2024-11-07 · supports

    “in every ethnic group, pupils eligible for free school meals had a lower average score than those not eligible”Hide quote

    in every ethnic group, pupils eligible for free school meals had a lower average score than those not eligible

38. Entry rates into higher education (Ethnicity facts and figures)

    Department for Education (Ethnicity facts and figures), 2025-07-09 · supports

    “in 2024, students from the Chinese ethnic group had the highest entry rate into higher education (66.1%) and White students had the lowest (29.8%)”Hide quote

    in 2024, students from the Chinese ethnic group had the highest entry rate into higher education (66.1%) and White students had the lowest (29.8%)

39. Entry rates into higher education (Ethnicity facts and figures)

    Department for Education (Ethnicity facts and figures), 2025-07-09 · supports

    “Recent research shows that young people from almost all ethnic minority backgrounds were more likely to go to university by age 19 than White British pupils. This was the case even when accounting for prior attainment or socio-economic background.”Hide quote

    Recent research shows that young people from almost all ethnic minority backgrounds were more likely to go to university by age 19 than White British pupils. This was the case even when accounting for prior attainment or socio-economic background.

40. Entry rates into higher education (Ethnicity facts and figures)

    Department for Education (Ethnicity facts and figures), 2025-07-09 · complicates

    “The data includes students from state schools in England – those funded directly by the government or their local authority. It only counts students who applied to full time undergraduate courses through UCAS (the Universities and Colleges Admissions Service).”Hide quote

    The data includes students from state schools in England – those funded directly by the government or their local authority. It only counts students who applied to full time undergraduate courses through UCAS (the Universities and Colleges Admissions Service).

41. Ethnic diversification and neighbourhood mixing: A rapid response analysis of the 2021 Census of England and Wales

    Catney, Lloyd, Ellis, Wright, Finney, Jivraj and Manley, The Geographical Journal 189(1), 2023 · supports

    “Looking across all four time points, we see steady declines in segregation for all ethnic groups: White and minority. The largest proportional decline in residential segregation between 1991 and 2021 was for the Black African group, with a decrease of 0.17. The Bangladeshi, Black Caribbean and Indian ethnic groups also experienced large decreases in neighbourhood residential segregation between 1991 and 2021.”Hide quote

    Looking across all four time points, we see steady declines in segregation for all ethnic groups: White and minority. The largest proportional decline in residential segregation between 1991 and 2021 was for the Black African group, with a decrease of 0.17. The Bangladeshi, Black Caribbean and Indian ethnic groups also experienced large decreases in neighbourhood residential segregation between 1991 and 2021.

42. Ethnic diversification and neighbourhood mixing: A rapid response analysis of the 2021 Census of England and Wales

    Catney, Lloyd, Ellis, Wright, Finney, Jivraj and Manley, The Geographical Journal 189(1), 2023 · complicates

    “The Index of Dissimilarity (D), which captures the evenness of the spatial distribution of two groups, is one of the most commonly used measures of segregation (Massey & Denton, 1988). Here, each named group is compared with all others (for example, people in the Pakistani ethnic group compared with all people other than Pakistani).”Hide quote

    The Index of Dissimilarity (D), which captures the evenness of the spatial distribution of two groups, is one of the most commonly used measures of segregation (Massey & Denton, 1988). Here, each named group is compared with all others (for example, people in the Pakistani ethnic group compared with all people other than Pakistani).

43. Ethnic diversification and neighbourhood mixing: A rapid response analysis of the 2021 Census of England and Wales

    Catney, Lloyd, Ellis, Wright, Finney, Jivraj and Manley, The Geographical Journal 189(1), 2023 · supports

    “White British segregation (not shown) remained the same between 2001 and 2011 (0.55), and decreased between 2011 and 2021 (to 0.53).”Hide quote

    White British segregation (not shown) remained the same between 2001 and 2011 (0.55), and decreased between 2011 and 2021 (to 0.53).

44. Segregation in education (SchoolDash blog, March 2017), analysis for the iCoCo Foundation, SchoolDash and The Challenge study Understanding School Segregation in England 2011 to 2016

    SchoolDash, 2017-03-22 · complicates

    “A school is deemed 'segregated' if the proportion of White British pupils is more than 15 percentage points higher or lower than that in other nearby schools.”Hide quote

    A school is deemed 'segregated' if the proportion of White British pupils is more than 15 percentage points higher or lower than that in other nearby schools.

45. Segregation in education (SchoolDash blog, March 2017), analysis for the iCoCo Foundation, SchoolDash and The Challenge study Understanding School Segregation in England 2011 to 2016

    SchoolDash, 2017-03-22 · complicates

    “Perhaps unsurprisingly, the highest levels of ethnic segregation are seen in non-Christian faith schools (which include Jewish, Muslim, Hindu, Sikh and Buddhist establishments). Though their numbers are small, fully 84% of primary schools and 93% of secondary schools in this group show ethnic segregation relative to their local areas.”Hide quote

    Perhaps unsurprisingly, the highest levels of ethnic segregation are seen in non-Christian faith schools (which include Jewish, Muslim, Hindu, Sikh and Buddhist establishments). Though their numbers are small, fully 84% of primary schools and 93% of secondary schools in this group show ethnic segregation relative to their local areas.

46. Community Life Survey 2024/25: headline findings

    Department for Culture, Media and Sport, 2026-07-31 · complicates

    “40% of adults agreed that many of the people in their neighbourhood can be trusted, no significant change from 2023/24 (41%). Levels of trust have remained broadly consistent since 2016/17 (40% to 42%) but have decreased from rates in 2013/14 (48%) when push-to-web data collection commenced.”Hide quote

    40% of adults agreed that many of the people in their neighbourhood can be trusted, no significant change from 2023/24 (41%). Levels of trust have remained broadly consistent since 2016/17 (40% to 42%) but have decreased from rates in 2013/14 (48%) when push-to-web data collection commenced.

47. Community Life Survey 2024/25: headline findings

    Department for Culture, Media and Sport, 2026-07-31 · supports

    “81% of adults agreed that their local area is a place where people from different backgrounds get along well together, a small, but significant, decrease from 2023/24 (from 81.4% in 2023/24 to 80.6% in 2024/25).”Hide quote

    81% of adults agreed that their local area is a place where people from different backgrounds get along well together, a small, but significant, decrease from 2023/24 (from 81.4% in 2023/24 to 80.6% in 2024/25).

48. Community Life Survey 2024/25: neighbourhood and community

    Department for Culture, Media and Sport, 2026-07-31 · complicates

    “Adults living in the least deprived areas (10th decile, 63%) were more likely to report that many people in their neighbourhood can be trusted than adults living in the most deprived areas (1st decile, 18%).”Hide quote

    Adults living in the least deprived areas (10th decile, 63%) were more likely to report that many people in their neighbourhood can be trusted than adults living in the most deprived areas (1st decile, 18%).

49. Community Life Survey 2024/25: neighbourhood and community

    Department for Culture, Media and Sport, 2026-07-31 · complicates

    “Compared with the average for adults in England (40%), Jewish (52%) and Christian (45%) adults were more likely to report that many people in their neighbourhood can be trusted. Adults from the No religion classification (39%), adults from the Any other religion classification (34%), and Buddhist (33%), Hindu (31%), Muslim (25%), and Sikh (24%) adults were less likely to report that many of the people in their neighbourhood can be trusted compared with the average for adults in England (40%).”Hide quote

    Compared with the average for adults in England (40%), Jewish (52%) and Christian (45%) adults were more likely to report that many people in their neighbourhood can be trusted. Adults from the No religion classification (39%), adults from the Any other religion classification (34%), and Buddhist (33%), Hindu (31%), Muslim (25%), and Sikh (24%) adults were less likely to report that many of the people in their neighbourhood can be trusted compared with the average for adults in England (40%).

50. Immigration, diversity and social cohesion

    The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2019-12-13 · supports

    “Most of the empirical literature on this subject finds that the relationship between diversity and trust is negative – the more diverse a community is, the less likely individuals in it are to be trusting.”Hide quote

    Most of the empirical literature on this subject finds that the relationship between diversity and trust is negative – the more diverse a community is, the less likely individuals in it are to be trusting.

51. Immigration, diversity and social cohesion

    The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2019-12-13 · complicates

    “Laurence and Heath (2008) and Letki (2008), looking at different predictors of social cohesion in the 2005 and 2001 Citizenship Surveys, argue that there is no strong evidence for an eroding effect of diversity once the association between diversity and economic deprivation is taken into account. Still, with British data based on the Citizenship Survey 2005, Laurence (2009) argued that rising diversity is associated with lower levels of neighbourhood trust.”Hide quote

    Laurence and Heath (2008) and Letki (2008), looking at different predictors of social cohesion in the 2005 and 2001 Citizenship Surveys, argue that there is no strong evidence for an eroding effect of diversity once the association between diversity and economic deprivation is taken into account. Still, with British data based on the Citizenship Survey 2005, Laurence (2009) argued that rising diversity is associated with lower levels of neighbourhood trust.

52. Immigration, diversity and social cohesion

    The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2019-12-13 · complicates

    “Most recently, Sturgis et al. (2013) establish that neighbourhood ethnic diversity in London is positively related to the perceived social cohesion of neighbourhood residents with control for economic deprivation. Moreover, it is ethnic segregation within neighbourhoods that is associated with lower levels of perceived social cohesion.”Hide quote

    Most recently, Sturgis et al. (2013) establish that neighbourhood ethnic diversity in London is positively related to the perceived social cohesion of neighbourhood residents with control for economic deprivation. Moreover, it is ethnic segregation within neighbourhoods that is associated with lower levels of perceived social cohesion.

53. Immigration, diversity and social cohesion

    The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford, 2019-12-13 · complicates

    “However, most research analyses the relationship between diversity (typically measured in terms of racial and ethnic composition of the population) and social cohesion, not between immigration (typically measured based on place of birth and/or nationality) and social cohesion.”Hide quote

    However, most research analyses the relationship between diversity (typically measured in terms of racial and ethnic composition of the population) and social cohesion, not between immigration (typically measured based on place of birth and/or nationality) and social cohesion.

54. C4 survey and documentary reveals What British Muslims Really Think

    Channel 4, 2016-04-11 · complicates

    “ICM Unlimited interviewed a random sample of 1,081 adults aged 18+ who self-identified themselves as belonging to the Muslim faith. Interviews were carried out face-to-face, in-home, in geographical areas in which minimum Muslims incidence was confirmed by Census to be a minimum of 20%. Interviews took place between 25th April and 31st May 2015 and the data has been weighted to representative of all Muslims by age, gender, work status and region. A nationally representative control sample of 1,008 adults aged 18+ was also conducted, by telephone, between 5th-7th June 2015.”Hide quote

    ICM Unlimited interviewed a random sample of 1,081 adults aged 18+ who self-identified themselves as belonging to the Muslim faith. Interviews were carried out face-to-face, in-home, in geographical areas in which minimum Muslims incidence was confirmed by Census to be a minimum of 20%. Interviews took place between 25th April and 31st May 2015 and the data has been weighted to representative of all Muslims by age, gender, work status and region. A nationally representative control sample of 1,008 adults aged 18+ was also conducted, by telephone, between 5th-7th June 2015.

55. C4 survey and documentary reveals What British Muslims Really Think

    Channel 4, 2016-04-11 · supports

    “52% do not believe that homosexuality should be legal in Britain Q: To what extent you agree or disagree with each one: homosexuality should be legal in Britain? Net agree 18% (strongly agree 8%, tend to agree 10%) Net disagree: 52% (strongly disagree: 38%, tend to disagree: 14%)”Hide quote

    52% do not believe that homosexuality should be legal in Britain Q: To what extent you agree or disagree with each one: homosexuality should be legal in Britain? Net agree 18% (strongly agree 8%, tend to agree 10%) Net disagree: 52% (strongly disagree: 38%, tend to disagree: 14%)

56. C4 survey and documentary reveals What British Muslims Really Think

    Channel 4, 2016-04-11 · supports

    “39% agree that “wives should always obey their husbands”.”Hide quote

    39% agree that “wives should always obey their husbands”.

57. C4 survey and documentary reveals What British Muslims Really Think

    Channel 4, 2016-04-11 · complicates

    “A large majority of British Muslims feel a strong sense of belonging to Britain (86%). This is higher than the national average (83%)”Hide quote

    A large majority of British Muslims feel a strong sense of belonging to Britain (86%). This is higher than the national average (83%)

58. British Muslims poll: methodology and summary of findings (J.L. Partners for the Henry Jackson Society)

    Henry Jackson Society, 2024-04 · complicates

    “J.L. Partners polled two audiences in conjunction with Number Cruncher: a nationally representative sample of British Muslims and a nationally representative sample of the general public. Fieldwork dates of 14th February – 12th March 2024 for British Muslims, 4th – 6th March 2024 for General Public [...] Sample of 1,000 for British Muslims, 2,013 for General Public [...] Sample collected using online panel”Hide quote

    J.L. Partners polled two audiences in conjunction with Number Cruncher: a nationally representative sample of British Muslims and a nationally representative sample of the general public. Fieldwork dates of 14th February – 12th March 2024 for British Muslims, 4th – 6th March 2024 for General Public [...] Sample of 1,000 for British Muslims, 2,013 for General Public [...] Sample collected using online panel

59. British Muslims poll: methodology and summary of findings (J.L. Partners for the Henry Jackson Society)

    Henry Jackson Society, 2024-04 · supports

    “Only 28% say it would be undesirable to outlaw homosexuality in the UK (compared to 62% of the public as a whole)”Hide quote

    Only 28% say it would be undesirable to outlaw homosexuality in the UK (compared to 62% of the public as a whole)

60. British Muslim youth and religious fundamentalism: a quantitative investigation (accepted manuscript)

    Kashyap and Lewis, Ethnic and Racial Studies 36(12), 2012-04-26 · complicates

    “From the 2001 Census, Super Output Areas (OAs) containing 10% or more Muslim residents were identified. Overall, the sampled areas contain 67.5% of the Muslim population of Great Britain as reported in the 2001 Census. Between January and May 2009, face-to-face interviews were conducted. [...] A total of 480 interviews were completed. The survey had an overall high rate of non-response at 79 percent.”Hide quote

    From the 2001 Census, Super Output Areas (OAs) containing 10% or more Muslim residents were identified. Overall, the sampled areas contain 67.5% of the Muslim population of Great Britain as reported in the 2001 Census. Between January and May 2009, face-to-face interviews were conducted. [...] A total of 480 interviews were completed. The survey had an overall high rate of non-response at 79 percent.

61. British Muslim youth and religious fundamentalism: a quantitative investigation (accepted manuscript)

    Kashyap and Lewis, Ethnic and Racial Studies 36(12), 2012-04-26 · complicates

    “Like other youth, Muslim youth show liberalizing social attitudes across generations on gay marriage and legal abortion.”Hide quote

    Like other youth, Muslim youth show liberalizing social attitudes across generations on gay marriage and legal abortion.

62. British Muslim youth and religious fundamentalism: a quantitative investigation (accepted manuscript)

    Kashyap and Lewis, Ethnic and Racial Studies 36(12), 2012-04-26 · supports

    “Notably, Muslim youth are the most conservative when it comes to the morality of homosexuality, falling even slightly more conservative than their elders. However, when it comes to the public policy question of gay marriage, a majority (74 percent) support legalizing either same-sex marriage or same-sex civil unions.”Hide quote

    Notably, Muslim youth are the most conservative when it comes to the morality of homosexuality, falling even slightly more conservative than their elders. However, when it comes to the public policy question of gay marriage, a majority (74 percent) support legalizing either same-sex marriage or same-sex civil unions.

63. 2011 Census analysis: Immigration Patterns of Non-UK Born Populations in England and Wales in 2011

    Office for National Statistics, 2013-12-17 · supports

    “This is reflected in the increase in the proportion of the usually resident population1 born abroad2 from 4.3 per cent (1.9 million) recorded in the 1951 Census to 13 per cent (7.5 million) in the 2011 Census (see figure 1). [...] There was a particularly marked increase in the latest inter-censal period, from 8.9 per cent (4.6 million)4 in 2001.”Hide quote

    This is reflected in the increase in the proportion of the usually resident population1 born abroad2 from 4.3 per cent (1.9 million) recorded in the 1951 Census to 13 per cent (7.5 million) in the 2011 Census (see figure 1). [...] There was a particularly marked increase in the latest inter-censal period, from 8.9 per cent (4.6 million)4 in 2001.

64. International migration, England and Wales: Census 2021

    Office for National Statistics, 2022-11-02 · supports

    “One in six usual residents of England and Wales were born outside the UK, an increase of 2.5 million since 2011, from 7.5 million (13.4%) to 10 million (16.8%).”Hide quote

    One in six usual residents of England and Wales were born outside the UK, an increase of 2.5 million since 2011, from 7.5 million (13.4%) to 10 million (16.8%).

65. Employment (Ethnicity facts and figures): by ethnicity over time

    Department for Work and Pensions (Ethnicity facts and figures), 2023-11-28 · supports

    “Percentage of 16 to 64 year olds who were employed, by ethnicity over time”Hide quote

    Percentage of 16 to 64 year olds who were employed, by ethnicity over time

66. Økonomisk Analyse: Indvandreres nettobidrag til de offentlige finanser i 2019

    Finansministeriet (Danish Ministry of Finance), 2023-05 · supports

    “Tabel 3.2 Nettobidrag til de offentlige finanser opdelt på herkomst, 2014-2019 [...] Gennemsnit, 1.000 kr. pr. person (2019-niveau) [...] Anm.: Tallene er opregnet til 2019-niveau med udviklingen i nominelt BNP.”Hide quote

    Tabel 3.2 Nettobidrag til de offentlige finanser opdelt på herkomst, 2014-2019 [...] Gennemsnit, 1.000 kr. pr. person (2019-niveau) [...] Anm.: Tallene er opregnet til 2019-niveau med udviklingen i nominelt BNP.

67. Entry rates into higher education (Ethnicity facts and figures): by ethnicity over time

    Department for Education (Ethnicity facts and figures), 2025-07-09 · supports

    “Percentages and number of state school pupils aged 18 years who were accepted to higher education in the UK, by ethnicity over time”Hide quote

    Percentages and number of state school pupils aged 18 years who were accepted to higher education in the UK, by ethnicity over time

68. Community Life Survey 2024/25: annual data tables (Timeseries sheet)

    Department for Culture, Media and Sport, 2026-07-31 · supports

    “Time series for headline indicators, people aged 16 and over, England, October 2018 to March 2025”Hide quote

    Time series for headline indicators, people aged 16 and over, England, October 2018 to March 2025