Asylum Deterrence and Protection Policies

Year Number of boats Crew Number of people (excludes crew) 2009 60 141 2726 2010 134 345 6555 2011 69 168 4565 2012 278 392 17 204 2013 300 644 20 587 2014 1 N/A 160 2015 0 0 0 2016 0 0 0

On 17 October 2016, these figures were confirmed in Senate Estimates (a total of 740 people from 29 vessels had been returned to their country of departure since December 2013)

Operation Sovereign Borders (OSB), established by the Abbott Government in 2013, defines ‘turnbacks’ as ‘the safe removal of vessels from Australian waters, with passengers and crew returned to their countries of departure’; and ‘take-backs’ as a transfer (often at sea) of passengers from one sovereign authority to another ‘where Australia works with a country of departure in order to see the safe return of passengers and crew’.

Notes: 2014—arrivals include 2 medical transfers on 31 January and 2 February 2014 from SIEV 879 (this boat was reportedly ‘turned back’ and not counted as an arrival);

During the first phase (13 August 2012–18 July 2013), when offshore processing was implemented with the possibility of (deferred) settlement in Australia for people found to be refugees, more than 24,000 asylum seekers arrived in Australia by boat.

there was no noticeable change in the rate of arrivals, with boats of varying numbers of people (from two to more than 200) continuing to arrive on average several times per week.

During the second phase (19 July–17 September 2013), boats continued to arrive even after Prime Minister Rudd announced the new bar on settlement in Australia. More than 1,500 people on at least 21 boats arrived in the first 16 days of the policy change.

Table 2 Boat arrivals since September 2013 … 2013 25 1107 134 1241 2014 12 157 293 450 2015 9 0 217 217 2016 6 0 51 51 2017 3 0 60 60 2018 2 0 24 24 2019 3 0 33 33

Rather, it is better attributed to changes in Australia’s engagement with vessels at sea (turnbacks and takebacks) under OSB.

As Table 2 shows, the number of boat arrivals dropped dramatically after Australia began maritime interceptions and returned to pre-2007 levels by 2016 (two years after the government stopped transferring people offshore).

During this period, no new asylum seekers arriving in Australia by boat have been sent offshore. Instead, Australia has returned asylum seekers to their places of departure, going to extraordinary lengths to pursue maritime pushbacks despite the availability of offshore processing.

While intercepting and turning back boats became the primary mechanism for deterring irregular maritime migration, offshore processing was retained as part of a ‘broad chain of measures end to end … designed to deter, to disrupt, to prevent’ asylum seekers travelling by boat from obtaining protection in Australia.

the fact is that people-smugglers are looking at the moment at what’s happening on Manus and if they can pitch to people in Indonesia that you can wait on Manus for a couple of years and then come to Australia, I tell you now that the boats will be back in action and we would have the drownings at sea again.

Table 1 Location of people transferred offshore since 2012 (as at 31 January 2021) … In Australia 882 1161 2043 Offshore (Nauru and PNG) 0 263 263 Resettled in a third country 0 921 921 Returned to country of origin (voluntarily or involuntarily) 168 767 935 Deceased 5 13 18 Total 1055 3125 4180

Australia transferred approximately 4,180 people offshore between 2012 and 2014 (see Table 1), almost half of whom had returned to Australia by 2021.

Since its reintroduction in 2012, eighteen people have died offshore (or in Australia, following medical evacuation).

Nevertheless, both sets show that offshore processing costs on average at least A$1 billion per year, and reached upwards of A$1.49 billion in 2017–18.

The consistently high annual expenditure (despite a dramatic reduction in the number of refugees and asylum seekers held on Nauru and PNG between its peak at 2,450 in April 2014, and May 2021 when only 239 people remained there), suggests that there are significant fixed costs involved in keeping the policy on foot regardless of the number of people actually kept offshore.

In practice, however, Australia has violated many of its obligations under international law, as well as the good faith promises it made to the international community through its ratification of core international human rights treaties and the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.

In marked distinction from other liberal democracies, Australia does not have a bill or charter of rights, and most of Australia’s obligations under international human rights and refugee law are not enshrined in federal legislation. As a result, it has not been possible to challenge offshore processing in Australian courts on the basis that the policy violates fundamental rules of international law.

Australia has spent more than $13 billion on offshore detention since 2012, including payments to primary contractors, subcontractors and third parties.

Transfers resumed to Nauru in late 2023 for the first time since 2014, with around 105 people currently held on Nauru.

Total people transferred offshore to a regional processing country (Nauru and PNG) 4,359 … Total resettled in third country 1,547 … Returned or removed to country of origin 978 … Deceased 21

During more than 2 years in which the policy and partnership operated, only four volunteers and no asylum seekers were sent to Rwanda.

The table below shows the total Home Office spend to date on the Migration and Economic Development Partnership (MEDP) and the IMA up until June 2024 - £715 million.

In April 2022, a one-off advance payment of £20 million was made for advance operational costs. This brings the total spent with Rwanda to £290 million.

Payments to the Economic Transformation and Integration Fund (ETIF), which were designed to support economic growth in Rwanda. These are fixed cash payments and were due while the agreement was in force.

Over £220 million in scheduled future payments will not have to be paid due to the partnership ending.

This report does not conclude on value for money, given that this would rest on whether the partnership deters individuals from making illegal journeys to claim asylum in the UK.

The UK will also pay a total of up to £150,874 per individual for processing and operational costs over five years.

The reset in Britain’s asylum offer, inspired by Denmark’s success, will encourage those wishing to build a life in the UK to do so via legal routes and reduce the pull factors driving illegal migration. The first step towards a new, ‘core protection’ system will be introduced through a change to the Immigration Rules later this week. While Denmark was cutting asylum claims to a 40-year low, the UK saw a 13% increase in the year to September 2025. Across the EU, applications fell by 22% over the same period.

Since 2015, Denmark has made refugee status temporary – subject to review every 2 years – introduced restrictions on family reunion and increased the wait for permanent settlement to 8 years, subject to strict integration and employment requirements.

freq,citizen,applicant,sex,unit,age,geo\TIME_PERIOD 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 A,EXT_EU27_2020,FRST,T,PER,TOTAL,DE 21325 27575 41245 45685 64410 109375 172945 441805 722270 198255 161885 142450 102525 148175 217735 329035 229695 113170 A,EXT_EU27_2020,FRST,T,PER,TOTAL,DK 2350 3720 5065 3945 6045 7170 14535 20825 6055 3125 3465 2605 1420 1995 4475 2355 2180 1835 A,EXT_EU27_2020,FRST,T,PER,TOTAL,EU27_2020 : : : : : : 530560 1216860 1166815 620265 564680 628930 415235 535985 873680 1049510 912425 671895 A,EXT_EU27_2020,FRST,T,PER,TOTAL,SE 24275 23605 31785 29630 43835 49230 74980 156115 22335 22190 18635 20770 11765 9015 13180 8945 6755 5080

freq,unit,citizen,sex,age,decision,geo\TIME_PERIOD 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 A,PER,EXT_EU27_2020,T,TOTAL,POS,DK 730 790 1345 1310 1695 2810 5480 9995 7125 2365 1315 1575 420 775 515 990 715 420 A,PER,EXT_EU27_2020,T,TOTAL,POS,EU27_2020 : : : : 83165 99060 157265 293700 662955 428715 207495 206865 212840 202980 312055 358275 387610 325935 A,PER,EXT_EU27_2020,T,TOTAL,TOTAL,DK 1240 1645 3280 3565 4680 6965 8055 12300 10410 6880 2625 3030 1185 1525 985 1570 1485 1170 A,PER,EXT_EU27_2020,T,TOTAL,TOTAL,EU27_2020 : : : : 260310 291800 341035 558590 1075490 933295 556390 546440 528165 531315 639150 677625 753970 833380

In 2025, the UK received around 101,000 asylum applicants, the 5th-highest among the EU+ (the EU-27 plus Switzerland and the three EEA countries: Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway). When adjusted for population size, it received the 12th-highest number of applications: 15 per 10,000 residents.

While proponents of temporary protection regimes argue that stronger incentives to qualify for residency based on labor-market attachment will speed up the labor-market integration, we find no evidence of positive effects on labor-market outcomes.

On the one hand, we find that temporary residents that are subject to a relatively less-inclusive situation have higher incomes and less unemployment. However, at the same time, they are less likely to spend time in education than are those with permanent residency.

Results show that the reform did not accelerate take-up rates of either overall or full-time employment. However, administrative data from the German Central Register of Foreign Nationals reveals that after the reform, permanent residency acquisition rates significantly declined.

Kilström, Larsen and Olme (2018) evaluate the effect of the permanent residency reform in 2002, which raised the required length of stay to receive permanent residency in Denmark from 3 to 7 years and demanded the passing of a language test at a basic level. The authors use a regression discontinuity design to find no significant effects of the reform on the probability of ever being employed or on earnings seven years into residency.

They find that the reform – contrary to its objectives - reduces work hours by 30% in full-time equivalents and has no effect on the share of individuals who pass the required language level test. The authors then split up their sample into high performers and low performers, based on employment and language test outcomes during the first two years after arrival, when both the treated and untreated were not yet affected by the reform. They show that the negative effects on employment are driven by individuals who pre-reform performed badly in terms of employment and language education.

Blomqvist, Thoursie and Tyrefors (2018) utilize a Swedish reform in 2016 to show that receiving temporary as opposed to permanent residency reduces participation in Swedish language courses, but has no effect on employment, education or welfare benefit receipt in the first year since residency.

We find that the strongest pull factor for asylum seekers to a destination is social networks both in terms of previous asylum applicants as well as stock of previous migrants. Our findings also suggest that employment bans are not a strong deterrence for asylum seekers given their modest association to asylum flows.

A one percent increase in cumulative sum of previous asylum applications is associated with 0.66% increase in first time asylum applications, while a one percent reduction in the length of ban is associated with 0.18% increase in first time asylum applications.

We find that exposure to a ban at arrival reduces refugee employment probability in post-ban years by 15%, an impact driven primarily by lower labour market participation. These effects are not mechanical, increase non-linearly in ban length, and last up to 10 years post arrival.

Temporary employment bans for asylum seekers have lasting negative consequences for their economic integration.

Refugees waiting an additional year for their asylum claim decision face a 20% reduction in their subsequent employment rate.

In that context, we urge the Government to review the ban on employment for asylum seekers. There is clear evidence of the harm that this causes, some of which we document in this Report, and little evidence that we are aware of that it provides significant benefits.

The Home Office may grant an asylum applicant permission to work if both (1) their asylum claim has been outstanding for more than 12 months through no fault of the applicant, and (2) the job is on the Immigration Salary List (which includes professional occupations, social care and some skilled trades).

The hon. Gentleman said he thought that people who are waiting on their claim should be given the right to work. I think he knows that would be a huge pull factor and increase rather than decrease the number of channel crossings.

Reducing the waiting period to three months could act as a pull factor—we have had a debate about that; I know some noble Lords will disagree with the use of that phrase—and would place additional strain on a stretched asylum system and divert resources away from those in genuine need of protection.

Under these changes, adults and accompanied children claiming asylum from today will receive a 30-month period of protection, if granted. At a 30-month review, refugees with a continuing need of sanctuary will have their protection renewed, while those whose countries are now deemed safe will be expected to return home.

Under reforms announced last autumn, refugees in the UK will have to wait 20 years for settlement, unless they switch to a legal visa route, as part of the “core protection” model.

Refugees under the reformed system will need to renew their permission to stay or apply for a legal visa route. Family reunion remains paused while new rules are designed that bring financial and integration requirements in line with those expected of British citizens.

Unaccompanied children will continue to receive 5 years’ leave, while the Government considers the appropriate long-term policy for this group.

The November 2025 policy statement outlined plans for a new approach to refugee protection, which is designed to adhere to, but not exceed, the UK’s obligations under international law and encourage refugees to work and contribute.

The bill would replace refugee status and humanitarian protection with a single new category called ‘protection status’.

The bill doesn’t say how much people would have to pay. However, the Home Office has suggested that the amount could be around £10,000.

The Immigration and Asylum Bill was introduced in the Commons on 30 June 2026. Second reading is scheduled for Monday 13 July.

The Bill does not specify how much people would be required to repay, although the government’s accompanying policy announcement said that the average repayment would be around £10,000. People who would be left destitute would be exempt from the repayment requirement. Recognised refugees who are required to repay these costs but do not do so could be prevented from obtaining Indefinite Leave to Remain until the debt has been repaid. As of July 2026, the Bill was progressing through Parliament.

However, our calendar year figures between 2009 and 2014 were compiled from a single source—advice provided to the Parliamentary Library by the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service in 2014. As a result, we can have confidence in the consistency and accuracy of that data.

Table 2 Boat arrivals since September 2013 … 2013 25 1107 134 1241 2014 12 157 293 450 2015 9 0 217 217 2016 6 0 51 51 2017 3 0 60 60 2018 2 0 24 24 2019 3 0 33 33

Since Australia’s offshore detention centres were reopened by the Gillard Government in 2012, successive governments have spent $13.35 billion on offshore detention and processing arrangements. … 2012-13 -- 2,106.4 2,106.4 … 2017-18 713.6 1,482.0 768.3 … 2024-25 604.4 575.2 - 29.2

freq,citizen,applicant,sex,unit,age,geo\TIME_PERIOD 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 A,EXT_EU27_2020,FRST,T,PER,TOTAL,DE 21325 27575 41245 45685 64410 109375 172945 441805 722270 198255 161885 142450 102525 148175 217735 329035 229695 113170 A,EXT_EU27_2020,FRST,T,PER,TOTAL,DK 2350 3720 5065 3945 6045 7170 14535 20825 6055 3125 3465 2605 1420 1995 4475 2355 2180 1835 A,EXT_EU27_2020,FRST,T,PER,TOTAL,EU27_2020 : : : : : : 530560 1216860 1166815 620265 564680 628930 415235 535985 873680 1049510 912425 671895 A,EXT_EU27_2020,FRST,T,PER,TOTAL,SE 24275 23605 31785 29630 43835 49230 74980 156115 22335 22190 18635 20770 11765 9015 13180 8945 6755 5080

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freq,unit,citizen,sex,age,decision,geo\TIME_PERIOD 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 A,PER,EXT_EU27_2020,T,TOTAL,POS,DE 7870 9765 10445 9675 17135 20125 40560 140910 433905 261620 75940 70320 62470 59850 128460 135275 133710 87395 A,PER,EXT_EU27_2020,T,TOTAL,POS,DK 730 790 1345 1310 1695 2810 5480 9995 7125 2365 1315 1575 420 775 515 990 715 420 A,PER,EXT_EU27_2020,T,TOTAL,POS,SE 7840 7095 8510 8805 12400 24020 30650 32360 66585 26510 10820 6905 5450 3900 4845 5250 3320 2185 A,PER,EXT_EU27_2020,T,TOTAL,TOTAL,DE 19245 26760 45300 40280 58605 76165 97275 249285 631090 524195 179115 154175 128590 132680 197540 217430 250255 272700 A,PER,EXT_EU27_2020,T,TOTAL,TOTAL,DK 1240 1645 3280 3565 4680 6965 8055 12300 10410 6880 2625 3030 1185 1525 985 1570 1485 1170 A,PER,EXT_EU27_2020,T,TOTAL,TOTAL,SE 29460 23920 27645 23815 25320 35955 39905 48570 95775 60575 34830 26330 24380 17145 16810 19155 9670 8615